WO2024169097A1 - Packet sending method, device, and computer-readable storage medium - Google Patents

Abstract

The embodiments of the present application relate to the technical field of data communication, and disclosed thereby are a packet sending method, a device, and a computer-readable storage medium. The packet sending method comprises: in response a target host being offline, acquiring an authenticated link-establishing packet and determining whether the authenticated link-establishing packet belongs to the target host, the authenticated link-establishing packet carrying a port number of a target port; when the authenticated link-establishing packet belongs to the target host, sending a feedback packet to the target host by means of the target port; on the basis of the authenticated link-establishing packet, generating a DHCP relationship table; and on the basis of the DHCP relationship table, generating a static MAC address, the static MAC address being used for instructing a current device to forward a packet to the target host.

Description

Message sending method, device and computer readable storage medium

Related Applications

This application claims priority to Chinese patent application No. 202310155897.4 filed on February 13, 2023, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application.

Technical Field

The embodiments of the present application relate to the field of data communication technology, and in particular to a message sending method, device, and computer-readable storage medium.

Background Art

At present, during the DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) authentication process of communication network equipment, it may encounter host spoofing message attacks. In the related technology, when the correct host really needs to perform a MAC address migration operation, due to the continuous attack of host spoofing messages, the CPU cannot determine who is the real host. Finally, once the correct host is offline, it will never be able to go online again during the attack.

Summary of the invention

The main purpose of the embodiments of the present application is to provide a message sending method, device and computer-readable storage medium, which can realize the MAC address drift requirement of the correct host.

To achieve the above object, an embodiment of the present application provides a message sending method, the message sending method comprising:

In response to the target host being offline, obtaining an authentication link establishment message and determining whether the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, wherein the authentication link establishment message carries a port number of a target port;

In a case where the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, sending a feedback message to the target host through the target port;

Generate a DHCP relationship table based on the authentication link establishment message;

A static MAC address is generated based on the DHCP relationship table, wherein the static MAC address is used to instruct the current device to forward the message to the target host.

In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, an embodiment of the present application further provides a message sending device, the message sending device comprising:

An acquisition module, wherein the acquisition module is used to acquire an authentication link establishment message in response to the target host being offline, and determine whether the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, wherein the authentication link establishment message carries a port number of a target port;

A sending module, wherein the sending module is used to send a feedback message to the target host through the target port when the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host;

A generating module, the generating module is used to generate a DHCP relationship table based on the authentication link establishment message;

The generating module is further used to generate a static MAC address based on the DHCP relationship table, wherein the static MAC address is used to instruct the current device to forward the message to the target host.

In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, an embodiment of the present application also provides a message sending device, which includes: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the message sending method as described above is implemented.

In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the message sending method as described above is implemented.

The embodiment of the present application proposes a message sending method, device and computer-readable storage medium, which overcomes the technical defect in the related art that the device cannot realize the correct host port migration during the process of continuous attack. After responding to the target host going offline, the embodiment of the present application obtains an authentication link establishment message and determines whether the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, wherein the authentication link establishment message carries the port number of the target port; when the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, a feedback message is sent to the target host through the target port; through the above message sending and receiving process, the current device can know that the target host has a MAC address drift requirement, so it can generate a DHCP relationship table based on the authentication link establishment message; and then generate a static MAC address based on the DHCP relationship table, wherein the static MAC address is used to instruct the current device to forward the message to the target host, thereby completing the MAC address drift of the target host. The embodiment of the present application does not access the MAC address table of the current device during the authentication and chain establishment process, but directly replies to the authentication message through the port that receives the authentication request, thereby ensuring the successful authentication of the correct host. Even if the current device is attacked by a message from a non-target host, resulting in an incorrect MAC address being recorded in the MAC address table, since the target port for sending the feedback message is not the incorrect port corresponding to the incorrect MAC address, the current device can still successfully send the feedback message to the target host, thereby completing the authentication and chain establishment and realizing the MAC address drift requirement of the target host.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the related technologies, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the related technical descriptions are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only part of the embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

FIG1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a message sending method provided by the present application;

FIG2 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of an embodiment of a message sending method provided by the present application;

FIG3 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of another embodiment of a message sending method provided by the present application;

FIG4 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a message sending device provided by the present application;

FIG5 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a message sending device provided in the present application.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description, specific details such as specific system structures, technologies, etc. are proposed for the purpose of illustration rather than limitation, so as to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the present application. However, it should be clear to those skilled in the art that the embodiments of the present application can also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other cases, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted to prevent unnecessary details from hindering the description of the embodiments of the present application.

