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WO2024027070A1 - Procédé et système d'authentification de dispositif terminal basés sur une clé publique d'identification et support de stockage lisible par ordinateur - Google Patents

Procédé et système d'authentification de dispositif terminal basés sur une clé publique d'identification et support de stockage lisible par ordinateur Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2024027070A1
WO2024027070A1 PCT/CN2022/138445 CN2022138445W WO2024027070A1 WO 2024027070 A1 WO2024027070 A1 WO 2024027070A1 CN 2022138445 W CN2022138445 W CN 2022138445W WO 2024027070 A1 WO2024027070 A1 WO 2024027070A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
terminal device
key
public key
random
identification
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Application number
PCT/CN2022/138445
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
王继业
姜琳
朱朝阳
周亮
朱亚运
张晓娟
缪思薇
曹靖怡
蔺子卿
胡柏吉
王海翔
宋小芹
张梦迪
应欢
韩丽芳
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
China Electric Power Research Institute Co Ltd CEPRI
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China Electric Power Research Institute Co Ltd CEPRI
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Publication of WO2024027070A1 publication Critical patent/WO2024027070A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q50/00—Information and communication technology [ICT] specially adapted for implementation of business processes of specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
    • G06Q50/06—Energy or water supply
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
    • Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Definitions

  • This application relates to the technical field of distributed power sources and their data transmission networks, and in particular to a terminal equipment authentication method, system and computer-readable storage medium based on an identification public key.
  • the current secondary security protection solution for the power grid is a boundary security protection system based on horizontal isolation and vertical encryption.
  • the exposure surface of the power monitoring system has increased significantly, and the protection boundaries are blurred.
  • Traditional boundary protection is difficult to ensure the safe access of distributed power sources.
  • Distributed power sources such as distributed photovoltaics
  • the information is sent to the main station of the control agency, and it can receive remote control and remote adjustment commands issued by the main station of the control agency.
  • the distributed power source entity interacts with the power grid, it is necessary to perform identity authentication and access control on the terminal equipment to prevent attackers from forging or controlling the distributed power source entity to access the dispatching main station and implement network attacks on the power grid.
  • the mainstream solution for supporting equipment authentication in power systems is a security authentication solution based on PKI, which uses each device as the subject.
  • PKI public key infrastructure
  • the current electric power dispatching digital certificate system only provides digital certificate services for systems, users, key network equipment, and servers in the electric power dispatching production control area (I/II area), and provides secure Web services, reverse isolation devices, and vertical encryption for the three public dispatching areas.
  • Devices, remote dial-up access systems, etc. provide confidentiality, integrity, and identity authentication services, and have not yet been involved in power station terminal security services.
  • the system can better ensure the trustworthiness of the identities of both communicating parties, but it is relatively time-consuming because the public key cryptography algorithm requires many operations.
  • the certificates of each device require the same CA system for review, issuance and query, and certificate storage will occupy the space of the device, if the number of devices reaches tens of millions or more, system performance will be greatly affected.
  • the communication between distributed power terminals has requirements such as narrow-band communication and low power consumption.
  • the terminals also have the characteristics of large number and wide area distribution.
  • Embodiments of the present application provide a terminal device authentication method, system and computer-readable storage medium based on an identification public key to solve the problem of how to authenticate a terminal device based on an identification public key.
  • embodiments of the present application provide a terminal device authentication method based on an identification public key.
  • the method includes:
  • the data message sent by the terminal device is signed and verified based on the public key and the private key, and based on the signature verification result, the terminal device is authenticated.
  • the identification fingerprint includes: the unique serial number of the terminal device, general parameters, product detection serial number, and the operating status of the embedded module.
  • the public key and private key of the terminal device are generated through the identification key generation algorithm, including:
  • the terminal device generates a random number, and generates a first random public key and a first random private key based on the random number and the identification fingerprint;
  • the device key management center performs operations on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain a mapping sequence
  • the device key management center encrypts the private key through the first random public key and sends the encrypted private key to the terminal device;
  • the terminal device decrypts the encrypted private key through the first random private key to obtain the private key
  • the device key management center publishes the public key.
