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WO2004007286A1 - Systeme de surveillance et de controle de securite - Google Patents

Systeme de surveillance et de controle de securite Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2004007286A1
WO2004007286A1 PCT/GB2003/003074 GB0303074W WO2004007286A1 WO 2004007286 A1 WO2004007286 A1 WO 2004007286A1 GB 0303074 W GB0303074 W GB 0303074W WO 2004007286 A1 WO2004007286 A1 WO 2004007286A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
security
security system
location
activation
aircraft
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/GB2003/003074
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Catherine Mitchell
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to GB0502962A priority Critical patent/GB2408131B/en
Priority to AU2003251335A priority patent/AU2003251335A1/en
Publication of WO2004007286A1 publication Critical patent/WO2004007286A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
    • B64D—EQUIPMENT FOR FITTING IN OR TO AIRCRAFT; FLIGHT SUITS; PARACHUTES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF POWER PLANTS OR PROPULSION TRANSMISSIONS IN AIRCRAFT
    • B64D45/00—Aircraft indicators or protectors not otherwise provided for
    • B64D45/0015—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems
    • B64D45/0036—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems by disabling or restraining attackers
    • B64D45/0042—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems by disabling or restraining attackers by spraying or injecting chemicals
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
    • B64D—EQUIPMENT FOR FITTING IN OR TO AIRCRAFT; FLIGHT SUITS; PARACHUTES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF POWER PLANTS OR PROPULSION TRANSMISSIONS IN AIRCRAFT
    • B64D45/00—Aircraft indicators or protectors not otherwise provided for
    • B64D45/0015—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems
    • B64D45/0036—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems by disabling or restraining attackers
    • B64D45/0048—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems by disabling or restraining attackers by harnesses, nets, ropes, or the like
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
    • B64D—EQUIPMENT FOR FITTING IN OR TO AIRCRAFT; FLIGHT SUITS; PARACHUTES; ARRANGEMENT OR MOUNTING OF POWER PLANTS OR PROPULSION TRANSMISSIONS IN AIRCRAFT
    • B64D45/00—Aircraft indicators or protectors not otherwise provided for
    • B64D45/0015—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems
    • B64D45/0051—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems by monitoring passengers or crew on aircraft
    • B64D45/0056—Devices specially adapted for the protection against criminal attack, e.g. anti-hijacking systems by monitoring passengers or crew on aircraft detecting passenger or crew behavior by sensors, e.g. biometrics
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B15/00—Identifying, scaring or incapacitating burglars, thieves or intruders, e.g. by explosives

Definitions

  • the present invention provides a security system and apparatus for monitoring and controlling potential human threats in a location such as a civil aircraft or building used by the public.
  • a security protection system for use in aircraft primarily associated with the transport of civilian passengers.
  • a security system for monitoring and enforcing control in a location in which security is desired such as an aircraft or building, the system including; - monitoring means for monitoring the security status of the location, - at least one countermeasure device which can be deployed in order to incapacitate a target, and - means for controlling the deployment of the at least one countermeasure device upon activation of the system.
  • the at least one countermeasure device is a projectile.
  • the at least one countermeasure device is a dart.
  • the projectile or dart contains a tranquilliser which causes the incapacitation of a target.
  • the projectile or dart is deployed from a delivery unit.
  • the delivery unit contains a plurality of projectiles or darts.
  • the delivery unit can be controlled so as to allow deployment of the projectile or dart along a pre-determined trajectory.
  • the projectile or dart is propelled or launched from the delivery unit through the use of compressed air.
  • the delivery unit can be mounted within a seat, such as a passenger seat of an aircraft or other similar vehicle.
  • the delivery unit is retained within the head portion of a passenger seat when in a first, stored position and, following activation of the at least one countermeasure device, assumes a second, activated position, protruding from the seat, which allows a projectile or dart contained therein to be deployed.
  • the at least one countermeasure device delivers a non-lethal electrical charge.
  • the countermeasure device is a restraining means which, following activation, provides an obstruction which substantially prevents movement of a target within the location in which security is desired.
