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WO2025043389A1 - Procédé, dispositif et produit-programme d'ordinateur pour communication sans fil - Google Patents

Procédé, dispositif et produit-programme d'ordinateur pour communication sans fil Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2025043389A1
WO2025043389A1 PCT/CN2023/114965 CN2023114965W WO2025043389A1 WO 2025043389 A1 WO2025043389 A1 WO 2025043389A1 CN 2023114965 W CN2023114965 W CN 2023114965W WO 2025043389 A1 WO2025043389 A1 WO 2025043389A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
wireless communication
authentication
key
update
communication terminal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
PCT/CN2023/114965
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English (en)
Inventor
Leyi Zhang
Shilin You
Yuze LIU
Peilin Liu
Zhen XING
Wei Ma
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ZTE Corp
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ZTE Corp
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Filing date
Publication date
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Priority to PCT/CN2023/114965 priority Critical patent/WO2025043389A1/fr
Publication of WO2025043389A1 publication Critical patent/WO2025043389A1/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • This document is directed generally to wireless communications, and in particular to 5 th generation (5G) communications or 6 th generation (6G) communications.
  • Authentication and Key Management for Applications is a component within 5G communication architecture, responsible for ensuring the security and integrity of network interactions. It focuses on authenticating devices and users before granting access to the network, thereby mitigating potential unauthorized breaches. Additionally, AKMA facilitates the secure exchange of encryption keys, a pivotal aspect in maintaining data confidentiality and preventing tampering. By integrating Authentication and Key Management for Applications, the 5G framework establishes a robust security foundation, fostering secure and trusted communication between various devices and the network. However, updating the AKMA context is still a topic to be discussed.
  • This document relates to methods, systems, and computer program products for a wireless communication.
  • the wireless communication method includes: updating, by a management node, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in an anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • a primary authentication is triggered to update the key identifier.
  • the management node performs at least one of:
  • the request for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications comprises an update indication indicating a cause for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications.
  • the management node triggers a home network triggered primary authentication to update the key identifier in response to the parameter update procedure for the wireless communication terminal being performed.
  • the management node informs, in response to the parameter update procedure for the wireless communication terminal being performed, the wireless communication terminal that at least one of an authentication key or an assess key is invalid to allow the wireless communication terminal to initiate a home network triggered primary authentication to update the key identifier.
  • the wireless communication method includes: updating, by an anchor node, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in the anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • a primary authentication is triggered to update the key identifier.
  • the anchor node performs at least one of:
  • a management node transmitting, to a management node in response to a request of an application key received from an application node and information for the authentication and key management for applications being removed, a request for a home network triggered primary authentication procedure to request the management node to perform the home network triggered primary authentication procedure and update the key identifier after the home network triggered primary authentication procedure.
  • the request for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications comprises at least one of an identifier of the wireless communication terminal or an update indication indicating a cause for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications.
  • the notification for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications comprises at least one of the key identifier or an update indication indicating a cause for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications.
  • the request of the key comprises a Subscription Permanent Identifier, SUPI, or a Generic Public Subscription Identifier, GPSI, of the wireless communication terminal.
  • SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier
  • GPSI Generic Public Subscription Identifier
  • the wireless communication method includes: updating, by an application node, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in an anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • the application node performs at least one of:
  • the notification for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications comprises at least one of the key identifier or an update indication indicating a cause for removing the information for the authentication and key management for applications.
  • the request of the key comprises a Subscription Permanent Identifier, SUPI, or a Generic Public Subscription Identifier, GPSI, of the wireless communication terminal.
  • SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier
  • GPSI Generic Public Subscription Identifier
  • a primary authentication is triggered to update the key identifier.
  • the wireless communication terminal receives an indication from a management node indicating that at least one of an authentication key or an assess key is invalid and initiates a home network triggered primary authentication to update the key identifier according to the indication.
  • the management node includes a communication unit and a processor.
  • the processor is configured to: update, via the communication unit, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in an anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • the anchor node includes a communication unit and a processor.
