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WO2025139994A1 - Procédé et appareil de communication - Google Patents

Procédé et appareil de communication Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2025139994A1
WO2025139994A1 PCT/CN2024/140605 CN2024140605W WO2025139994A1 WO 2025139994 A1 WO2025139994 A1 WO 2025139994A1 CN 2024140605 W CN2024140605 W CN 2024140605W WO 2025139994 A1 WO2025139994 A1 WO 2025139994A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
identifier
terminal
key
authentication
long
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
PCT/CN2024/140605
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
郭燕飞
吴义壮
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Publication of WO2025139994A1 publication Critical patent/WO2025139994A1/fr
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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communication technology, and in particular, to a communication method and device.
  • the user equipment authenticates itself with the network through the subscription data in the subscriber identity module (SIM) or the universal subscriber identity module (USIM) to obtain authorization to access the network.
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • USIM universal subscriber identity module
  • the network needs to obtain the permanent identity of the UE in order to obtain the corresponding long-term key K based on the permanent identity and then proceed with the authentication process.
  • the permanent identity is sent directly in plain text, the user's permanent identity will be exposed, thereby destroying the user's privacy. Therefore, in the 5th generation (5G) network, an encryption mechanism for the user's permanent identity is introduced. When the user registers for the first time, the user's permanent identity information is encrypted to ensure the security of the user's permanent identity information.
  • the existing encryption processing method for the user's permanent identity information requires the use of an asymmetric encryption mechanism with large communication and computing overhead, which may be unaffordable for individual terminals with limited capabilities.
  • the present application provides a communication method and device to protect the security of user identity information.
  • the present application provides a communication method, which can be applied to a terminal or a chip of a terminal, which is not specifically limited here, and the terminal can be a mobile phone, a vehicle-mounted device, an Internet of Things device, etc.
  • the execution is as follows:
  • Obtain a first identifier of a terminal and a first long-term key of the terminal send a first message, wherein the first message is used to trigger two-way authentication, the first message includes a second identifier of the terminal, the second identifier is used to determine a second long-term key for authenticating the terminal in the two-way authentication, the second identifier is determined based on the first identifier, and the second long-term key and the first long-term key are symmetric keys; receive first authentication data; perform authentication of the network in the two-way authentication based on a random number, the first long-term key and the first authentication data, wherein the random number is generated based on the first identifier.
  • the above-mentioned two-way authentication can be understood as a two-way authentication between the terminal and the network identity, such as a primary authentication.
  • the above-mentioned first identifier can be a random sequence code in the configuration parameters of the SIM or USIM, or a sequence code that follows the format of the user identity of the mobile communication network.
  • the first identifier can also include a network identifier, such as a public land mobile network identifier (PLMN) identifier, etc., and this does not specifically limit how to construct the first identifier.
  • PLMN public land mobile network identifier
  • the first identifier can be updated with the number of occurrences of the two-way authentication.
  • the terminal can obtain the first identifier from the configuration parameters of the SIM or USIM of the terminal.
  • the device on the network side After the two-way authentication between the terminal and the network is successful, the device on the network side generates a new first identifier and sends it to the terminal.
  • the terminal After the terminal stores the new first identifier, the terminal reads the first identifier from the storage location of the new first identifier (for example, SIM, USIM, or ME). It is not specifically limited here how the terminal obtains the first identifier.
  • the terminal may determine the second identifier based on the first identifier.
  • the first identifier is encrypted to obtain the second identifier; or the first identifier and the first long-term key of the terminal are encrypted to obtain the second identifier. How to determine the second identifier based on the first identifier is not specifically limited here.
  • random numbers are also used.
  • the random number of two-way authentication is generated according to the first identifier, and the network and the terminal do not need to carry random numbers during the signaling interaction of two-way authentication, thereby further improving the efficiency of two-way authentication and saving signaling resources.
  • the terminal also receives the encrypted ciphertext and decrypts the encrypted ciphertext using the communication key to obtain a third identifier of the terminal, wherein the communication key is derived from the first long-term key, and the third identifier is used to generate a message for the terminal to trigger the two-way authentication again. Furthermore, the terminal may also store the third identifier.
  • the terminal can update the first identifier based on the third identifier.
  • the terminal and the network device perform two-way authentication again, the terminal can determine a new second identifier based on the updated first identifier. Based on this, the second identifier in the first message is different each time the two-way authentication is performed. Even if the second identifier is stolen, the identity information of the terminal cannot be obtained, thereby ensuring the security of the identity information of the terminal. Therefore, the message sent by the terminal to trigger the two-way authentication may not include the permanent identity identifier of the terminal, but includes the second identifier determined based on the updated first identifier. Even if the attacker obtains the second identifier in the first message, the identity of the terminal cannot be deciphered.
  • the first message also includes: second authentication data for authenticating the terminal.
  • the terminal directly carries the second authentication data used to authenticate the terminal in the first message, which facilitates the network to directly authenticate the terminal and can improve the efficiency of two-way authentication.
  • a terminal parameter update process is used to receive the encrypted ciphertext.
  • second authentication data for authenticating the terminal is received; and authentication of the terminal is performed based on the verification data and the second authentication data.
  • the UDM/AUSF may receive the second authentication data, and the AUSF may perform authentication of the terminal based on the verification data and the second authentication data, which is not specifically limited in this application.
  • a third identifier is generated, and the third identifier is used to generate a message for the terminal to trigger two-way authentication again; the third identifier is encrypted using a communication key to obtain an encrypted ciphertext, wherein the communication key is derived from the second long-term key; and the encrypted ciphertext is sent.
  • the device on the network side also stores a third identifier.
  • the receiving terminal before storing the third identifier, the receiving terminal receives confirmation information of successfully receiving the third identifier.
  • the present application provides a communication method, which can be applied to a terminal or a chip of a terminal, which is not specifically limited here, and the terminal can be a mobile phone, a vehicle-mounted device, an Internet of Things device, etc.
  • the execution is as follows:
  • Obtain a first key identifier of the terminal the first key identifier indicating a first long-term key of the terminal; generate a communication key based on the first key identifier and the first long-term key; determine an identity hiding identifier, the identity hiding identifier includes a first encrypted ciphertext and a first key identifier, the first encrypted ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the first subscription permanent identifier of the terminal using the communication key; send the identity hiding identifier.
  • the terminal generates a communication key based on the first key identifier and the first long-term key, and encrypts the first subscription permanent identifier preconfigured in the terminal based on the communication key to obtain a first encrypted ciphertext.
  • the first encrypted ciphertext and the first key identifier are then sent to the network side as the content of the identity hiding identifier, so that the network side can determine the second long-term key and verify the first subscription permanent identifier.
  • the terminal and the network side use symmetric (identical) communication keys for encryption and decryption, which can reduce the data processing complexity of the subscription permanent identifier encryption.
  • the terminal also receives a second encrypted ciphertext and uses the communication key to decrypt the second encrypted ciphertext to obtain a second key identifier of the terminal, which is used to generate an identity hiding identifier for the terminal to access the network again. Further, the terminal may also store the second key identifier.
  • the terminal can update the first key identifier based on the second key identifier.
  • the communication key can be determined based on the second key identifier and the first long-term key, and the first subscription permanent identifier can be encrypted based on the communication key.
  • the communication key is different from the communication key determined based on the first key identifier and the first long-term key. Based on this, each time the network is accessed, the first encrypted ciphertext encrypted by the communication key in the identity hiding identifier is different, and even if the identity hiding identifier is stolen, the user's identity information cannot be decrypted, thereby ensuring the security of the user's identity information.
  • the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application can be applied to a 5G system, or to a future communication system or other similar communication systems.
  • the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application can be applied to a cellular link, a public land mobile network (PLMN), a machine to machine (M2M) network, an Internet of Things (IoT) network or other networks.
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • M2M machine to machine
  • IoT Internet of Things
  • It can also be applied to links between devices, such as a device to device (D2D) link.
  • a D2D link can also be referred to as a sidelink, where the sidelink can also be referred to as a side link or a side link, etc.
