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WO2025131541A1 - Procédé de signature d'un rapport de dispositif - Google Patents

Procédé de signature d'un rapport de dispositif Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2025131541A1
WO2025131541A1 PCT/EP2024/083235 EP2024083235W WO2025131541A1 WO 2025131541 A1 WO2025131541 A1 WO 2025131541A1 EP 2024083235 W EP2024083235 W EP 2024083235W WO 2025131541 A1 WO2025131541 A1 WO 2025131541A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
cloud server
report
field
field device
user
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
PCT/EP2024/083235
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Bastian Engel
Benjamin Fuchs
Julian Renz
Ingolf STACKE
Julien Messer
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Endress and Hauser Process Solutions AG
Original Assignee
Endress and Hauser Process Solutions AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Endress and Hauser Process Solutions AG filed Critical Endress and Hauser Process Solutions AG
Publication of WO2025131541A1 publication Critical patent/WO2025131541A1/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
    • G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
    • G05B19/418—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS] or computer integrated manufacturing [CIM]
    • G05B19/4185—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS] or computer integrated manufacturing [CIM] characterised by the network communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/30—Nc systems
    • G05B2219/31—From computer integrated manufacturing till monitoring
    • G05B2219/31121—Fielddevice, field controller, interface connected to fieldbus

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for signing a device report.
  • Field devices used in industrial plants are already known from the state of the art. Field devices are widely used in process automation technology as well as in production automation technology. Field devices are all devices that are used close to the process and that provide or process-relevant information. Field devices are used to record and/or influence process variables. Measuring devices or sensors are used to record process variables. These are used, for example, for pressure and temperature measurement, conductivity measurement, flow measurement, pH measurement, level measurement, etc. and record the corresponding process variables pressure, temperature, conductivity, pH value, level, flow, etc. Actuators are used to influence process variables. These are, for example, pumps or valves that can influence the flow of a liquid in a pipe or the fill level in a container. In addition to the measuring devices and actuators mentioned above, field devices also include remote I/Os, wireless adapters, and generally devices that are arranged at the field level.
  • field devices are usually connected to higher-level units via communication networks such as fieldbuses (Profibus®, Foundation® Fieldbus, HART®, etc.).
  • These higher-level units are usually control systems (DCS) or control units, such as a PLC (programmable logic controller).
  • DCS control systems
  • PLC programmable logic controller
  • the higher-level units are used, among other things, for process control, process visualization, process monitoring, and for commissioning the field devices.
  • the measured values recorded by the field devices are transmitted via the respective bus system to one (or possibly several) higher-level units.
  • data transmission from the higher-level unit via the bus system to the field devices in particular for the configuration and parameterization of field devices and for the control of actuators.
  • Mobile operating devices are often used to operate field devices (e.g., parameterize or retrieve data). These are connected to a field device either wired (e.g., via a service interface) or wirelessly (e.g., via Bluetooth). Examples of operating devices include laptops, mobile devices such as smartphones or tablets, or central asset management stations.
  • operating programs To operate the field devices, appropriate operating programs (operating tools) are required. These programs run either independently on the higher-level units or in the mobile operating devices (Endress+Hauser FieldCare, PACTware, AMS Fisher-Rosemount, PDM Siemens) or are integrated into control center applications (Siemens PCS7, ABB Symphony, Emerson Delta V).
  • operating includes, among other things, parameterizing the field device, updating the field device, and/or querying and visualizing process data and/or diagnostic data from the field device.
  • DTMs Device Type Managers
  • FDT Field Device Tool
  • Device drivers offer the ability to evaluate, diagnose, and/or verify specific device functionalities.
  • Many modern field devices for example, enable self-tests, such as within the framework of the "heartbeat" (a self-test functionality or SIL functionality implemented in the applicant's field devices).
  • the results of these self-tests, evaluations, etc. are output by the device driver in a report.
  • This driver receives the relevant report parameters, i.e., test results, device status, etc.
  • the report is sent directly to a printer and printed out in physical form.
  • the report is processed, for example, by service personnel, who perform a visual inspection of the report and then sign it. After the signature has been received, the report is scanned or physically stored.
  • a method for creating such reports is known, for example, from DE 102021 124 249 A1.
  • a disadvantage of this method is that creating and storing physical reports is time-consuming. Therefore, the creation of electronic reports is proposed in the prior art. However, the problem with this is that the authenticity of the report cannot currently be guaranteed.
  • the method according to the invention comprises:
  • Providing a system comprising a field device, a user device and a cloud server, wherein the field device 10 has a first communication unit, the user device has a second communication unit, and the cloud server has an access point and a private key 34, Reading field device data and field device information from the field device by the user device, Creating a device report of the field device by the user device based on the field device data and field device information,
  • the method according to the invention makes it possible to create a device report whose authenticity can be reliably verified. Furthermore, the creation of the device report is secure and simple.
  • identification of the user device takes place when connecting the user device to the cloud server.
  • the user device further comprises a public key and the user device verifies the device report certificate using the public key.
  • the cloud server is integrated into a local network.
  • the above-mentioned object is further achieved by a method for signing a device report of a field device according to claim 5.
  • the method according to the invention comprises:
  • the above-mentioned object is further achieved by a method for signing a device report of a field device according to claim 6.
  • the method according to the invention comprises:
  • Reading field device data and field device information from the field device by the cloud server
  • Fig. 1 a schematic representation of a field device, a user device and a cloud server,
  • Figure 1 shows a system 100 comprising a field device 10, a user device 20, and a cloud server 30.
  • the system 100 enables the creation of a secure and authenticatable device report 22 for the field device 10.
  • the field device 10 comprises a sensor, for example a pH sensor, a conductivity sensor, or another sensor (not shown). Furthermore, the field device 10 comprises a transmitter connected to the sensor and suitable for processing the sensor data generated by the sensor (not shown).
  • the field device 10 comprises a first communication unit 11, for example a Bluetooth module, a WLAN module, or another communication module, such as a wired communication module, which is suitable for communicating via HART.
  • the field device 10 is suitable for creating a device report 22 and sending it to the cloud server 30 by means of the first communication unit 11 (dashed arrow in Figure 1 ).
  • the user device 20 is, for example, a tablet, smartphone, or a PC with FieldCare software.
  • the user device 20 comprises a second communication unit 21, which enables internet-capable and/or intranet-capable communication.
  • the user device 20 preferably has user information that makes it possible to identify the user of the user device 20.
  • a password must be entered when starting the user device 20 to prevent an unauthorized user from using the user device 20.
  • the user information includes, for example, a user number, a user name, or information about the current shift of the maintenance personnel, or information about the user's customer organization.
  • the second communication unit 21 is suitable for connecting to the first communication module of the field device 10 and to the access point 33 of the cloud server 30, wherein the access point 33 is to be understood as merely a communication unit that is necessary to access the cloud server 30.
  • the second communication unit 21 is a Bluetooth module, a WLAN module, a mobile radio module such as LTE or similar, or another communication module, such as a wired communication module suitable for communicating via HART.
  • the second communication unit 21 can also comprise multiple communication means, for example a Bluetooth module and an LTE module.
  • the user device 20 is suitable for creating the device report 22 for the field device 10. The method for creating the device report 22 will be discussed in detail below.
  • the user device 20 further comprises a public key 24 for verifying the device report 22.
  • the public key 24 is a cryptographic key.
  • the public key 24 is publicly accessible and can be downloaded, for example, from the website of the manufacturer of the field device 10.
  • the cloud server 30 has an access point 33 and a private key 34.
  • the access point 33 is, for example, a WLAN antenna or a A mobile radio antenna or a cable input, each of which enables access to the Internet or another network. As mentioned above, the access point 33 can also be another communications unit, for example, a wired network.
  • the cloud server 30 preferably has a database (not shown).
  • the database particularly comprises a user database and a device database.
  • the user database stores, for example, data for authenticating user information and user accounts.
  • the device database stores, for example, data for authenticating field device information and a list of the field devices assigned to the user account.
  • the private key 34 is a cryptographic key known only to the cloud server 30.
  • the private key 34 is complementary to the public key 24 and enables the signing of a document, in particular a device report 22.
  • the signed device report 22 is called the device report certificate 35.
  • the private key 34 is located on the cloud server 30 in a secure location that is not accessible to third parties. The advantage of the private key 34 being located on the cloud server 30 is that it prevents unauthorized access to the private key 34.
  • the private key 34 is preferably protected on the cloud server 30 by an HSM module, so the private key 34 is never stored in plain text on the cloud server 30.
  • This is a special hardware that stores the keys in a secure memory and only makes them usable from outside, but the key itself never leaves the secure memory.
  • role-based access restrictions are preferably implemented on the cloud server 30, which prevent unauthorized persons from accessing the private key 34.
  • the private key 34 is provided by the manufacturer of the field device 10 in the cloud server 30, so that authentication of the device report 22 of the field device 10 is possible using the device report 22 signed with the private key 34.
