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WO2023137760A1 - Procédés de communication sans fil, ue distant, ausf et amf - Google Patents

Procédés de communication sans fil, ue distant, ausf et amf Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023137760A1
WO2023137760A1 PCT/CN2022/073565 CN2022073565W WO2023137760A1 WO 2023137760 A1 WO2023137760 A1 WO 2023137760A1 CN 2022073565 W CN2022073565 W CN 2022073565W WO 2023137760 A1 WO2023137760 A1 WO 2023137760A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
remote
ausf
nonce
mac
relay
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2022/073565
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
甘露
熊丽晖
曹进
任雄鹏
马如慧
李晖
杨元元
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corp Ltd
Original Assignee
Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corp Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corp Ltd filed Critical Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corp Ltd
Priority to PCT/CN2022/073565 priority Critical patent/WO2023137760A1/fr
Priority to CN202280073262.3A priority patent/CN118202681A/zh
Publication of WO2023137760A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023137760A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present application relate to the communication field, and more specifically, to a wireless communication method, a remote UE, an AUSF, and an AMF.
  • NCIS Network Controlled Interactive Services
  • 5G fifth-generation mobile communication technology
  • NCIS services are mainly aimed at applications such as augmented reality (AR)/virtual reality (VR), games, etc., and have high requirements on service quality such as speed, delay, packet loss rate, and high-speed codec.
  • AR augmented reality
  • VR virtual reality
  • service quality such as speed, delay, packet loss rate, and high-speed codec.
  • the rate needs to reach 10Gbps, and the packet loss rate should not exceed 10E-4.
  • the session established for the NCIS service is an NCIS session, and UEs in the same NCIS session can be considered to form an NCIS group, such as forming a team in a game.
  • ProSe In the 17th release (R17) of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the 5G Proximity-based Services (Prose) topic can be used to design solutions for short-range business communications.
  • ProSe includes NCIS.
  • An important scenario of Prose is the scenario of UE-to-network (U2N) relay.
  • the U2N relay uses a relay UE to relay data for a remote UE, so that the remote UE can communicate with the network, that is, data transmission is performed through an indirect path.
  • the remote UE accesses the network through the relay UE, it is necessary to consider the security of the PC5 connection between the remote UE and the relay UE.
  • the remote UE has not established the same Proximity based Service (Prose) Prose Relay User Key (PRUK) root key with the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) at this time, therefore, AUSF needs to mutually authenticate with the UE. Co-acknowledgment results in a PRUK, allowing PC5 communication to establish ProSe scenarios.
  • the remote UE needs to run a primary authentication procedure (primary authentication) again to realize the authentication between the AUSF and the remote UE.
  • primary authentication primary authentication
  • the main authentication process is used to implement the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE in the ProSe scenario, there will be redundant authentication information, such as the serving network name (serving network name), key K seaf , and Non-Access Stratum (Non-Access Stratum, NAS) security context (security context) information sent to the AUSF by the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF).
  • the remote UE and the relay UE will generate two different security roots K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link, and the K AUSF may be used to generate a PRUK. It can be seen that the main authentication process increases the complexity of the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE in the ProSe scenario and there is a problem that a new K AUSF will be generated.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a wireless communication method, a remote UE, an AUSF, and an AMF, which can not only reduce the complexity of the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE in the ProSe scenario, but also avoid the generation of a new K AUSF , thereby improving authentication performance.
  • the present application provides a wireless communication method, including:
  • the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the authentication service function AUSF for verifying the AUSF
  • the Nonce_2 is a random number
  • the Nonce_2 When the Nonce_2 is used to verify the MAC ausf successfully, send MAC remote to the AUSF, where the MAC remote is a message verification code generated by the remote UE for verifying the remote UE.
  • the present application provides a wireless communication method, including:
  • the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the AUSF
  • the Nonce_2 is a random number
  • the MAC remote is a message authentication code generated by the remote UE and used to verify the remote UE.
  • the present application provides a wireless communication method, including:
  • MAC remote sent by a remote user equipment UE, where the MAC remote is a message verification code generated by the remote UE for verifying the remote UE;
  • the MAC remote is sent to the authentication service function AUSF.
  • the present application provides a remote UE, configured to execute the method in the above first aspect or various implementation manners thereof.
  • the remote UE includes a functional module for executing the method in the above first aspect or each implementation manner thereof.
  • the remote UE may include a processing unit configured to perform functions related to information processing.
  • the processing unit may be a processor.
  • the remote UE may include a sending unit and/or a receiving unit.
  • the sending unit is used to perform functions related to sending, and the receiving unit is used to perform functions related to receiving.
  • the sending unit may be a transmitter or transmitter, and the receiving unit may be a receiver or receiver.
  • the remote UE is a communication chip, the sending unit may be an input circuit or interface of the communication chip, and the sending unit may be an output circuit or interface of the communication chip.
  • the present application provides an AUSF configured to execute the method in the above second aspect or various implementations thereof.
  • the AUSF includes a functional module for executing the method in the above second aspect or each implementation manner thereof.
  • the AUSF may include a processing unit configured to perform functions related to information processing.
  • the processing unit may be a processor.
  • the AUSF may include a sending unit and/or a receiving unit.
  • the sending unit is used to perform functions related to sending, and the receiving unit is used to perform functions related to receiving.
  • the sending unit may be a transmitter or transmitter, and the receiving unit may be a receiver or receiver.
  • the AUSF is a communication chip, the sending unit may be an input circuit or interface of the communication chip, and the sending unit may be an output circuit or interface of the communication chip.
  • the present application provides a relay AMF or a remote AMF, configured to perform the method in the above third aspect or various implementation manners thereof.
  • the relay AMF or the remote AMF includes a functional module for executing the method in the above third aspect or each implementation manner thereof.
  • the relay AMF or the remote AMF may include a processing unit, and the processing unit is configured to perform functions related to information processing.
  • the processing unit may be a processor.
  • the relay AMF or the remote AMF may include a sending unit and/or a receiving unit.
  • the sending unit is used to perform functions related to sending, and the receiving unit is used to perform functions related to receiving.
  • the sending unit may be a transmitter or transmitter, and the receiving unit may be a receiver or receiver.
  • the relay AMF or the remote AMF is a communication chip, the sending unit may be an input circuit or interface of the communication chip, and the sending unit may be an output circuit or interface of the communication chip.
  • the present application provides a remote UE, including a transceiver and a memory.
  • the memory is used to store a computer program
  • the transceiver is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory, so as to execute the method in the above first aspect or its various implementations.
  • the remote UE further includes one or more processors, and one or more memories.
  • the memory may be integrated with the processor, or the memory may be separated from the processor.
  • the present application provides an AUSF, including a transceiver and a memory.
  • the memory is used to store a computer program
  • the transceiver is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory, so as to execute the method in the above second aspect or its various implementations.
  • the AUSF further includes one or more processors, and one or more memories.
  • the memory may be integrated with the processor, or the memory may be separated from the processor.
  • the present application provides a relay AMF or a remote AMF, including a transceiver and a memory.
  • the memory is used to store a computer program
  • the transceiver is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory, so as to execute the method in the above third aspect or its various implementations.
  • the relay AMF or the remote AMF further includes one or more processors, and one or more memories.
  • the memory may be integrated with the processor, or the memory may be separated from the processor.
  • the present application provides a chip configured to implement any one of the foregoing first to third aspects or methods in each implementation manner thereof.
  • the chip includes: a processor, configured to call and run a computer program from the memory, so that the device installed with the chip executes the method in any one of the first to third aspects or implementations thereof.
  • the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program, and the computer program causes a computer to execute any one of the above-mentioned first to third aspects or the method in each implementation manner.