  • the terminal device generates a random number, generates a first random public key and a first random private key based on the random number and the identification fingerprint, and also includes:
  • the first random public key and the first random private key are generated through the SM9 algorithm based on the random number and the identification fingerprint.
  • the device key management center operates on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain the mapping sequence, which also includes:
  • the device key management center performs a hash operation on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain 32 sets of mapping sequences.
  • the data message sent by the terminal device is signed and verified based on the public key and private key, and the authentication of the terminal device is implemented based on the signature verification result, including:
  • the terminal device of the sender performs operations on the data message and the identification fingerprint to generate a first message digest; encrypts the first message digest using the private key of the terminal device to obtain a digital signature; The digital signature, the data message and the identification fingerprint are sent to the recipient;
  • the receiver performs operations on the data message and the identification fingerprint to obtain a second message digest; decrypts the digital signature through the public key of the terminal device to obtain a first message digest; and determines the first message digest. Whether the message digest and the second message digest are consistent, when the judgment result is consistent, the terminal device passes the authentication.
  • the terminal device uses the recipient's public key to encrypt the data plaintext based on the SM4 algorithm based on random numbers, and sends the encrypted data to the recipient;
  • the recipient uses its own private key to decrypt the received encrypted data using the SM4 algorithm to obtain the plain text of the data.
  • this application provides a terminal device authentication system based on an identification public key.
  • the system includes:
  • the determining part is configured to determine the access requirement and type of the terminal device, and confirm the identification fingerprint of the terminal device based on the access requirement and type;
  • the generation part is configured to generate the public key and private key of the terminal device through the identification key generation algorithm based on the identification fingerprint;
  • the verification part is configured to sign and verify the data message sent by the terminal device based on the public key and the private key, and implement authentication of the terminal device based on the signature verification result.
  • the identification fingerprint includes: the unique serial number of the terminal device, general parameters, product detection serial number, and the operating status of the embedded module.
  • the generation part is configured to generate the public key and private key of the terminal device through the identification key generation algorithm based on the identification fingerprint, and is also configured to:
  • the terminal device generates a random number, and generates a first random public key and a first random private key based on the random number and the identification fingerprint;
  • the device key management center operates on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain a mapping sequence
  • the device key management center encrypts the private key through the first random public key and sends the encrypted private key to the terminal device;
  • the terminal device decrypts the encrypted private key through the first random private key to obtain the private key
  • the device key management center publishes the public key.
  • the generating part is configured to generate a random number through the terminal device, generate a first random public key and a first random private key based on the random number and the identification fingerprint, and is also configured to:
  • the first random public key and the first random private key are generated through the SM9 algorithm based on the random number and the identification fingerprint.
  • the generating part is configured such that the device key management center operates on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain the mapping sequence, and is further configured as:
  • the device key management center performs a hash operation on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain 32 sets of mapping sequences.
  • the verification part is configured to sign and verify the data message sent by the terminal device based on the public key and private key, and implement authentication of the terminal device based on the signature verification result. It is also configured to:
  • the terminal device of the sender performs operations on the data message and the identification fingerprint to generate a first message digest; encrypts the first message digest using the private key of the terminal device to obtain a digital signature; The digital signature, the data message and the identification fingerprint are sent to the recipient;
  • the receiver performs operations on the data message and the identification fingerprint to obtain a second message digest; decrypts the digital signature through the public key of the terminal device to obtain a first message digest; and determines the first message digest. Whether the message digest and the second message digest are consistent, when the judgment result is consistent, the terminal device passes the authentication.
  • the above-mentioned device also includes a transmission part configured to encrypt the data plaintext based on the SM4 algorithm based on random numbers through the terminal device using the public key of the recipient, and send the encrypted data to the recipient;
  • the recipient uses its own private key to decrypt the received encrypted data using the SM4 algorithm to obtain the plain text of the data.