  • the processor is configured to: update a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in the anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • the application node includes a communication unit and a processor.
  • the processor is configured to: update, via the communication unit, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in an anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • the wireless communication terminal includes a communication unit and a processor.
  • the processor is configured to: update, via the communication unit, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in an anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for the wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • the present disclosure relates to a computer program product comprising a computer-readable program medium code stored thereupon, the code, when executed by a processor, causing the processor to implement a wireless communication method recited in any one of foregoing methods.
  • the present disclosure is not limited to the exemplary embodiments and applications described and illustrated herein. Additionally, the specific order and/or hierarchy of steps in the methods disclosed herein are merely exemplary approaches. Based upon design preferences, the specific order or hierarchy of steps of the disclosed methods or processes can be re-arranged while remaining within the scope of the present disclosure. Thus, those of ordinary skill in the art will understand that the methods and techniques disclosed herein present various steps or acts in a sample order, and the present disclosure is not limited to the specific order or hierarchy presented unless expressly stated otherwise.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B show a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3 shows a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 5 shows an example of a schematic diagram of a wireless communication terminal according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 6 shows an example of a schematic diagram of a wireless communication node according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIGs. 7 to 10 show flowcharts of wireless communication methods according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the procedure can be used to remove the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) context in the AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF) .
  • AKMA Authentication and Key Management for Applications
  • AAA AKMA Anchor Function
  • NF Network Function
  • An NF initiates an AAnF AKMA context removal procedure to delete the AKMA context within the AAnF.
  • the AKMA context can be a set of parameters stored in the AAnF, including the Authentication Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI) , AKMA Key Identifier (A-KID) , and AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA ) .
  • SUPI Authentication Subscriber Permanent Identifier
  • A-KID AKMA Key Identifier
  • K AKMA AKMA Anchor Key
  • the NF discovers the AAnF of the UE and sends a Naanf_AKMA_Context_Remove request to the AAnF, requesting the removal of the AKMA context for the UE (user equipment) .
  • the AAnF deletes the AKMA context (e.g., the Authentication Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI) , AKMA Key Identifier (A-KID) , and AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA ) ) from its local database.
  • AKMA context e.g., the Authentication Subscriber Permanent Identifier (SUPI) , AKMA Key Identifier (A-KID) , and AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA )
  • the AAnF sends a Naanf_AKMA_Context_Remove response to the NF.
  • the procedure provides a method for removing the AKMA context from the AAnF.
  • the AKMA context removal procedure can be applied in the UPU (UE Parameters Update) by the UDM (Unified Data Management) .
  • the reason or cause for AKMA context removal can be included in the Naanf_AKMA_Context_Remove request, and the AF can be aware of the AKMA context removal.
  • the UDM can initiate the UE Parameters Update (UPU) procedure to modify the UE's routing indicator (RID) . Subsequently, the UE generates a new AKMA Key Identifier (A-KID) based on the updated RID and employs it in the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) session with the Application Function (AF) .
  • the UDM may not trigger the home network-triggered primary authentication after performing the UPU, such that the A-KID within the AAnF context and AF is generated using the old RID, resulting in an inconsistency. Such inconsistency in the A-KID could lead to failures in the AKMA service.
  • Some embodiments of the present disclosure provide methods to remove the old AKMA context within the AAnF and update the A-KID in the AAnF and AF.
  • Some embodiments of the present disclosure provide methods for the AAnF to update the A-KID after the UDM performs the UPU.
  • FIG. 2A and FIG. 2B show a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the home network triggered primary authentication is triggered upon the request of the AAnF.
  • the UDM performs the UPU and updates the RID of the UE.
  • the UDM discovers the AAnF of the UE and sends a message (e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_Context_Remove request) to the AAnF to remove the AKMA context for the UE.
  • a message e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_Context_Remove request
  • the message includes at least one of the UE’s SUPI and/or an indication (e.g., a RID update indication) indicating the reason or the cause for the AKMA context removal.
  • the AAnF sends notification (s) (e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_ContextRemNotification) to the AF about the AKMA context removal (also referred to as AKMA context removal notification) .
