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WO2022032692A1 - 通信方法、装置及系统 - Google Patents

通信方法、装置及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022032692A1
WO2022032692A1 PCT/CN2020/109382 CN2020109382W WO2022032692A1 WO 2022032692 A1 WO2022032692 A1 WO 2022032692A1 CN 2020109382 W CN2020109382 W CN 2020109382W WO 2022032692 A1 WO2022032692 A1 WO 2022032692A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
security
security protection
terminal device
protection method
connection
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2020/109382
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
李�赫
吴�荣
吴义壮
雷骜
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co Ltd filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority to PCT/CN2020/109382 priority Critical patent/WO2022032692A1/zh
Priority to EP20949190.1A priority patent/EP4187953A4/en
Priority to CA3189502A priority patent/CA3189502A1/en
Priority to CN202080103118.0A priority patent/CN115836539B/zh
Publication of WO2022032692A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022032692A1/zh
Priority to US18/168,228 priority patent/US12406059B2/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/554—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures involving event detection and direct action
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/009—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
    • H04W12/37—Managing security policies for mobile devices or for controlling mobile applications
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/03—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/50, monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms
    • G06F2221/034—Test or assess a computer or a system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W28/00—Network traffic management; Network resource management
    • H04W28/02—Traffic management, e.g. flow control or congestion control
    • H04W28/08—Load balancing or load distribution
    • H04W28/0875—Load balancing or load distribution to or through Device to Device [D2D] links, e.g. direct-mode links
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/005—Discovery of network devices, e.g. terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W92/00—Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
    • H04W92/16—Interfaces between hierarchically similar devices
    • H04W92/18—Interfaces between hierarchically similar devices between terminal devices

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of communication technologies, and in particular, to a communication method, device, and system.
  • UE user equipment
  • network-side devices such as base stations/serving gateways (SGWs)/packet data network gateways. , PGW).
  • SGWs serving gateways
  • PGW packet data network gateways.
  • Different UEs cannot communicate directly.
  • UE1 and UE2 are very close, taking UE1 and UE2 as an example, during data transfer, UE1 needs to send data to the connected base station 1 first, and then the data is transmitted through the network side to reach the base station 2 connected to UE2 (At this time, base station 1 and base station 2 can be the same base station or different base stations), and finally base station 2 sends the data to UE2, which requires a large amount of network transmission bandwidth and has low transmission efficiency.
  • Proximity-based services is proposed under the requirement of short-distance direct communication for device-to-device (D2D) communication.
  • D2D device-to-device
  • ProSe requires direct data exchange between UEs, or data exchange only through the base station without going through core network equipment (such as SGW/PGW), so the communication efficiency between close UEs can be improved.
  • core network equipment such as SGW/PGW
  • the short-distance direct communication service is used in vehicle-to-everything (V2X).
  • the ProSe discovery process and the PC5 establishment process need to be executed in sequence.
  • the ProSe discovery process is used to realize mutual discovery between two UEs
  • the PC5 establishment process is used to establish a signaling connection and a data connection for direct communication between the two UEs through the PC5 interface.
  • the security protection mechanism in the existing V2X PC5 establishment process (for details, please refer to 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) technical standards (TS) 23.303) is not perfect, and the V2X PC5 establishment process
  • the control plane signaling in the network is easy to be attacked by an attacker in the middle, which may cause the security level to be degraded. Therefore, how to improve the security of the V2X PC5 establishment process is an urgent problem to be solved.
  • Embodiments of the present application provide a communication method, device, and system, which are used to improve the security of the V2X PC5 establishment process.
  • a communication method comprising: acquiring a first security protection method by a first terminal device, where the first security protection method is determined in a discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device A security protection method; the first terminal device determines a second security protection method according to the first security protection method, where the second security protection method is a security protection method for the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device. Since the first security protection method determined in the discovery process can be referred to when determining the second security protection method in this embodiment of the present application, the security level of the determined second security protection method can be made not lower than that of the first security protection method grade. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • the communication method further includes: the first terminal device receives a first message from the second terminal device, where the first message is a PC5 establishment process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device The first message in ; the first terminal device performs de-security protection on the first message according to the first security protection method. That is to say, in the embodiment of the present application, the first message is protected by the first security protection method.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • since the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to perform security protection on the first message the attack on the first message in the process of establishing the PC5 can be avoided.
  • the problem of reducing the security level caused by attackers' attack or tampering has improved the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • a communication method comprising: acquiring a first security protection method by a first terminal device, where the first security protection method is determined in a discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device A security protection method; after the first terminal device uses the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, it sends the security-protected message to the second terminal device. at least one message.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to communicate between the first terminal device and the second terminal device
  • Security protection is performed on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the two, so the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the messages in the PC5 establishment process can be avoided, and the security level of the PC5 establishment process can be improved.
  • the security level of the first security protection method is higher than or equal to the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, because the first terminal device The device can use the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, so it can be avoided that the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 has a low security level Due to the problem of reducing the security level caused by the security level of the first security protection method, the security level of the PC5 establishment process is improved.
  • At least one message includes a first message
  • the first message is the first message in the process of establishing the PC5. That is to say, in the embodiment of the present application, the first message is protected by the first security protection method.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • since the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to perform security protection on the first message the attack on the first message in the process of establishing the PC5 can be avoided.
  • the problem of reducing the security level caused by attackers' attack or tampering has improved the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • At least one message further includes a third message
  • the third message is sent by the first terminal device in the PC5 establishment process for negotiating the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device
  • the first terminal device uses the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the establishment process of the PC5, including: the first terminal device uses the first security protection method to perform security protection on the first terminal device.
  • a message for security protection when the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 is lower than the security level of the first security protection method, the first terminal device uses the first security protection method to protect the third message for security protection.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to establish the first step in the process of establishing the PC5 between the first terminal device and the second terminal device
  • the message is protected by security, so the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the first message in the PC5 establishment process can be avoided, and the security level of the PC5 establishment process is improved.
  • the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5 is lower than the security level of the first security protection method, because the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to protect the first terminal device
  • the third message in the process of establishing the PC5 between the second terminal device and the second terminal device performs security protection, so that the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 can be avoided to be lower than the security level of the first security protection method.
  • the problem of level reduction has improved the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • the communication method may further include: the first terminal device receives a second message from the second terminal device, where the second message includes the control plane selected by the second terminal device and connected to the PC5 Security algorithm; the first terminal device determines, according to the security algorithm of the control plane connected to the PC5, that the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 is lower than the security level of the first security protection method. Based on this solution, the first terminal device can learn that the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 is lower than the security level of the first security protection method.
  • At least one message includes a fourth message
  • the fourth message is a message sent by the first terminal device in the PC5 establishment process for negotiating the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the security level of the protection method is lower than the security level of the first security protection method; the first terminal device uses the first security protection method to perform security protection on the fourth message.
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application further includes: the first terminal device determines a second security protection method according to the first security protection method, where the second security protection method is the first terminal device and the A security protection method for PC5 connection between the second terminal devices. Since the first security protection method determined in the discovery process can be referred to when determining the second security protection method in this embodiment of the present application, the security level of the determined second security protection method can be made not lower than that of the first security protection method grade. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • the first terminal device determines the second security protection method according to the first security protection method, including: the first terminal device determines the first security protection method as The second security protection method. That is, in this embodiment of the present application, the first terminal device may directly activate the security of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device according to the first security protection method.
  • the first terminal device since the first terminal device does not need to negotiate the second security protection method with the second terminal device, but directly determines the first security protection method as the second security protection method, it not only simplifies the processing of the first terminal device logic, and can save the signaling overhead of the PC5 establishment process.
  • the first terminal device determines the second security protection method according to the first security protection method, including: the first terminal device receives the first security protection method from the second terminal device.
  • the second security policy is the security policy of the second terminal device in the PC5 connection; the first terminal device determines the second security protection method according to the second security policy and the first security protection method.
  • the second security protection method determined by the first terminal device can also be used to the greatest extent. Used by the second terminal device.
  • the first terminal device determines the second security protection method according to the second security policy and the first security protection method, including: in the first security protection method When the second security policy is satisfied, the first security protection method is determined as the second security protection method. Since this solution determines the first security protection method as the second security protection method when the first security protection method satisfies the second security policy, not only the second security protection method determined by the first terminal device can also be used by the second security protection method The second terminal device is used, and it is ensured that the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • the first terminal device determines the second security protection method according to the second security policy and the first security protection method, including: in the first security protection method When the second security policy is satisfied, according to the second security policy, a security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method is selected as the first security protection method.
  • the first security protection method when the first security protection method satisfies the second security policy, according to the second security policy, a security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method is selected as the first security protection method, so not only can the first security protection method be
  • the second security protection method determined by a terminal device can also be used by the second terminal device, and it is ensured that the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so that the security can not be degraded. Purpose.
  • the first terminal device determines the second security protection method according to the second security policy and the first security protection method, including: in the first security protection method If the second security policy is not satisfied, a security protection method that satisfies the second security policy is selected as the second security protection method according to the second security policy.
  • this solution selects a security protection method that satisfies the second security policy as the second security protection method according to the second security policy when the first security protection method does not satisfy the second security policy, not only can the first terminal device determine
  • the developed second security protection method can also be used by the second terminal device, and it is ensured that the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading security.
  • the second security policy includes a second control plane security policy and/or a second user plane security policy; wherein the second control plane security policy is the first The control plane security policy of the second terminal device in the PC5 connection, and the second user plane security policy is the user plane security policy of the second terminal device in the PC5 connection.
  • the second control plane security policy may be used to determine the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5, and the second user plane security policy may be used to determine the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5.
  • the second security protection method is used to perform security protection on some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection; and/or, The second security protection method is used for security protection of part or all of the user plane data connected to the PC5.
  • the second security protection method in this embodiment of the present application includes a security protection method used by a control plane connected to the PC5, and/or a security protection method used by a user plane connected by the PC5.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 is used for security protection of some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection
  • the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 is used for the PC5 connection. Part or all of the user plane data is securely protected.
  • obtaining the first security protection method by the first terminal device includes: the first terminal device sends the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element to the first a piece of information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal equipment, the first information includes identity information for ProSe services or information for determining identity information for ProSe services; the first terminal equipment receives the discovery from the first direct communication A first security protection method for a network element with a name management function. Based on this solution, the first terminal device can acquire the first security protection method in the discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • a communication method comprising: a first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element receiving first information from a first terminal device and 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, wherein the first One piece of information includes identity information used for ProSe service or information used to determine identity information used for ProSe service; the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines according to the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device The security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service; the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element sends the security protection method required by the first terminal device to use the ProSe service to the first terminal device. Based on the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application, the first terminal device can acquire the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service in the discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines, according to the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, a security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service , comprising: the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element, according to the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, determines a plurality of optional security protection methods corresponding to the first terminal device using the ProSe service; The first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines, according to the plurality of optional security protection methods, a security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service. That is to say, in this embodiment of the present application, the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service is determined from a plurality of optional security protection methods corresponding to the first terminal device using the ProSe service .
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application further includes: the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element obtains the second terminal device from the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element to use the The security protection method required for the ProSe service; the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines the security protection method required for the first terminal device to use the ProSe service according to the multiple optional security protection methods, including : the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines whether the multiple optional security protection methods include the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service; when the multiple optional security protection methods When the protection method includes a security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service, the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element determines the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service as: The security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service. Based on this solution, the first terminal device and the second terminal device can obtain the same security protection method in the discovery process between the
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application further includes: the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element obtains the second terminal device from the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element to use the The security protection method required for the ProSe service; the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines the security protection method required for the first terminal device to use the ProSe service according to the multiple optional security protection methods, including : the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines whether the multiple optional security protection methods include the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service; when the multiple optional security protection methods When the protection method does not include a security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service, the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines the first terminal from the plurality of optional security protection methods The security protection method required by the device when using the ProSe service. Based on this solution, the first terminal device can acquire the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service in the discovery process between
  • the security protection method required when using the ProSe service is used to secure a fifth message, where the fifth message is the discovery between the first terminal device and the second terminal device The first PC5 broadcast message in the process. Based on this solution, the security protection of the fifth message can be realized, so that the fifth message can be prevented from being attacked or tampered with by an attacker.
  • the security protection method required when using the ProSe service is used to determine the security protection method of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device. Since in this embodiment of the present application, when determining the security protection method of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, reference may be made to the security protection method determined in the discovery process, so that the determined first terminal device and the second terminal device can be The security level of the security protection method of the PC5 connection between terminal devices shall not be lower than the security level of the security protection method determined in the discovery process. That is to say, the security level of the security protection method determined in the discovery process is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • the security protection method of the PC5 connection is used for security protection of some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection; and/or, the security protection method of the PC5 connection is used for Part or all of the user plane data connected to the PC5 is securely protected.
  • the security protection method for PC5 connection includes a security protection method for a control plane connected to PC5, and/or a security protection method for a user plane connected to PC5.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 is used for security protection of some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection
  • the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 is used for the PC5 connection. Part or all of the user plane data is securely protected.
  • the security protection method required when using the ProSe service is used for security protection of at least one message in the process of establishing the PC5 between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the required security protection method includes that integrity protection is turned on, because the required security protection method when using the ProSe service is used for the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • Security protection is performed on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the two, so the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the messages in the PC5 establishment process can be avoided, and the security level of the PC5 establishment process can be improved.
  • the security level of the security protection method required is higher than or equal to the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device
  • the required security protection method when using this ProSe service is used to carry out security protection to at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device
  • the control of the PC5 connection can be avoided.
  • the security level of the security protection method used on the surface is lower than the security level of the security protection method determined in the discovery process to use the ProSe service, and the security level is lowered, which improves the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • the at least one message includes a first message
  • the first message is the first message in the process of establishing the PC5. That is to say, in the embodiment of the present application, the first message is protected by the first security protection method.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • since the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to perform security protection on the first message the attack on the first message in the process of establishing the PC5 can be avoided.
  • the problem of reducing the security level caused by attackers' attack or tampering has improved the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • a communication device for implementing the above method.
  • the communication device may be the first terminal device in the first aspect or the second aspect, or a device including the first terminal device; or, the communication device may be the first direct communication discovery name in the third aspect.
  • the communication device includes corresponding modules, units, or means (means) for implementing the above method, and the modules, units, or means may be implemented by hardware, software, or hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules or units corresponding to the above functions.
  • a communication device comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory is used for storing computer instructions, when the processor executes the instructions, so that the communication device executes the method described in any one of the above aspects.
  • the communication device may be the first terminal device in the first aspect or the second aspect, or a device including the first terminal device; or, the communication device may be the first direct communication discovery name in the third aspect.
  • a communication device comprising: a processor; the processor is configured to be coupled to a memory, and after reading an instruction in the memory, execute the method according to any one of the preceding aspects according to the instruction.
  • the communication device may be the first terminal device in the first aspect or the second aspect, or a device including the first terminal device; or, the communication device may be the first direct communication discovery name in the third aspect.
  • a communication device comprising: a processor and an interface circuit; the interface circuit is configured to receive a computer program or instruction and transmit it to the processor; the processor is configured to execute the computer program or instruction to enable the communication
  • the apparatus performs a method as described in any of the above aspects.
  • the communication device may be the first terminal device in the first aspect or the second aspect, or a device including the first terminal device; or, the communication device may be the first direct communication discovery name in the third aspect.
  • a computer-readable storage medium is provided, and instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, when the computer-readable storage medium runs on a computer, the computer can execute the method described in any one of the above-mentioned aspects.
  • a computer program product comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, enable the computer to perform the method of any of the preceding aspects.
  • a tenth aspect provides a communication apparatus (for example, the communication apparatus may be a chip or a chip system), the communication apparatus includes a processor for implementing the functions involved in any of the above aspects.
  • the communication device further includes a memory for storing necessary program instructions and data.
  • the communication device is a chip system, it may be constituted by a chip, or may include a chip and other discrete devices.
  • a communication system in an eleventh aspect, includes a first terminal device and a second terminal device.
  • the first terminal device is used to obtain a first security protection method, where the first security protection method is a security protection method determined in a discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device; the first terminal device is further After the first security protection method is used to perform security protection on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, the at least one message after security protection is sent to the second terminal device; the second The terminal device is configured to receive at least one message after security protection, and use the first security protection method to perform de-security protection on the at least one message.
  • the eleventh aspect reference may be made to the above-mentioned second aspect, which will not be repeated here.
  • the first terminal device or the second terminal device is further configured to determine a second security protection method according to the first security protection method, and the second security protection method is the first terminal device and the second terminal device A method of security protection between PC5 connections.
  • the communication system further includes a first direct connection communication discovery name management function network element and a second direct connection communication discovery name management function network element.
  • the first terminal device configured to obtain the first security protection method, includes: a first terminal device, configured to receive from the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service Safeguarding method.
  • the second terminal device is further configured to receive the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service from the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element.
  • the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service and the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service are both the above-mentioned first security protection method. Based on this solution, the first terminal device or the second terminal device can acquire the security protection method required for using the ProSe service in the discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • a twelfth aspect provides a communication system, the communication system includes a first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element and a second direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element; wherein the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element The function network element is used to obtain the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service from the second direct connection communication discovery name management function network element; and, the first direct connection communication discovery name management function network element is also used In determining a plurality of optional security protection methods corresponding to the first terminal device using the ProSe service, and determining according to the plurality of optional security protection methods and the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service After the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service, the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service is sent to the first terminal device.
  • the third aspect which will not be repeated here.
  • FIG. 1a is a schematic structural diagram of a communication system provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 1b is a schematic structural diagram of a communication system provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a ProSe control plane architecture in a 5G network provided by an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 4 is an interactive schematic diagram of a communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is an interactive schematic diagram of another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is an interactive schematic diagram of another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is an interactive schematic diagram of still another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of a communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart of another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication apparatus provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the discovery type includes open discovery (open discovery) or restricted discovery (restricted discovery).
  • open discovery and restricted discovery please refer to the existing 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) technical standards (TS) 23.303, v15.1.0, which will not be repeated here.
  • 3GPP 3rd generation partnership project
  • TS 3rd generation partnership project
  • Model A Model A
  • Model B Mode B
  • the difference between Model A and Model B is the way in which discovery is initiated.
  • the meaning of Model A is "I am here”.
  • the terminal devices at both ends are divided into the broadcasting user equipment (user equipment, UE) (announcing UE) and the monitoring UE (monitoring UE).
  • the announcing UE broadcasts "I am here”.
  • the monitoring UE determines whether to establish a proximity service connection with the announcing UE according to whether it meets its own service requirements after receiving the message broadcast by the announcing UE.
  • the meaning of Model B is "Who is there? / Where are you?".
  • the terminal devices at both ends are divided into the discoverer UE (discoveree UE) and the discoverer UE (discoverer UE).
  • the discoverer UE initiates specific services Request, the request includes specific information, that is, "Who is there?/Where are you?", after the discoveree UE receives the service request initiated by the discoverer UE, it determines whether to reply to the request message according to whether it can provide business services. Reply with a response message stating "I'm here".
  • the embodiment of the present application is described by taking the open discovery scene applicable to the model A discovery model, and the restricted discovery scene applicable to the two discovery models of model A and model B as an example, which is described in a unified manner here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the discovery command is used to inform the network side whether the two terminal equipments communicating with each other are announcing UE or monitoring UE; whether it is a response terminal equipment (response UE) or a requesting terminal equipment (query UE).
  • the announcing UE and the monitoring UE are terminal devices at both ends in the above-mentioned Model A discovery process, and the response UE and the query UE correspond to the discoveree UE and the discoverer UE in the above-mentioned Model B discovery process respectively.
  • the identity information for the ProSe service may be, for example, an application level user identity (application level user identity).
  • the identity information used for the ProSe service may be a proximity service application ID (ProSe application ID), or a restricted proximity service application user ID (restricted ProSe application user ID, RPAUID) or a proximity discovery UE ID (ProSe discovery UE ID, PDUID), etc.
  • the embodiment of the present application takes the ProSe application ID for the open discovery (open discovery) scene, and the PDUID or RPAUID for the restricted discovery (restricted discovery) scene as an example for description, which is described in a unified manner, and will not be repeated below.
  • the PC5 connection in the embodiment of the present application refers to the communication connection between terminal devices based on the PC5 interface.
  • the PC5 connection establishment process in the embodiment of the present application is used to establish a communication connection between at least two terminal devices supporting the PC5 interface. Wherein, after the establishment of the PC5 connection is completed, at least two terminal devices can use the PC5 connection to perform control plane signaling negotiation and/or user plane data transfer.
  • the PC5 connection establishment procedure in the embodiment of the present application may include a PC5 unicast connection establishment (one-to-one communication) procedure and a PC5 multicast connection establishment (one-to-many communication) procedure.
  • the PC5 unicast connection establishment process is used to establish a communication connection between two terminal devices supporting the PC5 interface
  • the PC5 multicast connection establishment process is used to establish a communication connection between more than two terminal devices supporting the PC5 interface.
  • the following embodiments of the present application are illustratively described by taking the establishment of a communication connection between two terminal devices as an example, that is, the following embodiments of the present application are all illustratively described by taking a PC5 unicast connection establishment process as an example.
  • the method of establishing a communication connection between any two terminal devices in the PC5 multicast connection establishment process can refer to the process of establishing a communication connection between two terminal devices in the PC5 unicast connection establishment process.
  • a security policy is a policy used to describe whether to enable security protection, and can be used to determine a security protection method.
  • Security policies used in different scenarios in the embodiments of the present application include at least one of the following:
  • the confidentiality protection of the control plane is to protect the confidentiality of the signaling during the transmission process;
  • the integrity protection of the control plane is to protect the integrity of the signaling during the transmission process;
  • the confidentiality protection of the user plane is to protect the data of the user plane during the transmission process.
  • User plane integrity protection is to protect the integrity of user plane data during transmission.
  • integrity means that the acquired signaling or data is consistent with the original signaling or data and has not been modified. Therefore, integrity protection is to prevent an attacker from "attacking”. Confidentiality means that the real content cannot be seen directly, so confidentiality protection is to make the attacker "unreadable”.
  • the confidentiality protection in the embodiments of the present application may also be referred to as encryption protection, which is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • control plane confidentiality protection policy in the PC5 connection and the control plane integrity protection policy in the PC5 connection belong to the control plane security policy in the PC5 connection; the user plane confidentiality protection policy in the PC5 connection is connected with the PC5
  • the user plane integrity protection policy in the PC5 connection belongs to the user plane security policy in the PC5 connection, which is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the protection policies are divided into three types: REQUIRED, NOT NEEDED, and PREFERRED.
  • REQUIRED means that security needs to be turned on
  • NOT NEEDED means that security does not need to be turned on
  • PREFERRED prefers to turn on or is called optional turn-on, which means that security can be turned on but not turned on. It is explained here and will not be repeated below.
  • control plane confidentiality protection policy in the PC5 connection includes: control plane confidentiality protection enabled (REQUIRED) in the PC5 connection, control in the PC5 connection The plane confidentiality protection is not enabled (NOT NEEDED), or the control plane confidentiality protection in the PC5 connection is optional (PREFERRED).
  • control plane confidentiality protection policies in PC5 connections, user plane confidentiality protection policies in PC5 connections, or user plane integrity protection policies in PC5 connections can refer to Examples of control plane confidentiality protection policies in PC5 connections, It is not repeated here.
  • the security policy when the security policy is sent, generally only one of the three types (REQUIRED, NOT NEEDED, and PREFERRED) is selected for sending, and in some special scenarios, it may be selected At least 2 send, and one of them is PREFERRED. For example, when sending NOT NEEDED and PREFERRED, it means that the security protection is not turned on; when sending REQUIRED and PREFERRED, it means that the security protection is turned on.
  • control plane confidentiality protection policy in the PC5 connection the control plane integrity protection policy in the PC5 connection, and the user plane confidentiality protection policy in the PC5 connection; or, in the PC5 connection
  • the multiple protection policies in the user plane integrity protection policy may be the same, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • one or more user plane integrity protection algorithms supported in the PC5 connection are supported in the PC5 connection.
  • the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm refers to a confidentiality protection algorithm used to protect the control plane.
  • the control plane integrity protection algorithm refers to an integrity protection algorithm used to protect the control plane.
  • the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm refers to a confidentiality protection algorithm used to protect the user plane.
  • the user plane integrity protection algorithm refers to a user plane protection algorithm used to protect the control plane.
  • one or more control plane confidentiality protection algorithms supported in the PC5 connection may be the same or have a common item, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the security protection in the embodiments of this application refers to using a security protection method to protect user plane data/control plane signaling; the de-security protection in the embodiments of this application refers to restoring user plane data/control plane signaling according to the security protection method .
  • the security protection method here includes whether confidentiality protection and/or integrity protection are enabled, which are described here in a unified manner, and will not be repeated below.
  • the encryption key and the encryption algorithm can be used to encrypt and protect the user plane data/control plane signaling; when the integrity protection is enabled, the integrity protection key and the integrity protection algorithm can be used. Perform integrity protection on user plane data/control plane signaling.
  • encryption protection and integrity protection of user plane data/control plane signaling may be performed first; The integrity protection is performed on the user plane data/control plane signaling first, and then the encryption protection is performed.
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the execution sequence of the encryption protection and the integrity protection, which are uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the encryption key and the encryption algorithm can be used to decrypt the user plane data/control plane signaling; when the integrity protection is turned on, the integrity protection key and the integrity protection algorithm can be used to decrypt the data. Integrity protection verification is performed on user plane data/control plane signaling.
  • the security is to perform integrity protection verification first, and then decrypt the encrypted user plane data/control plane signaling; if the user plane data/control plane signaling is integrity-protected first, and then encrypted, the security protection is removed.
  • the sequence is to decrypt the encrypted user plane data/control plane signaling first, and then perform integrity protection verification, which is described here uniformly, and will not be repeated below.
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message in the ProSe discovery process is used to protect all or part of the parameters passed in the first PC5 broadcast message in the ProSe discovery process.
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message may include, for example, whether confidentiality protection and/or integrity protection of the first PC5 broadcast message is enabled. Exemplarily, “00” may indicate that confidentiality protection is not enabled, and integrity protection is not enabled; “01” may indicate that confidentiality protection is not enabled, and integrity protection is enabled; “10” may indicate that confidentiality protection 1 is enabled, and integrity protection is enabled. Confidentiality protection is not turned on; "11” can mean that confidentiality protection is turned on, and integrity protection is turned on.
  • this example uses high bits to represent confidentiality protection and low bits to represent integrity protection as an example. Of course, it can also be low bits to represent confidentiality protection and high bits to represent integrity protection. This is not specifically limited.
  • "0" means not being turned on and "1” means being turned on as an example for illustration. Of course, it may also be “1” that means not being turned on, and "0" that is being turned on, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the first PC5 broadcast messages corresponding to different discovery modes are different.
  • the first PC5 broadcast message is sent by the broadcaster UE (announcing UE), and the first PC5 broadcast message can be an announcing message
  • the first PC5 broadcast message in model A discovery mode, is sent by the broadcaster UE (announcing UE), and the first PC5 broadcast message can be an announcing message
  • model B discovery mode the first PC5 broadcast message
  • the broadcast message is sent by the discoverer UE (discoverer UE), and the first PC5 broadcast message can be a Send Query Code message.
  • a unified description is provided, and details are not repeated below.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection which is used to protect all or part of the parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected by PC5 may include, for example, whether confidentiality protection and/or integrity protection of the control plane connected by PC5 is enabled.
  • the security protection method used by the user plane connected to the PC5 is used to protect part or all of the user plane data connected to the PC5.
  • the security protection method used by the user plane connected by PC5 may include, for example, whether confidentiality protection and/or integrity protection of the user plane connected by PC5 is enabled.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 may also be referred to as the security protection method used by the control plane signaling connected by the PC5; the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 is also It can be called the security protection method used by the user plane data connected by the PC5, which is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the MIC in this embodiment of the present application is a generated parameter that uses the integrity protection key of the terminal device 1 to perform integrity protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the message 1 sent by the terminal device 1 , and is included in the message 1 .
  • the expected MIC in this embodiment of the present application is to use the integrity protection key of the terminal device 2 (same as the integrity protection key of the terminal device 1) to perform all or part of the parameters transmitted in the message 1 received by the terminal device 2.
  • the generation parameter of the integrity check is used to compare with the MIC in the message 1 received by the terminal device 2, so as to verify whether the message 1 received by the terminal device 2 has been tampered with.
  • the integrity protection key of the terminal device 1 can be understood as a key used for integrity protection of the message 1 sent by the terminal device 1, and can be used by the device that generates the MIC.
  • the device that generates the MIC may include, for example, a terminal device 1 or other devices (eg, a network element with a direct connection communication discovery name management function corresponding to the terminal device 1 ), which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the integrity protection key of the terminal device 1 can be understood as being used for the message received by the terminal device 1. 2.
  • the key for integrity verification which can be used by the device that generates the desired MIC.
  • the device that generates the desired MIC may include, for example, a terminal device 1 or other devices (eg, a network element with a direct connection communication discovery name management function corresponding to the terminal device 1 ), which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the integrity protection key of the terminal device 2 can be understood as a key used for integrity verification of the message 1 received by the terminal device 2, and can be used by the device that generates the expected MIC .
  • the device that generates the desired MIC may include, for example, the terminal device 2 or other devices (eg, the direct-connect communication discovery name management function network element corresponding to the terminal device 2 ), which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the integrity protection key of the terminal device 2 can be understood as the message 2 sent to the terminal device 2
  • the key for integrity protection can be used by the device that generates the MIC.