Although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be performed in a different order than that in the flowchart. The terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims and the above drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence.

It should also be understood that the references to "one embodiment" or "some embodiments" described in the specification of the embodiments of the present application mean that one or more embodiments of the embodiments of the present application include specific features, structures or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment. Thus, the statements "in one embodiment", "in some embodiments", "in some other embodiments", "in some other embodiments", etc. that appear in different places in this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, but mean "one or more but not all embodiments", unless otherwise specifically emphasized in other ways. The terms "including", "comprising", "having" and their variations all mean "including but not limited to", unless otherwise specifically emphasized in other ways.

At present, in the process of DHCP authentication of communication network equipment, it may encounter host spoofing attack. Generally speaking, when communication network equipment encounters DHCP host spoofing attack, relevant technologies The prevention scheme for DHCP host spoofing attack is as follows:

According to the address allocation of DHCP, the device creates a relationship table of IP (Internet Protocol), MAC address (Media Access Control Address, also known as LAN address, Ethernet address or physical address), and port. When the IP, MAC address, and corresponding port of the received message are not recorded in this table, the message will be discarded through ACL (Access Control Lists) or other means, making it impossible for the device to carry out normal business communications.

However, this method has the following defects: although the device can judge and discard the spoofed message through the corresponding table of IP, MAC address and port formed by DHCP when receiving the host spoofed message, the MAC address of this spoofed message has been learned on the device hardware, and the learned MAC address is the same as the MAC address learned by the original correct host. Since the MAC address learning port of the spoofed message is different from the port where the MAC address of the correct host is learned, the MAC address of the correct host will drift. Once the MAC address drift problem occurs, the traffic of the correct host will be interrupted, because the downlink data will be sent to the port that receives the spoofed message in a short time, until the correct host sends the message data again so that the device can learn the correct MAC address. Therefore, once the device is continuously attacked by the host spoofed message, although the spoofed host cannot go online for normal communication, it will cause the correct host to have continuous traffic jitter problems.

In addition, in the related technology, if the correct host needs to drift the MAC address, but due to the continuous attack of host spoofing messages, the CPU cannot determine who the real host is. Finally, once the correct host goes offline, it will never be able to go online again during the attack.

Based on this, the embodiments of the present application provide a message sending method, apparatus, device and computer-readable storage medium. When the device encounters a continuous attack of DHCP host spoofing messages, in addition to using the correspondence table of IP, MAC and port to discard the message of the abnormal IP, the MAC address of the correct host is written as a static MAC address according to the relationship table generated by DHCP to prevent the MAC address from drifting; when the correct host needs to drift the MAC address, in response to the host being offline, the CPU deletes the host-related information from the DHCP relationship table and refreshes the DHCP relationship table in real time. After the correct host is back online, the refresh of the DHCP relationship table is processed first, and a static MAC address is generated based on the new DHCP relationship table. The device can send a message to the correct host based on the static MAC address, that is, the MAC address drift of the correct host is achieved.

The message sending method, device, equipment and computer-readable storage medium provided in the embodiments of the present application are The following embodiments are used to illustrate the method for sending a message.

Refer to Figure 1, which is a flow chart of a message sending method provided in an embodiment of the present application. The message sending method can be applied to a message sending device. As shown in Figure 1, the message sending method provided in this embodiment includes steps S10 to S40.

Step S10, in response to the target host being offline, obtaining an authentication link building message and determining whether the authentication link building message belongs to the target host, wherein the authentication link building message carries the port number of the target port.

In this embodiment, the execution subject can be a terminal device such as a router or a switch that can communicate with the network side. Specifically, each step in this embodiment can be executed by the CPU protocol side in the terminal device; the target host can be regarded as the original correct host that has completed DHCP protocol authentication and established a connection relationship with the current device before step S10. MAC address drift refers to the process in which the target host goes offline from the port where it has completed DHCP protocol authentication and established a connection relationship with the current device, then goes online from a new port, and re-establishes a connection with the current device. From the perspective of the target host, it can also be regarded as a port migration process. However, in this process, the target host will not inform the device of prompt information about the port migration requirement, but the device can obtain the port migration intention of the target host based on the authentication link establishment message resent after the target host goes offline.