  • the present application provides a computer program product, including computer program instructions, the computer program instructions cause a computer to execute any one of the first to third aspects above or the method in each implementation manner.
  • the present application provides a computer program, which, when run on a computer, causes the computer to execute any one of the above first to third aspects or the method in each implementation manner.
  • this application introduces the process of AUSF sending MAC ausf and Nonce_2 to the remote UE, so that the remote UE can verify the AUSF based on the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 sent by the AUSF. Further, by introducing MAC remote , the AUSF can verify the remote UE. Through the authentication between the AUSF and the remote UE, it can be ensured that the AUSF and the remote UE generate a shared key, thereby allowing the establishment of secure PC5 communication.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication system provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is an example of a system architecture in which a remote terminal is connected to a 5G network through a relay terminal provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 3 is an example of implementing the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE based on the main authentication process provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a wireless communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 to FIG. 7 are examples of implementing the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE based on the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 8 is another schematic flowchart of the wireless communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 9 is another schematic flowchart of the wireless communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of a remote UE provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 11 is a schematic block diagram of the AUSF provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 12 is a schematic block diagram of an AMF provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 13 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 14 is a schematic block diagram of a chip provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • GSM Global System of Mobile communication
  • CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
  • WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
  • GPRS General Packet Radio Service
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • LTE-A Advanced long term evolution
  • NR New Radio
  • NR Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
  • WLAN Wireless Local Area Networks
  • WiFi Wireless Fidelity
  • the communication system in the embodiment of the present application may be applied to a carrier aggregation (Carrier Aggregation, CA) scenario, may also be applied to a dual connectivity (Dual Connectivity, DC) scenario, and may also be applied to an independent (Standalone, SA) network deployment scenario.
  • Carrier Aggregation, CA Carrier Aggregation
  • DC Dual Connectivity
  • SA independent network deployment scenario
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the applied frequency spectrum.
  • the embodiments of the present application may be applied to licensed spectrum, and may also be applied to unlicensed spectrum.
  • FIG. 1 exemplarily shows a schematic diagram of a communication system 100 applied in this application.
  • the communication system 100 mainly includes a terminal equipment (User Equipment, UE) 101, an access network (Access Network, AN) device 102, an access and mobility management function (Access and Mobility Management Function, AMF) entity 103, a session management function (Session Management Function, SMF) entity 104, a user plane function (User Plane Function, UPF) entity 105, a policy control Function (Policy Control function, PCF) entity 106, unified data management (Unified Data Management, UDM) entity 107, data network (Data Network, DN) 108, application function (Application Function, AF) entity 109, authentication server function (Authentication Server Function, AUSF) entity 110, network slice selection function (Network Slice Selection Function, NSSF) entity 111.
  • a terminal equipment User Equipment, UE
  • AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
  • SMF Session Management Function
  • UPF User Plane Function
  • PCF Policy Control function
  • UDM Unified Data Management
  • UDM data management
  • the UE 101 is connected to the access layer with the AN device 102 through the Uu interface to exchange access layer messages and wireless data transmission, and the UE 101 is connected to the AMF entity 103 through the N1 interface to perform a non-access layer (Non-Access Stratum, NAS) connection to exchange NAS messages;
  • the AN device 102 is connected to the AMF entity 103 through the N2 interface, and the AN device 102 is connected to the UPF entity 105 through the N3 interface;
  • multiple UPF entities 1 05 are connected by N9 interface, UPF entity 105 is connected with DN 108 by N6 interface, meanwhile, UPF entity 105 is connected with SMF entity 104 by N4 interface;
  • SMF entity 104 is connected with PCF entity 106 by N7 interface, SMF entity 104 is connected with UDM entity 107 by N10 interface, SMF entity 104 controls UPF entity 105 by N4 interface, meanwhile, SMF entity 104 is by N11 interface and AMF entity 1 03 connection;
  • the UDM entity 107 is a subscription database in the core network, which stores subscription data of users in the 5G network.
  • the AMF entity 103 is the mobility management function in the core network
  • the SMF entity 104 is the session management function in the core network.
  • the AMF entity 103 is in addition to carrying out mobility management to the UE 101, and is also responsible for forwarding session management related messages between the UE 101 and the SMF entity 104.
  • the PCF entity 106 is a policy management function in the core network, and is responsible for formulating policies related to mobility management, session management, and charging of the UE 101.
  • the UPF entity 105 is the user plane function in the core network, and performs data transmission with the external data network through the N6 interface, and performs data transmission with the AN device 102 through the N3 interface.
  • a protocol data unit (Protocol Data Unit, PDU) session data connection between the UE 101 and the UPF entity 105 is established under the control of the SMF entity 104, so as to perform data transmission.
  • the AMF entity 103 and the SMF entity 104 respectively obtain user subscription data from the UDM entity 107 through the N8 and N10 interfaces, and obtain policy data from the PCF entity 106 through the N15 and N7 interfaces.
  • NEF Network Exposure Function
  • a device with a communication function in the network/system in the embodiment of the present application may be referred to as a communication device.
  • the above-mentioned communication system 100 is described using a 5G communication system as an example.
  • this application can also be applied to other 3GPP communication systems, such as 4G communication systems, or future 3GPP communication systems, and this application is not limited to this.
  • system and “network” are often used interchangeably herein.
  • the term "and/or” in this article is just an association relationship describing associated objects, which means that there may be three relationships, for example, A and/or B may mean: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists alone.
  • the character "/" in this article generally indicates that the contextual objects are an "or” relationship.
  • Embodiments of the present application describe various embodiments in conjunction with terminal equipment and network equipment, wherein the terminal equipment may also be referred to as user equipment, access terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, remote terminal, mobile equipment, user terminal, terminal, wireless communication equipment, user agent, or user device.
  • terminal equipment may also be referred to as user equipment, access terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, remote terminal, mobile equipment, user terminal, terminal, wireless communication equipment, user agent, or user device.
  • Terminal devices can be stations (STAION, ST) in WLAN, cellular phones, cordless phones, Session Initiation Protocol (Session Initiation Protocol, SIP) phones, wireless local loop (Wireless Local Loop, WLL) stations, personal digital processing (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA) devices, handheld devices with wireless communication functions, computing devices or other processing devices connected to wireless modems, vehicle-mounted devices, wearable devices, and next-generation A communication system, for example, a terminal device in an NR network or a terminal device in a future evolved public land mobile network (Public Land Mobile Network, PLMN) network, etc.
  • PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
  • the terminal device may also be a wearable device.
  • Wearable devices can also be called wearable smart devices, which is a general term for the application of wearable technology to intelligently design daily wear and develop wearable devices, such as glasses, gloves, watches, clothing and shoes.
  • a wearable device is a portable device that is worn directly on the body or integrated into the user's clothing or accessories. Wearable devices are not only a hardware device, but also achieve powerful functions through software support, data interaction, and cloud interaction.
  • Wearable smart devices in a broad sense include full-featured, large-sized devices that do not rely on smartphones to achieve complete or partial functions, such as smart watches or smart glasses, etc., and only focus on a certain type of application function, and need to be used in conjunction with other devices such as smart phones, such as smart bracelets and smart jewelry for physical signs monitoring.
  • the above-mentioned AN device 102 may be a device for communicating with a mobile device, and the AN device 102 may be an access point (Access Point, AP) in WLAN, a base station (Base Transceiver Station, BTS) in GSM or CDMA, or a base station (NodeB, NB) in WCDMA, or an evolved base station (Evolutional Node B, eNB or eNodeB) in LTE, or a relay station or an access point, or a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable Equipment and base stations (gNB) in NR networks or network equipment in future evolved PLMN networks.