  • the above terms all refer to links established between devices of the same type, and their meanings are the same.
  • the operator network may include one or more of the following network elements: authentication server function (AUSF), network exposure function (NEF), policy control function (PCF), unified data management (UDM), unified data repository (UDR), network repository function (NRF), access and mobility management function (AMF), session management function (SMF), access network and user plane function (UPF), etc.
  • AUSF authentication server function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • PCF policy control function
  • UDM unified data management
  • UDR unified data repository
  • NRF network repository function
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • SMF session management function
  • UPF user plane function
  • the part other than the wireless access network part can be called the core network part.
  • the operator network also includes an application function (AF).
  • the AF may not belong to the operator network, but to a third party.
  • the control plane functions mainly perform user registration and authentication, mobility management, and delivery of data packet forwarding strategies and QoS control strategies to the user plane functions.
  • the control plane functions can be further refined to include other network elements besides UPF, such as AMF and SMF.
  • AMF mainly performs the registration process when users access, as well as location management, access authentication/authorization and other functions during user mobility. In addition, it is also responsible for transmitting user policies between terminal devices and PCF.
  • the connection between terminal devices and AMF can be called a non-access stratum (NAS) connection, and the messages transmitted between terminal devices and AMF are NAS messages.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • SMF is mainly responsible for establishing corresponding session connections when users initiate services and providing specific services to users, such as sending data packet forwarding policies and QoS policies to UPF based on the NG4 interface between SMF and UPF.
  • UDM is mainly responsible for storing the contract data of terminal devices, user access authorization and other functions.
  • UDR is mainly responsible for the storage and access of contract data, policy data, application data and other types of data.
  • PCF is mainly responsible for issuing business-related policies to AMF or SMF.
  • NEF is mainly used to support the opening of capabilities and events.
  • AF mainly transmits the application side's requirements on the network side to PCF, so that PCF generates corresponding policies.
  • AF can be a third-party functional entity or an application service deployed by an operator, such as the Internet protocol (IP) multimedia subsystem (IMS) voice call service.
  • IP Internet protocol
  • IMS multimedia subsystem
  • NRF can be used to provide network element discovery functions and provide network element information corresponding to the network element type based on requests from other network elements. NRF also provides network element management services, such as network element registration, update, deregistration, and network element status subscription and push.
  • DN is a network outside the operator network.
  • the operator network can access multiple DNs. Multiple services can be deployed on DN, which can provide data and/or voice services to terminal devices.
  • DN is the private network of a smart factory.
  • the sensors installed in the workshop of the smart factory can be terminal devices.
  • the control server of the sensors is deployed in DN, and the control server can provide services for the sensors.
  • the sensors can communicate with the control server, obtain instructions from the control server, and transmit the collected sensor data to the control server according to the instructions.
  • DN is the internal office network of a company.
  • the mobile phones or computers of the company's employees can be terminal devices.
  • the employees' mobile phones or computers can access information and data resources on the company's internal office network.
  • Nnssf, Nausf, Nnef, Nnrf, Npcf, Nudm, Naf, Namf, Nsmf, N1, N2, N3, N4, and N6 are interface sequence numbers. The meanings of these interface sequence numbers can be found in the meanings defined in the 3GPP protocol and are not limited here.
  • the above network element or function can be a network element in a hardware device, a software function running on dedicated hardware, or a virtualized function instantiated on a platform (e.g., a cloud platform).
  • a platform e.g., a cloud platform
  • the above network element or function can be implemented by one device, or by multiple devices, or a functional module in one device, which is not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the access and mobility management function (also referred to as the mobility management function), the authentication server function, and the unified data management in the embodiments of the present application may be the AMF, AUSF, and UDM in FIG. 1 , respectively, or may be a network element having the above-mentioned AMF, AUSF, and UDM functions in future communications such as the sixth generation (6G) network, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this.
  • 6G sixth generation
  • Home Network Identifier represents the home network identifier.
  • SUPI type is IMSI
  • the home network identifier consists of two parts:
  • MNC Mobile Network Code
  • the Home Network Identifier consists of a sequence of characters with variable length representing a domain name as specified in section 2.2 of IETF RFC 7542.
  • the domain name shall correspond to the realm portion specified in the SUPI NAI format.
  • Routing Indicator represents the routing identification, which consists of 1 to 4 decimal numbers allocated by the home network operator and provided in the USIM, allowing the network signaling with SUCI to be routed to the AUSF and UDM instances that can serve the user together with the home network identifier. If the routing indication is not configured on the USIM or ME, this data field should be set to 0.
  • Protection Scheme Id represents the protection scheme identifier used for SUPI encryption, and consists of values in the range of 0-15. Protection Scheme Id represents the null scheme or non-null scheme specified in Appendix C of 3GPP TS 33.501 or the protection scheme specified by the HPLMN; if the SUPI type is GLI or GCI, the null scheme should be used. Currently, 3GPP defines this value as follows:
  • null-scheme value is 0x0
  • the NAS integrity key, RRC integrity key, and UP integrity key are all used to protect the integrity of the message.
  • the NAS encryption key, RRC encryption key, and UP encryption key are all used to encrypt and protect the message.
  • integrity protection and encryption protection can be performed, or one of the protections can be performed.
  • security protection can be collectively referred to as security protection.
  • the UE should generate UPU-MAC-I UE and include the generated UPU-MAC-I UE in the uplink NAS transmission message.
  • UPU may also involve other specific details, which are not elaborated here. You can refer to the existing protocols for understanding.
  • the first identifier can be understood as a temporary identity identifier of the terminal, and the first identifier can be updated as the number of two-way authentications occurs.
  • the first identifier corresponding to the Xth two-way authentication between the terminal and the network is identifier A
  • the first identifier corresponding to the X+1th two-way authentication between the terminal and the network is identifier B
  • identifier A is different from identifier B.
  • the first identifier may be a random sequence code or a sequence code in the format of a mobile communication network user identity identifier.
  • the first identifier may also include a network identifier, such as a PLMN identifier, etc., and how to construct the first identifier is not specifically limited.
  • the terminal may obtain the first identifier from the configuration parameters of the SIM or USIM of the terminal.
  • the device on the network side After the two-way authentication between the terminal and the network is successful, the device on the network side generates a new first identifier and sends it to the terminal.
  • the terminal After the terminal stores the new first identifier, the terminal reads the first identifier from the storage location of the new first identifier (for example, SIM, USIM, or ME). How the terminal obtains the first identifier is not specifically limited here.
  • each first identifier is used for one two-way authentication, so that the first identifier of each two-way authentication in multiple two-way authentications is different. For example, each time a two-way authentication is performed with the network, a first identifier is selected from a resource pool of first identifiers as the first identifier used for the two-way authentication, and the first identifier is deleted from the resource pool.
  • each first identifier can be used for multiple two-way authentications, but the first identifiers used by the same terminal in two consecutive two-way authentications are different. For example, each time a two-way authentication is performed with the network, a first identifier is selected from a resource pool of first identifiers as the first identifier used for the two-way authentication.
  • the network side also configures the first identifier accordingly, for example, the first identifier is configured in the UDM or ARPF, and the configuration method is the same as the terminal.
  • the second identifier is determined based on the first identifier in 6).
  • the second identifier is updated as the first identifier is updated. For example, if the first identifier is identifier A, the second identifier corresponding to the first identifier is identifier 1; if the first identifier is identifier B, the second identifier corresponding to the first identifier is identifier 2. This is only an example and is not specifically limited.
  • the second identifier can be carried in a two-way authentication request message between the terminal and the network, and indicates the identity information of the terminal in the two-way authentication process between the terminal and the network device.
  • the second identifier is determined based on the first identifier.
  • the first identifier can be reused as the second identifier (that is, the first identifier and the second identifier are the same identifier), or the first identifier can be encrypted to determine the second identifier.
  • the second identifier can also be determined based on the first identifier and the long-term key of the terminal (the first long-term key or the second long-term key), such as the terminal (or the device on the network side) performs an encryption operation or a hash operation on the first identifier and the first long-term key to obtain the second identifier.