As an example, when a message is detected that the target host is offline, the current device will continue to listen to external authentication and link establishment messages, and after obtaining the authentication and link establishment messages, determine whether it belongs to the correct host that was previously offline, or a spoofing attack message from the network.

As an example, in this embodiment, the port of the target host before it goes offline is recorded as Port1, and the target port at which the current device receives the authentication link establishment message is recorded as Port3. If the authentication link establishment message is confirmed to be correct, it means that the target host is the correct host that was previously offline, and the current device can learn that the target host's port migration intention is to migrate from Port1 to Port3.

In some feasible embodiments, after the step of responding to the target host being offline in the above step S10, the message sending method further includes:

Step S11, deleting the relationship entry of the target host in the DHCP relationship table.

As an example, after learning that the target host is offline, the CPU can delete the correct host-related IP, MAC, and port information from the DHCP relationship table according to the DHCP protocol, or delete the DHCP relationship table; at the same time, delete the MAC address recorded in the MAC table.

Step S20, when the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, The target port sends a feedback message to the target host.

In this embodiment, when it is confirmed that the authentication link establishment message does belong to the correct host that was previously offline, the current device can establish a connection relationship with the target host based on the DHCP protocol. It should be noted that when the CPU sends a feedback message to the target host, it directly confirms the target port through the port number of the target port carried in the authentication link establishment message, and does not access the MAC table stored in the hardware chip of the current device. This is because after the target host is offline, the current device may be attacked by a spoofing message, and then mistakenly write the MAC address of the spoofing attack host into the MAC table. If the feedback message is sent based on the wrong port obtained from the MAC table, the target host cannot receive the message; therefore, the CPU directly confirms the target port of the target host based on the port number of the target port carried in the authentication link establishment message, and sends a feedback message to the target host through the target port to ensure that the target host can receive the feedback message, thereby avoiding the spoofing attack host interfering with the authentication link establishment between the current device and the target host.

As an example, the feedback message may include an ACK (Acknowledge character) so that the target host knows that the authentication and link establishment with the current device has been successful.

As an example, the message transmission and reception between the current device and the target host may be one time or multiple times, so that the current device can completely collect the identity information of the target host for establishing the DHCP relationship table.

Step S30: Generate a DHCP relationship table based on the authentication link establishment message.

In this embodiment, after confirming that the identity of the target host is correct, the CPU can obtain the IP, MAC address of the target host and the port number of the target port used to send and receive messages from the authentication link establishment message sent by the target host. After obtaining this information, a DHCP relationship table can be established based on this information according to the DHCP protocol. In the DHCP relationship table, there is a corresponding relationship between the IP, MAC address and port of the target host.

Step S40: Generate a static MAC address based on the DHCP relationship table, wherein the static MAC address is used to instruct the current device to forward the message to the target host.

Although the authentication and link establishment between the current device and the target host is completed after the DHCP relationship table is generated, in order to ensure the normal message sending and receiving business process, the MAC address of the target host still needs to be recorded in the MAC table of the current device chip. At the same time, in order to prevent the MAC address of the target host from being affected by the spoofing attack host, the MAC address of the target host can be written into the MAC table in the form of a static MAC address.

As an example, when the device is in a DHCP network application, the device generates a DHCP relationship table according to relevant technologies, and finds the relevant MAC address in the device MAC address table based on the correspondence between the MAC and the port in the DHCP relationship table, and converts it into a static MAC address (a static MAC table entry with the correspondence between the MAC address and the port can also be directly issued to the device. The static MAC table entry can directly cover the dynamic MAC address, which may appear in hardware as a direct overwriting of all entries or as a replacement of the MAC address export); after the static MAC address is generated, a static MAC address table entry is directly formed on the device with the port where the correct host is located and the MAC address of the correct host.