  • Access Point Access Point
  • BTS Base Transceiver Station
  • NodeB, NB base station
  • Evolutional Node B, eNB or eNodeB evolved base station
  • gNB wearable Equipment and base stations
  • the network device provides services for the cell, and the terminal device communicates with the network device through the transmission resources (for example, frequency domain resources, or spectrum resources) used by the cell.
  • the cell may be a cell corresponding to the network device (such as a base station), and the cell may belong to a macro base station or a base station corresponding to a small cell.
  • the small cells here may include: Metro cell, Micro cell, Pico cell, Femto cell cell), etc. These small cells have the characteristics of small coverage and low transmission power, and are suitable for providing high-speed data transmission services.
  • NCIS Network Controlled Interactive Services
  • 5G proximity service Proximity based Service, ProSe
  • Proximity based Service ProSe
  • NCIS service communication short-distance service communication
  • An important scenario of Proximity Service is the UE to network (U2N) relay scenario.
  • the U2N relay is to relay and transmit data for a remote terminal through a relay terminal, so that the remote terminal can communicate with the network. That is to say, a terminal device with ProSe capability can directly communicate with another terminal device with ProSe capability through the PC5 interface.
  • a terminal device When a terminal device can connect to an external data network through a 5G network and also has ProSe capabilities, this terminal device can act as a relay terminal, and another remote terminal with ProSe capabilities can establish a direct connection with the Relay UE through the PC5 interface, and interact with the external network through the PDU session established between the relay terminal and the 5G network.
  • FIG. 2 is an example of a system architecture in which a remote terminal is connected to a 5G network through a relay terminal provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the remote terminal can be connected to the relay terminal through the PC5 interface, and the relay terminal can be connected to the next generation radio access network (Next Generation Radio Access Network, NG-RAN) through the Uu interface, so as to connect to the 5G core network (5G Core Network, 5GC), and the 5GC can be connected to the application server (application server, AS) through the N6 interface.
  • NG-RAN Next Generation Radio Access Network
  • AS application server
  • a PC5 connection is established between the remote terminal and the relay terminal, and the relay terminal uses the PDU session to relay data from the remote terminal for the remote terminal.
  • each PDU session has a type, such as: IPv4, IPv6, IPv4v6, Ethernet (Ethernet), unstructured (Unstructured), for a specific type of data, only the corresponding similar PDU session is used for data transmission.
  • FIG. 2 is illustrated by taking a 5G communication system as an example, and of course, it may also be applicable to other 3GPP communication systems, such as 4G communication systems, or future 3GPP communication systems, which are not limited in this application.
  • the application server (AS) in FIG. 2 may also be other terminal devices or external public security Internet.
  • the relay terminal establishes a PDU session with the 5G network, and the remote terminal performs data interaction with the external network through the PDU session of the relay terminal.
  • Relay discovery may include the discovery process of model (Model) A or model B.
  • the relay terminal In the discovery process of mode A, the relay terminal actively broadcasts the relay service code (Relay service code, RSC) supported by the relay terminal, and the remote terminal does not need to feed back a response message.
  • the RSC may be used to determine that the relay terminal can provide a relay service.
  • the remote terminal In the discovery process of mode B, the remote terminal first broadcasts the RSC required by the remote terminal, and if there is a relay terminal around that can support the RSC required by the remote terminal, the relay terminal replies to the remote terminal. After the discovery process, a PC5 connection is established between the relay terminal and the remote terminal.
  • NCIS Network Controlled Interactive Services
  • 5G fifth-generation mobile communication technology
  • NCIS services are mainly aimed at applications such as augmented reality (AR)/virtual reality (VR), games, etc., and have high requirements on service quality such as speed, delay, packet loss rate, and high-speed codec.
  • AR augmented reality
  • VR virtual reality
  • service quality such as speed, delay, packet loss rate, and high-speed codec.
  • the rate needs to reach 10Gbps, and the packet loss rate should not exceed 10E-4.
  • the session established for the NCIS service is an NCIS session, and UEs in the same NCIS session can be considered to form an NCIS group, such as forming a team in a game.
  • ProSe In the 17th release (R17) of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the 5G Proximity-based Services (Prose) topic can be used to design solutions for short-range business communications.
  • ProSe includes NCIS.
  • An important scenario of Prose is the scenario of UE-to-network (U2N) relay.
  • the U2N relay uses a relay UE to relay data for a remote UE, so that the remote UE can communicate with the network, that is, data transmission is performed through an indirect path.
  • the remote UE accesses the network through the relay UE, it is necessary to consider the security of the PC5 connection between the remote UE and the relay UE.
  • the remote UE has not established the same Proximity based Service (Prose) Prose Relay User Key (PRUK) root key with the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) at this time, therefore, AUSF needs to mutually authenticate with the UE. Co-acknowledgment results in a PRUK, allowing PC5 communication to establish ProSe scenarios.
  • the remote UE needs to run a primary authentication procedure (primary authentication) again to realize the authentication between the AUSF and the remote UE.
  • primary authentication primary authentication
  • FIG. 3 is an example of implementing an authentication process 200 between the AUSF and the remote UE based on the main authentication process provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • the authentication process 200 may include:
  • the remote UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the remote UE can be authenticated by the network, that is, the remote UE can be a UE capable of accessing the network through the relay UE.
  • the relay UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE is registered in the network, the relay UE can be authenticated and authorized by the network, that is, the network supports it as a UE capable of supporting remote UE access to the network.
  • the remote UE initiates a discovery procedure.
  • the remote UE initiates the discovery procedure using Mode A or Mode B.
  • the relay UE actively broadcasts the relay service code (Relay service code, RSC) supported by the relay UE, and the remote UE does not need to feed back a response message.
  • the RSC may be used to determine that the relay UE can provide a relay service.
  • the remote UE first broadcasts the RSC required by the remote UE, and if there is a relay UE around that can support the RSC required by the remote UE, the relay UE replies to the remote UE.
  • the remote UE sends a direct communication message to the relay UE; it includes SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1.
  • a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the discovery procedure, a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the remote UE discovers the relay UE, the remote UE sends a Direct Communication Request (DCR) to the relay UE, and the DCR is used to establish a secure PC5 unicast link.
  • DCR Direct Communication Request
  • the remote UE includes its security capability and security policy in the DCR message.
  • the DCR may also include SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1. Among them, Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF; it includes the relay UE ID, the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE receives the DCR, the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF, and the relay key request includes the parameters received in the DCR.
  • the relay AMF authorizes the relay UE.
  • the relay AMF verifies the authorization of the relay UE, that is, the relay AMF verifies whether the relay UE is authorized as a UE capable of supporting UE access to the network.
  • the relay AMF sends a UE identity authentication request to the AUSF; it includes the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay AMF selects the AUSF according to the SUCI, and sends the UE identity authentication request.
  • the UE identity authentication request is used to request the PC5 root key, namely 5GPRUK, from the AUSF.
  • the UE identity authentication request may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication request may be sent by invoking an AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication request may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate request.
  • the AUSF retrieves the SUPI from the UDM, and verifies whether the remote UE is authorized to access the network through the relay UE through the subscription information in the UDM.
  • the remote UE realizes identity authentication between the remote UE and the AUSF by initiating the main authentication process.
  • AUSF generates 5GPRUK and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the remote UE generates a 5GPRUK and a 5GPRUK ID.
  • both AUSF and the remote UE After performing the main authentication process of the remote UE, both AUSF and the remote UE generate 5GPRUK and 5GPRUK ID.