  • the device that generates the MIC may include, for example, the terminal device 2 or other devices (eg, the direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element corresponding to the terminal device 2 ), which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • At least one item(s) below or similar expressions thereof refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single item(s) or plural items(s).
  • at least one item (a) of a, b, or c may represent: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, or abc, where a, b, and c may be single or multiple .
  • words such as “first” and “second” are used to distinguish the same or similar items with basically the same function and effect.
  • words “first”, “second” and the like do not limit the quantity and execution order, and the words “first”, “second” and the like are not necessarily different.
  • words such as “exemplary” or “for example” are used to represent examples, illustrations or illustrations. Any embodiments or designs described in the embodiments of the present application as “exemplary” or “such as” should not be construed as preferred or advantageous over other embodiments or designs. Rather, the use of words such as “exemplary” or “such as” is intended to present the related concepts in a specific manner to facilitate understanding.
  • the network architecture and service scenarios described in the embodiments of the present application are for the purpose of illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application more clearly, and do not constitute limitations on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application.
  • the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application are also applicable to similar technical problems.
  • the first message direct communication request needs to carry UE1 to connect to PC5
  • the control plane security policy (signaling security policy) in the message is used to assist UE2 to negotiate the security policy of the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • This message has no security protection.
  • PREFERRED optional security policies
  • the attacker in the middle can tamper with the signaling security policy in the direct communication request after receiving the direct communication request sent by UE1. is NOT NEEDED.
  • UE2 finds that UE1 requires that the control plane connected to PC5 does not have security protection enabled, so it determines that the control plane security protection method connected to PC5 is that the control plane does not enable security protection, and sends a direct security mode command to UE1. ). Since the security protection is not enabled on the control plane, the attacker can then tamper with the signaling security policy in the above direct connection security mode command back to the content sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request, and the control plane security of the subsequent PC5 connection is attacked in the middle. The security protection of the control plane is forcibly not enabled under the interference of others.
  • control plane security policies of UE1 and UE2 are both optional (PREFERRED) and there is no tampering by an attacker in the middle, the control plane security protection can be enabled originally.
  • the attacker forcibly shuts down the control plane security protection between UE1 and UE2 in the above manner, which will cause the security level to be degraded, and will also be attacked during the subsequent user plane security policy negotiation of the PC5 connection because there is no control plane security protection. further attack.
  • the communication system 10 includes a first terminal device 101 with a ProSe application function and a second terminal device 102 with a ProSe application function.
  • the first terminal device 101 acquires the first security protection method, and the first security protection method is the security protection method determined in the discovery process between the first terminal device 101 and the second terminal device 102 . Further, after the first terminal device 101 uses the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the process of establishing the PC5 between the first terminal device 101 and the second terminal device 102, the first terminal device 101 sends the security protection to the second terminal device 102 at least one message after.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to protect the first terminal device and the second terminal device
  • Security protection is performed on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the two, so the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the messages in the PC5 establishment process can be avoided, and the security level of the PC5 establishment process can be improved.
  • the security level of the first security protection method is higher than or equal to the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, because the first terminal device The device can use the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, so it can be avoided that the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 has a low security level Due to the problem of reducing the security level caused by the security level of the first security protection method, the security level of the PC5 establishment process is improved.
  • the first terminal device 101 or the second terminal device 102 may also determine a second security protection method according to the first security protection method, and the second security protection method is the first terminal device 101 and the second security protection method.
  • a security protection method for PC5 connection between terminal devices 102 Since the first security protection method determined in the discovery process can be referred to when determining the second security protection method in this embodiment of the present application, the security level of the determined second security protection method can be made not lower than that of the first security protection method grade. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • the communication system 10 may further include a first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 103 and a second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 104 .
  • acquiring the first security protection method by the first terminal device 101 includes: the first terminal device 101 receives the security protection required when the first terminal device 101 uses the ProSe service from the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element 103 method.
  • the second terminal device 102 can receive the security protection method required when the second terminal device 102 uses the ProSe service from the network element 104 of the second direct connection communication discovery name management function.
  • the security protection method required when the first terminal device 101 uses the ProSe service and the security protection method required when the second terminal device 102 uses the ProSe service are both the above-mentioned first security protection method.
  • the first terminal device or the second terminal device can acquire the security protection method required for using the ProSe service in the discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the communication system 20 includes a first direct connection communication discovery name management function network element 201 and a second direct connection communication discovery name management function network element 202 .
  • the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 201 and the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 202 may communicate directly or communicate through forwarding by other devices, which is not done in this embodiment of the present application Specific restrictions.
  • the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 201 obtains from the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 202 the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service; and, the first direct-connected communication The discovery name management function network element 201 determines a plurality of optional security protection methods corresponding to when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service. Further, the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element 201 determines the required security protection method when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service according to a plurality of optional security protection methods and the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service. After the security protection method of the first terminal device, the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service is sent to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device can acquire the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service in the discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the communication system 10 shown in FIG. 1a or the communication system 20 shown in FIG. 1b may be applicable to the 5G network currently under discussion, and may also be applicable to other future networks, etc., which is not specifically described in this embodiment of the present application. limited.
  • the direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element ( The network elements or entities corresponding to the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 201 and the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element 202 in FIG. 1 b may be the direct-connected communication discovery names in the 5G network.
  • Management function direct discovery name management function, DDNMF
  • the network elements or entities corresponding to the terminal devices (including the first terminal device 101 and the second terminal device 102 in FIG. 1 a ) in the embodiments of the present application may be terminal devices with ProSe application functions in the 5G network.
  • a schematic diagram of a ProSe control plane architecture in a 5G network includes one or more terminal devices (in FIG. 2 , it includes a terminal device 1, a terminal device 2, a terminal device 3 and a terminal device 4), next generation-radio access network (NG-RAN) equipment, unified data repository (UDR) network element, unified data management (UDM) Network element, session management function (SMF) network element, access and mobility management function (AMF) network element, network exposure function (NEF) network element, policy control Policy control function (PCF) network element, user plane function (UPF) network element, 5G DDNMF network element, and data network (DN).
  • NG-RAN next generation-radio access network
  • UDR unified data repository
  • UDM unified data management
  • SMF session management function
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • PCF policy control Policy control function
  • UPF user plane function
  • 5G DDNMF data network
  • DN data network
  • the terminal equipment that can be used for Prose communication needs to have the function of ProSe application, and the terminal equipment with the function of ProSe application communicates through the PC5 port.
  • the ProSe application server may be an application function (application function, AF) network element in the DN.
  • AF with ProSe application server function has all the functions of AF defined in version 23.501R-15, and related functions for Prose business. That is to say, in the ProSe control plane architecture in the 5G network, the ProSe application server and the terminal device perform user plane communication through the path of the terminal device-NG-RAN device-UPF network element-AF network element.
  • the ProSe application server can also communicate with other network functions (NF) in the 5G core network (5G core network, 5GC) through the NEF, such as communicating with the PCF network element through the NEF network element.
  • NF network functions
  • the DDNMF network element has the function of assigning and processing the mapping relationship between the proximity service application ID (ProSe application ID) and the code used for ProSe discovery for the open ProSe direct discovery (open ProSe direct discovery).
  • ProSe application ID the proximity service application ID
  • open ProSe direct discovery the DDNMF network element communicates with the ProSe application server through the PC2 interface for processing the authorization of the discovery request.
  • AMF network element UDR network element, SMF network element, UPF network element, UDM network element, NEF network element or PCF network element
  • the terminal device in this embodiment of the present application may be a device for implementing wireless communication functions, such as a terminal or a chip that can be used in a terminal, etc., which may be deployed on land, including indoor or outdoor, handheld or vehicle-mounted. ; Can also be deployed on the water (such as ships, etc.); can also be deployed in the air (such as aircraft, balloons and satellites, etc.).
  • the terminal may be a UE, an access terminal, a terminal unit, a terminal station, a mobile station, a mobile station, a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile station in a 5G network or a public land mobile network (PLMN) evolved in the future. equipment, wireless communication equipment, terminal agent or terminal device, etc.
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • the access terminal may be a cellular phone, a cordless phone, a session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, a wireless local loop (WLL) station, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a wireless communication Functional handheld devices, computing devices or other processing devices connected to wireless modems, in-vehicle devices or wearable devices, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and UAV controllers (UAV controllers, UAVC), virtual reality ( virtual reality (VR) terminal equipment, augmented reality (AR) terminal equipment, wireless terminals in industrial control, wireless terminals in self-driving, remote medical (remote medical) Wireless terminal, wireless terminal in smart grid, wireless terminal in transportation safety, wireless terminal in smart city, wireless terminal in smart home, etc. Terminals can be mobile or stationary.
  • SIP session initiation protocol
  • WLL wireless local loop
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • a wireless communication Functional handheld devices computing devices or other processing devices connected to wireless modems, in-vehicle devices or wearable devices, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and UAV
  • the RAN device in this embodiment of the present application is a device that provides a wireless communication function for a terminal device.
  • Access network equipment includes, but is not limited to, next-generation base stations (gnodeB, gNB), evolved node B (evolved node B, eNB), radio network controller (radio network controller, RNC), node B (node B) in 5G. B, NB), base station controller (BSC), base transceiver station (base transceiver station, BTS), home base station (for example, home evolved nodeB, or home node B, HNB), baseband unit (baseBand unit, BBU), transmission point (transmitting and receiving point, TRP), transmitting point (transmitting point, TP), mobile switching center, etc.
  • the first terminal device, the second terminal device, the first direct connection communication discovery name management function network element, and the second direct connection communication discovery name management function network element in the embodiment of the present application may also be referred to as communication devices.
  • communication devices which may be a general-purpose device or a dedicated device, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the related functions of the first terminal device, the second terminal device, the first direct connection communication discovery name management function network element, and the second direct connection communication discovery name management function network element in the embodiment of the present application may be performed by one device.
  • the implementation may also be implemented jointly by multiple devices, or may be implemented by one or more functional modules in one device, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the above-mentioned functions can be either network elements in hardware devices, or software functions running on dedicated hardware, or a combination of hardware and software, or instantiated on a platform (eg, a cloud platform). Virtualization capabilities.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 300 according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 300 includes one or more processors 301, a communication line 302, and at least one communication interface (in FIG. 3, the communication interface 304 and one processor 301 are used as an example for illustration only), optional
  • the memory 303 may also be included.
  • the processor 301 can be a general-purpose central processing unit (central processing unit, CPU), a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more processors for controlling the execution of the programs of the present application. integrated circuit.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
  • Communication line 302 may include a path for connecting the various components.
  • the communication interface 304 can be a transceiver module for communicating with other devices or communication networks, such as Ethernet, RAN, wireless local area networks (wireless local area networks, WLAN) and the like.
  • the transceiver module may be a device such as a transceiver or a transceiver.
  • the communication interface 304 may also be a transceiver circuit located in the processor 301, so as to realize the signal input and signal output of the processor.
  • the memory 303 may be a device having a storage function. For example, it may be read-only memory (ROM) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, random access memory (RAM) or other types of storage devices that can store information and instructions
  • the dynamic storage device can also be electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (electrically erasable programmable read-only memory, EEPROM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disk storage, optical disk storage (including compact discs, laser discs, compact discs, digital versatile discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), magnetic disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or capable of carrying or storing desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and capable of being stored by a computer any other medium taken, but not limited to this.
  • the memory may exist independently and be connected to the processor through communication line 302 .
  • the memory can also be integrated with the processor.
  • the memory 303 is used for storing computer-executed instructions for executing the solution of the present application, and the execution is controlled by the processor 301 .
  • the processor 301 is configured to execute the computer-executed instructions stored in the memory 303, thereby implementing the communication method provided in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the processor 301 may also perform processing-related functions in the communication methods provided in the following embodiments of the present application, and the communication interface 304 is responsible for communicating with other devices or communication networks.
  • the embodiment does not specifically limit this.
  • the computer-executed instructions in the embodiment of the present application may also be referred to as application code, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the processor 301 may include one or more CPUs, such as CPU0 and CPU1 in FIG. 3 .
  • the communication device 300 may include multiple processors, such as the processor 301 and the processor 308 in FIG. 3 .
  • processors can be a single-core processor or a multi-core processor.
  • the processor here may include, but is not limited to, at least one of the following: a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), a microcontroller (MCU), or artificial intelligence Processors and other types of computing devices that run software, each computing device may include one or more cores for executing software instructions to perform operations or processing.
  • the communication device 300 may further include an output device 305 and an input device 306 .
  • the output device 305 is in communication with the processor 301 and can display information in a variety of ways.
  • the output device 305 may be a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light emitting diode (LED) display device, a cathode ray tube (CRT) display device, or a projector (projector) Wait.
  • Input device 306 is in communication with processor 301 and can receive user input in a variety of ways.
  • the input device 306 may be a mouse, a keyboard, a touch screen device, a sensor device, or the like.
  • the above-mentioned communication device 300 may also be sometimes referred to as a communication device, which may be a general-purpose device or a dedicated device.
  • the communication device 300 may be a desktop computer, a portable computer, a network server, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a wireless terminal device, an embedded device, the above-mentioned terminal device, the above-mentioned network device, or a 3 devices of similar structure.
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • This embodiment of the present application does not limit the type of the communication device 300 .
  • security protection of the message may be understood as security protection of all or part of the parameters transmitted in the message, which is described here uniformly and will not be repeated below.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a communication method, which uses the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process to protect one or more messages in the PC5 establishment process, so that the security level of the PC5 establishment process can be improved.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected by the PC5 and/or the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 may be determined according to the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process.
  • the security level of the security protection method used on the face and/or the security protection method used on the user plane connected to the PC5 is not lower than the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process. That is to say, the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process is the minimum security requirement for the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process. This can achieve the purpose of not degrading security.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a communication method, and the communication method uses the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process to establish a process for PC5 between UE1 and UE2.
  • One or more messages in the message are integrity protected.
  • the PC5 establishment process negotiate the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 (for convenience, the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 will be referred to as the PC5 connection in the future) and the user plane of the first PC5 connection
  • the security protection method used used.
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application includes the following steps:
  • the UE1 determines that the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection.
  • the first security protection method is the security protection method acquired in the ProSe discovery process between UE1 and UE2.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the manner of determining the security protection method in the ProSe discovery process. In a possible implementation manner, for the manner of determining the security protection method in the ProSe discovery process, reference may be made to the subsequent embodiment shown in FIG. 7 .
  • UE1 in this embodiment of the present application may be an announcer UE (announcing UE) in a model A discovery mode, or UE1 may be a discoverer UE (discoverer UE) in a model B discovery mode.
  • the first security protection method in this embodiment of the present application may be used to perform security protection on the first PC5 broadcast message in the ProSe discovery process between UE1 and UE2.
  • the first PC5 broadcast message and the security protection method reference may be made to the preamble of the specific implementation manner, which will not be repeated here.
  • the first security protection method in this embodiment of the present application may further include enabling confidentiality protection, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • UE1 sends a direct communication request (direct communication request) to UE2.
  • UE2 receives the direct connection communication request from UE1.
  • the direct connection communication request includes the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the MIC1.
  • control plane security policy and the control plane security capability in the PC5 connection reference may be made to the preamble part of the specific implementation manner, which will not be repeated here.
  • the direct connection communication request may also include some or all of the discovery parameters of the UE1.
  • the discovery parameters please refer to Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 or Table 7 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 . Fourth, I will not repeat them here.
  • the first security protection method may be used to perform security protection on at least one of the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection or the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the MIC1 is a generated parameter after integrity protection is performed on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication request by using the integrity protection key of the UE1.
  • the integrity protection key of the UE1 may be generated by the UE1, or may be issued by the network side, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and/or the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection may be used as input parameters for generating the MIC1.
  • MIC1 KDF (parameter one, parameter two, other parameters).
  • the first parameter can be the control plane security policy in the PC5 connection
  • the second parameter can be the control plane security capability in the PC5 connection
  • the key derivation function (KDF) is a function for calculating MIC1.
  • the KDF may be a hash function.
  • other parameters may include the integrity protection key of UE1.
  • the MIC1 may be generated by the UE1 itself, or may be generated by a DDNMF network element (which may be referred to as a DDNMF1 network element) corresponding to the UE1, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • a DDNMF network element which may be referred to as a DDNMF1 network element
  • the UE1 receives the MIC1 from the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the DDNMF1 network element generates the MIC1.
  • the required control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and/or the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection is sent by the UE1 to the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the process of verifying the MIC1 is the process of comparing the MIC1 in the received direct connection communication request with the expected MIC of the MIC1.
  • the expected MIC of MIC1 is generated by using the integrity protection key of UE2 (same as the integrity protection key of UE1) to perform integrity verification on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication request received by UE2.
  • the parameter is used to compare with the MIC1 in the direct connection communication request received by UE2, so as to verify whether the direct connection communication request received by UE2 has been tampered with.
  • the expected MIC of MIC1 is the same as the MIC1 in the direct connection communication request received by UE2, it can be determined that the verification of MIC1 is passed, that is, UE2 can determine that the received direct connection communication request has not been tampered with;
  • the verification of the MIC1 fails, that is, the UE2 may determine that the received direct connection communication request has been tampered with.
  • the formula for generating the expected MIC of the MIC1 is the same as the formula for generating the MIC1. For details, please refer to the formula for generating the MIC1, which will not be repeated here.
  • the UE2 may verify the MIC1 by itself, or verify the MIC1 through a match report (match report) process, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • match report reference may be made to the existing 3GPP TS 33.303 standard, which is not repeated in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the integrity protection key of UE2 may be obtained by UE2 from the network side, for example, UE2 may obtain it from a DDNMF network element (which may be referred to as a DDNMF1 network element) corresponding to UE1 in the process of obtaining discovery parameters.
  • the integrity protection key of the UE2 may be generated by the UE2 according to the generation material of the integrity protection key issued by the network side.
  • This embodiment of the present application does not specifically limit the generation material of the integrity protection key.
  • the generation material of the integrity protection key may include a root key, and may also include other key generation parameters, etc., which are described here uniformly, and will not be repeated below.
  • the DDNMF network element corresponding to UE2 can protect the key according to the integrity of UE2 (with the integrity of UE1). (identical protection key) to generate the desired MIC of MIC1.
  • the integrity protection key of UE2 may be obtained by the DDNMF2 network element from the network side, or may be generated by the DDNMF2 network element according to the generation material of the integrity protection key issued by the network side. This is not specifically limited.
  • the DDNMF2 network can send the integrity protection key of UE2 to UE2 in the match report process; or the DDNMF2 network element can send the generation material of the integrity protection key to UE2 in the match report process.
  • the integrity protection key of UE2 is generated by UE2 according to the generation material of the integrity protection key. After obtaining the integrity protection key of UE2, UE2 saves the integrity protection key of UE2 for subsequent use.
  • the DDNMF network element corresponding to UE1 can protect the key (complete with UE1's integrity) according to the integrity protection key of UE2. (identical protection key) to generate the desired MIC of MIC1.
  • the integrity protection key of UE2 may be obtained by the DDNMF1 network element from the network side, or may be generated by the DDNMF1 network element according to the generation material of the integrity protection key issued by the network side. This is not specifically limited.
  • the DDNMF1 network The control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and/or the control plane security capability of UE1 in the PC5 connection required to generate the desired MIC of the MIC1 is sent by the UE2 to the DDNMF1 network element through the DDNMF2 network element.
  • the DDNMF1 network element can send the integrity protection key of UE2 to UE2 through the DDNMF2 network element in the match report process, or the DDNMF1 network element can pass the integrity protection key in the match report process through the DDNMF2 network element.
  • the key generation material is sent to the UE2, and the UE2 generates the integrity protection key of the UE2 according to the generation material of the integrity protection key. After obtaining the integrity protection key of UE2, UE2 saves the integrity protection key of UE1 for subsequent use.
  • step S404 if the verification of MIC1 is successful, it can indicate that all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication request in step S402 are completely protected and have not been attacked by external attackers, and then the following step S404 can be continued.
  • UE2 determines the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 according to the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection;
  • the control plane security capability in the PC5 connection and the control plane security capability of the UE2 in the PC5 connection determine the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2.
  • the implementation of step S404 may refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 reference may be made to the preamble of the specific implementation manner, which will not be repeated here.
  • the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection includes one or more confidentiality protection algorithms and one or more integrity protection algorithms.
  • the corresponding selected integrity and confidentiality protection algorithms are both null algorithms.
  • the corresponding selected control plane integrity protection algorithm needs to be a non-null algorithm (non-null) to indicate that the control plane integrity protection is enabled; if the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled at this time Then the corresponding selected control plane confidentiality protection algorithm needs to be a non-null algorithm (non-null) to indicate that the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled; if the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled at this time, the corresponding selected control plane confidentiality protection algorithm needs to be A null algorithm (null) indicates that the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled.
  • UE2 sends a direct security mode command (direct security mode command) to UE1.
  • UE1 receives the direct connection security mode command from UE2.
  • the direct connection security mode command includes the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2.
  • the direct connection security mode command may further include the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and/or the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • UE1 receives the direct connection security mode command from UE2
  • UE1 determines that the security protection method used by the control plane of the final PC5 connection includes that the control plane integrity protection is disabled
  • UE1 needs to determine that in the direct connection security mode command Whether the control plane security policy in the included PC5 connection is the control plane security policy in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, and whether the security capability in the PC5 connection is the security capability in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, if the verification is passed, you can continue to execute the follow-up process, otherwise terminate the current process. This prevents bidding down attacks.
  • the embodiment of the present application may use the PC5 selected by the UE2.
  • the security algorithm used by the control plane of the connection performs integrity protection on all or part of the parameters passed in the direct connection security mode command.
  • the specific integrity protection method can refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • the direct connection security mode command in the embodiment of the present application also includes MIC2 .
  • MIC2 is a generated parameter that uses the integrity protection key of UE2 to perform integrity protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode command.
  • some parameters for integrity protection using the integrity protection key of UE2 may include, for example, the security algorithm (selected null algorithm) used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by UE2, and the control plane security of UE1 in the PC5 connection. At least one of a policy and a control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • UE2 determines that the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 is lower than the security level of the first security protection method, since this solution can use the integrity protection key of UE2 to directly pair Integrity protection is performed on all or part of the parameters passed in the connection security mode command, so it can be ensured that the information in the direct connection security mode command can be trusted by the UE1. Further, after UE1 receives the direct connection security mode command from UE2, it also needs to verify MIC2. The manner in which the UE1 verifies the MIC2 is similar to the manner in which the UE2 verifies the MIC1 described above, and details are not described herein again. If the MIC2 verification is successful, it can be shown that all or part of the parameters passed in the direct connection security mode command are completely protected and have not been attacked by external attackers, and then the following step S406 can be continued.
  • the integrity protection key of the UE2 may be generated by the UE2, or may be issued by the network side, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the integrity protection key used by each generated MIC or expected MIC is the same.
  • the integrity protection key used is the same, the integrity protection key used to generate the desired MIC of MIC3, the desired MIC of MIC3, the desired MIC of MIC4 or the desired MIC of MIC4 described below is the same as the one used above to generate the desired MIC of MIC1 or MIC1.
  • the protection key is also the same, which is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the UE1 determines the final security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection according to the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2.
  • UE1 determines the final security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection according to the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by UE2, including:
  • the security protection method used by the final control plane of the PC5 connection is: integrity protection and confidentiality protection of the control plane of the PC5 connection are not turned on. That is to say, the subsequent control plane signaling in the PC5 connection does not require integrity protection and confidentiality protection.
  • the integrity protection algorithm in the security algorithm used in the control plane of the PC5 connection is non-null, and the confidentiality protection algorithm in the security algorithm used in the control plane of the PC5 connection is non-null, then the final security algorithm used in the control plane of the PC5 connection is non-null.
  • the protection method is: the control plane integrity protection of the PC5 connection is turned on, and the control plane confidentiality is turned on. That is to say, the subsequent control plane signaling in the PC5 connection needs to be integrity protected and confidentiality protected.
  • the final security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection For: the control plane integrity protection of the PC5 link is enabled, and the control plane confidentiality is not enabled. That is to say, the subsequent control plane signaling in the PC5 connection needs to be integrity-protected, and does not need to be confidentiality-protected.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by UE1 can be used for the protection of messages in the subsequent negotiation of the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2, such as The direct connection security mode in step S407 completes the security protection of the message and the security protection of the direct connection communication acceptance message in step S409.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by the UE1 can also be used for the security protection of the control plane signaling after the PC5 establishment process shown in FIG.
  • UE1 sends a direct security mode complete (direct security mode complete) message to UE2.
  • UE2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE1.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message includes the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may also include the user plane of the UE1 in the PC5 connection. security capabilities.
  • the following user plane security capabilities of UE1 in the PC5 connection are the control plane security capabilities of UE1 in the PC5 connection (also referred to as the security capabilities of UE1 in the PC5 connection). No longer.
  • the related description of the user plane security policy in the PC5 connection and the user plane security capability in the PC5 connection may refer to the preamble part of the specific implementation manner, which will not be repeated here.
  • the embodiment of the present application may use the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2.
  • the used security algorithm performs integrity protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode completion message.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message in this embodiment of the present application further includes MIC3.
  • MIC3 is a generated parameter that uses the integrity protection key of UE1 to perform integrity protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode completion message.
  • some parameters for integrity protection using the integrity protection key of the UE1 may include, for example, the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the user plane security capability (optional) of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • this solution can be completed in the direct connection security mode by using the integrity protection key of UE1 All or part of the parameters transmitted in the message are integrity protected, so it can be ensured that the information in the direct connection security mode completion message can be trusted by UE2. Further, after UE2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE1, it needs to verify MIC3.
  • the manner in which the UE2 verifies the MIC3 is similar to the manner in which the UE2 verifies the MIC1 described above, and details are not described herein again. If the verification of the MIC3 is successful, it means that all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode completion message are completely protected and have not been attacked by external attackers, and the following step S408 can be continued.
  • the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and the user plane security capability (optional) of the UE1 in the PC5 connection can be used as input parameters for generating the MIC3.
  • the calculation method of MIC3 reference may be made to the calculation method of MIC1 above, which will not be repeated here.
  • the MIC3 may be generated by the UE1 itself, or may be generated by a DDNMF network element (which may be referred to as a DDNMF1 network element) corresponding to the UE1, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • a DDNMF network element which may be referred to as a DDNMF1 network element
  • the UE1 receives the MIC3 from the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the DDNMF1 network element The user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and the user plane security capability (optional) of the UE1 in the PC5 connection required to generate the MIC3 are sent by the UE1 to the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the UE1 determines that the security protection method used by the control plane of the final PC5 connection includes turning on confidentiality protection, then all parameters or part of the parameters transmitted in the completion message of the direct connection security mode also need to be processed.
  • Confidentiality protection the specific protection method can refer to the prior art, which is not repeated here.
  • UE2 determines a security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 according to the user plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the user plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection.
  • the specific implementation of step S408 may refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • the security protection method used in the user plane connected to the PC5 reference may be made to the preamble part of the specific implementation manner, which will not be repeated here.
  • UE2 if the security algorithm used by the control plane connected by PC5 is different from the security algorithm used by the user plane connected by PC5, UE2 also needs to compare the security capabilities of UE1 in the user plane connected to PC5 with that of UE2 in PC5.
  • the user plane security capability in the connection determines the security algorithm used by the user plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the security algorithm used on the user plane of the PC5 connection includes one or more confidentiality protection algorithms and one or more integrity protection algorithms. For the principle followed by the selection of the security algorithm, reference may be made to step S404, which will not be repeated here.
  • UE2 sends a direct communication accept (direct communication accept) message to UE1.
  • UE1 receives the direct connection communication accept message from UE2.
  • the direct connection communication acceptance message includes the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5.
  • the direct connection communication acceptance message may further include the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and the user plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection (optional).
  • UE1 needs to determine that the security protection method used by the control plane of the final PC5 connection includes that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on, UE1 needs to determine that the direct connection communication accept message contains Whether the user plane security policy in the included PC5 connection is the user plane security policy in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, whether the security capability in the PC5 connection is the security capability in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, if the verification is passed, you can continue to execute the follow-up process, otherwise terminate the current process. This prevents downgrade attacks.
  • the direct connection communication acceptance message also includes the security algorithm used by the user plane connected by the PC5.
  • the embodiment of the present application may use the PC5 connection selected by the UE2.
  • the security algorithm used in the control plane of the Receiver performs integrity protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication acceptance message. For the specific integrity protection method, reference may be made to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • the direct connection communication accept message in step S409 also includes MIC4.
  • the MIC4 is a generated parameter that uses the integrity protection key of the UE2 to perform integrity protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication accept message.
  • some parameters for integrity protection using the integrity protection key of UE2 may include, for example, a security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection, and a security algorithm (optional) used by the user plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security level of the security protection method used on the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 is lower than the security level of the first security protection method (for example, the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 includes complete In the case where the security protection is not enabled, and the first security protection method includes the integrity protection being enabled), since this scheme can use the integrity protection key of UE2 to perform integrity protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication acceptance message , so it can be ensured that the information in the direct connection communication acceptance message can be trusted by UE1. Further, after UE1 receives the direct connection communication acceptance message from UE2, it also needs to verify MIC4.