  • the notification message includes at least one of the A-KID and/or an indication (e.g., a RID update indication) indicating the reason or the cause for the AKMA context removal.
  • the AF responds to the AKMA context removal notification.
  • the AF transmits a response (e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_ContextRemNotification response) responding the AKMA context removal notification.
  • the AAnF deletes the AKMA context (e.g., including the SUPI of the UE, the corresponding A-KID and the corresponding AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA ) ) from its local database.
  • AKMA context e.g., including the SUPI of the UE, the corresponding A-KID and the corresponding AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA )
  • the AAnF sends a response (e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_Context_Remove response) to the UDM.
  • a response e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_Context_Remove response
  • the UE When the UE decides to initiate the communication with the AKMA AF, the UE includes the updated A-KID in a message (e.g., an Application Session Establishment Request message) requesting an application session establishment and sends the message to the AF.
  • a message e.g., an Application Session Establishment Request message
  • the AF Since the AF does not have an active context associated with the A-KID, the AF sends a request to the UE for requesting the identifier of the UE.
  • the UE responds the AF with its GPSI (Generic Public Subscription Identifier) .
  • the AF sends a request message (e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get Request) for an application key (e.g., an AKMA application key) to the AAnF.
  • a request message e.g., a Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get Request
  • an application key e.g., an AKMA application key
  • the AF acknowledges the lack of the AKMA context in the AAnF.
  • the AF acknowledges the AKMA context removal in the AAnF.
  • the AF may include an identifier of the UE (e.g., the GPSI and/or SUPI) in the request message for requesting the application key.
  • the AF may send the request message for requesting the application key with the identifier of the UE according to the acknowledgement of the lack of the AKMA context in the AAnF (e.g., the AKMA context removal in the AAnF) .
  • the AAnF when the AF is located in the operator's network, the AAnF may use the Service-Based Interface to communicate with the AF directly, and the SUPI may be sent to the AAnF via the request message for the application key.
  • the NEF when the AF is located outside the operator's network, the NEF may be used to exchange the messages between the AF and the AAnF, and the GPSI may be sent to the AAnF via the request message for the application key.
  • the AAnF sends a request (e.g., a Naanf_UECM_AuthTrigger Request) for triggering the home network triggered primary authentication procedure to the UDM.
  • a request e.g., a Naanf_UECM_AuthTrigger Request
  • the AAnF sends a request for triggering the home network triggered primary authentication procedure to the UDM in response to the request message for the application key being received from the AF.
  • the request for triggering the home network triggered primary authentication procedure includes the identifier of the UE.
  • the UDM starts the home network triggered primary authentication procedure.
  • the AAnF can acquire the new A-KID which is consistent with the A-KID in the UE.
  • the UE and AAnF can derive the AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA ) .
  • the AAnF derives the AKMA Application Key (K AF ) from the K AKMA .
  • the AAnF sends a Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get response to the AF with the identifier of the UE, the K AF and the K AF expiration time.
  • the AAnF determines whether to send the identifier of the UE (e.g., SUPI or GPSI) based on the local policy.
  • FIG. 3 shows a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the home network triggered primary authentication is triggered by the UDM after the UPU.
  • the UDM performs the UPU and updates the RID of the UE.
  • the UDM In response to the UPU being performed and/or the RID is updated, the UDM triggered the home network triggered primary authentication procedure.
  • the AAnF can acquire the new A-KID which is consistent with the A-KID in the UE.
  • the UE and AAnF can derive the AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA ) .
  • the AAnF derives the AKMA Application Key (K AF ) from the K AKMA .
  • the AAnF sends a Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get response to the AF with the identifier of the UE, the K AF and the K AF expiration time.
  • the AAnF determines whether to send the identifier of the UE (e.g., SUPI or GPSI) based on the local policy.
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a procedure according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the primary authentication is triggered due to the invalid K AMF and/or K AUSF.
  • the UDM performs the UPU and updates the RID of the UE.