  • this application provides a terminal device authentication system based on an identification public key.
  • the system includes a memory and a processor; wherein, the memory is used to store executable instructions; the processor, Used to implement any of the above terminal device authentication methods based on the identification public key by executing executable instructions stored in the memory.
  • the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium that stores executable instructions, and the executable instructions cause the processor to implement any of the above-mentioned identification-based public statements when executed. Key-based terminal device authentication method.
  • Embodiments of the present application provide a terminal equipment authentication method, system and computer-readable storage medium based on an identification public key.
  • the method includes: determining the access requirements and types of the terminal equipment, and confirming the access requirements and types of the terminal equipment based on the access requirements and types.
  • Identification fingerprint; based on the identification fingerprint, the public key and private key of the terminal device are generated through the identification key generation algorithm; the data message sent by the terminal device is signed and verified based on the public key and private key, and based on the signature verification result, the Certification of terminal equipment.
  • the identification public key technology used in the embodiment of this application serves as a lightweight key generation and management method to realize the binding of terminal device identification and public key, reducing the construction cost and operation and maintenance cost of the key system, and is suitable for distribution Massive key management for power supply. It provides a basis for identity authentication and secure communication of distributed power terminal equipment, realizes the safety of distributed power grid connection, and provides security guarantee for the company's new power system construction and the development and application of distributed power.
  • Figure 1 is a flow chart of a terminal device authentication method based on an identification public key provided by an embodiment of the present application
  • Figure 2 is a flow chart of a zero-trust secure access method based on an identification public key provided by an embodiment of the present application
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the user private key and public key generation process of a power Internet of Things identification public key generation algorithm provided by the embodiment of the present application;
  • Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a digital signature/signature verification process provided by the embodiment of this application.
  • Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a data encryption transmission process provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 6 is a structural diagram of a terminal device authentication system based on an identification public key provided by an embodiment of the present application
  • Figure 7 is a second structural diagram of a terminal device authentication system based on an identification public key provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 1 is a flow chart of a terminal device authentication method based on an identification public key according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • IPK Identity Public Key
  • IPK signature takes up less resources for storage and transmission, and is more suitable for narrowband frame communication of terminal devices.
  • the storage resources required by IPK are only 1/10 of PKI, which is more suitable for edge computing terminals.
  • IPK lightweight key technology has more obvious application advantages than traditional PKI technology.
  • the terminals of the power supply are securely connected to prevent attacks from spreading from the terminals to the power grid and posing a threat to the safe and stable operation of the power grid.
  • this application chooses a lightweight identification public key cryptographic algorithm suitable for massive IoT terminals, so the cost is lower and more suitable for large-scale distributed deployment. Promote the application of power sources, ensure the security of distributed energy access, and promote energy transformation and the construction of new power systems.
  • This application analyzes the risks of distributed power Internet of Things terminal access, and proposes a distributed power secure access method based on identification public keys to achieve security authentication of distributed power terminal equipment and encrypted data transmission to ensure terminal access.
  • the security and data transmission are not threatened by illegal intrusion, and the active defense capability of the power grid is improved.
  • the zero-trust secure access method based on identification public keys includes three steps. First, analyze the types of terminal equipment that need to interact with the power grid for distributed power supply access, and extract device fingerprints; secondly, design a power Internet of Things terminal identification key generation algorithm based on equipment fingerprints to generate terminal equipment public and private keys; finally, design a power IoT terminal identification key generation algorithm based on identification public keys.
  • the distributed power supply secure access method includes terminal security authentication and data encrypted transmission. as shown in picture 2.
  • this embodiment of the present application provides a terminal device authentication method based on an identification public key.
  • the method includes:
  • Step 101 Determine the access requirements and type of the terminal device, and confirm the identification fingerprint of the terminal device based on the access requirements and type.
  • the identification fingerprint includes: the unique serial number of the terminal device, general parameters, product detection serial number, and embedded module running status.