As an example, after the static MAC address is generated, the port where the correct host is located and the MAC address of the correct host are directly formed into a static MAC address table entry on the device. At this time, if the device encounters a host spoofing message attack (the MAC address and IP address of the spoofed host are consistent with the MAC address of the correct host, but the port to which the message is sent is inconsistent), the device will automatically obtain the MAC address of the spoofed host, but because the dynamic MAC address cannot overwrite the static MAC address when writing into the MAC address table, the device will not learn the MAC address of the port where the spoofed message is located, so that the correct host MAC address will not drift, and therefore will not interfere with the correct host traffic.

As an example, when the original host is offline, the device deletes the static MAC address of the original host. Therefore, the message spoofing the attacking host will learn a new dynamic MAC address on the device. The port of the MAC address is the port of the host spoofing message. At this time, the DHCP protocol processing flow must be specially processed. Otherwise, during the DHCP authentication process, the message will be sent to the attacking port, causing the original host to be unable to go online again after being offline. Specific processing measures are as follows: First, after the DHCP message receives the host authentication link-building message, it is necessary to record the sending port of this message. If the message authentication passes (indicating that the message received by the device CPU at this time is the correct DHCP link-building message sent by the host), the link can be established. When the CPU sends a DHCP message to establish a link with it, it will no longer query the device's MAC address table (because the content of the MAC address table at this time may be the dynamic MAC address learned by the host spoofing message), but directly send a packet to the port where the host authentication link-building message is received; then, when all DHCP link-building authentications are completed, the DHCP relationship table is formed, that is, the corresponding relationship between MAC and port in the relationship table is used to send a static MAC address to the MAC address table of the device chip. This MAC address table can directly replace the dynamic MAC address of the wrong host spoofing attack message previously learned by the device; through the above processing, the DHCP relationship table can be used to send a correct host to the device. Static MAC addresses can prevent the interruption of correct host traffic caused by attacks from host spoofing messages, and can also maintain correct operations when the correct host really needs to migrate its MAC address, ensuring that business traffic migrates with the correct host.

This embodiment provides a message sending method. When the MAC address of the correct target host drifts, the CPU message sending method is modified. Even if the current router device is continuously attacked by messages from non-target hosts, resulting in a short-term MAC address learning error, it will not affect the drift process of the correct target host MAC address. Once the target host is back online, the technical solution provided by this embodiment can correct the wrong MAC address and ensure the normal service forwarding of the target host. By implementing the message sending method provided by this embodiment, when the current device encounters a non-target host spoofing attack, the MAC address drift interruption anomaly will not occur, the attack source can be quickly isolated, and the DHCP service will not be abnormal. The correctness of the DHCP service can be guaranteed, the stability of the network can be improved, and the user experience can be improved.

In some feasible embodiments, the step of determining whether the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host in the above step S10 includes:

Step S12, determining whether the key information carried in the authentication link establishment message is consistent with the preset key information;

Step S121, when the key information carried in the authentication link establishment message is consistent with the preset key information, it is determined that the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host;

Step S122: When the key information carried in the authentication link establishment message is inconsistent with the preset key information, it is determined that the authentication link establishment message does not belong to the target host.

In this embodiment, the CPU will determine whether the authentication link establishment message is a message sent by the original correct host according to the DHCP protocol. For example, the key information carried in the message is compared with the preset key information. If the two are consistent, it means that the message comes from the original correct host and the message authentication is successful; if the two are inconsistent, it means that the message does not come from the original correct host and the message is directly discarded.

In some feasible embodiments, the above step S30 includes:

Step S301, determining the MAC address of the target host based on the authentication link establishment message;

Step S302, performing DHCP protocol interaction with the target host based on the authentication link establishment message, and allocating an IP address to the target host;

Step S303: Generate a DHCP relationship table based on the IP address, the MAC address of the target host, and the port number of the target port.

In this embodiment, after confirming that the identity of the target host is correct, the CPU can obtain the MAC address of the target host from the authentication link establishment message sent by the target host, and interact with the target host through the DHCP protocol to assign an IP address to the target host, and then establish a new DHCP relationship table based on the port number of the target port carried in the authentication link establishment message.

As an example, the new DHCP relationship table may contain the following relationship entries for the target host: IP 10.1.1.1, Port3, MAC1, vlan1.