  • the restraining means is at least one rod or pole.
  • the restraining means is constructed of a rigid plastics material or a lightweight metal.
  • the restraining means is a rod which, upon activation, moves from a first stored position, to a second protruding position, the rod protruding in a substantially vertical direction and being located so as to obstruct the movement of a target within the location in which security is desired.
  • the restraining means is a rod which, upon activation, moves from a first stored position, to a second protruding position, the rod protruding in a substantially horizontal direction and being located so as to obstruct the movement of a target within the location in which security is desired.
  • the restraining means is retained within a suitable object, such that following activation, a first end of the rod is retained within the object in which it was stored, while the second end of the rod is secured to a second location which provides a securing and holding point .
  • the object within which the restraining means is retained prior to activation is a seat, such as a passenger seat of an aircraft.
  • the object within which the restraining means is retained prior to activation is a wall of a building.
  • the monitoring means includes a visual seating plan which provides an indication as to whether a seat is occupied or vacant.
  • the visual seating plan further indicates whether a passenger should be occupying a particular seat.
  • the monitoring means further includes an electronic information tablet which allows visual communication.
  • the tablet also includes touch sensitive panels.
  • the electronic tablet allows signalling between a first and second area through the use of at least one electronic tablet located at each of the first and second areas.
  • the first and second areas are the cabin and cockpit of an aircraft.
  • the information communicated by the tablets is signalled by lights or lit panels on the tablet.
  • a further aspect of the present invention provides a security apparatus for the incapacitation of targets within a location in which security is desired, the apparatus including at least one restraining means which assumes a first stored position, and which following an activation step, assumes a second extended position which substantially obstructs movement of a target within the location in which security is desired.
  • the restraining means is a rod or pole.
  • the restraining means is constructed of a rigid plastics material or a lightweight metal.
  • the restraining means is a rod which, upon activation, moves from a first stored position, to a second protruding position, the rod protruding in a substantially vertical direction and being located so as to obstruct the movement of a target within the location in which security is desired.
  • the restraining means is a rod which, upon activation, moves from a first stored position, to a second protruding position, the rod protruding in a substantially horizontal direction and being located so as to obstruct the movement of a target within the location in which security is desired.
  • the restraining means when in the inactivated position, is retained within a suitable object, such that following activation, a first end of the rod is retained within the object in which it was stored, while the second end of the rod is secured to a second location which provides a securing and holding point.
  • the object within which the restraining means is retained prior to activation is a seat, such as a passenger seat of an aircraft.
  • the restraining means is secured at a first end to the seat in which it is usually secured and at the second end to a further seat .
  • the restraining means is secured to an appropriate securing and holding point on the internal body of the aircraft .
  • the object within which the restraining means is retained prior to activation is a wall of a building.
  • a further aspect of the present invention provides a security apparatus for monitoring passengers seated within a vehicle, and in particular a civilian aircraft, including: - a means for monitoring persons seated in the vehicle, - means for acquiring and processing data received from the monitoring means and comparing them to defined parameters in order to detect passenger movement and potential security threats, and - means for activating an alert signal or security system.
  • the monitoring means includes a visual seating plan which provides an indication as to whether a seat is occupied or vacant.
  • the visual seating plan further indicates whether a passenger should be occupying a particular seat .
  • the monitoring means further includes an electronic information tablet which allows visual communication.
  • the tablet also includes touch sensitive panels.
  • the electronic tablet allows signalling between a first and second area through the use of at least one electronic tablet located at each of the first and second areas.
  • the first and second areas are the cabin and cockpit of an aircraft.
  • the information communicated by the tablets is signalled by lights or lit panels on the tablet.
  • the apparatus may be activated and/or controlled from an area within the vehicle.
  • the activation and control of the apparatus may be effected from an area outwith the vehicle.