  • the embodiment of this application determines the type of terminal equipment involved in the control according to the network security requirements of distributed power grid connection, and determines the device identification fingerprint with the goal of ensuring uniqueness and low redundancy.
  • the network communication between the data collection server of the distributed photovoltaic station control system and the outdoor on-site collection terminal should adopt encryption authentication measures to achieve identity authentication, data Security measures such as encryption and access control prohibit the access of external equipment to prevent the security risks of a single wind turbine or photovoltaic power generation unit from spreading to the station control system.
  • Distribution Internet of Things access Distributed photovoltaic deployable converged terminals are connected to the power grid company's distribution Internet of Things platform.
  • the data interaction between distributed photovoltaic converged terminals and the power grid company's distribution Internet of Things platform should have identity authentication, access control, data Encryption function.
  • Access to the power information collection system The data interaction between the distributed photovoltaic energy controller and the power distribution Internet of Things platform of the power grid company should have identity authentication, access control, and data encryption functions.
  • Public network cloud platform access The data interaction between distributed photovoltaic aggregators and the power grid company's public network cloud platform should have identity authentication, access control, and data encryption functions.
  • Perception layer terminals such as photovoltaic power generation unit measurement and control terminals usually need to obtain a variety of data types, such as electrical quantity sensing, environmental quantity sensing, physical quantity sensing, behavioral quantity sensing, etc., covering a variety of sensors, video collectors, data collection equipment, etc. , depending on the complexity of its functions, the feature labels covered are also different, such as device numbers, performance parameters, and operating environment parameters.
  • Intelligent devices such as distributed photovoltaic energy controllers and distributed photovoltaic integration terminals also include communication modules, metering modules, control modules, etc., and these modules have their own numerous characteristic parameter information.
  • the extraction of device fingerprint feature information should not only fully reflect the characteristics of a device, but also be able to uniquely identify a device. It also needs to consider pressures such as device computing power and energy consumption. Therefore, in the embodiment of this application, through a multi-mark feature selection algorithm based on multi-variable mutual information, the feature subsets screened from multi-dimensional feature information are: device/module unique serial number, general parameters, product detection serial number, embedded module Operating status.
  • the device serial number/ID is the unique identifier assigned to the device by the manufacturer; device general parameters, such as type, name, model, function, etc.; embedded module running status, such as security status, storage status, etc., due to the module’s software
  • the hardware design has the characteristics of high security, high security, and these states are not easily copied and have good uniqueness. This subset covers as much category information as possible with less redundancy.
  • Step 102 Based on the identification fingerprint, generate the public key and private key of the terminal device through the identification key generation algorithm.
  • the public key and private key of the terminal device are generated through an identification key generation algorithm, including:
  • the terminal device generates a random number, and generates a first random public key and a first random private key based on the random number and identification fingerprint;
  • the device key management center operates the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain the mapping sequence
  • the device key management center encrypts the private key through the first random public key and sends the encrypted private key to the terminal device;
  • the terminal device decrypts the encrypted private key through the first random private key to obtain the private key
  • the device key management center publishes the public key.
  • the terminal device generates a random number, generates a first random public key and a first random private key based on the random number and the identification fingerprint, and further includes:
  • the first random public key and the first random private key are generated through the SM9 algorithm based on the random number and identification fingerprint.
  • the device key management center operates on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain the mapping sequence, which also includes:
  • the device key management center performs a hash operation on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain 32 sets of mapping sequences.
  • the power Internet of Things identification public key generation algorithm provided by the embodiment of this application is based on IPK identification public key technology, using the SM9 algorithm to design an identification key pair generation method, and converts the existing public key system into a public key combined with the Internet of Things device identification.
  • the system realizes the binding of identification and public key, combines the generation and distribution of keys, and realizes the key management of massive terminals.
  • As a lightweight key generation and management method it directly simplifies the key generation. complexity and management difficulty, while reducing the construction cost and operation and maintenance cost of the key system.
  • the user private key and public key generation process of the power Internet of Things identification public key generation algorithm is shown in Figure 3.
