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WO2020138532A1 - Procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs basé sur un vote aveugle dynamique pour un environnement internet des objets - Google Patents

Procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs basé sur un vote aveugle dynamique pour un environnement internet des objets Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020138532A1
WO2020138532A1 PCT/KR2018/016709 KR2018016709W WO2020138532A1 WO 2020138532 A1 WO2020138532 A1 WO 2020138532A1 KR 2018016709 W KR2018016709 W KR 2018016709W WO 2020138532 A1 WO2020138532 A1 WO 2020138532A1
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Prior art keywords
block
voting
internet
blockchain
devices
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Ceased
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English (en)
Korean (ko)
Inventor
조수환
박수용
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Sogang University Research Foundation
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Sogang University Research Foundation
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
    • H04L9/0836—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key using tree structure or hierarchical structure
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/46—Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem
    • H04L2209/463—Electronic voting

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to Internet of Things (IoT) technology, and more specifically, to maintain and maintain data integrity in an Internet of Things environment composed of low-performance devices that are flexible to connect and disconnect from a network, and to reduce reliability from security threats that cause integrity breaches. It relates to a dynamic blind voting based blockchain consensus method for the IoT environment that implements a dynamic blind voting based blockchain consensus to ensure.
  • IoT Internet of Things
  • IITP Information & communications Technology Promotion
  • Internet of Things is a device that can be identified as a thing, Bluetooth (Bluetooth), Wi-Fi, LTE, Zigbee, NFC, and built-in various sensors and communication functions to connect in real time to connect things and things, people and things It means intelligent technologies and services that exchange information between them.
  • the current Internet of Things environment is in the form of fog, edge computing, a distributed environment that makes connections between devices in a cloud-based centralized environment due to problems such as connection control, scalability, large-scale data processing, and security of numerous devices. Is developing.
  • IBM proposed the Internet of Things blockchain concept as a project called ADET.
  • a blockchain-based Internet of Things peer-to-peer (Peer To Peer) network environment composed of IoT devices, clouds, and computers was proposed.
  • a consensus algorithm is a new issue in this IoT blockchain environment.
  • the blockchain consensus algorithm allows nodes to maintain the same transaction history (block) that is not forged in a distributed environment.
  • conventional consensus algorithms have been developed based on the electronic money system, and thus, many problems are inherent when applied to the Internet of Things.
  • IoT Internet of Things
  • the consensus algorithm must be able to maintain data integrity even when attempting to forge data from malicious attackers.
  • the present invention is a block chain based on dynamic blind voting to ensure reliability from security threats that cause integrity breaches by maintaining data integrity in an IoT environment composed of low-performance devices that are flexible and disconnected from the network.
  • the aim is to provide a dynamic blind voting-based blockchain consensus method for the IoT environment that implements consensus.
  • each of the devices constituting the blockchain network of the IoT environment selects a voting node using a transaction list. And, the first step of transmitting the voting information to the voting node device; A second step of receiving the voting information and propagating blocks to devices constituting the blockchain network; And a third step of each of the devices receiving the propagated block verifying the block, connecting the block to a blockchain storage if the block is valid, and ignoring the block if the block is invalid; It is characterized by having.
  • the present invention enables data recording by enabling block recording of devices participating in the network by implementing a dynamic blind voting-based blockchain consensus in an IoT environment in which the connection and disconnection from the network is flexible and consists of low-performance devices. Maintains the effect of ensuring reliability from security threats that cause integrity breaches.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates devices in an Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a device participation process in an Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an algorithm for device participation in an Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a voting negotiation process of devices in an Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an algorithm for voting negotiation of devices in an Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a process for re-voting of devices in an Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an algorithm for re-voting negotiation of devices in an Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • POW Proof of Work
  • the method refers to an algorithm in which the participant's stake is reflected in the block creation authority.
  • the equity proof method is a special transaction that locks up the cryptocurrency that it holds in the form of a deposit to become a validator that plays a role of block creation and verification. After that, the process of creating and verifying a new block is done by a specific'Consensus Algorithm' that allows all validators to participate.
