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tests/tls-trust: TLS trust harness for CA distrust responses - #976
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…offline) A self-contained min project (its own minimal.toml, [upstream] pinned to gominimal/pkgs) that checks every TLS client we ship refuses a distrusted CA, using the packages a user's project would get. One directory per incident under incidents/; CVE-2026-111943 (eMudhra) is the first. - live: a handshake per client x host (12 bad, 2 positive), in parallel (--jobs, default 8) under a hard per-probe deadline. Only certificate verification errors count as a refusal. - offline: no network. Each runtime's own verifier (openssl verify, certtool, JDK PKIX, Go x509.Verify), or the files it loads where it has no verify API (python, pip, httpie: union of the stores they trust), validates the captured chains at a pinned instant. node/bun/deno check root-store anchoring. Rows with no honest offline check read N/A (live-only). - Every run has SELFTEST (bundle minus the anchors, must be FIXED) and NEGCONTROL (bundle plus the anchors, must accept every bad target). - Opt-in *-blocklist rows trust the anchors on purpose, so only the client's own blocklist (Go SPKI list, node kBlockedSPKIs, JDK blocked.certs, rustls-webpki) can refuse. - Human table plus --json; exit 0 clean, 1 inconclusive, 2 vulnerable, 3 harness invalid. Validated at the pre-fix pin 24009b6 (every row VULNERABLE, offline cells match live) and at main 0618acc (every row FIXED). Full live run is about 16s, down from 2-3 minutes per task. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The title clearly and concisely identifies the new TLS trust harness and its purpose of testing CA distrust responses, which matches the main pull request change. |
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Actionable comments posted: 8
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @tests/tls-trust/lib/c-clients.sh:
- Line 55: Narrow the `unexpected` alternative in the `live_git` success pattern
so it matches only the intended HTTP-level Git message, not network or handshake
errors; retain the other alternatives and remove the bare-word match.
Review comments at @tests/tls-trust/lib/common.sh:
- Line 18: Update CERT_RE to match only trust-related certificate diagnostics,
removing the broad `x509: ` match that also captures expiry and name errors.
Keep client-specific trust diagnostics so expiry or name-validation failures
classify as ERR, not CERT-FAIL.
Review comments at @tests/tls-trust/lib/controls.sh:
- Line 17: Update the curl invocation in the live-control function in
controls.sh to pass -q as curl’s first argument, before other options, so curl
ignores inherited configuration files.
Review comments at @tests/tls-trust/lib/python.sh:
- Around line 40-42: Update the live_pip certificate-failure check to classify
refusals only when output matches CERT_RE. Remove the broad SSLError match and
its certificate-failure fallback so non-verification TLS errors remain
inconclusive.
Review comments at @tests/tls-trust/run.sh:
- Line 43: Validate that each value-taking option, including --mode, has a
following argument before calling shift 2. On a missing value, exit with status
3; otherwise preserve the existing option parsing behavior.
- Line 119: Update the selection logic that appends rows to SEL so it verifies
at least one selected non-control client row before scheduling probes. Reject an
empty client selection even when SELFTEST and NEGCONTROL are present, while
preserving the existing behavior for selections containing a client.
- Around line 56-57: After validating JOBS and TIMEOUT as positive integers,
normalize both values to canonical decimal before arithmetic, deadline
calculations, or report generation; ensure leading-zero inputs such as 08 work
without octal interpretation and are emitted as valid JSON numbers.
- Line 160: Update the environment-reporting pipeline in run.sh so it prints
only the names of matched variables, not their values, preventing proxy URL
credentials from appearing in task output or retained logs.