  • the terminal device extracts fingerprint information and forms a fingerprint ID
  • the random number s generated by the terminal device generates the user's random public and private key pair (r, R) according to the SM9 algorithm, and passes R and the fingerprint ID to the device key management center;
  • the device key management center performs a hash operation on the R and fingerprint ID sent by the device to obtain 32 sets of mapping sequences;
  • the device key management center uses the encryption algorithm with R as the public key to encrypt the ISK to obtain the ciphertext and send it back to the device;
  • the device uses the random private key r to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain its own private key ISK;
  • the device key management center will publish the public key PSK, and other users can decrypt the ciphertext sent by the device based on the device's public key.
  • the device key management center cannot know the private key of the device, and other users cannot decrypt the ciphertext, ensuring the security of the private key and message.
  • the SM9 national secret algorithm is used to generate the random public and private key pairs of the terminal, replacing ECC and other foreign algorithms.
  • the performance is better and safer, the processing speed is fast, and the machine performance consumption is smaller. , get rid of the dependence on foreign cryptography technology, and realize the control of core information security technology from the cryptographic algorithm level.
  • Step 103 Sign and verify the data message sent by the terminal device based on the public key and private key, and implement authentication of the terminal device based on the signature verification result.
  • the data message sent by the terminal device is signed and verified based on the public key and private key, and the authentication of the terminal device is implemented based on the signature verification result, including:
  • the sender's terminal device calculates the data message and the identification fingerprint to generate a first message digest; encrypts the first message digest with the private key of the terminal device to obtain a digital signature; sends the digital signature, data message and identification fingerprint to the recipient square;
  • the receiver calculates the data message and the identification fingerprint to obtain the second message digest; decrypts the digital signature through the public key of the terminal device to obtain the first message digest; determines whether the first message digest and the second message digest are consistent. When the results are consistent, the terminal device is authenticated.
  • the embodiment of this application implements terminal device identity authentication based on the digital signature of the identification public key.
  • the identity authentication of the terminal device in this embodiment of the application is an important link in the secure access of distributed power sources.
  • the embodiment of this application uses a lightweight identification key system. Basically, the digital signature of the terminal device is realized and the terminal identity is verified. When the distributed power terminal equipment and the control system transmit message data, in order to ensure that the message has not been tampered with, the message needs to be digitally signed and verified.
  • the lightweight SM2 algorithm is used for signature verification from the edge side to the terminal side, using electricity. IoT identification public key generation algorithm for key management.
  • the digital signature and signature verification process is shown in Figure 4.
  • Digital signature process The sender's terminal device first splices the message and device identification and performs Hash function encryption to obtain the encrypted message digest; then inputs the encrypted message digest and the device private key ISK into the encryption algorithm for signature operation to obtain a digital signature. Put the obtained digital signature and the original message identifier into the data packet for transmission.
  • Signature verification process When the recipient receives the data packet, it must first verify the digital signature information to ensure the authenticity of the data packet. Use the public key to decrypt the received signature information, and compare the decrypted message sequence with the transmitted message sequence. If the results are consistent, the signature is valid and the message has not been tampered with. Otherwise, the signature is invalid.
  • public and private keys are generated based on the power Internet of Things identification public key generation algorithm, and the message is digitally signed based on the SM2 algorithm. Key management and key management using the power Internet of Things identification public key generation algorithm are realized.
  • the combination of SM2 digital signatures ensures that the relevant data is real data obtained from legal equipment, realizes the security authentication of distributed power terminal equipment, and prevents counterfeit attacks.
  • the terminal device after implementing the authentication of the terminal device, it also includes:
  • the terminal device uses the recipient's public key to encrypt the data plaintext based on the SM4 algorithm based on random numbers, and sends the encrypted data to the recipient;
  • the receiver uses its own private key to decrypt the received encrypted data using the SM4 algorithm to obtain the plain text of the data.