  • a yet further aspect of the present invention provides a method for monitoring and enforcing control in a location in which security is desired, such as an aircraft or a building, the method including the steps of : - monitoring persons located within the location, - acquiring and processing data received from monitoring the location and comparing them to defined parameters in order to detect passenger movement and potential security threats, and - activating an alert signal or security system, this causing the deployment of at least one countermeasure .
  • Figure 1 shows an example of the format of an electronic seat map used to monitor the location of passengers within the cabin of an aircraft
  • Figure 2 shows an example of a system for restricting movement of persons up and down the aisle of an aircraft
  • Figure 3 shows the system used to effect targetable deployment of darts from delivery units
  • Figure 4 shows examples of delivery units which can be orientated to allow darts to be directed appropriately
  • Figure 5 shows the principle of fixed target deployment from dart delivery units contained within passenger seats
  • Figure 6 illustrates fixed trajectory deployment of darts from delivery units mounted in an aircraft cabin
  • Figure 7 illustrates the principle of incorporating a dart delivery unit into a passenger seat
  • Figure 8 shows an example of close quarters deployment of one component of the defence system
  • Figure 9 shows an example of a mode of deployment of the system
  • Figure 10 shows a general schematic diagram of the individual components that can be used by the system
  • Figure 11 shows an electronic information tablet in a first configuration
  • Figure 12 shows an information tablet in a second configuration
  • Figure 13 shows an alternative example of a system for restricting movement of persons up and down the aisle of an aircraft.
  • the threat should be identified. 2. The threat should be isolated. 3. The threat should be targeted. 4. Counter-measures should be deployed.
  • the countermeasures should be small, rapidly deployed, fast-acting tranquilliser darts, which are effective in neutralising the hostile threat by rendering the target unconscious. This allows the hostile threat to be disarmed (if required) , apprehended and restrained.
  • the system of the present invention can incorporate an electronic seat map, which can be used to relay information regarding the status of every seat in the aircraft such that it can be established instantly whether that seat is occupied or vacant.
  • this information can provide the operator of the security system with information regarding the movement of passengers about the aircraft and also where any threat is likely to have emanated from.
  • Figure 1 shows an example of the format of such a seating plan (10) , wherein the simple illumination of a light can be used to show whether a seat is vacant or occupied. Further, a more advanced variation of this theme could incorporate cross-checking with the aircraft passenger list such that a specific signal (such as a light colour, or flashing light) could be used to denote a seat where a passenger should be sitting, but which has been vacated.
  • a specific signal such as a light colour, or flashing light
  • the monitoring of the seating arrangements in this way could further be linked to a CCTV or other camera system, which could be used to track the movements of the passengers throughout the aircraft.
  • the seating map (10) would operate in real-time and could further be linked to a computer which could further analyse the various information and parameters associated with this component in order to identify potential security threats. For example, the length of time that a passenger's seat was unoccupied could be monitored, with excessive absence times (over a determined parameter) being flagged. Such information could be used to indicate the initiation of disruptive or hostile activities.
  • Computer analysis could further be used to monitor the occupation of seats which should have been occupied during the flight, such that the positioning of terrorists prior to the attack could be predicted.
  • the system could be programmed with patterns which indicate terrorist activity - for example, if terrorists took up positions of symmetry within the cabin, the system could recognise this pattern of activity and would be alerted to any potential activity.
  • the programming into the computer of historical hijacking situations could aid in the identification of such potential attack patterns. Any early warning of impending activity could be used to allow the positioning of defence assets (countermeasures) within the cabin.
  • the seating map (10) could be further modified to show the location and status of the countermeasures, for example the position and location of the dart delivery units and the number of darts available to be fired therefrom.
  • An electronic tablet (12) placed within the cabin would allow the cabin crew to alert the cockpit as to any area of concern or disturbance, and vice versa.
  • FIG. 11 An example of an electronic tablet (12) is depicted in figures 11 and 12.
  • the electronic tablet (12) allows silent communication between the flight crew and the cabin crew and consists of twin touch sensitive panels of light (20) corresponding to different areas of the aircraft.
  • a tablet (12) would be located in the cockpit, with a further tablet (12) in the cabin - with each having a direct effect on the status and information displayed by the other.