  • KID H(K, RAND), where H represents a hash operation.
  • K represents the first long-term key
  • K represents the second long-term key
  • RAND represents the first identifier
  • KID represents the second identifier
  • the second identifier can also be determined based on the first identifier, the first long-term key of the terminal, and the count value indicating the number of times the terminal triggers two-way authentication, such as performing an encryption operation or a hash operation on the first identifier, the first long-term key, and the count value to obtain the second identifier.
  • KID H (K, RAND, COUNT), where COUNT represents the count value, H represents the hash operation, K represents the first long-term key, RAND represents the first identifier, and KID represents the second identifier.
  • the device on the network side can pre-calculate the second identifier based on the first identifier, and store the correspondence between the first identifier, the second identifier and the second long-term key.
  • the device on the network side can pre-calculate the second identifier according to the first identifier in accordance with the above-mentioned terminal to obtain the pre-calculated second identifier, which is not explained in detail here. It should be noted that when the device on the network side pre-calculates the second identifier, the first long-term key involved in calculating the second identifier needs to be replaced with the second long-term key.
  • Symmetric key algorithm also known as symmetric encryption algorithm, private key encryption algorithm, shared key encryption algorithm, is a type of encryption algorithm in cryptography. This type of algorithm uses the same key for encryption and decryption, that is, the key is the same.
  • A/B can mean A or B.
  • “And/or” in this document is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships.
  • a and/or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone.
  • “at least one” means one or more, and “plurality” means two or more.
  • the words “first”, “second”, etc. do not limit the quantity and execution order, and the words “first”, “second”, etc. do not limit them to be different.
  • the encryption processing mechanism In order to protect user privacy, there is an asymmetric encryption processing mechanism that encrypts the permanent identity (such as the above-mentioned SUPI).
  • the encryption processing mechanism has high computational complexity and large computational consumption, and is unbearable for some terminal devices.
  • the present application provides a processing scheme based on a symmetric encryption processing mechanism to protect the identity information of the terminal.
  • the second identifier can be determined using the first identifier pre-configured by the terminal (applicable to the first access to the network and two-way authentication) or the updated first identifier from the network side (applicable to subsequent access to the network and two-way authentication).
  • a two-way authentication process is performed between the terminal and the network, without using SUCI to perform a two-way authentication process between the terminal and the network (for example, 5G main authentication), such as implementation method one.
  • the existing SUCI structure can also be modified, and the network can be accessed based on the modified SUCI, such as implementation method two.
  • the present application does not specifically limit which specific scheme is used to encrypt the identity information of the terminal.
  • the terminal in the following implementation method can be the terminal itself or a chip inside the terminal.
  • the terminal can be a mobile phone, a vehicle-mounted device, an Internet of Things device, etc.
  • the network may be a device on the network side or a chip of a device on the network side, which is not specifically limited here.
  • the device on the network side may include UDM, AUSF, SEAF, and/or ARPF, etc.
  • the device on the network side may be one network element or multiple network elements, or a device configured by multiple network elements, which is not specifically limited here. The following is an explanation based on different embodiments, which are as follows:
  • Figure 4A is a schematic flow chart of a method embodiment of the present application, showing the detailed communication steps or operations of the method, but these steps or operations are only examples.
  • the embodiment of the present application can also perform other operations or variations of the various operations in Figure 4A.
  • the various steps in Figure 4A can be executed in a different order from that presented in Figure 4A, and it is possible that not all operations in Figure 4A need to be executed.
  • Figure 4A takes the terminal and the network side device as an example for illustration. In actual application, it may also involve interaction with other devices, which will not be explained in detail here. As shown in Figure 4A, the method is executed as follows:
  • Step 401 A terminal obtains a first identifier of the terminal and a first long-term key of the terminal.
  • the terminal may obtain the first identifier from the configuration parameters of the SIM or USIM of the terminal.
  • the device on the network side After the two-way authentication between the terminal and the network is successful, the device on the network side generates a new first identifier and sends it to the terminal.
  • the terminal After the terminal stores the new first identifier, the terminal reads the first identifier from the storage location of the new first identifier (for example, SIM, USIM, or ME).
  • the first identifier can be understood with reference to 6) above, which will not be repeated here.
  • the first long-term key of the terminal can be obtained from the configuration parameters of the SIM or USIM of the terminal. Specifically, the first long-term key can be understood with reference to 5) above, which will not be repeated here.
  • the terminal can be configured with a corresponding relationship between the first identifier and the first long-term key.
  • the network side is configured with a corresponding relationship between the first identifier and the second long-term key (the second long-term key and the first long-term key are symmetric keys).
  • the terminal also determines the second identifier based on the first identifier, which can be understood by referring to the above 7) and will not be repeated here.
  • Step 402 The terminal sends a first message, wherein the first message is used to trigger two-way authentication and includes a second identifier.
  • the device on the network side receives the first message.
  • the first message mentioned above can be understood as a two-way authentication request message or a registration request message, and the present application does not specifically limit the message type of the first message.
  • the first message can be sent by reusing existing message signaling or by using new message signaling, which is not specifically limited here.
  • the first message further includes: second authentication data for authenticating the terminal, so that the network can directly authenticate the terminal and improve the efficiency of two-way authentication.
  • the second authentication data can be derived from the first long-term key and the first identifier.
  • RES* KDF(CK
  • the second authentication data may not be sent at the same time as the second identifier, that is, it may be sent using a different message from the second identifier, which is not specifically limited in this application. It should be understood that the second authentication data may also be generated by the terminal after step 405 is executed and when it is determined that the terminal has successfully authenticated the network.
  • the above-mentioned first message may also include indication information, and the indication information is used to indicate the method for determining the second identifier.
  • the indication information is used to indicate that the second identifier is directly determined based on the first identifier, or is determined based on the first identifier and the first long-term key, or is determined based on the first identifier, the first long-term key and the count value. For example, if the indication information is index1, it indicates that the second identifier is directly determined based on the first identifier. If the indication information is index2, it indicates that the second identifier is determined based on the first identifier and the first long-term key.
  • the indication information is index3, it indicates that the second identifier is determined based on the first identifier, the first long-term key and the count value.
  • the first message may also include the count value, so that the device on the network side can more quickly determine the second long-term key that is symmetrical with the first long-term key based on the count value and the second identifier.
  • Step 403 The network-side device determines the first identifier of the terminal and a second long-term key for authenticating the terminal in two-way authentication according to the second identifier, wherein the second long-term key and the first long-term key are symmetric keys.
  • the device on the network side can perform pre-calculation based on the stored first identifier, determine the second identifier, and store the correspondence between the first identifier, the pre-calculated second identifier and the second long-term key. It should be understood that the pre-calculation can also use parameters such as the second long-term key, which is not limited in this application. For details, please refer to the description in 7) above.
  • the device on the network side can search for the pre-calculated second identifier that is the same as the received second identifier, and determine the second long-term key based on the correspondence between the pre-calculated second identifier and the second long-term key.
  • the device on the network side can also determine the first identifier based on the correspondence between the pre-calculated second identifier and the first identifier.
  • other network side devices receive and save the second authentication data.
  • the network side device determines the first verification data based on the second long-term key and the random number, and sends the first verification data to the other network side devices.
  • the other network side devices verify the received second authentication data based on the first verification data.
  • the network side device is UDM, and the other network side device is AUSF.
  • the terminal generates the second authentication data and sends it to the device on the network side after step 406
  • the device on the network side determines the first verification data based on the second long-term key and the random number, and sends the first verification data to other network side devices.
  • Other network side devices store the first verification data, and use the first verification data to verify the second authentication data after receiving the second authentication data.
  • the UDM may determine the first verification data and send the first verification data to the AUSF, and the AUSF stores the first verification data so that the received second authentication data can be verified after the terminal side sends the second authentication data in step 406.
  • the device on the network side After receiving the second authentication data, the device on the network side can perform authentication on the terminal according to the verification data and the second authentication data.