  • the manner in which the UE1 verifies the MIC4 is similar to the manner in which the UE2 verifies the MIC1, and details are not repeated here. If the MIC4 verification is successful, it can be shown that the direct connection communication accepts all or part of the parameters passed in the message is completely protected and has not been attacked by external attackers, and then the subsequent process can be continued.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • UE1 and UE2 can use the first security protection method to establish a PC5
  • the message in the process is integrity protected, so it can avoid the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the message in the PC5 establishment process, and improve the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • the actions of UE1 or UE2 in the above steps S401 to S409 may be performed by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 by calling the application code stored in the memory 303 to instruct the UE1 or UE2 to execute. No restrictions apply.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a communication method, which uses the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process to establish a PC5 between UE1 and UE2 One or more messages in the process are secured.
  • the security protection method of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 is determined according to the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process (for convenience, the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 will be referred to as the PC5 connection in the future)
  • the security of the control plane used Protection method The security protection method used on the user plane connected to PC5.
  • the communication method provided by this embodiment of the present application includes the following steps:
  • UE1 sends a direct communication request (direct communication request) to UE2.
  • UE2 receives the direct connection communication request from UE1.
  • the direct connection communication request includes the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the direct connection communication request may also include part or all of the discovery parameters of the UE1.
  • the discovery parameters of the UE1 For details, reference may be made to the existing 3GPP TS23.303, v15.1.0 standard, which will not be repeated here.
  • the first security protection method may be used to perform security protection on the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the first security protection method is the security protection method acquired in the ProSe discovery process between UE1 and UE2.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the manner of determining the security protection method in the ProSe discovery process. In a possible implementation manner, for the manner of determining the security protection method in the ProSe discovery process, reference may be made to the subsequent embodiment shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the direct connection communication request may further include the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection can be used to subsequently determine the PC5 between UE1 and UE2.
  • the security method used by the connected control plane may be protected by the first security protection method.
  • the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection can be protected by the first security protection method.
  • the direct connection communication request may further include the MIC1.
  • the MIC1 For the related description of the MIC1, reference may be made to the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 , and details are not repeated here.
  • UE2 can verify MIC1, and the verification method of MIC1 can refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, and details are not repeated here. If the verification of MIC1 is successful, it can be shown that all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication request in step S501 are completely protected and have not been attacked by external attackers, and then the following step S502 can be continued.
  • UE2 determines the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5 according to the first security protection method; The security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE2.
  • the UE2 may directly determine the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, that is, the UE2 directly activates the control plane security of the PC5 connection according to the first security protection method.
  • the first security protection method is that the confidentiality protection is enabled
  • the UE2 determines to activate the control plane confidentiality protection
  • the first security protection method is that the confidentiality protection is not enabled
  • the UE2 determines not to activate the control plane confidentiality protection
  • the first security protection method is that the integrity protection is enabled
  • the UE2 determines to activate the control plane control integrity protection
  • the first security protection method is that the integrity protection is not enabled, the UE2 determines not to activate the control plane integrity protection.
  • UE2 since UE2 does not need to negotiate the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5 with UE1, but directly determines the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5, it not only simplifies UE2's security protection method processing logic, and can save the signaling overhead of the PC5 establishment process.
  • the UE2 when determining the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, the UE2 also refers to the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the first security protection method satisfies the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by the UE1 in the direct connection communication request (it can also be understood that the first security protection method can be sent by the UE1 in the direct connection communication request to send the UE1 in the PC5
  • UE2 may determine the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, that is, UE2 activates the control plane security of the PC5 connection according to the first security protection method.
  • the first security protection method is that confidentiality protection is not enabled, integrity protection is enabled, and the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection is confidentiality protection optional and integrity protection optional, then UE2 can determine that the PC5 connection is The security protection method used by the control plane is that confidentiality protection is not turned on, and integrity protection is turned on.
  • the first security protection method when the first security protection method satisfies the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, the first security protection method is determined as the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, so not only can the PC5 determined by the UE2 be made
  • the security protection method used by the connected control plane can be supported by UE1, and it is ensured that the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading security.
  • the first security protection method does not satisfy the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request (it can also be understood that the first security protection method cannot be used by UE1 in the direct connection communication request sent by UE1 in PC5
  • UE2 can select a security protection method that satisfies the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request as the security protection used by the control plane of the PC5 connection method, so that UE2 activates the control plane security of the PC5 connection according to the selected security protection method.
  • the first security protection method is that confidentiality protection is not enabled, integrity protection is enabled, and the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection is confidentiality protection enabled, and integrity protection is optional
  • UE2 can determine the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane is: Confidentiality protection is enabled, and integrity protection is enabled.
  • the UE2 may also refuse the joining of the UE1. This embodiment of the present application There is no specific limitation on this.
  • UE2 selects a security policy that satisfies the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection according to the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method is used as the security protection method for the control plane of the PC5 connection, so not only can the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by the UE2 be supported by the UE1, but also ensures that the security level of the first security protection method is The minimum security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • the first security protection method satisfies the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by the UE1 in the direct connection communication request (it can also be understood that the first security protection method can be used by the UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by the UE1 in the direct connection communication request.
  • UE2 may also select a security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method according to the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection so that the UE2 activates the control plane security of the PC5 connection according to the selected security protection method.
  • the first security protection method is that confidentiality protection is not enabled, integrity protection is not enabled, and the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection is that confidentiality protection is optional and integrity protection is optional, then UE2 can determine that PC5
  • the security protection methods used by the connected control plane are: Confidentiality Protection On and Integrity Protection On.
  • UE2 selects a security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method according to the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection it can not only make the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by the UE2 to be used by the UE1, but also ensure that the security level of the first security protection method is established by the PC5.
  • the minimum security level of the PC5 connection in the process so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • UE2 determines the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, it also refers to the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection.
  • the first security protection method can satisfy both the control plane security policy of UE1 in PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request and the control plane of UE2 in PC5 connection saved locally by UE2 or obtained from other network elements
  • the security policy (it can also be understood that the first security protection method can be simultaneously sent by the UE1 in the direct connection communication request to the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and the UE2 locally saved or obtained from other network elements.
  • the UE2 is connected to the PC5
  • UE2 may determine the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane connected by PC5, that is, UE2 activates the control plane security connected by PC5 according to the first security protection method.
  • the first security protection method is that confidentiality protection is not enabled, integrity protection is enabled, and the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection is confidentiality protection optional and integrity protection optional, UE2 is in the PC5 connection.
  • the security policy of the control plane is that confidentiality is not enabled, and integrity protection is optional, UE2 can determine that the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5 is that confidentiality protection is disabled and integrity protection is enabled. Since this solution can satisfy both the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection, the first security protection method is determined as the one used by the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method so not only can make the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by UE2 to be supported by UE1 and UE2 at the same time, but also ensure that the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process. Security level, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading security.
  • the first security protection method does not satisfy the control plane security policy of UE1 in PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request or the control plane security policy of UE2 in PC5 connection saved locally or obtained from other network elements ( It can also be understood that the first security protection method cannot be simultaneously sent by the UE1 in the direct connection communication request.
  • UE2 can select a control plane security policy that satisfies UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request, and satisfies the control plane security policy that UE2 saves locally or obtains from other network elements.
  • the security protection method of the control plane security policy in the PC5 connection is used as the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, so that the UE2 activates the control plane security of the PC5 connection according to the selected security protection method.
  • the first security protection method is that confidentiality protection is not enabled, integrity protection is enabled
  • the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection is confidentiality protection enabled and integrity protection is optional
  • the control of UE2 in the PC5 connection The plane security policy is that confidentiality protection is enabled and integrity protection is optional, then UE2 may determine that the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5 is confidentiality protection enabled and integrity protection enabled.
  • the first security protection method does not satisfy the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by the UE1 in the direct connection communication request, or the UE2 saves locally or obtains from other network elements in the PC5
  • the UE2 may also refuse the joining of the UE1, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application. Since this solution does not satisfy the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection or the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection, the UE2 is based on the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection.
  • the control plane security policy in the connection select a security protection method that satisfies the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and satisfies the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection as the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, so Not only can the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by UE2 be supported by UE1 and UE2 at the same time, but also ensure that the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process. To achieve the purpose of not degrading security.
  • the first security protection method can satisfy both the control plane security policy of UE1 in PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request and the control plane security policy of UE2 in PC5 connection saved locally by UE2 or obtained from other network elements (It can also be understood that the first security protection method can be simultaneously used by the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request and the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection saved locally by UE2 or obtained from other network elements.
  • UE2 can also according to the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection sent by UE1 in the direct connection communication request and the UE2 in the PC5 connection saved locally or obtained from other network elements.
  • the security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method is selected as the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection, so that the UE2 activates the control plane security of the PC5 connection according to the selected security protection method.
  • the first security protection method is to enable confidentiality protection, but not to enable integrity protection
  • the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection is optional for confidentiality protection and optional for integrity protection
  • UE2 in the PC5 connection If the confidentiality protection of the control plane security policy is not enabled, the UE2 may determine that the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 is the confidentiality protection enabled and the integrity protection enabled.
  • the UE2 Since the first security protection method satisfies both the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection, the UE2 is based on the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the control plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method is selected as the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method can be supported by UE1 and UE2 at the same time, and it is ensured that the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading security.
  • the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 determined by the UE2 is not lower than the security level of the first security protection method. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the minimum security level requirement for control plane signaling interaction, so that the purpose of not degrading security can be achieved.
  • UE2 can combine the control plane security capability of UE1 in the PC5 connection with the control plane security capability of UE2 in the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by UE2 determines the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2.
  • the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection includes one or more confidentiality protection algorithms and one or more integrity protection algorithms. For the principle followed by the selection of the security algorithm, reference may be made to step S404, which will not be repeated here.
  • UE2 sends a direct security mode command (direct security mode command) to UE1.
  • UE1 receives the direct connection security mode command from UE2.
  • the direct connection security mode command includes the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2.
  • the direct connection security mode command may further include the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and/or the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • UE1 receives the direct connection security mode command from UE2
  • UE1 determines that the security protection method used by the control plane of the final PC5 connection includes that the control plane integrity protection is disabled
  • UE1 needs to determine that in the direct connection security mode command Whether the control plane security policy in the included PC5 connection is the control plane security policy in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, and whether the security capability in the PC5 connection is the security capability in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, if the verification is passed, you can continue to execute the follow-up process, otherwise terminate the current process. This prevents bidding down attacks.
  • all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode command are secured by adopting the security protection method determined by the UE2 and used by the control plane of the PC5 connection. For example, if UE2 determines the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5, all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode command are secured by the first security protection method.
  • the manner of performing security protection on all or part of the parameters passed in the direct connection security mode command may refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • some parameters for security protection in the direct connection security mode command may include, for example, the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2, the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the control of the UE1 in the PC5 connection. at least one of the surface security capabilities.
  • the UE1 determines the final security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection according to the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2.
  • step S504 For the related description of step S504, reference may be made to step S406 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 , and details are not repeated here.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by UE1 can be used for the protection of messages in the subsequent negotiation of the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2, such as The direct connection security mode in step S505 completes the security protection of the message and the security protection of the direct connection communication acceptance message in step S507.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by the UE1 can also be used for the security protection of the control plane signaling after the PC5 establishment process shown in FIG.
  • UE1 sends a direct security mode complete (direct security mode complete) message to UE2.
  • UE2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE1.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may include the user plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the user plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection can be used to subsequently determine the connection between UE1 and UE2.
  • the security protection method used on the user plane of the PC5 connection For the relevant description of the user plane security policy in the PC5 connection, reference may be made to the preamble part of the specific implementation manner, which will not be repeated here.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may also include the user plane of the UE1 in the PC5 connection. security capabilities.
  • the standard stipulates that the user plane security capability of UE1 in the PC5 connection is the same as the control plane security capability of UE1 in the PC5 connection, or the security capability does not distinguish between the user plane and the control plane, then the The direct connection security mode completion message does not need to carry the user plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the user plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection described below is the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, which is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode completion message are secured by adopting the security protection method determined by the UE1 and used by the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method determined by the UE1 and used by the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • UE2 determines the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5
  • all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode completion message are secured by the first security protection method.
  • the way of performing security protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode completion message may refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • some parameters for security protection in the direct connection security mode completion message may be, for example, at least one of the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection or the user plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the UE2 determines, according to the first security protection method, a security protection method used by the user plane connected to the PC5.
  • the implementation manner of the UE2 determining the security protection method used by the user plane connected to the PC5 according to the first security protection method is the same as the security protection method used by the UE2 to determine the control plane used by the PC5 connection according to the first security protection method in the above step S502
  • the implementation method is similar, the difference is for example: 1. Replace the control plane in step S502 with the user plane in step S506; 2.
  • step S506 the user plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection comes from the direct connection sent by UE1 to UE2
  • step S502 for the safety mode completion message, reference may be made to the above-mentioned step S502 for other related descriptions, which will not be repeated here.
  • the security level of the security protection method used by the user plane connected to the PC5 determined by the UE2 is not lower than the security level of the first security protection method. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the minimum security requirement for data interaction on the user plane, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading security.
  • the security algorithm used by the control plane connected by PC5 is different from the security algorithm used by the user plane connected by PC5, after UE2 determines the security protection method used by the user plane connected by PC5, UE2 also According to the user plane security capabilities of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the user plane security capabilities of UE2 in the PC5 connection, combined with the security protection method used by UE2 to determine the user plane of the PC5 connection, determine the user of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2.
  • the security algorithm used in this aspect is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the security algorithm used on the user plane of the PC5 connection includes one or more confidentiality protection algorithms and one or more integrity protection algorithms. For the principle followed by the selection of the security algorithm, reference may be made to step S404, which will not be repeated here.
  • UE2 sends a direct communication accept (direct communication accept) message to UE1.
  • UE1 receives the direct connection communication accept message from UE2.
  • the direct connection communication acceptance message includes the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5.
  • the direct connection communication acceptance message may further include the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and the user plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection (optional).
  • UE1 needs to determine that the security protection method used by the control plane of the final PC5 connection includes that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on, UE1 needs to determine that the direct connection communication accept message contains Whether the user plane security policy in the included PC5 connection is the user plane security policy in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, whether the security capability in the PC5 connection is the security capability in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, if the verification is passed, you can continue to execute the follow-up process, otherwise terminate the current process. This prevents downgrade attacks.
  • the direct connection communication acceptance message also includes the security algorithm used by the user plane connected by the PC5.
  • all parameters or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication accept message are secured by adopting the security protection method determined by the UE2 and used by the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method determined by the UE2 and used by the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • UE2 determines the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5
  • all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication accept message are protected by the first security protection method.
  • the manner of performing security protection on all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection communication acceptance message may refer to the prior art, which will not be described here.
  • some parameters for security protection in the direct connection communication accept message may include, for example, the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection, the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the user plane security of the UE1 in the PC5 connection. capabilities, or at least one of the security algorithms used by the user plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 and the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 can be determined according to the first security protection method in the PC5 establishment process in the embodiment of the present application
  • the protection method wherein the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 and the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 is not lower than the security level of the first security protection method. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the minimum security level requirement of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so that the purpose of not degrading the security can be achieved.
  • the embodiment of the present application may use the first security protection method to protect the first message in the PC5 establishment process, and when the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection, UE1 and UE2 may use the ProSe discovery process
  • the first security protection method determined in the PC5 establishment process performs integrity protection on the first message, so it can avoid the problem that the security level is reduced due to the attack or tampering of the message in the PC5 establishment process, and improves the PC5 Establish a security level for the process.
  • the actions of UE1 or UE2 in the above steps S501 to S507 may be executed by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 by calling the application code stored in the memory 303 to instruct the UE1 or UE2 to execute. No restrictions apply.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 is described by taking as an example the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 and the security protection method used by the user plane connected to the PC5 according to the first security protection method.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection may also be determined according to the first security protection method, and the users connected to the PC5 are negotiated by means of steps S407-S409 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 .
  • the security protection method used by the user plane connected to the PC5 may also be determined according to the first security protection method, and the method similar to steps S402-S406 in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection is negotiated in the manner of negotiation, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a communication method, which uses the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process to establish a PC5 between UE1 and UE2 One or more messages in the process are secured.
  • the security protection method of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 is determined according to the security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process (for convenience, the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 will be referred to as the PC5 connection in the future)
  • the security of the control plane used Protection method negotiate the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the communication method provided by this embodiment of the present application includes the following steps:
  • UE1 sends a direct communication request (direct communication request) to UE2.
  • UE2 receives the direct connection communication request from UE1.
  • the direct connection communication request includes the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the related descriptions of the user plane security policy in the PC5 connection and the control plane security capability in the PC5 connection can refer to the preamble part of the specific implementation, which will not be repeated here.
  • the direct connection communication request may also include part or all of the discovery parameters of the UE1.
  • the discovery parameters of the UE1 For details, reference may be made to the existing 3GPP TS23.303, v15.1.0 standard, which will not be repeated here.
  • control plane security capability of UE1 in the PC5 connection is the same as the user plane security capability of UE1 in the PC5 connection, or the security capability does not distinguish between the user plane and the control plane, in the embodiment of this application, the PC5
  • the control plane security capability in the connection may also be called the security capability in the PC5 connection, which is described here in a unified manner, and will not be repeated below.
  • the first security protection method may be used to perform security protection on the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection and/or the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the first security protection method is the security protection method acquired in the ProSe discovery process between UE1 and UE2.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the manner of determining the security protection method in the ProSe discovery process. In a possible implementation manner, for the manner of determining the security protection method in the ProSe discovery process, reference may be made to the subsequent embodiment shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the direct connection communication request may further include the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the control plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection can be used to subsequently determine the PC5 between UE1 and UE2.
  • the security method used by the connected control plane may be protected by the first security protection method.
  • the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection can be protected by the first security protection method.
  • the direct connection communication request may also include the user plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the direct connection communication request may further include MIC3.
  • the related description of the MIC3 may refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 , which will not be repeated here.
  • UE2 can verify MIC3, and the verification method of MIC3 can refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, and details are not repeated here. If the verification of the MIC3 is successful, it can be shown that all or part of the parameters passed in the direct connection communication request in step S601 are completely protected and have not been attacked by external attackers, and the following step S602 can be continued.
  • UE2 determines the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5 according to the first security protection method; The security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between UE2.
  • step S602 For the related description of step S602, reference may be made to step S502 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, and details are not repeated here.
  • UE2 determines a security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection between UE1 and UE2 according to the user plane security policy of UE1 in the PC5 connection and the user plane security policy of UE2 in the PC5 connection.
  • step S603 For the related description of step S603, reference may be made to step S408 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, and details are not repeated here.
  • UE2 sends a direct security mode command (direct security mode command) to UE1.
  • UE1 receives the direct connection security mode command from UE2.
  • the direct connection security mode command includes the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 and the security algorithm selected by the UE2 and used by the control plane connected by the PC5.
  • the direct connection security mode command may also include the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection (optional), and the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • the user plane security capability (optional) and the control plane security policy (optional) of UE1 in the PC5 connection may also include the user plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection (optional), and the UE1 in the PC5 connection.
  • UE1 After UE1 receives the direct connection security mode command from UE2, when UE1 determines that the security protection method used by the control plane of the final PC5 connection includes that the control plane integrity protection is disabled, UE1 needs to determine that in the direct connection security mode command Whether the user plane security policy in the included PC5 connection is the user plane security policy in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, whether the control plane security capability in the PC5 connection is the control plane security capability in the PC5 connection sent by yourself, the Whether the user plane security capability is the user plane security capability in the PC5 connection sent by itself, and whether the control plane security policy in the PC5 connection is the control plane security policy in the PC5 connection sent by itself. If the verification is passed, the subsequent process can be continued, otherwise the current process is terminated. This prevents degradation attacks.
  • the direct connection security mode command further includes the security algorithm used by the user plane connected by the PC5.
  • all or part of the parameters transmitted in the direct connection security mode command are secured by adopting the security protection method determined by the UE2 and used by the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method determined by the UE2 determines the first security protection method as the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5
  • all or part of the parameters passed in the direct connection security mode command are the first security protection method determined in the ProSe discovery process. for security protection.
  • the method of performing security protection on all or part of the parameters passed in the direct connection security mode command may refer to the prior art, which will not be repeated here.
  • some parameters for security protection in the direct connection security mode command may include, for example, the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2, the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection, the user of the UE1 in the PC5 connection. At least one of the plane security policy, the user plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, the control plane security capability of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, the control plane security policy of the UE1 in the PC5 connection, and the security algorithm used by the user plane of the PC5 connection kind.
  • the UE1 determines the final security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection according to the security algorithm used by the control plane of the PC5 connection selected by the UE2.
  • step S605 For the related description of step S605, reference may be made to step S406 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 , which will not be repeated here.
  • both UE1 and UE2 can learn the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 and the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection determined by the UE1 can be used for the security protection of the control plane signaling after the PC5 establishment process shown in FIG. 6 . No longer.
  • the direct connection communication request in step S601 in the embodiment of the present application may also be replaced with a direct connection safe mode completion message
  • the direct connection safe mode command in step S604 may also be replaced with a direct connection communication accept message. That is, the negotiation of the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection is performed through the message of the negotiation process of the security protection method used by the user plane of the existing PC5 connection, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 can be determined according to the first security protection method, wherein the control plane connected by the PC5 uses the The security level of the first security protection method is not lower than the security level of the first security protection method. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the minimum security level requirement for control plane signaling interaction, so that the purpose of not degrading security can be achieved.
  • the embodiment of the present application may use the first security protection method to protect the first message in the PC5 establishment process, and when the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection, UE1 and UE2 may use the first security protection method.
  • the protection method performs integrity protection on the first message in the PC5 establishment process, so it can avoid the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the messages in the PC5 establishment process, and improve the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 is carried out by taking as an example the security protection method used by the control plane connected by the PC5 connection according to the first security protection method in the PC5 establishment process, and the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the negotiation of the PC5 connection. illustrate.
  • the embodiment of the present application may further provide a communication method, which uses the first security protection method to perform security protection on one or more messages in the PC5 establishment process.
  • the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 is determined according to the first security protection method, and the security protection method used by the control plane connected by the PC5 is negotiated.
  • FIG. 6 For the specific implementation of the method, reference may be made to the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 , which will not be repeated here.
  • the actions of UE1 or UE2 in the above steps S601 to S605 may be performed by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 by calling the application code stored in the memory 303 to instruct the UE1 or UE2 to execute. No restrictions apply.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 or FIG. 6 is described by taking as an example the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 and/or the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 according to the first security protection method.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection and/or the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection can also be obtained in the ProSe discovery process, so that the PC5 establishment process does not need to negotiate the control plane of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method used does not need to negotiate the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection, so that the signaling overhead of the PC5 establishment process can be saved.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection obtained in the ProSe discovery process includes that the control plane integrity protection is turned on, since the integrity protection can be performed on all messages in the PC5 establishment process, the PC5 establishment process can be avoided.
  • the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the messages in the PC5 improves the security level of the PC5 establishment process.
  • An embodiment of the present application further provides a communication method, and the communication method is used to obtain the first security protection method in any of the embodiments in FIG. 4 to FIG. 6 .
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected by the PC5 and/or the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 can also be obtained.
  • the communication method includes the following steps:
  • the terminal device 1 sends a discovery request (discovery request) to the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the DDNMF1 network element receives the discovery request from the terminal device 1 .
  • the discovery request includes the 3GPP identity information of the terminal device 1, the identity information used for the ProSe service, the discovery mode (discovery mode), the discovery command (discovery command), the discovery type (discovery type) and the application ID (application ID) in one or more of.
  • discovery mode discovery mode
  • discovery command discovery command
  • discovery type discovery type
  • application ID application ID
  • the terminal device 1 in the embodiment of the present application may be the announcing UE (announcing UE) in the model A discovery mode, and the following terminal device 2 may be the monitoring UE (monitoring UE) in the model A discovery mode.
  • the terminal equipment 1 in the embodiment of the present application can be the discoverer UE (discoveree UE) under the model B discovery mode, and the following terminal equipment 2 can be the discoverer UE (discoverer UE) under the model B discovery mode , which is described here uniformly, and will not be repeated below.
  • the terminal device 1 may send a discovery request to the DDNMF1 network element through a non-access stratum (non access stratum, NAS) message of the control plane, that is, at this time, the discovery request itself is a The NAS message, or a parameter carried by the NAS message to realize the function of the discovery request; in another possible implementation, the terminal device 1 can send it to the DDNMF1 network element through the user, that is, at this time, the discovery request is carried by the Internet Protocol. (internet protocol, IP) or non-IP bearer, the embodiment of this application does not specifically limit the sending method of the discovery request.
  • IP Internet protocol
  • IP bearer the embodiment of this application does not specifically limit the sending method of the discovery request.
  • the 3GPP identity information of the terminal device 1 may be, for example, a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI), a 5G-global unique temporary identifier (GUTI), a general public user identity One of the generic public subscription identifier (GPSI) and the permanent equipment identifier (PEI).
  • SUCI subscription concealed identifier
  • GUI 5G-global unique temporary identifier
  • GPSI generic public subscription identifier
  • PEI permanent equipment identifier
  • the application identifier in this embodiment of the present application is used to represent a specific application.
  • the application identifier may be preconfigured on the terminal device 1 .
  • the DDNMF1 network element may determine the corresponding identity information for the ProSe service according to the application identifier.
  • the discovery type corresponding to an application ID is fixed, that is, an application ID corresponds to a discovery type (such as open discovery or restricted discovery)
  • the discovery type can correspond to the user identity of the ProSe service (such as ProSe application ID is used for open discovery scenarios; PDUID or RPAUID is used for restricted discovery scenarios)
  • the corresponding identity information for ProSe services can be indirectly determined according to the application ID.
  • the discovery request in this embodiment of the present application may further include a service type (service type).
  • service type is the next finer granularity of the application identifier, that is, an application identifier can correspond to different service types.
  • the service type is used to assist the application identifier to determine the corresponding identity information for the ProSe service. That is to say, in this embodiment of the present application, the DDNMF1 network element can determine the corresponding identity information for the ProSe service according to the application identifier and the service type.
  • the service type in this embodiment of the present application may be used to represent specific business requirements under the application identified by the application identifier.
  • the service type is used to represent a charged service or a free service under an application.
  • the embodiments of the present application can improve the flexibility of application usage by introducing a service type.
  • the content of the service type in this embodiment of the present application may have different storage or transmission methods according to different information represented.
  • 0 or 1 is used to represent whether the service is charged or free, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the service type in the embodiment of the present application may be configured on the terminal device 1 when the application identified by the application identifier is installed, or may be sent to the terminal device 1 by the network side, which is not the case in the embodiment of the present application. Make specific restrictions.
  • the discovery request when the discovery request is transmitted between the terminal device 1 and the DDNMF1 network element, it may be forwarded and processed by other network elements. That is to say, when the discovery request is transmitted between the terminal device 1 and the DDNMF1 network element, the content of the message can be appropriately modified.
  • the embodiment of this application only describes the message from the functional aspect, which is described here uniformly, and will not be described below. Repeat. For example, in the process of sending a discovery request to the DDNMF1 network element through the control of the terminal device 1, the 3GPP identity information of the terminal device 1 needs to be "translated" by the AMF network element or other network elements and converted into the permanent subscription identifier (subscription) of the terminal device 1.
  • the 3GPP identity information of the terminal device 1 may be converted into the SUPI of the terminal device 1 through "translation" by the NEF network element or other network elements.
  • the DDNMF1 network element can also obtain the SUPI of the terminal device 1 through interaction with the UDM network element (or other network elements).
  • the DDNMF1 network element sends a UE ID request (UE ID request) message to the UDM network element, where the UE ID request message includes the 3GPP identity information (such as GPSI or PEI) of the terminal device 1.
  • the UDM network element receives the UE ID request message from the DDNMF1 network element, and after determining the SUPI of the terminal device 1 according to the 3GPP identity information of the terminal device 1, sends the SUPI of the terminal device 1 to the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the DDNMF1 network element performs ProSe service discovery authorization check on the terminal device 1 according to the identity information and application identifier used for the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF1 network element may determine the corresponding proximity service application server (ProSe app server) according to the application identifier, and notify the DDNMF1 network element after the ProSe app server completes the authorization check.
  • ProSe app server authorization check is used to verify whether the terminal device 1 can legally use the ProSe service, which is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the DDNMF1 network element shall, according to each identity information used for the ProSe service, identify the terminal device respectively. 1. Perform the ProSe service discovery authorization check.
  • the above multiple authorizations can be performed in separate processes or in a unified process, which are described here in a unified manner, and will not be repeated below.
  • the DDNMF1 network element acquires the corresponding discovery parameters and security information when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF1 network element can obtain the corresponding discovery parameters and security information when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service according to the 3GPP identity information of the terminal device 1 and the identity information used for the ProSe service.
  • the manner in which the DDNMF network element obtains the corresponding discovery parameters and security information when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service includes: both the discovery parameters and the security information are obtained locally from the DDNMF1 network element; or, part of the discovery parameters and security information are obtained from the DDNMF1 Obtained locally by the network element, and some content is obtained from the authentication request (authentication request) returned by the ProSe app server in the ProSe service discovery authorization check process; or, the discovery parameters and security information are both returned from the ProSe app server in the ProSe service discovery authorization check process. It is obtained from the authentication response, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the discovery parameters of the terminal device 1 may be, for example, as shown in Table 1:
  • Code-Send-SecParams contains the discovery parameters used to protect Prose Restricted Code in the discovery process on the PC5 interface; in Model B mode,
  • Code-Send-SecParams is used to protect the discovery parameters used by the ProSe Response Code in the discovery process on the PC5 interface.
  • the discovery parameters used by the code For the description of the parameters found in Table 1, reference may be made to the existing 3GPP TS 23.303, v15.1.0 and 3GPP TS 33.303, v15.0.0 standards, which will not be repeated here.
