WO2025065970A1

WO2025065970A1 - Method and apparatus for communication

Info

Publication number: WO2025065970A1
Application number: PCT/CN2024/071585
Authority: WO
Inventors: Bidi YING; Chenchen YANG; Hang Zhang
Original assignee: Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Current assignee: Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority date: 2023-09-29
Filing date: 2024-01-10
Publication date: 2025-04-03
Anticipated expiration: 2026-03-29

Abstract

Embodiments of this application disclose a method and an apparataus. The method includes: determining a solution for security protection on a data session between a device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session; and collecting a plurality of parameters based on the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session, where the plurality of parameters are used to derive at least one key used for protection of the data session. Keys used for protection of a data session could be generated based on different solutions and different levels. It could improve security of communication. Moreover, it could bring more flexibility for different security requirements from different devices and different services.

Description

METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR COMMUNICATION

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application is related to, and claims priority to, United States provisional patent application Serial No. 63/586,707, entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD ON SECURITY PROTECTION ON DATA SESSION IN FUTURE NETWORKS” , and filed on September29, 2023.

The disclosure of the aforementioned application is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

Embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of communications technologies, and more specifically, to a method and an apparatus for communication.

BACKGROUND

A security procedure may be involved when a user equipment requests a service from a service provider. However, it may lead data leakage when a keyis used for security protection on multiple communication sessionswhen the key is compromised.

SUMMARY

Embodiments of this application provide a method and an apparatus for communication, which can improve security of communication.

According to a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for communication, and the method may be performed by a key management function or a chip installed in the key management function (KMF) . A KMF is a network function that is responsible for key management. The method includes: determining a solution for security protection on a data sessionbetween a device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session; and collecting a plurality of parameters based on the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session, where the plurality of parameters are used to derive at least one key used for protection of the data session.

According to the above-mentioned technical solution, keys used for protection of a data session could be generated based on different solutions and different levels. It could improve security of communications. Moreover, it could bring more flexibility for different security requirements from different devices and different services.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the data session between the device and the first server includes a first communication between a first network function and the device and a second communication between the first network function and the first server.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the solution for security protection on the data session includes a first solution, the at least one key corresponds to the first solution and includes a first key and a second key, the first key is used for protection of the first communication, and the second key is used for protection of the second communication.

According to the above-mentioned technical solution, security protection on the data session could be implemented by hop-to-hop.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the first network function includes a first gate way or a user plane function (UPF) .

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the solution for security protection on the data session includes a second solution, the at least one key corresponds to the second solution and includes a third key, and the third key is used at the device and the first server.

According to the above-mentioned technical solution, security protection on the data session could be implemented by end-to-end.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the data session is related to a service, an application or a session, or a mission or a device is related to the data session.

In an embodiment, the level for security protection on the data session includes a first level, and keys related to the first level are used for protection on the service or the application.

In another embodiment, the level for security protection on the data session includes a second level, and keys related to the second level are used for protection on the session.

In still another embodiment, the level for security protection on the data session includes a third level, and keys related to the third level are used for protection on the mission, and the mission includes at least one session.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the solution for security protection on the data session is a first solution, and the plurality of parameters used to derive at least one key include a first parameter used to generate the first key and a second parameter used to generate the second key.

The first parameter includes: an identifier (ID) of the device, an ID of a first network function, an ID of an algorithm (s) for generating a first key, a time window and a shared key known by the device. The second parameter includes: the ID of the first network function, an ID of the first server, a time window and a shared key known by the device.

When the level for security protection on the data session is a first level, the first parameter and the second parameter further include a service ID or an application ID. When the level for security protection on the data session is a second level, the first parameter and the second parameter further include a session ID. When the level for security protection on the data session is a third level, the first parameter and the second parameter further include a mission ID.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the solution for security protection on the data session is a second solution. The plurality of parameters used to derive at least one key include: an ID of the device, an ID of the first server, a time window and a shared key known by the device.

When the level for security protection on the data session is a first level, the plurality of parameters further includes a service ID or an application ID. When the level for security protection on the data session is a second level, the plurality of parameters further includes a session ID. When the level for security protection on the data session is a third level, the plurality of parameters further includes a mission ID.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: receiving a first message, where the first message includes at least one of: a security process capability of a first network function or a security process capability of the device. The determining a solution for security protection on a data session between a device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session includes: determining the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session based on the first message.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: transmitting a second message to the first server, where the second message is used to request a security process capability of the first server; and receiving a third message from the first server, where the third message include the security process capability of the first server.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: transmitting a fourth message, where the fourth message includes a first security context, and the first security context includes at least one of: a security context for the device, a security context for the first server, or a security context for a first network function.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: receiving a fifth message from a second network function, where the fifth message is used to request for refreshing the keys used for protection of the data session.

Withreference to the first aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: receiving a sixth message from a second network function, where the sixth message indicates a release of the data session; and transmitting a seventh message, where the seventh message includes an ID of at least one key that needs to be released, and the keys used for protection of the data session includes the at least one key.

According to a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for communication, and the method may be performed by a second network function or a chip installed in the second network function. The method includes: receiving a fourth message, where the fourth message includes the first security context, the first security context is used to configure keys used for protection of a data session between a device and a first server. The keysused for protection of the data session are generated based on a solution for security protection on the data session and a level for security protection on the data session.

Withreference to the second aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: transmitting a first message, wherethe first message includes at least one of: a security process capability of a first network function or a security process capability of the device, and the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session is determined based on the first message.

Withreference to the second aspect, in some embodiments, the first security context includes a security context for the first server. The method further includes: transmitting an eighth messageto the first server, where the eighth message includes the security context for the first server.

Withreference to the second aspect, in some embodiments, the first security context includes a security context for a first network function. The method further includes: transmitting a ninth message to the first network function, where the ninth message includes the security context for the first network function.

Withreference to the second aspect, in some embodiments, the first security context includes a security context for the device. The method further includes: transmitting a tenth message to the device, where the tenth message includes the security context for the device.

Withreference to the second aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: transmitting a fifth message to the KMF, where the fifth message is used to request for refreshing the keys used for protection of the data session.

Withreference to the second aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: transmitting a sixth message to the KMF, where the sixth message indicates a release of the data session; and receiving a seventh message from the KMF, where the seventh message includes an ID of at least one key that needs to be released, and the keys used for protection of the data session includes the at least one key.

According to a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for communication, and the method may be performed by a first server or a chip installed in the first server. The method includes: receiving a second message from a KMF, where the second message is used to request a security process capability of the first server; and transmitting a third message to the KMF, where the third message include the security process capability of the first server, and the security process capability of the first server is used to determine a solution for security protection on a data sessionbetween a user device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session.

Withreference to the third aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: receiving a fourth message from the KMF, where the fourth message includes a security context for the first server; orreceivingan eighth messagefrom a second network function, where the fifth message includes the security context for the first server.

Withreference to the third aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: receiving aseventh message from the KMF, where the seventh message includes an ID of at least one key that needs to be released among the keys used for protection of the data session; or receiving aneleventh message from a second network function, where the eleventh messageincludes an ID of at least one key that needs to be released among the keys used for protection of the data session.

According to a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for communication, and the method may be performed by a first network function or a chip installed in the first network function. The method includes: receiving a fourth message from a KMF, and the fourth message includesa security context for the first network function; or receiving a ninth message from a second network function and the ninth message includes the security context for the first network function.

The security context for the first network function, is used to configure keys at the first network function for used for protection of a data session between the device and a first server.

The keysused for protection of the data session are generated based on a solution for security protection on the data session and a level for security protection on the data session.

Withreference to the fourth aspect, in some embodiments, the method further includes: receiving a seventh message from a KMF, and seventh message includes an ID of at least one key that needs to be released among the keys used for protection of the data session; or receiving a twelfth message from a second network function, and the twelfth messageincludes an ID of at least one key that needs to be released among the keys used for protection of the data session.

According to a fifth aspect, there is provided a communication apparatus having a function or module to perform the method in any one of the first aspect to the fourth aspect, or any one of the implementations in these aspects.

According to asixth aspect, there is provided a chip (or a chip system) . The chip includes at least one processor, the at least one processor is coupled to at least one memory. The at least one memory is configured to store one or more instructions and/or executable computer code. The at least one processor is configured to invoke the one or more instructions and/or executable computer code, so that a communication apparatus installed the chip performs the method in any one of the first aspect to the fourth aspect, or any possible implementation in these aspects.

Optionally, the chip may further include the at least one memory.

Optionally, the chip may further include a communication interface, and the communication interface is configured to input and/or outputinformation or data.

According to a seventh aspect, there is provided a communication apparatus. The communication apparatus includes one or more circuits and one or more communication interfaces. The one or more communication interfaces may include a first interface for receiving (that is, inputting) information and/or data that is to be processed by the one or more circuits and a second interface for transmitting (that is, outputting) information and/or data processed by the one or more circuit. The one or more circuits are configured to process the information and/or data that is to be processed so that the communication apparatus performs the method in any one of the first aspect to thefourth aspect, or any one of the implementations in these aspects.

According to an eighth aspect, there is provided a communication system. The communication system may include the communication apparatus according to the fifth aspect or the seventh aspect. For example, the communication system may include the one or more of: the KMF, the first network function, the second network function, or the first server. The communication system may further include a device.

According to a ninth aspect, there is provided a computer storage medium that stores executable computer code, and the executable computer code is used to execute one or more instructions for the method in any one of the first aspect to thefourth aspect, or any one of the implementations in these aspects.

According to a tenth aspect, there is provided a computer program product including one or more instructions, and when the computer product program runs on a computer, the computer performs the method in any one of the first aspect to the fourth aspect, or any one of the implementations in these aspects.

DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of a communication system.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example communication system.

FIG. 3 illustrates another example of an ED and a base station.

FIG. 4 illustrates units or modules in a device.

FIG. 5 illustrates 6G System conceptual structure.

FIG. 6 is a network scenario according to some embodiments of the present application.

FIG. 7 is an architecture of security protection on a data session according to some embodiments of the present application.

FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application.

FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application.

FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application.

FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application.

FIG. 12 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application.

FIG. 13 is a schematic block diagram of a communication apparatus according to an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 14 is a schematic block diagram of a communication apparatus according to an embodiment of the present application.

DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

In order to understand features and technical contents of embodiments of the present application in detail, implementations of the embodiments of the present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings, and the attached drawings are only for reference and illustration purposes, and are not intended to limit the embodiments of the present applications. In the following technical descriptions, for ease of explanation, numerous details are set forthto provide a thorough understanding of the disclosed embodiments.

The present application at least includes the following parts:

1) Design methods of security protection on data session

A basic concept is that a network function (we call it as a key management function (KMF) is used for selection on a solution for security protection on a data session, and a level for security protection on the data session. What’s more, the KMF collects parameters for key derivation according to the selected solution and the selected level and generates keys based on the selected solution/level of security protection on data session.

2) Design a procedure about key generation

Related embodiments provide a procedure about key generation. These embodiments illustrate two issues: (1) how to determine which solution/level of security protection on data session by a KMF; (2) what parameters for key derivation according to the selected solution/level?

3) Provide a procedure of key update and a procedure of key release

These embodiments provide details about a procedure of key update and a procedure of key release.

The present disclosure relates generally to wireless communications.

Many new trends will trigger the consideration and design of 6G/future wireless networks: a new network infrastructure capability (e.g., cloud natured/friendly infrastructures that are broadly deployed) ; new or relative matured techniques (e.g., artificial intelligence (AI) large scale models, data de-privacy, block chain, etc. ) that have made significant progresses and significantly impact on the entire society and human life; new applications and services (e.g., AI services, data or sensing service, digital world service, etc. ) that are broadly applied in industry/business and used by individual customers; and more global/open/collaborative operation trend (i.e., a more open and more collaborative operation mode are becoming common practice in many fields) .

New expectation and stricter requirements on future networks also drive rethinking and development of new generation of wireless networks. These requirements include: privacy and trustworthiness, simplified standardization, rapid deployment, etc.

All of the above drives sixth generation (6G) network architecture research work.

Our proposed 6G network architecture (X-centric) are: SBA (XaaS service) based; and/or cloud-native. Anything as a service could be denoted as XaaS.

Requirements to 6G system network architecture design include:

1) The proposed 6G network architecture needs to support new 6G services which could be developed/deployed by 3rd parties.

2) The proposed 6G network architecture needs to embrace more open ecosystem to open door to technical capable 3rd parties.

3) The proposed 6G network architecture needs to enable better trustworthiness management.

A solution to enable above requirements is needed.

For ease of understanding the embodiments of this application, a communication system shown in FIGS. 1-4 is firstly used as an example to describe in detail a communication system to which the embodiments of this application are applicable.