  • AUSF After performing the main authentication process of the remote UE, AUSF generates 5GPRUK and 5GPRUK ID.
  • AUSF generates K NR_ProSe .
  • AUSF generates K NR_ProSe based on 5GPRUK.
  • AUSF sends UE identity authentication response to relay AMF; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity authentication response to the relay AMF.
  • the UE identity authentication response may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication response may be sent by invoking AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication response may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate response.
  • the relay AMF sends a relay key response to the relay UE; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay AMF When receiving the K NR_Prose from the AUSF, the relay AMF will not try to trigger the NAS security mode command (SMC) procedure with the Remote UE.
  • the NAS SMC procedure is a procedure triggered when the AMF of the UE is switched.
  • the relay UE sends a direct security mode command to the remote UE; it includes Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay UE can derive the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_Prose included in the relay key response.
  • K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NR Prose, NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the remote UE generates K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE may generate K NR_ProSe based on the direct security mode command including Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the remote UE sends a direct security mode completion message to the relay UE.
  • the remote UE After the remote UE receives the direct security mode command sent by the relay UE, the remote UE will use the 5GPRUK ID to retrieve the K AUSF and/or 5GPRUK for PC5 link security, and then generate K NR_ProSe based on the direct security mode command including Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the remote UE generates a key K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE derives the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_ProSe .
  • the K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the main authentication process is used to implement the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE in the ProSe scenario, there will be redundant authentication information, such as the serving network name (serving network name), key K seaf , and Non-Access Stratum (Non-Access Stratum, NAS) security context (security context) information sent to the AUSF by the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF).
  • the remote UE and the relay UE will generate two different security roots K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link, and the K AUSF may be used to generate a PRUK. It can be seen that the main authentication process increases the complexity of the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE in the ProSe scenario and there is a problem that a new K AUSF will be generated.
  • the present application provides a wireless communication method, a remote UE, an AUSF, and an AMF, which can not only reduce the complexity of the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE in the ProSe scenario, but also avoid generating a new K AUSF , thereby improving authentication performance.
  • Nonce_1 and Nonce_2 can be random numbers used to derive secret keys or verification codes.
  • the message authentication codes in Table 1 can be generated by various derivative functions.
  • 5GPRUK derivation process can be realized as:
  • KDF When deriving 5GPRUK from K AUSF , the following parameters are used as input to KDF:
  • L1 length of relay service code
  • the input key (KEY) is K AUSF .
  • SUPI shall be the same as parameter P0 in the standard (eg TS 33.501 Annex A.7.0).
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the protocol.
  • 5GPRUK ID derivation process can be realized as:
  • FC 0xAA (assigned by 3GPP);
  • L1 length of relay service code
  • L2 length of SUPI.
  • the input key KEY is K AUSF .
  • the last two bits in the 0xAA are stipulated by the protocol.
  • K NR_ProSe derivation process can be realized as:
  • KDF When deriving K NR_ProSe from a 5GPRUK key, the following parameters are used as input to the KDF:
  • L1 length of Nonce_1.
  • the input key KEY is 5GPRUK.
  • SUPI has the same value as parameter P0 in TS 33.501 Annex A.7.0.
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the protocol.
  • MAC ausf derivation process can be realized as:
  • L1 length of relay service code
  • L2 length of Nonce_1
  • L3 length of Nonce_2.
  • the input key KEY is K AUSF .
  • SUPI shall be the same as parameter P0 in the standard (eg TS 33.501 Annex A.7.0).
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the protocol.
  • XMAC remote and MAC remote derivation process can be realized as:
  • the input key KEY is K AUSF .
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the protocol.
  • HXMAC remote derivation process can be realized as:
  • the HXMAC remote is identified by the 128 least significant bits output by the SHA-256 hash function.
  • any key derivation function of the present application satisfies computational security; for example, it includes but is not limited to HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SM3.
  • the input parameters of the key derivation function in this application are not limited to the above-mentioned necessary parameters, and may contain other optional parameters, which are not specifically limited in this application.
  • the derivation process of each message verification code or secret key involved in the following application can be implemented as the corresponding derivation process above, and in order to avoid repetition, no specific description will be given later.
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a wireless communication method 300 provided by an embodiment of the present application, and the wireless communication method 300 may be executed by a remote UE.
  • the remote terminal shown in FIG. 2 the remote terminal shown in FIG. 2 .
  • the method 300 may include:
  • the remote UE can verify the AUSF based on the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 sent by the AUSF. Further, by introducing MAC remote , the AUSF can verify the remote UE. Through the authentication between the AUSF and the remote UE, it can be ensured that the AUSF and the remote UE generate a shared key, thereby allowing the establishment of secure PC5 communication.
  • the method 300 may also include:
  • the first verification code is equal to the MAC ausf , it is determined that the MAC ausf is successfully verified by using the Nonce_2.
  • the first KDF may be a KDF used by the AUSF to generate the MAC ausf .
  • the first KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the first KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement
  • the Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the Nonce_1 may be the same as the random number included in the UE identity authentication request sent by the relay AMF to the AUSF.
  • the Nonce_1 may be the same as the random number generated by the relay AMF.
  • the remote UE may acquire the random number generated by the relay AMF through the relay UE.
  • the method 300 may also include:
  • the MAC remote is obtained by using the second key derivation function KDF.
  • the second KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the second KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link, and the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement.
  • the second KDF may be the same as the KDF used when the AUSF verifies the MAC remote .
  • the S310 may include:
  • the S320 includes:
  • the difference between the serving network of the remote UE and the serving network of the relay UE may mean that the AMF of the remote UE is different from the AMF of the relay UE, and the AMF of the remote UE may also be called a remote AMF, and the AMF of the relay UE may also be called a relay AMF.
  • the difference between the serving network of the remote UE and the serving network of the relay UE may mean that the PLMN where the remote UE is located is different from the PLMN where the relay UE is located.
  • the MAC ausf and the Nonce_2 are carried in a UE identity authentication response message, and the UE identity authentication response message is a response message to the UE identity authentication request sent by the relay UE.
  • the UE identity authentication request is used to request the PC5 root key, namely 5GPRUK, from the AUSF.
  • the UE identity authentication response may be a Nausf signaling, or may be received by invoking an AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication response is a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate (Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate) response.
  • the UE identity authentication request may be Nausf signaling, or may be received by invoking an AUSF service or Nausf interface, that is, the UE identity authentication request may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate request.
  • the UE identity authentication request includes: the identifier of the relay UE, the user concealment identifier SUCI of the remote UE, the relay service code RSC, and Nonce_1, where the Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the method 300 may also include:
  • the direct security mode command includes the identity of the fifth generation mobile communication technology neighbor service relay user key 5GPRUK and the Nonce_2;
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity authentication response to the relay AMF.
  • the UE identity authentication response may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication response may be sent by invoking an AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication response may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate response.
  • the relay AMF receives the K NR_Prose from the AUSF, the relay AMF will not attempt to trigger the NAS security mode command (SMC) procedure with the Remote UE, and the NAS SMC procedure is a procedure triggered when the AMF of the UE is switched.
  • SMC NAS security mode command
  • the relay UE After receiving the relay key response, the relay UE can derive the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_Prose included in the relay key response.
  • the remote UE After receiving the direct security mode command sent by the relay UE, the remote UE may generate K NR_ProSe based on the direct security mode command including Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID, and further, the remote UE sends a direct security mode completion message to the relay UE.
  • the method 300 may also include:
  • the 5GPRUK or the identity of the 5GPRUK is determined based on the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link.