  • the discovery parameters of the terminal device 1 may be, for example, as shown in Table 2:
  • the Discovery Key contains the discovery parameters used to protect the ProSe Application Code in the discovery process, that is, the above discovery parameters are used to protect the Code used for ProSe discovery on the PC5 interface.
  • the parameters found in Table 2 reference may be made to the existing 3GPP TS 23.303, v15.1.0 and 3GPP TS 33.303, v15.0.0 standards, which will not be repeated here.
  • the corresponding security information when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service includes a security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service, or a plurality of available security information corresponding to when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the chosen security method is a security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service is a fixed security protection method.
  • this security protection method can be used to perform security protection on the subsequent first PC5 broadcast message; and/or, this security protection method can be used to perform security protection on one or more messages in the PC5 setup process; and /or, the security protection method may be used to determine the security protection method of the PC5 connection between the terminal device 1 and the terminal device 2 .
  • the security protection method of PC5 connection is used to secure some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of PC5 connection; and/or, the security protection method of PC5 connection is used to protect part or all of the user plane of PC5 connection. Data is secured.
  • the security protection method is used to perform security protection on one or more messages in the PC5 establishment process; and/or the security protection method is used to determine the security of the PC5 connection between the terminal device 1 and the terminal device 2.
  • the protection method reference may be made to any of the embodiments shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 6 , and details are not described herein again.
  • the related description of the first PC5 broadcast message reference may be made to the preamble part of the specific implementation manner, which will not be repeated here.
  • the security protection methods required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service may be multiple security protection methods.
  • a security protection method is the security protection method used by the first PC5 broadcast message
  • a security protection method is the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5
  • a security protection method is the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 .
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message, the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5, and the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 may be the same or different, and this embodiment of the present application does not make any difference. Specific restrictions.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service may include, for example, any one of the following: confidentiality protection is enabled + integrity protection is enabled, confidentiality protection is enabled + integrity protection is disabled. , confidentiality protection off + integrity protection on, or, confidentiality protection off + integrity protection off.
  • confidentiality protection method to be used can at least be used for security protection of the first subsequent PC5 broadcast message.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service may include, for example:
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message is: confidentiality protection off + integrity protection on; the security protection method used by the control plane connected to PC5 is: confidentiality protection on + integrity protection on; The security protection method used on the connected user plane is: Confidentiality Protection On + Integrity Protection On.
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message, the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5, and the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 are all different.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service may include, for example:
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message and the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection are: confidentiality protection is not turned on + integrity protection is turned on; the security protection method used by the user plane of the PC5 connection is: confidentiality Protection On + Integrity Protection On.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service may include, for example:
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message is: confidentiality protection off + integrity protection on; and, the security protection method used on the control plane of the PC5 connection is: confidentiality protection on + integrity protection on.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service may include, for example:
  • the security protection method used in the first PC5 broadcast message is: confidentiality protection off + integrity protection on; and, the security protection method used on the user plane of the PC5 connection is: confidentiality protection on + integrity protection on.
  • the multiple alternative security protection methods may be, for example, the security protection methods corresponding to the security policies recommended by the ProSe app server. Further, multiple alternative security protection methods can be prioritized.
  • multiple alternative security protection methods with priority may include, for example: confidentiality protection not enabled + integrity protection enabled > confidentiality protection enabled + integrity protection enabled > confidentiality protection disabled + integrity Sexual protection is not turned on.
  • confidentiality protection not enabled + integrity protection enabled > confidentiality protection enabled + integrity protection enabled > confidentiality protection disabled + integrity Sexual protection is not turned on.
  • the ">” here can be understood as “the security level is higher than”, which is described in a unified manner here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the security information in the embodiment of the present application may also be associated with the code used for ProSe discovery in Table 1 or Table 2, that is, the codes used for different ProSe discovery may correspond to different security information, or the same code may be used. security information, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the security information in the embodiment of the present application may be included in the discovery parameter, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • step S704 when the security information corresponding to the terminal device 1 using the ProSe service in the embodiment of the present application includes multiple alternative security protection methods corresponding to the terminal device 1 using the ProSe service, the following step S704 needs to be continued. Step S705 is then executed; when the corresponding security information when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service in the embodiment of the present application includes the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service, then step S705 is directly executed without performing the steps S704.
  • the DDNMF1 network element determines the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service according to multiple optional security protection methods.
  • the DDNMF1 network element may select from multiple options according to parameters such as the state of the device 1 of the terminal, the type of the terminal device 1, and the quality of service (quality of service, QoS) requirements of the current service. Select the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF1 network element may determine the security protection method with the lowest security level as the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service. Or, for example, if it is a highly reliable service, the DDNMF1 network element may determine the security protection method with the highest security level as the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF1 network element may also directly determine the security protection method with the highest security level among the multiple optional security protection methods as the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the embodiment does not specifically limit this.
  • the DDNMF1 network element sends a discovery response (discovery response) to the terminal device 1.
  • the terminal device 1 receives the discovery response from the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the discovery response includes the corresponding discovery parameters and the required security protection method when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service may be included in the discovery parameter, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the terminal device 1 can acquire the corresponding discovery parameters and the required security protection method when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service.
  • the terminal device 2 sends a discovery request to the DDNMF2 network element.
  • the DDNMF2 network element receives the discovery request from the terminal device 2.
  • the DDNMF2 network element performs ProSe service discovery authorization check on the terminal device 2 according to the identity information and application identifier used for the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF2 network element acquires the corresponding discovery parameters and security information when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service.
  • step S709 needs to be continued.
  • Step S710 is then executed; when the corresponding security information when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service in the embodiment of the present application includes the security protection method required when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service, then step S710 is directly executed without performing the steps S709.
  • the DDNMF2 network element determines the security protection method required when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service according to multiple optional security protection methods.
  • the DDNMF2 network element sends a discovery response to the terminal device 2 .
  • the terminal device 2 receives the discovery response from the DDNMF2 network element.
  • the discovery response includes the corresponding discovery parameters and the required security protection method when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service.
  • the discovery parameters of the terminal device 2 may be, for example, as shown in Table 3:
  • Code-Rcv-SecParams contains the discovery parameters used to protect Prose Restricted Code in the discovery process on the PC5 interface
  • Code-Send-SecParams contains the discovery parameters used in the PC5 interface
  • the above discovery process protects the discovery parameters used by the ProSe Query Code.
  • Code-Rcv-SecParams contains the discovery parameters used to obtain the code used for ProSe discovery sent by the peer in the discovery process on the PC5 interface. That is, the above discovery parameters are used to protect the Code used for ProSe discovery on the PC5 interface.
  • Table 3GPP TS 23.303, v15.1.0 and 3GPP TS 33.303, v15.0.0 standards which will not be repeated here.
  • the discovery parameters of the terminal device 2 may be, for example, as shown in Table 4:
  • Model A ProSe found the code used ProSe Application Code Discovery time limit parameter CURRENT_TIME, MAX_OFFSET
  • the terminal device 2 does not need the corresponding discovery key, and the decryption relies on the match report process. That is to say, there is no corresponding discovery parameter in the terminal device 2 at this time.
  • the terminal device 2 does not need the corresponding discovery key, and the decryption relies on the match report process. That is to say, there is no corresponding discovery parameter in the terminal device 2 at this time.
  • steps S706-S710 can refer to the above steps S701-S705, the difference is, for example: the terminal device 1 in the steps S701-S705 is replaced with the terminal device 2 in the steps S706-S710;
  • the DDNMF1 network element in step S706-S710 is replaced with the DDNMF2 network element in steps S706-S710, and other related descriptions can refer to the above-mentioned steps S701-S705, which will not be repeated here.
  • the terminal device 2 can obtain the corresponding discovery parameters and the required security protection method when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service.
  • steps S706-S710 are described by taking the DDNMF2 network element itself as an example to determine the security protection method required for using the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF2 network element may further determine the security protection method required when using the ProSe service through negotiation with the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the DDNMF2 network element obtains the required security protection method when the terminal equipment 1 uses the ProSe service from the DDNMF1 network element;
  • the optional security protection method and the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service determines the security protection method required when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF2 network element determines whether the multiple optional security protection methods corresponding to the terminal device 2 using the ProSe service include the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service; when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service
  • the DDNMF2 network element determines the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service as the terminal device.
  • the security protection method required when the device 2 uses the ProSe service For another example, when terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service, the corresponding multiple alternative security protection methods do not include the security protection method required when terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service, the DDNMF2 network element uses ProSe from terminal device 2.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service is determined from the multiple optional security protection methods corresponding to the service.
  • the multiple optional security protection methods include integrity protection on + confidentiality protection off, integrity protection on + confidentiality protection on, that is, as long as Integrity protection is enabled, and confidentiality protection can be enabled or disabled.
  • the DDNMF2 network element can determine that the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service is the security protection method required when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF2 network element obtains from the DDNMF1 network element the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service; further, the DDNMF2 network element determines that the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service. After the security protection method, it can be further determined whether the security protection method required when the terminal equipment 1 uses the ProSe service is the same as the security protection method required when the terminal equipment 2 uses the ProSe service, if the same, the DDNMF network element can continue to perform Step S710; if not the same, the DDNMF2 network element can determine the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service as the security protection method required when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service, and in step S710
  • the security protection method required when using the ProSe service with the terminal device 2 is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the DDNMF2 network element obtains the security protection required by the terminal device 1 to use the ProSe service from the DDNMF1 network element. After the method, if the required security protection method when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service includes a plurality of security protection methods corresponding to the codes used by ProSe discovery, then the DDNMF2 network element determines that the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service.
  • the DDNMF2 network element may further perform step S710, and carry the security protection method corresponding to the code used by the ProSe discovery in step S710, which is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the DDNMF2 network element obtains from the DDNMF1 network element the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service, which may include: the DDNMF2 network element sends a request message to the DDNMF1 network element, and the request message uses The security protection method required when requesting the terminal device 1 to use the ProSe service.
  • the request message includes the identity information for the ProSe service sent by the terminal device 2, or the information that can be associated with the identity information for the ProSe service sent by the terminal device 1, or the information that can be associated with the target application.
  • the DDNMF2 network element receives the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service from the DDNMF1 network element.
  • the DDNMF2 network element may use the prior art to determine whether to obtain the security protection method required by the terminal device 1 using the ProSe service from the DDNMF1 network element, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the embodiments of this application are described by taking the identity information sent by the terminal device 1 for the ProSe service as the same as the identity information sent by the terminal device 2 and used for the ProSe service. .
  • the identity information for the ProSe service sent by the terminal device 1 and the identity information for the ProSe service sent by the terminal device 2 may also be different.
  • the DDNMF1 network element/DDNMF2 network element can determine the security protection method to be used according to the identity information for the ProSe service sent by the terminal device 2 and the identity information for the ProSe service sent by the terminal device 1.
  • the DDNMF1 network element/DDNMF2 network element may associate the identity information sent by the terminal device 2 for the ProSe service and the identity information sent by the terminal device 1 for the ProSe service.
  • the association may be performed through an application ID, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application further includes the following discovery broadcast process.
  • the communication method provided by this embodiment of the present application may further include the following steps S711-S712:
  • the terminal device 1 sends an broadcasting (announcing) message to the terminal device 2 .
  • the terminal device 2 receives the broadcast message from the terminal device 1 .
  • the broadcast message is secured by using the security protection method required when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service obtained in step S705.
  • the broadcast message may include a security protection method for security protection of the broadcast message, so that the terminal device 2 using this security protection method can receive the broadcast message.
  • the security protection method for security protection of the broadcast message may be implicitly carried in the broadcast message, or may be explicitly carried in the broadcast message, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the hermit way such as different ProSe discovers that the codes used represent different security protection methods. That is, the DDNMF1 network element can send multiple codes used in ProSe discovery to the announcing UE, and different codes used in ProSe discovery correspond to different security protection methods. Further, after the terminal device 2 receives the broadcast message, it can determine the corresponding security protection method according to the code used by the ProSe discovery.
  • the broadcast message carries security indication information, where the security indication information is used to indicate the security protection method used by the broadcast message.
  • the security indication information is 2 bits, 0 means security is not enabled, and 1 means security is enabled.
  • 00 means confidentiality protection is not turned on and integrity protection is not turned on
  • 10 means confidentiality protection is turned on, but integrity protection is not turned on
  • 01 means confidentiality protection is not turned on, but integrity protection is not turned on
  • 11 means confidentiality protection Not turned on and integrity protection not turned on.
  • the terminal device 2 may determine a corresponding security protection method according to the security indication information.
  • the terminal device 2 verifies the broadcast message.
  • step S712 reference may be made to existing implementations, and details are not described herein again.
  • the security protection method required by the terminal device 2 when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service and sent by the DDNMF2 network element received by the terminal device 2 is: confidentiality protection is enabled + integrity protection is not enabled, but the broadcast received by the terminal device 2.
  • the security protection method used by the broadcast message indicated by the message is: confidentiality protection on + integrity protection on, then even if the terminal device 2 and the terminal device 1 are interested in the same application, the subsequent PC5 connection cannot be established. In other words, the PC5 connection cannot be established between the terminal device 1 and the terminal device 2 simply because the security requirements do not match.
  • the security protection method used by the broadcast message indicated by the broadcast message received by the terminal device 2 is: confidentiality protection enabled + integrity protection enabled, the terminal device 2 received the DDNMF2 network element sent by the terminal device 2.
  • the security protection method required when using the ProSe service includes: the confidentiality protection is turned on + the integrity protection is turned on, then the terminal device 2 can determine to establish a PC5 connection for the application of the terminal device 1 .
  • the communication method provided by this embodiment of the present application may further include the following steps S713-S716:
  • the terminal device 2 sends a request code (Send Query Code) message to the terminal device 1.
  • the terminal device 1 receives the send request code message from the terminal device 2 .
  • the request code message is secured by using the security protection method required when the terminal device 2 uses the ProSe service obtained in step S710.
  • the request code message may include a security protection method for security protection of the request code message, so that the terminal device 1 using this security protection method can receive the request code message.
  • the security protection method for performing security protection on the request code message may be implicitly carried in the request code message, or may be explicitly carried in the request code message, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the hermit way such as different ProSe discovers that the codes used represent different security protection methods. That is, the DDNMF2 network element can send multiple codes used for ProSe discovery to the discoverer UE, and different codes used in ProSe discovery correspond to different security protection methods. Further, after receiving the request code message, the terminal device 1 can determine the corresponding security protection method according to the code used by the ProSe discovery.
  • the request code message carries security indication information, where the security indication information is used to indicate the security protection method used by the request code message.
  • the security indication information is 2 bits, 0 means security is not enabled, and 1 means security is enabled.
  • 00 means confidentiality protection is not turned on and integrity protection is not turned on
  • 10 means confidentiality protection is turned on, but integrity protection is not turned on
  • 01 means confidentiality protection is not turned on, but integrity protection is not turned on
  • 11 means confidentiality protection Not turned on and integrity protection not turned on.
  • the terminal device 1 may determine a corresponding security protection method according to the security indication information.
  • the terminal device 1 verifies and sends the request code message.
  • step S417 reference may be made to existing implementations, and details are not described herein again.
  • the security protection method required by the terminal device 1 when the terminal device 1 uses the ProSe service and sent by the DDNMF1 network element received by the terminal device 1 is: confidentiality protection is enabled + integrity protection is not enabled, but the request received by the terminal device 1.
  • the security protection method used by the request code message indicated by the code message is: confidentiality protection enabled + integrity protection enabled, then even if terminal device 2 and terminal device 1 are interested in the same application, subsequent PC5 connections cannot be established. In other words, the PC5 connection cannot be established between the terminal device 1 and the terminal device 2 simply because the security requirements do not match.
  • step S715 may be further performed.
  • the terminal device 1 sends a response code (Send response Code) message to the terminal device 2.
  • the terminal device 2 receives the send response code message from the terminal device 1 .
  • the terminal device 2 verifies and sends the response code message.
  • a process of finding a match report may also be included.
  • match report For details, please refer to the existing 3GPP TS 23.303, v15.1.0 and 3GPP TS 33.303. , the v15.0.0 standard, and will not be repeated here.
  • the security protection method required when the terminal device uses the ProSe service can be acquired in the ProSe discovery process.
  • the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 and/or the security protection method used by the user plane connected by the PC5 can also be obtained through the communication method.
  • the actions of the DDNMF1 network element, the DDNMF2 network element, the terminal device 1 or the terminal device 2 in the above steps S701 to S716 can be performed by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 calling the application code stored in the memory 303 to The DDNMF1 network element, the DDNMF2 network element, the terminal device 1 or the terminal device 2 are instructed to execute, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the PC5 establishment process shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 6 in the embodiment of the present application may use the security protection method required when the terminal device uses the ProSe service obtained by the embodiment shown in FIG. 7, that is, FIGS. 4 to 7 .
  • the first security protection method in the PC5 establishment process shown in FIG. 6 may be the security protection method acquired by the terminal device 1 or the terminal device 2 when using the ProSe service in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the PC5 establishment process shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 6 in the embodiment of the present application may use the security protection method obtained in the ProSe discovery process in other ways, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the security protection method shown in FIG. 7 if the security protection method required for using the ProSe service obtained by the terminal device 1 and the terminal device 2 shown in FIG. 7 includes enabling integrity protection, the security protection method shown in FIG.
  • the first PC5 broadcast message in the embodiment carries the parameters of the direct connection communication request transmission in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 or FIG. 5 or FIG. Step S402 in FIG. 4 , step S501 in FIG. 5 or step S601 in FIG. 6 ), so that signaling overhead can be further saved, which are described in a unified manner here, and will not be repeated below.
  • a communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application includes the following steps:
  • the first terminal device acquires a first security protection method, where the first security protection method is a security protection method determined in a discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • step S801 may refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 , which will not be repeated here.
  • first terminal device in the embodiment of the present application may be the terminal device 1 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7
  • second terminal device may be the terminal device 2 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7
  • first terminal device in the embodiment of the present application may be the terminal device 2 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7
  • second terminal device may be the terminal device 1 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the following description will not be repeated.
  • the first terminal device determines a second security protection method according to the first security protection method, where the second security protection method is a security protection method for the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • step S802 may refer to step S502 and step S506 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 ; or, the specific implementation of step S802 may refer to step S602 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 , which will not be repeated here. .
  • the first terminal device may be UE2 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 or FIG. 6
  • the second terminal device may be UE1 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 or FIG. 6 . , which is described here uniformly, and will not be repeated below.
  • the security level of the determined second security protection method can be made not lower than that of the first security protection method grade. That is to say, the security level of the first security protection method is the lowest security level of the PC5 connection in the PC5 establishment process, so as to achieve the purpose of not degrading the security.
  • the actions of the first terminal device in the above steps S801 to S802 may be performed by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 calling the application code stored in the memory 303 to instruct the first terminal device to execute. There are no restrictions on this.
  • a communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application includes the following steps:
  • the first terminal device acquires a first security protection method, where the first security protection method is a security protection method determined in a discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • step S801 may refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 , which will not be repeated here.
  • first terminal device in the embodiment of the present application may be the terminal device 1 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7
  • second terminal device may be the terminal device 2 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7
  • first terminal device in the embodiment of the present application may be the terminal device 2 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7
  • second terminal device may be the terminal device 1 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the following description will not be repeated.
  • the first terminal device uses the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the process of establishing the PC5 between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, and sends at least one message after security protection to the second terminal device information.
  • step S902 may refer to step S402, step S405, step S407 and step S409 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4; or, the specific implementation of step S902 may refer to step S501 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 , step S503 , step S505 and step S507 ; or, for the specific implementation of step S902 , reference may be made to step S601 and step S604 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 , which will not be repeated here.
  • the first terminal device may be UE2 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 or FIG. 5 or FIG. 6
  • the second terminal device may be shown in FIG. 4 or FIG. 5 or FIG. 6
  • the first terminal device may be UE1 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 or FIG. 5 or FIG. 6
  • the second terminal device may be FIG. 4 or FIG. 5 or
  • the UE2 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 is uniformly described here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the first security protection method includes enabling integrity protection
  • the first terminal device can use the first security protection method to protect the first terminal device and the second terminal device Security protection is performed on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the two, so the problem of reducing the security level caused by the attack or tampering of the messages in the PC5 establishment process can be avoided, and the security level of the PC5 establishment process can be improved.
  • the security level of the first security protection method is higher than or equal to the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, because the first terminal device The device can use the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, so it can be avoided that the security protection method used by the control plane connected to the PC5 has a low security level Due to the problem of reducing the security level caused by the security level of the first security protection method, the security level of the PC5 establishment process is improved.
  • the actions of the first terminal device in the above steps S901 to S902 may be performed by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 calling the application code stored in the memory 303 to instruct the first terminal device to execute. There are no restrictions on this.
  • a communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application includes the following steps:
  • the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element receives first information from a first terminal device and 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, where the first information includes identity information used for ProSe services or used to determine Information for identity information for ProSe services.
  • the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element determines, according to the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, a security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service.
  • the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element sends to the first terminal device a security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service.
  • FIG. 10 The specific implementation of the embodiment shown in FIG. 10 may refer to the embodiment shown in FIG. 7 , which will not be repeated here.
  • the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element may be, for example, the DDNMF1 network element in FIG. 7
  • the first terminal device may be, for example, the terminal device 1 in FIG.
  • the direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element may be, for example, the DDNMF2 network element in FIG. 7
  • the second terminal device may be, for example, the terminal device 2 in FIG. 4 ; or, in the embodiment of the present application, the first direct-connected communication discovery name
  • the management function network element may be, for example, the DDNMF2 network element in FIG. 7
  • the first terminal device may be, for example, the terminal device 2 in FIG.
  • the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element may be, for example, the DDNMF1 network element in FIG. 7 .
  • the second terminal device may be, for example, the terminal device 1 in FIG. 7 , which is described in a unified manner here, and will not be repeated below.
  • the first terminal device can acquire the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service in the discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the action of the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element in the above steps S1001 to S1003 may be performed by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 calling the application code stored in the memory 303 to instruct the first
  • the terminal device performs the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the first terminal device UE1 or UE2 in the embodiments shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 6 , or the embodiment shown in FIG. 7
  • the methods and/or steps implemented by the network element with the name management function in the direct connection communication can also be implemented by a component (eg, a chip or a circuit) that can be used for the network element with the name management function in the first direct connection communication.
  • a component eg, a chip or a circuit
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a communication apparatus, and the communication apparatus may be the first terminal device in the above method embodiments, or a device including the above-mentioned first terminal device, or a component usable for the first terminal device;
  • the communication device may be the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element in the above method embodiment, or a device including the above-mentioned first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element, or may be used for the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element.
  • Component of the communication discovery name management function network element may be used for the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element.
  • the communication apparatus includes corresponding hardware structures and/or software modules for executing each function.
  • the present application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software with the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein. Whether a function is performed by hardware or computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality using different methods for each particular application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
  • FIG. 11 shows a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 110 .
  • the communication device 110 includes a transceiver module 1101 and a processing module 1102 .
  • the transceiver module 1101 may also be called a transceiver unit to implement a transceiver function, for example, a transceiver circuit, a transceiver, a transceiver or a communication interface.
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to acquire a first security protection method, where the first security protection method is a security protection method determined in a discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the processing module 1102 is further configured to determine a second security protection method according to the first security protection method, where the second security protection method is a security protection method of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the security level of the second security protection method is not lower than the security level of the first security protection method.
  • the processing module 1102 configured to determine the second security protection method according to the first security protection method, includes: determining the first security protection method as the second security protection method.
  • the processing module 1102 configured to determine the second security protection method according to the first security protection method, includes: receiving, through the transceiver module 1101, a second security policy from the second terminal device, where the second security policy is the second terminal device The security policy in the PC5 connection; the second security protection method is determined according to the second security policy and the first security protection method.
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to determine the second security protection method according to the second security policy and the first security protection method, including: in the case that the first security protection method satisfies the second security policy The protection method is determined to be the second security protection method; or, in the case that the first security protection method satisfies the second security policy, according to the second security policy, a security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method is selected as the first security protection method. a security protection method; or, when the first security protection method does not satisfy the second security policy, select a security protection method that satisfies the second security policy as the second security protection method according to the second security policy.
  • the second security policy includes a second control plane security policy and/or a second user plane security policy; wherein, the second control plane security policy is the control plane security policy of the second terminal device in the PC5 connection, and the second The user plane security policy is the user plane security policy of the second terminal device in the PC5 connection.
  • the second security protection method is used to perform security protection on some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection; and/or, the second security protection method is used for part or all of the user plane connected by the PC5 connection. Data is secured.
  • the transceiver module 1101 is further configured to receive a first message from the second terminal device, where the first message is the first message in the process of establishing the PC5 between the first terminal device and the second terminal device; the processing module 1102, further configured to perform de-security protection on the first message by using the first security protection method.
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to obtain the first security protection method, comprising: sending the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device to the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element through the transceiver module 1101, and the first One information includes identity information for ProSe service or information for determining identity information for ProSe service;
  • the first security protection method from the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element is received by the transceiver module 1101 .
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to acquire a first security protection method, where the first security protection method is a security protection method determined in a discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the processing module 1102 is further configured to use the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the process of establishing the PC5 between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the transceiver module 1101 is configured to send at least one message after security protection to the second terminal device.
  • At least one message includes a first message, and the first message is the first message in the process of establishing the PC5.
  • At least one message further includes a third message
  • the third message is the security of the user plane used for negotiating the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device and sent by the first terminal device in the PC5 establishment process.
  • message of the protection method processing module 1102.
  • For using the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process including: for using the first security protection method to perform security protection on the first message; And, the security used in the control plane of the PC5 connection
  • the first security protection method is used to perform security protection on the third message.
  • the transceiver module 1101 is further configured to receive a second message from the second terminal device, where the second message includes the selection of the second terminal device.
  • the security algorithm of the control plane connected by the PC5; the processing module 1102 is also used to determine, according to the security algorithm of the control plane connected by the PC5, that the security level of the security protection method used by the control plane connected by the PC5 is lower than the security of the first security protection method grade.
  • At least one message includes a fourth message
  • the fourth message is the security protection used by the user plane for negotiating the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device and sent by the first terminal device in the PC5 establishment process.
  • the message of the method; the processing module 1102 is configured to use the first security protection method to perform security protection on at least one message in the PC5 establishment process, including: the security level of the security protection method used in determining the control plane connected to the PC5 is lower than After the security level of the first security protection method is determined, use the first security protection method to perform security protection on the fourth message.
  • the processing module 1102 is further configured to determine a second security protection method according to the first security protection method, where the second security protection method is a security protection method of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the security level of the second security protection method is not lower than the security level of the first security protection method.
  • the processing module 1102 configured to determine the second security protection method according to the first security protection method, includes: being configured to receive, through the transceiver module 1101, a second security policy from the second terminal device, where the second security policy is the second security policy.
  • the security policy of the terminal device in the PC5 connection; the second security protection method is determined according to the second security policy and the first security protection method.
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to determine the second security protection method according to the second security policy and the first security protection method, including: in the case that the first security protection method satisfies the second security policy The protection method is determined to be the second security protection method; or, in the case that the first security protection method satisfies the second security policy, according to the second security policy, a security protection method whose security level is not lower than the first security protection method is selected as the first security protection method. a security protection method; or, when the first security protection method does not satisfy the second security policy, select a security protection method that satisfies the second security policy as the second security protection method according to the second security policy.
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to obtain the first security protection method, including: sending the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device to the first direct-connection communication discovery name management function network element through the transceiver module 1101 , the first information includes identity information for the ProSe service or information for determining the identity information for the ProSe service; the first security protection method from the first direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element is received through the transceiver module 1101 .
  • Transceiver module 1101 configured to receive first information from the first terminal device and 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, wherein the first information includes identity information for ProSe services or for determining identity information for ProSe services Information.
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to determine, according to the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, a security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service.
  • the transceiver module 1101 is further configured to send, to the first terminal device, a security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service.
  • the processing module 1102 is configured to determine, according to the first information and the 3GPP identity information of the first terminal device, a security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service, including: being configured to: The 3GPP identity information of a terminal device determines a plurality of optional security protection methods corresponding to the first terminal device using the ProSe service; according to the plurality of optional security protection methods, determine the required security protection methods when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service method of security protection.
  • the processing module 1102 is further configured to obtain the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service from the second direct-connected communication discovery name management function network element;
  • the selected security protection method determines the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service, including: determining whether the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service is included in the multiple optional security protection methods protection method; when the multiple optional security protection methods include the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service, the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service is determined as the first The security protection method required when the terminal device uses the ProSe service; or, when the security protection method required when the second terminal device uses the ProSe service is not included in the multiple optional security protection methods, choose from multiple optional security protection methods.
  • the security protection method required when the first terminal device uses the ProSe service is determined in the security protection method.
  • the required security protection method when using the ProSe service is used to secure the fifth message, and the fifth message is the first PC5 broadcast message in the discovery process between the first terminal device and the second terminal device .
  • the security protection method required when using the ProSe service is used to determine the security protection method of the PC5 connection between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • the security protection method of the PC5 connection is used to secure some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection; and/or, the security protection method of the PC5 connection is used to protect part or all of the PC5 connection.
  • User plane data for security protection is used to protect some or all parameters transmitted in the control plane signaling of the PC5 connection; and/or, the security protection method of the PC5 connection is used to protect part or all of the PC5 connection.
  • the security protection method required when the ProSe service is used is used for security protection of at least one message in the process of establishing the PC5 between the first terminal device and the second terminal device.