  • specific consensus algorithms include'Chain-based proof of stake'and'BFT Style poof of stake'.
  • PBFT Practical Byzantine fault tolerance
  • This is a protocol that enables the entire system to operate stably despite system failures and malicious nodes.
  • replicas there is a primary node that acts as a leader in decision making, and multiple messages are broadcasted. Collect the resolution.
  • the present invention proposes a voting based algorithm considering a low performance device environment. It uses hash values and transactions based on blockchain history to collect a number of votes, and proposes a dynamic blind voting method to prevent tracking of elected devices.
  • the present invention includes a re-voting blind block consensus function in a piggy-back format for when a block consensus failure due to network delay and connection failure occurs.
  • ECDSA secp 2561 kl kurve
  • SHA 256 hashing
  • Merkle tree Merkle tree
  • the devices 1001 to 100N of the Internet of Things environment constitute a blockchain network, and a new device 200 may participate in the above-mentioned blockchain network.
  • the devices 1001 to 100N,200 select a device by an operation blind voting method, the elected device sets a block generation difficulty level according to the voting result, and generates a block according to the block generation difficulty level to generate other devices To propagate.
  • the device receiving the block performs verification of the block and stores the block in the internal blockchain storage.
  • the devices 1001 to 100N, 200 process the corresponding device as a failure node and perform re-voting if the elected device does not propagate the block or the received block is an invalid block.
  • FIG. 2 shows a network pre-visioning process in which a new device participates in a blockchain network
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a network pre-visioning algorithm in which a new device participates in a blockchain network.
  • the node mapping table is composed of an index number of a node, identification information for a device, a beer cellar, a verification key, and a network connection state of the corresponding node.
  • the device 200 participating in the network generates a key pair (signature key, verification key) using ECDSA (2561kl kurve) (step 300), a unique identification value and a beer place , Propagating the network participation information consisting of the node's verification key to the network (step 302).
  • Devices in the network record and store received network participation information in a node mapping table (steps 304 and 306). This completes network provisioning for consensus.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a voting negotiation process of devices in the Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 illustrates an algorithm for voting negotiation of devices in the Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention It is one drawing.
  • each of the devices constituting the network checks the block creation condition, which confirms whether the block creation condition is satisfied by the number of transactions and the size of the block (capacity of a certain transaction). (Step 400).
  • each of the devices reads a pre-stored transaction list, hashs the transaction list into an even number of SHA 256, and completes the merkle tree through repetitive hashes (steps 402 and 404).
  • the Merkle Tree feature if all nodes have the same transaction, the Merkle Tree root value is the same for all nodes. As a result, when a malicious attacker falsifies the transaction, the Merkle Tree root hash value is wrong.
  • each of the devices generates a voting f (last voting block hash value) by adding the previous block hash value to the merkle tree root hash value (step 406).
  • a device according to the value is set to Voting n , that is, a voting node (step 408). Thereafter, each of the devices signs a device corresponding to Voting n with a private key and transmits voting information (step 410).
  • the voting node device receives voting information from other devices, checks whether a voting result is valid, and determines the difficulty of generating a block according to the voting result (steps 412 and 414). Here, if even one vote is received from another node, a block is generated, and the validity verification is determined according to whether the vote is received or the signature of the corresponding vote is verified.
  • the difficulty of generating the block is determined to correspond to the voting result, and a device that receives a plurality of votes can generate a fast block and a device that receives less votes can generate a block slowly.
  • a malicious node attempts to forge data, it is possible to forge more than 51% of the entire network.
  • the device When the block generation difficulty is determined, the device generates a block according to the block generation difficulty, and propagates the generated block to devices in the network (steps 416 and 418).
  • the rest of the devices in the network verify the received block and, if the block is valid, connect the received block to the previous block and store it in the blockchain storage (steps 422,424,426). Otherwise, if the block is invalid, the rest of the devices in the network ignore the received block (step 428) and perform a re-voting procedure (step 430). In addition, if a block is not received for a predetermined time or more, the remaining devices in the network perform a re-voting procedure (step 430).
  • FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a process for re-voting of devices in the Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 7 illustrates an algorithm for re-voting of devices in the Internet of Things environment according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention It is one drawing.
  • each of the devices constituting the network checks a block creation condition when a blind re-voting is requested, which is a block creation condition based on the number of transactions and the size of the block (capacity of a certain transaction). Check if this is satisfied (500,502 steps).
