WO2024196331A2 - Système de contre-mesure d'uav - Google Patents
Système de contre-mesure d'uav Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2024196331A2 WO2024196331A2 PCT/TR2024/050266 TR2024050266W WO2024196331A2 WO 2024196331 A2 WO2024196331 A2 WO 2024196331A2 TR 2024050266 W TR2024050266 W TR 2024050266W WO 2024196331 A2 WO2024196331 A2 WO 2024196331A2
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- uav
- wearable
- countermeasure
- signals
- countermeasure system
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
- F41H11/00—Defence installations; Defence devices
- F41H11/02—Anti-aircraft or anti-guided missile or anti-torpedo defence installations or systems
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/45—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by including monitoring of the target or target signal, e.g. in reactive jammers or follower jammers for example by means of an alternation of jamming phases and monitoring phases, called "look-through mode"
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
- H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/90—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to allowing or preventing navigation or positioning, e.g. GPS
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/92—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to allowing or preventing remote control
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/22—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for communication related to vehicles
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/30—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components
- H04K2203/32—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components including a particular configuration of antennas
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/42—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming frequency or wavelength
Definitions
- the invention relates to a wearable spectrum monitoring, UAV detection, identification, classification and countermeasure system that can be carried by personnel, which performs wearable tactical UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) detection, identification, classification, spoofing, jamming and taking control (with hacking) operations.
- UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- UAV countermeasure systems are in the form of fixed stations or mobile station on the vehicle, and do not include all the detection, identification, classification, target location finding, direction finding and countermeasure features that are wearable by personnel.
- the applications detected on the subject as a result of the research are given below.
- TR2017/11161 comprises a jammer capability that allows UAVs, which have the ability to return to the starting point of flight when the connection with the remote control is lost, by taking advantage of this feature and sending them back to the place where they started the flight, developed to interrupt mobile phone and Wi-Fi signals in areas requiring special protection and also to prevent UAVs from flying over the protected area.
- US10915099B1 relates to a system for detecting and neutralizing a UAV that comprises a sensing antenna array and command control signal configured to detect the UAV in a 360-degree area.
- the system focuses on detecting signals in the 2.4GHz band and video signals.
- US11190233B2 and US11442141 B2 comprise the detection of aircraft by the technological method used by sampling the RF signal.
- the application numbered KR102054089B1 comprises a signal detector configured to detect wireless signals transmitted between a remote control unit and a remote controlled vehicle; a feature extractor configured to extract signal features from detected wireless signals; a classifier configured to determine whether the detected wireless signal and detected radio signals based on signal characteristics correspond to a known or unknown radio protocol; a remote control detected based on at least one of the classification and remote sensing data of the detected radio signals; a threat analyzer configured to determine whether said vehicle is a threat and an intrusion detection system for a remote control system using an unknown wireless protocol based on extracted signal characteristics.
- the applications numbered KR102155284B1 and US11074822B2 comprise the feature of detecting UAVs in a certain region (for example, a no-fly zone) and printing a false GNSS signal to land the detected UAVs in a different region, that is, spoofing.
- Non-wearable large-scale systems have high costs, high power consumption and are widely difficult to install and use in the operation field.
- UAV capabilities, behaviors and communication technologies are also developing rapidly with the development of technology. For example, for a UAV with a return-to-home feature, only cutting off communication with the command center is not enough, this feature can be configured differently in different UAV manufacturers and models. For example, if the threatening UAV is disconnected from the command control, it may land where it is instead of returning home, remain suspended in the air, and when its battery runs out, it may fall to the ground uncontrollably, causing loss of life and property. Besides, due to the developing UAV features, jamming alone is not enough to neutralize the UAV system, it is also necessary to use spoofing and taking control countermeasure.
- the ability of a wearable hardware to estimate the target direction with an integrated directional antenna and network support feature allows it to be used for jamming, spoofing and control tasks with lower power consumption, that is, for a longer period of time.
- the invention has been formed for the aim of defense against newly emerging threats and aims to solve the above-mentioned negativities.
- the invention is a wearable tactical UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) detection, identification, classification, spoofing, jamming and control system that can be carried by personnel and has the feature of operating with battery. Each user can protect the area within a certain range with the device on them and prevent UAV flights in this area.
- UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- This invention enables the region where personnel are located to be scanned at a certain range with the omnidirectional antenna it contains.
- the invention can perform spectrum analysis based on SDR (Software Defined Radio) and detect the signals in the ISM bands (2.4GHz, 5.8GHz, 433MHz, etc.) used by commercial and special production UAVs, the signals of special production UAVs operating in different frequency bands.