  • At least one message includes a first message, and the first message is the first message in the process of establishing the PC5.
  • the communication device 110 is presented in the form of dividing each functional module in an integrated manner.
  • Module herein may refer to a specific ASIC, circuit, processor and memory executing one or more software or firmware programs, integrated logic circuit, and/or other device that may provide the functions described above.
  • the communication apparatus 110 may take the form of the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 .
  • the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 can execute the instructions by calling the computer stored in the memory 303, so that the communication device 300 executes the communication method in the above method embodiment.
  • the functions/implementation process of the transceiver module 1101 and the processing module 1102 in FIG. 11 can be implemented by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 calling the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 303 .
  • the function/implementation process of the processing module 1102 in FIG. 11 can be implemented by the processor 301 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 calling the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 303, and the function of the transceiver module 1101 in FIG.
  • the implementation process can be implemented through the communication interface 304 in the communication device 300 shown in FIG. 3 .
  • the communication apparatus 110 provided in this embodiment can execute the above communication method, the technical effects that can be obtained by the communication apparatus 110 can refer to the above method embodiments, and details are not repeated here.
  • one or more of the above modules or units may be implemented by software, hardware or a combination of both.
  • the software exists in the form of computer program instructions and is stored in the memory, and the processor can be used to execute the program instructions and implement the above method flow.
  • the processor can be built into a SoC (system on chip) or an ASIC, or it can be an independent semiconductor chip.
  • SoC system on chip
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • the internal processing of the processor may further include necessary hardware accelerators, such as field programmable gate array (FPGA), PLD (Programmable Logic Device) , or a logic circuit that implements dedicated logic operations.
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • PLD Programmable Logic Device
  • the hardware can be CPU, microprocessor, digital signal processing (DSP) chip, microcontroller unit (MCU), artificial intelligence processor, ASIC, Any or any combination of SoCs, FPGAs, PLDs, dedicated digital circuits, hardware accelerators, or non-integrated discrete devices that may or may not run the necessary software to perform the above method flows.
  • DSP digital signal processing
  • MCU microcontroller unit
  • ASIC any or any combination of SoCs, FPGAs, PLDs, dedicated digital circuits, hardware accelerators, or non-integrated discrete devices that may or may not run the necessary software to perform the above method flows.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a communication apparatus (for example, the communication apparatus may be a chip or a chip system), where the communication apparatus includes a processor for implementing the method in any of the foregoing method embodiments.
  • the communication device further includes a memory.
  • the memory is used to store necessary program instructions and data, and the processor can call the program code stored in the memory to instruct the communication apparatus to execute the method in any of the above method embodiments.
  • the memory may also not be in the communication device.
  • the communication device is a chip system, it may be composed of a chip, or may include a chip and other discrete devices, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the above-mentioned embodiments it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof.
  • a software program it can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on the computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of the present application are generated.
  • the computer may be a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, computer network, or other programmable device.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be downloaded from a website site, computer, server, or data center Transmission to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wire (eg, coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line, DSL) or wireless (eg, infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.).
  • the computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or data storage devices including one or more servers, data centers, etc. that can be integrated with the medium.
  • the usable media may be magnetic media (eg, floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (eg, DVDs), or semiconductor media (eg, solid state disks (SSDs)), and the like.

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Abstract

本申请实施例提供通信方法、装置及系统，用于提升V2X PC5建立流程的安全性。方法包括：第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，该第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法；第一终端设备根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，第二安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。示例性的，第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。该通信方法适用于V2X通信领域。

Description

通信方法、装置及系统 技术领域
本申请涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及通信方法、装置及系统。
背景技术
传统的移动网络中，用户设备(user equipment，UE)之间的信令通信和数据通信路径需要经过网络侧设备(如基站/服务网关(serving gateway，SGW)/分组数据网关(packet data network gateway，PGW))。不同的UE之间是不能直接进行通信的。即使两个距离很近的UE之间，以UE1和UE2为例，在进行数据传递时，也需要UE1先将数据发送给连接的基站1，进而数据经过网络侧的传输到达UE2连接的基站2(此时基站1和基站2可以为相同基站，也可为不同基站)，最后由基站2将数据发送给UE2，这样会对网络传输带宽有较大的需求量，并且传输效率较低。
在设备到设备通信(device-to-device，D2D)需要短距离直连通信的需求下，邻近业务(Proximity-based services，ProSe)课题被提出。ProSe要求UE之间直接进行数据交换，或者仅通过基站而不经过核心网设备(如SGW/PGW)进行数据交换，因此可以提高距离较近的UE之间的通信效率。在第五代(5th generation，5G)通信技术中，短距离直连通信业务被用于车联网(vehicle-to-everything，V2X)中。
目前，ProSe技术建立两个UE之间的数据交换前，需要按顺序执行ProSe发现流程和PC5建立流程。其中，ProSe发现流程用于实现两个UE之间的彼此发现，PC5建立流程用于建立两个UE之间通过PC5接口直连通信的信令连接与数据连接。然而，现有的V2X PC5建立流程(具体可参考第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)技术标准(technical standards，TS)23.303)中的安全保护机制并不完善，V2X PC5建立流程中的控制面信令容易被中间攻击者攻击，从而可能造成安全等级降级。因此，如何提升V2X PC5建立流程的安全性，是目前亟待解决的问题。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供通信方法、装置及系统，用于提升V2X PC5建立流程的安全性。
为达到上述目的，本申请的实施例采用如下技术方案：
第一方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法包括：第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，该第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法；第一终端设备根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，该第二安全保护方法为该第一终端设备与该第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。由于本申请实施例在确定第二安全保护方法时，可以参考发现流程中确定的第一安全保护方法，因此可以使得确定的第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该通信方法还包括：第一终端设备接收来自第二终端设备的第一消息，该第一消息为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中 的第一条消息；第一终端设备根据第一安全保护方法对第一消息进行解安全保护。也就是说，本申请实施例中，第一消息是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。这样，在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的第一消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
第二方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法包括：第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，该第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法；第一终端设备使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护后，向第二终端设备发送安全保护后的至少一条消息。基于本申请实施例提供的通信方法，一方面，在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。另一方面，在第一安全保护方法的安全等级高于或者等于第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
在一种可能的实现方式中，至少一条消息包括第一消息，该第一消息为该PC5建立流程中的第一条消息。也就是说，本申请实施例中，第一消息是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。这样，在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的第一消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
在一种可能的实现方式中，至少一条消息还包括第三消息，第三消息为该PC5建立流程中第一终端设备发送的用于协商第一终端设备和第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息；第一终端设备使用第一安全保护方法对该PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，包括：第一终端设备使用第一安全保护方法对该第一消息进行安全保护；在PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于该第一安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，第一终端设备使用该第一安全保护方法对第三消息进行安全保护。一方面，在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的第一消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的第一消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。另一方面，在PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于该第一安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的第三消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的 安全等级所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该通信方法还可以包括：第一终端设备接收来自第二终端设备的第二消息，该第二消息包括该第二终端设备选择的该PC5连接的控制面的安全算法；第一终端设备根据该PC5连接的控制面的安全算法，确定该PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于该第一安全保护方法的安全等级。基于该方案，第一终端设备可以获知PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于该第一安全保护方法的安全等级。
在一种可能的实现方式中，至少一条消息包括第四消息，第四消息为该PC5建立流程中第一终端设备发送的用于协商第一终端设备和第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息；第一终端设备使用第一安全保护方法对该PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，包括：第一终端设备确定该PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于该第一安全保护方法的安全等级；第一终端设备使用该第一安全保护方法对该第四消息进行安全保护。该方案中，在PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于该第一安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的第四消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例提供的通信方法还包括：第一终端设备根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，该第二安全保护方法为该第一终端设备与该第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。由于本申请实施例在确定第二安全保护方法时，可以参考发现流程中确定的第一安全保护方法，因此可以使得确定的第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第一终端设备根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：第一终端设备将第一安全保护方法确定为第二安全保护方法。也就是说，本申请实施例中，第一终端设备可以根据第一安全保护方法直接激活第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全。该方案中，由于第一终端设备不需要与第二终端设备协商第二安全保护方法，而是直接将第一安全保护方法确定为第二安全保护方法，因此不仅简化了第一终端设备的处理逻辑，而且可以节省PC5建立流程的信令开销。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第一终端设备根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：第一终端设备接收来自第二终端设备的第二安全策略，该第二安全策略为第二终端设备在该PC5连接中的安全策略；第一终端设备根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法。该方案中，由于第一终端设备在确定第二安全保护方法时，还参考第二终端设备的第二安全策略，因此可以最大程度的使得第一终端设备确定出的第二安全保护方法也能被第二终端设备使用。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第一终端设备根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法，包括：在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略的情况下，将第一安全保护方法确定为第二安全保护方法。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略时，将第一安全保护方法确定为第二安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得第一终端设备确定出的第二安全保护方法也能被第二终端设备使用，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第一终端设备根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法，包括：在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略的情况下，根据第二安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为该第一安全保护方法。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略时，根据第二安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为该第一安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得第一终端设备确定出的第二安全保护方法也能被第二终端设备使用，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第一终端设备根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法，包括：在第一安全保护方法不满足第二安全策略的情况下，根据第二安全策略，选择一个满足第二安全策略的安全保护方法作为第二安全保护方法。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法不满足第二安全策略时，根据第二安全策略，选择一个满足第二安全策略的安全保护方法作为第二安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得第一终端设备确定出的第二安全保护方法也能被第二终端设备使用，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第二安全策略包括第二控制面安全策略和/或第二用户面安全策略；其中，第二控制面安全策略为第二终端设备在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，第二用户面安全策略为第二终端设备在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略。本申请实施例中，第二控制面安全策略可以用于确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，第二用户面安全策略可以用于确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第二安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护；和/或，第二安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。换言之，本申请实施例中的第二安全保护方法包括PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，和/或，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。其中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。
结合上述第一方面或第二方面，在一种可能的实现方式中，第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，包括：第一终端设备向第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元发送第 一信息和该第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息；第一终端设备接收来自第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的第一安全保护方法。基于该方案，第一终端设备可以在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中获取第一安全保护方法。
第三方面，提供了一种通信方法，该方法包括：第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元接收来自第一终端设备的第一信息和该第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，其中，第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息；第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元向第一终端设备发送第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。基于本申请实施例提供的通信方法，第一终端设备可以在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中获取第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，包括：第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法；第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据该多个可供选择的安全保护方法确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。也就是说，本申请实施例中，第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法是从第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法中确定的。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例提供的通信方法还包括：第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元从第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元获取第二终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据该多个可供选择的安全保护方法确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，包括：第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元确定该多个可供选择的安全保护方法中是否包括第二终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需安全保护方法；当该多个可供选择的安全保护方法中包括第二终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元将第二终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定为第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。基于该方案，可以使得第一终端设备和第二终端设备在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程获取相同的安全保护方法。
在一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例提供的通信方法还包括：第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元从第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元获取第二终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据该多个可供选择的安全保护方法确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，包括：第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元确定该多个可供选择的安全保护方法中是否包括第二终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需安全保护方法；当该多个可供选择的安全保护方法中不包括第二终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时， 第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元从该多个可供选择的安全保护方法中确定该第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。基于该方案，第一终端设备可以在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中获取第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对第五消息进行安全保护，该第五消息为该第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中的第一条PC5广播消息。基于该方案，可以实现第五消息的安全保护，从而可以避免第五消息被攻击者攻击或篡改。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于确定第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。由于本申请实施例在确定第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法时，可以参考发现流程中确定的安全保护方法，因此可以使得确定的第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法的安全等级不低于发现流程中确定的安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，发现流程中确定的安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
在一种可能的实现方式中，PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护；和/或，该PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。换言之，本申请实施例中，PC5连接的安全保护方法包括PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，和/或，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。其中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法用于对该PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对该第一终端设备与该第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护。一方面，在使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对该第一终端设备与该第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。另一方面，在使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法的安全等级高于或者等于第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对该第一终端设备与该第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于发现流程中确定的使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法的安全等级所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该至少一条消息包括第一消息，第一消息为该PC5建立流程中的第一条消息。也就是说，本申请实施例中，第一消息是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。这样，在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免 PC5建立流程中的第一消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
第四方面，提供了一种通信装置用于实现上述方法。该通信装置可以为上述第一方面或第二方面中的第一终端设备，或者包含上述第一终端设备的装置；或者，该通信装置可以为上述第三方面中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元，或者包含上述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的装置。该通信装置包括实现上述方法相应的模块、单元、或手段(means)，该模块、单元、或means可以通过硬件实现，软件实现，或者通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块或单元。
第五方面，提供了一种通信装置，包括：处理器和存储器；该存储器用于存储计算机指令，当该处理器执行该指令时，以使该通信装置执行上述任一方面所述的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第一方面或第二方面中的第一终端设备，或者包含上述第一终端设备的装置；或者，该通信装置可以为上述第三方面中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元，或者包含上述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的装置。
第六方面，提供了一种通信装置，包括：处理器；该处理器用于与存储器耦合，并读取存储器中的指令之后，根据该指令执行如上述任一方面所述的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第一方面或第二方面中的第一终端设备，或者包含上述第一终端设备的装置；或者，该通信装置可以为上述第三方面中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元，或者包含上述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的装置。
第七方面，提供了一种通信装置，包括：处理器和接口电路；接口电路，用于接收计算机程序或指令并传输至处理器；处理器用于执行所述计算机程序或指令，以使该通信装置执执行如上述任一方面所述的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第一方面或第二方面中的第一终端设备，或者包含上述第一终端设备的装置；或者，该通信装置可以为上述第三方面中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元，或者包含上述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的装置。
第八方面，提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机可以执行上述任一方面所述的方法。
第九方面，提供了一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机可以执行上述任一方面所述的方法。
第十方面，提供了一种通信装置(例如，该通信装置可以是芯片或芯片系统)，该通信装置包括处理器，用于实现上述任一方面中所涉及的功能。在一种可能的实现方式中，该通信装置还包括存储器，该存储器，用于保存必要的程序指令和数据。该通信装置是芯片系统时，可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。
其中，第四方面至第十方面中任一种可能的实现方式所带来的技术效果可参见上述第一方面或第二方面或第三方面中不同设计方式所带来的技术效果，此处不再赘述。
第十一方面，提供了一种通信系统，该通信系统包括第一终端设备和第二终端设备。其中，第一终端设备，用于获取第一安全保护方法，该第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法；第一终端设备，还用于使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的 至少一条消息进行安全保护后，向第二终端设备发送安全保护后的至少一条消息；第二终端设备，用于接收安全保护后的至少一条消息，并使用第一安全保护方法对至少一条消息进行解安全保护。其中，第十一方面的技术效果可参考上述第二方面，在此不再赘述。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第一终端设备或第二终端设备，还用于根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，第二安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。该方案的技术效果可参考上述第一方面，在此不再赘述。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该通信系统还包括第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元和第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元。其中，第一终端设备，用于获取第一安全保护方法，包括：第一终端设备，用于接收来自第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。类似的，第二终端设备，还用于接收来自第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。其中，第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法与第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法均为上述第一安全保护方法。基于该方案，第一终端设备或第二终端设备可以在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中获取使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
第十二方面，提供了一种通信系统，该通信系统包括第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元和第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元；其中，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元，用于从第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元获取第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；以及，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元，还用于确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法，并根据多个可供选择的安全保护方法以及第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法之后，向第一终端设备发送第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。其中，第十二方面的技术效果可参考上述第三方面，在此不再赘述。
附图说明
图1a为本申请实施例提供的一种通信系统的结构示意图；
图1b为本申请实施例提供的一种通信系统的结构示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种5G网络中ProSe控制面架构示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的通信设备的结构示意图；
图4为本申请实施例提供的一种通信方法的交互示意图；
图5为本申请实施例提供的另一种通信方法的交互示意图；
图6为本申请实施例提供的又一种通信方法的交互示意图；
图7为本申请实施例提供的又一种通信方法的交互示意图；
图8为本申请实施例提供的一种通信方法的流程示意图；
图9为本申请实施例提供的另一种通信方法的流程示意图；
图10为本申请实施例提供的又一种通信方法的流程示意图；
图11为本申请实施例提供的通信装置的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
为了方便理解本申请实施例的技术方案，首先给出本申请相关技术的简要介绍如下。
第一，发现类型(discovery type)：
本申请实施例中，发现类型包括开放发现(open discovery)或者限制发现(restricted discovery)。open discovery与restricted discovery的相关描述可参考现有的第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)技术标准(technical standards，TS)23.303，v15.1.0，在此不予赘述。举个例子，比如一个终端设备自己打游戏，没有明确的游戏伙伴，则他可以发起一个开放发现，“随机”找到一个游戏伙伴就行。而若终端设备打游戏有明确的伙伴，则他可以通过限制发现来“指定”一个伙伴，只有他指定的伙伴才能接入游戏，其他的则不行。因此，开放发现就如摇一摇应用，可以随意的摇到开起了摇一摇应用的另一个用户。限制发现则如面对面建群，只有知道群号的用户才可以接入。
第二，发现模式(discovery mode)：
在现有4G ProSe标准中(3GPP TS 23.303，v15.1.0)，定义了模式A(Model A)或模式B(Model B)。Model A和Model B的区别在于发起discovery的方式不同。Model A的含义是“我在这”，Model A发现流程中两端终端设备分为播报方用户设备(user equipment，UE)(announcing UE)和监听方UE(monitoring UE)，announcing UE广播“我在这”，monitoring UE接收到announcing UE广播的消息后根据是否符合自己业务需求确定是否与announcing UE建立邻近业务的连接。Model B的含义是“谁在那？/你在哪？”，Model B发现流程中两端终端设备分为被发现者UE(discoveree UE)和发现者UE(discoverer UE)，discoverer UE发起特定业务请求，请求中包括特定的信息，就是问“谁在那？/你在哪？”，discoveree UE接收到discoverer UE发起的业务请求之后根据自己是否可以提供业务服务来确定是否回复该请求消息，若回复响应消息，说明“我在这”。其中，本申请实施例以open discovery场景适用于model A发现模型，而restricted discovery场景适用于model A和model B两种发现模型为例进行说明，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
第三，发现命令(discovery command)：
本申请实施例中，发现命令用于告知网络侧互相通信的两个终端设备是announcing UE还是monitoring UE；是响应终端设备(response UE)还是请求终端设备(queryUE)。其中，announcing UE与monitoring UE为上述Model A发现流程中的两端终端设备，response UE与query UE分别对应上述Model B发现流程中的discoveree UE和discoverer UE，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
第四，用于ProSe业务的身份信息(user identity)：
用于ProSe业务的身份信息例如可以是应用级别的用户标识(application level user identity)。例如，用于ProSe业务的身份信息可以是邻近业务应用标识(ProSe application ID)，或者是限制邻近业务应用用户标识(restricted ProSe application user ID，RPAUID)或者是邻近发现UE标识(ProSe discovery UE ID，PDUID)等。其中，本申请实施例以ProSe application ID用于开放发现(open discovery)场景，PDUID或 RPAUID用于限制发现(restricted discovery)场景为例进行说明，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
第五，PC5连接与PC5连接建立流程：
本申请实施例中的PC5连接是指基于PC5接口的终端设备之间的通信连接。
本申请实施例中的PC5连接建立流程用于在支持PC5接口的至少2个终端设备之间建立通信连接。其中，PC5连接建立完成后，至少2个终端设备可以利用PC5连接进行控制面信令协商和/或用户面数据传递。本申请实施例中的PC5连接建立流程可以包括PC5单播连接建立(one-to-one communication)流程和PC5多播连接建立(one-to-many communication)流程。PC5单播连接建立流程用于在支持PC5接口的2个终端设备之间建立通信连接，PC5多播连接建立流程用于在支持PC5接口的2个以上终端设备之间建立通信连接。本申请下述实施例均是示例性的以2个终端设备之间建立通信连接为例进行说明，即本申请下述实施例均是示例性的以PC5单播连接建立流程为例进行说明。PC5多播连接建立流程中任意2个终端设备之间建立通信连接的方式可参考PC5单播连接建立流程中2个终端设备之间建立通信连接的流程，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
第六，安全策略：
安全策略是用于描述是否开启安全保护的策略，可用于确定安全保护方法。本申请实施例中用于不同场景的安全策略包括以下至少一种：
PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护策略；
PC5连接中的控制面完整性保护策略；
PC5连接中的用户面机密性保护策略；
或者，PC5连接中的用户面完整性保护策略。
其中，控制面机密性保护即保护信令在传输过程中的机密性；控制面完整性保护即保护信令在传输过程中的完整性；用户面机密性保护即保护用户面数据在传输过程中的机密性；用户面完整性保护即保护用户面数据在传输过程中的完整性。本申请实施例中，完整性是指获取到的信令或数据与原始的信令或数据一致，没有被修改，因此，完整性保护是为了使得攻击者“攻击不成”。机密性是指无法被直接看出真实内容，因此机密性保护是为了使得攻击者“读不懂”。此外，本申请实施例中的机密性保护也可以称为加密保护，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
本申请实施例中，PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护策略与PC5连接中的控制面完整性保护策略属于PC5连接中的控制面安全策略；PC5连接中的用户面机密性保护策略与PC5连接中的用户面完整性保护策略属于PC5连接中的用户面安全策略，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
本申请实施例中，保护策略共分有开启(REQUIRED)，不开启(NOT NEEDED)和可选(PREFERRED)三种。REQUIRED为需要开启安全，NOT NEEDED为不需要开启安全，PREFERRED偏好开启或者称为可选开启，即可以开启安全但也可以不开启安全，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
示例性的，以PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护策略为例，则PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护策略包括：PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护开启(REQUIRED)、PC5连 接中的控制面机密性保护不开启(NOT NEEDED)、或者PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护可选(PREFERRED)。PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护策略、PC5连接中的用户面机密性保护策略、或者PC5连接中的用户面完整性保护策略的示例可参考PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护策略的示例，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，安全策略在被发送时，一般情况下只会选择三种(REQUIRED、NOT NEEDED和PREFERRED)中的一种发送，在某些特殊的场景下可能会选择至少2种发送，并且其中一个是PREFERRED。比如，在发送NOT NEEDED和PREFERRED时，代表倾向不开启安全保护；在发送REQUIRED和PREFERRED时，则代表倾向开启安全保护。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，PC5连接中的控制面机密性保护策略、PC5连接中的控制面完整性保护策略、PC5连接中的用户面机密性保护策略；或者，PC5连接中的用户面完整性保护策略中的多种保护策略可以相同，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
第七，安全能力：
本申请实施例中的安全能力包括以下至少一种：
PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个控制面机密性保护算法；
PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个控制面完整性保护算法；
PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个用户面机密性保护算法；
或者，PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个用户面完整性保护算法。
其中，控制面机密性保护算法是指一种用于保护控制面的机密性保护算法。控制面完整性保护算法是指一种用于保护控制面的完整性保护算法。用户面机密性保护算法是指一种用于保护用户面的机密性保护算法。用户面完整性保护算法是指一种用于保护控制面的用户面保护算法。其中，PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个控制面机密性保护算法与PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个控制面完整性保护算法属于PC5连接中的控制面安全能力；PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个用户面机密性保护算法与PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个用户面完整性保护算法属于PC5连接中的用户面安全能力，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个控制面机密性保护算法、PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个控制面完整性保护算法、PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个用户面机密性保护算法、或者PC5连接中支持的一个或者多个用户面完整性保护算法中的多种保护算法可以相同或者存在共同项，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
第八，安全保护与解安全保护：
本申请实施例中的安全保护是指使用安全保护方法对用户面数据/控制面信令进行保护；本申请实施例中的解安全保护是指根据安全保护方法还原用户面数据/控制面信令。其中，这里的安全保护方法包括机密性保护和/或完整性保护是否开启，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
具体的，当机密性保护开启时，可以使用加密密钥和加密算法对用户面数据/控制面信令进行加密保护；当完整性保护开启时，可以使用完整性保护密钥和完整性保护 算法对用户面数据/控制面信令进行进行完整性保护。此外，需要说明的是，当需要对用户面数据/控制面信令进行加密保护和完整性保护时，可以对用户面数据/控制面信令先进行加密保护，再进行完整性保护；也可以对用户面数据/控制面信令先进行完整性保护，再进行加密保护，本申请实施例不限定加密保护和完整性保护的执行顺序，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
具体的，当机密性保护开启时，可以使用加密密钥和加密算法对用户面数据/控制面信令进行解密；当完整性保护开启时，可以使用完整性保护密钥和完整性保护算法对用户面数据/控制面信令进行进行完整性保护验证。此外，可以理解的是，当同时对用户面数据/控制面信令进行加密保护和完整性保护时，如果用户面数据/控制面信令先被加密保护，再被完整性保护，则解安全保护的顺序是先进行完整性保护验证、再对加密后的用户面数据/控制面信令进行解密；如果用户面数据/控制面信令先被完整性保护，再被加密，则解安全保护的顺序是先对加密后的用户面数据/控制面信令进行解密，再进行完整性保护验证，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
示例性的，本申请实施例中的安全保护方法分为以下三类：
1、ProSe发现流程中第一条PC5广播消息使用的安全保护方法，用于保护ProSe发现流程中第一条PC5广播消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数。其中，第一条PC5广播消息使用的安全保护方法例如可以包括第一条PC5广播消息的机密性保护和/或完整性保护是否开启。示例性的，“00”可以表示机密性保护不开启，且完整性保护不开启；“01”可以表示机密性保护不开启，完整性保护开启；“10”可以表示机密性保护1开启，完整性保护不开启；“11”可以表示机密性保护开启，且完整性保护开启。需要说明的是，该示例以高比特表征机密性保护，低比特表征完整性保护为例进行说明，当然，也可以是低比特表征机密性保护，高比特表征完整性保护，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。此外，该示例以“0”表示不开启，“1”表示开启为例进行说明，当然，也可以是“1”表示不开启，“0”表示开启，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
本申请实施例中，不同发现模式对应的第一条PC5广播消息是不同的。比如，model A发现模式下，第一条PC5广播消息是由播报方UE(announcing UE)发送的，第一条PC5广播消息可以为广播(announcing)消息；model B发现模式下，第一条PC5广播消息是由发现者UE(discoverer UE)发送的，第一条PC5广播消息可以为请求代码(Send Query Code)消息。在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
2、PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，用于保护PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的全部参数或部分参数。其中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法例如可以包括PC5连接的控制面的机密性保护和/或完整性保护是否开启。相关示例可参考第一条PC5广播消息使用的安全保护方法中的示例，在此不再赘述。
3、PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，用于保护PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据。其中，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法例如可以包括PC5连接的用户面的机密性保护和/或完整性保护是否开启。相关示例可参考第一条PC5广播消息使用的安全保护方法中的示例，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法也可以 称之为PC5连接的控制面信令使用的安全保护方法；PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法也可以称之为PC5连接的用户面数据使用的安全保护方法，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
第九、MIC与期望MIC：
以终端设备1向终端设备2发送消息1为例：