Referring to FIG. 1, as an illustrative example without limitation, a simplified schematic illustration of a communication system is provided. The communication system 100 comprises a radio access network 120. The radio access network 120 may be a next generation (e.g. 6G or later) radio access network, or a legacy (e.g. fifth generation (5G) , orfourth generation (4G) ) radio access network. One or more communication electronic devices (ED) 110a-110j (generically referred to as 110) may be interconnected to one another or connected to one or more network nodes (170a, 170b, generically referred to as 170) in the radio access network 120. A core network 130 may be a part of the communication system and may be dependent or independent of the radio access technology used in the communication system 100. Also, the communication system 100 comprises a public switched telephone network (PSTN) 140, the internet 150, and other networks 160.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example communication system 100. In general, the communication system 100 enables multiple wireless or wired elements to communicate data and other content. The purpose of the communication system 100 may be to provide content, such as voice, data, video, and/or text, via broadcast, multicast, groupcast, unicast, etc. The communication system 100 may operate by sharing resources, such as carrier spectrum bandwidth, between its constituent elements. The communication system 100 may include a terrestrial communication system and/or a non-terrestrial communication system. The communication system 100 may provide a wide range of communication services and applications (such as earth monitoring, remote sensing, passive sensing and positioning, navigation and tracking, autonomous delivery and mobility, etc. ) . The communication system 100 may provide a high degree of availability and robustness through a joint operation of a terrestrial communication system and a non-terrestrial communication system. For example, integrating a non-terrestrial communication system (or components thereof) into a terrestrial communication system can result in what may be considered a heterogeneous network comprising multiple layers. Compared to conventional communication networks, the heterogeneous network may achieve better overall performance through efficient multi-link joint operation, more flexible functionality sharing, and faster physical layer link switching between terrestrial networks and non-terrestrial networks.

The terrestrial communication system and the non-terrestrial communication system could be considered sub-systems of the communication system. In the example shown in FIG. 2, the communication system 100 includes electronic devices (ED) 110a-110d (generically referred to as ED 110) , radio access networks (RANs) 120a, 120b, a non-terrestrial communication network 120c, a core network 130, a public switched telephone network (PSTN) 140, the Internet 150, and other networks 160. The RANs 120a, 120b include respective base stations (BSs) 170a, 170b, which may be generically referred to as terrestrial transmit and receive points (T-TRPs) 170a, 170b. The non-terrestrial communication network 120c includes an access node 172, which may be generically referred to as a non-terrestrial transmit and receive point (NT-TRP) 172.

Any ED 110 may be alternatively or additionally configured to interface, access, or communicate with any T-TRP 170a, 170b and NT-TRP 172, the Internet 150, the core network 130, the PSTN 140, the other networks 160, or any combination of the preceding. In some examples, ED 110a may communicate an uplink and/or downlink transmission over a terrestrial air interface 190a with T-TRP 170a. In some examples, the EDs 110a-110d may also communicate directly with one another via one or more side-link air interfaces 190b. In some examples, ED 110d may communicate an uplink and/or downlink transmission over a non-terrestrial air interface 190c with NT-TRP 172.

The air interfaces 190a and 190b may use similar communication technology, such as any suitable radio access technology. For example, the communication system 100 may implement one or more channel access methods, such as code division multiple access (CDMA) , space division multiple access (SDMA) , time division multiple access (TDMA) , frequency division multiple access (FDMA) , orthogonal FDMA (OFDMA) , or single-carrier FDMA (SC-FDMA, also known as discrete Fourier transform spread OFDMA, DFT-s-OFDMA) in the air interfaces 190a and 190b. The air interfaces 190a and 190b may utilize other higher dimension signal spaces, which may involve a combination of orthogonal and/or non-orthogonal dimensions.

The non-terrestrial air interface 190c can enable communication between the ED 110d and one or multiple NT-TRPs 172 via a wireless link or simply a link. For some examples, the link is a dedicated connection for unicast transmission, a connection for broadcast transmission, or a connection between a group of EDs 110 and one or multiple NT-TRPs 172 for multicast transmission.

The RANs 120a and 120b are in communication with the core network 130 to provide the EDs 110a 110b, and 110c with various services such as voice, data, and other services. The RANs 120a and 120b and/or the core network 130 may be in direct or indirect communication with one or more other RANs (not shown) , which may or may not be directly served by core network 130, and may or may not employ the same radio access technology as RAN 120a, RAN 120b or both. The core network 130 may also serve as a gateway access between (i) the RANs 120a and 120b or EDs 110a 110b, and 110c or both, and (ii) other networks (such as the PSTN 140, the Internet 150, and the other networks 160) . In addition, some or all of the EDs 110a 110b, and 110c may include functionality for communicating with different wireless networks over different wireless links using different wireless technologies and/or protocols. Instead of wireless communication (or in addition thereto) , the EDs 110a 110b, and 110c may communicate via wired communication channels to a service provider or switch (not shown) , and to the Internet 150. PSTN 140 may include circuit switched telephone networks for providing plain old telephone service (POTS) . Internet 150 may include a network of computers and subnets (intranets) or both, and incorporate protocols, such as Internet Protocol (IP) , Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) , User Datagram Protocol (UDP) . EDs 110a 110b, and 110c may be multimode devices capable of operation according to multiple radio access technologies, and incorporate multiple transceivers necessary to support such.

FIG. 3 illustrates another example of an ED 110 and a base station 170a, 170b and/or 170c. The ED 110 is used to connect persons, objects, machines, etc. The ED 110 may be widely used in various scenarios including, for example, cellular communications, device-to-device (D2D) , vehicle to everything (V2X) , peer-to-peer (P2P) , machine-to-machine (M2M) , machine-type communications (MTC) , internet of things (IoT) , virtual reality (VR) , augmented reality (AR) , mixed reality (MR) , metaverse, digital twin, industrial control, self-driving, remote medical, smart grid, smart furniture, smart office, smart wearable, smart transportation, smart city, drones, robots, remote sensing, passive sensing, positioning, navigation and tracking, autonomous delivery and mobility, etc.

Each ED 110 represents any suitable end user device for wireless operation and may include such devices (or may be referred to) as a user equipment/device (UE) , a wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU) , a mobile station, a fixed or mobile subscriber unit, a cellular telephone, a station (STA) , a machine type communication (MTC) device, a personal digital assistant (PDA) , a smartphone, a laptop, a computer, a tablet, a wireless sensor, a consumer electronics device, a smart book, a vehicle, a car, a truck, a bus, a train, or an IoT device, wearable devices (such as a watch, a pair of glasses, head mounted equipment, etc. ) , an industrial device, or an apparatus in (e.g. communication module, modem, or chip) or comprising the forgoing devices, among other possibilities. Future generation EDs 110 may be referred to using other terms. The base station 170a and 170b is a T-TRP and will hereafter be referred to as T-TRP 170. Also shown in FIG. 3, a NT-TRP will hereafter be referred to as NT-TRP 172. Each ED 110 connected to T-TRP 170 and/or NT-TRP 172 can be dynamically or semi-statically turned-on (i.e., established, activated, or enabled) , turned-off (i.e., released, deactivated, or disabled) and/or configured in response to one of more of: connection availability and connection necessity.

The ED 110 includes a transmitter 201 and a receiver 203 coupled to one or more antennas 204. Only one antenna 204 is illustrated to avoid congestion in the drawing. One, some, or all of the antennas 204 may alternatively be panels. The transmitter 201 and the receiver 203 may be integrated, e.g. as a transceiver. The transceiver is configured to modulate data or other content for transmission by at least one antenna 204 or network interface controller (NIC) . The transceiver is also configured to demodulate data or other content received by the at least one antenna 204. Each transceiver includes any suitable structure for generating signals for wireless or wired transmission and/or processing signals received wirelessly or by wire. Each antenna 204 includes any suitable structure for transmitting and/or receiving wireless or wired signals.

The ED 110 includes at least one memory 208. The memory 208 stores instructions and data used, generated, or collected by the ED 110. For example, the memory 208 could store software instructions or modules configured to implement some or all of the functionality and/or embodiments described herein and that are executed by one or more processing unit (s) (e.g., a processor 210) . Each memory 208 includes any suitable volatile and/or non-volatile storage and retrieval device (s) . Any suitable type of memory may be used, such as random access memory (RAM) , read only memory (ROM) , hard disk, optical disc, subscriber identity module (SIM) card, memory stick, secure digital (SD) memory card, on-processor cache, and the like.

The ED 110 may further include one or more input/output devices (not shown) or interfaces (such as a wired interface to the Internet 150 in FIG. 1) . The input/output devices or interfaces permit interaction with a user or other devices in the network. Each input/output device or interface includes any suitable structure for providing information to or receiving information from a user, and/or for network interface communications. Suitable structures include, for example, a speaker, microphone, keypad, keyboard, display, touch screen, etc.

The ED 110 includes the processor 210 for performing operations including those operations related to preparing a transmission for uplink transmission to the NT-TRP 172 and/or the T-TRP 170; those operations related to processing downlink transmissions received from the NT-TRP 172 and/or the T-TRP 170; and those operations related to processing sidelink transmission to and from another ED 110. Processing operations related to preparing a transmission for uplink transmission may include operations such as encoding, modulating, transmit beamforming, and generating symbols for transmission. Processing operations related to processing downlink transmissions may include operations such as receive beamforming, demodulating and decoding received symbols. Depending upon the embodiment, a downlink transmission may be received by the receiver 203, possibly using receive beamforming, and the processor 210 may extract signaling from the downlink transmission (e.g. by detecting and/or decoding the signaling) . An example of signaling may be a reference signal transmitted by the NT-TRP 172 and/or by the T-TRP 170. In some embodiments, the processor 210 implements the transmit beamforming and/or the receive beamforming based on the indication of beam direction, e.g. beam angle information (BAI) , received from the T-TRP 170. In some embodiments, the processor 210 may perform operations relating to network access (e.g. initial access) and/or downlink synchronization, such as operations relating to detecting a synchronization sequence, decoding and obtaining the system information, etc. In some embodiments, the processor 210 may perform channel estimation, e.g. using a reference signal received from the NT-TRP 172 and/or from the T-TRP 170.

Although not illustrated, the processor 210 may form part of the transmitter 201 and/or part of the receiver 203. Although not illustrated, the memory 208 may form part of the processor 210.

The processor 210, the processing components of the transmitter 201, and the processing components of the receiver 203 may each be implemented by the same or different one or more processors that are configured to execute instructions stored in a memory (e.g. in the memory 208) . Alternatively, some or all of the processor 210, the processing components of the transmitter 201, and the processing components of the receiver 203 may each be implemented using dedicated circuitry, such as a programmed field-programmable gate array (FPGA) , an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) , or a hardware accelerator such as a graphics processing unit (GPU) or an artificial intelligence (AI) accelerator.

The T-TRP 170 may be known by other names in some implementations, such as a base station, a base transceiver station (BTS) , a radio base station, a network node, a network device, a device on the network side, a transmit/receive node, a Node B, an evolved NodeB (eNodeB or eNB) , a Home eNodeB, a next Generation NodeB (gNB) , a transmission point (TP) , a site controller, an access point (AP) , a wireless router, a relay station, a terrestrial node, a terrestrial network device, a terrestrial base station, a base band unit (BBU) , a remote radio unit (RRU) , an active antenna unit (AAU) , a remote radio head (RRH) , a central unit (CU) , a distributed unit (DU) , a positioning node, among other possibilities. The T-TRP 170 may be a macro BS, a pico BS, a relay node, a donor node, or the like, or combinations thereof. The T-TRP 170 may refer to the forgoing devices or refer to apparatus (e.g. a communication module, a modem, or a chip) in the forgoing devices.

In some embodiments, the parts of the T-TRP 170 may be distributed. For example, some of the modules of the T-TRP 170 may be located remote from the equipment that houses the antennas 256 for the T-TRP 170, and may be coupled to the equipment that houses the antennas 256 over a communication link (not shown) sometimes known as front haul, such as common public radio interface (CPRI) . Therefore, in some embodiments, the term T-TRP 170 may also refer to modules on the network side that perform processing operations, such as determining the location of the ED 110, resource allocation (scheduling) , message generation, and encoding/decoding, and that are not necessarily part of the equipment that houses the antennas 256 of the T-TRP 170. The modules may also be coupled to other T-TRPs. In some embodiments, the T-TRP 170 may actually be a plurality of T-TRPs that are operating together to serve the ED 110, e.g. through the use of coordinated multipoint transmissions.