  • the first identifier can be updated so that the second identifier in the first message is different each time the two-way authentication is performed. Even if the second identifier is stolen during a certain two-way authentication, the identity information of the terminal cannot be obtained, thereby ensuring the security of the identity information of the terminal. Referring to FIG. 4B , after executing the above steps 401 to 407, it also includes:
  • Step 408 When the terminal is successfully authenticated, the device on the network side generates a third identifier, and the third identifier is used to generate a message for the terminal to trigger two-way authentication again.
  • Step 409 The device on the network side encrypts the third identifier using the communication key to obtain an encrypted ciphertext, wherein the communication key is derived from the second long-term key.
  • the above step 409 may be performed by UDM or ARPF, for example, UDM generates a third identifier, and UDM uses the communication key to encrypt the third identifier to obtain an encrypted ciphertext.
  • the above step 409 may also be performed by AUSF, for example, UDM sends the third identifier to AUSF, AUSF receives the third identifier, and then AUSF uses the communication key to encrypt the third identifier to obtain an encrypted ciphertext.
  • Step 410 The device on the network side sends the encrypted ciphertext.
  • the terminal receives the encrypted ciphertext.
  • Step 411 The terminal uses the communication key to decrypt the encrypted ciphertext to obtain the third identifier of the terminal.
  • the terminal can update the first identifier based on the third identifier.
  • the terminal and the network device perform two-way authentication again, the terminal can determine a new second identifier based on the updated first identifier. Based on this, the second identifier in the first message is different each time the two-way authentication is performed. Even if the second identifier is stolen, the identity information of the terminal cannot be obtained, thereby ensuring the security of the identity information of the terminal. Therefore, the message sent by the terminal to trigger the two-way authentication may not include the permanent identity identifier of the terminal, but includes the second identifier determined based on the updated first identifier. Even if the attacker obtains the second identifier in the first message, the identity of the terminal cannot be deciphered.
  • the first identifier may be obtained with reference to step 401 in FIG. 4A above.
  • the UE obtains the first long-term key from the USIM and obtains the first identifier from the ME.
  • This application does not specifically limit the method for obtaining the first identifier and the first long-term key.
  • the characteristics of the first identifier may be understood with reference to 6) above and will not be described in detail here.
  • the first message may also carry a count value, for example, when a count value is introduced when determining the second identifier.
  • the first message may also carry indication information of a two-way authentication method, that is, the indication information of the above-mentioned 5G-AKA, EAP-AKA, or EAP-TLS.
  • the second identifier can be transmitted between devices on the network side through different messages.
  • SEAF sends an authentication request message to AUSF
  • AUSF sends an authentication vector acquisition request message to UDM/ARPF.
  • the authentication request message and the authentication vector acquisition request message carry the parameters introduced in 502 above.
  • Step 505 UDM determines the first identifier of the terminal and the second long-term key for authenticating the UE in the two-way authentication based on the second identifier, and determines the first authentication data for authenticating the network in the two-way authentication based on the second long-term key and the random number, wherein the random number is generated based on the first identifier, and the second long-term key and the first long-term key of the UE are symmetric keys.
  • the UDM may determine the first authentication data AUTN according to the second long-term key and the random number. It should be understood that the operation of the UDM in the present application may also be specifically performed by the ARPF. For ease of description, the UDM is used as an example in the following.
  • UDM also determines the first verification data XRES* based on the second long-term key and the random number.
  • MAC, where xor is exclusive OR, SQN is the serial number maintained by the UE and UDM, MAC f1(SQN
  • AMF), AK f5(RAND), and the above f1, f2, f3, f4, and f5 are only examples, and the encryption function is not specifically limited here.
  • the random number determined according to the first identifier is the same as the first identifier, the random number used in the above determination of the first authentication data and the first verification data can also be replaced by the first identifier.
  • the execution order of the determination action of the UDM in the present application is not limited, for example, the first verification data XRES* may be determined first and then the first authentication data may be determined, and the present application does not make any limitation. Other embodiments are similar.
  • Step 506 UDM sends first authentication data to AUSF.
  • UDM also sends first verification data to AUSF. Accordingly, AUSF receives the first authentication data and the first verification data.
  • the first authentication data and/or the first verification data is transmitted through an authentication vector acquisition response message.
  • Step 507 AUSF stores the first verification data.
  • AUSF stores the first verification data.
  • the UE can be authenticated based on the first verification data.
  • the key is deduced based on the first verification data to obtain the second verification data.
  • AUSF deduce the first verification data XRES* to obtain the second verification data HXRES*. This can be understood by referring to the 5G main authentication, which will not be elaborated here.
  • Step 508 AUSF sends first authentication data to SEAF.
  • the second verification data and/or the first authentication data are transmitted via an authentication response message.
  • Step 509 SEAF sends first authentication data to UE.
  • UE receives the first authentication data.
  • This step 509 can be sent via a NAS message. Specifically, it can be an authentication request message. To distinguish the authentication request message in step 503, the authentication request message in step 509 can be called a second authentication request message, and the authentication request message in step 503 can be called a first authentication request message.
  • Step 510 The UE performs authentication of the network in a two-way authentication according to the random number, the first long-term key and the first authentication data.
  • the second authentication data is generated according to the first long-term key and the random number.
  • the UE includes two parts, the ME and the USIM, the ME can receive the first authentication data, and the USIM can calculate the second authentication data. Specifically, the ME can forward the first authentication data received in the NAS message to the USIM.
  • the UE performs authentication of the network in the two-way authentication according to the random number, the first long-term key and the first authentication data. This can be understood by referring to the description of step 406 above and will not be repeated here.
  • the second authentication data is generated based on the first long-term key and the random number.
  • RES* KDF(CK
  • KDF the key derivation function
  • CK f3(K, RAND)
  • IK f4(K, RAND)
  • SN name is the service network name
  • L0 is the length corresponding to the service network name
  • RAND is a random number
  • L1 is the length of the random number
  • RES f2(K, RAND)
  • L2 is the length of RES.
  • the above f2, f3, and f4 are only examples, and the encryption function is not specifically limited here.
  • the random number determined based on the first identifier is the same as the first identifier
  • the random number used in the above determination of the first authentication data and the verification data can also be replaced by the first identifier.
  • Step 511 UE sends second authentication data to SEAF.
  • SEAF receives the second authentication data.
  • the second authentication data may be carried in an authentication response message.
  • Step 512 SEAF performs authentication based on the second authentication data.
  • SEAF calculates the third authentication data HRES* based on the second authentication data, and verifies the third authentication data HRES* and the second verification data HXRES*.
  • the specific calculation and verification methods can be understood with reference to the 5G main authentication, which will not be repeated here. If the third authentication data HRES* and the second verification data HXRES* are the same, the authentication is successful. Specifically, it means that the UE has the right to access the visited network. It should be understood that the authentication of the UE by the network side can specifically include the authentication in step 512 and/or the authentication in step 514.
  • Step 513 SEAF sends the second authentication data to AUSF. Accordingly, AUSF receives the second authentication data.
  • the second authentication data may be carried in an authentication request message and transmitted.
  • the authentication request message may be referred to as a third authentication request message.
  • Step 514 AUSF performs authentication based on the second authentication data.
  • the AUSF performs verification based on the second authentication data RES* and the first verification data XRES*. If RES* and XRES* are the same, it is considered that the UE is successfully authenticated. Specifically, it means that the UE has the authority to access the home network.
  • Step 515a AUSF sends the authentication result to SEAF.
  • SEAF receives the authentication result.
  • Step 515b AUSF sends the authentication result to UDM.
  • UDM receives the authentication result.
  • step 515a and step 515b The execution order of step 515a and step 515b is not specifically limited here. If the AUSF believes that the UE has the authority to access the home network, the authentication result is authentication success, and if the AUSF believes that the UE does not have the authority to access the home network, the authentication result is authentication failure.
  • the network side may also update the first identifier.
  • the steps are as follows:
  • Step 516 If the authentication result received by the UDM is successful, a third identifier is generated for the UE.