  • each of the devices converts a device that is a previously selected voting node to a failure and elects a new device (step 504).
  • Each of the devices reads a pre-stored transaction list, hashs the transaction list in even pairs, SHA 256, and completes the Merkle tree through repetitive hashes (steps 506 and 508).
  • the Merkle Tree feature if all nodes have the same transaction, the Merkle Tree root value is the same for all nodes. As a result, when a malicious attacker falsifies the transaction, the Merkle Tree root hash value is wrong.
  • each of the devices generates a voting f (last voting block hash value) by adding the previous block hash value to the merkle tree root hash value (step 510).
  • Voting n a device according to the value is set to Voting n , that is, a voting node (step 512). Thereafter, each of the devices transmits the voting information after signing the private key to the device corresponding to Voting n (step 514).
  • the voting node device receives voting information from other devices, checks whether the voting result is valid, and determines the difficulty of generating a block according to the voting result (steps 516,518).
  • the difficulty of generating the block is determined to correspond to the voting result, and a device that receives a plurality of votes can generate a fast block and a device that receives less votes can generate a block slowly.
  • a malicious node attempts to forge data, it is possible to forge more than 51% of the entire network.
  • integrity is maintained when there are more than 51% of honest nodes in the blockchain network, and voting results using Merkle Tree are different when forgery of malicious node data.
  • malicious nodes small numbers
  • receive fewer votes and fewer votes increase the difficulty of block creation, thereby suppressing the creation of forged blocks.
  • the device When the block generation difficulty is determined, the device generates a block according to the block generation difficulty, and propagates the generated block to devices in the network (steps 520 and 522).
  • the rest of the devices in the network verify the received block and, if the block is valid, connect the received block to the previous block and store it in the blockchain storage (steps 526,528,530). Otherwise, if the block is invalid, the rest of the devices in the network ignore the received block (step 532) and perform a revoting procedure (step 534). In addition, if a block is not received for a predetermined time or more, the remaining devices in the network perform a re-voting procedure (step 534).
  • a device controls a network connection failure in an IoT environment through a state check of devices and a piggyback flow control method through a node mapping table. Also, even if the device fails to connect to the network, block consensus across the network can be finally achieved.
  • the present invention implements an agreement by each device in the Internet of Things environment voting based on the distributed ledger history and transaction content of the block and generating a block according to the voting result.
  • the voting message exchange method and the bona fide node are given a low level of difficulty in creating blocks, the availability in low-performance devices is high.
  • the Byzantine general problem enables a correct majority of votes to be collected when there are malicious nodes in the blockchain network.
  • each node independently votes. Since this is a blind way of not knowing which node will be elected, it can prevent an attack by traceability from a malicious node.
  • the node selected from the voting is a node that receives a number of votes, and the conditions of block generation are also easily given. Malicious nodes do not receive a table or get a small number of votes, so block generation is suppressed. This eventually results in a consensus on the block that received the majority of votes. Also, if a malicious node is elected, the vote is ignored through re-voting.
  • the consensus algorithm according to the present invention maintains data integrity if F+1 (more than 51%) nodes exist when there are F malicious nodes.
  • the transaction processing speed of the present invention experiments were performed in the following environment. That is, the consensus algorithm of the present invention was applied to the blockchain platform developed by "Blockchain-based IoT reliability control system control development project".
  • the Logchain is an advanced blockchain platform in the IoT environment.
  • the experimental environment consisted of 5 IoT devices (5 Raspberry Pi), 2 cloud nodes (2 Windows Hyperv), and 10 PC nodes, consisting of a blockchain network of the Internet of Things environment.
  • the number of transaction processing and the block generation speed were measured for 30 transactions per block.
  • the present invention has proposed a blockchain consensus algorithm considering the Internet of Things. Unlike the conventional electronic money consensus algorithm, in the IoT environment, it is necessary to solve the Byzantine general problem and ensure IoT data integrity while satisfying the device's network connection failure, availability on a low-performance device, and high transaction processing speed.
  • the present invention proposes a blind voting method by voting based on a distributed ledger history, and the elected device varies the block creation conditions according to the voting results. This eliminates the traceability of malicious devices and suppresses block generation. Also, considering the failure of the device, the network status is checked through the node mapping table, and consensus is possible through re-voting.
  • the present invention will maintain data integrity in the Internet of Things environment based on the consensus algorithm to ensure reliability from security threats that cause integrity breaches.