- SDR Software Defined Radio
- the invention can identify the UAV brand and model by using the previously formed model library on the detected signals. Embedded software algorithms and artificial intelligence competence are used as identification, classification method.
- the invention is capable of analyzing with its algorithms for systems that cannot be detected or identified, classified applying countermeasures according to the obtained signal characteristics, modulation type, and protocol. Additionally, it can record the signal segment and, when connected to a corporate or private network, send the unidentified signal cross section to the central software.
- the invention also comprises a central unit to keep wearable devices updated.
- the software contained in this unit enables the development of an identification, classification algorithm by analyzing the signal cross sections transmitted from the devices with artificial intelligence competence.
- the developed new identification, classification algorithms and other device updates can be sent to all devices via the central software.
- the system is kept up to date according to new UAV models, capabilities, behavior and communication technologies.
- the user can direction finding of the UAV by picking up the device and scanning in the air as soon as the UAV is detected.
- the user can follow the instructions on the device screen or the light, sound and vibration-based notifications on the device. By monitoring the change in intensity of these notifications during scanning, target detection can be made in the direction where the notification signal is maximum.
- the network function is activated and
- Users who determine the target direction using the directional antenna integrated on the device can estimate the target location with the AOA (Angle of Arrival) angle of incidence technique by sharing their current location information and target direction information with other users.
- AOA Angle of Arrival
- users can make location estimation using the TDOA (Time Difference of Arrival) arrival time difference technique, based on the delay of the incoming target signal compared to the GNSS reference clock.
- TDOA Time Difference of Arrival
- target location estimation can be made with the multilateration technique by using the range information from many users.
- the device on each user has standalone the functions of UAV detection, identification, classification and direction finding with directional antenna, jamming, spoofing and taking control with hacking.
- the hacked UAV can be landed to the desired location by controlling it with the command/control keypad on the device. From the warning and information screen, all functions, including but not limited to switching between menus, UAV detection, identification, classification warning, operation information, hacked UAV control, can be followed.
- UAV detection warning can be made with light, sound and vibration, and these warnings can be turned off if desired.
- countermeasure functions can also be performed with the directional antenna integrated into the device. In this way, the same tasks can be performed with lower RF power consumption. In addition, the possibility of friendly elements being affected by these broadcasts is reduced.
- the device can produce location, direction information and reference clock signals used for target location estimation with the integrated GNSS receiver, digital compass and reference clock generator.
- the invention eliminates security vulnerabilities that may arise as a result of malicious use of commercial/consumer or special production UAV platforms and provides protection against these threats at the personnel level.
- Figure 1 is a representative block diagram view of the system, which is subject of the invention.
- FIG. 2 is a flow diagram of the subject of the invention.
- FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of the central software unit.
- This invention is a wearable tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) detection, identification, classification, spoofing, jamming and taking control system and it can detect activities by monitoring the spectrum in selected bands and the ISM band (2.4GHz, 5.8GHz, 433MHz, etc.) with its omnidirectional transceiver antenna (5) and directional transceiver antenna (6).
- the device can be operated in two basic modes.
- SDR Software Defined Radio
- UAV control can identify, classify UAV systems detected and defined by the algorithms and software on the device and inform the user about the system features.
- it can perform signal analysis for new model UAV systems or new frequencies that UAV systems use/will use, that is, for unidentified systems, and the user is informed if signal characteristics are detected. Spoofing, jamming can be applied for RC-Remote Control, Video, Telemetry, GNSS and other RF signals used by the UAV suitable for the system/signal features (protocol, modulation) reported to the user, and UAV control can be taken over.
- countermeasure can be provided with default/generic jamming or GNSS spoofing functions for RC-Remote Control, Video, Telemetry, GNSS signals.
- the user can terminate the function that he/she is applying at any time he/she desires.
- the system continues to operate in a cycle in accordance with the flow given in Figure 2.
- These functions are provided by the control unit (2), which has special algorithms developed for spectrum monitoring, embedded software and artificial neural networks, and algorithms and device software for detection, identification, classification and countermeasure.
- the navigation and timing unit (4) which comprises GNSS receiver, digital compass and reference clock generator equipment, forms data to determine the location of the target UAV. This data is shared with other devices via a defined protocol and wireless channel with network support function.
- the central unit (3) receives the data collected by the device and performs signal processing, classification, algorithm development and device updates. In addition, it enables the central unit user to form an algorithm based on the signal cross section by performing analysis with artificial intelligence capabilities for unidentified signals.
- control unit (2) For the received signal, whose direction is determined, it is first checked whether the control unit (2) is a predefined system with special algorithms, artificial intelligence and software capabilities. If it is a defined system, the features of the system are reported to the user. For the unidentified system, signal analysis is performed, signal properties are determined and the relevant signal cross section is recorded.