The T-TRP 170 includes at least one transmitter 252 and at least one receiver 254 coupled to one or more antennas 256. Only one antenna 256 is illustrated to avoid congestion in the drawing. One, some, or all of the antennas 256 may alternatively be panels. The transmitter 252 and the receiver 254 may be integrated as a transceiver. The T-TRP 170 further includes a processor 260 for performing operations including those related to: preparing a transmission for downlink transmission to the ED 110, processing an uplink transmission received from the ED 110, preparing a transmission for backhaul transmission to the NT-TRP 172, and processing a transmission received over backhaul from the NT-TRP 172. Processing operations related to preparing a transmission for downlink or backhaul transmission may include operations such as encoding, modulating, precoding (e.g. multiple input multiple output (MIMO) precoding) , transmit beamforming, and generating symbols for transmission. Processing operations related to processing received transmissions in the uplink or over backhaul may include operations such as receive beamforming, demodulating received symbols, and decoding received symbols. The processor 260 may also perform operations relating to network access (e.g. initial access) and/or downlink synchronization, such as generating the content of synchronization signal blocks (SSBs) , generating the system information, etc. In some embodiments, the processor 260 also generates an indication of beam direction, e.g. BAI, which may be scheduled for transmission by a scheduler 253. The processor 260 performs other network-side processing operations described herein, such as determining the location of the ED 110, determining where to deploy the NT-TRP 172, etc. In some embodiments, the processor 260 may generate signaling, e.g. to configure one or more parameters of the ED 110 and/or one or more parameters of the NT-TRP 172. Any signaling generated by the processor 260 is sent by the transmitter 252. Note that “signaling” , as used herein, may alternatively be called control signaling. Signaling may be transmitted in a physical layer control channel, e.g. a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) , in which case the signaling may be known as dynamic signaling. Signaling transmitted in a downlink physical layer control channel may be known as downlink control information (DCI) . Siganling transmitted in an uplink physical layer control channel may be known as uplink control information (UCI) . Signaling transmitted in a sidelink physical layer control channel may be known as sidelink control information (SCI) . Signaling may be included in a higher-layer (e.g., higher than physical layer) packet transmitted in a physical layer data channel, e.g. in a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) , in which case the signaling may be known as higher-layer signaling, static signaling, or semi-static signaling. Higher-layer signaling may also refer to radio resource control (RRC) protocol signaling or Media Access Control –Control Element (MAC-CE) signaling.

The scheduler 253 may be coupled to the processor 260. The scheduler 253 may be included within or operated separately from the T-TRP 170. The scheduler 253 may schedule uplink, downlink, sidelink, and/or backhaul transmissions, including issuing scheduling grants and/or configuring scheduling-free (e.g., “configured grant” ) resources. The T-TRP 170 further includes a memory 258 for storing information and data. The memory 258 stores instructions and data used, generated, or collected by the T-TRP 170. For example, the memory 258 could store software instructions or modules configured to implement some or all of the functionality and/or embodiments described herein and that are executed by the processor 260.

Although not illustrated, the processor 260 may form part of the transmitter 252 and/or part of the receiver 254. Also, although not illustrated, the processor 260 may implement the scheduler 253. Although not illustrated, the memory 258 may form part of the processor 260.

The processor 260, the scheduler 253, the processing components of the transmitter 252, and the processing components of the receiver 254 may each be implemented by the same or different one or more processors that are configured to execute instructions stored in a memory, e.g. in the memory 258. Alternatively, some or all of the processor 260, the scheduler 253, the processing components of the transmitter 252, and the processing components of the receiver 254 may be implemented using dedicated circuitry, such as a programmed FPGA, a hardware accelerator (e.g., a GPU or AI accelerator) , or an ASIC.

Although the NT-TRP 172 is illustrated as a drone only as an example, the NT-TRP 172 may be implemented in any suitable non-terrestrial form, such as satellites and highaltitude platforms, including international mobile telecommunication base stations and unmanned aerial vehicles, for example. Also, the NT-TRP 172 may be known by other names in some implementations, such as a non-terrestrial node, a non-terrestrial network device, or a non-terrestrial base station. The NT-TRP 172 includes a transmitter 272 and a receiver 274 coupled to one or more antennas 280. Only one antenna 280 is illustrated to avoid congestion in the drawing. One, some, or all of the antennas may alternatively be panels. The transmitter 272 and the receiver 274 may be integrated as a transceiver. The NT-TRP 172 further includes a processor 276 for performing operations including those related to: preparing a transmission for downlink transmission to the ED 110, processing an uplink transmission received from the ED 110, preparing a transmission for backhaul transmission to T-TRP 170, and processing a transmission received over backhaul from the T-TRP 170. Processing operations related to preparing a transmission for downlink or backhaul transmission may include operations such as encoding, modulating, precoding (e.g. MIMO precoding) , transmit beamforming, and generating symbols for transmission. Processing operations related to processing received transmissions in the uplink or over backhaul may include operations such as receive beamforming, demodulating received symbols, and decoding received symbols. In some embodiments, the processor 276 implements the transmit beamforming and/or receive beamforming based on beam direction information (e.g. BAI) received from the T-TRP 170. In some embodiments, the processor 276 may generate signaling, e.g. to configure one or more parameters of the ED 110. In some embodiments, the NT-TRP 172 implements physical layer processing, but does not implement higher layer functions such as functions at the medium access control (MAC) or radio link control (RLC) layer. As this is only an example, more generally, the NT-TRP 172 may implement higher layer functions in addition to physical layer processing.

The NT-TRP 172 further includes a memory 278 for storing information and data. Although not illustrated, the processor 276 may form part of the transmitter 272 and/or part of the receiver 274. Although not illustrated, the memory 278 may form part of the processor 276.

The processor 276, the processing components of the transmitter 272, and the processing components of the receiver 274 may each be implemented by the same or different one or more processors that are configured to execute instructions stored in a memory, e.g. in the memory 278. Alternatively, some or all of the processor 276, the processing components of the transmitter 272, and the processing components of the receiver 274 may be implemented using dedicated circuitry, such as a programmed FPGA, a hardware accelerator (e.g., a GPU or AI accelerator) , or an ASIC. In some embodiments, the NT-TRP 172 may actually be a plurality of NT-TRPs that are operating together to serve the ED 110, e.g. through coordinated multipoint transmissions.

The T-TRP 170, the NT-TRP 172, and/or the ED 110 may include other components, but these have been omitted for the sake of clarity.

One or more steps of the embodiment methods provided herein may be performed by corresponding units or modules, according to FIG. 4. FIG. 4 illustrates units or modules in a device, such as in the ED 110, in the T-TRP 170, or in the NT-TRP 172. For example, a signal may be transmitted by a transmitting unit or by a transmitting module. A signal may be received by a receiving unit or by a receiving module. A signal may be processed by a processing unit or a processing module. Other steps may be performed by an AI or machine learning (ML) module. The respective units or modules may be implemented using hardware, one or more components or devices that execute software, or a combination thereof. For instance, one or more of the units or modules may be a circuit such as an integrated circuit. Examples of an integrated circuit includes a programmed FPGA, a GPU, or an ASIC. For instance, one or more of the units or modules may be logical such as a logical function performed by a circuit, by a portion of an integrated circuit, or by software instructions executed by a processor. It will be appreciated that where the modules are implemented using software for execution by a processor for example, the modules may be retrieved by a processor, in whole or part as needed, individually or together for processing, in single or multiple instances, and that the modules themselves may include instructions for further deployment and instantiation.

Additional details regarding the EDs 110, the T-TRP 170, and the NT-TRP 172 are known to those of skill in the art. As such, these details are omitted here.

The solution described in the application is applicable to a next generation (e.g. 6G or later) network, or a legacy (e.g. 5G, or4G) network.

The proposed 6G system architecture is defined to support 6G XaaS services by using techniques such as network function virtualization and network slicing. The 6G system architecture utilizes service-based interactions between 6G services.

The 6G system leverages service-based architecture and XaaS concept. XaaS services in the 6G system are categorized into three layers. For illustrative purpose, the 6G system conceptual structure is shown in FIG. 5.

An infrastructure layer includes infrastructures supporting 6G services. Among them are wireless networks (e.g., a RAN, and a core network (CN) ) infrastructures, cloud/data center infrastructures, satellite networks, storage/database infrastructures, and sensing networks, and etc. These infrastructures can be provided by a single provider or by multiple providers.

Each of the infrastructures could have its control and management functions, denoted as C/M functions, for infrastructure management. Each of these infrastructures is one type of infrastructure as a service.

A control and management (C/M) layer includes control and management services of the 6G system. They are developed and deployed by using slicing techniques and utilizing resource provided by infrastructure layer. In the 6G system conceptual structure:

- resource management (RM) as a service provides a capability of life-cycle management of a variety of slices and over-the-air resource assignment to wireless devices.

- mission management (MM) as a service provides a capability to program provisioning of XaaS services at service layer to provide mission services. A 6G mission is defined as a service provided to customers by the 6G system. A mission can be a type of services which is provided by a single 6G XaaS service or a type of services that needs contributions from multiple XaaS services.

- confederation network (CONET) as a service provides a capability to enable multiple partners jointly provide 6G services. This capability is provided by confederation formation, mutual authentication, mutual authorization among partners and negotiation of agreement on recording and retracing of selected actions performed by partners, in order to assure a trustworthy environment of 6G system operations.

- service provisioning management (SPM) as a service provides a capability of control and management of 6G service access by customers and provisioning of requested services. The capability is provided by unified mutual authentication, authorization and policy, key management, quality of service (QoS) assurance and charging between any pair of XaaS service provider and customer. The customers include end-customers not only in physical world, but also digital representatives in digital world.

- connectivity management (CM) as a service leverages 5G connectivity management functions, but with extension to include digital world.

- protocol as a service provides a capability to design service customized protocol stacks for identified interfaces. The protocol stacks could be pre-defined for on-demand selection, or could be on-demand designed.

- network security as a serviceprovides a capability for owners of infrastructures to detect potential security risks of their infrastructures.

- XaaS services in C/M Layer support control and management of the 6G system itself and also provide support to verticals if requested. One example is that RM service can serve RAN for over-the-air resource management and can also provide service to a vertical for the vertical’s over-the-air resource allocation to its end-customers. The XaaS in C/M layer can be deployed by using slicing technique.

A service layer includes 6G services which provide services to customers. In the 6G system conceptual structure:

- AI service is denoted as NET4AI as a service. Artificial intelligence service provides AI capability to support a variety of AI applications.

- Service of data collection, data sanitization, data analysis and data delivery are denoted as DAM as a service. This service provides a capability of lifecycle management of statistic data, including acquisition, de-privatization, analysis and delivery of data which are information statistic data from any types of sensors, devices, network functions, and etc.

- Service of storage and sharing of data is denoted as NET4Data as a service. This service provides a capability to trustworthily storage and share data under the control of owners of data and following recognized authorities’ regulations on control of identified data.

- Service to provide digital world is denoted as NET4DW as a service. Digital world service provides a capability to construct, control and manage digital world. Digital world is defined as digital realization of physical world.

- 6G block chain service is denoted as NET4BC as a service. This service provides a capability to support 6G block chain services.

- 6G connectivity service is denoted as NET4CON as a service. Enhanced connectivity service, e.g., network for connectivity (NET4CON) as a service. This service provides a capability to support exchange of messages and data among new 6G services.

All XaaS services at this layer are developed and deployed by using resource provided in infrastructure and utilizing network function virtualization and slicing techniques. the capability of each of 6G services is provided by its control and management functions and service specific data process functions.

In addition to support 6G XaaS services at service layer, 6G system leverages 5G system for provisioning of vertical services. The difference between 6G XaaS services and other verticals are that a vertical is a pure customer which needs other XaaS services to enable its operation, while each of XaaS services provide their capabilities to 6G customers.

Any pair of XaaS services of the 6G system could also be mutual customer and provider of each other. Some of example are that: an infrastructure owner provides its resource to XaaS services in service layer and C/M layer; RM services may need the capabilities provided by NET4AI, DAM and NET4DW for its resource management for vertical slicing; CONET service and NET4Data service may need the capability provided by NET4BC for their operation.

The key concepts of 6G system includes that:

- define basic XaaS Services by decoupling comprehensive types of services into basic XaaS services. A basic XaaS service provides unique capability to enable a specific type of service, such as NET4AI service, NET4DW service, DAM service, NET4Data service, block chain service, mission management service, etc.

- allow joint operation of the 6G system by multiple partners.

- define data plane of the 6G system which includes processing functions of data plane of XaaS services. Programing the interconnection of these functions, by mission management service, enables to support a variety of customized customer services.

- simplify 6G system architecture by categorizing basic control services and management services and combining them as basic XaaS services in C/M layer.