  • the UDM informs the UE (e.g., through an indication) that at least one of the key (K AMF ) for the corresponding Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and/or the key (K AUSF ) for the corresponding Authentication Server Function (AUSF) is invalid in response to the UPU being performed and/or the RID is updated.
  • the UDM sets the value of a parameter ngKSI to “111” and sends it to the UE to informs the UE that at least one of the K AMF and/or the K AUSF is invalid.
  • the UE receives the indication from the UDM. For example, the UE examines the value of the parameter ngKSI and finds that at least one of the K AMF and/or the K AUSF is invalid.
  • the UE initiates a primary (re) authentication to get a new K AMF and/or the K AUSF based on the successful primary authentication.
  • the AAnF can acquire the new A-KID which is consistent with the A-KID in the UE.
  • the UE and AAnF can derive the AKMA Anchor Key (K AKMA ) .
  • the AAnF derives the AKMA Application Key (K AF ) from the K AKMA .
  • the AAnF sends a Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get response to the AF with the with the identifier of the UE, the K AF and the K AF expiration time.
  • the AAnF determines whether to send the identifier of the UE (e.g., SUPI or GPSI) based on the local policy.
  • Some embodiments of the present disclosure provide mechanisms for the AAnF to update the A-KID after the UDM performs the UPU and updates the RID.
  • the A-KID in the AAnF is updated by triggering the primary authentication.
  • methods for triggering the primary authentication are provided.
  • the UDM requests the AAnF for the AKMA context removal after performing the UPU.
  • the home network triggered primary authentication is triggered upon the request from the AAnF.
  • the reason for the AKMA context removal is included in the request message.
  • the AF is informed of the removal of the AKMA context in the AAnF.
  • the UDM triggers the home network triggered primary authentication after the UPU.
  • the UDM informs the UE that at least one of the K AMF and/or the K AUSF is invalid, and the UE triggers the primary authentication accordingly.
  • FIG. 5 relates to a diagram of a wireless communication terminal 30 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the wireless communication terminal 30 may be a tag, a mobile phone, a laptop, a tablet computer, an electronic book or a portable computer system and is not limited herein.
  • the wireless communication terminal 30 may be used to implement the UE described in this disclosure.
  • the wireless communication terminal 30 may include a processor 300 such as a microprocessor or Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) , a storage unit 310 and a communication unit 320.
  • the storage unit 310 may be any data storage device that stores a program code 312, which is accessed and executed by the processor 300.
  • Embodiments of the storage code 312 include but are not limited to a subscriber identity module (SIM) , read-only memory (ROM) , flash memory, random-access memory (RAM) , hard-disk, and optical data storage device.
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • ROM read-only memory
  • RAM random-access memory
  • the communication unit 320 may a transceiver and is used to transmit and receive signals (e.g., messages or packets) according to processing results of the processor 300.
  • the communication unit 320 transmits and receives the signals via at least one antenna 322 or via wiring.
  • the storage unit 310 and the program code 312 may be omitted and the processor 300 may include a storage unit with stored program code.
  • the processor 300 may implement any one of the steps in exemplified embodiments on the wireless communication terminal 30, e.g., by executing the program code 312.
  • the communication unit 320 may be a transceiver.
  • the communication unit 320 may as an alternative or in addition be combining a transmitting unit and a receiving unit configured to transmit and to receive, respectively, signals to and from a wireless communication node.
  • the wireless communication terminal 30 may be used to perform the operations of the UE described in this disclosure.
  • the processor 300 and the communication unit 320 collaboratively perform the operations described in this disclosure. For example, the processor 300 performs operations and transmit or receive signals, message, and/or information through the communication unit 320.
  • FIG. 6 relates to a diagram of a wireless communication node 40 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the wireless communication node 40 may be a satellite, a base station (BS) , a gNB, a network entity, a Domain Name System (DNS) server, a Mobility Management Entity (MME) , Serving Gateway (S-GW) , Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway (P-GW) , a radio access network (RAN) , a next generation RAN (NG-RAN) , a data network, a core network, a communication node in the core network, or a Radio Network Controller (RNC) , and is not limited herein.