  • the embodiment of this application implements secure transmission of terminal data based on SM4 encryption and decryption of the power Internet of Things identification public key. After collecting data information, the distributed power supply terminal equipment in the embodiment of the present application transmits the data obtained by the terminal to the power Internet of Things management platform. During the transmission process, the transmitted information data is encrypted to ensure that the information received by the recipient is safe and reliable.
  • the embodiment of this application adopts the SM4 data encryption and decryption algorithm using the public and private keys generated by the power Internet of Things identification public key generation algorithm as the key to ensure its security.
  • SM4 encryption and decryption The speed is faster and the machine performance consumption is smaller.
  • the sender uses the receiver's public key to encrypt the message with SM4.
  • Random numbers are used in the encryption process, so the same plaintext data has different encryption results every time; the receiver uses Its own private key performs SM4 decryption on the received encrypted data packets, calculates the plaintext of the transmitted message, and performs data verification to ensure the integrity of the data transmission process, solve the problem of data tampering during network transmission, and ensure that the business system receives The data is reliable, that is, data tampering attacks are prevented.
  • the distributed power terminal fingerprint extraction technology in the embodiment of this application determines the type of terminal involved in the control based on the network security requirements of distributed power grid connection, and determines the device fingerprint characteristics with the goal of ensuring uniqueness and low redundancy.
  • the interaction between the distributed power supply and the dispatching master station in the embodiment of this application needs to meet the security protection requirements of the power monitoring system for identity authentication, access control, and data encryption.
  • Sensing layer terminals such as photovoltaic power generation unit measurement and control terminals and smart devices such as distributed photovoltaic energy controllers contain numerous characteristic parameter information.
  • the extraction of device fingerprint feature information should not only fully reflect the characteristics of a device, but also be able to uniquely identify a device. It also needs to consider pressures such as device computing power and energy consumption.
  • the feature subsets screened from multi-dimensional feature information are: device/module unique serial number, general parameters, product detection serial number, embedded module Operating status.
  • the electric power Internet of Things identification public key generation algorithm designed in the embodiment of this application is developed on the basis of IPK identification public key technology. Based on the SM9 identification key pair generation method, the existing public key system is transformed into a combination of Internet of Things device identification.
  • the public key system realizes the binding of identification and public key, combines the generation and distribution of keys, and provides ideas for massive key management. As a lightweight key generation and management method, it directly simplifies It reduces the complexity and management difficulty of key generation, uses the national secret algorithm to improve security and independent controllability, and at the same time reduces the construction cost and operation and maintenance cost of the key system.
  • the identity authentication of the terminal equipment in the embodiment of this application is an important link in the secure access of distributed power sources.
  • the embodiment of this application implements the digital signature of the terminal equipment based on the lightweight identification key system to perform terminal identity verification.
  • the distributed power terminal equipment and the control system transmit message data, in order to ensure that the message has not been tampered with, the message is digitally signed and verified.
  • the lightweight SM2 algorithm is used for signature verification from the edge side to the terminal side.
  • the network identification public key generation algorithm performs key management to ensure that the relevant data is real data obtained from legal equipment, realizes the security authentication of distributed power terminal equipment, and prevents counterfeit attacks.
  • the application identification public key in the embodiment of this application brings high security: PKI is a security system using a single root key, and IPK is a combination of multiple algorithms based on a seed key, which is more suitable for distributed power control. Terminal security authentication can more effectively resist cloud computing and quantum computing attacks; the embodiments of this application have strong compatibility: IPK is compatible with mainstream security applications such as PKI, and integrates the original business security mechanisms without affecting the original business security mechanism.
  • the embodiment of this application is highly disaster-tolerant: the IPK authentication process does not require the support of a central certificate (public key) library, which not only helps improve efficiency but also reduces Resource consumption, and the system will not be paralyzed due to central system failures and unexpected disasters, which is very suitable for distributed power grid-connected scenarios; the embodiments of this application are autonomously controllable: IPK lightweight key technology is independently controllable in China Control, supported by the national secret algorithm, can independently control the key without relying on a third party, and realize an active security defense mechanism in the process of distributed power grid connection; the applicability of the embodiments of this application is strong: IPK technology is very efficient in the management and distribution of keys , easy to use, simple to deploy, and fully meets the requirements of core security mechanisms such as terminal authentication and data transmission in the process of distributed power grid connection.