- define C/M Plane of the 6G system which includes C/M functions in XaaS services and may include 5G CP (e.g., AMF) depending on implementation options.

- define basic architecture structure (BAS) which is a unified basic structure with minimized number of interfaces and is independent of types of infrastructures.

- simplify standardization, development and deployment of the 6G system using the BAS concept, while supporting a variety of infrastructure deployment scenarios.

- adapt to a variety of deployment scenarios by applying the BAS or a subset of it to infrastructures based on capability, capacity and requirement of the infrastructure networks.

- leverage SBI interface concept and apply SBI interaction in both 6G C/M plane and 6G data plane.

- simplify SBI interfaces by introducing trustworthy gateways (GWs) in data plane and C/M plane of the 6G system.

- improve trustworthiness from perspectives of operation of the 6G system by introducing CONET capability, NET4BC capability and anonymous service provisioning provided by the trustworthy GWs in the C/M plane and data plane of the 6G system.

- improve trustworthiness from perspective of end customer privacy protection by unified mutual authentication, IDM, data sanitization and etc. provided by SPM service, DAM service and 6G Block Chain service.

- simplify roaming management of wireless devices, in physical world and digital world, by unified authentication including all participated partners and customers.

- support multiple development paths from 5G system to 6G system by defining multiple architecture options without incurring much efforts due to the introduction of the BAS concept.

- support backward compatibility by utilizing benefits of SBA and its add-on feature. 5G users can use the 6G system to access 5G services.

- support future extension by adding new XaaS services with minimized impact on standardization and deployment, due to the introduced anonymous service provisioning concept implemented in trustworthy GWs in 6G C/M plane and in 6G data plane.

Currently, security procedures between a UE and network functions would be involved when the UE is capable of connecting to a network. For illustrative purpose, a key hierarchy or key framework involved in the current security procedures could include: keys for protection of non-access stratum (NAS) signals with a particular integrity/encryption algorithm, keys for protection of user plane (UP) traffic with a particular integrity/encryption algorithm, and keys for protection of RRC signaling with a particular integrity/encryption algorithm. These keys could be used to perform security protection on NAS interface, data from a UE to a RAN, and RRC interface, respectively; correspondingly, these keys could also be referred to as keys for NAS integrity/ciphering, keys for UP integrity/ciphering and keys for RRC integrity/ciphering, respectively. These keys are derived from a long-term shared key known by the UE and the network. Keys for UP integrity/ciphering may be indirectly derived from the long-term shared key with UE’s information and serving network’s information. For example, the UE’s information may include PCI or UE’s ID. These keys for UP integrity/ciphering could be used for data protection from UE to RAN, after a PDU session is established. These keys for UP integrity/ciphering could be used for secure multiple PDU session. However, applying the same key to secure multiple communication sessions may lead to data leakage when the key is compromised.

In the future network, new applications and services would be supported, e.g., AI service, data service, sensing service and digital world service. These services can be developed and deployed by using resource provided by infrastructure (e.g., radio access network, data center or other infrastructures) and utilizing network function virtualization and slicing techniques. Each of these services could be referred to as anything as a service (XaaS) . In a XaaS module, there may be multiple network functions. In a XaaS module, there may be multiple network functions. These network functions could be classified into two categories: control/management (C/M) functions and data processing functions. The data processing functions are used for processing data and could only exist in a service layer of XaaS. The C/M functions are used for control and management and could exist in a service layer and C/M layer of XaaS. A service provider of XaaS could also be referred to as a XaaS service. A network function that could be used for processing data related to theXaaS service and be deployed by the XaaS service could be referred to as a XaaSprocessing service function.

FIG. 6 is a network scenario according to some embodiments of the present application. As shown in FIG. 6, the control/management trustworthy gateway (C/M-TW-GW) is a network function and could be defined as an endpoint of a C/M session at network side. The setup of the C/M session is for the device or the XaaS service to transmit the control message. The C/M session could be defined as a secured logical connection between a device (e.g., a UE) and its serving C/M-TW-GW. The data trustworthy gateway (Data-TW-GW) is a network function could be defined as an endpoint of data session of a device. The setup of the data session is for the device or the XaaS service to participate in processing data. The data session could be defined as a secured logical connection between a device and its serving Data-TW-GW. The radio bearer (RB) handler is a network function and could be implemented as a radio access network (RAN) . The RB handler could be connected both other infrastructures (e.g., a core network and/or a third-part cloud) and C/M-TW-GW. Communications between the device and the RB handler could include a C/M RB or a data RB. The C/M RB could be defined as an over-the-air connection for carrying control signaling for over-the-air interface management and C/M plane messages. The data RB could be an over-the-air connection for carrying data plane traffic. In this scenario, there may be more network functions, e.g., authentication server, authorization server.

As shown in FIG. 6, there are some interfaces used for connecting these NFs within the network scenario. For example, the interface I could be defined as a set of security features that enables a deviceto authenticate and access services via the network securely, and to protect against attacks on the radio interfaces. For another example, the interface II could be defined as a set of security features that enables the system shown in FIG. 6 to securely exchange C/M session between a device and a C/M-TW-GW or securely exchange data session between thedevice and theData-TW-GW. For still another example, the interface III could be defined as a set of security features that enables the system to securely exchange C/M session between the XaaS service and the C/M-TW-GW or securely exchange data session between the XaaS service and a Data-TW-GW. In other words, the interface I could support a connection between a device and an RB handler; the interface II could support a connection between a device and a C/M-TW-GW/Data-TW-GW; the interface III could support a connection between a XaaS service and a C/M-TW-GW/Data-TW-GW. For still another example, the interface IV could support a connection between the RB handler and the C/M-TW-GW/Data-TW-GW. For illustrative purpose, compared to the current network, NAS interface between a UE and an AMF could be switch to a C/M session interface II between a UE and a serving C/M-TW-GW.

In this scenario, security procedures between a device (e.g., aUE) and network functions would be involved when the device is capable of connecting to a network. For example, when the device is capable of connecting to a C/M-TW-GW and/or connecting to a RAN infrastructure (e.g., an RB handler in FIG. 6) that is connected to both other infrastructures (e.g. a CN infrastructure, a third-party cloud) and C/M-TW-GWs, the security procedures may include a primary authentication and key agreement procedures. The purpose of the primary authentication and key agreement procedures is to enable mutual authentication between the device and a severing network and to provide keying materials that can be used between the device and the severing network. The keying materials can be used for signaling security protection on the interface I and interface II in subsequent security procedures. For another example, when a service is requested by the device, the security procedures may include a secondary primary authentication and key agreement procedures. The purpose of the secondary authentication and key agreement procedures is to enable mutual authentication between the device and the XaaS service, and to provide keying materials that can be used between the device and the XaaS service in subsequent security procedures. The keying materials can be used for data security protection on an interface I and an interface II in subsequent security procedures.

Since new services, network functionsand interfaces may be involved in the future network, security protection on the new interfaces may be involved. For example, theData-TW-GWcould be introduced in the future network, and a direct communication between the device and the Data-TW-GW could be allowed in the future network. In other words, a connection between the device and the Data-TW-GW is not supported by the current network, but it could be supported by the interface II as mentioned in FIG. 6. For another example, a data session of a device could be a connection between a device and its serving Data-TW-GW; a data session of a XaaS service could be a connection between a serving Data-TW-GW and a XaaS service. For still another example, an end-to end data session could be introduced. The end-to end data session could connect from a device to a serving Data-TW-GW, and connect from the serving Data-TW-GW and a XaaS. Moreover, since the data-session may be involved in the future work but not supported by the current network, the current security protection doesn’ t involve a security protection on the data-session.

As shown in FIG. 6, a Data-TW-GW is introduced to a 6G system, and a new interface II between a device and a Data-TW-GW is proposed. A serving Data-TW-GW of a device is defined as an endpoint of data session of a device. A serving Data-TW-GW could be deployed in the domain of RAN. The serving Data-TW-GW could be deployed in the domain of CN. XaaS services (e.g. DAM service, AI service) could be deployed in the domain of RAN, or in the domain of CN.A data session of a device is secured connection between a device and its serving Data-TW-GW (i.e., the interface II) . A data session of a XaaS service is secured connection between a serving Data-TW-GW and XaaS service (i.e., the interface III) . The end-to-end data session includes a data session of a device, and a data session of a XaaS Service.

In 5G system, security protection on NAS interface, RRC interface, and data from UE to RAN, uses keys for NAS ciphering/integrity, keys for RRC ciphering/integrity, keys for UP ciphering/integrity. These keys are derived from a long-term shared key which known by UE and the network. Keys for UP ciphering/integrity may be indirectly derived from the long-term shared key with UE’s information (e.g. PCI, UE ID) and serving network’s information (e.g. name of the serving network) . These keys for UP ciphering/integrity are used for data protection from UE to RAN, after a PDU session establishment. These keys for UP ciphering/integrity could be used for secure multiple PDU sessions. Several studies have highlighted that applying the same keys to secure multiple communication sessions, which leads to data leakage when it is compromised. Moreover, NIST recommends that the keys should be applied only once in every communication or should be unique to each session.

Allowing a UE to directly communicate with a serving Data-TW-GW (without the involvement of the RAN node ciphering data) , is proposed in 6G. NAS interface between UE and AMF is switched to C/M session interface II between UE and a serving C/M-TW-GW, and data session interface II between UE and a serving Data-TW-GW. However, what is missing is efficient mechanisms supporting data session security between UE and the serving Data-TW-GW. For example: Whether should security protection on communications between UE and a serving Data-TW-GW? Which function determines it? What security parameters should be included?

An end-to-end data session that connects from a UE to a serving Data-TW-GW, and connects from a serving Data-TW-GW to a XaaS service, is proposed in 6G. In 5G system, IPsec protocol or TLS protocol can be used to implement on an interface between AMF to other NF for secure communications, or on an interface among UPFs or from a UPF to a DN-AAA. How to manage these keys for IPsec protocol or TLS protocol is out of the scope of 3GPP. In 6G system, DN-AAA may be deployed by the network (e.g, XaaS service) , how to provide secure communications from a Data-TW-GW and a XaaS service should be addressed by the network. Thus, the following technical issues appear: which function is responsible for providing keys for secure communications between a Data-TW-GW and a XaaS service. What level of security protection on an end-to-end data session?

To solve it, we provide systems and methods on security protection on data session for the future network. Our work provides a system on security protection on data session where a KMF selects a solution/level of security protection on data session and generates keys that shall be configured to the network and the device. These keys could be per session, per service, or per device. That could improve security protection on data session. What’s more, the present application could provide security customization that provides a hop-to-hop security protection or an end-to-end security protection.

We provide a system on security protection on data session where a KMF selects a solution/level of security protection on data session and generates keys that shall be configured to the network and the device. These keys could be per session, per service, or per device. That could improve security protection on data session. With the concept of the present application, there have the following technical problems.

(1) Keys per session

If we use the technique about key derivation in 5G system, the keys shall be used for multiple PDU sessions. These may lead to data leakage. If the keys shall be applied only once in every communication or should be unique to each session, what the new issues will appear? For example, the keys are associated with the session? Which function provides the session’s information for key generation? If session changes, how to update these keys? If the session is released, how to deactivate these keys or release these keys?

(2) How to determine key per session per service per device

In 5G system, keys for UP encryption/integrity are used for multiple secure PDU sessions, but these keys are associated with a specific device. As we discussed before, in 6G system, the keys may be per session, per service, per device. The keys may be used for hop-to-hop security protections (e.g., security protection on communications from a device to a serving Data-TW-GW and security protection on communication from the serving Data-TW-GW to a XaaS service) . The keys may be used for end-to-end security protection (e.g. security protection on communications from the device to the XaaS service) . So, which function selects or determine what kind of keys will be used, and how does the function make a choice? How are these keys configurated to a Data-TW-GW, or a device, or a XaaS service?

With the problem identified above, the present application provides a system and method on security protection on data session in a network, for example, the future network, which could improve security protection on data session.

FIG. 7 is an architecture of security protection on a data session according to some embodiments of the present application. The objective of these embodiment is to provide a method of security protection on a data session. This data session includes communications between a device to a Data-TW-GW and communications between the Data-TW-GW to a XaaS service (shown in FIG. 7) .

A mission management (MM) could be a network function that is responsible for mission management. A mission may be a type of service that is provided by a single XaaS service or a type of services that needs contributions from multiple XaaS services. For example, a mission could include at least one session, and a session could include at least one service or application. For illustrative purpose, a MM could support a service that provides a capability to a program provisioning of XaaS services to provide mission services.