  • the remote UE can verify the AUSF based on the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 sent by the AUSF. Further, by introducing MAC remote , the AUSF can verify the remote UE. Through the authentication between the AUSF and the remote UE, it can be ensured that the AUSF and the remote UE generate a shared key, thereby allowing the establishment of secure PC5 communication.
  • Fig. 5 is an example of an authentication process 400 provided by the embodiment of this application.
  • the authentication process 400 may include:
  • the remote UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the remote UE can be authenticated by the network, that is, the remote UE can be a UE capable of accessing the network through the relay UE.
  • the relay UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE is registered in the network, the relay UE can be authenticated and authorized by the network, that is, the network supports it as a UE capable of supporting remote UE access to the network.
  • the remote UE initiates a discovery procedure.
  • the remote UE initiates the discovery procedure using Mode A or Mode B.
  • the relay UE actively broadcasts the relay service code (Relay service code, RSC) supported by the relay UE, and the remote UE does not need to feed back a response message.
  • the RSC may be used to determine that the relay UE can provide a relay service.
  • the remote UE first broadcasts the RSC required by the remote UE, and if there is a relay UE around that can support the RSC required by the remote UE, the relay UE replies to the remote UE.
  • the remote UE sends a direct communication message to the relay UE; it includes SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1.
  • a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the discovery procedure, a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the remote UE discovers the relay UE, the remote UE sends a Direct Communication Request (DCR) to the relay UE, and the DCR is used to establish a secure PC5 unicast link.
  • DCR Direct Communication Request
  • the remote UE includes its security capability and security policy in the DCR message.
  • the DCR may also include SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1. Among them, Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF; it includes the relay UE ID, the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE receives the DCR, the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF, and the relay key request includes the parameters received in the DCR.
  • the relay AMF authorizes the relay UE.
  • the relay AMF verifies the authorization of the relay UE, that is, the relay AMF verifies whether the relay UE is authorized as a UE capable of supporting UE access to the network.
  • the relay AMF sends a UE identity authentication request to the AUSF; it includes the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay AMF selects the AUSF according to the SUCI, and sends the UE identity authentication request.
  • the UE identity authentication request is used to request the PC5 root key, namely 5GPRUK, from the AUSF.
  • the UE identity authentication request may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication request may be sent by invoking an AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication request may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate request.
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity acquisition request to the UDM, which includes the SUCI of the remote UE.
  • the UDM sends a UE identity acquisition response to the AUSF, which includes the SUCI of the remote UE.
  • the UDM After receiving the UE identity acquisition request sent by the AUSF, the UDM uses the subscription information in the UDM to verify whether the remote UE is authorized to access the network through the relay UE based on the SUCI of the remote UE included in the UE identity acquisition request.
  • the remote UE receives MAC ausf and Nonce_2 sent by the AUSF, where the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the authentication service function AUSF for verifying the AUSF, and the Nonce_2 is a random number.
  • the remote UE sends an authentication response to the AUSF; it includes MAC remote .
  • the remote UE sends an authentication response to the AUSF; it includes MAC remote .
  • the AUSF generates a 5GPRUK and a 5GPRUK ID after the received authentication response includes the successful verification of the MAC remote ,
  • AUSF sends UE identity authentication response to relay AMF; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity authentication response to the relay AMF.
  • the UE identity authentication response may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication response may be sent by invoking AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication response may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate response.
  • the relay AMF sends a relay key response to the relay UE; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay AMF When receiving the K NR_Prose from the AUSF, the relay AMF will not try to trigger the NAS security mode command (SMC) procedure with the Remote UE.
  • the NAS SMC procedure is a procedure triggered when the AMF of the UE is switched.
  • the relay UE sends a direct security mode command to the remote UE; it includes Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay UE can derive the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_Prose included in the relay key response.
  • K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NR Prose, NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the remote UE generates K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE After the remote UE receives the direct security mode command sent by the relay UE, the remote UE will use the 5GPRUK ID to retrieve the K AUSF and/or 5GPRUK for PC5 link security, and then generate K NR_ProSe based on the direct security mode command including Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the remote UE generates a key K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE derives the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_ProSe .
  • the K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the remote UE sends a direct security mode completion message to the relay UE.
  • the remote UE can verify the AUSF based on the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 sent by the AUSF. Further, by introducing MAC remote , the AUSF can verify the remote UE. Through the authentication between the AUSF and the remote UE, it can be ensured that the AUSF and the remote UE generate a shared key, thereby allowing the establishment of secure PC5 communication.
  • the present application also introduces HXMAC remote so that the relay AMF can verify the remote UE, so as to apply to the scenario where the service network of the remote UE is different from the service network of the relay UE.
  • the AMF of the remote UE is different from the AMF of the relay UE.
  • the difference between the service network of the remote UE and the service network of the relay UE may mean that the PLMN where the remote UE is located is different from the PLMN where the relay UE is located.
  • FIG. 6 is an example of an authentication process 500 provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • the authentication process 500 may include:
  • the remote UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the remote UE can be authenticated by the network, that is, the remote UE can be a UE capable of accessing the network through the relay UE.
  • the relay UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE is registered in the network, the relay UE can be authenticated and authorized by the network, that is, the network supports it as a UE capable of supporting remote UE access to the network.
  • the remote UE initiates a discovery procedure.
  • the remote UE initiates the discovery procedure using Mode A or Mode B.
  • the relay UE actively broadcasts the relay service code (Relay service code, RSC) supported by the relay UE, and the remote UE does not need to feed back a response message.
  • the RSC may be used to determine that the relay UE can provide a relay service.
  • the remote UE first broadcasts the RSC required by the remote UE, and if there is a relay UE around that can support the RSC required by the remote UE, the relay UE replies to the remote UE.
  • the remote UE sends a direct communication message to the relay UE; it includes SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1.
  • a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the discovery procedure, a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the remote UE discovers the relay UE, the remote UE sends a Direct Communication Request (DCR) to the relay UE, and the DCR is used to establish a secure PC5 unicast link.
  • DCR Direct Communication Request
  • the remote UE includes its security capability and security policy in the DCR message.
  • the DCR may also include SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1. Among them, Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF; it includes the relay UE ID, the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE receives the DCR, the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF, and the relay key request includes the parameters received in the DCR.
  • the relay AMF authorizes the relay UE.
  • the relay AMF verifies the authorization of the relay UE, that is, the relay AMF verifies whether the relay UE is authorized as a UE capable of supporting UE access to the network.
  • the relay AMF sends a UE identity authentication request to the AUSF; it includes the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay AMF selects the AUSF according to the SUCI, and sends the UE identity authentication request.
  • the UE identity authentication request is used to request the PC5 root key, namely 5GPRUK, from the AUSF.
  • the UE identity authentication request may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication request may be sent by invoking an AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication request may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate request.
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity acquisition request to the UDM, which includes the SUCI of the remote UE.
  • the UDM sends a UE identity acquisition response to the AUSF, which includes the SUCI of the remote UE.
  • the UDM After receiving the UE identity acquisition request sent by the AUSF, the UDM uses the subscription information in the UDM to verify whether the remote UE is authorized to access the network through the relay UE based on the SUCI of the remote UE included in the UE identity acquisition request.
  • AUSF generates Nonce_2, MAC ausf , XMAC remote and HXMAC remote .
  • AUSF can store XMAC remote temporarily.
  • AUSF sends UE identity authentication response to relay AMF; it includes Nonce_2, MAC ausf and HXMAC remote .
  • the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the authentication service function AUSF for verifying the AUSF
  • the Nonce_2 is a random number.
  • the relay AMF stores the Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote .
  • the relay AMF sends the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 to the remote UE.
  • the remote UE sends an authentication response to the relay AMF; it includes MAC remote .