In some feasible embodiments, the above step S40 includes:

Step S401, determining a correspondence between the MAC address of the target host and the port number of the target port based on the DHCP relationship table;

Step S402: Generate a static MAC address based on the MAC address of the target host, the port number of the target port, and the corresponding relationship.

As an example, in this embodiment, the CPU forms a new MAC address table based on MAC1, vlan1, and Port3 in the new DHCP relationship table, and writes the new MAC address table into the chip MAC address table in the form of a static MAC address.

In some feasible embodiments, before the above step S10, the message sending method further includes:

Step A: upon receiving an offline notification sent by the target host, determining that the target host is in an offline state.

As an example, after the target host goes offline from Port 1, a DHCP offline message may be sent to the CPU to inform the CPU that the correct host is offline.

In some feasible embodiments, before the above step S10, the message sending method further includes:

Step B: when the target host is not detected based on the preset protocol detection mechanism, determine that the target host is in an offline state.

As an example, after the target host goes offline from Port1, it is also possible not to send a DHCP offline message to the CPU. The current device automatically determines whether the correct host is offline based on the DHCP protocol. If the target host is not detected based on the preset protocol detection mechanism, it obviously means that it is offline.

In some feasible embodiments, after the above step S40, the message sending method further includes:

Step S50: When attacked by a message from a non-target host, the static MAC The address is written into the MAC address table of the current device, overwriting the dynamic MAC address in the MAC address table, wherein the dynamic MAC address is generated according to the message of the non-target host.

In this embodiment, the MAC address learning function of the current device is continuously enabled. If the authentication and link building process between the target host and the current device is performed when the current device is attacked by a message from a non-target host, then the dynamic MAC address corresponding to the spoofed attack host must have been written into the chip MAC table of the current device. The message sending and receiving ports contained therein must be inconsistent with the ports required by the target host. Therefore, in order to ensure that the business traffic migrates with the correct host, it is necessary to associate the MAC address and port number of the target host and other information based on the DHCP relationship table after re-establishing the DHCP relationship table, and write them into the chip MAC table in the form of a static MAC address, overwriting the dynamic MAC address corresponding to the spoofed attack host in the MAC table.

As an example, before step S10 of the above embodiment, the scenario in which the original correct host performs DHCP authentication with the current device can be understood in conjunction with Figure 2. As can be seen from Figure 2, the current device can be a switch, which includes a CPU and a switching chip. A DHCP relationship table can be formed in the CPU, and the switching chip is used to store a MAC table; the correct host (IP: 10.1.1.1, MAC1) initiates an authentication link establishment request to the CPU through Port1 and vlan1; the CPU authenticates the correct host through the DHCP protocol, and establishes a relationship with it to form a DHCP relationship table, recording the relationship between the host IP: 10.1.1.1, MAC1, Port1, and vlan1 as the location of the normal host, and then writes the corresponding relationship between MAC, Port, and vlan in the DHCP relationship table into the MAC table of the switching chip, and the writing method is static MAC, that is, in the chip MAC address table, static MAC1, vlan1, and Port1 entries are added; this When a packet from a spoofing attack host (IP: 10.1.1.1, MAC1) appears on Port2, the switch device will send a dynamic MAC address learning message and send the information including MAC1, vlan1, and Port2 to the MAC table of the switching chip. The MAC table of the switching chip searches for MAC1+vlan1 to index the static MAC entry: MAC1, vlan1, and Port1. Since the indexes of MAC1+vlan1 are exactly the same and this entry is a static MAC entry, the dynamic learning MAC address is rejected. According to relevant technologies, the DHCP relationship table can issue ACL rules to discard the packets sent by the spoofing attack host. The final effect is that the packets sent by the spoofing attack host to the switch cannot be forwarded, and the wrong MAC address will not be learned to cause the MAC address of the correct host to drift. The static MAC address corresponding to the correct host is used to block the device from learning the MAC address sent by the spoofing attack host.