  • BS base station
  • gNB a network entity
  • DNS Domain Name System
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • S-GW Serving Gateway
  • PDN Packet Data Network Gateway
  • RAN radio access network
  • NG-RAN next generation RAN
  • RNC Radio Network Controller
  • the wireless communication node 40 may include (perform) at least one network function such as a UDM, an AAnF, an access and mobility management function (AMF) , a session management function (SMF) , a user place function (UPF) , a policy control function (PCF) , an application function (AF) , etc.
  • the wireless communication node 40 may be used to implement the network functions (e.g., the UDM, the AAnF, and the AF) , described in this disclosure.
  • the wireless communication node 40 may include a processor 400 such as a microprocessor or ASIC, a storage unit 410 and a communication unit 420.
  • the storage unit 410 may be any data storage device that stores a program code 412, which is accessed and executed by the processor 400. Examples of the storage unit 412 include but are not limited to a SIM, ROM, flash memory, RAM, hard-disk, and optical data storage device.
  • the communication unit 420 may be a transceiver and is used to transmit and receive signals (e.g., messages or packets) according to processing results of the processor 400. In an embodiment, the communication unit 420 transmits and receives the signals via at least one antenna 422 or via wiring.
  • the storage unit 410 and the program code 412 may be omitted.
  • the processor 400 may include a storage unit with stored program code.
  • the processor 400 may implement any steps described in exemplified embodiments on the wireless communication node 40, e.g., via executing the program code 412.
  • the communication unit 420 may be a transceiver.
  • the communication unit 420 may as an alternative or in addition be combining a transmitting unit and a receiving unit configured to transmit and to receive, respectively, signals, messages, or information to and from a wireless communication node or a wireless communication terminal.
  • the wireless communication node 40 may be used to perform the operations of the UDM, the AAnF, and/or the AF described in this disclosure.
  • the processor 400 and the communication unit 420 collaboratively perform the operations described in this disclosure. For example, the processor 400 performs operations and transmit or receive signals through the communication unit 420.
  • a wireless communication method is also provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the wireless communication method may be performed by using a management node (e.g., a UDM) .
  • the management node may be implemented by using the wireless communication node 40 described in this disclosure, but is not limited thereto.
  • the wireless communication method includes updating, by a management node, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in an anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • the wireless communication method may be performed by using an anchor node (e.g., an AAnF) .
  • the anchor node may be implemented by using the wireless communication node 40 described in this disclosure, but is not limited thereto.
  • the wireless communication method includes updating, by an anchor node, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in the anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • the wireless communication method may be performed by using an application node (e.g., an AF) .
  • the application node may be implemented by using the wireless communication node 40 described in this disclosure, but is not limited thereto.
  • the wireless communication method includes updating, by an application node, a key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications stored in an anchor node in response to a parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal being performed to update a routing indicator of the wireless communication terminal.
  • a wireless communication method is also provided according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the wireless communication method may be performed by using a wireless communication terminal (e.g., a UE) .
  • the wireless communication terminal may be implemented by using the wireless communication terminal 30 described in this disclosure, but is not limited thereto.
  • the wireless communication method includes:
  • the management node used in the present disclosure may indicate the UDM described above.
  • the anchor node used in the present disclosure may indicate the AAnF described above.
  • the application node used in the present disclosure may indicate the AF described above.
  • the wireless communication terminal used in the present disclosure may indicate the UE described above.
  • the key identifier for an authentication and key management for applications used in the present disclosure may indicate the A-KID described above.
  • the parameter update procedure for a wireless communication terminal used in the present disclosure may indicate the UPU described above.
  • the routing indicator used in the present disclosure may indicate the RID described above.
  • the information for the authentication and key management for applications used in the present disclosure may indicate the AKMA context.
  • the authentication key used in the present disclosure may indicate the K AUSF described above.
  • the assess key used in the present disclosure may indicate the K AMF described above.
  • a and/or B and/or C includes any and all combinations of one or more of A, B, and C, including A, B, C, A and B, A and C, B and C, and a combination of A and B and C.