  • the distributed power supply secure access method based on the identification public key in the embodiment of this application creates significant economic benefits in terms of cost saving and risk prevention.
  • cost saving the cost of the secure access method based on identification public keys is significantly lower than that of traditional power dispatch digital certificates.
  • the economic benefits are significant and the cost can be greatly reduced;
  • risk prevention At the same level, large-scale power outages caused by cyber attacks will bring great losses to social production.
  • the secure access method of distributed power sources based on identification public keys is applied to the secure access of wind turbines and photovoltaic power stations. It can achieve data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity in the data transmission process between distributed power sources and grid control systems. This further protects the security of the power grid and reduces losses caused by power emergencies.
  • the power grid is developing a new power system, and the proportion of new energy will increase significantly. It is particularly important to ensure the safety of new energy plants and stations entering the grid.
  • the application of the secure access method of distributed power sources based on identification public keys improves the attack prevention capabilities of the vertical network boundary between new energy plants and main grid dispatching stations, avoids security threats to the power grid caused by access to distributed power sources, and ensures The stable operation of new energy power plants and the national grid provides reliable power supply for economic and social development.
  • the secure access method of distributed power sources based on identification public keys improves the security of new energy plants and stations entering the network, it will definitely promote the integration of clean energy into the network, accelerate the construction of new energy plants and stations, promote the green transformation of energy, and help the country achieve Two-carbon target.
  • FIG. 6 is a structural diagram 1 of a terminal device authentication system based on an identity public key provided according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the system includes:
  • the determination part 601 is configured to determine the access requirements and type of the terminal device, and confirm the identification fingerprint of the terminal device based on the access requirements and type;
  • the identification fingerprint includes: the unique serial number of the terminal device, general parameters, product detection serial number, and embedded module running status.
  • the generation part 602 is configured to generate the public key and private key of the terminal device through the identification key generation algorithm based on the identification fingerprint;
  • the generation part 602 is configured to generate the public key and private key of the terminal device through the identification key generation algorithm based on the identification fingerprint, and is also configured to:
  • the terminal device generates a random number, and generates a first random public key and a first random private key based on the random number and identification fingerprint;
  • the device key management center operates the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain the mapping sequence
  • the device key management center encrypts the private key through the first random public key and sends the encrypted private key to the terminal device;
  • the terminal device decrypts the encrypted private key through the first random private key to obtain the private key
  • the device key management center publishes the public key.
  • the generation part 602 is configured to generate random numbers through the terminal device, generate the first random public key and the first random private key based on the random number and identification fingerprint, and is also configured to:
  • the first random public key and the first random private key are generated through the SM9 algorithm based on the random number and identification fingerprint.
  • the generation part 602 is configured for the device key management center to operate the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain the mapping sequence, and is also configured to:
  • the device key management center performs a hash operation on the first random public key and the identification fingerprint to obtain 32 sets of mapping sequences.
  • the verification part 603 is configured to sign and verify the data message sent by the terminal device based on the public key and private key, and implement authentication of the terminal device based on the signature verification result.
  • the verification part 603 is configured to sign and verify the data message sent by the terminal device based on the public key and private key, and implement authentication of the terminal device based on the signature verification result. It is also configured to:
  • the sender's terminal device calculates the data message and the identification fingerprint to generate a first message digest; encrypts the first message digest with the private key of the terminal device to obtain a digital signature; sends the digital signature, data message and identification fingerprint to the recipient square;
  • the receiver calculates the data message and the identification fingerprint to obtain the second message digest; decrypts the digital signature through the public key of the terminal device to obtain the first message digest; determines whether the first message digest and the second message digest are consistent. When the results are consistent, the terminal device is authenticated.