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⛔ Files ignored due to path filters: 15
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📒 Files selected for processing: 20
tests/tls-trust/README.mdtests/tls-trust/incidents/cve-2026-111943/chains/README.mdtests/tls-trust/incidents/cve-2026-111943/chains/SHA256SUMStests/tls-trust/incidents/cve-2026-111943/expected.txttests/tls-trust/incidents/cve-2026-111943/positives.txttests/tls-trust/incidents/cve-2026-111943/targets.txttests/tls-trust/lib/Probe.javatests/tls-trust/lib/c-clients.shtests/tls-trust/lib/common.shtests/tls-trust/lib/controls.shtests/tls-trust/lib/go.shtests/tls-trust/lib/httpie.shtests/tls-trust/lib/java.shtests/tls-trust/lib/js.shtests/tls-trust/lib/probe.gotests/tls-trust/lib/probe.mjstests/tls-trust/lib/python.shtests/tls-trust/lib/rust.shtests/tls-trust/minimal.tomltests/tls-trust/run.sh
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- live: expiry and hostname-mismatch certificate errors (NOT_TRUST_RE) now classify as ERR before CERT_RE, so e.g. "x509: certificate has expired" can never read as a refusal. - pip: drop the bare SSLError match (SSLEOFError etc. are not trust decisions); git: drop the bare "unexpected" success match. - curl -q in the client row and the controls, so no inherited .curlrc (CURL_HOME) can change verification. - run.sh: options without a value exit 3 instead of looping; --jobs and --timeout are normalized to decimal; a --rows/--only that selects no client exits 3 instead of passing on the controls alone; proxy URL credentials are redacted in the header. Re-validated: pre-fix pin 24009b6 every row VULNERABLE (exit 2), main 0618acc every row FIXED (exit 0), SELFTEST/NEGCONTROL valid throughout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Early feedback, since you've marked it not ready to merge.
Good:
- There are no private keys or credentials.
chains/holds public certs only, all matchingSHA256SUMS, and proxy userinfo is redacted (run.sh:168). - Every compromised key is in
ca-certificates/distrust.txt. - The
go-blocklistrow would have caught the Go 1.27.3 case offline, and the NEGCONTROL row stops a dead live host from reading as FIXED.
Open questions for when it's ready:
- Placement: AGENTS.md has no convention for a top-level
tests/directory. It would be worth adding one in this PR. - CI: is this a manual playbook first, with the weekly job in Phase 2? If so, who owns its alerts?
- Maintenance:
- six tasks to keep in sync;
- re-pinning
[upstream] locked_commit(it currently tests 0618acc, not the checkout); - re-capturing chains before the leaves expire (the last on 2027-05-03);
- the dependency on
*.we-have-a-problem.com; - the ~3/20 min exit-125 flake on live runs.
Minor:
lib/common.sh:22:CERT_REstill matches anyx509:text.NOT_TRUST_REnow covers expiry and name errors, but other x509 failures would still count as REJECTED.lib/probe.go:90-97: "untrusted" and "no valid chains built" also catch policy/EKU failures. The comment acknowledges it, but a narrower match would make FIXED more trustworthy.
It would be good to run this against #968's head before that merges, as the README describes.
Generated by Claude Code
… maintenance) - Go: decide on the x509 error type. Only UnknownAuthorityError, or NoValidChains with an empty Detail (go1.27.3's distrusted-SPKI drop), is a refusal. EKU, policy, constraint and expiry failures are ERR. CERT_RE no longer matches bare "x509: " or Go's "failed to verify certificate" prefix. NOT_TRUST_RE gains rustls's expiry wording. - run.sh: print the earliest target leaf expiry, warn 60 days ahead (EXPIRY_WARN_DAYS), and add it to the JSON. - README: who runs it and who owns a failure (manual now; weekly run to #pkgmgr-mgr later, pkgmgr-rs#1021), and a Maintenance section. - AGENTS.md: a convention for top-level tests/ directories. - Pin: pkgs main befeac7, the commit this run verified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Thanks @norrietaylor. I addressed everything in 9a2d8fe and merged main first (43109bd). Placement. AGENTS.md now has a short CI and ownership. Yes: Phase 1 is a manual playbook. Whoever drives an incident runs it, and so does any PR that touches a trust store or a TLS client. The weekly scheduled run is Phase 2. Its non-zero exits will post to #pkgmgr-mgr, the channel the pkgmgr runner's failure backstop already posts to, so the pkgsec on-call who watches the nightly runs owns the alerts. It's tracked with the weekly Maintenance. The README has a new "Maintenance" section, one bullet per point:
While there I found the rustls equivalent: "certificate expired" and "certificate not valid yet" weren't in
The "distrust"/"untrusted" string matches are gone. Re-verified offline:
#968's head. I ran the per-PR flow and posted the table on #968. node 26.12.1 and node-lts 24.22.1 are FIXED in every mode. That includes The PR body has the full re-verification table. 🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
A tests/<name>/ directory is a self-contained min project with its own [upstream] pin (AGENTS.md "Tests", #976); mip never evaluates it as a package, so editing it cannot break one. It previously counted as a file outside packages/ and stacks/ and forced the full check. A loose file directly under tests/ is not a project and still runs everything. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
House wording rule: each CA distrust is a response. Moves the profile directory and updates the min task defaults, README playbook, comments and the expected.txt prose header. No behaviour change: run.sh reads only verify_at and blocklist_rows from expected.txt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Second pass at 16cf0b7. The earlier points are addressed: the tests/ convention is in AGENTS.md, ownership and maintenance are in the README, the Go probe now decides on the error type, and the leaf-expiry warning is in. SHA256SUMS verifies, and every captured leaf is valid at verify_at.
I found two places where a refusal can still be counted for a reason other than trust, plus one comment nit. Neither changes the verdicts you recorded, since the baseline differential shows each row flipping. Both would let a future run read FIXED for the wrong reason, which is the failure this harness exists to rule out.
…SSL match (review) - Probe.java: the PKIX builder reduces every failure to "unable to find valid certification path", so REJECTED meant "no path, for any reason" (a disabled algorithm in the chain would read FIXED on java-blocklist). On a builder failure the captured chain now goes through CertPathValidator with the same anchors and date; only NO_TRUST_ANCHOR or blocked.certs' "Untrusted certificate" is REJECTED, the rest ERR, like the Go probe. - common.sh: drop `ssl certificate` from CERT_RE. pip logs that phrase for every requests SSLError (handshake alerts, EOF, resets), so a non-trust failure classified CERT-FAIL; real verification failures still match CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED / certificate verify failed. - java.sh: the blocklist row's anchors are the system bundle plus the profile's anchors, not the only ones. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The harness design holds up: SHA256SUMS verifies at de2348e, the controls are sound (SELFTEST and NEGCONTROL both gate the exit code), and the ### Tests convention in AGENTS.md reads well. The de2348e fixes for Norrie's second pass also look right on reading: Probe.java:81-112 only marks REJECTED on NO_TRUST_ANCHOR or UntrustedChecker's "Untrusted certificate", and off_java's tail -4 still captures the marker line. Two things stop me approving:
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de2348e has never run. Your reply on
Probe.java:67says it wasn't compiled, and every table in the PR body predates it (the latest is "Re-verification after review fixes (9a2d8fe)"). That commit changes how three rows decide:javaandjava-blocklistnow go throughvalidatorVerdict(), andpiploses thessl certificatealternative inCERT_RE(lib/common.sh:31). Please runoffline,offline-altandoffline-jdk27at the pre-fix pin and at main, pluslivefor pip. Check that every java/java-blocklist refusal at main printsvalidator: TRUST ..., notOTHER, then update the body. The fix only counts once a run shows its rows still read FIXED. -
The live
javarow still decides by elimination.Probe.live(lib/Probe.java:36-42) prints the whole cause chain, andCERT_RE(lib/common.sh:31) acceptsPKIX path,CertPathValidatorExceptionandCertificateException. JSSE wraps an algorithm-constraint failure asPKIX path validation failed: ... Algorithm constraints check failed, and a builder failure asPKIX path building failed: ... unable to find valid certification pathwhatever the cause. Both classify CERT-FAIL, and NEGCONTROL runs curl, so it can't catch them. This is the same false FIXED that de2348e fixed offline. Either havelive()walk the causes for aCertPathValidatorExceptionand print a non-trust marker for any reason other thanNO_TRUST_ANCHORor "Untrusted certificate" (and add that marker toNOT_TRUST_RE), or state the limit in the README java row (README.md:120).