  • the UDM may also encrypt the third identifier to obtain an encrypted ciphertext.
  • the UDM may encrypt RAND' to generate an encrypted ciphertext. This may be understood by referring to steps 408 and 409 in FIG. 4B above, and will not be described in detail here.
  • Step 517 UDM sends the encrypted ciphertext or the third identifier to the UE through the UPU process.
  • the encrypted ciphertext is transmitted through the UPU process.
  • the encrypted ciphertext is used as the UPU data in the UPU process.
  • the UDM may also use the UPU process to encrypt and transmit the third identifier.
  • the third identifier is used as UPU data in the UPU process.
  • step 517 is used as an example for UDM to send encrypted ciphertext to UE through the UPU process.
  • Step 518a The UE decrypts the encrypted ciphertext to obtain the third identifier, or directly decrypts to obtain the third identifier.
  • the UE stores a third identifier.
  • the third identifier is an updated first identifier, for example, used to generate a message for the terminal to trigger the two-way authentication again, that is, the third identifier is used as the first identifier in step 501 during the next two-way authentication.
  • the UE can replace the original first identifier with the third identifier, or the UE retains the original first identifier and further stores the third identifier. No limitation is made.
  • the UE after obtaining the third identifier, the UE sends a confirmation message to the UDM indicating that the UE successfully receives the third identifier, so as to trigger the execution of step 518b.
  • Step 518b The UDM stores the third identifier.
  • the UDM may update the first identifier to the third identifier, see step 518a for details.
  • the UDM may also pre-calculate a new second identifier based on the third identifier.
  • step 518a and step 518b are not specifically limited here.
  • This method uses a symmetric encryption mechanism to protect user privacy.
  • the first identifier also replaces the random number in the main authentication process, which can save the cost of the main authentication process.
  • the use of a 256-bit symmetric encryption algorithm can achieve the beneficial effect of anti-quantum attack and reduce the computing and transmission consumption introduced by the post-quantum encryption algorithm.
  • the UE obtains the first identifier of the UE and the first long-term key of the UE, and determines the second identifier according to the first identifier.
  • the UE also generates second authentication data according to the first long-term key and a random number. The random number is generated according to the first identifier.
  • the generation of the second authentication data can be understood by referring to step 510 in FIG. 5 , which will not be described in detail here.
  • Step 602 UE sends a second identifier and second authentication data to SEAF.
  • SEAF receives the second identifier and second authentication data.
  • the second identifier and the second authentication data may be carried in the first message, and the first message may be a registration request message or an identity response message. That is, the second identifier and the second authentication data may be carried in the registration request message initiated by the UE, or the network side may initiate an identity request, so that the identity response message sent by the UE carries the second identifier and the second authentication data.
  • the first message may also carry a count value, for example, when a count value is introduced when determining the second identifier.
  • the first message may also carry indication information of a two-way authentication method, that is, the indication information of the above-mentioned 5G-AKA, EAP-AKA, or EAP-TLS.
  • the second authentication data may be determined with reference to step 510 in FIG. 5 , and is not specifically limited here.
  • Step 603 SEAF forwards the second identifier and the second authentication data to AUSF. Accordingly, AUSF receives the second identifier and the second authentication data.
  • Step 604 AUSF forwards the second identifier to UDM. Accordingly, UDM receives the second identifier.
  • the AUSF stores second authentication data.
  • the AUSF also forwards the second authentication data to the UDM. Accordingly, the UDM receives the second authentication data.
  • the second identifier can be transmitted between devices on the network side through different messages, and the second authentication data and the second identifier can be carried in the same message.
  • SEAF sends an authentication request message to AUSF
  • AUSF sends an authentication vector acquisition request message to UDM.
  • the authentication request message and the authentication vector acquisition request message carry the parameters introduced in step 602 above.
  • the first authentication data may be determined by referring to step 505 in Fig. 5 above, which will not be described in detail herein.
  • the first verification data may also be determined by referring to step 505 in Fig. 5 above.
  • Step 606 UDM sends the first authentication data to AUSF.
  • AUSF receives the first authentication data.
  • the UDM also sends the first verification data to the AUSF in step 606. Accordingly, the AUSF receives the first verification data.
  • the first authentication data and/or the first verification data may be transmitted via an authentication vector acquisition response message.
  • Step 607 UDM/AUSF authenticates the second authentication data.
  • Step 607 in FIG. 6 is illustrated by taking the AUSF authenticating the second authentication data as an example.
  • the UDM may use the first verification data to verify the second authentication data to thereby authenticate the terminal.
  • the AUSF If the AUSF does not forward the second authentication data to the UDM in step 604, the AUSF verifies the second authentication data received in step 603 and stored in step 604 according to the first verification data received in step 606, thereby authenticating the terminal. That is, the AUSF stores the second authentication data in step 604.
  • the UDM/AUSF performs authentication based on the second authentication data RES* and the first verification data XRES*. If RES* and XRES* are the same, it is considered that the UE is successfully authenticated.
  • step 607 can occur after the first verification data is determined in step 605 on the UDM side, or after the first verification data is received in step 606 on the AUSF side, and is not limited here.
  • Step 608 UDM obtains the authentication result.
  • the UDM verifies the second authentication data according to the above step 607 to obtain an authentication result.
  • the AUSF verifies the second authentication data according to the above step 607 to obtain an authentication result, and sends the authentication result to the UDM, so that the UDM obtains the authentication result.
  • step 608 is described by taking the example of the AUSF sending the authentication result to the UDM.
  • the network side may also update the first identifier.
  • the steps are as follows:
  • Step 609 If the authentication result received by the UDM is successful, a third identifier is generated for the UE.
  • Step 610 UDM sends a third identifier or encrypted ciphertext to AUSF.
  • step 610 in which the UDM sends the third identifier to the AUSF is taken as an example for explanation.
  • Step 611 AUSF encrypts the third identifier to generate an encrypted ciphertext.
  • UDM may also encrypt the third identifier, generate encrypted ciphertext, and send the encrypted ciphertext to AUSF.
  • the UDM If in the above step 609, the UDM generates a third identifier and encrypts the third identifier to generate an encrypted ciphertext, then the above step 610 is that the UDM sends the encrypted ciphertext to the AUSF, and the above step 611 may not be executed.
  • Step 612 AUSF sends the encrypted ciphertext and the first authentication data to SEAF.
  • SEAF receives the encrypted ciphertext and the first authentication data.
  • the encrypted ciphertext and/or the first authentication data are transmitted via an authentication response message.
  • the first authentication data can be sent through the same message as the encrypted ciphertext; it can also be sent through different messages, for example, after step 607, AUSF sends the first authentication data and after step 610 or 611, AUSF sends the first encrypted ciphertext.
  • Step 613 SEAF sends the encrypted ciphertext and the first authentication data to the UE.
  • the UE receives the encrypted ciphertext and the first authentication data.
  • This step 613 can be sent via a NAS message. Specifically, it can be an authentication request message. To distinguish the authentication request message in step 603, the authentication request message in step 613 can be called a second authentication request message, and the authentication request message in step 603 can be called a first authentication request message.
  • the first authentication data and the encrypted ciphertext may be sent through the same message; or may be sent through different messages.
  • Step 614 The UE performs authentication of the network in the two-way authentication according to the random number, the first long-term key and the first authentication data.
  • step 510 in FIG. 5 The specific authentication may be understood by referring to step 510 in FIG. 5 above, which will not be described in detail here.
  • the encrypted ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the third identifier, and the third identifier is stored.
  • the third identifier is the updated first identifier, for example, used to generate a message for the terminal to trigger the two-way authentication again, that is, the third identifier is used as the first identifier in step 601 during the next two-way authentication.
  • the UE can replace the original first identifier with the third identifier, or the UE can retain the original first identifier and further store the third identifier. No limitation is made.
  • Step 615 UE sends a message of successful network authentication to UDM through SEAF and AUSF.
  • UDM receives the message of successful network authentication of UE.