- the device generally consist of; a processor unit (1) has SDR (Software Defined Radio) whose processing, receiving, transmitting Radio Frequency (RF) signals, digital processing units (CPU, FPGA, DSP, etc.) and supporting peripherals that perform the functions of, a control unit (2), which comprises detection, identification, classification and countermeasure algorithms and device management software, an external central unit (3) for artificial intelligence-based algorithms and device updating, a navigation and timing unit with GNSS receiver, digital compass and reference clock generator (4), omnidirectional transceiver antenna (5), directional transceiver antenna (6).
- SDR Software Defined Radio
- RF Radio Frequency
- buttons (8) forturning on/off the device and device functions (jamming, spoofing, taking over UAV control, network support), frequency selection and adjusting the volume.
- Menu transitions and control of the hacked UAV are carried out via the keypad (9).
- Warning light, vibration and audio warning are provided on the information unit (10) for visual information in case of UAV detection.
- Selection and information in the menus are provided on the screen (11 ).
- Charging and data exchange with other devices are carried out through interfaces (12).
- the device comprises a replaceable, rechargeable internal battery (13).
- the processor unit (1) performs spectrum monitoring, signal analysis, detection, identification, classification and countermeasure functions with its SDR, digital processors, peripheral equipment and signal processing-specific algorithms and software provided by the control unit (2). Spectrum monitoring is carried out for detection, identification, classification and countermeasure by means of algorithms and device software running on the processor unit (1). It is carried out by the collaboration of the control unit (2) and processor units (1), which have algorithms and software running within the functions of spoofing, jamming and taking control.
- the central unit (3) is an externally running software that provides artificial intelligence-based central signal processing, classification, algorithm development and device updates functions. When the device is connected to the network, it can send the unidentified signal cross section on it to the central unit (3) in the direction of the flow in Figure 3, and if available, the device can receive updates and new algorithms from the central unit (3).
- the navigation and timing unit (4) comprises GNSS receiver, digital compass and reference clock generator hardware.
- the control unit (2) forms data to determine the location of the target UAV and shares it with other devices with the network support function.
- the omnidirectional transceiver antenna (5) which receives/transmits signals for detection/identification and countermeasure, is used for spectrum monitoring and omnidirectional spoofing, jamming and taking control functions.
- the directional transceiver antenna (6) receives and transmits signals for target direction determination and countermeasure functions (spoofing, jamming and taking control). New frequencies to be used in the operation area can be added with the expansion antenna input (7).
- the keypad (9) is used for switching between menus, other input operations and management of the hacked UAV.
- the information unit (10) forms warning lights, vibrations and audio warnings for visual information in case of UAV detection. Audio, visual and vibration are formed via the device, the intensity of which can be increased/decreased or turned off completely.
- the screen (11 ) enables selections to be made in the menus and to inform the personnel. Charging of the device battery (13) and integration of other external hardware units with the central software are carried out through interfaces (12).
- the battery (13) is rechargeable and replaceable.
- Devices operating in the same region can work together using AOA, TDOA, RSSI techniques to detect the location of the target once the user activates network support.
- the device is wearable and can be carried by a single personnel.
- the threat library can be updated both on the device and in the central unit (3) in line with new threats collected from the field by the devices.
- the threat library is constantly kept up to date using data received from the field, and the user device can receive new updates when connected to the network.
- Direction finding can be made for the detected UAV signals (RC-Remote Control, Video, Telemetry, etc.) using the directional transceiver antenna (6) integrated into the device.
- Direction determination is achieved by the user manually scanning the airspace where the device is located with the surface containing the directional transceiver antenna (6).
- the user can make an estimated location for the target UAV by sharing information on the basis of a defined RF channel and protocol over the omnidirectional antenna using the in-device SDR with the button (8) where network support is activated with other users in the same region.
- Users who determine the target direction by using a directional transceiver antenna (6) on the device can estimate the target position with the AOA (Angle of Arrival) angle of incidence technique by sharing their current location information and target direction information with other users via the defined RF channel.
- AOA Angle of Arrival
- the target signal coming to the users via the defined RF channel is transmitted through the control unit (2) and location estimation can be made using the TDOA (Time Difference of Arrival) arrival time difference technique, based on its delay compared to the GNSS reference time.
- an estimated range can be made by using RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator), the power levels of the signals of defined UAVs with known RF output power reaching the users and measured by the processor unit (1).