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
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Abstract

Selon l'invention, un procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs basé sur un vote aveugle dynamique pour un environnement Internet des objets comprend : une première étape dans laquelle chacun des dispositifs constituant un réseau de chaîne de blocs d'un environnement Internet des objets sélectionne un nœud de vote au moyen d'une liste de transactions et transmet des informations de vote à un dispositif qui est le nœud de vote; une deuxième étape dans laquelle le dispositif aynt reçu les informations de vote génère un bloc et propage le bloc aux dispositifs constituant le réseau de chaîne de blocs; et une troisième étape dans laquelle chacun des dispositifs ayant reçu le bloc propagé vérifie le bloc, se connecte et stocke le bloc dans un stockage de chaîne de blocs lorsque le bloc est valide, et ignore le bloc lorsque le bloc n'est pas valide.
PCT/KR2018/016709 2018-12-27 2018-12-27 Procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs basé sur un vote aveugle dynamique pour un environnement internet des objets Ceased WO2020138532A1 (fr)

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KR10-2018-0170020 2018-12-27
KR1020180170020A KR20200081533A (ko) 2018-12-27 2018-12-27 사물 인터넷 환경을 위한 동적 블라인드 투표기반의 블록체인 합의방법

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CN112738090A (zh) * 2020-12-29 2021-04-30 重庆邮电大学 在边缘计算中基于绿色计算共识机制区块链的数据完整性检测方法
WO2022127424A1 (fr) * 2020-12-16 2022-06-23 中兴通讯股份有限公司 Procédé et appareil d'obtention pour en-tête de groupe de blocs, support de stockage et dispositif électronique
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CN116800764A (zh) * 2023-06-26 2023-09-22 中国人民解放军海军特色医学中心 一种基于区块链的仪器设备管理节点动态选取方法及系统

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WO2022127424A1 (fr) * 2020-12-16 2022-06-23 中兴通讯股份有限公司 Procédé et appareil d'obtention pour en-tête de groupe de blocs, support de stockage et dispositif électronique
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CN112738090A (zh) * 2020-12-29 2021-04-30 重庆邮电大学 在边缘计算中基于绿色计算共识机制区块链的数据完整性检测方法
CN112738090B (zh) * 2020-12-29 2022-08-26 重庆邮电大学 在边缘计算中基于绿色计算共识机制区块链的数据完整性检测方法
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CN115396504B (zh) * 2022-08-23 2024-01-16 浪潮工业互联网股份有限公司 一种区块链投票数据缓存方法、设备及介质
CN115842767A (zh) * 2022-09-07 2023-03-24 湖北工业大学 基于共识算法的物联网设备集群协同方法及系统
CN115842767B (zh) * 2022-09-07 2024-04-23 湖北工业大学 基于共识算法的物联网设备集群协同方法及系统
CN116800764A (zh) * 2023-06-26 2023-09-22 中国人民解放军海军特色医学中心 一种基于区块链的仪器设备管理节点动态选取方法及系统

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