A KMF, is a network function that is responsible for key generations and key configurations. Moreover, the KMF could be responsible for keys refresh and key revocation. For illustrative purpose, by taking the scenario shown in FIG. 6 as an example, there may be plurality of intermediate keys and terminal keys used for security protection on communications on interface I and interface II, such as keys for protection of the C/M session (also referred to as C/M session keys) , and keys for protection of data session (also referred to as data session keys) . These keys would be generated by one or more KMFs and be configured to related network functions, such as C/M-TW-GW, and Data-TW-GW. Therefore, for the related network functions, these keys could not be generated by themselves.

The KMF could also be responsible for management on device’s security context. The security context is a state that shall be established locally at a device and a serving network domain. For example, security contexts for a Data-TW-GW could include keys configured to the Data-TW-GW. The security contexts for theData-TW-GW could further include a set of identifiers or names corresponding to ciphering algorithms and integrity algorithms implemented in the Data-TW-GW. For another example, security contexts for a XaaS service could include keys configured to the XaaS service. The security contexts for a XaaS service could further include a set of identifiers or names corresponding to ciphering algorithms and integrity algorithms implemented in the XaaS service. For still another example, security contexts for a device could include inputs of generating keys that shall be configured to the device, and algorithms for generating these keys shall be configured to the device. The security contexts for a device could further include a set of identifiers or names corresponding to ciphering algorithms and integrity algorithms implemented in the device.

As shown in FIG. 7, a communication between a device and a XaaS service could include a communication between the device and a Data-TW-GW and a communication between the data TW-GW and the XaaS service. In other words, the data session between a device and a XaaS service could include a data session of the device and a data session of the XaaS service.

In some implementations, there may be different solutions for security protection on data session. For example, thesecurity protection on data session could include an end-to-end security protection on data session. In this scenario, keys for protection of the data session are used at the device and the XaaS service. These keys could also be referred to as keys for theXaaS service and thedevice. For another example, the security protection on data session could include a hop-to-hop security protection on data session. In this scenario, keys for protection on data session could include keys for protection of data session on an interface II (also be referred to as keys for a Data-TW-GW and a device) and keys for protection of data session on aninterface III (also be referred to as keys for a Data-TW-GW and a XaaS service) . Keys for protection of data session on the interface II could be known by the device and the Data-TW-GW. Keys for protection of data session on the interface III could be known by the Data-TW-GW and the XaaS service. The KMF could be used for selecting a solution for the security protection on the data session from different solutions.

In some implementations, the data session (s) betweenthe device and theXaaSservice could be related to at least one service/application, at least one session, at least one mission, or at least one device. There may be different levelsfor the security protection on data session. For illustrative purpose, keys for security protection on data session could have different levels, e.g., keys for service/application, keys for session or keys for missions. A key for service/application could be used for protection of a service/application related to a data session. A key for session could be used for protection of a session related to a data session. A key for mission could be used for protection of all data session (s) belonging to a mission. In some embodiments, the keys for security protection on data session may include keys for device. A key for a device could be used for protection of all data session (s) belonging to the device. In other words, security protection of data sessions may be performed per service/application, per session, per mission or per device. There may be a plurality of devices capable to communicate with the XaaS service and a plurality of data sessions. The KMF could select a level for the security protection of each data session. Keys for protection of these data sessionsmay include: keys for service/application, keys for per session, keys for per mission or keys for per device.

Technical terms, such as “C/M-TW-GW” , “Data-TW-GW” , and “KMF” , are not limited to the specific example names presented herein. These terms or the concepts referred to by these terms may also be known by other names. For example, a key management function may be referred to as a key generation and configuration function. For another example, a control/management trustworthy gateway may be referred to as a control/management gateway.

FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of a method 300 according to some embodiments of the present application. The following separately describes steps involved in the method 300 in detail.

At S301, a second network function transmits a first message to a KMF.

The first message could include at least one of: a security process capability of a first network function or a security process capability of the device.

The security capability could indicate process capabilities that could be provided to perform the security protection on the data session. For example, the security process capability of the device could indicate encryption algorithms/integrity algorithms that could be implemented by the device. Similarly, the security process capability of the first network function could indicate encryption algorithms/integrity algorithms that could be implemented by the first network function. For another example, the security process capability of the device could further indicate the algorithms for key derivation able to be implemented by the device.

The first message could be used to request for security contexts associated with a data session between the device and a first server.

At S302, the KMF transmits a second message to the first server.

The second message could be used to request a security process capability of the first server.

At S303, the first server transmits a third message to the KMF.

The third message includes the security process capability of the first server.

In some embodiments, when the security process capability of the first server is not needed, steps S302 and S303 could be skipped.

At S304, a KMF determines a solution for security protection on a data session between a device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session.

The data session between the device and the first server could include a first communication and a second communication. The first communication could be a communication between the device and a first network function, and the second communication could be a communication between the first network function and the first server. For illustrative purpose, by taking the scenario shown in FIG. 6 or FIG. 7 as an example, theXaaS service could be taken as an example of the first server, and theData-TW-GW could be taken as the first network function. Correspondingly, a data session of the device (i.e., a data session on the interface II) could be taken as an example of the first communication and a data session of the XaaS service (i.e., a data session on the interface III) could be taken as an example of the second communication. In some implementations, the first network function could be a user plane function (UPF) .

The solution for the security protection could indicate a network function (s) that is capable to use the keys for protection of the data session between the device and the first server. For example, the solution for the security protection could indicate whether the keys for protection of the data session are used at the first network function.

In some embodiments, the solution for security protection on the data session includes a first solution. At least one key corresponding to the first solution could include a first key and a second key. The first key is used for protection of the first communication and the second key is used for protection of the second communication. The first key could be configured to the device and the first network function, while the second key could be configured to the first network function and the first server. The first key could be used at the device and the first network function, and the second key could be used at the first network function and the first server. For illustrative purpose, by taking the scenario shown in FIG. 7 as an example, keys for protection of data session on the interface II could be taken as examples of the first keys, and keys for protection of data session on the interface III could be taken as examples of the second keys. The hop-to-hop security protection on data session could be taken as an example of the first solution for the security protection.

In some embodiments, the solution for security protection on the data session includes a second solution. At least one key corresponding to the second solution could include a third key, where the third key is used at the device and the first server. For illustrative purpose, by taking the scenario shown in FIG. 7 as an example, the end-to-end security protection on data session could be taken as an example of the second solution for the security protection.

In some implementations, the data session is related to: at least one service/application, at least one session, at least one mission, or at least one device.

In an embodiment, the level for the security protection include a first level. The keys corresponding to the first level could be used for protection of the data session by a protection of the at least one service/application. For example, a service #1 to a service #3 are related to a data session #1. Keys for protection of data session could include a key #1 to a key #3. The key #1 to the key #3 could beused to protect the service #1 to the service #3, respectively. In other words, according to the first level, security protection on data session could be performed per service/application.

In another embodiment, the level for the security protection includes a second level. The keys corresponding to the second level could be used for protection of the data session by a protection of the at least one session. In other words, according to the second level, security protection on data sessions could be performed per session.

In still another embodiment, the level for the security protection includes a third level. The keys corresponding to the third level could be used for protection of all data session (s) related to each mission of the at least one mission. In other words, according to the third level, security protection on data session could be performed per mission.

For illustrative purpose, a mission #1 could include a data session #1, and a mission #2 could include a data session #2 and a data session #3. For example, when security protection of the data sessions is performed according to the second level, keys for protection of data sessions could include a key #4 to a key #6. The key #4 to the key #6 could be used to secure the data session #1 to the data session #3, respectively. For another example, when security protection ofthe data sessions is performed according to the third level, keys for protection of data sessions could include a key #7 and a key #8. The key #7 and the key #8 could be used to securethe data session (s) related to themission #1 and the mission #2, respectively.

In still another embodiment, the level for the security protection include a fourth level. The keys corresponding to the fourth level could be used for protection of all data sessions related to each device of the at least one device. For example, a data session #4 and a data session #5 are related to a UE #1, and a data session #6 is related to a UE #2.Keys for protection of data sessions could include a key #9 and a key #10. The key #9 and the key #10 could be used for protection on data session (s) related to the UE #1 and the UE #2, respectively. In other words, according to the fourth level, security protection on data sessions could be performed per device.

Inan embodiment, there have two solutions for security protection on a data session. One is end-to-end security protection on data session, where keys for data protection are known by the device and the XaaS service. Another is hop-to-hop security protection on data session, where keys for data protection on interface II, and keys for data protection on interface III. What’s more, keys for security protection on data session could have different levels, e.g., keys per device, keys per service (or application) , keys per session (or mission) . Note that a mission or a session could include at least one service or one application. Keys could be used for data encryption, or data integrity. The KMF shall determine a solution and a level for security protection of a data session.

At S305, the KMF collects a plurality of parameters based on the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session.

The plurality of parameters are used to derive at least one key used for protection of the data session. The plurality of parameters may include at least one of: information from the device, information from the first network function, information from the first server, or information from the KMF. The second network function could be configured to manage a plurality of missions.

For illustrative purpose, by taking the scenario shown in FIG. 7 as an example, the MM could be taken as an example of the second network function. Parameters for key derivation could include: information from the MM, information from the device, information from the Data-TW-GW, information from the KMF and information from the XaaS service. For example, the information from the MM could include a service ID/application ID, or a session ID/mission ID. A mission or a session could include at least one service or one application. For another example, information from the device could include a device and an ID of an algorithm used for generating keys. For still another example, the information from Data-TW-GW could include an ID of the Data-TW-GW. For still another example, information from the KMF may include a shared key that is known by the device and the KMF, a time window indicating key’s validation period. The shared key could be a root key. For still another example, the information from the XaaSservice may include an ID of a XaaSprocession service function (PSF) . The XaaS PSF is a network function that deployed by the XaaS service and is used for processing data related to the XaaS service.

In some implementations, when the first solution for security protection is used to secure the data session between the device and the first server, the plurality of parametersinclude a first parameter used to generate the first key and a second parameter used to generate the second key. The first parameter may include at least one of: an ID of the device, an ID of the first network function, an ID of an algorithm (s) for generating the first key, a time window or a shared key that is known by the device and the KMF. The second parameter may include at least one of: an ID of the first server, an ID of the first network function, an ID of an algorithm (s) for generating the second key, a time window or a shared key.

In some embodiments, when the first level for security protection is used to secure the data session between the first server and the device, the first parameter and the second parameter further include a service ID/application ID. When the second level for security protection is used to secure the data session between the first server and the device, the first parameter and the second parameter further include a session ID. When the third level for security protection is used to secure the data session between the first server and the device, the first parameter and the second parameter includes a mission ID.

In some implementations, the plurality of parameters includes at least one of: an ID of the device, an ID of the first server, a time window or a shared key that is known by the device and the KMF.

In some embodiments, when the first level for security protection is used to secure the data session between the first server and the device, the plurality of parametersinclude a service ID/application ID. When the second level for security protection is used to secure the data session between the first server and the device, the plurality of parameters includes a session ID. When the third level for security protection is used to secure the data session between the first server and the device, the plurality of parameters includes a mission ID.

In some implementations, the KMF determines the solution for security protection and the level for the security protection based on at least one of: a local policy from a network operator or security requirement for the data session.

In some implementations, the solution for security protection and the level for the security protection could be determined based on at least one of: the security process capability of the first server, the security process capability of the device or the security process capability of the network function.

At S306, the KMF generate security contexts.

At least one of: a security context for the device, a security context for the first network function, or a security context for the first server could be generated based on collected parameters.

At S307, the KMF transmits a fourth message to configure security contexts.

The key configuration could be implemented by the KMF or the second network function.

In some embodiments, the KMF is responsible for key configuration. The fourth message could be used to configure these security contexts. For example, at S307a, the KMF could transmit a message to the first network function. The message could include the security context for the first network function. For another example, at S307b, the KMF could transmit a message to the first server. The message could include the security context for the first server. For still another example, at S307c, the KMF could transmit a message to the second network function. The message includes the security context for the device. The messages could be taken as examples of the fourth message.

In some embodiments, the second network function is responsible for key configuration. For example, at S307c, the KMF could transmit a message to the second network function, and the message includes the security context for the device and the security context for the first server. When the first solution for the security protection is used, the message could further include the security context for the first network function. In this scenario, steps S307a and S307b could be skipped. The message in S307c could be taken as an example of the fourth message.

In other words, the step S307 include the step S307c. Moreover, in some embodiments, the step S307 further include steps S307a and S307b.

In practice, keys used for protection of the data session could be refreshed or updated.

In some implementations, the second network function transmits a fifth message to the KMF to request refreshing the keys used for protection of the data session. The KMF could refresh these keys. New keys could be generated and be configured to related entities.