The body still says "Do not merge yet". Drop that line when you post the new run.
Probe live prints JSSE's cause chain and CERT_RE accepts any PKIX path / CertPathValidatorException / CertificateException text, so an algorithm-constraint or other builder failure reads CERT-FAIL. A live distrust refusal is itself a builder failure, so the live probe can't separate them without the chain. Say so in the java row; offline, which re-validates the captured chain, is the row's verdict. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@mitodrummer thanks, both points are right.
I also merged main (43cd433). The branch was 273 commits behind, and the merge is clean. |
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Point 2 is settled: the README java row (tests/tls-trust/README.md:120) now says a live java CERT-FAIL only means PKIX refused the chain, and that offline decides the row.
Point 1 is still open, as your reply says. de2348e, and now the 43cd433 merge, has not been run. It needs offline, offline-alt and offline-jdk27 at the pre-fix pin and at main, plus live for pip, with every java/java-blocklist refusal at main printing validator: TRUST …. Then update the body tables and drop "Do not merge yet".
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@mitodrummer point 1 is run. The harness is at this branch's head,
SELFTEST was FIXED and NEGCONTROL was VULNERABLE in all 8 runs, every positive was OK, and nothing hit exit 125.
At the pre-fix pin pip live at main: all 12 refusals are Every pre-fix offline cell matches the earlier pre-fix tables. Main has moved from Not run at this head: The body now has a "Re-verification at 43cd433" section with the per-row tables. The java row in "What offline proves" now describes the validator re-check, and "Do not merge yet" is gone. Full logs ( Summary lines from each runmain offline: result table |
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Point 1 is done. The 43cd433 harness ran offline, offline-alt, offline-jdk27 and live pip at the pre-fix pin (all VULN, exit 2) and at main (all FIXED, exit 0), and all 8 logs are in the gist. The body has the "Re-verification at 43cd433" tables, "Do not merge yet" is gone, and minimal build is green on the head. Approving, with the committed pin left at befeac7 until a full six-task run.
What
This adds
tests/tls-trust/, a harness that checks every TLS client we ship refuses a distrusted CA. It is meant to be rerun for every future CA distrust and once a week as a regression check. The first response it covers is CVE-2026-111943 (eMudhra).It is a self-contained min project. It has its own
minimal.toml, and[upstream]pinsgominimal/pkgs. So the clients come from that commit, the same way a user's project gets them, andmin updatere-pins it to main.Why the tasks are split. node and node-lts both install
usr/bin/node, and jdk-21/25/27 all installusr/lib/jvm. When two of them share a task, one silently wins. So*-altcarries node-lts + jdk-21,*-jdk27carries jdk-27, and the main tasks carry the rest. The same comment is inminimal.toml.Modes
NET-ERR, which makes the row INCONCLUSIVE.verify_at. Where a runtime has no verify API, the harness feeds the files that runtime loads toopenssl verify. Rows that cannot be checked honestly without a handshake readN/A (live-only).--jsongives per-row client, version, mode, proof, verdict and per-host results, plus run metadata (profile, pinned pkgs commit, timestamp, selftest and negcontrol verdicts, runtime).What offline proves, per row
openssl verify, default store; the box's OPENSSLDIR is our package's, printed in the headercerttool --verifywith no CA argument, so gnutls system trust and gnutls's verifierCertPathBuilderover the default JSSE store; appliesblocked.certs. On a builder failure the chain is re-run throughCertPathValidatorwith the same anchors and date: onlyNO_TRUST_ANCHORorblocked.certs' "Untrusted certificate" is REJECTED (printed asvalidator: TRUST …); algorithm, expiry and constraint failures are ERR (de2348e)x509.Verifywith the system pool, which includes Go's distrusted-SPKI list. Decided on the error type: onlyUnknownAuthorityError, orNoValidChainswith an empty detail (the distrusted-SPKI drop), is REJECTED; EKU, policy, constraint and expiry failures are ERRopenssl verify -x509_strict -partial_chainoverssl.get_default_verify_paths(); Python has no verify APItls.getCACertificates('default')list anchor the chain? Links are checked withcheckIssued/verifykBlockedSPKIsand rustls-webpki fire only in a handshake, so these are live-onlyWhat the baseline caught. At the pre-fix pin, every offline cell matches its live cell, for every row that has both. That is how the two models below were found to be wrong and fixed:
ensure_default_certs_loaded()callsload_default_certs()(the system store), and requests then adds certifi on top.Blocklist rows (
go-blocklist,node-blocklist,java-blocklist,uv-blocklist) are opt-in throughblocklist_rowsinexpected.txt. They run with the anchors trusted, so they test the second layer independently of the store. Before the fixes they read VULNERABLE. On main they read FIXED: Go 1.27.3's SPKI list, node'skBlockedSPKIs(#946), the JDK'sblocked.certs(#949), and rustls-webpki 0.103.16 in uv.Validation
All runs were
min task run <task> -C <scratch git copy> --config-dir <empty> --no-inputon remote min boxes (aarch64). Nothing was built locally. Cells read<refused>/<accepted>for emSign · AAA, 6 hosts each. Live uses F/C, offline uses R/A. Every positive was OK in every run.Pre-fix pin
24009b6b. Every row is VULNERABLE in both modes: 0 FIXED, 0 INCONCLUSIVE, SELFTEST FIXED, NEGCONTROL VULNERABLE, exit 2. Main0618acca(first run; the pin is nowbefeac7d, re-verified below), reached withmin updatefrom a copy pinned at 24009b6. Every row is FIXED (pip 26.2.2 included), with N/A only where noted above: 0 VULNERABLE, 0 INCONCLUSIVE, exit 0.main task (jdk-25, node 26)
alt task (node-lts, jdk-21) and jdk27 task
Runtimes. "In-box" is run.sh's own runtime. "Wall" is the whole
min task run, including session setup.Other checks:
verify_atto 2031, when every le 8000 af has expired, gave exit 3 and NEGCONTROLBROKEN (0/12 accepted). Stale chains cannot read as FIXED.[upstream]at pkgs#967's head (branch = "uv-0.13.4-webpki-lock"+ its sha) gave uv 0.13.4, FIXED on uv, uv-system-certs and uv-blocklist.min task run offline -C tests/tls-trustfrom a worktree of this branch: exit 0, 8 s.--only '^(curl|go)$' --jobs 4.liveruns returned 125 from min with the output cut off mid-run. run.sh never exits 125. Six back-to-back runs inside one task, with output going to files, all passed. So this is min's output relay, and the README says to rerun.Review follow-up (second commit, from the CodeRabbit pass, all 8 accepted):
SSLErrorand gitunexpectedmatches are dropped.-q.--jobsand--timeoutare normalized to decimal.After these changes I re-ran all 12 task runs. The verdicts match the tables above.
Security
targets.txtandpositives.txt, live mode only. Host names are validated.chains/is public certificates only, from the disclosure'schains.zip(sha2568a2edc81…08fa1af2), with every file pinned inSHA256SUMS. All 12 intermediates are onpackages/ca-certificates/distrust.txt, andanchors.pemmatches its root fingerprints.curl | sh. The Go and Java probes compile from this directory inside the box, withGOPROXY=off.mktemp -d, which is removed on exit. HOME and the XDG dirs point inside it.Location
AGENTS.md now has a
### Testsconvention under "General layout":tests/<name>/is a self-contained min project with its own[upstream]pin, tests whatever that pin names, and is never evaluated as a package. The CIminimal checkjob ignores it, since it contains no.ncl.One thing to know: the response directories are named
responses/, notprofiles/. The first attempt usedprofiles/, and min tried to importprofiles/<name>/profile.ncland failed to create the session.Who runs it
Phase 1 (this PR) is a manual playbook: whoever drives a response runs it, and so does any PR that touches a trust store or a TLS client. Phase 2 is the weekly scheduled run below. Its failures post to #pkgmgr-mgr, the channel the pkgmgr runner's failure backstop uses, so the pkgsec on-call who watches the nightly runs owns them (tracked with pkgmgr-rs#1021). README "Who runs it" and "Maintenance" cover this, including leaf expiry: run.sh now warns 60 days before the targets' leaves expire (2027-05-03).