  • step 609 can also be performed after step 615, that is, UDM generates a third identifier (the encrypted ciphertext is similar and will not be repeated) and sends the third identifier when determining that both authentications are successful.
  • the UDM may generate the third identifier first, and then send the third identifier after step 615. That is, the UDM sends the third identifier when determining that both bidirectional authentications are successful.
  • Step 616 The UDM stores the third identifier.
  • the UDM may update the first identifier to the third identifier, see step 518a for details.
  • the UDM may also pre-calculate a new second identifier based on the third identifier.
  • This method uses a symmetric cryptographic mechanism to protect user privacy while combining the transmission of the terminal's identity (i.e., the first identification), the main authentication, and the transmission process of the new terminal identity (i.e., the third identification), thereby saving transmission consumption.
  • the use of a 256-bit symmetric cryptographic algorithm can achieve the beneficial effect of anti-quantum attack and reduce the computation and transmission consumption introduced by the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm.
  • this process sends the second identification together with the second authentication data used to authenticate the terminal, which can save signaling overhead and improve data processing efficiency.
  • Step 701 to step 708 are the same as the execution process of step 601 to step 608 in FIG. 6 , which can be understood by reference and will not be described in detail here.
  • Step 709 AUSF sends the first authentication data to SEAF. Accordingly, SEAF receives the first authentication data.
  • the first authentication data is transmitted through an authentication vector acquisition response message.
  • Step 710 SEAF sends first authentication data to UE.
  • UE receives the first authentication data.
  • This step 710 may be sent via a NAS message. Specifically, it may be an authentication request message. To distinguish the authentication request message in step 703, the authentication request message in step 710 may be referred to as a second authentication request message, and the authentication request message in step 703 may be referred to as a first authentication request message.
  • Step 711 The UE performs authentication of the network in a two-way authentication according to the random number, the first long-term key and the first authentication data.
  • step 510 in FIG. 5 This can be understood by referring to step 510 in FIG. 5 , and will not be described in detail here.
  • Step 712 UE sends a message of successful network authentication to UDM through SEAF and AUSF.
  • UDM receives the message of successful network authentication of UE.
  • Step 713 If the authentication result received by the UDM is successful, a third identifier is generated for the UE.
  • UDM can also encrypt the third identifier to obtain encrypted ciphertext.
  • the third identifier is RAND'
  • UDM can encrypt RAND' to generate encrypted ciphertext.
  • the process of generating the third identifier and encrypting the third identifier can be understood by referring to steps 408 and 409 in FIG. 4B , or step 516 in FIG. 5 , or step 609 in FIG. 6 , and will not be described in detail here.
  • Step 714 UDM sends a third identifier or encrypted ciphertext to the UE through the UPU process.
  • step 714 is taken as an example for explaining that the UDM sends encrypted ciphertext to the UE through the UPU process.
  • Step 715a The UE decrypts the encrypted ciphertext to obtain the third identifier, or directly decrypts to obtain the third identifier.
  • the UE stores a third identifier.
  • the third identifier is an updated first identifier, for example, used to generate a message for the terminal to trigger the two-way authentication again, that is, the third identifier is used as the first identifier in step 701 during the next two-way authentication.
  • the UE can replace the original first identifier with the third identifier, or the UE retains the original first identifier and further stores the third identifier. No limitation is made.
  • the UE sends a confirmation message to the UDM indicating that the UE successfully receives the third identifier, so as to trigger the execution of step 715b.
  • Step 715b UDM stores the third identifier.
  • the UDM may update the first identifier to the third identifier, see step 715a for details.
  • the UDM may also pre-calculate a new second identifier based on the third identifier.
  • This method combines the transmission process of the terminal identity (i.e., the first identification) transmission, the main authentication and the new terminal identity (i.e., the third identification) transmission process while using a symmetric cryptographic mechanism to protect user privacy, thereby saving transmission consumption.
  • the use of a 256-bit symmetric cryptographic algorithm can achieve the beneficial effect of anti-quantum attack and reduce the calculation and transmission consumption introduced by the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm.
  • the process sends the second identification together with the second authentication data used to authenticate the terminal, which can save signaling overhead and improve data processing efficiency.
  • the scheme of Figure 7 has smaller changes and is more adapted to the needs of the current communication system.
  • Step 801 A terminal obtains a first key identifier of the terminal, where the first key identifier indicates a first long-term key of the terminal.
  • the terminal may obtain the first key identifier from the configuration parameters of the SIM or USIM of the terminal.
  • the network-side device After the terminal's identity authentication is successful, the network-side device generates a new first key identifier and sends it to the terminal. After the terminal stores the new first key identifier, the terminal reads the first key identifier from the storage location of the new first key identifier (e.g., SIM, USIM, or ME).
  • the storage location of the new first key identifier e.g., SIM, USIM, or ME.
  • the first key identifier is obtained from the ME, and the first long-term key is obtained from the USIM or the SIM.
  • the first long-term key and the first key identifier are obtained from the USIM or SIM.
  • the first key identifier may be a temporary key identifier generated by the network after the terminal is successfully authenticated and sent to the UE, and the first key identifier is not specifically limited herein.
  • the terminal also obtains a first subscription permanent identifier preconfigured in the terminal.
  • the terminal may obtain the first subscription permanent identifier from a SIM or a USIM.
  • the terminal may preconfigure multiple first key identifiers, for example, a first key identifier resource pool.
  • each first key identifier is used only for one identity authentication, so that the first key identifier for each identity authentication in multiple identity authentications is different. For example, each time when authenticating with the network, a first key identifier is selected from the first key identifier resource pool as the first key identifier used for identity authentication, and the selected first key identifier in the first key identifier resource pool is deleted.
  • a first key identifier is selected from a resource pool of first key identifiers as a first key identifier used for identity authentication, the selected first key identifier is not deleted.
  • Step 802 The terminal generates a communication key based on the first key identifier and the first long-term key.
  • the terminal may use the first long-term key to perform encryption operation on the first key identifier to obtain the communication key.
  • the communication key is a symmetric key for encrypting and protecting the SUPI, EK
  • MK KDF(K, KID, SN Name), where EK
  • Step 803 The terminal determines an identity hiding identifier, where the identity hiding identifier includes a first encrypted ciphertext and a first key identifier, where the first encrypted ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the first subscription permanent identifier of the terminal using a communication key.
  • the identity hiding identifier may be understood as SUCI, and the first subscription permanent identifier may be understood as SUPI, which are not specifically limited herein.
  • the structure of SUCI in this application is shown in FIG9 , which is equivalent to replacing the Home Network Public Key Id in the existing SUCI with KID.
  • the communication key EK is used to encrypt SUPI to generate a first encrypted ciphertext C
  • the communication key MK is used to encrypt the ciphertext generated by SUPI to perform integrity protection, and generate a message authentication code MAC tag value.
  • the scheme out part of SUCI is the concatenation of the first encrypted ciphertext C and the message authentication code MAC tag value, that is, C
  • the scheme out part of SUCI does not need to transmit a temporary public key. Instead, only the encrypted first ciphertext and the message authentication code MAC tag value can be sent.
  • Step 804 The terminal sends an identity hiding identifier.
  • the device on the network side receives the identity hiding identifier.
  • the above step 804 may be sent via a registration request or an identity authentication request, which is not specifically limited here.
  • Step 805 The network-side device determines a second long-term key and a preconfigured second subscription permanent identifier of the terminal according to the first key identifier, and the second long-term key and the first long-term key of the terminal are symmetric keys.
  • the device on the network side obtains the first key identifier from the received identity hiding identifier according to the data structure of the identity hiding identifier, for example, obtains the first key identifier KID from the location where the SUCI stores the KID, and the device on the network side (for example, UDM or ARPF) can pre-configure the correspondence between the first key identifier and the second long-term key and the pre-configured second subscription permanent identifier of the terminal.
  • the device on the network side can retrieve the second long-term key and the pre-configured second subscription permanent identifier according to the first key identifier.
  • Step 806 The device on the network side determines the communication key according to the second long-term key, and uses the communication key to decrypt the first encrypted ciphertext to obtain the first subscription permanent identifier of the terminal.