In practice, one or more keys could be released when the data session is released. In this scenario, the KMF could transmit a sixth message for key release. The message could include an ID of at least one key needed to be released.

Similar to the key configuration, a release of key could be implemented by the KMF or the second network function.

In some implementations, the KMFis responsible for key release. For example, the KMF could transmit a message to the first network function. This message could includean ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the first network function. For another example, the KMF could transmit a message to the first server. This messagecould include an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the first server. For still another example, the KMF could transmit a message to the second network function. This messagecould include an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the device. The messages could be taken as examples of the sixth message.

In some embodiments, the second network function is responsible for key configuration. For example, the KMF could transmit a message to the second network function. This message could include an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the first server and an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the device. When the first solution for the security protection is used, the message could further include an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the first network function.

In some embodiments, when the second network function is responsible for key configuration, the method 300 further includes step S308 and S309.

At S308, the second network function transmit an eighth message to the first server, and the eighth message includes the security context for the first server.

At S309, the second network function transmit a ninth message to the first network function, and ninth message includesthe security context for the first network function.

At S310, the second network function transmit a tenth message to the device, and tenth message includesthe security context for the device.

In some embodiments, when the second network function is responsible for key release, the second network function transmits aneleventh message to the first server, and the message includes an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the first server. The second network function transmits a twelfth message to the first network function, and the twelfth message includes an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the first network function. The second network function transmits a thirteenth message to the device, and the thirteenth message includes an ID of one or more keys needed to be released at the device.

For illustrative purpose, by taking the scenario shown in FIG. 7 as an example, an example of a method for security protection on data sessionwill be described in combination with FIG. 9.

FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of a method400 according to some embodiments of the present application. The method 400 shown in FIG. 9could include steps S402to S412. The following separately describes the steps in detail.

At S402, a MM determines security protection on a data session.

When receiving a service request from a device, a MM could determine whether a security protection on a data session is needed. When the security protection on the data session is needed, the MM may transmit a request for security protection provision from aKMF. Correspondingly, the KMF could receive the request.

At S404, a KMF determines a solution and a level for security protection on the data session.

At S406, the KMF collects inputs for key derivation.

The KMF could collect parameters based on the solution and the level for security protection, and these parameters could be used as input for key derivation.

At S408, the KMF select algorithms for key derivation and algorithm for key activation.

The KMF could select algorithms for key derivation. The algorithms for key derivation could be used to generate keys for protection of the data session. For example, KMF could select algorithms for generating keys for Data-TW-GW and device, keys for Data-TW-GW and XaaS service, or keys for XaaS service and device.

Keys for protection of the data session could include a key used for protectionof the data session with a particular encryption algorithm, and/or a key used for protection with a particular integrity algorithm. The KMF could determine the particular encryption algorithm and the particular integrity algorithm. For example, the keys for Data-TW-GW and device could include a key used for protection of the data session on interface II with a particular encryption algorithm, and a key used for protection of the data session on interface II with a particular integrity algorithm. These encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm could be determined by the KMF.

At S410, the KMF generates security contexts.

The KMF could generate a key for data encryption and a key for data integrity. The KMF could generatesecurity contexts for the device, security contexts for the Data-TW-GW and security contexts for theXaaS service.

At S412, configure the security contexts.

These security contexts could be configured to the device or related network function by the KMF or by the MM.

Inother words, FIG. 9 illustrates a principle of security protection on data session corresponding to the FIG. 7. When receiving a service request from a device, a MM shall determine whether it needs a security protection on a data session. If it needs a security protection on a data session, MM shall request for security protection provision from a KMF. The KMF shall select a solution for security protection on a data session, and a level for security protection on the data session. After that, the KMF collects parameters for key derivation according to the selected solution and the selected level. Then, the KMF selects algorithms for key derivation, an algorithm for data encryption, an algorithm for data integrity. Later, the KMF generates a key for data encryption and a key for data integrity, and security contexts for a device, security contexts for a Data-TW-GW, security contexts for a XaaS service. At last, these security contexts are configurated to the device, the Data-TW-GW, the XaaS service.

The method of security protection on data session could have the following new features compared to prior arts in 3GPP 33.501.1) Communication between a device and a serving Data-GW should be secured. When the communication is secured, communication content is ciphered and not readable by RAN and other Data-TW-GWs. 2) KMF has new features of determination which solution/level of security protection on a data session, and of collection inputs for key generations.

For illustrative purpose, in the following, an example of a call flow about a procedure of key generation will be described in combination with FIG. 10.

FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application. These embodiments provide more details about key generation according to FIG. 9. The key points about in the security protection on data session are as followers:

(1) How to determine which solution/level of security protection on data session by a KMF.

A KMF shall determine which solution/level of security protection on data session according to service security requirements from a MM, local policy from a network operator, security process capabilities from a device, serving Data-TW-GW, and XaaS service. Note that security requirements from a MM shall include service security requirements from a device, network security performances from the MM. The security process capabilities shall indicate what process capabilities could be provided to run security protection on a data session, for example, algorithms for data encryption/data integrity, algorithms for key derivation.

(2) What parameters for key derivation according to the selected solution/level?

Parameters for key derivation may include information from a MM, information from a device, information from a Data-TW-GW, information from a KMF, and information from a XaaS service. For example, information from the MM may include a service ID/application ID, or a mission ID/session ID. Note that a mission or a session may include at least one service or one application. Information from the device may include at least a device ID, an algorithm ID for generating keys. Information from the Data-TW-GW may include at least an ID of the Data-TW-GW. Information from the KMF may include at least, a root key that is known by the device and the KMF, a time window that indicates a time window for the key’s validation period. Information from a XaaS service may include at least an ID of a XaaS PSF that is used for process on data.

For illustrative purpose, by taking the scenario shown in FIG. 7 as an example, Table 1 illustrates parameters for key derivation according to some embodiments of the present application.

As shown in Table 1, keys for Data-TW-GW and device in Table 1 mean that these keys are configured to both of a Data-TW-GW and a device. Keys for Data-TW-GW and XaaS service in Table 1 mean that these keys are configured to both of a Data-TW-GW and a XaaS PSF that is used for data procession. Keys for device and XaaS service in Table 1 mean that these keys are configured to both of a device and a XaaS PSF. In other word, keys for Data-TW-GW and device could be taken as examples of the first key, keys for Data-TW-GW and XaaS service could be taken as examples of the second key, and keys for XaaS service and key could be taken as examples of the third key. A “hop-to-hop” in Table 1 means a KMF selects a hop-to-hop security protection of data session, the end-to-end security protection of data session could be represented by the “end-to-end” in Table 1. The “per device” , “per mission/session” and “per service/application” in Table 1 could represent the security protection on data session performed per device, per mission/session and per service/application, respectively. The ID of XaaS PSF could be taken as an example of the first server.

Table 1: inputs for key derivation.

As shown in FIG. 10, a XaaS service is taken as an example of the first server, the Data-TW-GW is taken as an example of the first network function.

At S501, a device transmits a message 1 to a MM.

The message 1 is used to request a service supported by the XaaS service. The message 1 may include an ID of the device, security requirement of the service and a security capability of the device.

At S502, the MM determines whether the service needs to be protected.

The MM could determine whether the service needs to be protected according to the security requirement of the service.

At S503, the MM transmits a message 3 to a KMF.

The message 3 is used to request security configuration. The message 3 could include an ID of the device, security requirements, the security capability of the device and a security capability of a Data-TW-GW.

In some embodiments, for the KMF, the security requirements received from the MM could include at least one of: security requirements from the device (e.g., security requirements of the service, security requirement of the device) , network security performance from the MM.

The message 3 could be considered as an example of the first message mentioned in the method 300.

In some embodiments, the message 3 further includes a security capability of a XaaS service, an ID of XaaS PSF, and an ID of the Data-TW-GW. In this scenario, the message 3 could also be considered as an example of the third message mentioned in the method 300.

At S504, the KMF transmits a message 4 to the XaaS service.

The message 4 is used to request the security capability of the XaaS service. The message 4 could include indication for request for security process capability of the XaaS service.

The message 4 could be considered as an example of the second message mentioned in the method 300.

At S505, the XaaS service transmits a message 5 to the KMF.

The message 5 includes the security capability of the XaaS service. The message 5 could be a response of the message 4.

The message 5 could be considered as an example of the third message mentioned in the method 300.

At S506, the KMF determines a level and a solution for security protection on adata session.

For example, the level and the solution for security protection on the data session could be determined based on at least one of: security requirements from the MM, local policy from the network operator, the security process capability of the device, the security process capability of the Data-TW-GW or the security process capability of the XaaS service.

At S507, the KMFcollects inputs for key derivation.

In an embodiment, the KMF may send a request to the MM for collecting information from the MM, or collecting information from the Data-TW-GW. Correspondingly, the MM could transmit a response according to the request. For example, the response may include a service ID/application ID, or a session ID/mission ID.

In another embodiment, the KMF may send a request to the XaaS service for collecting information from the service. Correspondingly, theXaaS service could transmit a response according to the request. For example, the response may include an ID of the XaaSPSF.

The collected information could be used as input for generating keys used for protection of the data session.

At S508, the KMF generates security contexts.

The KMF could generate keysused for protection of the data session according to the selected level and solution for security protection of the data session. The KMF could generate at least one of: the security context for the device, the security context for the Data-TW-GWor the security context for the XaaS service.

In an embodiment, the KMF is responsible for keys configuration.

In another embodiment, the MM is responsible for keys configuration.

At S509, the KMF transmits a message 9 to the Data-TW-GW.

The message 9 could include the security context for the Data-TW-GW and IDs of keys used at the Data-TW-GW for protection of the data session. The message 9 could be used to configure these keys.

The message 9 could be considered as an example of the fourth messagementioned in the method 300.

At S510, the Data-TW-GW transmits a message 10 to the KMF.

The Data-TW-GW could keep or maintain its security context. The message 10 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the Data-TW-GW.

At S511, the KMF transmits a message 11 to the XaaS service.

The message 11 could include the security context for theXaaS service and IDs of keys used at XaaS service for protection of the data session.

The message 11 could be considered as an example of the fourth messagementioned in the method 300.

At S512, the XaaS service transmit a message 12 to the KMF.

The XaaS service could keep or maintain its security context. The message 12 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the XaaS service.

In some embodiments, the KMF could configure keys to the XaaS service and the Data-TW-GW according to S509 to S512.

At S513, the KMF transmits a message 13 to the MM.

The message 13 may include the security context for the device and IDs of keys used at the device for protection of the data session. The MM could further transmit message that includes the security context for the device to the device. Moreover, keys used at device could be generated according to the message.

The message 13 could be considered as an example of the fourth messagementioned in the method 300.

In some embodiments, the message 13 further includes the security context for the Data-TW-GW and the security context for the XaaS service.

At S514, the MM transmit a message 14 to the XaaS service.

The message 14 could include the security context for the XaaS service and IDs of keys used at XaaS service for protection of the data session.

The message 14 could be considered as an example of the eighth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S515, the XaaS service transmits a message 15 to the MM.

The MM could configure keys to the XaaS service according to S514 and S515.

At S516, the MM transmits a message 16 to the Data-TW-GW.

The message 16 could include the security context for the Data-TW-GW and IDs of keys used at the Data-TW-GW for protection of the data session.

The message 16 could be considered as an example of the ninth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S517, the Data-TW-GW transmits a message 17 to the MM.

The Data-TW-GW could keep or maintain its security context. The message 17 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the Data-TW-GW.

The MM could configure keys to the Data-TW-GW according to S516 and S517.

At S518, the Data-TW-GW maintains security context for the Data-TW-GW.

At S519, the XaaS service maintains security context for the XaaS service.

At S520, the MM transmit message 20 to the device.

The message 20 includes the security context for the device and ID of keys used at the device.

The message 20 could be considered as an example of the tenth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S521, the device generates keys and maintain the security context for the device.

In an embodiment, for a call flow about a procedure of key generation (e.g., as shown in FIG. 10) , details are as followers:

(1) Device sends a message1 to a MM.

(2) The MM determines whether the service needs to be protected or not according to the service requirements

(3) If the service needs to be protected, the MM, the MM sends a message3 to a KMF.

(4) The KMF may request for a security process capability of a XaaS service if the message3 does not include it. The KMF sends a message4 to a XaaS service.

(5) The XaaS service sends a message5 to the KMF.

(6) The KMF determines which level/solution of security protection on data session.