Re-verification after review fixes (9a2d8fe)
All six tasks at three pins, aarch64,
--details all:24009b6bbefeac7d(new pin)28b82577common.shchanged 0 of them. Recorded and re-classified cells match on all 1,260.gorefused 12/12 asUnknownAuthorityError;go-blocklistrefused 12/12 as barex509: no valid chains built(the distrusted-SPKI drop). go1.27.2 at the pre-fix pin accepted all 14 in both rows.Re-verification at 43cd433 (de2348e + the main merge)
de2348e changed how three rows decide:
javaandjava-blocklistgo throughvalidatorVerdict()on a builder failure, andpiploses thessl certificatealternative inCERT_RE. These runs are the first at a head that contains it. They are the harness at43cd4335(this branch's head), copied into a scratch git repo with only[upstream] locked_commitchanged, run withmin task run <task> -C <copy> --config-dir <empty> --no-input --details allon min boxes (aarch64, 2026-11-02). Nothing was built locally.--only '^pip$'24009b6b74677189SELFTEST read FIXED and NEGCONTROL read VULNERABLE (0R/6A · 0R/6A offline, 0F/6C · 0F/6C live) in all 8 runs. Every positive (letsencrypt.org, www.google.com) was OK in every run. No run hit min's exit 125.
The java rows at main. Every java and java-blocklist refusal printed
validator: TRUST …, and none printedOTHER: 12/12 per row, for each of jdk-25, jdk-21 and jdk-27 (72 refusals):java:validator: TRUST NO_TRUST_ANCHOR: Path does not chain with any of the trust anchors.java-blocklist(anchors trusted):validator: TRUST UNSPECIFIED: Untrusted certificate: CN=EM {DV,OV,EV} TLS CA - G3{B,C}, …, which isblocked.certsnaming each of the six intermediates.At the pre-fix pin, the 6 AAA refusals on
javaalso printvalidator: TRUST NO_TRUST_ANCHOR, andjava-blocklistaccepts all 14.pip live at main refuses with
[SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate, so droppingssl certificatefromCERT_REleaves the real verification failure classified CERT-FAIL.Offline rows at both pins (
<refused>R/<accepted>Afor emSign · AAA):The N/A rows (curl, wget, git, node-blocklist, deno-sysstore, uv, uv-system-certs, uv-blocklist) read
N/A (live-only)as before. The pre-fix offline cells match the earlier pre-fix tables cell for cell. Main moved frombefeac7dto74677189in between (OpenSSL 4.1.0, Python 3.14.10, git 2.56.0, deno 2.9.8, uv 0.13.6, the JDK point releases), and every row still reads FIXED.Not re-run at this head:
livefor rows other than pip,live-altandlive-jdk27. de2348e doesn't touch the live java probe, and the only live classifier change is the pip-onlyssl certificatephrase. The committed pin staysbefeac7d, because the README re-pins only after a full six-task run.Phase 2 (not in this PR)
pkgmgr truststores(pm#1020) into a row list, so every package that embeds a store gets a probe automatically. That would cover the compiled-in webpki roots in the uv/prek/tealdeer family, gcloud's bundles, and vendored certifi copies.--dump-domagainst the targets), gcloud (gcloud storage lsagainst a target as endpoint override), gws, and claude-code (node runtime with its own bundled CAs).min updateplus all six tasks for everyresponses/*directory, retrying on min exit 125, with a non-zero exit posting to #pkgmgr-mgr.--jsonoutput, with a per-response ledger diffing baseline, PR and main.🤖 Generated with Claude Code