  • the relay AMF uses the stored Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote to verify the MAC remote .
  • the AUSF may use the temporarily stored XMAC remote to verify the MAC remote .
  • the temporarily stored XMAC remote is the same as the MAC remote , it means that the verification of the MAC remote is successful.
  • AUSF generates K NR_ProSe based on 5GPRUK.
  • AUSF sends UE identity authentication response to relay AMF; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity authentication response to the relay AMF.
  • the UE identity authentication response may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication response may be sent by invoking AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication response may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate response.
  • the relay AMF sends a relay key response to the relay UE; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay AMF When receiving the K NR_Prose from the AUSF, the relay AMF will not try to trigger the NAS security mode command (SMC) procedure with the Remote UE.
  • the NAS SMC procedure is a procedure triggered when the AMF of the UE is switched.
  • the relay UE sends a direct security mode command to the remote UE; it includes Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay UE can derive the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_Prose included in the relay key response.
  • K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NR Prose, NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the remote UE generates K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE After the remote UE receives the direct security mode command sent by the relay UE, the remote UE will use the 5GPRUK ID to retrieve the K AUSF and/or 5GPRUK for PC5 link security, and then generate K NR_ProSe based on the direct security mode command including Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the remote UE generates a key K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE derives the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_ProSe .
  • the K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the remote UE sends a direct security mode completion message to the relay UE.
  • the remote UE can verify the AUSF based on the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 sent by the AUSF. Further, by introducing MAC remote , the AUSF can verify the remote UE. Through the authentication between the AUSF and the remote UE, it can be ensured that the AUSF and the remote UE generate a shared key, thereby allowing the establishment of secure PC5 communication.
  • the present application also introduces HXMAC remote , so that the remote AMF can verify the remote UE, so as to apply to the scenario where the service network of the remote UE is different from the service network of the relay UE.
  • the AMF of the remote UE is different from the AMF of the relay UE.
  • the difference between the service network of the remote UE and the service network of the relay UE may mean that the PLMN where the remote UE is located is different from the PLMN where the relay UE is located.
  • FIG. 7 is an example of an authentication process 600 provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • the authentication process 600 may include:
  • the remote UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the remote UE can be authenticated by the network, that is, the remote UE can be a UE capable of accessing the network through the relay UE.
  • the relay UE registers, authenticates and authorizes in the network.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE is registered in the network, the relay UE can be authenticated and authorized by the network, that is, the network supports it as a UE capable of supporting remote UE access to the network.
  • the remote UE initiates a discovery procedure.
  • the remote UE initiates the discovery procedure using Mode A or Mode B.
  • the relay UE actively broadcasts the relay service code (Relay service code, RSC) supported by the relay UE, and the remote UE does not need to feed back a response message.
  • the RSC may be used to determine that the relay UE can provide a relay service.
  • the remote UE first broadcasts the RSC required by the remote UE, and if there is a relay UE around that can support the RSC required by the remote UE, the relay UE replies to the remote UE.
  • the remote UE sends a direct communication message to the relay UE; it includes SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1.
  • a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the discovery procedure, a PC5 connection is established between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE After the remote UE discovers the relay UE, the remote UE sends a Direct Communication Request (DCR) to the relay UE, and the DCR is used to establish a secure PC5 unicast link.
  • DCR Direct Communication Request
  • the remote UE includes its security capability and security policy in the DCR message.
  • the DCR may also include SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1. Among them, Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF; it includes the relay UE ID, the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay UE After the relay UE receives the DCR, the relay UE sends a relay key request to the relay AMF, and the relay key request includes the parameters received in the DCR.
  • the relay AMF authorizes the relay UE.
  • the relay AMF verifies the authorization of the relay UE, that is, the relay AMF verifies whether the relay UE is authorized as a UE capable of supporting UE access to the network.
  • the relay AMF sends a UE identity authentication request to the AUSF; it includes the SUCI, RSC and Nonce_1 of the remote UE.
  • the relay AMF selects the AUSF according to the SUCI, and sends the UE identity authentication request.
  • the UE identity authentication request is used to request the PC5 root key, namely 5GPRUK, from the AUSF.
  • the UE identity authentication request may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication request may be sent by invoking an AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication request may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate request.
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity acquisition request to the UDM, which includes the SUCI of the remote UE.
  • the UDM sends a UE identity acquisition response to the AUSF, which includes the SUCI of the remote UE.
  • the UDM After receiving the UE identity acquisition request sent by the AUSF, the UDM uses the subscription information in the UDM to verify whether the remote UE is authorized to access the network through the relay UE based on the SUCI of the remote UE included in the UE identity acquisition request.
  • AUSF generates Nonce_2, MAC ausf , XMAC remote and HXMAC remote .
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity authentication response to the remote AMF; it includes Nonce_2 and HXMAC remote .
  • the remote AMF stores the Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote .
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity authentication response to the relay AMF; it includes Nonce_2, MAC ausf and remote AMF ID.
  • the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the authentication service function AUSF for verifying the AUSF
  • the Nonce_2 is a random number.
  • AUSF can retrieve the remote AMF ID from UDM.
  • AUSF can store XMAC remote temporarily.
  • the relay AMF sends the MAC ausf and Nonce_2 to the remote UE.
  • the remote UE sends an authentication response to the relay AMF; it includes MAC remote .
  • the relay AMF sends an authentication response to the remote AMF, which includes MAC remote .
  • the remote AMF uses the stored Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote to verify the MAC remote .
  • the AUSF may use the temporarily stored XMAC remote to verify the MAC remote .
  • the temporarily stored XMAC remote is the same as the MAC remote , it means that the verification of the MAC remote is successful.
  • AUSF generates K NR_ProSe based on 5GPRUK.
  • AUSF sends UE identity authentication response to relay AMF; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the AUSF sends a UE identity authentication response to the relay AMF.
  • the UE identity authentication response may be Nausf signaling, or the UE identity authentication response may be sent by invoking AUSF service or interface Nausf, that is, the UE identity authentication response may be a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate response.
  • the relay AMF sends a relay key response to the relay UE; it includes K NR_ProSe , Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay AMF When receiving the K NR_Prose from the AUSF, the relay AMF will not try to trigger the NAS security mode command (SMC) procedure with the Remote UE, and the NAS SMC procedure is a procedure triggered when the AMF of the UE is switched.
  • SMC NAS security mode command
  • the relay UE sends a direct security mode command to the remote UE; it includes Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the relay UE can derive the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_Prose included in the relay key response.
  • K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NR Prose, NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the remote UE generates K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE After the remote UE receives the direct security mode command sent by the relay UE, the remote UE will use the 5GPRUK ID to retrieve the K AUSF and/or 5GPRUK for PC5 link security, and then generate K NR_ProSe based on the direct security mode command including Nonce_2 and 5GPRUK ID.
  • the remote UE generates a key K NR_ProSe .
  • the remote UE derives the PC5 session key K relay-sess and the confidentiality and integrity keys from K NR_ProSe .
  • the K NR_Prose ID and the K relay-sess ID are established in the same manner as the K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively.
  • K NRP ID and K NRP-sess ID respectively refer to a new air interface neighbor service (NR Prose, NRP) key and an identifier of the NRP key.
  • NRP new air interface neighbor service
  • the remote UE sends a direct security mode completion message to the relay UE.
  • the present application designs a control-plane-based secure communication establishment procedure for a future side-channel UE-to-Network relay (UE-to-Network relay) architecture.