  • the following describes the method according to the invention for creating the device report 22 of the field device 10. An exemplary embodiment of the method is shown in Figure 2.
  • the system 100 described above including the field device 10, the user device 20, and the cloud server 30, is provided. All components of the system 100 are operational.
  • the user has activated the user device 20, i.e., logged in there if the user device 20 has such a login function.
  • the user is also logged in to the cloud server 30, i.e., identified or authenticated.
  • the user device 20 is connected to the field device 10 (see Figure 2, S1).
  • the connection is established via the second communication unit 21 and the first communication unit 11.
  • This is preferably a wireless connection, in particular a Bluetooth connection.
  • communication between the user device 20 and the field device 10 is established via a cable connection.
  • the device report 22 of the field device 10 is then created by the user device 20.
  • Creating the device report 22 involves reading the field device data FD and the field device information Fl from the field device 10 by the user device 20 (see Figure 2, S2). The data reading is also represented, for example, by the arrow between the field device 10 and the user device 20 in Figure 1.
  • the user device 20 evaluates the field device data FD and the field device information Fl and then creates the device report 22, which provides information about the current status of the field device 10. For example, the device report 22 includes whether calibration is necessary due to sensor drift or other reasons.
  • the device report 22 is thus created by the user device 20 according to this first embodiment.
  • the user device 20 is connected to the cloud server 30 (see Figure 2, S3).
  • the connection is established using the second communication unit 21 described above and the access point 33 of the cloud server 30.
  • the connection is preferably a wireless Internet connection via a mobile network, or a wired connection, for example, via a local network or an intranet.
  • identification preferably occurs, i.e., the user logs into their user account in the database of the cloud server 30. This prevents a device report certificate from being created for counterfeit field devices.
  • the device report 22 is sent from the user device 20 to the cloud server 30 (see Figure 2, S4) and double arrow in Figure 1 .
  • the device report 22 is then signed with the private key 34 by the cloud server 30, creating a device report certificate 35 (see Figure 2, S5).
  • the device report certificate 35 includes the device report 22, which was signed with the private key 34.
  • the device report certificate 35 together with the public key 24, enables a user to recognize that the device report certificate 35 is an authentic document that actually originates from the field device 10.
  • a user uses the public key 24 to decrypt the device report certificate 35 created with the private key 34.
  • the signature created by the private key 34 is preferably visible in the file properties of the device report certificate 35.
  • the device report certificate 35 is then sent from the cloud server 30 to the user device 20 (see Figure 2, S6) as well as the double arrow in Figure 1.
  • a copy of the device report certificate 35 can of course remain on the cloud server 30 and be assigned, for example, to the user's user account.
  • the device report 22 is created on the field device 10 and sent to the cloud server 30 via the first communication unit 11 (see dashed arrow in Figure 1). All subsequent steps up to receipt on the user device 20 are identical to the embodiment first described above.
  • the device report 22 is created on the field device 10 and sent to the user device 20 via the first communication unit 11. The device report 22 is then sent from the user device 20 to the cloud server 30. All subsequent steps up to receipt on the user device 20 are identical to the embodiment first described above.
  • field device data FD and field device information Fl are read from field device 10 by cloud server 30 (dashed arrow in Figure 1). Subsequently, a device report 22 of field device 10 is created by cloud server 30 based on field device data FD and field device information Fl. All subsequent steps up to receipt on user device 20 are identical to the first-described embodiment.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Manufacturing & Machinery (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de signature d'un rapport de dispositif (22) pour un dispositif de terrain (10), comprenant les étapes consistant à : • - fourniture d'un système comprenant un dispositif de terrain (10), un dispositif utilisateur (20) et un serveur cloud (30), ledit serveur cloud (30) disposant d'une clé privée (34), • - lecture des données du dispositif de terrain et des informations du dispositif de terrain à partir du dispositif de terrain (10) au moyen du dispositif utilisateur (20), • - générer un rapport de dispositif (22) pour le dispositif de terrain (10) sur la base des données du dispositif de terrain et des informations du dispositif de terrain au moyen du dispositif utilisateur (20), • - connecter le dispositif utilisateur (20) au serveur cloud (30), • - transmettre le rapport de dispositif (22) du dispositif utilisateur (20) au serveur cloud (30), • - signer le rapport de dispositif (22) à l'aide de la clé privée (34) au moyen du serveur cloud (30) de manière à produire un certificat de rapport de dispositif (35), et • - transmettre le certificat de rapport de dispositif (35) du serveur cloud (30) au dispositif utilisateur (20).
PCT/EP2024/083235 2023-12-22 2024-11-22 Procédé de signature d'un rapport de dispositif Pending WO2025131541A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102023136445.6A DE102023136445A1 (de) 2023-12-22 2023-12-22 Verfahren zum Signieren eines Geräteberichts
DE102023136445.6 2023-12-22