(7) The KMF may collect inputs for key derivation. For example, the KMF may send a request for information from a MM, information from a Data-TW-GW, to a MM. The MM sends the response according to the request. In some embodiments, the KMF may send a request for information from a XaaS service, to a XaaS service. The XaaS service sends the response according to the request. In some embodiments, information from the XaaS service may be sent to the KMF via MM.In some embodiments, information from a MM, information from a XaaS service, information from a Data-TW-GW, may be included in the message3.

(8) The KMF generates keys according to the select solution/level of security protection on the data session. The KMF generates security contexts for the device, security contexts for the Data-TW-GW, security contexts for the XaaS service. The KMF sets an ID of these keys.

(9) The KMF may configure these security contexts to the Data-TW-GW and the XaaS service. The KMF sends a message9 to the Data-TW-GW.

The message 9 could be considered as an example of the fourth message mentioned in the method 300.

(10) The Data-TW-GW keeps the security contexts for the Data-TW-GW, and sends a message10 to the KMF.

(11) The KMF sends a message11 to the XaaS service.

The message 11 could be considered as an example of the fourth message mentioned in the method 300.

(12) The XaaS service keeps the security contexts for the XaaS service, and sends a message12 to the KMF.

(13) The KMF sends a message13 to the MM.

The message 13 could be considered as an example of the fourth message mentioned in the method 300.

(14) The MM may configure these security contexts to the Data-TW-GW and the XaaS service. The MM sends a message14 to the XaaS service.

(15) The XaaS service keeps the security contexts for the XaaS service, and sends a message15 to the MM.

(16) The MM sends a message16 to the Data-TW-GW.

(17) The Data-TW-GW keeps the security contexts for the Data-TW-GW, and sends a message17 to the KMF.

(18) The Data-TW-GW maintains the security contexts for the Data-TW-GW.

(19) The XaaS service maintains the security contexts for the XaaS service.

(20) The MM sends a message20 to the device.

(21) The device generates keys, and maintains security contexts for the device.

This embodiment provides the factors that effect on how to determine which solution/level of security protection on a data session. In 3GPP 33.501, there has only one solution for key generation, without the selection on solutions/levels. But, the present application could provide multiple customized security protection on data session.

In 3GPP 33.501, the inputs of key derivation include a device ID, name of the serving network, root key, and information related to accessing gNB (e.g., PCI) . However, the present application adds information from a MM (e.g., session ID, service ID) into the above inputs of key derivation. In other words, keys for data encryption/data integrity could be per session, or per service, or per device. This could improve security protection on a data session.

In practice, keys used for protection of a data session may need to be updated.

In some implementations, a procedure of key update could be trigged by a MM when a mission/session is changed due to a change of the Data-TW-GW and a XaaS PSF. In some implementations, the procedure of key update could be trigged by a KMF when a time window is expired or a root key is changed.

For illustrative purpose, in the following, an example of a call flow about a procedure of key updatewill be described in combination with FIG. 11.

FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application. As shown in FIG. 11, the XaaS service is taken as an example of the first server, the Data-TW-GW is taken as an example of the first network function.

At S601, a MM transmit a message 1 to a KMF.

The message 1 is used to request for an update of keys used for protection on the data session (e.g., keys for protection of the data session on interface II, keys for protection of the data session on interface III, or keys used at the device and the XaaS service) . The message 1 could include an ID of the device, an ID of the XaaS PSF and an ID of the Data-TW-GW.

The message 1 could be considered as an example of the fifth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S602, the KMF generates new security contexts.

The KMF could generate new keys according to the selected solution/level for security protection on the data session. The KMF could set an ID of these keys.

The KMF could generate at least one of: the security context for the device, the security context for the Data-TW-GW, and the security context for the XaaS service.

At S603, the KMF transmits a message 3 to the Data-TW-GW.

The message 3 could include the security context for the Data-TW-GW and IDs of keys used at the Data-TW-GW for protection of the data session. The message 3 could be used to configure these keys.

The message 3 could be considered as an example of the fourth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S604, the Data-TW-GW transmits a message 4 to the KMF.

The Data-TW-GW could keep or maintain its security context. The message 4 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the Data-TW-GW.

At S605, the KMF transmits a message 5 to the XaaS service.

The message 5 could include the security context for the XaaS service and IDs of keys used at XaaS service for protection of the data session.

The message 5 could be considered as an example of the fourth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S606, the XaaS service transmit a message 6 to the KMF.

The XaaS service could keep or maintain its security context. The message 6 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the XaaS service.

At S607, the KMF transmits a message 7 to the MM.

The message 7 may include the security context for the device and IDs of keys used at the device for protection of the data session.

The message 7 could be considered as an example of the fourth message mentioned in the method 300.

In some embodiments, the MM could further transmit message that includes the security context for the device to the device. Moreover, keys used at device could be generated according to the message. In this scenario, the MM could be responsible for the key configuration.

At S608, the MM transmit a message 8 to the XaaS service.

The message 8 could include the security context for the XaaS service and IDs of keys used at XaaS service for protection of the data session.

The message 8 could be considered as an example of the eighth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S609, the XaaS service transmits a message 9 to the MM.

The XaaS service could keep or maintain its security context. The message 9 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the XaaS service.

At S610, the MM transmits a message 10 to the Data-TW-GW.

The message 10 could include the security context for the Data-TW-GW and IDs of keys used at the Data-TW-GW for protection of the data session.

The message 10 could be considered as an example of the ninth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S611, the Data-TW-GW transmits a message 11 to the MM.

The Data-TW-GW could keep or maintain its security context. The message 11 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the Data-TW-GW.

At S612, the Data-TW-GW maintains security context for the Data-TW-GW.

At S613, the XaaS service maintains security context for the XaaS service.

At S614, the MM transmit message 14 to the device.

The message 14 includes the security context for the device, and ID of keys used at the device.

The message 14 could be considered as an example of the tenth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S615, the device generates keys and maintain the security context for the device.

At S616, the device transmits a message 16 to the MM.

The message 16 could indicate a successful configuration for the keys used at the device.

In an embodiment, for a call flow about a procedure of key update (as shown in FIG. 11) , details are as followers:

(1) A MM sends a message1 to a KMF.

(2) The KMF generates keys according to the select solution/level of security protection on the data session. The KMF generates security contexts for the device, security contexts for the Data-TW-GW, security contexts for the XaaS service. The KMF sets an ID for these keys.

(3) The KMF may configure these security contexts to the Data-TW-GW and the XaaS service. The KMF sends a message3 to the Data-TW-GW.

(4) The Data-TW-GW keeps the security contexts for the Data-TW-GW, and sends a message4 to the KMF.

(5) The KMF sends a message5 to the XaaS service.

(6) The XaaS service keeps the security contexts for the XaaS service, and sends a message5 to the KMF.

(7) The KMF sends a message7 to the MM.

(8) The MM may configure these security contexts to the Data-TW-GW and the XaaS service. The MM sends a message8 to the XaaS service.

(9) The XaaS service keeps the security contexts for the XaaS service, and sends a message9 to the MM.

(10) The MM sends a message10 to the Data-TW-GW.

(11) The Data-TW-GW keeps the security contexts for the Data-TW-GW, and sends a message11 to the KMF.

(12) The Data-TW-GW maintains the security contexts for the Data-TW-GW.

(13) The XaaS service maintains the security contexts for the XaaS service.

(14) The MM sends a message14 to the device.

(15) The device generates keys, and maintains security contexts for the device.

(16) The device sends a message16 to the MM.

In practice, keys for protection of a data session may need to be released. For example, a procedure of key release could be trigged by a MM when the MM releases a session.

For illustrative purpose, in the following, an example of a call flow about a procedure of key release will be described in combination with FIG. 12.

FIG. 12 is a schematic flowchart of a method for communication according to some embodiments of the present application. As shown in FIG. 12, the XaaS service is taken as an example of the first server, the Data-TW-GW is taken as an example of the first network function.

At S701, the MM transmits a message 1 to a KMF.

The message 1 is used to notifya release of a data session. The message 1 could include an ID of the device, and an ID of a session or a service.

The message 1 could be considered as an example of the sixth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S702, the KMF determines whether keys for protection of the data session is needed to be released.

For example, when the security protection on data session is performed on per service, per application or per session, the KMF could notify the related network functions to release the keys used for protection of the data session.

At S703, the KMF transmits a message 3 to the Data-TW-GW.

The message 3 could include an ID of at least one key needed to be released among keys used at the Data-TW-GWfor protection of the data session.

The message 3 could be considered as an example of the seventh message mentioned in the method 300.

At S704, the Data-TW-GW transmits a message 4 to the KMF.

The message 4 could indicate a successful release for the at least one key needed to be released.

At S705, the KMF transmits a message 5 to the XaaS service.

The message 5 could include an ID of at least one key needed to be released among the keys used at the XaaS servicefor protection ofthe data session.

The message 5 could be considered as an example of the seventh message mentioned in the method 300.

At S706, the XaaS service transmit a message 6 to the KMF.

The message 6 could indicate a successful release for the at least one key needed to be released.

At S707, the KMF transmits a message 7 to the MM.

The message 7 is used to acknowledge the notification of the release of the data session. The message 7 could include an ID of at least one key needed to be released among the keys used at the device service for protection of the data session.

The message 7 could be considered as an example of the seventh message mentioned in the method 300.

In some embodiments, the message 7 could further include: at least one key needed to be released among the keys used at the XaaS, and at least one key needed to be released among keys used at the Data-TW-GW. In this scenario, the MM could be responsible for the key release.

At S708, the MM transmit a message 8 to the XaaS service.

The message 8 could include an ID of at least one key needed to be released among the keys used at the XaaS servicefor protection ofthe data session.

The message 8 could be considered as an example of the eleventh message mentioned in the method 300.

At S709, the XaaS service transmits a message 9 to the MM.

The message 9 could indicate a successful release for the at least one key needed to be released.

At S710, the MM transmits a message 10 to the Data-TW-GW.

The message 10 could include an ID of at least one key needed to be released among keys used at the Data-TW-GWfor protection of the data session.

The message 10 could be considered as an example of the twelfth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S711, the Data-TW-GW transmits a message 11 to the MM.

The message 11 could indicate a successful release for the at least one key needed to be released.

At S712, the MM transmit message 12 to the device.

The message 12 could include an ID of at least one key needed to be released among keys used at the devicefor protection of the data session.

The message 12 could be considered as an example of the thirteenth message mentioned in the method 300.

At S713, the device transmits a message 13 to the MM.

In an embodiment, for a call flow of key deactivation (as shown in FIG. 12) , details are as followers:

(1) A MM sends a message1 to a KMF.

(2) The KMF determines whether release keys or not according to the message1. If these keys are per mission/session, or per service/application, the KMF shall notify to release these keys.

(3) The KMF may release these keys. The KMF sends a message3 to a Data-TW-GW.

(4) The Data-TW-GW sends a message4 to the KMF.

(5) The KMF sends a message5 to a XaaS service.

(6) The XaaS service sends a message5 to the KMF.

(7) The KMF sends a message7 to the MM.

(8) The MM may release these keys. The MM sends a message8 to a XaaS service.

(9) The XaaS service sends a message9 to the MM.

(10) The MM sends a message10 to a Data-TW-GW.

(11) The Data-TW-GW sends a message1 to the MM.

(12) The MM sends a message12 to a device.

(13) The device sends a message13 to the MM.

In the present application, security protection on a data session, especially in communications between a device and a serving Data-GW is provided. When the communication is secured, communication content is ciphered and not readable by RAN and other Data-TW-GWs.

Moreover, KMF has a new feature of determination which level/method of security protection on a data session, and collection inputs for key generations.

We want to claim what information exchanges for determination which level/method of security protection and what information exchanges for key generations.

According to these above-mentioned technical solutions, it could bring some benefits.

1) For security protection

In 3GPP 33.501, keys are used for multiple communication sessions. In the present application, keys could be per session, per service. That could improve security of communications.

2) For customization

We provide different methods/levels for security protection on a data session. This brings more flexibility for different security requirements from different devices and different services.

The method proposed in embodiments of the present application is described in detail above, and a communication apparatus provided by the present application will be described in detail below.

FIG. 13 is a schematic block diagram of a communication apparatus 10 according to some embodiments of the present application. The communication apparatus may be a communication device or an apparatus applied to the communication device and capable of realizing corresponding functions of any one of the network functions in the embodiments of the present application, for example, the apparatus may be a chip, a chip system or a circuit, which is not limited. The communication device may be a KMF, a first network function, a second network function or a first server, or the chip installed in any one of these network functions.

The communication apparatus 10 includes a processing module 11. The processing module 11 may be a processor, a processing circuit, a processing board, a processing unit, or a processing device, et al. The processing module 11 is configured to implement processing and/or operations implemented inside the communication apparatus except sending the receiving actions.