本申请实施例中的MIC是使用终端设备1的完整性保护密钥对终端设备1发送的消息1中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护后的生成参数，包含在消息1中。本申请实施例中的期望MIC是使用终端设备2的完整性保护密钥(与终端设备1的完整性保护密钥相同)对终端设备2接收到的消息1中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行完整性校验的生成参数，用于与终端设备2接收到的消息1中的MIC作对比，进而校验终端设备2接收到的消息1是否被篡改。其中，MIC与期望MIC的相关示例将结合后续方法实施例详细阐述，在此不予赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，终端设备1的完整性保护密钥可以理解为用于对终端设备1发送的消息1进行完整性保护的密钥，可以被生成MIC的设备使用。其中，生成MIC的设备例如可以包括终端设备1或者其他设备(如终端设备1对应的直连通信发现名称管理功能网元)，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。当然，在终端设备1作为接收消息的设备时，以终端设备1接收来自终端设备2的消息2为例，则终端设备1的完整性保护密钥可以理解为用于对终端设备1接收的消息2进行完整性校验的密钥，可以被生成期望MIC的设备使用。其中，生成期望MIC的设备例如可以包括终端设备1或者其他设备(如终端设备1对应的直连通信发现名称管理功能网元)，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，终端设备2的完整性保护密钥可以理解为用于对终端设备2接收的消息1进行完整性校验的密钥，可以被生成期望MIC的设备使用。其中，生成期望MIC的设备例如可以包括终端设备2或者其他设备(如终端设备2对应的直连通信发现名称管理功能网元)，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。当然，在终端设备2作为发送消息的设备时，以终端设备2向终端设备1发送消息2为例，则终端设备2的完整性保护密钥可以理解为用于对终端设备2发送的消息2进行完整性保护的密钥，可以被生成MIC的设备使用。其中，生成MIC的设备例如可以包括终端设备2或者其他设备(如终端设备2对应的直连通信发现名称管理功能网元)，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图，对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行描述。其中，在本申请的描述中，除非另有说明，“/”表示前后关联的对象是一种“或”的关系，例如，A/B可以表示A或B；本申请中的“和/或”仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况，其中A,B可以是单数或者复数。并且，在本申请的描述中，除非另有说明，“多个”是指两个或多于两个。“以下至少一项(个)”或其类似表达，是指的这些项中的任意组合，包括单项(个)或复数项(个)的任意组合。例如，a，b，或c中的至少一项(个)，可以表示：a，b，c，a-b，a-c，b-c，或a-b-c，其中a，b，c可以是单个，也可以是多个。另外，为了便于清楚描述本申请实施例的技术方案， 在本申请的实施例中，采用了“第一”、“第二”等字样对功能和作用基本相同的相同项或相似项进行区分。本领域技术人员可以理解“第一”、“第二”等字样并不对数量和执行次序进行限定，并且“第一”、“第二”等字样也并不限定一定不同。同时，在本申请实施例中，“示例性的”或者“例如”等词用于表示作例子、例证或说明。本申请实施例中被描述为“示例性的”或者“例如”的任何实施例或设计方案不应被解释为比其它实施例或设计方案更优选或更具优势。确切而言，使用“示例性的”或者“例如”等词旨在以具体方式呈现相关概念，便于理解。
此外，本申请实施例描述的网络架构以及业务场景是为了更加清楚的说明本申请实施例的技术方案，并不构成对于本申请实施例提供的技术方案的限定，本领域普通技术人员可知，随着网络架构的演变和新业务场景的出现，本申请实施例提供的技术方案对于类似的技术问题，同样适用。
以UE1与UE2之间的V2X PC5建立流程为例，现有的V2X PC5建立流程(具体可参考3GPP TS 23.303)中，首条消息直连通信请求(direct communication request)中需要携带UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(signaling security policy)以辅助UE2进行PC5连接的控制面的安全策略协商，此条消息没有安全保护。这样，当UE1和UE2本身被配置的安全策略均为可选(PREFERRED)的情况下，中间攻击者在接收到UE1发送的直连通信请求后，可将直连通信请求中的signaling security policy篡改为不开启(NOT NEEDED)。进而，UE2发现UE1的需求为PC5连接的控制面不开启安全保护，于是确定PC5连接的控制面安全保护方法为控制面不开启安全保护，并向UE1发送直连安全模式命令(direct security mode command)。由于控制面不开启安全保护，此时攻击者可以再将上述直连安全模式命令中的signaling security policy篡改回UE1在直连通信请求中发送的内容，后续PC5连接的控制面安全则在中间攻击者干扰下强行不开启控制面安全保护。而在PC5建立流程中，UE1与UE2的控制面安全策略均为可选(PREFERRED)且没有中间攻击者篡改的情况下，本来是可以开启控制面安全保护的。攻击者以上述方式强制关闭了UE1与UE2之间的控制面安全保护，将会造成安全等级降级，且在后续PC5连接的用户面安全策略协商时也会因为没有控制面的安全保护，被攻击者进一步攻击。
为解决该问题，本申请实施例提供的一种通信系统10。如图1a所示，该通信系统10包括具有ProSe应用功能的第一终端设备101和具有ProSe应用功能的第二终端设备102。其中，第一终端设备101获取第一安全保护方法，该第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备101与第二终端设备102之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法。进而，第一终端设备101使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备101与第二终端设备102之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护后，向第二终端设备102发送安全保护后的至少一条消息。该方案的具体实现将在后续方法实施例中详细描述，在此不予赘述。基于本申请实施例提供的通信系统，一方面，在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。另一方面，在第一安全保护方法的安全等级高于或者等于 第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
可选的，本申请实施例中，第一终端设备101或者第二终端设备102还可以根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，第二安全保护方法为第一终端设备101与第二终端设备102之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。由于本申请实施例在确定第二安全保护方法时，可以参考发现流程中确定的第一安全保护方法，因此可以使得确定的第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
可选的，如图1a所示，该通信系统10还可以包括第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元103和第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元104。其中，第一终端设备101获取第一安全保护方法，包括：第一终端设备101接收来自第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元103的第一终端设备101使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。类似的，第二终端设备102可以接收来自第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元104的第二终端设备102使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。其中，第一终端设备101使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法与第二终端设备102使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法均为上述第一安全保护方法。基于该方案，第一终端设备或第二终端设备可以在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中获取使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
如图1b所示，为本申请实施例提供的另一种通信系统20。该通信系统20包括第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元201和第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元202。该第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元201和第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元202之间可以直接通信，也可以通过其他设备的转发进行通信，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
其中，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元201从第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元202获取第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；以及，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元201确定第一终端设备使用该ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法。进而，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元201根据多个可供选择的安全保护方法以及第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法之后，向第一终端设备发送第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。该方案的具体实现将在后续方法实施例中详细描述，在此不予赘述。基于本申请实施例提供的通信系统，第一终端设备可以在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中获取第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
可选的，图1a所示的通信系统10或图1b所示的通信系统20可以适用于目前正在讨论的5G网络，也可以适用于未来的其他网络等，本申请实施例对此不做具体限 定。
示例性的，以图1a所示的通信系统10或图1b所示的通信系统20适用于目前正在讨论的5G网络为例，则本申请实施例中的直连通信发现名称管理功能网元(包括图1b中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元201和第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元202)所对应的网元或者实体可以为该5G网络中的直连通信发现名称管理功能(direct discovery name management function，DDNMF)网元。本申请实施例中的终端设备(包括图1a中的第一终端设备101和第二终端设备102)所对应的网元或者实体可以为该5G网络中的具有ProSe应用功能的终端设备。
如图2所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种5G网络中ProSe控制面架构示意图，包括一个或多个终端设备(图2以包括终端设备1、终端设备2、终端设备3与终端设备4为例进行示意)、下一代无线接入网络(next generation-radio access network，NG-RAN)设备、统一数据存储(unified data repository，UDR)网元、统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)网元、会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)网元、接入和移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)网元、网络开放功能(network exposure function，NEF)网元、策略控制功能(policy control function，PCF)网元、用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)网元、5G DDNMF网元以及数据网络(data network，DN)。
其中，与传统蜂窝网络通信相比，可以用于Prose通信的终端设备需要有临近业务应用(ProSe application)功能，具有ProSe应用功能的终端设备之间通过PC5口通信。与ProSe应用相对应的是ProSe应用服务器。ProSe应用服务器可以是DN中的应用功能(application function，AF)网元。具有ProSe应用服务器功能的AF具有23.501R-15版本中定义的AF的所有功能，以及用于Prose业务的相关功能。也就是说，在5G网络中ProSe控制面架构中，ProSe应用服务器与终端设备是通过终端设备-NG-RAN设备-UPF网元-AF网元的路径进行用户面通信。此外，ProSe应用服务器还可以通过NEF与5G核心网(5G core network，5GC)中的其他网络功能(network function，NF)进行通信，比如通过NEF网元与PCF网元通信。
本申请实施例中，DDNMF网元具有为开放临近业务直连发现(open ProSe direct discovery)分配和处理临近业务应用标识(ProSe application ID)与ProSe发现使用的code之间映射关系的作用。在限制性临近业务直连发现(restricted ProSe direct discovery)中，DDNMF网元与ProSe应用服务器通过PC2接口通信，用于处理发现请求的授权。
此外，AMF网元、UDR网元、SMF网元、UPF网元、UDM网元、NEF网元或者PCF网元的相关描述可参考现有的3GPP 5G标准，在此不予赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中的终端设备，可以是用于实现无线通信功能的设备，例如终端或者可用于终端中的芯片等，其可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上(如轮船等)；还可以部署在空中(例如飞机、气球和卫星上等)。其中，终端可以是5G网络或者未来演进的公共陆地移动网(public land mobile network，PLMN)中的UE、接入终端、终端单元、终端站、移动站、移动台、远方站、远程终端、移动设备、无线通信设备、终端代理或终端装置等。接入终端可以是蜂窝 电话、无绳电话、会话启动协议(session initiation protocol，SIP)电话、无线本地环路(wireless local loop，WLL)站、个人数字助理(personal digital assistant，PDA)、具有无线通信功能的手持设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它处理设备、车载设备或可穿戴设备，无人机(unmanned aerial vehicle，UAV)和无人机控制器(UAV controller，UAVC)，虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)终端设备、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端设备、工业控制(industrial control)中的无线终端、无人驾驶(self driving)中的无线终端、远程医疗(remote medical)中的无线终端、智能电网(smart grid)中的无线终端、运输安全(transportation safety)中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端等。终端可以是移动的，也可以是固定的。
可选的，本申请实施例中的RAN设备，是一种为终端设备提供无线通信功能的设备。接入网设备例如包括但不限于：5G中的下一代基站(gnodeB，gNB)、演进型节点B(evolved node B，eNB)、无线网络控制器(radio network controller，RNC)、节点B(node B，NB)、基站控制器(base station controller，BSC)、基站收发台(base transceiver station，BTS)、家庭基站(例如，home evolved nodeB，或home node B，HNB)、基带单元(baseBand unit，BBU)、传输点(transmitting and receiving point，TRP)、发射点(transmitting point，TP)、移动交换中心等。
可选的，本申请实施例中的第一终端设备、第二终端设备、第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元与第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元也可以称之为通信装置，其可以是一个通用设备或者是一个专用设备，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例中的第一终端设备、第二终端设备、第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元与第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的相关功能可以由一个设备实现，也可以由多个设备共同实现，还可以是由一个设备内的一个或多个功能模块实现，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。可以理解的是，上述功能既可以是硬件设备中的网络元件，也可以是在专用硬件上运行的软件功能，或者是硬件与软件的结合，或者是平台(例如，云平台)上实例化的虚拟化功能。
例如，本申请实施例中的第一终端设备、第二终端设备、第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元与第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的相关功能可以通过图3中的通信设备300来实现。图3所示为本申请实施例提供的通信设备300的结构示意图。该通信设备300包括一个或多个处理器301，通信线路302，以及至少一个通信接口(图3中仅是示例性的以包括通信接口304，以及一个处理器301为例进行说明)，可选的还可以包括存储器303。
处理器301可以是一个通用中央处理器(central processing unit，CPU)，微处理器，特定应用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit，ASIC)，或一个或多个用于控制本申请方案程序执行的集成电路。
通信线路302可包括一通路，用于连接不同组件之间。
通信接口304，可以是收发模块用于与其他设备或通信网络通信，如以太网，RAN，无线局域网(wireless local area networks，WLAN)等。例如，所述收发模块可以是收发器、收发机一类的装置。可选的，所述通信接口304也可以是位于处理器301内的收 发电路，用以实现处理器的信号输入和信号输出。
存储器303可以是具有存储功能的装置。例如可以是只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)或可存储静态信息和指令的其他类型的静态存储设备，随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)或者可存储信息和指令的其他类型的动态存储设备，也可以是电可擦可编程只读存储器(electrically erasable programmable read-only memory，EEPROM)、只读光盘(compact disc read-only memory，CD-ROM)或其他光盘存储、光碟存储(包括压缩光碟、激光碟、光碟、数字通用光碟、蓝光光碟等)、磁盘存储介质或者其他磁存储设备、或者能够用于携带或存储具有指令或数据结构形式的期望的程序代码并能够由计算机存取的任何其他介质，但不限于此。存储器可以是独立存在，通过通信线路302与处理器相连接。存储器也可以和处理器集成在一起。
其中，存储器303用于存储执行本申请方案的计算机执行指令，并由处理器301来控制执行。处理器301用于执行存储器303中存储的计算机执行指令，从而实现本申请实施例中提供的通信方法。
或者，可选的，本申请实施例中，也可以是处理器301执行本申请下述实施例提供的通信方法中的处理相关的功能，通信接口304负责与其他设备或通信网络通信，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例中的计算机执行指令也可以称之为应用程序代码，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，处理器301可以包括一个或多个CPU，例如图3中的CPU0和CPU1。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，通信设备300可以包括多个处理器，例如图3中的处理器301和处理器308。这些处理器中的每一个可以是一个单核(single-core)处理器，也可以是一个多核(multi-core)处理器。这里的处理器可以包括但不限于以下至少一种：中央处理单元(central processing unit，CPU)、微处理器、数字信号处理器(DSP)、微控制器(microcontroller unit，MCU)、或人工智能处理器等各类运行软件的计算设备，每种计算设备可包括一个或多个用于执行软件指令以进行运算或处理的核。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，通信设备300还可以包括输出设备305和输入设备306。输出设备305和处理器301通信，可以以多种方式来显示信息。例如，输出设备305可以是液晶显示器(liquid crystal display，LCD)，发光二级管(light emitting diode，LED)显示设备，阴极射线管(cathode ray tube，CRT)显示设备，或投影仪(projector)等。输入设备306和处理器301通信，可以以多种方式接收用户的输入。例如，输入设备306可以是鼠标、键盘、触摸屏设备或传感设备等。
上述的通信设备300有时也可以称为通信装置，其可以是一个通用设备或者是一个专用设备。例如通信设备300可以是台式机、便携式电脑、网络服务器、掌上电脑(personal digital assistant，PDA)、移动手机、平板电脑、无线终端设备、嵌入式设备、上述终端设备，上述网络设备、或具有图3中类似结构的设备。本申请实施例不限定通信设备300的类型。
下面将结合附图，对本申请实施例提供的通信方法进行示例性说明。
需要说明的是，本申请下述实施例中各个网元之间的消息名字或消息中各参数的名字等只是一个示例，具体实现中也可以是其他的名字，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，“对消息进行安全保护”可以理解为对消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行安全保护，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
本申请实施例提供一种通信方法，该通信方法使用ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的一条或多条消息进行保护，从而可以提升PC5建立流程的安全等级。可选的，本申请实施例可以根据ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法和/或PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，其中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法和/或PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级不低于ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法。也就是说，ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全要求。这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
下面将结合几个示例对该通信方法进行详细阐述。
一种可能的实现方式中，以UE1与UE2的交互为例，本申请实施例提供一种通信方法，该通信方法使用ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法对UE1与UE2之间的PC5建立流程中的一条或多条消息进行完整性保护。同时在PC5建立流程中协商UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接(方便起见，后续将UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接简称为PC5连接)的控制面使用的安全保护方法和第一PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。示例性的，如图4所示，本申请实施例提供的通信方法包括如下步骤：
S401、UE1确定第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启。其中，该第一安全保护方法为UE1与UE2之间的ProSe发现流程中获取的安全保护方法。本申请实施例中不限定ProSe发现流程中确定安全保护方法的方式。一种可能的实现方式中，ProSe发现流程中确定安全保护方法的方式可参考后续图7所示的实施例。
示例性的，本申请实施例中的UE1可以为model A发现模式下的播报方UE(announcing UE)，或者UE1可以为model B发现模式下的发现者UE(discoverer UE)。
可选的，本申请实施例中的第一安全保护方法可以用于对UE1与UE2之间的ProSe发现流程中的第一条PC5广播消息进行安全保护。第一条PC5广播消息与安全保护方法的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中的第一安全保护方法还可以包括机密性保护开启，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
S402、UE1向UE2发送直连通信请求(direct communication request)。相应的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连通信请求。该直连通信请求包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力以及MIC1。其中，PC5连接中的控制面安全策略与控制面安全能力的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
当然，本申请实施例中，该直连通信请求还可以包括UE1的部分或全部发现参数，发现参数的相关描述可参考图7所示的实施例中的表一、表二、表三或表四，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例中，直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。比如，可以采用第一安全保护方法对UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略或者UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力的至少一种进行安全保护。
本申请实施例中，MIC1是使用UE1的完整性保护密钥对直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护后的生成参数。其中，UE1的完整性保护密钥可以是UE1生成的，也可以是网络侧下发的，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例中，UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力可以作为生成MIC1的输入参数。一种可能的实现方式中，MIC1＝KDF(参数一，参数二，其他参数)。其中，参数一可以为PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，参数二可以为PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，密钥衍生功能(key derivation function，KDF)为计算MIC1的函数。示例性的，KDF可以是一个哈希函数。示例性的，其他参数可以包括UE1的完整性保护密钥。
可选的，本申请实施例中，MIC1可能是UE1自己生成的，也可能是UE1对应的DDNMF网元(可以称之为DDNMF1网元)生成的，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。其中，若MIC1是由DDNMF1网元生成，则在UE1向UE2发送直连通信请求之前，UE1接收来自DDNMF1网元的MIC1。可选的，若生成MIC1的输入参数中包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，则一种可能的实现方式中，DDNMF1网元生成MIC1所需的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力是由UE1发送给DDNMF1网元的。
S403、UE2验证MIC1。
本申请实施例中，验证MIC1的过程也就是将接收到的直连通信请求中的MIC1与MIC1的期望MIC作对比的过程。其中，MIC1的期望MIC是使用UE2的完整性保护密钥(与UE1的完整性保护密钥相同)对UE2接收到的直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行完整性校验的生成参数，用于与UE2接收到的直连通信请求中的MIC1作对比，进而校验UE2接收到的直连通信请求是否被篡改。具体的，当MIC1的期望MIC与UE2接收到的直连通信请求中的MIC1相同时，可以确定MIC1验证通过，即UE2可以确定接收到的直连通信请求未被篡改；或者，当MIC1的期望MIC与UE2接收到的直连通信请求中的MIC1不相同时，可以确定MIC1验证未通过，即UE2可以确定接收到的直连通信请求被篡改。其中，生成MIC1的期望MIC的公式与生成MIC1的公式相同，具体可参考生成MIC1的公式，在此不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，UE2可以自己验证MIC1，或者要通过匹配上报(match report)流程验证MIC1，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。其中，match report可参考现有的3GPP TS 33.303标准，本申请实施例对此不予赘述。
一种可能的实现方式中，若UE2可以自己验证MIC1，则此时由UE2根据UE2的完整性保护密钥(与UE1的完整性保护密钥相同)生成MIC1的期望MIC。可选的，UE2的完整性保护密钥可以是UE2从网络侧获得的，比如，UE2在发现参数获取流程中从UE1对应的DDNMF网元(可以称之为DDNMF1网元)获得的。或者，可选的，UE2的完整性保护密钥可以是UE2根据网络侧下发的完整性保护密钥的生成材料生成的。本申请实施例对完整性保护密钥的生成材料不做具体限定。示例性的，完整性保 护密钥的生成材料可以包括一个根密钥，还可以包括其他密钥生成参数等，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
另一种可能的实现方式中，若UE2要通过match report流程验证MIC1，则可以由UE2对应的DDNMF网元(可以称之为DDNMF2网元)根据UE2的完整性保护密钥(与UE1的完整性保护密钥相同)生成MIC1的期望MIC。可选的，UE2的完整性保护密钥可以是DDNMF2网元从网络侧获取的，也可以是DDNMF2网元根据网络侧下发的完整性保护密钥的生成材料生成的，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。可选的，若生成MIC1的期望MIC的输入参数中包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，则一种可能的实现方式中，DDNMF2网元生成MIC1的期望MIC所需的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力是由UE2发送给DDNMF2网元的。进一步地，该方案中，DDNMF2网元可以在match report流程中将UE2的完整性保护密钥发送给UE2；或者DDNMF2网元可以在match report流程中将完整性保护密钥的生成材料发送给UE2，由UE2根据完整性保护密钥的生成材料生成UE2的完整性保护密钥。UE2获取UE2的完整性保护密钥后，保存UE2的完整性保护密钥，以便后续使用。
又一种可能的实现方式中，若UE2要通过match report流程验证MIC1，则可以由UE1对应的DDNMF网元(可以称之为DDNMF1网元)根据UE2的完整性保护密钥(与UE1的完整性保护密钥相同)生成MIC1的期望MIC。可选的，UE2的完整性保护密钥可以是DDNMF1网元从网络侧获取的，也可以是DDNMF1网元根据网络侧下发的完整性保护密钥的生成材料生成的，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。可选的，若生成MIC1的期望MIC的输入参数中包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，则一种可能的实现方式中，DDNMF1网元生成MIC1的期望MIC所需的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力是由UE2通过DDNMF2网元发送给DDNMF1网元的。进一步的，该方案中，DDNMF1网元可以在match report流程中通过DDNMF2网元将UE2的完整性保护密钥发送给UE2，或者DDNMF1网元可以在match report流程通过DDNMF2网元中将完整性保护密钥的生成材料发送给UE2，由UE2根据完整性保护密钥的生成材料生成UE2的完整性保护密钥。UE2获取UE2的完整性保护密钥后，保存UE1的完整性保护密钥，以便后续使用。
本申请实施例中，若MIC1验证成功，可以说明步骤S402中的直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数保护完整，未受到外界攻击者攻击，进而可以继续执行下述步骤S404。
S404、UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略与UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法；以及，UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力与UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法。其中，步骤S404的实现可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不予赘述。
本申请实施例中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法包括一个或者多个机密性保 护算法、以及一个或者多个完整性保护算法。
本申请实施例中，安全算法的选择遵循以下原则：
第一，控制面完整性保护不开启的情况下，对应选择的完整性和机密性保护算法均为空算法(null)。
第二，控制面完整性保护开启的情况下，对应选择的控制面完整性保护算法需要为非空算法(non-null)以表示控制面完整性保护开启；如果此时控制面机密性保护开启则对应选择的控制面机密性保护算法需要为非空算法(non-null)以表示控制面机密性保护开启；如果此时控制面机密性保护不开启则对应选择的控制面机密性保护算法需要为空算法(null)以表示控制面机密性保护不开启。
S405、UE2向UE1发送直连安全模式命令(direct security mode command)。相应的，UE1接收来自UE2的直连安全模式命令。其中，该直连安全模式命令中包括UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连安全模式命令中还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力。进而，UE1接收来自UE2的直连安全模式命令之后，在UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括控制面完整性保护不开启的情况下，UE1需要确定直连安全模式命令中包括的PC5连接中的控制面安全策略是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，PC5连接中的安全能力是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的安全能力，如果验证通过，可以继续执行后续流程，否则终止当前流程。这样可以防止降质攻击(bidding down attack)。
一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，若UE2确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启，则本申请实施例可以采用UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法对直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行完整性保护，具体的完整性保护方法可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。
另一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，若UE2确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级(比如UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括完整性保护不开启，第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启)，则本申请实施例中的直连安全模式命令中还包括MIC2。MIC2是使用UE2的完整性保护密钥对直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护后的生成参数。示例性的，使用UE2的完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护的部分参数例如可以包括UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法(选择的空算法)、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力中的至少一种。在UE2确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于该方案可以使用UE2的完整性保护密钥对直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护，因此可以确保直连安全模式命令中的信息是可以被UE1信任的。进一步的，UE1接收来自UE2的直连安全模式命令之后，还需要验证MIC2。其中，UE1验证MIC2的方式与上述UE2验证MIC1的方式类似，在此不再赘述。若MIC2验证成功，可以说明该直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数保护完整，未受到外 界攻击者攻击，进而可以继续执行下述步骤S406。
可选的，本申请实施例中，UE2的完整性保护密钥可以是UE2生成的，也可以是网络侧下发的，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，生成的各个MIC或期望MIC所使用的完整性保护密钥是相同的，比如生成MIC2所使用的完整性保护密钥与上述生成MIC1或MIC1的期望MIC所使用的完整性保护密钥是相同的，下述生成MIC3、MIC3的期望MIC、MIC4或MIC4的期望MIC所使用的完整性保护密钥与上述生成MIC1或MIC1的期望MIC所使用的完整性保护密钥也是相同的，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
S406、UE1根据UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，UE1根据UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，包括：
若PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法中完整性保护算法为空算法(null)，则最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为：该PC5连接的控制面完整性保护和机密性保护均不开启。也就是说，PC5连接中后续的控制面信令均不需要进行完整性保护与机密性保护。
若PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法中完整性保护算法为non-null，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法中机密性保护算法为non-null，则最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为：该PC5连接的控制面完整性保护开启，且控制面机密性开启。也就是说，PC5连接中后续的控制面信令均需要进行完整性保护与机密性保护。
若PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法中完整性保护算法为non-null，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法中机密性保护算法为null，则最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为：该PC5链接的控制面完整性保护开启，且控制面机密性不开启。也就是说，PC5连接中后续的控制面信令需要进行完整性保护，不需要进行机密性保护。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，UE1确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法可用于后续协商UE1和UE2之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息的保护，如步骤S407中的直连安全模式完成消息的安全保护以及步骤S409中直连通信接受消息的安全保护。此外，UE1确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法还可以用于图4所示的PC5建立流程之后的控制面信令的安全保护，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
S407、UE1向UE2发送直连安全模式完成(direct security mode complete)消息。相应的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连安全模式完成消息。其中，该直连安全模式完成消息包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略。
可选的，本申请实施例中，当PC5连接中的用户面安全能力与PC5连接中的控制面安全能力不相同时，该直连安全模式完成消息还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，假设标准规定UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力与UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力相同，或者安全能力不区分用户面与控制 面，则该直连安全模式完成消息不需要携带UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力。该场景下，下述UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力即为UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力(也可以称之为UE1在PC5连接中的安全能力)，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
其中，PC5连接中的用户面安全策略与PC5连接中的用户面安全能力的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，若UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启，则本申请实施例可以采用UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法对直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行完整性保护，具体的完整性保护方法可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。
另一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，若UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级(比如最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全保护方法包括完整性保护不开启，第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启)，则本申请实施例中的直连安全模式完成消息还包括MIC3。MIC3是使用UE1的完整性保护密钥对直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护后的生成参数。示例性的，使用UE1的完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护的部分参数例如可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略、UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力(可选)。在UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于该方案可以使用UE1的完整性保护密钥对直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护，因此可以确保直连安全模式完成消息中的信息是可以被UE2信任的。进一步的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连安全模式完成消息之后，需要验证MIC3。其中，UE2验证MIC3的方式与上述UE2验证MIC1的方式类似，在此不再赘述。若MIC3验证成功，可以说明该直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数保护完整，未受到外界攻击者攻击，进而可以继续执行下述步骤S408。
可选的，本申请实施例中，UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略与UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力(可选)可以作为生成MIC3的输入参数。具体的，MIC3的计算方式可参考上述MIC1的计算方式，在此不予赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，MIC3可能是UE1自己生成的，也可能是UE1对应的DDNMF网元(可以称之为DDNMF1网元)生成的，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。其中，若MIC3是由DDNMF1网元生成，则在UE1向UE2发送直连安全模式完成消息之前，UE1接收来自DDNMF1网元的MIC3。可选的，若生成MIC1的输入参数中包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略与UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力(可选)，则一种可能的实现方式中，DDNMF1网元生成MIC3所需的UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略与UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力(可选)是由UE1发送给DDNMF1网元的。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括机密性保护开启，则该直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数还需要进行机密性保护，具体的保护方式可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。
S408、UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略与UE2在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。其中，步骤S408的具体实现可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不予赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法与PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法不同，UE2还需要根据UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力与UE2在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。其中，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法包括一个或者多个机密性保护算法、以及一个或者多个完整性保护算法。安全算法的选择遵循的原则可参考步骤S404，在此不再赘述。
S409、UE2向UE1发送直连通信接受(direct communication accept)消息。相应的，UE1接收来自UE2的直连通信接受消息。其中，该直连通信接受消息包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连通信接受消息中还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略和UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力(可选)。进而，UE1接收来自UE2的直连通信接受消息之后，在UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括控制面完整性保护不开启的情况下，UE1需要确定直连通信接受消息中包括的PC5连接中的用户面安全策略是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的用户面安全策略，PC5连接中的安全能力是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的安全能力，如果验证通过，可以继续执行后续流程，否则终止当前流程。这样可以防止降质攻击。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若UE2确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法，则该直连通信接受消息还包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法。
一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，若步骤S404中UE2确定该PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括控制面完整性保护，则本申请实施例可以采用UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法对该直连通信接受消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行完整性保护，具体的完整性保护方法可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。
另一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，若步骤S407中的直连安全模式完成消息中包括MIC3，则步骤S409中的直连通信接受消息中还包括MIC4。MIC4是使用UE2的完整性保护密钥对直连通信接受消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护后的生成参数。示例性的，使用UE2的完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护的部分参数例如可以包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法、PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法(可选)。在UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级(比如UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括完整性保护不开启，第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启)的情况下，由于该方案可以使用UE2的完整性保护密钥对直连通信接受消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数做完整性保护，因此可以确保直连通信接受消息中的信息是可以被UE1信任的。进一步的，UE1接收来自UE2的直连通信接受消息之后，还需要验证MIC4。其中，UE1验证MIC4的方式与上述UE2验证MIC1的方式类似，在此不再赘述。若MIC4验证成功，可以说明该直连通信接受消息中传递的全部参数或部分 参数保护完整，未受到外界攻击者攻击，进而可以继续执行后续流程。
基于本申请实施例提供的通信方法，由于UE1确定第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启之后，在UE1与UE2之间的PC5建立流程中，UE1和UE2可以使用第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的消息进行完整性保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
其中，上述步骤S401至S409中UE1或者UE2的动作可以由图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的应用程序代码以指令该UE1或者UE2执行，本实施例对此不作任何限制。
另一种可能的实现方式中，以UE1与UE2的交互为例，本申请实施例提供一种通信方法，该通信方法使用ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法对UE1与UE2之间的PC5建立流程中的一条或多条消息进行安全保护。同时在PC5建立流程中根据ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接(方便起见，后续将UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接简称为PC5连接)的控制面使用的安全保护方法与PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。示例性的，如图5所示，本申请实施例提供的通信方法包括如下步骤：
S501、UE1向UE2发送直连通信请求(direct communication request)。相应的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连通信请求。其中，该直连通信请求包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力。其中，PC5连接中的控制面安全能力的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
当然，本申请实施例中，该直连通信请求还可以包括UE1的部分或全部发现参数，具体可参考现有的3GPP TS23.303，v15.1.0标准，在此不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。比如，可以采用第一安全保护方法对UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力进行安全保护。其中，第一安全保护方法为UE1与UE2之间的ProSe发现流程中获取的安全保护方法。本申请实施例中不限定ProSe发现流程中确定安全保护方法的方式。一种可能的实现方式中，ProSe发现流程中确定安全保护方法的方式可参考后续图7所示的实施例。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连通信请求还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略可用于后续确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法。其中，UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略可以采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护。PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，在UE1确定第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，该直连通信请求还可以包括MIC1。其中，MIC1的相关描述可参考图4所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。进一步的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连通信请求之后，可以验证MIC1，MIC1的验证方式可参考图4所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。若MIC1验证成功，可以说明步骤S501中的直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数保护完整，未受到外界攻击者攻击，进而可以继续执行下述步骤S502。
S502、UE2根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法；以及，UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力与UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法。
下面给出UE2确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的两种具体实现。
一种可能的实现方式中，UE2可以直接将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，即UE2直接按照第一安全保护方法激活PC5连接的控制面安全。示例性的，若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护开启，则UE2确定激活控制面机密性保护；若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，则UE2确定不激活控制面机密性保护；若第一安全保护方法为完整性保护开启，则UE2确定激活控制面控制完整性保护；若第一安全保护方法为完整性保护不开启，则UE2确定不激活控制面完整性保护。该方案中，由于UE2不需要与UE1协商PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，而是直接将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，因此不仅简化了UE2的处理逻辑，而且可以节省PC5建立流程的信令开销。
另一种可能的实现方式中，UE2在确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法时，还参考UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略。