  • A/B/C includes any and all combinations of one or more of A, B, and C, including A, B, C, A and B, A and C, B and C, and a combination of A and B and C.
  • any reference to an element herein using a designation such as “first, “ “second, “ and so forth does not generally limit the quantity or order of those elements. Rather, these designations can be used herein as a convenient means of distinguishing between two or more elements or instances of an element. Thus, a reference to first and second elements does not mean that only two elements can be employed, or that the first element must precede the second element in some manner.
  • any one of the various illustrative logical blocks, units, processors, means, circuits, methods and functions described in connection with the aspects disclosed herein can be implemented by electronic hardware (e.g., a digital implementation, an analog implementation, or a combination of the two) , firmware, various forms of program or design code incorporating instructions (which can be referred to herein, for convenience, as "software” or a “software unit” ) , or any combination of these techniques.
  • a processor, device, component, circuit, structure, machine, unit, etc. can be configured to perform one or more of the functions described herein.
  • IC integrated circuit
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • the logical blocks, units, and circuits can further include antennas and/or transceivers to communicate with various components within the network or within the device.
  • a general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor can be any conventional processor, controller, or state machine.
  • a processor can also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other suitable configuration to perform the functions described herein. If implemented in software, the functions can be stored as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium. Thus, the steps of a method or algorithm disclosed herein can be implemented as software stored on a computer-readable medium.
  • Computer-readable media includes both computer storage media and communication media including any medium that can be enabled to transfer a computer program or code from one place to another.
  • a storage media can be any available media that can be accessed by a computer.
  • such computer-readable media can include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a computer.
  • unit refers to software, firmware, hardware, and any combination of these elements for performing the associated functions described herein. Additionally, for purpose of discussion, the various units are described as discrete units; however, as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art, two or more units may be combined to form a single unit that performs the associated functions according to embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • memory or other storage may be employed in embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • memory or other storage may be employed in embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • any suitable distribution of functionality between different functional units, processing logic elements or domains may be used without detracting from the present disclosure.
  • functionality illustrated to be performed by separate processing logic elements, or controllers may be performed by the same processing logic element, or controller.
  • references to specific functional units are only references to a suitable means for providing the described functionality, rather than indicative of a strict logical or physical structure or organization.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Un procédé de communication sans fil est divulgué. Le procédé consiste à mettre à jour, par un nœud de gestion, un identifiant de clé pour une authentification et une gestion de clé pour des applications stockées dans un nœud d'ancrage en réponse à une procédure de mise à jour de paramètre pour un terminal de communication sans fil mise en œuvre pour mettre à jour un indicateur de routage du terminal de communication sans fil.
PCT/CN2023/114965 2023-08-25 2023-08-25 Procédé, dispositif et produit-programme d'ordinateur pour communication sans fil Pending WO2025043389A1 (fr)

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CN112512043A (zh) * 2020-10-22 2021-03-16 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种会话请求方法、装置、终端及存储介质
WO2022156933A1 (fr) * 2021-01-22 2022-07-28 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Extraction d'indicateur de routage pour l'authentification et la gestion de clé pour applications (akma)
CN115280715A (zh) * 2020-03-31 2022-11-01 中兴通讯股份有限公司 用于应用通信建立的参数
WO2023008929A1 (fr) * 2021-07-28 2023-02-02 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Appareil et procédé d'établissement de communication dans l'authentification et la gestion de clés pour des applications (akma)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN115280715A (zh) * 2020-03-31 2022-11-01 中兴通讯股份有限公司 用于应用通信建立的参数
CN112512043A (zh) * 2020-10-22 2021-03-16 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种会话请求方法、装置、终端及存储介质
WO2022156933A1 (fr) * 2021-01-22 2022-07-28 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Extraction d'indicateur de routage pour l'authentification et la gestion de clé pour applications (akma)
WO2023008929A1 (fr) * 2021-07-28 2023-02-02 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Appareil et procédé d'établissement de communication dans l'authentification et la gestion de clés pour des applications (akma)

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