  • the purpose of the tablet (12) and the signal depicted and communicated should be known only to the crew and any coded information contained therein could be specific to particular users, wherein the users would effectively create their own "language of light" .
  • both panels could be made to show identical lights when in use by one company (as depicted in figure 12) and show opposite lights used by another company (figure 11) .
  • the status of the lights could remain static or could be used to show the cabin crews the areas where CCTV is in operation. It could be used to direct the cabin crew to a particular area of concern, or vice versa.
  • the cockpit has isolated a threat and are about to deploy the defence system in a particular area, the tablet system would allow this to be communicated to the crew, thus allowing the crew to evacuate or avoid that specific area.
  • the size of the electronic tablet (12) , its positioning and layout would be determined by specific users, as would the use of the codes transmitted by the tablets.
  • the isolation and subsequent control of the terrorists or hostile party is vitally important to the effectiveness of the system. This allows more straight-forward targeting and deployment of the countermeasures, this reducing the risk of the tranquilliser darts missing their intended target (s) and causing collateral damage.
  • the isolation of the terrorist or hostile party makes it far more difficult for them to carry out their intended mission.
  • the present system In order to restrict the movement of persons through the cabin, the present system also contains a component which can be used to restrict this intra- cabin movement .
  • the present system makes use of the passenger seats, using a restraining means (16) such as a lightweight rod constructed of a rigid plastics material or lightweight metal which is set at various heights across the seats and which can be extended across the aisle when required. This results in a "corral" which impedes movement up and down the aisle of the aircraft.
  • a restraining means (16) activated between opposing seats in an aisle is shown in figure 2.
  • Deployment of the rods or other restraining means (16) can be instigated by either intervention from the cockpit, the cabin crew, or via pressure pads set in the floor of the aisle. In the case of specific pressure pad operation, this would ensure that the most appropriate sets of rods (or other restraining means) were extended. It should be noted however, that the pressure pads would normally remain inactive and turned off during normal, incident free flights.
  • the above-described component describes a method by which physical isolation of the terrorist or hostile party can be carried out. However, in many cases the behaviour of the terrorist will lead to self isolation - for example a terrorist chooses a position he perceives as dominant with respect to the passengers and crew. If for example, he is attempting to access the cockpit, then this position could be in front of the cockpit doors facing rearwards. In such instances this self isolation would facilitate targeting, removing the need for restraining means to isolate the terrorist.
  • the ability of the system to be able to specifically focus on and direct the countermeasure towards a desired target such as a terrorist or other hostile party ensures that the system has complete utility and efficiency as a defence and security system.
  • the system can be made to "take aim" not only at general areas on the terrorist or hostile party, but advantageously, at specific points on a terrorist's body from a variety of angles.
  • the preferred type of countermeasure which is activated by the system so as to effect the incapacitation of the hostile party is a projectile, and in particular a dart which contains a tranquilliser, the administration of which incapacitates the target.
  • a projectile and in particular a dart which contains a tranquilliser, the administration of which incapacitates the target.
  • other incapacitating means such as a non-lethal electrical charge may also be used.
  • the darts are preferably propelled from a delivery unit (18) via a compressed air system. Activation of the darts is from a central control unit which is preferably located outwith the main cabin of the aircraft, in a location such as the cockpit or at the central control system operation unit.
  • the system When the system is used as a security defence mechanism in a building, the system may be controlled and activated from a control unit situated within the building. Alternatively, the system may be controlled and activated from a control unit situated outwith the building.
  • the countermeasures of the security system would generally be inactivated in the absence of a threat, however, the system would monitor the location of persons, with activation of the countermeasures occurring only in response to a potential disturbance.
  • the deployment of the countermeasures, by means of the different methods identified is detailed further below:
  • the darts are preferably housed in delivery units (18) .
  • These can be fixed (18a, 18b) (e.g. on the bulkhead outside the cockpit, for deployment when the terrorist is facing rearwards) , or moveable (18c) (e.g. located on tracks which can move forwards and backwards throughout the cabin) .