- RSSI Receiveived Signal Strength Indicator
- Target location estimation can be made with the range information received from a large number of users and the multilateration technique. It can identify model UAV systems defined by means of algorithms and device software running on the SDR and digital processors on the device and inform the user about the system features. In addition, it can perform signal analysis for new model UAV systems or new frequencies that UAV systems use/will use, that is, for unidentified systems, and the user is informed if signal characteristics are detected. Spoofing, jamming can be applied for RC-Remote Control, Video, Telemetry, GNSS and other RF signals used by the UAV, in accordance with the system/signal features (protocol, modulation) reported to the user, and UAV control can be taken over.
- model UAV systems defined by means of algorithms and device software running on the SDR and digital processors on the device and inform the user about the system features.
- signal analysis for new model UAV systems or new frequencies that UAV systems use/will use, that is, for unidentified systems, and the user is informed if signal characteristics are
- countermeasure can be provided with default/generic jamming or GNSS spoofing functions for RC-Remote Control, Video, Telemetry, GNSS signals.
- the user can terminate the function that he/she is applying by using the relevant button (8) whenever he/she wishes.
- the system has processing steps that occur in a cycle as shown in Figure 2. Additionally, the unidentified signal cross section can be recorded on the processor unit (1), and then when connected to the network, these records are transmitted to the central unit (3) with the algorithm and device software (capabilities) for analysis. In addition, the identities of the defined systems are recorded on the processor unit (1 ) along with time and location information.
- the user can make a function selection before the operation regarding the countermeasure (spoofing, jamming, taking control with hacking) that the device will apply after detection.
- the countermeasure spoofing, jamming, taking control with hacking
- autonomous mode is selected at device startup, the selected functions can be applied without user intervention.
- autonomous mode the device has the ability to provide all functions in manual mode, depending on the user's choice.
- informing with sound, light and vibration via the information unit (10) can be performed.
- the user can perform countermeasure functions such as jamming, spoofing, and taking control of the UAV (hacking) in line with the tactical operation decision, based on the warning received, by using the buttons (8) on the device.
- the buttons (8) on the device There is a keypad (9) on the device for menu transitions or management of the hacked UAV. The user can use the keypad (9) and buttons (8) to monitor the spectrum at different frequencies and to turn the device and functions on and off.
- the device has a processor unit (1 ) comprising SDR (Software Defined Radio), which performs the functions of receiving, transmitting and processing Radio Frequency (RF) signals, digital processing units (CPU, FPGA, DSP, etc.) and peripherals that support them and a control unit (1) comprising specialized system operation algorithm and software.
- SDR Software Defined Radio
- RF Radio Frequency
- Unidentified signals can be analyzed externally by artificial intelligence capabilities in the central unit (3) located at the center, and new algorithms can be sent from the center to all devices via the network connection to the interface (12). If the user gives approval via the interface (12), unidentified signal cross sections are transferred to the central unit. A new algorithm is developed for these signal cross sections analyzed by the artificial intelligence-based central unit (3), and when the devices are connected to the network, these updates are uploaded to the device, depending on the user approval. Thus, by keeping the system constantly updated against new UAV threats, all devices can provide effective protection against new UAV systems.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Alarm Systems (AREA)
- Control Of Position, Course, Altitude, Or Attitude Of Moving Bodies (AREA)
- Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| TR2023/003097 TR2023003097A2 (tr) | 2023-03-21 | İha karşi tedbi̇r si̇stemi̇ | |
| TR2023003097 | 2023-03-21 |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2024196331A2 true WO2024196331A2 (fr) | 2024-09-26 |
| WO2024196331A3 WO2024196331A3 (fr) | 2024-10-17 |
Family
ID=92842472
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/TR2024/050266 Pending WO2024196331A2 (fr) | 2023-03-21 | 2024-03-18 | Système de contre-mesure d'uav |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| WO (1) | WO2024196331A2 (fr) |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US9715009B1 (en) * | 2014-12-19 | 2017-07-25 | Xidrone Systems, Inc. | Deterent for unmanned aerial systems |
| WO2018135522A1 (fr) * | 2017-01-19 | 2018-07-26 | 日本電気株式会社 | Système de commande de corps mobile, dispositif de commande de corps mobile, procédé de commande de corps mobile et support d'enregistrement |
| RU2769037C2 (ru) * | 2020-06-26 | 2022-03-28 | Российская Федерация, от имени которой выступает Федеральное государственное казенное учреждение "Войсковая часть 68240" | Многофункциональный комплекс средств обнаружения, сопровождения и радиопротиводействия применению беспилотных летательных аппаратов малого класса |
| KR102670206B1 (ko) * | 2021-06-22 | 2024-05-29 | 주식회사 삼정솔루션 | 하드킬 연동형 소형무인기 대응 재머 |
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2024
- 2024-03-18 WO PCT/TR2024/050266 patent/WO2024196331A2/fr active Pending
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| WO2024196331A3 (fr) | 2024-10-17 |
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