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2025131541A1 true WO2025131541A1 (fr) 2025-06-26

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2024/083235 Pending WO2025131541A1 (fr) 2023-12-22 2024-11-22 Procédé de signature d'un rapport de dispositif

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DE (1) DE102023136445A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2025131541A1 (fr)

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102016124146A1 (de) * 2016-12-13 2018-06-14 Endress+Hauser Process Solutions Ag Verfahren zur Inbetriebnahme oder Wartung eines Feldgeräts der Automatisierungstechnik
DE102017102677A1 (de) * 2017-02-10 2018-08-16 Endress+Hauser Conducta Gmbh+Co. Kg Verfahren zur Authentifizierung eines Feldgeräts der Automatisierungstechnik
DE102019134895A1 (de) * 2019-12-18 2021-06-24 Endress+Hauser SE+Co. KG Verfahren zum rückführungsfreien Übertragen feldgerätebezogener Daten
DE102021124249A1 (de) 2021-09-20 2023-03-23 Endress+Hauser Process Solutions Ag Verfahren zum Erfassen von Ergebnissen einer Evaluierung, Diagnose und/oder Überprüfung von zumindest einer Gerätefunktionalität eines Feldgeräts

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB0119629D0 (en) * 2001-08-10 2001-10-03 Cryptomathic As Data certification method and apparatus
DE102020120300A1 (de) * 2020-07-31 2022-02-03 Endress+Hauser Flowtec Ag Verfahren zum Detektieren einer etwaigen Manipulation einer Automatisierungskomponente
US12328399B2 (en) * 2022-03-17 2025-06-10 Zebra Technologies Corporation Sensor data authentication

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102016124146A1 (de) * 2016-12-13 2018-06-14 Endress+Hauser Process Solutions Ag Verfahren zur Inbetriebnahme oder Wartung eines Feldgeräts der Automatisierungstechnik
DE102017102677A1 (de) * 2017-02-10 2018-08-16 Endress+Hauser Conducta Gmbh+Co. Kg Verfahren zur Authentifizierung eines Feldgeräts der Automatisierungstechnik
DE102019134895A1 (de) * 2019-12-18 2021-06-24 Endress+Hauser SE+Co. KG Verfahren zum rückführungsfreien Übertragen feldgerätebezogener Daten
DE102021124249A1 (de) 2021-09-20 2023-03-23 Endress+Hauser Process Solutions Ag Verfahren zum Erfassen von Ergebnissen einer Evaluierung, Diagnose und/oder Überprüfung von zumindest einer Gerätefunktionalität eines Feldgeräts

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Publication number Publication date
DE102023136445A1 (de) 2025-06-26

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