  • the delivery units (18) can also be fixed at optimum positions within the aircraft or building.
  • the targeting of the delivery units (18) to orientate them in the desired direction could be achieved through the use of small cameras mounted immediately adjacent and parallel to the direction in which the dispensing units release the darts, these cameras preferably being an integral part of the design of the delivery unit. Examples of delivery units (18) and the adjustment of their orientation during delivery are shown in figure 4.
  • the system can additionally or alternatively incorporate dart delivery units (18) which are set at fixed trajectories.
  • This arrangement of the dart delivery units (18) enables darts to be deployed at any set position within the aircraft aisles or throughout the building. Targeting in this manner will mean that there will be no need to wait for all of the terrorists or hostile parties to be located at optimum positions for targeting, nor would there be a need to wait for moveable delivery units to become available, as it would be possible to target multiple persons at the same time, by means of a combined attack.
  • the fixed trajectory system uses the passenger seats to deploy the darts (figure 6, figure 7) .
  • the proximity of the seats to the aisle means that the deployment of the darts from the seats allows the targeting of the terrorist or other hostile party while they are standing in or moving up or down the aisle.
  • Dart delivery units could be incorporated into every aisle seat (26) , or alternatively every second or third seat.
  • the delivery units will have fixed trajectories, and are targeted such that the darts fired therefrom are directed towards a receiving pad (28) on another seat (generally located diagonally forward from the "loaded" seat) .
  • a receiving pad (28) on another seat generally located diagonally forward from the "loaded” seat
  • darts would be dispensed from the seat mounted delivery units (26) and would target the legs and body of persons in the aisle.
  • An example of the dispensing of the darts and the targeting of persons within the aisle is shown in figure 5.
  • Deployment of the darts could be achieved by manual intervention at the control deck located in the cockpit or similar, or alternatively the firing of the darts could be triggered by pressure pads activated by the terrorist himself in the floor of the cabin.
  • FIG. 6 shows an example of the location of fixed trajectory delivery units within passenger seats. It is preferable to deploy the darts in a forward diagonal direction only, as the back of each seat acts as a shield for the passenger occupied therein. In cases where rearward targeting is required, a roof or side-based delivery unit should be utilised. Alternatively, a system for the rearward deployment of the darts could be used, with an example of such a system being shown in figure 7.
  • a device (30) is fitted to the head restraint element of the seat and is subsequently raised prior to deployment of the darts.
  • the raising of the device allows deployment in multiple directions, and specifically up and down the aisle of the aircraft cabin. As the device is raised above the height of the seats, this prevents the fired darts hitting passengers who are seated.
  • the raised devices would be hidden through retention within the seat during normal flight conditions, with their operation being controlled by the central control point.
  • the seats would also contain a receiving pad which would be receptive to a dart which had been deployed, but which had not hit its intended target.
  • the receiving pad (28) is concealed within the seat, and generally a dart would gain access to the pad by passing through a flap of material which would cover the pad. Retention of the dart in the pad (28) in this way means that any darts which are retained in the pad cannot be retrieved and misused.
  • the receiving pad (28) may take the form of a guide which would direct any fired darts into a funnel leading to a container located within the seat, such that the darts would be safely stored without being directly accessible.
  • the store of used darts could be accessed by authorised persons at a later time.
  • Cabin crew fully trained to use dart-dispensing equipment could have delivery units mounted about their person.
  • the delivery unit could be concealed at a number of appropriate locations, for example under the arm, belt-mounted, or alternatively incorporated into a watch, bracelet or ring which would include a releasable needle to pierce the skin of the captor's hand, this allowing fast and effective delivery of the tranquilliser which would render the captor unconscious.
  • An example of the use of a close-quarters defence system is shown in figure 8.
  • any close quarters defence system prevents unauthorised use and inadvertent deployment. This would prevent the terrorist from being able to utilise the system by taking control from individual cabin crew members. In such cases therefore, release and deployment of the personally concealed dispensing devices would only be available when a release code was emitted from the central control unit. Upon receiving such a signal, each individual close-quarters system would be armed and ready for use.