As an example, in the above embodiment, the current device is continuously attacked by the message of the spoof attack host and the correct host actively drifts from Port 1 to Port 3, which can be understood in conjunction with FIG. 3. As shown in Figure 3, the correct host goes offline from Port 1 and sends a DHCP offline message to the CPU, or does not send an offline message, and the DHCP protocol automatically determines that the correct host is offline; the CPU deletes the original correct host relationship entry from the DHCP relationship table, that is, deletes the IP address. 10.1.1.1, Port1, MAC1, vlan1, and at the same time, delete the static MAC address MAC1, vlan1, and Port1 in the MAC table; because the attack message continues, after the static MAC address is deleted, the switch device will immediately learn the wrong dynamic MAC address MAC1, vlan1, and Port2 of the spoofed attack host. However, because the spoofed attack host cannot complete the DHCP authentication and link establishment, the service message sent by the spoofed attack host to the device cannot be forwarded, and the device only completes the learning of the wrong MAC address; afterwards, the correct host goes online again from Port3 and re-initiates DHCP authentication to the device. The device sends the DHCP message to the CPU for authentication and records the port that receives the DHCP message as Port3. After the authentication is passed, the CPU directly sends subsequent messages from Port3 (the correct host migrates, the original DHCP relationship table is deleted, and in the process of establishing a new DHCP relationship table, the CPU directly communicates with the verified host port without querying the MAC table), directly interacts with the correct host through the DHCP protocol, allocates an IP address, and forms a new DHCP relationship table: IP 10.1.1.1, Port3, MAC1, vlan1; MAC1, vlan1, Port3 in the new DHCP relationship table form a new MAC address table, which is written into the chip MAC address table as a static MAC address. Since the static MAC address can directly cover the dynamic MAC address, the correct host MAC address MAC1, vlan1, Port3 will eventually directly cover the MAC1, vlan1, Port2 that the device has learned incorrectly before, so that the final service remains normal. This embodiment fully explains how the device protects against the messages sent by the spoofed attack host during the entire attack process without affecting all steps of the MAC address drift process of the correct host.

In addition, an embodiment of the present application also provides a message sending device. Referring to Figure 4, Figure 4 is a structural schematic diagram of a message sending device provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 4, in this embodiment, the message sending device includes: an acquisition module 100, a sending module 200 and a generation module 300.

An acquisition module 100, wherein the acquisition module 100 is used to acquire an authentication link establishment message in response to a target host being offline, and determine whether the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, wherein the authentication link establishment message carries a port number of a target port;

A sending module 200, wherein the sending module 200 is used to send a feedback message to the target host through the target port when the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host;

A generating module 300, the generating module 300 is used to generate a DHCP relationship table based on the authentication link establishment message;

The generating module 300 is further configured to generate a static MAC address based on the DHCP relationship table, wherein the static MAC address is used to instruct the current device to forward a message to the target host.

The message sending device provided in this embodiment and the message sending method provided in the above embodiment belong to the same inventive concept. The technical details not fully described in this embodiment can be referred to any of the above embodiments, and this embodiment has the same beneficial effects as executing the message sending method.

The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, and the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

In addition, an embodiment of the present application also provides a message sending device. The above-mentioned message sending method applied to the message sending device can be executed by a message sending device. The message sending device can be implemented by software and/or hardware and integrated in the message sending device. The message sending device can be a router, a switch, or other terminal device that can communicate with the network side.

Referring to FIG. 5 , FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a message sending device provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 5 , the message sending device may include: a processor 1001, such as a central processing unit (CPU), a communication bus 1002, a user interface 1003, a network interface 1004, and a memory 1005. Among them, the communication bus 1002 is used to realize the connection and communication between these components. The user interface 1003 may include a display screen (Display), an input unit such as a keyboard (Keyboard), and the user interface 1003 may also include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface. The network interface 1004 may include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface (such as a wireless fidelity (Wireless-Fidelity, WI-FI) interface). The memory 1005 may be a high-speed random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), or a stable non-volatile memory (Non-Volatile Memory, NVM), such as a disk storage. The memory 1005 may also be a storage device independent of the aforementioned processor 1001.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the structure shown in FIG5 does not constitute a limitation on the message sending device, and may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or arrange components differently. As shown in FIG5, the memory 1005 as a storage medium may include an operating system, a data storage module, a network communication module, a user interface module, and a computer program.