The communication apparatus 10 may further include a communication module 12. The communication unit 12 is configured to implement a sending action and/or a receiving action. The communication module 12 also may be called a transceiver module, a transceiver, or a transceiver device, et al, and is configured to implement operations of receiving (which may be referred to as inputting) and/or sending (which may be referred to as an outputting) .

For example, if the communication apparatus 10 corresponds to the KMF in FIG. 3, the communication module 12 could be configured to receive the first message. The communication module 12 could further be configured to transmit the second message to the second KMF.

For another example, if the communication apparatus 10 corresponds to the second function in FIG. 8, the communication module 12 could be configured to receive the fourth message.

For still another example, if the communication apparatus 10 corresponds to the first server in FIG. 8, the communication module 12 could be configured to receive the second message.

Briefly, the operations and/or functions of the apparatus 10 are intended to implement corresponding steps of the foregoing method embodiments.

FIG. 14 is a schematic block diagram of a communication apparatus according to an embodiment of the present application. The communication apparatus 20 includes at least one processor 21. The at least one processor 21 is coupled to at least one memory 22. The at least one memory 22 is configured to store one or more instructions and/or executable computer code. The at least one processor 21 is configured to invoke the one or more instructions and/or executable computer code, so that the communication apparatus 20 implements the method provided in the embodiments of the present application. Optionally, the communication apparatus 20 may further include the at least one memory 22. Optionally, the communication apparatus 20 may further include at least one communication interface 23, and the at least one communication interface 23 is configured to input and/or output information or data.

In an implementation, the communication apparatus 20 may be any one of the network functions in the method embodiments. For example, the communication apparatus 20 may be a KMF, a first network function, a second network function or a first server. In this implementation, the processor 21 may be a baseband apparatus, and the communication interface 23 may be a radio frequency apparatus.

In another implementation, the communication apparatus 20 may be a chip (or a chip system) installed at a communication device such as a KMF, a first network function, a second network function or a first server. In this implementation, the processor 21 may be a circuit, for example, a logic circuit, an integrated circuit, etc. The communication interface 23 may be a transceiver, an interface circuit, an input/output interface, a bus, a module, a pin, or other types of interfaces.

An embodiment of the present application further provides a communication system. The communication system may include any one of communication apparatuses according to any one of the method embodiments. For example, the communication system may include one or more of the following network functions: aKMF, a first network function, a second network function or a first server. The communication system may further include a device (e.g., a UE) or other network functions, which is not limited.

An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer storage medium, and the computer storage medium may store one or more instructions for executing any of the foregoing methods.

An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, and the computer program product may store one or more instructions for executing any of the foregoing methods.

In the embodiments of this application, “and/or” describes an association relationship between associated objects and represents that three relationships may exist. For example, A and/or B may represent the following three cases: Only A exists, both A and B exist, and only B exists. The character “/” generally indicates an “or” relationship between the associated objects. “At least one” means one or more. “At least one of A and B” , similar to “A and/or B” , describes an association relationship between associated objects and represents that three relationships may exist. For example, at least one of A and B may represent the following three cases: Only A exists, both A and B exist, and only B exists.

Besides, the use of a singular form of “a” , “an” and “the” in the embodiments of the present application and the claims appended hereto is also intended to include a plural form, unless otherwise clearly indicated herein by context.

A person of ordinary skill in the art will be aware that, in combination with the examples described in the embodiments disclosed in this specification, units and algorithm steps may be implemented by using electronic hardware or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether the functions are performed by using hardware or software depends on particular applications and design constraint conditions of the technical solutions. A person skilled in the art may use different methods to implement the described functions for each particular application, but it should not be considered that the embodiment goes beyond the scope of this application.

It would be understood by a person skilled in the art that, for the purpose of convenience and brevity, in a detailed working process of the foregoing system, apparatus, and unit, reference may be made to a corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, and details are not described herein again.

In the several embodiments provided in this application, the disclosed system, apparatus, and method may be implemented in other manners. For example, the described apparatus embodiment is merely an example. For example, the unit division is a logical function division and other methods of division may be used in an actual embodiment. For example, a plurality of units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not performed. In addition, the displayed or discussed mutual couplings or direct couplings or communication connections may be implemented using various communication interfaces. The indirect couplings or communication connections between the apparatuses or units may be implemented in electronic, mechanical, or other forms.

In addition, function units in the embodiments of this application may be integrated into one processing unit, each of the units may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

When the functions are implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, the functions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The technical solutions of this application may be implemented in the form of a software product. The software product is stored in a storage medium, and includes several instructions for instructing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, a network device, or the like) to perform all or some of the steps of the methods described in the embodiments of this application. The foregoing storage medium includes any medium that can store program code, such as a USB flash drive, a removable hard disk, a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disc or the like.

The units described as separate parts may be or may not be physically separate, and parts displayed as units may be or may not be physical units, may be located in one position, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units may be selected based on actual requirements to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments. In addition, functional units in the embodiments of this application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each of the units may exist alone physically, or two or more units are integrated into one unit.

The foregoing descriptions are merely specific implementations of this application, but are not intended to limit the protection scope of this application. Any variation or replacement readily figured out by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application shall fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

A methodfor communication, performed by a key management function (KMF) , comprising:

determining a solution for security protection on a data sessionbetween a device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session; and

collecting a plurality of parameters based on the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session, wherein the plurality of parameters are used to derive at least onekey used for protection of the data session.
The communication method according to claim 1, wherein the data session between the device and the first server comprises a first communication between a first network function and the device and a second communication between the first network function and the first server.
The communication method according to claim 1 or 2, whereinthe solution for security protection on the data session comprises a first solution, the at least one keycorresponds to the first solutionand comprises a first key and a second key, the first key is used for protection of the first communication, and the second key is used for protection of the second communication.
The communication method according to claim 2, wherein the first network function comprises a first gate way or a user plane function.
The communication method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the solution for security protection on the data session comprises a second solution, the at least one keycorresponds to the second solution andcomprises a third key, and the third key is used at the device and the first server.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the data session is related to a service, an application or a session, or a mission or a device is related to the data session; wherein

the level for security protection on the data session comprises a first level, andkeys related to the first level are used for protection on the service or the application; or

the level for security protection on the data session comprises a second level, and keys related to the second level are used for protection on the session; or

the level for security protection on the data session comprises a third level, and keys related to the third level are used for protection on the mission, and the mission comprises at least one session.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein

the solution for security protection on the data session is a first solution, and the plurality of parameters used to derive at least one key comprise a first parameter used to generate the first key and a second parameter used to generate the second key; wherein

the first parameter comprises: an identifier (ID) of the device, an ID of a first network function, an ID of an algorithm (s) for generating afirst key, a time window and a shared key known by the device; and

the second parameter comprises: the ID of the first network function, an ID of the first server, a time window and a shared key known by the device; and wherein

when the level for security protection on the data session is a first level, the first parameter and the second parameter further comprise a service ID or an application ID; or

when the level for security protection on the data session is a second level, the first parameter and the second parameter further comprise a session ID; or

when the level for security protection on the data session is a third level, the first parameter and the second parameter further comprise a missionID.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein

the solution for security protection on the data session is a second solution, and the plurality of parameters used to derive at least one key comprise:

an ID of the device, an ID of the first server, a time window and a shared key known by the device; and wherein

when the level for security protection on the data session is a first level, the plurality of parameters further comprises a service ID or an application ID; or

when the level for security protection on the data session is a second level, the plurality of parameters further comprises a session ID; or

when the level for security protection on the data session is a third level, the plurality of parameters further comprises a mission ID.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, further comprising:

receiving a first message, wherein the first message comprises at least one of: a security process capability of a first network function or a security process capability of the device;

wherein the determining a solution for security protection on a data sessionbetween a device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session comprises:

determining the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session based on the first message.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, further comprising:

transmitting a second messageto the first server, wherein the second message is used to request a security process capability of the first server; and

receiving a third messagefrom the first server, wherein the third message comprise the security process capability of the first server.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, further comprising:

transmitting a fourth message, wherein the fourth message comprises a first security context, and the first security context comprises at least one of: a security context for the device, a security context for the first server, or a security context for a first network function.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, further comprising:

receiving a fifth message from a second network function, wherein the fifth message is used to request for refreshing the keys used for protection of the data session.
The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 12, further comprising:

receiving a sixth message from a second network function, wherein the sixth message indicates a release of the data session; and

transmitting a seventh message, wherein the seventh message comprises an ID of at least one key that needs to be released, and the keys used for protection of the data session comprises the at least one key.
A methodfor communication, performed by a second network function, comprising:

receiving a fourth message, wherein the fourth message comprises the first security context, the first security context is used to configure keys used for protection of a data session between a device and a first server;

wherein the keysused for protection of the data session are generated based on a solution for security protection on the data session and a level for security protection on the data session.
The communication method according to claim 14, further comprising:

transmitting a first message, whereinthe first message comprises at least one of: a security process capability ofa first network function or a security process capability of the device, and the solution for security protection on the data session and the level for security protection on the data session is determined based on the first message.
The communication method according to claim 14 or 15, wherein the first security context comprises a security context for the first server, and the method further comprises:

transmitting an eighth messageto the first server, wherein the eighth message comprises the security context for the first server.
The communication method according to claim 14 or 15, wherein the first security context comprises a security context for a first network function, and the method further comprises:

transmitting a ninth message to the first network function, wherein the ninth message comprises the security context for the first network function.
The communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 17, wherein the first security context comprises a security context for the device, and the method further comprises:

transmitting a tenth message to the device, wherein the tenth message comprises the security context for the device.
The communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 18, further comprising:

transmitting a fifth message to the KMF, wherein the fifth message is used to request for refreshing the keys used for protection of the data session.
The communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 19, further comprising:

transmitting a sixth message to the KMF, wherein the sixth message indicates a release of the data session; and

receiving a seventh message from the KMF, wherein the seventh message comprises an ID of at least one key that needs to be released, and the keys used for protection of the data session comprises the at least one key.
A methodfor communication, performed by a first server, comprising:

receiving a second message from a KMF, wherein the second message is used to request a security process capability of the first server; and

transmitting a third message to the KMF, wherein the third message comprise the security process capability of the first server, and the security process capability of the first server is used to determine a solution for security protection on a data sessionbetween a user device and a first server and a level for security protection on the data session.
The communication method according to claim 21, further comprising:

receiving a fourth message from the KMF, wherein the fourth message comprises a security context for the first server; or

receivingan eighth message from a second network function, wherein the fifth message comprises the security context for the first server.
The communication method according to claim 21 or 22, further comprising:

receiving aseventh message from the KMF, wherein the seventh message comprises an ID of at least one key that needs to be released among the keys used for protection of the data session; or

receiving aneleventh message from a second network function, wherein the eleventh message comprises an ID of at least one key that needs to be released among the keys used for protection of the data session.
A communication apparatus, wherein the communication apparatus comprises a processor, the processor is configured to execute one or more instructions stored in a memory, to enable the communication apparatus to implement the method according to any one of claims 1to 13, or the method according to any one of claims 14 to20, or the method according to any one of claims 21 to 23.
Thecommunication apparatus according to claim 24, wherein the communication apparatus further comprises the memory.
The communication apparatus according to claim 24 or 25, wherein the communication apparatus comprises a communication interface, and the communication interface is configured to input and/or output information or data.
A communication apparatus, wherein the communication apparatus comprises a function or unit to implement the method according toany one of claims 1to 13, or the method according to any one of claims 14 to20, or the method according to any one of claims 21 to 23.
A communication apparatus, wherein the communication apparatus comprises a circuit and a communication interface, the communication interface is configured to receive information and/or data that is to be processed by the circuit, and transmit the information and/or data to the circuit; and the circuit is configured to implement the method according toany one of claims 1to 13, or the method according to any one of claims 14 to 20, or the method according to any one of claims 21 to 23.
The communication apparatus according to claim 28, wherein the communication interface is further configured to output information and/or data processed by the circuit.
A communication system, comprising one or more communication apparatuses of:

a communication apparatus that performs the method according to any one of claims 1 to 13;

a communication apparatus that performs the method according to any one of claims 14to20; and

a communication apparatus that performs the method according to any one of claims 21 to 23.
A computer readable storage medium, comprising one or more instructions, wherein when the one or more instructions are run on a computer, the computer implements themethod according toany one of claims 1to 13, or the method according to any one of claims 14 to 20, or the method according to any one of claims 21 to 23.
A computer program product, comprising one or more instructions, wherein when the one or more instructions are run on a computer, the computer implements themethod according toany one of claims 1to 13, or the method according to any one of claims 14 to 20, or the method according to any one of claims 21 to 23.