  • a principle which is important to the effectiveness of any defence system is that of redundancy and dispersal. This means that the system as designed must be invulnerable to total disablement if attacked. For example, if the terrorists target the fixed dart delivery units, there should be others available to replace those disabled. In general, the system should not be able to be disabled through an attack of any kind, but should maintain its functionality no matter how much of the system is attacked.
  • the present system will incorporate a full analysis of possible and probable attack modes to enable all eventualities to be addressed. This will ensure that the system will perform as required if attempts are made to disable it.
  • system is formed from many sub-systems integrated into an overall system.
  • This modular design of the system facilitates flexibility in the design of the system and allows different designs of systems to be fitted or tailored to different aircraft or buildings.
  • the full system could be expanded for larger aircraft (e.g. deployed on twin aisles as opposed to single aisle aircraft) , or bespoked for smaller aircraft, where for example, only the fully targetable deployment option would be used.
  • This modularity also facilitates the retrofitting of existing aircraft (although in such instances the retro-fitting of the seat based dart deployment units may not be appropriate) , whilst allowing the design of new aircraft to have the full system fitted at the manufacture stage.
  • the system must be self-contained (and thus does not involve the participation of civilian passengers) - The system should be targetable (either directly or indirectly) to the threat to the aircraft (whether it be a terrorist or other) . - Deployment of the system should not endanger the aircraft
  • the self-contained nature of the system removes the requirement for passengers to be involved in the activation of the system.
  • the deployment of the system would preferably be effected by the aircrew or the cabin crew.
  • an operator who has been specifically assigned the task of monitoring the internal safety of the aircraft may carry out this task.
  • Operation of the system in this way ensures that the system will be operated by a fully trained and competent person, this being advantageous not only in that it ensures that the safety of the passengers is maintained, but also that the operator's training will allow them to be able to deploy the system in the manner most appropriate to the threat being posed.
  • One particular embodiment of the system would be to prevent hostile situations and in particular to prevent terrorists or other persons with hostile intents assuming control of the aircraft. In such instances, the system would physically target the weak points of the terrorist.
  • the present system is designed to exploit the fact that a terrorist cannot protect all parts of his body from all angles at all times. Accordingly, the present system can be directed to target exposed points of a terrorist, typically exposed in a terrorist who thinks he is in a strong position but who is in fact vulnerable and open to attack.
  • a terrorist typically exposed in a terrorist who thinks he is in a strong position but who is in fact vulnerable and open to attack.
  • One specific example of this situation would be where the terrorist or hostile party was standing in the aisle of the aircraft with his back to the cockpit (perhaps even holding a hostage) .
  • a component of the system such as the rapidly deployed fast-acting tranquilliser darts, could be used to incapacitate or neutralise the hostile party, thus removing him from his position of threat.
  • the deployment of the components of the system does not lead to mortality of the terrorist or other hostile parties.
  • the deployment of the darts is specifically designed to prevent the death of the target. This further serves to increase the confidence of innocent civilian passengers as inaccurate or misdirected activation of the system would not lead to mortality of that person.
  • Incapacitation of the terrorist or hostile party in this manner would further be of benefit in that the person may later be taken into custody.
  • the system specifically uses darts as a medium by which to carry the tranquilliser component of the system.
  • This medium is a preferred method by which a component can be deployed or fired within the cabin in order to introduce the tranquilliser component into the terrorist or other hostile party.
  • the present system provides effective countermeasures which can be deployed to prevent or restrict the occurrence of hostile situations such as hijacking or the like aboard an aircraft, and in particular an aircraft used for the transport of civilians.
  • the system is further applicable to other locations such as buildings where security is required.
  • the system uses the deployment of fast-acting tranquilliser darts using various methods of deployment .
  • the system further provides restraining means to obstruct the movement of persons down an aisle of an aircraft or about a building.
  • the system When applied to the aircraft, the system further allows identification and analysis of passenger movement throughout the aircraft based on an electronic seat map.