  • the terminal device authentication system also includes a transmission part configured to encrypt the data plaintext using the SM4 algorithm based on random numbers through the terminal device using the public key of the recipient, and send the encrypted data to the recipient;
  • the recipient uses its own private key to decrypt the received encrypted data using the SM4 algorithm to obtain the plain text of the data.
  • terminal device authentication system 600 based on the identity public key provided by the embodiment of the present application corresponds to the terminal device authentication method 100 based on the identity public key provided by the embodiment of the present application, and will not be described again here.
  • FIG. 7 is a structural diagram 2 of a terminal device authentication system based on an identification public key provided according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the system includes: communication interface 901, memory 902 and processor 903; various components are coupled together through a bus system 904. It can be understood that the bus system 904 is used to implement connection communication between these components.
  • the bus system 904 also includes a power bus, a control bus and a status signal bus.
  • various buses are labeled as bus system 904 in FIG. 9 .
  • the communication interface 901 is used for receiving and sending signals during the process of sending and receiving information with other external network elements;
  • Memory 902 for storing executable instructions that can be run on the processor 903;
  • the processor 903 is configured to implement any terminal device authentication method based on the identification public key provided by the embodiments of this application when running the executable instructions.
  • Embodiments of the present application provide a computer-readable storage medium that stores executable instructions for causing the processor 903 to implement the terminal device authentication method based on the identification public key provided by the embodiments of the present application.
  • the storage medium may be a memory such as FRAM, ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM, flash memory, magnetic surface memory, optical disk, or CD-ROM; it may also include one or any combination of the above memories.
  • Various equipment may be a memory such as FRAM, ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM, flash memory, magnetic surface memory, optical disk, or CD-ROM; it may also include one or any combination of the above memories.
  • embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Accordingly, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment that combines software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
  • the solutions in the embodiments of this application can be implemented using various computer languages, such as the object-oriented programming language Java and the literal scripting language JavaScript.
  • These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that causes a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including the instruction means, the instructions
  • the device implements the functions specified in a process or processes of the flowchart and/or a block or blocks of the block diagram.
  • These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, causing a series of operating steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing, thereby executing on the computer or other programmable device.
  • Instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in a process or processes of a flowchart diagram and/or a block or blocks of a block diagram.
  • the identification public key technology used in the embodiment of this application serves as a lightweight key generation and management method to realize the binding of terminal device identification and public key, reducing the construction cost and operation and maintenance cost of the key system, and is suitable for distribution Massive key management for power supply. It provides a basis for identity authentication and secure communication of distributed power terminal equipment, realizes the safety of distributed power grid connection, and provides security guarantee for the company's new power system construction and the development and application of distributed power.

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Abstract

La présente demande divulgue un procédé et un système d'authentification de dispositif terminal basés sur une clé publique d'identification, ainsi qu'un support de stockage lisible par ordinateur, le procédé consistant à : déterminer une demande d'accès et le type d'un dispositif terminal et confirmer une empreinte digitale d'identification du dispositif terminal sur la base de la demande d'accès et du type ; générer une clé publique et une clé privée du dispositif terminal au moyen d'un algorithme de génération de clé d'identification et sur la base de l'empreinte digitale d'identification ; et effectuer, sur la base de la clé publique et de la clé privée, une signature et une vérification de signature sur un message de données qui est envoyé par le dispositif terminal et réaliser l'authentification du dispositif terminal sur la base du résultat de vérification de signature. La technique de clé publique d'identification utilisée dans la présente demande sert de procédé léger de génération et de gestion de clé, réalise la liaison d'un identifiant de dispositif terminal et d'une clé publique, réduit les coûts de construction et les coûts de fonctionnement et de maintenance d'un système de clé et est appropriée pour la gestion de clé de masse d'une source d'alimentation distribuée.
PCT/CN2022/138445 2022-08-03 2022-12-12 Procédé et système d'authentification de dispositif terminal basés sur une clé publique d'identification et support de stockage lisible par ordinateur Ceased WO2024027070A1 (fr)

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