  • step 806 The method for determining the communication key in the above step 806 can be understood by referring to step 802 and will not be repeated here.
  • the device on the network side can obtain the first encrypted ciphertext C and the message authentication code MAC tag value from the received identity hiding identifier according to the data structure of the identity hiding identifier.
  • the message authentication code MAC tag value is verified using the communication key MK and the first encrypted ciphertext. If the verification passes, the first encrypted ciphertext C is decrypted using the communication key CK to obtain the first subscription permanent identifier of the terminal.
  • the verification of MAC tag value can be performed in the following manner: the first encrypted ciphertext C is MAC calculated using the communication key MK to obtain the message authentication code MAC tag value2, and the MAC tag value2 is compared to see if they are the same. If they are the same, the verification passes, and if they are not the same, the verification fails.
  • Step 807 The network-side device authenticates the terminal according to the first subscription permanent identifier and the second subscription permanent identifier.
  • the above steps 806 and 807 can both be executed by UDM or ARPF.
  • the terminal authentication is successful; if they are not the same, the terminal authentication fails.
  • the network side device can deduce the communication keys EK and MK based on the first key identifier, the service network, etc., and use MK to perform integrity check on the MAC tag value of the schemeout part. If the MAC tag value is verified, the first encrypted ciphertext is decrypted using EK to obtain the decoded SUPI (that is, the first subscription permanent identifier).
  • the network side device compares the decrypted SUPI with the pre-configured SUPI retrieved by the first key identifier in the above step 805 to see if they are consistent; if they are consistent, the network side device considers that the terminal identity authentication is successful.
  • the terminal generates a communication key based on the first key identifier and the first long-term key, and encrypts the first subscription permanent identifier preconfigured in the terminal based on the communication key to obtain a first encrypted ciphertext.
  • the first encrypted ciphertext and the first key identifier are then sent to the network side as the content of the identity hiding identifier, so that the network side can determine the second long-term key and verify the first subscription permanent identifier.
  • the terminal and the network side use symmetric (identical) communication keys for encryption and decryption, which can reduce the data processing complexity of the subscription permanent identifier encryption.
  • the first key identifier can be updated to ensure that the first key identifier in the SUCI is different during the terminal identity authentication. Even if the first key identifier is stolen during a terminal authentication, the identity of the terminal cannot be obtained, thereby ensuring the security of the terminal identity information. Referring to FIG. 8B, after executing the above steps 801 to 807, the following steps are also included:
  • Step 808 When the terminal is successfully authenticated, the network-side device generates a second key identifier, which is used to generate an identity hiding identifier for the terminal to access the network again.
  • the second key identifier can be a random number generated by a random number generator.
  • the second key identifier can be composed of a random number generated by a random number generator and a proprietary identifier (for example, a PLMN identifier).
  • the device on the network side (for example, UDM) maintains a resource pool of second key identifiers, and each time the network successfully authenticates the terminal, a second key identifier is randomly selected from the resource pool.
  • the device on the network side maintains an increasing serial number of a fixed length, and each time the network successfully authenticates a terminal, the current serial number is selected as the second key identifier of the terminal.
  • the generation method of the second key identifier is not specifically limited here.
  • the above step 808 can be performed by UDM or ARPF.
  • the device on the network side stores a second key identifier.
  • the second key identifier is an updated first key identifier, for example, used to generate an identity hiding identifier for the terminal to access the network again, that is, the second key identifier is used as the first key identifier in step 801 the next time the terminal accesses the network.
  • the UDM can replace the original first key identifier with the second key identifier, or the UDM retains the original first key identifier and further stores the second key identifier. No limitation is made.
  • Step 809 The device on the network side uses the communication key to encrypt the second key identifier to obtain a second encrypted ciphertext.
  • a second key identifier is generated for the terminal.
  • UDM or ARPF can use EK to encrypt the second key identifier to obtain a second encrypted ciphertext.
  • Step 810 The device on the network side sends a second encrypted ciphertext.
  • the second encrypted ciphertext in the above step 810 may be transmitted to the terminal by the UDM or ARPF via the AUSF and SEAF.
  • the device on the network side may also use the terminal parameter update process to transmit the encrypted ciphertext.
  • the encrypted ciphertext is transmitted through the UPU process.
  • the second encrypted ciphertext is used as the UPU data in the UPU process.
  • the device on the network side may also use a UPU process to encrypt and transmit the second key identifier.
  • the second key identifier is used as UPU data in the UPU process.
  • Step 811 The terminal uses the communication key to decrypt the second encrypted ciphertext to obtain a second key identifier of the terminal.
  • the terminal may store the second key identifier, and it should be understood that the second key identifier is an updated first key identifier, for example, used to generate an identity hiding identifier for the terminal to access the network again, that is, the second key identifier is used as the first key identifier in step 801 the next time the terminal accesses the network.
  • the terminal may replace the original first key identifier with the second key identifier, or the terminal may retain the original first key identifier and further store the second key identifier. No limitation is made.
  • the terminal may send a confirmation message to the network side device indicating that the terminal has successfully received the second key identifier.
  • the network side device may store the second key identifier.
  • the terminal can update the first key identifier based on the second key identifier.
  • the communication key can be determined based on the second key identifier and the first long-term key, and the first subscription permanent identifier can be encrypted based on the communication key.
  • the communication key is different from the communication key determined based on the first key identifier and the first long-term key. Based on this, each time the network is accessed, the first encrypted ciphertext encrypted by the communication key in the identity hiding identifier is different, and even if the identity hiding identifier is stolen, the user's identity information cannot be decrypted, thereby ensuring the security of the user's identity information.
  • each device may include a hardware structure and/or software module corresponding to each function.
  • the embodiments of the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in the form of hardware or computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to exceed the scope of the present application.
  • the embodiment of the present application can divide the functional units of the device according to the above method example, for example, each functional unit can be divided according to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one unit.
  • the above integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.
  • FIG10 shows a possible exemplary block diagram of a communication device involved in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 1000 may include: a processing unit 1001 and a transceiver unit 1002.
  • the processing unit 1001 is used to control and manage the actions of the communication device 1000.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is used to support the communication of the communication device 1000 with other devices.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 may include a receiving unit and/or a sending unit, which are respectively used to perform receiving and sending operations.
  • the communication device 1000 may also include a storage unit for storing program code and/or data of the communication device 1000.
  • the transceiver unit may be referred to as an input-output unit, a communication unit, etc., and the transceiver unit may be a transceiver; the processing unit may be a processor.
  • the communication device is a module (such as a chip) in a communication device
  • the transceiver unit may be an input-output interface, an input-output circuit or an input-output pin, etc., and may also be referred to as an interface, a communication interface or an interface circuit, etc.
  • the processing unit may be a processor, a processing circuit or a logic circuit, etc.
  • the device may be the above-mentioned terminal, network side equipment such as SEAF, AUSF and UDM, etc.
  • the specific execution process may refer to the description of the above-mentioned method embodiment and will not be described in detail here.
  • the communication device 1000 is a terminal, and the processing unit 1001 is used to obtain a first identifier of the terminal and a first long-term key of the terminal; the transceiver unit 1002 is used to send a first message, wherein the first message is used to trigger two-way authentication, the first message includes a second identifier, and the second identifier is used to determine a second long-term key for authenticating the terminal in the two-way authentication, the second identifier is determined based on the first identifier, and the second long-term key and the first long-term key are symmetric keys; the transceiver unit 1002 is also used to receive first authentication data; the processing unit 1001 is also used to perform authentication of the network in the two-way authentication based on a random number, the first long-term key and the first authentication data, wherein the random number is generated based on the first identifier.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is also used to receive encrypted ciphertext; the processing unit 1001 is also used to decrypt the encrypted ciphertext using a communication key to obtain a third identifier of the terminal, wherein the communication key is derived from the first long-term key, and the third identifier is used to generate a message for the terminal to trigger two-way authentication again.