In the message sending device shown in FIG5 , the network interface 1004 is mainly used for data communication with other devices; the user interface 1003 is mainly used for data interaction with the user; the processing in this embodiment The processor 1001 and the memory 1005 may be arranged in a message sending device. The message sending device calls a computer program stored in the memory 1005 through the processor 1001, and executes a message sending method applied to the message sending device provided in any of the above embodiments.

The message sending device proposed in this embodiment and the message sending method applied to the message sending device proposed in the above embodiment belong to the same inventive concept. The technical details not fully described in this embodiment can be referred to any of the above embodiments, and this embodiment has the same beneficial effects as executing the message sending method.

In addition, an embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which may be a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the message sending method provided in any of the above embodiments is implemented.

It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that all or some of the steps and systems in the disclosed method above may be implemented as software, firmware, hardware and appropriate combinations thereof. Some physical components or all physical components may be implemented as software executed by a processor, such as a central processing unit, a digital signal processor or a microprocessor, or may be implemented as hardware, or may be implemented as an integrated circuit, such as an application specific integrated circuit. Such software may be distributed on a computer-readable medium, which may include a computer storage medium (or a non-transitory medium) and a communication medium (or a temporary medium). As known to those skilled in the art, the term computer storage medium includes volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storing information (such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data). Computer storage media include, but are not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tapes, disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that may be used to store desired information and may be accessed by a computer. Furthermore, it is well known to those skilled in the art that communication media typically embodies computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism, and may include any information delivery media.

The above is a specific description of the preferred implementation of the embodiments of the present application, but the embodiments of the present application are not limited to the above-mentioned implementation methods. Technical personnel familiar with the field can also make various equivalent modifications or substitutions without violating the spirit of the embodiments of the present application. These equivalent modifications or substitutions are all included in the scope defined by the claims of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims (10)

A message sending method, wherein the message sending method comprises: In response to the target host being offline, obtaining an authentication link establishment message and determining whether the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, wherein the authentication link establishment message carries a port number of a target port; In a case where the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host, sending a feedback message to the target host through the target port; Generate a DHCP relationship table based on the authentication link establishment message; A static MAC address is generated based on the DHCP relationship table, wherein the static MAC address is used to instruct the current device to forward the message to the target host. The message sending method according to claim 1, wherein the step of determining whether the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host comprises: Determine whether the key information carried in the authentication link establishment message is consistent with the preset key information; When the key information carried in the authentication link establishment message is consistent with the preset key information, determining that the authentication link establishment message belongs to the target host; When the key information carried in the authentication link establishment message is inconsistent with the preset key information, it is determined that the authentication link establishment message does not belong to the target host. The message sending method according to claim 1, wherein, after the step of responding to the target host being offline, the message sending method further comprises: The relationship entry of the target host in the DHCP relationship table is deleted. The message sending method according to claim 1, wherein the step of generating a DHCP relationship table based on the authentication link establishment message comprises: Determine the MAC address of the target host based on the authentication link establishment message; Performing DHCP protocol interaction with the target host based on the authentication link establishment message to allocate an IP address to the target host; A DHCP relationship table is generated based on the IP address, the MAC address of the target host, and the port number of the target port. The message sending method according to claim 4, wherein the step of generating a static MAC address based on the DHCP relationship table comprises: Determine the MAC address of the target host and the target port based on the DHCP relationship table The correspondence between the port numbers; A static MAC address is generated based on the MAC address of the target host, the port number of the target port, and the corresponding relationship. The message sending method according to claim 1, wherein before the step of responding to the target host being offline, the message sending method further comprises: When receiving the offline notification sent by the target host, it is determined that the target host is in an offline state. The message sending method according to claim 1, wherein before the step of responding to the target host being offline, the message sending method further comprises: When the target host is not detected based on the preset protocol detection mechanism, it is determined that the target host is in an offline state. The message sending method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein after the step of generating a static MAC address based on the DHCP relationship table, the message sending method further comprises: In the case of being attacked by a message from a non-target host, the static MAC address is written into the MAC address table of the current device to overwrite the dynamic MAC address in the MAC address table, wherein the dynamic MAC address is generated according to the message from the non-target host. A message sending device, wherein the message sending device comprises: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, implements the message sending method according to any one of claims 1 to 8. A computer-readable storage medium, wherein a computer program is stored on the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the message sending method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.