  • Figure 9 shows an example of the series of steps of a mode of deployment of the system
  • figure 10 shows a general schematic diagram of the individual components of the system that can by used in conjunction with each other to synergise the effect of the system in defending the aircraft and the occupants of the aircraft.
  • the system is non-lethal and can be fully targetable. Essentially the deployment of the system does not result in harm being caused to innocent civilians or other persons aboard the aircraft such as cabin crew. Activation of the system is effected such that once activated, the system does not harm or pose a threat to the innocent occupants of the aircraft, rather, the effectiveness of the system is directed to containing and/or neutralising the threat posed by hostile party, whether it be a passenger who is intoxicated by alcohol and acting in a drunk and abusive manner, or a terrorist with aspirations of assuming control of the aircraft.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Chemical Kinetics & Catalysis (AREA)
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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système et un dispositif permettant de surveiller et de contrôler un environnement sécurisé, tel que l'intérieur d'un aéronef, ou d'un bâtiment, tel qu'une banque ou tout autre lieu sécurisé. L'invention concerne un système de surveillance conçu pour permettre le contrôle automatique de l'environnement et l'activation du système ou du dispositif à un moment approprié lors de la détection d'une brèche de sécurité. Le déclenchement manuel du système peut également être effectué. L'activation du système a pour conséquence le déploiement d'au moins un dispositif de contre-mesure. Ce dispositif de contre-mesure permet de paralyser une ou plusieurs cibles considérées comme une menace pour la sécurité du lieu. Les contre-mesures déployées peuvent comprendre un projectile, tel qu'une flèche pouvant contenir un tranquillisant ou, dans un mode de réalisation différent, une charge électrique peut être appliquée. En outre, des moyens de restriction peuvent permettre de restreindre le déplacement des cibles dans la zone de sécurité; par exemple, le déploiement de moyens de sécurité tels que des tiges verticales ou horizontales qui empêchent le déplacement des cibles dans l'allée d'un aéronef civil ou dans le couloir d'un bâtiment.
PCT/GB2003/003074 2002-07-12 2003-07-14 Systeme de surveillance et de controle de securite Ceased WO2004007286A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0502962A GB2408131B (en) 2002-07-12 2003-07-14 Security monitoring and protection system
AU2003251335A AU2003251335A1 (en) 2002-07-12 2003-07-14 Security monitoring and protection system

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GBGB0216141.2A GB0216141D0 (en) 2002-07-12 2002-07-12 Protection system
GB0216141.2 2002-07-12

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SG188579A1 (en) 2011-08-03 2013-04-30 Sita Inf Networking Computing Usa Inc Item handling and tracking system and method therefor
GB2499288A (en) 2012-02-09 2013-08-14 Sita Inf Networking Computing Usa Inc Path determination
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US10320908B2 (en) 2013-03-25 2019-06-11 Sita Information Networking Computing Ireland Limited In-flight computing device for aircraft cabin crew
GB2523441A (en) 2014-02-19 2015-08-26 Sita Information Networking Computing Ireland Ltd Reservation system and method therefor
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US3841328A (en) * 1972-08-04 1974-10-15 J Jensen Airplane hijacking injector
DE3736744A1 (de) * 1987-10-30 1989-05-11 Safa Kirma Einrichtung zum schutz von objekten
US5649466A (en) * 1992-11-25 1997-07-22 The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Army Method of rapidly deploying volume-displacement devices for restraining movement of objects
DE19732806A1 (de) * 1997-07-30 1999-02-04 Vidair Avionics Ag Überwachungseinrichtung für Innenräume von Flugzeugen, insbesondere Passagierflugzeugen
EP1026647A1 (fr) * 1999-02-08 2000-08-09 Giat Industries Dispositif de défense d'une zone contre l'intrusion

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AU2003251335A1 (en) 2004-02-02
GB0216141D0 (en) 2002-08-21
GB0502962D0 (en) 2005-03-16
GB2408131B (en) 2006-03-01

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