  • the first message also includes: second authentication data for authenticating the terminal.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is further configured to send a confirmation message indicating that the terminal has successfully received the third identifier.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is further configured to receive encrypted ciphertext using a terminal parameter update process.
  • the second identifier is determined by one of the following:
  • the first identifier or, the first identifier and the first long-term key; or, the first identifier, the first long-term key, and a count value, wherein the count value indicates the number of times the terminal triggers two-way authentication.
  • the communication device 1000 is a device on the network side (for example, UDM), and the transceiver unit 1002 is used to receive the second identifier of the terminal; the processing unit 1001 is used to determine the first identifier of the terminal and the second long-term key for authenticating the terminal in two-way authentication based on the second identifier, and the second long-term key and the first long-term key of the terminal are symmetric keys; the verification data is determined based on the second long-term key and the random number, and the verification data is used to perform authentication of the terminal in two-way authentication, and the random number is determined based on the first identifier; the first authentication data used to authenticate the network in two-way authentication is determined based on the second long-term key and the random number; the transceiver unit 1002 is also used to send the first authentication data.
  • the processing unit 1001 is used to determine the first identifier of the terminal and the second long-term key for authenticating the terminal in two-way authentication based on the second identifier, and the
  • the communication device 1000 is a terminal
  • the processing unit 1001 is used to obtain a first key identifier of the terminal, the first key identifier indicating a first long-term key of the terminal; generate a communication key based on the first key identifier and the first long-term key; determine an identity hiding identifier, the identity hiding identifier includes a first encrypted ciphertext and a first key identifier, the first encrypted ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the first subscription permanent identifier of the terminal using the communication key; the transceiver unit 1002 is used to send the identity hiding identifier.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is also used to receive a second encrypted ciphertext; the processing unit 1001 is also used to decrypt the second encrypted ciphertext using the communication key to obtain a second key identifier of the terminal, and the second key identifier is used to generate an identity hiding identifier for the terminal to access the network again.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is further configured to receive the second encrypted ciphertext using a terminal parameter update procedure.
  • the communication device 1000 is a device on the network side (such as UDM or ARPF), and the transceiver unit 1002 is used to receive the identity hiding identifier of the terminal, and the identity hiding identifier includes a first encrypted ciphertext and a first key identifier; the processing unit 1001 is used to determine the second long-term key and the pre-configured second subscription permanent identifier of the terminal according to the first key identifier, and the second long-term key and the first long-term key of the terminal are symmetric keys; the first encrypted ciphertext is decrypted based on the communication key to obtain the first subscription permanent identifier of the terminal, and the communication key is derived from the second long-term key; the terminal is authenticated according to the first subscription permanent identifier and the second subscription permanent identifier.
  • the identity hiding identifier includes a first encrypted ciphertext and a first key identifier
  • the processing unit 1001 is used to determine the second long-term key and the pre-configured second subscription permanent identifier of
  • the processing unit 1001 is also used to generate a second key identifier, which is used to generate an identity hiding identifier for the terminal to access the network again; the second key identifier is encrypted using the communication key to obtain a second encrypted ciphertext; and the transceiver unit 1002 is also used to send the second encrypted ciphertext.
  • the processing unit 1001 is configured to store the second key identifier.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is further configured to receive confirmation information that the terminal successfully receives the second key identifier.
  • the transceiver unit 1002 is further configured to send the second encrypted ciphertext using a terminal parameter update process.
  • the present application also provides a communication device 1100.
  • the communication device 1100 may be a chip or a chip system.
  • the communication device may be located in a device involved in any of the above method embodiments, such as a first terminal, a network device, etc., to perform actions corresponding to the device.
  • the chip system may consist of the chip, or may include the chip and other discrete devices.
  • the communication device 1100 includes a processor 1110 .
  • the processor 1110 is used to execute the computer program stored in the memory 1120 to implement the actions of each device in any of the above method embodiments.
  • the communication device 1100 may further include a memory 1120 for storing computer programs.
  • the memory 1120 is coupled to the processor 1110. Coupling is an indirect coupling or communication connection between devices, units or modules, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms, for information exchange between devices, units or modules.
  • the memory 1120 is integrated with the processor 1110.
  • the processor 1110 and the memory 1120 may be one or more and are not limited.
  • the communication device 1100 may include or exclude the transceiver 1130, which is illustrated by a dotted box in the figure.
  • the communication device 1100 may exchange information with other devices through the transceiver 1130.
  • the transceiver 1130 may be a circuit, a bus, or any other device that can be used for information exchange.
  • the communication device 1100 may be the first terminal or the network device in the implementation of the above methods.
  • the specific connection medium between the above-mentioned transceiver 1130, the processor 1110 and the memory 1120 is not limited.
  • the memory 1120, the processor 1110 and the transceiver 1130 are connected by a bus in FIG. 11, and the bus is represented by a thick line in FIG. 11.
  • the connection mode between other components is only for schematic illustration and is not limited.
  • the bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, only one thick line is used in FIG. 11, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
  • the processor can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor, an application-specific integrated circuit, a field programmable gate array or other programmable logic device, a discrete gate or transistor logic device, a discrete hardware component, and can implement or execute the various methods, steps and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc.
  • the steps of the method disclosed in the embodiment of the present application can be directly embodied as a hardware processor to be executed, or a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor can be executed.
  • the memory may be a non-volatile memory, such as a hard disk drive (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD), etc., or a volatile memory (volatile memory), such as a random-access memory (RAM).
  • the memory may also be any other medium that can be used to carry or store the desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto.
  • the memory in the embodiments of the present application may also be a circuit or any other device that can implement a storage function, for storing computer programs, program instructions and/or data.
  • the embodiments of the present application also provide another communication device 1200, including: an interface circuit 1210 and a logic circuit 1220; the interface circuit 1210 can be understood as an input-output interface, which can be used to execute the receiving and sending steps of each device in any of the above method embodiments; the logic circuit 1220 can be used to run codes or instructions to execute the method executed by each device in any of the above embodiments, which will not be repeated.
  • the embodiments of the present application further provide a computer-readable storage medium, which stores instructions.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may include: a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory, a random access memory, a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and other media that can store program codes.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a communication system, which includes the terminal, UDM, AUSF, SEAF, and/or ARPF and other devices mentioned in any of the above method embodiments, and can be used to execute the method executed by each device in any of the above method embodiments.
  • the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.
  • CD-ROM compact disc read-only memory
  • optical storage etc.
  • These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a product including an instruction device that implements the functions specified in one or more processes in the flowchart and/or one or more boxes in the block diagram.
  • These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operational steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, whereby the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more processes in the flowchart and/or one or more boxes in the block diagram.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente demande se rapporte au domaine technique des communications. L'invention concerne un procédé et un appareil de communication. Un terminal acquiert un premier identifiant et une première clé à long terme du terminal. Le terminal peut envoyer à un réseau un premier message transportant un second identifiant qui est déterminé sur la base du premier identifiant de façon à déclencher une authentification mutuelle. Ainsi, sur la base du second identifiant, le réseau peut déterminer une seconde clé à long terme qui est symétrique à la première clé à long terme du terminal, puis authentifier le terminal sur la base de la seconde clé à long terme. Le terminal peut générer un nombre aléatoire sur la base du premier identifiant, puis authentifier le réseau sur la base de la première clé à long terme, de premières données d'authentification provenant du réseau et du nombre aléatoire. Le terminal et le réseau effectuent une authentification mutuelle au moyen de clés symétriques, sans nécessiter des calculs complexes. En outre, au cours de l'authentification mutuelle entre le terminal et le réseau, le nombre aléatoire pour l'authentification mutuelle est généré sur la base du premier identifiant. Le réseau et le terminal n'ont donc pas besoin de transporter le nombre aléatoire pendant l'interaction de signalisation permettant l'authentification mutuelle, ce qui améliore encore l'efficacité d'authentification mutuelle et économise des ressources de signalisation.
PCT/CN2024/140605 2023-12-28 2024-12-19 Procédé et appareil de communication Pending WO2025139994A1 (fr)

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