  • UE-to-Network relay UE-to-Network relay
  • the authentication process between the remote UE, AMF and AUSF is redesigned, which respectively considers whether the remote UE and the relay UE belong to the same network, and the authentication process of the relay AMF or the remote AMF to the remote UE if they belong to different networks.
  • the authentication process provided by this application will not have an additional impact on the establishment process of the control plane secure communication.
  • the operations performed by each network element are relatively simple and the process is light.
  • the problem of the AUSF is that it can not only reduce the complexity of the authentication process between the AUSF and the remote UE in the ProSe scenario, but also improve the authentication performance.
  • sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes do not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined by its functions and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the terms “downlink” and “uplink” are used to indicate the transmission direction of signals or data, wherein “downlink” is used to indicate that the transmission direction of signals or data is the first direction sent from the station to the user equipment of the cell, and “uplink” is used to indicate that the transmission direction of the signal or data is the second direction sent from the user equipment of the cell to the station.
  • downlink signal indicates that the transmission direction of the signal is the first direction.
  • the term “and/or” is only an association relationship describing associated objects, indicating that there may be three relationships. Specifically, A and/or B may mean: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists alone.
  • the character "/" in this article generally indicates that the contextual objects are an "or" relationship.
  • the wireless communication method provided according to the embodiment of the present application is described in detail from the perspective of the remote UE above in conjunction with FIG. 2 to FIG. 7 .
  • the wireless communication method provided according to the embodiment of the present application will be described from the perspective of AUSF and AMF respectively in conjunction with FIG. 8 and FIG. 9 .
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of a wireless communication method 710 provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the method 710 may be performed by the AUSF 110 as shown in FIG. 1 .
  • the method 710 may include:
  • the method 710 may also include:
  • the MAC ausf is obtained using a first key derivation function KDF.
  • the first KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the first KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement
  • the Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the method 710 may also include:
  • the method 710 may also include:
  • the XMAC remote is equal to the MAC remote , it is determined that the verification of the MAC remote is successful.
  • the third KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the third KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link, and the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement.
  • the S711 may include:
  • the S712 may include:
  • the S711 may include:
  • HXMAC remote is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the remote UE.
  • the S711 may include:
  • the method 710 may also include:
  • the method 710 may also include:
  • the HXMAC remote is determined using a fourth key derivation function KDF.
  • the fourth KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input of the fourth KDF is information obtained by concatenating the Nonce_2 and the XMAC remote .
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of a wireless communication method 720 provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the method 720 may be executed by the AMF 103 shown in FIG. 1 .
  • the method 720 may include:
  • the method is applicable to the distal AMF; the method 720 may also include:
  • the HXMAC remote is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the remote UE, and the Nonce_2 is a random number;
  • the MAC remote is verified based on the Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote .
  • the S721 may include:
  • the method is applicable to the relay AMF, and the method 720 may further include:
  • the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the authentication service function AUSF for verifying the AUSF
  • the Nonce_2 is a random number
  • the HXMAC remote is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the remote UE
  • the MAC remote is verified based on the Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote .
  • the method 720 may also include:
  • the method 720 may also include:
  • the second verification code is equal to the HXMAC remote , it is determined that the verification of the MAC remote is successful.
  • the fifth KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the MAC remote The MAC remote .
  • the input of the fifth KDF is information obtained by concatenating the Nonce_2 and the MAC remote .
  • the method 720 may also include:
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of a remote UE 810 according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the remote UE 810 may include:
  • the receiving unit 811 is configured to receive MAC ausf and Nonce_2 sent by the authentication service function AUSF, the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the authentication service function AUSF for verifying the AUSF, and the Nonce_2 is a random number;
  • the sending unit 812 is configured to send a MAC remote to the AUSF when the Nonce_2 is used to verify the MAC ausf successfully, and the MAC remote is a message verification code generated by the remote UE for verifying the remote UE.
  • the sending unit 812 is also configured to:
  • the first verification code is equal to the MAC ausf , it is determined that the MAC ausf is successfully verified by using the Nonce_2.
  • the first KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the first KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement
  • the Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the sending unit 812 is also configured to:
  • the MAC remote is obtained by using the second key derivation function KDF.
  • the second KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the second KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link, and the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement.
  • the receiving unit 811 is specifically configured to:
  • the sending unit 812 is specifically used for:
  • the MAC ausf and the Nonce_2 are carried in a UE identity authentication response message, and the UE identity authentication response message is a response message to the UE identity authentication request sent by the relay UE.
  • the UE identity authentication request includes: an identifier of the relay UE, a user concealed identifier SUCI of the remote UE, a relay service code RSC, and Nonce_1, where the Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the receiving unit 811 is further configured to:
  • the direct security mode command includes the identity of the fifth generation mobile communication technology neighbor service relay user key 5GPRUK and the Nonce_2;
  • the sending unit 812 is also used for:
  • the sending unit 812 is also configured to:
  • the 5GPRUK or the identity of the 5GPRUK is determined based on the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link.
  • the device embodiment and the method embodiment may correspond to each other, and similar descriptions may refer to the method embodiment.
  • the remote UE 810 shown in FIG. 10 may correspond to a corresponding subject that executes the methods provided in the embodiments of the present application, and the aforementioned and other operations and/or functions of the units in the remote UE 810 are respectively for realizing the corresponding processes in the methods provided in the embodiments of the present application, and for the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here.
  • Fig. 11 is a schematic block diagram of the AUSF 820 of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the AUSF 820 may include:
  • the sending unit 821 is configured to send MAC ausf and Nonce_2 to the remote user equipment UE, the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the AUSF, and the Nonce_2 is a random number;
  • the receiving unit 822 is configured to receive the MAC remote sent by the remote UE, where the MAC remote is a message verification code generated by the remote UE for verifying the remote UE.
  • the sending unit 821 is also configured to:
  • the MAC ausf is obtained using a first key derivation function KDF.
  • the first KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the first KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link
  • the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement
  • the Nonce_1 is a random number.
  • the receiving unit 822 is also used to:
  • the receiving unit 822 is also used to:
  • the XMAC remote is equal to the MAC remote , it is determined that the verification of the MAC remote is successful.
  • the third KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input key of the third KDF is the security root K AUSF of the PC5 unicast link, and the last two digits in the 0xXX are stipulated by the agreement.
  • the sending unit 821 is specifically configured to:
  • the receiving unit 822 is specifically used for:
  • the sending unit 821 is specifically configured to:
  • HXMAC remote is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the remote UE.
  • the sending unit 821 is specifically configured to:
  • the sending unit 821 is also configured to:
  • the receiving unit 822 is also used to:
  • the HXMAC remote is determined using a fourth key derivation function KDF.
  • the fourth KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the input of the fourth KDF is information obtained by concatenating the Nonce_2 and the XMAC remote .
  • the device embodiment and the method embodiment may correspond to each other, and similar descriptions may refer to the method embodiment.
  • the AUSF 820 shown in FIG. 11 may correspond to the corresponding subject in each method provided in the embodiment of the present application, and the aforementioned and other operations and/or functions of each unit in the AUSF 820 are respectively for realizing the corresponding processes in the methods provided in the embodiment of the present application, and for the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here.
  • Fig. 12 is a schematic block diagram of the AMF 830 of the embodiment of the present application.
  • described AMF 830 can comprise:
  • the receiving unit 831 is configured to receive a MAC remote sent by a remote user equipment UE, where the MAC remote is a message verification code generated by the remote UE for verifying the remote UE;
  • the sending unit 832 is configured to send the MAC remote to the authentication service function AUSF if the verification of the MAC remote is successful.
  • the method is applicable to the remote AMF; the receiving unit 831 is further configured to:
  • the HXMAC remote is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the remote UE, and the Nonce_2 is a random number;
  • the MAC remote is verified based on the Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote .
  • the receiving unit 831 is specifically configured to:
  • the method is applicable to the relay AMF, and the receiving unit 831 is further configured to:
  • the MAC ausf is a message verification code generated by the authentication service function AUSF for verifying the AUSF
  • the Nonce_2 is a random number
  • the HXMAC remote is a message verification code generated by the AUSF for verifying the remote UE
  • the MAC remote is verified based on the Nonce_2 and the HXMAC remote .
  • the sending unit 832 is also configured to:
  • the sending unit 832 is also configured to:
  • the second verification code is equal to the HXMAC remote , it is determined that the verification of the MAC remote is successful.
  • the fifth KDF includes at least one of the following parameters:
  • the MAC remote The MAC remote .
  • the input of the fifth KDF is information obtained by concatenating the Nonce_2 and the MAC remote .
  • the receiving unit 831 is also used for:
  • the device embodiment and the method embodiment may correspond to each other, and similar descriptions may refer to the method embodiment.
  • the AMF 830 shown in FIG. 12 may correspond to the corresponding subject in each method provided in the embodiment of the present application, and the aforementioned and other operations and/or functions of each unit in the AMF 830 are respectively for realizing the corresponding processes in the methods provided in the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here.
  • each step of the method embodiment in the embodiment of the present application can be completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in the processor and/or instructions in the form of software, and the steps of the method disclosed in the embodiment of the present application can be directly implemented by a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor.
  • the software module may be located in a mature storage medium in the field such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, and registers.
  • the storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory, and completes the steps in the above method embodiments in combination with its hardware.
  • the receiving unit and the sending unit mentioned above may be realized by a transceiver.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 900 according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 900 may include a processor 910 .
  • processor 910 may invoke and run a computer program from the memory, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 900 may further include a memory 920 .
  • the memory 920 may be used to store indication information, and may also be used to store codes, instructions, etc. executed by the processor 910 .
  • the processor 910 can invoke and run a computer program from the memory 920, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the memory 920 may be an independent device independent of the processor 910 , or may be integrated in the processor 910 .
  • the communication device 900 may further include a transceiver 930 .
  • the processor 910 can control the transceiver 930 to communicate with other devices, specifically, can send information or data to other devices, or receive information or data sent by other devices.
  • Transceiver 930 may include a transmitter and a receiver.
  • the transceiver 930 may further include antennas, and the number of antennas may be one or more.
  • bus system includes not only a data bus, but also a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus.
  • the communication device 900 can be the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 900 can implement the corresponding procedures implemented by the remote UE, AUSF or AMF in the various methods of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a chip.
  • the chip may be an integrated circuit chip, which has signal processing capabilities, and can implement or execute the methods, steps and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the chip can also be called system-on-chip, system-on-chip, system-on-chip or system-on-chip, etc.
  • the chip can be applied to various communication devices, so that the communication device installed with the chip can execute the methods, steps and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip 1000 according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip 1000 includes a processor 1010 .
  • the processor 1010 can invoke and run a computer program from the memory, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip 1000 may further include a memory 1020 .
  • the processor 1010 can invoke and run a computer program from the memory 1020, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the memory 1020 may be used to store indication information, and may also be used to store codes, instructions, etc. executed by the processor 1010 .
  • the memory 1020 may be an independent device independent of the processor 1010 , or may be integrated in the processor 1010 .
  • the chip 1000 may further include an input interface 1030 .
  • the processor 1010 can control the input interface 1030 to communicate with other devices or chips, specifically, can obtain information or data sent by other devices or chips.
  • the chip 1000 may further include an output interface 1040 .
  • the processor 1010 can control the output interface 1040 to communicate with other devices or chips, specifically, can output information or data to other devices or chips.
  • the chip 1000 can be applied to the remote UE, AUSF or AMF in the embodiments of the present application, and the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the remote UE, AUSF or AMF in the methods of the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here. It should also be understood that various components in the chip 1000 are connected through a bus system, wherein the bus system includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus in addition to a data bus.
  • Processors mentioned above may include, but are not limited to:
  • DSP Digital Signal Processor
  • ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
  • the processor may be used to implement or execute the methods, steps and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the steps of the method disclosed in connection with the embodiments of the present application may be directly implemented by a hardware decoding processor, or implemented by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor.
  • the software module may be located in a mature storage medium in the field such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory or erasable programmable memory, register.
  • the storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory, and completes the steps of the above method in combination with its hardware.
  • the storage mentioned above includes but is not limited to:
  • non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), a programmable read-only memory (Programmable ROM, PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (Erasable PROM, EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (Electrically EPROM, EEPROM) or a flash memory.
  • the volatile memory can be Random Access Memory (RAM), which acts as external cache memory.
  • RAM Static RAM
  • DRAM Dynamic RAM
  • SDRAM Synchronous DRAM
  • DDR SDRAM Double Data Rate SDRAM
  • Enhanced Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory Enhanced SDRAM, ESDRAM
  • Synchronous Connect dynamic random access memory switch link DRAM, SLDRAM
  • Direct Rambus RAM Direct Rambus RAM
  • Embodiments of the present application also provide a computer-readable storage medium for storing computer programs.
  • the computer-readable storage medium stores one or more programs, and the one or more programs include instructions that, when executed by a portable electronic device including multiple application programs, enable the portable electronic device to execute the wireless communication method provided in this application.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be applied to the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program causes the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the methods of the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program.
  • the computer program product can be applied to the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the methods of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the computer program product can be applied to the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the methods of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program.
  • the computer program When the computer program is executed by the computer, the computer can execute the wireless communication method provided in this application.
  • the computer program may be applied to the remote UE, AUSF, or AMF in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the computer program When the computer program is run on the computer, the computer executes the corresponding processes implemented by the remote UE, AUSF or AMF in the methods of the embodiments of the present application. For the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system, and the communication system may include the above-mentioned remote UE, AUSF or AMF to form the communication system as shown in FIG. 1 , which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • the terms "system” and the like in this document may also be referred to as “network management architecture” or “network system”.
  • the computer software products are stored in a storage medium and include several instructions to make a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the method described in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage medium includes: various media capable of storing program codes such as U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory, random access memory, magnetic disk or optical disk.
  • the units/modules/components described above as separate/display components may or may not be physically separated, that is, they may be located in one place, or may also be distributed to multiple network units. Part or all of the units/modules/components can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed above may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Des modes de réalisation de la présente demande concernent des procédés de communication sans fil, un UE distant, une AUSF et une AMF. Un procédé consiste : à recevoir un Nonce_2 et une MACausf envoyés par une fonction de serveur d'authentification (AUSF), la MACausf étant un code de vérification de message généré par l'AUSF et utilisé pour vérifier ladite AUSF, et le Nonce_2 étant un nombre aléatoire ; et lorsque le Nonce_2 est utilisé pour vérifier avec succès la MACausf, à envoyer une MACdistante à l'AUSF, la MACdistante étant un code de vérification de message généré par un UE distant et utilisé pour vérifier l'UE distant. Le procédé fourni par la présente demande réduit la complexité d'un processus d'authentification entre une AUSF et un UE distant dans un scénario de service basé sur la proximité, et évite également une KAUSF nouvellement générée, et les performances d'authentification peuvent en outre être améliorées.
PCT/CN2022/073565 2022-01-24 2022-01-24 Procédés de communication sans fil, ue distant, ausf et amf Ceased WO2023137760A1 (fr)

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CN202280073262.3A CN118202681A (zh) 2022-01-24 2022-01-24 无线通信方法、远端ue、ausf以及amf

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