其中，在第一安全保护方法满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(也可以理解为第一安全保护方法可以被UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略支持)的情况下，UE2可以将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，即UE2按照第一安全保护方法激活PC5连接的控制面安全。比如，若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，完整性保护开启，并且UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性保护可选，完整性保护可选，则UE2可以确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，完整性保护开启。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略时，将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得UE2确定出的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法能被UE1支持，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
在第一安全保护方法不满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(也可以理解为第一安全保护方法不可以被UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略支持)的情况下，UE2可以选择一个满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，从而UE2按照选择的安全保护方法激活PC5连接的控制面安全。比如，若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，完整性保护开启，并且UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性保护开启，完整性保护可选，则UE2可以确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为机密性保护开启，完整性保护开启。当然，本申请实施例中，在第一安全保护方法不满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的情况下，UE2也可以拒绝UE1的加入，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法不满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略时，UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，选择一 个满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得UE2确定出的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法能被UE1支持，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
在第一安全保护方法满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(也可以理解为第一安全保护方法可以被UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略支持)的情况下，UE2还可以根据UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，从而UE2按照选择的安全保护方法激活PC5连接的控制面安全。比如，若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，完整性保护不开启，并且UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性保护可选，完整性保护可选，则UE2可以确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为机密性保护开启，完整性保护开启。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略时，UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得UE2确定出的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法也能被UE1使用，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
又一种可能的实现方式中，UE2在确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法时，还参考UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略。
其中，在第一安全保护方法可以同时满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(也可以理解为第一安全保护方法可以同时被UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略支持)的情况下，UE2可以将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，即UE2按照第一安全保护方法激活PC5连接的控制面安全。比如，若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，完整性保护开启，并且UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性保护可选且完整性保护可选，UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性不开启，完整性保护可选，则UE2可以确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，完整性保护开启。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法可以同时满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略时，将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得UE2确定出的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法能被UE1和UE2同时支持，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
在第一安全保护方法不满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略或者UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(也可以理解为第一安全保护方法不可以同时被UE1在直连通信请求发 送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略支持)的情况下，UE2可以选择一个满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，且满足UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，从而UE2按照选择的安全保护方法激活PC5连接的控制面安全。比如，若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护不开启，完整性保护开启，并且UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性保护开启且完整性保护可选，UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性保护开启且完整性保护可选，则UE2可以确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为机密性保护开启，完整性保护开启。当然，本申请实施例中，在第一安全保护方法不满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略或者UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的情况下，UE2也可以拒绝UE1的加入，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法不满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略或者UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略时，UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略以及UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，选择一个满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略且满足UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得UE2确定出的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法能被UE1和UE2同时支持，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
在第一安全保护方法可以同时满足UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(也可以理解为第一安全保护方法可以同时被UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略支持)的情况下，UE2还可以根据UE1在直连通信请求发送的UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略以及UE2在本地保存或者从跟其他网元获取的UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，从而UE2按照选择的安全保护方法激活PC5连接的控制面安全。比如，若第一安全保护方法为机密性保护开启，完整性保护不开启，并且UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略为机密性保护可选且完整性保护可选，UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的机密性保护不开启，则UE2可以确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为机密性保护开启，完整性保护开启。由于该方案在第一安全保护方法同时满足UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略时，UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略以及UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，因此不仅可以使得UE2确定出的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法能被UE1和UE2同时支持，而且保证了第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
综上，也就是说，本申请实施例中，UE2确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，第一安全保护方法的安全等级是控制面信令交互的最低安全等级要求，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
进一步地，本申请实施例中，在UE2确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法之后，UE2可以根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力与UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，结合UE2确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法。其中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法包括一个或者多个机密性保护算法、以及一个或者多个完整性保护算法。安全算法的选择遵循的原则可参考步骤S404，在此不再赘述。
S503、UE2向UE1发送直连安全模式命令(direct security mode command)。相应的，UE1接收来自UE2的直连安全模式命令。其中，该直连安全模式命令中包括UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连安全模式命令中还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力。进而，UE1接收来自UE2的直连安全模式命令之后，在UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括控制面完整性保护不开启的情况下，UE1需要确定直连安全模式命令中包括的PC5连接中的控制面安全策略是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，PC5连接中的安全能力是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的安全能力，如果验证通过，可以继续执行后续流程，否则终止当前流程。这样可以防止降质攻击(bidding down attack)。
本申请实施例中，直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用UE2确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法进行安全保护的。比如，若UE2将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，则直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。其中，对直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行安全保护的方式可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。示例性的，直连安全模式命令中进行安全保护的部分参数例如可以包括UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力中的至少一种。
S504、UE1根据UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法。
其中，步骤S504的相关描述可参考图4所示的实施例步骤S406，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，UE1确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法可用于后续协商UE1和UE2之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息的保护，如步骤S505中的直连安全模式完成消息的安全保护以及步骤S507中直连通信接受消息的安全保护。此外，UE1确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法还可以用于图5所示的PC5建立流程之后的控制面信令的安全保护，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
S505、UE1向UE2发送直连安全模式完成(direct security mode complete)消息。 相应的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连安全模式完成消息。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连安全模式完成消息可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略，UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略可用于后续确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。其中，PC5连接中的用户面安全策略的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，当PC5连接中的用户面安全能力与PC5连接中的控制面安全能力不相同时，该直连安全模式完成消息还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，假设标准规定UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力与UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力相同，或者安全能力不区分用户面与控制面，则该直连安全模式完成消息不需要携带UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力。该场景下，下述UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力即为UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
本申请实施例中，直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用UE1确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法进行安全保护的。比如，若UE2将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，则直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。其中，对直连安全模式完成消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行安全保护的方式可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。示例性的，直连安全模式完成消息中进行安全保护的部分参数例如可以UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略或UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力中的至少一种。
S506、UE2根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。
本申请实施例中，UE2根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的实现方式与上述步骤S502中UE2根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的实现方式类似，区别比如在于：1、将步骤S502中的控制面替换为步骤S506中的用户面；2、步骤S506中UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略来自UE1向UE2发送的直连安全模式完成消息，其余相关描述可参考上述步骤S502，在此不再赘述。
也就是说，本申请实施例中，UE2确定的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说第一安全保护方法的安全等级是用户面数据交互的最低安全要求，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法与PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法不同，则在UE2确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法之后，UE2还需要根据UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力与UE2在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力，结合UE2的确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。其中，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法包括一个或者多个机密性保护算法、以及一个或者多个完整性保护算法。安全算法的选择遵循的原则可参考步骤S404，在此不再赘述。
S507、UE2向UE1发送直连通信接受(direct communication accept)消息。相应 的，UE1接收来自UE2的直连通信接受消息。其中，该直连通信接受消息包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连通信接受消息中还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略和UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力(可选)。进而，UE1接收来自UE2的直连通信接受消息之后，在UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括控制面完整性保护不开启的情况下，UE1需要确定直连通信接受消息中包括的PC5连接中的用户面安全策略是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的用户面安全策略，PC5连接中的安全能力是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的安全能力，如果验证通过，可以继续执行后续流程，否则终止当前流程。这样可以防止降质攻击。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若UE2确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法，则该直连通信接受消息还包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法。
本申请实施例中，直连通信接受消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用UE2确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法进行安全保护的。比如，若UE2将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，则直连通信接受消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。其中，对直连通信接受消息中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行安全保护的方式可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。示例性的，直连通信接受消息中进行安全保护的部分参数例如可以包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法、UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略和UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力、或者PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法中的至少一种。
基于本申请实施例提供的通信方法，一方面，由于本申请实施例在PC5建立流程中可以根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法和PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，其中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法和PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级均不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级要求，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。另一方面，本申请实施例可以使用第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的第一条消息进行保护，则在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启时，UE1和UE2可以使用ProSe发现流程中确定的第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的第一条消息进行完整性保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
其中，上述步骤S501至S507中UE1或者UE2的动作可以由图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的应用程序代码以指令该UE1或者UE2执行，本实施例对此不作任何限制。
需要说明的是，图5所示的实施例以根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法与PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法为例进行说明。可选的，本申请实施例中，也可以根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，通过图4所示的实施例中步骤S407-S409的方式协商PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法；或者，本申请实施例中，也可以根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，通过类似图4所示的实施例中步骤S402-S406的方式协商PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
另一种可能的实现方式中，以UE1与UE2的交互为例，本申请实施例提供一种通信方法，该通信方法使用ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法对UE1与UE2之间的PC5建立流程中的一条或多条消息进行安全保护。同时在PC5建立流程中根据ProSe发现流程中确定的安全保护方法确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接(方便起见，后续将UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接简称为PC5连接)的控制面使用的安全保护方法，协商PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。示例性的，如图6所示，本申请实施例提供的通信方法包括如下步骤：
S601、UE1向UE2发送直连通信请求(direct communication request)。相应的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连通信请求。其中，该直连通信请求包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略以及UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力。其中，PC5连接中的用户面安全策略与PC5连接中的控制面安全能力的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
当然，本申请实施例中，该直连通信请求还可以包括UE1的部分或全部发现参数，具体可参考现有的3GPP TS23.303，v15.1.0标准，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，假设标准规定UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力与UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力相同，或者安全能力不区分用户面与控制面，则本申请实施例中，PC5连接中的控制面安全能力也可以称之为PC5连接中的安全能力，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。比如，可以第一安全保护方法对UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略和/或UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力进行安全保护。其中，第一安全保护方法为UE1与UE2之间的ProSe发现流程中获取的安全保护方法。本申请实施例中不限定ProSe发现流程中确定安全保护方法的方式。一种可能的实现方式中，ProSe发现流程中确定安全保护方法的方式可参考后续图7所示的实施例。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连通信请求还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略可用于后续确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法。其中，UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略可以采用第一安全保护方法进行安全保护。PC5连接中的控制面安全策略的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，当PC5连接中的用户面安全能力与PC5连接中的控制面安全能力不相同时，该直连通信请求还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力。
可选的，本申请实施例中，在UE1确定第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，该直连通信请求还可以包括MIC3。其中，MIC3的相关描述可参考图4所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。进一步的，UE2接收来自UE1的直连通信请求之后，可以验证MIC3，MIC3的验证方式可参考图4所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。若MIC3验证成功，可以说明步骤S601中的直连通信请求中传递的全部参数或部分参数保护完整，未受到外界攻击者攻击，进而可以继续执行下述步骤S602。
S602、UE2根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法； 以及，UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力与UE2在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法。
其中，步骤S602的相关描述可参考图5所示的实施例中的步骤S502，在此不再赘述。
S603、UE2根据UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略与UE2在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略，确定UE1与UE2之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。
其中，步骤S603的相关描述可参考图4所示的实施例中的步骤S408，在此不再赘述。
S604、UE2向UE1发送直连安全模式命令(direct security mode command)。相应的，UE1接收来自UE2的直连安全模式命令。其中，该直连安全模式命令中包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法以及UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该直连安全模式命令中还可以包括UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力(可选)、UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力(可选)以及UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略(可选)。进而，UE1接收来自UE2的直连安全模式命令之后，在UE1确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括控制面完整性保护不开启的情况下，UE1需要确定直连安全模式命令中包括的PC5连接中的用户面安全策略是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的用户面安全策略，PC5连接中的控制面安全能力是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的控制面安全能力，PC5连接中的用户面安全能力是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的用户面安全能力，PC5连接中的控制面安全策略是否是自己发送的PC5连接中的控制面安全策略。如果验证通过，可以继续执行后续流程，否则终止当前流程。这样可以防止降质攻击。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若UE2确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法，则该直连安全模式命令还包括PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法。
本申请实施例中，直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用UE2确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法进行安全保护的。比如，若UE2将第一安全保护方法确定为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，则直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数是采用ProSe发现流程中确定的第一安全保护方法进行安全保护的。其中，对直连安全模式命令中传递的全部参数或部分参数进行安全保护的方式可参考现有技术，在此不予赘述。示例性的，直连安全模式命令中进行安全保护的部分参数例如可以包括UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法、PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法、UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略、UE1在PC5连接中的用户面安全能力、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全能力、UE1在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略、PC5连接的用户面使用的安全算法中的至少一种。
S605、UE1根据UE2选择的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全算法确定最终的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法。
其中，步骤S605的相关描述可参考图4所示的实施例步骤S406，在此不再赘述。
至此，UE1和UE2均可以获知PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法以及PC5 连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，UE1确定的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法可用于图6所示的PC5建立流程之后的控制面信令的安全保护，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中步骤S601中的直连通信请求也可以替换为直连安全模式完成消息，步骤S604中的直连安全模式命令也可以替换为直连通信接受消息。即通过现有的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的协商流程的消息进行上述PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的协商，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
基于本申请实施例提供的通信方法，一方面，由于本申请实施例在PC5建立流程中可以根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，其中，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级均不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，第一安全保护方法的安全等级是控制面信令交互的最低安全等级要求，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。另一方面，本申请实施例可以使用第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的第一条消息进行保护，则在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启时，UE1和UE2可以使用第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的第一条消息进行完整性保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
需要说明的是，图6所示的实施例以在PC5建立流程中根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，协商PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法为例进行说明。可选的，本申请实施例还可以提供一种通信方法，该通信方法使用第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的一条或多条消息进行安全保护。同时在PC5建立流程中根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，协商PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法。其中，该方法的具体实现可参考图6所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。
其中，上述步骤S601至S605中UE1或者UE2的动作可以由图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的应用程序代码以指令该UE1或者UE2执行，本实施例对此不作任何限制。
需要说明的是，图5或图6所示的实施例以根据第一安全保护方法确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法和/或PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法为例进行说明。当然，本申请实施例也可以在ProSe发现流程中获取PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法和/或PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，从而PC5建立流程不需要协商PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法，也不需要协商PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法，从而可以节省PC5建立流程的信令开销。进一步的，当ProSe发现流程中获取的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法包括控制面完整性保护开启时，由于可以对PC5建立流程中的所有消息进行完整性保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
本申请实施例还提供一种通信方法，该通信方法用于获取图4至图6任一实施例中的第一安全保护方法。可选的，通过该通信方法还可以获取PC5连接的控制面使用 的安全保护方法和/或PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。示例性的，如图7所示，该通信方法包括如下步骤：
S701、终端设备1向DDNMF1网元发送发现请求(discovery request)。相应的，DDNMF1网元接收来自终端设备1的发现请求。
其中，该发现请求包括终端设备1的3GPP身份信息、用于ProSe业务的身份信息、发现模式(discovery mode)、发现命令(discovery command)，发现类型(discovery type)和应用标识(application ID)中的一个或多个。发现类型、发现模式、发现命令或者用于ProSe业务的身份信息的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序介绍部分，在此不再赘述。
示例性的，本申请实施例中的终端设备1可以为model A发现模式下的播报方UE(announcing UE)，下述的终端设备2可以为model A发现模式下的监听方UE(monitoring UE)；或者，本申请实施例中的终端设备1可以为model B发现模式下的被发现者UE(discoveree UE)，下述的终端设备2可以为model B发现模式下的发现者UE(discoverer UE)，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，终端设备1可以通过控制面的非接入层(non access stratum，NAS)消息向DDNMF1网元发送发现请求，即此时发现请求本身就是一条NAS消息，或者是被NAS消息承载的一种实现发现请求的功能的参数；另一种可能的实现方式中，终端设备1可以通过用户面向DDNMF1网元发送，即此时发现请求是被互联网协议(internet protocol,IP)或者非IP承载的，本申请实施例对发现请求的发送方式不做具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1的3GPP身份信息例如可以为签约隐藏标识(subscription concealed identifier，SUCI)、5G-全球唯一临时标识(global unique temporary identifier，GUTI)、通用公共用户标识符(generic public subscription identifier，GPSI)、永久设备标识符(permanent equipment identifier，PEI)中的一个。若终端设备1通过控制面流程接入DDNMF1网元，则可以使用SUCI或者5G-GUTI等身份信息作为终端设备1的3GPP身份信息；若终端设备1通过用户面流程接入DDNMF1网元，则可以使用GPSI或PEI等身份信息作为终端设备1的3GPP身份信息。在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中的应用标识用于表示某个特定的应用。其中，应用标识可以是预配置在终端设备1上的。一种可能的实现方式中，本申请实施例中，DDNMF1网元根据应用标识可以确定对应的用于ProSe业务的身份信息。示例性的，假设一个应用标识对应的发现类型是固定的，即一个应用标识对应一种发现类型(比如是open discovery还是restricted discovery)，则由于发现类型可以对应用于ProSe业务的user identity(比如ProSe application ID用于开放发现场景；PDUID或RPAUID用于限制发现场景)，因此根据应用标识可以间接确定出对应的用于ProSe业务的身份信息。
可选的，本申请实施例中的发现请求还可以包括服务类型(service type)。该服务类型是应用标识下一个更细的粒度，即一个应用标识可以对应不同的服务类型。其中，该服务类型用于辅助应用标识确定对应的用于ProSe业务的身份信息。也就是说，本申请实施例中，DDNMF1网元根据应用标识和服务类型可以确定对应的用于ProSe 业务的身份信息。
可选的，本申请实施例中的服务类型可以用于表征应用标识所标识的应用下的具体业务需求。比如服务类型用来表示一个应用下的收费业务或者免费业务。其中，本申请实施例通过引入服务类型可以提升应用使用的灵活性。
可选的，本申请实施例中的服务类型的内容可以根据表示的不同信息有不同的存储或者传递方法。比如，用0或者1代表是收费的还是免费的业务，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例中的服务类型可以是在安装应用标识所标识的应用时配置在终端设备1上的，也可以是网络侧发送给终端设备1的，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，发现请求在终端设备1与DDNMF1网元之间传递时，可能经过其他网元的转发与处理。也就是说，发现请求在终端设备1与DDNMF1网元之间传递时，消息的内容可以做适当的变形，本申请实施例仅是从功能方面对消息进行描述，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。比如，终端设备1在通过控制面向DDNMF1网元发送发现请求的过程中，终端设备1的3GPP身份信息需要经过AMF网元或者其他网元的“翻译”转化为终端设备1的签约永久标识(subscription permanent identifier，SUPI)。或者，终端设备1在通过用户面向DDNMF1网元发送发现请求的过程中，终端设备1的3GPP身份信息可能经过NEF网元或者其他网元的“翻译”转化为终端设备1的SUPI。当然，若DDNMF1网元获取到的终端设备1的3GPP身份信息中不包括SUPI，DDNMF1网元还可以通过与UDM网元(或者其他网元)的交互获取终端设备1的SUPI。示例性的，DDNMF1网元向UDM网元发送UE ID请求(UE ID request)消息，该UE ID请求消息包括终端设备1的3GPP身份信息(比如GPSI或PEI)。UDM网元接收来自DDNMF1网元的UE ID请求消息，并根据终端设备1的3GPP身份信息确定终端设备1的SUPI之后，向DDNMF1网元发送终端设备1的SUPI。
S702、DDNMF1网元根据用于ProSe业务的身份信息和应用标识对终端设备1进行ProSe业务发现授权检查。
可选的，本申请实施例中，DDNMF1网元可以根据应用标识确定对应的邻近业务应用服务器(ProSe app server)并由ProSe app server完成授权检查后通知给DDNMF1网元。本申请实施例中，ProSe app server授权检查用于验证终端设备1是否可以合法使用该ProSe业务，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若终端设备1携带了多个用于ProSe业务的身份信息，则根据上面的描述，DDNMF1网元要根据各个用于ProSe业务的身份信息，分别对终端设备1进行ProSe业务发现授权检查，上述多个授权可分别在独立流程中进行，也可在统一的流程中进行，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
S703、DDNMF1网元获取终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数以及安全信息。
本申请实施例中，DDNMF1网元可以根据终端设备1的3GPP身份信息和用于ProSe业务的身份信息，获取终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数以及安全信息。其中，DDNMF网元获取终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数与安全信 息的方式包括：发现参数与安全信息均从DDNMF1网元本地获取；或者，发现参数与安全信息中的部分内容从DDNMF1网元本地获取，部分内容从ProSe业务发现授权检查流程中ProSe app server回复的认证响应(authentication request)中获取；或者，发现参数与安全信息均从ProSe业务发现授权检查流程中ProSe app server回复的认证响应中获取，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
本申请实施例中，在restricted discovery的发现场景下，终端设备1的发现参数例如可以如表一所示：
表一
Figure PCTCN2020109382-appb-000001
其中，在Model A模式下，Code-Send-SecParams包含用来在PC5接口上的发现流程中保护Prose Restricted Code所用的发现参数；在Model B模式下，
Code-Send-SecParams用来在PC5接口上的发现流程中保护ProSe Response Code所用的发现参数，Code-Rcv-SecParams包含用来在PC5接口上的发现流程中获取对端发来的ProSe发现使用的code所用的发现参数。表一中发现参数的相关描述可参考现有的3GPP TS 23.303，v15.1.0和3GPP TS 33.303，v15.0.0标准，在此不予赘述。
本申请实施例中，在open discovery的发现场景下，终端设备1的发现参数例如可以如表二所示：
表二
  Model A
ProSe发现使用的code ProSe Application Code
发现参数 Discovery Key
发现时间限制参数 CURRENT_TIME，MAX_OFFSET
其中，Discovery Key包含用来在发现流程中保护ProSe Application Code所用的发现参数，即上述发现参数用于在PC5接口上保护ProSe发现使用的Code。表二中发现参数的相关描述可参考现有的3GPP TS 23.303，v15.1.0和3GPP TS 33.303，v15.0.0标准，在此不予赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的安全信息包括终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，或者终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法。
其中，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法为固定的安全保护方法。可选的，该安全保护方法可以用于对后续第一条PC5广播消息进行安全保护；和/或，该安全保护方法可以用于对PC5建立流程中的一条或多条消息进行安全保护；和/或，该安全保护方法可以用于确定终端设备1与终端设备2之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。其中，PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护；和/或，PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对PC5 连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。示例性的，该安全保护方法用于对PC5建立流程中的一条或多条消息进行安全保护；和/或，该安全保护方法用于确定终端设备1与终端设备2之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法的示例可参考图4至图6所示的任一实施例，在此不再赘述。其中，第一条PC5广播消息的相关描述可参考具体实施方式前序部分，在此不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法可以为多个安全保护方法。比如，一个安全保护方法为第一条PC5广播消息使用的安全保护方法；一个安全保护方法为PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法；一个安全保护方法为PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。其中，第一条PC5广播消息使用的安全保护方法、PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法以及PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法可以相同，也可以不相同，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
示例性的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法例如可以包括以下任意一个：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启，机密性保护开启+完整性保护不开启，机密性保护不开启+完整性保护开启，或者，机密性保护不开启+完整性保护不开启。其中，默认该待使用的安全保护方法至少可用于对后续第一条PC5广播消息进行安全保护。
或者，示例性的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法例如可以包括：
第一条PC5广播消息所使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护不开启+完整性保护开启；PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启；以及，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启。其中，第一条PC5广播消息所使用的安全保护方法、PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法与PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法均不相同。
或者，示例性的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法例如可以包括：
第一条PC5广播消息所使用的安全保护方法以及PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护不开启+完整性保护开启；PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启。
或者，示例性的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法例如可以包括：
第一条PC5广播消息所使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护不开启+完整性保护开启；以及，PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启。
或者，示例性的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法例如可以包括：
第一条PC5广播消息所使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护不开启+完整性保护开启；以及，PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启。
其中，本申请实施例中，多个可供选择的安全保护方法例如可以是ProSe app server 推荐的安全策略对应的安全保护方法。进一步的，多个可供选择的安全保护方法可以有优先级排序。
示例性的，有优先级排序的多个可供选择的安全保护方法例如可以包括：机密性保护不开启+完整性保护开启＞机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启＞机密性保护不开启+完整性保护不开启。其中，这里的“＞”可以理解为“安全等级高于”，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，对于不同的发现模式，比如上述Model A或Model B，可以分别采用不同的安全信息，也可以采用相同的安全信息，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例中的安全信息也可以与表一或表二中的ProSe发现使用的code相关联，即不同的ProSe发现使用的code，可以对应不同的安全信息，也可以采用相同的安全信息，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中的安全信息可能包含在发现参数中，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
进一步的，当本申请实施例中的终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的安全信息包括终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法时，则需要继续执行下述步骤S704之后再执行步骤S705；当本申请实施例中的终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的安全信息包括终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，则直接执行步骤S705，不需要执行步骤S704。
S704、DDNMF1网元根据多个可供选择的安全保护方法，确定终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，DDNMF1网元可以根据终端的设备1的状态、终端设备1的类型以及当前业务的服务质量(quality of service，QoS)要求等参数，从多个可供选择的安全保护方法中选择终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
示例性的，若是一个低时延的业务，则DDNMF1网元可以将安全等级最低的安全保护方法确定为终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。或者，比如，若是一个高可靠的业务，则DDNMF1网元可以将安全等级最高的安全保护方法确定为终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
当然，本申请实施例中，DDNMF1网元也可以将多个可供选择的安全保护方法中安全等级最高的安全保护方法直接确定为终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
S705、DDNMF1网元向终端设备1发送发现响应(discovery response)。相应的，终端设备1接收来自DDNMF1网元的发现响应。其中，该发现响应包括终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数和所需的安全保护方法。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法可能包含在发现参数中，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
综上，通过步骤S701-S705，终端设备1可以获取终端设备1使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数和所需的安全保护方法。
S706、终端设备2向DDNMF2网元发送发现请求。相应的，DDNMF2网元接收 来自终端设备2的发现请求。
S707、DDNMF2网元根据用于ProSe业务的身份信息和应用标识对终端设备2进行ProSe业务发现授权检查。
S708、DDNMF2网元获取终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数以及安全信息。
进一步的，当本申请实施例中的终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的安全信息包括终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法时，则需要继续执行下述步骤S709之后再执行步骤S710；当本申请实施例中的终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的安全信息包括终端设备2使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，则直接执行步骤S710，不需要执行步骤S709。
S709、DDNMF2网元根据多个可供选择的安全保护方法，确定终端设备2使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
S710、DDNMF2网元向终端设备2发送发现响应。相应的，终端设备2接收来自DDNMF2网元的发现响应。其中，该发现响应包括终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数和所需的安全保护方法。
本申请实施例中，在restricted discovery的发现场景下，终端设备2的发现参数例如可以如表三所示：
表三
Figure PCTCN2020109382-appb-000002
其中，在Model A模式下，Code-Rcv-SecParams包含用来在PC5接口上的发现流程中保护Prose Restricted Code所用的发现参数；在Model B模式下，Code-Send-SecParams包含用来在PC5接口上的发现流程中保护ProSe Query Code所用的发现参数，Code-Rcv-SecParams包含用来在PC5接口上的发现流程中获取对端发来的ProSe发现使用的code所用的发现参数。即上述发现参数用于在PC5接口上保护ProSe发现使用的Code。表三中发现参数的相关描述可参考现有的3GPP TS 23.303，v15.1.0和3GPP TS 33.303，v15.0.0标准，在此不予赘述。
本申请实施例中，在open discovery的发现场景下，终端设备2的发现参数例如可以如表四所示：
表四
  Model A
ProSe发现使用的code ProSe Application Code
发现时间限制参数 CURRENT_TIME，MAX_OFFSET
需要说明的是，open discovery的发现场景下，终端设备2不需要对应的discovery key，解密依靠匹配上报(match report)流程。也就是说，此时终端设备2不存在对应的发现参数。相关描述可参考现有的3GPP TS 23.303，v15.1.0和3GPP TS 33.303， v15.0.0标准，在此不予赘述。
其中，上述步骤S706-S710的具体实现可参考上述步骤S701-S705，区别比如在于：将步骤S701-S705中的终端设备1替换为步骤S706-S710中的终端设备2；将步骤S701-S705中的DDNMF1网元替换为步骤S706-S710中的DDNMF2网元等，其余相关描述可参考上述步骤S701-S705，在此不再赘述。
综上，通过步骤S706-S710，终端设备2可以获取终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的发现参数和所需的安全保护方法。
需要说明的是，步骤S706-S710以DDNMF2网元自己确定使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法为例进行说明。可选的，本申请实施例中，DDNMF2网元还可以通过与DDNMF1网元的协商确定使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
一种可能的实现方式中，DDNMF2网元从DDNMF1网元获取终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；进一步的，DDNMF2网元根据终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法和终端设备1使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定终端设备2使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。例如，DDNMF2网元确定终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法中是否包括终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；当终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法中包括终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，DDNMF2网元将终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定为终端设备2使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。再例如，当终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法中不包括终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，DDNMF2网元从终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法中确定终端设备2使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。比如，DDNMF2网元获取的终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法中包括完整性保护开启+机密性保护不开启、完整性保护开启+机密性保护开启，即只要完整性保护开启，机密性保护可以开启也可以不开启。假设终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启+机密性保护不开启，或者终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启+机密性保护开启，则DDNMF2网元可以确定终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法即为终端设备2使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
另一种可能的实现方式中，DDNMF2网元从DDNMF1网元获取终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；进一步的，在DDNMF2网元确定终端设备2使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法之后，可以进一步确定终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法与终端设备2使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法是否相同，若相同，DDNMF网元可以继续执行步骤S710；若不相同，则DDNMF2网元可以将终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定为最终终端设备2使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，并在步骤S710中携带该终端设备2使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
需要说明的是，当终端设备1或终端设备2需要获取多个ProSe发现使用的code对应的安全保护方法时，DDNMF2网元从DDNMF1网元获取终端设备1使用该ProSe 业务时所需的安全保护方法之后，若终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法中包括多个ProSe发现使用的code对应的安全保护方法，则DDNMF2网元确定终端设备2使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法中是否存在某个ProSe发现使用的code对应的安全保护方法与终端设备1使用该ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法中相同ProSe发现使用的code对应的安全保护方法相同，若存在，则DDNMF2网元可以进一步执行步骤S710，并在步骤S710中携带该ProSe发现使用的code对应的安全保护方法，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
可选的，本申请实施例中，DDNMF2网元从DDNMF1网元获取终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，可以包括：DDNMF2网元向DDNMF1网元发送请求消息，该请求消息用于请求终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。其中，该请求消息包括终端设备2发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息，或者可以关联到终端设备1发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息，或者可以关联到目标应用的信息。进而，DDNMF2网元接收来自DDNMF1网元的终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
可选的，本申请实施例中，DDNMF2网元可以使用现有技术确定是否从DDNMF1网元获取终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例以终端设备1发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息与终端设备2发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息相同为例进行说明，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。当然，本申请实施例中，终端设备1发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息与终端设备2发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息也可以不相同。此时，DDNMF1网元/DDNMF2网元可以根据终端设备2发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息、以及终端设备1发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息确定待使用的安全保护方法。比如，DDNMF1网元/DDNMF2网元可以关联终端设备2发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息、以及终端设备1发送的用于ProSe业务的身份信息。比如可以通过应用ID关联，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例提供的通信方法还包括如下发现广播流程。
以Model A发现场景为例，则本申请实施例提供的通信方法还可以包括如下步骤骤S711-S712：
S711、终端设备1向终端设备2发送广播(announcing)消息。相应的，终端设备2接收来自终端设备1的广播消息。其中，该广播消息使用步骤S705中获取的终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法进行安全保护。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该广播消息中可以包括对该广播消息进行安全保护的安全保护方法，从而使得使用这种安全保护方法的终端设备2可以接收该广播消息。其中，对该广播消息进行安全保护的安全保护方法可以隐式携带在该广播消息中，也可以显示携带在该广播消息中，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
示例性的，隐士的方式比如不同的ProSe发现使用的code代表不同的安全保护方法。即DDNMF1网元可以发送多个ProSe发现使用的code给announcing UE，不同的ProSe发现使用的code对应不同的安全保护方法。进一步的，终端设备2接收广播消 息之后，可以根据ProSe发现使用的code确定对应的安全保护方法。
或者，示例性的，显示的方式比如在广播消息中携带安全指示信息，该安全指示信息用于指示该广播消息使用的安全保护方法。比如，安全指示信息是2个bit，0代表安全没有开启，1代表安全开启。比如，00代表机密性保护未开启且完整性保护未开启，10代表机密性保护开启，但是完整性保护未开启，01代表机密性保护未开启，但是完整性保护没有开启，11代表机密性保护未开启且完整性保护未开启。进一步的，终端设备2接收广播消息之后，可以根据安全指示信息确定对应的安全保护方法。
S712、终端设备2验证广播消息。
步骤S712可参考现有的实现方式，在此不再赘述。
示例性的，假设终端设备2接收到的DDNMF2网元发送的终端设备2使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护不开启，但是终端设备2接收到的广播消息指示的该广播消息使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启，则即使终端设备2与终端设备1对相同的应用感兴趣，也不能建立后续的PC5连接。换言之，终端设备1与终端设备2之间仅是因为安全要求不匹配而不能建立PC5连接。
或者，示例性的，假设终端设备2接收到的广播消息指示的该广播消息使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启，终端设备2接收到的DDNMF2网元发送的终端设备2使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法中包括：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启，则终端设备2可以确定对终端设备1的应用建立PC5连接。
可选的，以Model B发现场景为例，则本申请实施例提供的通信方法还可以包括如下步骤骤S713-S716：
S713、终端设备2向终端设备1发送请求代码(Send Query Code)消息。相应的，终端设备1接收来自终端设备2的发送请求代码消息。
其中，该请求代码消息使用步骤S710中获取的终端设备2使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法进行安全保护。
可选的，本申请实施例中，该请求代码消息中可以包括对该请求代码消息进行安全保护的安全保护方法，从而使得使用这种安全保护方法的终端设备1可以接收该请求代码消息。其中，对该请求代码消息进行安全保护的安全保护方法可以隐式携带在该请求代码消息中，也可以显示携带在该请求代码消息中，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
示例性的，隐士的方式比如不同的ProSe发现使用的code代表不同的安全保护方法。即DDNMF2网元可以发送多个ProSe发现使用的code给discoverer UE，不同的ProSe发现使用的code对应不同的安全保护方法。进一步的，终端设备1接收请求代码消息之后，可以根据ProSe发现使用的code确定对应的安全保护方法。
或者，示例性的，显示的方式比如在请求代码消息中携带安全指示信息，该安全指示信息用于指示该请求代码消息使用的安全保护方法。比如，安全指示信息是2个bit，0代表安全没有开启，1代表安全开启。比如，00代表机密性保护未开启且完整性保护未开启，10代表机密性保护开启，但是完整性保护未开启，01代表机密性保护未开启，但是完整性保护没有开启，11代表机密性保护未开启且完整性保护未开启。 进一步的，终端设备1接收请求代码消息之后，可以根据安全指示信息确定对应的安全保护方法。
S714、终端设备1验证发送请求代码消息。
步骤S417可参考现有的实现方式，在此不再赘述。
示例性的，假设终端设备1接收到的DDNMF1网元发送的终端设备1使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护不开启，但是终端设备1接收到的请求代码消息指示的该请求代码消息使用的安全保护方法为：机密性保护开启+完整性保护开启，则即使终端设备2与终端设备1对相同的应用感兴趣，也不能建立后续的PC5连接。换言之，终端设备1与终端设备2之间仅是因为安全要求不匹配而不能建立PC5连接。
可选的，本申请实施例中，终端设备1验证发送请求代码消息准确后，还可以继续执行下述步骤S715。
S715、终端设备1向终端设备2发送响应代码(Send response Code)消息。相应的，终端设备2接收来自终端设备1的发送响应代码消息。
S716、终端设备2验证发送响应代码消息。
可选的，本申请实施例中，在Model A或者Model B上述流程结束之后，还可能包括发现匹配上报(match report)流程，具体可参考现有的3GPP TS 23.303，v15.1.0和3GPP TS 33.303，v15.0.0标准，在此不予赘述。
基于本申请实施例提供的通信方法，可以在ProSe发现流程中获取终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。可选的，通过该通信方法还可以获取PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法和/或PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法。
其中，上述步骤S701至S716中DDNMF1网元、DDNMF2网元、终端设备1或者终端设备2的动作可以由图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的应用程序代码以指令该DDNMF1网元、DDNMF2网元、终端设备1或者终端设备2执行，本实施例对此不作任何限制。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例图4至图6所示的PC5建立流程可以使用通过上述图7所示的实施例获取的终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，即图4至图6所示的PC5建立流程中的第一安全保护方法可以为图7所示的实施例中终端设备1或者终端设备2获取的使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。当然，本申请实施例图4至图6所示的PC5建立流程可以使用通过其他方式在ProSe发现流程中获取的安全保护方法，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
可选的，本申请实施例中，若图7所示的终端设备1与终端设备2获取到的使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启，则可以通过图7所示的实施例中的第一条PC5广播消息携带图4或图5或图6所示的实施例中直连通信请求传输的参数，此时可以不用执行UE1向UE2发送直连通信请求的步骤(如图4中的步骤S402、图5中的步骤S501或者图6中的步骤S601)，从而可以进一步节省信令开销，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
如图8所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种通信方法，包括如下步骤：
S801、第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，该第一安全保护方法为第一终端设 备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法。
其中，步骤S801的具体实现可参考图7所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中的第一终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备1，第二终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备2；或者，本申请实施例中的第一终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备2，第二终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备1，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
S802、第一终端设备根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，第二安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。
其中，步骤S802的具体实现可参考图5所示的实施例中的步骤S502与步骤S506；或者，步骤S802的具体实现可参考图6所示的实施例中的步骤S602，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，第一终端设备可以为图5或图6所示的实施例中的UE2，第二终端设备可以为图5或图6所示的实施例中的UE1，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
由于本申请实施例在确定第二安全保护方法时，可以参考发现流程中确定的第一安全保护方法，因此可以使得确定的第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。也就是说，第一安全保护方法的安全等级是PC5建立流程中PC5连接的最低安全等级，这样可以达到安全不降级的目的。
其中，上述步骤S801至S802中第一终端设备的动作可以由图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的应用程序代码以指令该第一终端设备执行，本实施例对此不作任何限制。
如图9所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种通信方法，包括如下步骤：
S901、第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法。
其中，步骤S801的具体实现可参考图7所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中的第一终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备1，第二终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备2；或者，本申请实施例中的第一终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备2，第二终端设备可以为图7所示的实施例中的终端设备1，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
S902、第一终端设备使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，并向第二终端设备发送安全保护后的至少一条消息。
其中，步骤S902的具体实现可参考图4所示的实施例中的步骤S402、步骤S405、步骤S407与步骤S409；或者，步骤S902的具体实现可参考图5所示的实施例中的步骤S501、步骤S503、步骤S505与步骤S507；或者，步骤S902的具体实现可参考图6所示的实施例中的步骤S601与步骤S604，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，第一终端设备可以为图4或图5或图6所示的实施例中的UE2，第二终端设备可以为图4或图5或图6所示的实施例中的UE1；或者，本申请实施例中，第一终端设备可以为图4或图5或图6所示的实施例中的UE1，第二终端设备可以为图4或图5或图6所示的实施例中的UE2，在此统一说明，以下 不再赘述。
基于本申请实施例提供的通信系统，一方面，在第一安全保护方法包括完整性保护开启的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5建立流程中的消息被攻击者攻击或篡改所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。另一方面，在第一安全保护方法的安全等级高于或者等于第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，由于第一终端设备可以使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，因此可以避免PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级所造成的安全等级降低的问题，提高了PC5建立流程的安全等级。
其中，上述步骤S901至S902中第一终端设备的动作可以由图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的应用程序代码以指令该第一终端设备执行，本实施例对此不作任何限制。
如图10所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种通信方法，包括如下步骤：
S1001、第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元接收来自第一终端设备的第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，其中，第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息。
S1002、第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
S1003、第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元向第一终端设备发送第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
其中，图10所示的实施例的具体实现可参考图7所示的实施例，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元例如可以为图7中的DDNMF1网元，第一终端设备例如可以为图7中的终端设备1，第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元例如可以为图7中的DDNMF2网元，第二终端设备例如可以为图4中的终端设备2；或者，本申请实施例中，第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元例如可以为图7中的DDNMF2网元，第一终端设备例如可以为图7中的终端设备2，第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元例如可以为图7中的DDNMF1网元，第二终端设备例如可以为图7中的终端设备1，在此统一说明，以下不再赘述。
基于本申请实施例提供的通信方法，第一终端设备可以在第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中获取第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
其中，上述步骤S1001至S1003中第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的动作可以由图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的应用程序代码以指令该第一终端设备第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元执行，本实施例对此不作任何限制。
可以理解的是，图4至图10所示的实施例中，由第一终端设备(如图4至图6所示的实施例中的UE1或UE2、或者如图7所示的实施例中的终端设备1或终端设备2、或者如图8或图9所示的实施例中的第一终端设备)实现的方法和/或步骤，也可 以由可用于第一终端设备的部件(例如芯片或者电路)实现；由第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元(如图7所示的实施例中的DDNMF1网元或者DDNMF网元、或者如图10所示的实施例中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元)实现的方法和/或步骤，也可以由可用于第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的部件(例如芯片或者电路)实现。
上述主要从各个网元之间交互的角度对本申请实施例提供的方案进行了介绍。相应的，本申请实施例还提供了通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述方法实施例中的第一终端设备，或者包含上述第一终端设备的装置，或者为可用于第一终端设备的部件；或者，该通信装置可以为上述方法实施例中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元，或者包含上述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的装置，或者为可用于第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的部件。可以理解的是，该通信装置为了实现上述功能，其包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
图11示出了一种通信装置110的结构示意图。该通信装置110包括收发模块1101和处理模块1102。所述收发模块1101，也可以称为收发单元用以实现收发功能，例如可以是收发电路，收发机，收发器或者通信接口。
以通信装置110为上述方法实施例中的第一终端设备或者设置在该第一终端设备中的芯片或其他部件为例，一种可能的实现方式中：
处理模块1102，用于获取第一安全保护方法，第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法。处理模块1102，还用于根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，第二安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。
可选的，第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：将第一安全保护方法确定为第二安全保护方法。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：通过收发模块1101接收来自第二终端设备的第二安全策略，第二安全策略为第二终端设备在PC5连接中的安全策略；根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法，包括：在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略的情况下，将第一安全保护方法确定为第二安全保护方法；或者，在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略的情况下，根据第二安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为第一安全保护方法；或者，在第一安全保护方法不满足第二安全策略的情况下，根据第二安全策略，选择一个满足第二安全策略的安全保护方法作为第二安全保护方 法。
可选的，第二安全策略包括第二控制面安全策略和/或第二用户面安全策略；其中，第二控制面安全策略为第二终端设备在PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，第二用户面安全策略为第二终端设备在PC5连接中的用户面安全策略。
可选的，第二安全保护方法用于对PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护；和/或，第二安全保护方法用于对PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。
可选的，收发模块1101，还用于接收来自第二终端设备的第一消息，第一消息为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的第一条消息；处理模块1102，还用于使用第一安全保护方法对第一消息进行解安全保护。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于获取第一安全保护方法，包括：通过收发模块1101向第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元发送第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息；
通过收发模块1101接收来自第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的第一安全保护方法。
或者，以通信装置110为上述方法实施例中的第一终端设备或者设置在该第一终端设备中的芯片或其他部件为例，另一种可能的实现方式中：
处理模块1102，用于获取第一安全保护方法，第一安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法。处理模块1102，还用于使用第一安全保护方法对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护。收发模块1101，用于向第二终端设备发送安全保护后的至少一条消息。
可选的，至少一条消息包括第一消息，第一消息为PC5建立流程中的第一条消息。
可选的，至少一条消息还包括第三消息，第三消息为PC5建立流程中第一终端设备发送的用于协商第一终端设备和第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息；处理模块1102。用于使用第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，包括：用于使用第一安全保护方法对第一消息进行安全保护；以及，在PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，使用第一安全保护方法对第三消息进行安全保护。
可选的，在处理模块1102使用第一安全保护方法对第三消息进行安全保护之前，收发模块1101，还用于接收来自第二终端设备的第二消息，第二消息包括第二终端设备选择的PC5连接的控制面的安全算法；处理模块1102，还用于根据PC5连接的控制面的安全算法，确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。
可选的，至少一条消息包括第四消息，第四消息为PC5建立流程中第一终端设备发送的用于协商第一终端设备和第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息；处理模块1102，用于使用第一安全保护方法对PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，包括：用于在确定PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的 安全等级低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级后，使用第一安全保护方法对第四消息进行安全保护。
可选的，处理模块1102，还用于根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，第二安全保护方法为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。
可选的，第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全等级。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于根据第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：用于通过收发模块1101接收来自第二终端设备的第二安全策略，第二安全策略为第二终端设备在PC5连接中的安全策略；根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于根据第二安全策略和第一安全保护方法，确定第二安全保护方法，包括：在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略的情况下，将第一安全保护方法确定为第二安全保护方法；或者，在第一安全保护方法满足第二安全策略的情况下，根据第二安全策略，选择安全等级不低于第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为第一安全保护方法；或者，在第一安全保护方法不满足第二安全策略的情况下，根据第二安全策略，选择一个满足第二安全策略的安全保护方法作为第二安全保护方法。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于获取第一安全保护方法，包括：用于通过收发模块1101向第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元发送第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息；通过收发模块1101接收来自第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的第一安全保护方法。
或者，以通信装置110为上述方法实施例中的第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元或者设置在该第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元中的芯片或其他部件为例，一种可能的实现方式中：
收发模块1101，用于接收来自第一终端设备的第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，其中，第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息。处理模块1102，用于根据第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。收发模块1101，还用于向第一终端设备发送第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
可选的，处理模块1102，用于根据第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，包括：用于根据第一信息和第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法；根据多个可供选择的安全保护方法确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
可选的，处理模块1102，还用于从第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元获取第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；处理模块1102，用于根据多个可供选择的安全保护方法确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，包括：用于确定多个可供选择的安全保护方法中是否包括第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；当多个可供选择的安全保护方法中包括第二终端设备使用ProSe 业务时所需的安全保护方法时，将第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定为第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；或者，当多个可供选择的安全保护方法中不包括第二终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，从多个可供选择的安全保护方法中确定第一终端设备使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
可选的，使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对第五消息进行安全保护，第五消息为第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中的第一条PC5广播消息。
可选的，使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于确定第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。
可选的，PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护；和/或，PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。
可选的，使用ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护。
可选的，至少一条消息包括第一消息，第一消息为PC5建立流程中的第一条消息。
其中，上述方法实施例涉及的各步骤的所有相关内容均可以援引到对应功能模块的功能描述，在此不再赘述。
在本实施例中，该通信装置110以采用集成的方式划分各个功能模块的形式来呈现。这里的“模块”可以指特定ASIC，电路，执行一个或多个软件或固件程序的处理器和存储器，集成逻辑电路，和/或其他可以提供上述功能的器件。在一个简单的实施例中，本领域的技术人员可以想到该通信装置110可以采用图3所示的通信设备300的形式。
比如，图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301可以通过调用存储器303中存储的计算机执行指令，使得通信设备300执行上述方法实施例中的通信方法。
具体的，图11中的收发模块1101和处理模块1102的功能/实现过程可以通过图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的计算机执行指令来实现。或者，图11中的处理模块1102的功能/实现过程可以通过图3所示的通信设备300中的处理器301调用存储器303中存储的计算机执行指令来实现，图11中的收发模块1101的功能/实现过程可以通过图3中所示的通信设备300中的通信接口304来实现。
由于本实施例提供的通信装置110可执行上述通信方法，因此其所能获得的技术效果可参考上述方法实施例，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，以上模块或单元的一个或多个可以软件、硬件或二者结合来实现。当以上任一模块或单元以软件实现的时候，所述软件以计算机程序指令的方式存在，并被存储在存储器中，处理器可以用于执行所述程序指令并实现以上方法流程。该处理器可以内置于SoC(片上系统)或ASIC，也可是一个独立的半导体芯片。该处理器内处理用于执行软件指令以进行运算或处理的核外，还可进一步包括必要的硬件加速器，如现场可编程门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)、PLD(可编程逻辑器件)、或者实现专用逻辑运算的逻辑电路。
当以上模块或单元以硬件实现的时候，该硬件可以是CPU、微处理器、数字信号 处理(digital signal processing，DSP)芯片、微控制单元(microcontroller unit，MCU)、人工智能处理器、ASIC、SoC、FPGA、PLD、专用数字电路、硬件加速器或非集成的分立器件中的任一个或任一组合，其可以运行必要的软件或不依赖于软件以执行以上方法流程。
可选的，本申请实施例还提供了一种通信装置(例如，该通信装置可以是芯片或芯片系统)，该通信装置包括处理器，用于实现上述任一方法实施例中的方法。在一种可能的实现方式中，该通信装置还包括存储器。该存储器，用于保存必要的程序指令和数据，处理器可以调用存储器中存储的程序代码以指令该通信装置执行上述任一方法实施例中的方法。当然，存储器也可以不在该通信装置中。该通信装置是芯片系统时，可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
在上述实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件程序实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式来实现。该计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行计算机程序指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本申请实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或者数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(digital subscriber line，DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可以用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)，光介质(例如，DVD)、或者半导体介质(例如固态硬盘(solid state disk，SSD))等。
尽管在此结合各实施例对本申请进行了描述，然而，在实施所要求保护的本申请过程中，本领域技术人员通过查看所述附图、公开内容、以及所附权利要求书，可理解并实现所述公开实施例的其他变化。在权利要求中，“包括”(comprising)一词不排除其他组成部分或步骤，“一”或“一个”不排除多个的情况。单个处理器或其他单元可以实现权利要求中列举的若干项功能。相互不同的从属权利要求中记载了某些措施，但这并不表示这些措施不能组合起来产生良好的效果。
尽管结合具体特征及其实施例对本申请进行了描述，显而易见的，在不脱离本申请的精神和范围的情况下，可对其进行各种修改和组合。相应地，本说明书和附图仅仅是所附权利要求所界定的本申请的示例性说明，且视为已覆盖本申请范围内的任意和所有修改、变化、组合或等同物。显然，本领域的技术人员可以对本申请进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本申请的精神和范围。这样，倘若本申请的这些修改和变型属于本申请权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内，则本申请也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims (30)

  1. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，所述第一安全保护方法为所述第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法；
    所述第一终端设备根据所述第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，所述第二安全保护方法为所述第一终端设备与所述第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于所述第一安全保护方法的安全等级。
  3. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一终端设备根据所述第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：
    所述第一终端设备将所述第一安全保护方法确定为所述第二安全保护方法。
  4. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一终端设备根据所述第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：
    所述第一终端设备接收来自所述第二终端设备的第二安全策略，所述第二安全策略为所述第二终端设备在所述PC5连接中的安全策略；
    所述第一终端设备根据所述第二安全策略和所述第一安全保护方法，确定所述第二安全保护方法。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一终端设备根据所述第二安全策略和所述第一安全保护方法，确定所述第二安全保护方法，包括：
    在所述第一安全保护方法满足所述第二安全策略的情况下，将所述第一安全保护方法确定为所述第二安全保护方法；或者，
    在所述第一安全保护方法满足所述第二安全策略的情况下，根据所述第二安全策略，选择安全等级不低于所述第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为所述第一安全保护方法；或者，
    在所述第一安全保护方法不满足所述第二安全策略的情况下，根据所述第二安全策略，选择一个满足所述第二安全策略的安全保护方法作为所述第二安全保护方法。
  6. 根据权利要求4或5所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二安全策略包括第二控制面安全策略和/或第二用户面安全策略；其中，所述第二控制面安全策略为所述第二终端设备在所述PC5连接中的控制面安全策略，所述第二用户面安全策略为所述第二终端设备在所述PC5连接中的用户面安全策略。
  7. 根据权利要求1-6任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二安全保护方法用于对所述PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护；和/或，所述第二安全保护方法用于对所述PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。
  8. 根据权利要求1-7任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一终端设备接收来自所述第二终端设备的第一消息，所述第一消息为所述第一终端设备与所述第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的第一条消息；
    所述第一终端设备使用所述第一安全保护方法对所述第一消息进行解安全保护。
  9. 根据权利要求1-8任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一终端设备获取第 一安全保护方法，包括：
    所述第一终端设备向第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元发送第一信息和所述第一终端设备的第三代合作伙伴计划3GPP身份信息，所述第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定所述用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息；
    所述第一终端设备接收来自第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的所述第一安全保护方法。
  10. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，所述第一安全保护方法为所述第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中确定的安全保护方法；
    所述第一终端设备使用所述第一安全保护方法对所述第一终端设备与所述第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护；
    所述第一终端设备向所述第二终端设备发送安全保护后的至少一条消息。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一条消息包括第一消息，所述第一消息为所述PC5建立流程中的第一条消息。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一条消息还包括第三消息，所述第三消息为所述PC5建立流程中所述第一终端设备发送的用于协商所述第一终端设备和所述第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息；所述第一终端设备使用所述第一安全保护方法对所述PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，包括：
    所述第一终端设备使用所述第一安全保护方法对所述第一消息进行安全保护；以及，
    在所述PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于所述第一安全保护方法的安全等级的情况下，所述第一终端设备使用所述第一安全保护方法对所述第三消息进行安全保护。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一终端设备接收来自所述第二终端设备的第二消息，所述第二消息包括所述第二终端设备选择的所述PC5连接的控制面的安全算法；
    所述第一终端设备根据所述PC5连接的控制面的安全算法，确定所述PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于所述第一安全保护方法的安全等级。
  14. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一条消息包括第四消息，所述第四消息为所述PC5建立流程中所述第一终端设备发送的用于协商所述第一终端设备和所述第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的用户面使用的安全保护方法的消息；所述第一终端设备使用所述第一安全保护方法对所述PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护，包括：
    所述第一终端设备确定所述PC5连接的控制面使用的安全保护方法的安全等级低于所述第一安全保护方法的安全等级；
    所述第一终端设备使用所述第一安全保护方法对所述第四消息进行安全保护。
  15. 根据权利要求10或11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一终端设备根据所述第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，所述第二 安全保护方法为所述第一终端设备与所述第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二安全保护方法的安全等级不低于所述第一安全保护方法的安全等级。
  17. 根据权利要求15或16所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一终端设备根据所述第一安全保护方法确定第二安全保护方法，包括：
    所述第一终端设备接收来自所述第二终端设备的第二安全策略，所述第二安全策略为所述第二终端设备在所述PC5连接中的安全策略；
    所述第一终端设备根据所述第二安全策略和所述第一安全保护方法，确定所述第二安全保护方法。
  18. 根据权利要求17所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一终端设备根据所述第二安全策略和所述第一安全保护方法，确定所述第二安全保护方法，包括：
    在所述第一安全保护方法满足所述第二安全策略的情况下，将所述第一安全保护方法确定为所述第二安全保护方法；或者，
    在所述第一安全保护方法满足所述第二安全策略的情况下，根据所述第二安全策略，选择安全等级不低于所述第一安全保护方法的安全保护方法作为所述第一安全保护方法；或者，
    在所述第一安全保护方法不满足所述第二安全策略的情况下，根据所述第二安全策略，选择一个满足所述第二安全策略的安全保护方法作为所述第二安全保护方法。
  19. 根据权利要求10-18任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一终端设备获取第一安全保护方法，包括：
    所述第一终端设备向第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元发送第一信息和所述第一终端设备的第三代合作伙伴计划3GPP身份信息，所述第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定所述用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息；
    所述第一终端设备接收来自第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元的所述第一安全保护方法。
  20. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元接收来自第一终端设备的第一信息和所述第一终端设备的第三代合作伙伴计划3GPP身份信息，其中，所述第一信息包括用于ProSe业务的身份信息或者用于确定所述用于ProSe业务的身份信息的信息；
    所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据所述第一信息和所述第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；
    所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元向所述第一终端设备发送所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据所述第一信息和所述第一终端设备的3GPP身份信息，确定所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，包括：
    所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据所述第一信息和所述第一终端设备 的3GPP身份信息，确定所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时对应的多个可供选择的安全保护方法；
    所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据所述多个可供选择的安全保护方法确定所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元从第二直连通信发现名称管理功能网元获取第二终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；
    所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元根据所述多个可供选择的安全保护方法确定所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法，包括：
    所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元确定所述多个可供选择的安全保护方法中是否包括所述第二终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；
    当所述多个可供选择的安全保护方法中包括所述第二终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元将所述第二终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法确定为所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法；或者，
    当所述多个可供选择的安全保护方法中不包括所述第二终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法时，所述第一直连通信发现名称管理功能网元从所述多个可供选择的安全保护方法中确定所述第一终端设备使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法。
  23. 根据权利要求20-22任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对第五消息进行安全保护，所述第五消息为所述第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的发现流程中的第一条PC5广播消息。
  24. 根据权利要求20-23任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于确定所述第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5连接的安全保护方法。
  25. 根据权利要求24所述的方法，其特征在于，所述PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对所述PC5连接的控制面信令中传递的部分或全部参数进行安全保护；和/或，所述PC5连接的安全保护方法用于对所述PC5连接的部分或全部用户面数据进行安全保护。
  26. 根据权利要求20-25任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述使用所述ProSe业务时所需的安全保护方法用于对所述第一终端设备与第二终端设备之间的PC5建立流程中的至少一条消息进行安全保护。
  27. 根据权利要求26所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一条消息包括第一消息，所述第一消息为所述PC5建立流程中的第一条消息。
  28. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括用于执行如权利要求1-9中任一项所述方法的模块，或者，包括用于执行如权利要求10-19中任一项所述方法的模块，或者，包括用于执行如权利要求20-27中任一项所述方法的模块。
  29. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置包括：处理器和接口电路；
    所述接口电路，用于接收计算机程序或指令并传输至所述处理器；
    所述处理器用于执行所述计算机程序或指令，以使所述通信装置执行如权利要求1-9中任一项所述的方法，或者，以使所述通信装置执行如权利要求10-18中任一项所述的方法，或者，以使所述通信装置执行如权利要求20-27中任一项所述的方法。
  30. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，包括指令，当所述指令在通信装置上运行时，以使所述通信装置执行如权利要求1-9中任一项所述的方法，或者，以使所述通信装置执行如权利要求10-19中任一项所述的方法，或者，以使所述通信装置执行如权利要求20-27中任一项所述的方法。
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