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WO2019115469A1 - Justificatif physique comportant une paire de clés cryptographiques - Google Patents

Justificatif physique comportant une paire de clés cryptographiques Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019115469A1
WO2019115469A1 PCT/EP2018/084213 EP2018084213W WO2019115469A1 WO 2019115469 A1 WO2019115469 A1 WO 2019115469A1 EP 2018084213 W EP2018084213 W EP 2018084213W WO 2019115469 A1 WO2019115469 A1 WO 2019115469A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
code
credential
physical
opaque covering
key pair
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2018/084213
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Frans Lundberg
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Assa Abloy AB
Original Assignee
Assa Abloy AB
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Assa Abloy AB filed Critical Assa Abloy AB
Publication of WO2019115469A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019115469A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09C—CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
    • G09C5/00—Ciphering apparatus or methods not provided for in the preceding groups, e.g. involving the concealment or deformation of graphic data such as designs, written or printed messages
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/77—Graphical identity

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a physical credential and related method, computer program and computer program product, where the credential comprises a public key and a private key of a cryptographic key pair.
  • IoT Internet of Things
  • IoT With IoT, the number of devices is set to increase greatly. Each person will become responsible for more and more devices. An issue is how all of these devices are to be configured, especially since it is often desired not to need to provide a user interface with every single device. Moreover, security is needed to ensure that no unauthorised party gains access to the device.
  • a physical credential comprising: a first code, being a machine-readable optical code, wherein the first code comprises a public key of a cryptographic key pair; and a second code, being a machine-readable optical code, wherein the second code comprises a private key of the cryptographic key pair.
  • the second code is covered by an opaque covering.
  • the opaque covering is, at least partly, irreversibly removable to uncover the second code.
  • the first code is provided without any opaque covering.
  • the opaque covering may be a covering being removable by user scratching.
  • the machine-readable optical code may be a matrix barcode.
  • the physical credential may be implemented as a card.
  • Both the first code and the second code are printed codes.
  • a method for providing a physical credential comprising the steps of: obtaining a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key; providing a first code as a machine-readable optical code on a credential blank, wherein the first code comprises the public key; and providing a second code as a machine-readable optical code on the credential blank, wherein the second code comprises the private key; providing an opaque covering over the second code, the opaque covering being irreversibly user removable, and the first code is provided without any opaque covering.
  • the step of obtaining a cryptographic key pair may comprise generating, within the credential provider, the key pair.
  • the key pair may be generated based on a random number from a dedicated random number generator implemented in hardware.
  • the private key may be generated based on the random number and the public key may then be computed based on the private key.
  • the step of providing a first code may comprise printing the first code and the step of providing the second code may comprise printing the second code.
  • a computer program for providing a physical credential comprises computer program code which, when run on a credential provider causes the credential provider to: obtain a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key; provide a first code as a machine-readable optical code on a credential blank, wherein the first code comprises the public key; and provide a second code as a machine-readable optical code on the credential blank, wherein the second code comprises the private key; provide an opaque covering over the second code, the opaque covering being irreversibly user removable, and the first code is provided without any opaque covering.
  • a computer program product comprising a computer program according to claim the third aspect and a computer readable means on which the computer program is stored.
  • Fig l is a schematic diagram illustrating an environment in which
  • Figs 2A-B are schematic diagrams illustrating the physical credential of Fig l, with and without an opaque covering, respectively;
  • Fig 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a credential provider for providing the physical credential of Fig l, according to one embodiment
  • Fig 4 is a flow chart illustrating for providing the physical credential of Fig l, according to one embodiment
  • Fig 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating components of the credential provider of Fig 3 according to one embodiment.
  • Fig 6 shows one example of a computer program product comprising computer readable means.
  • Embodiments presented herein relate to a physical credential comprising a first optical code comprising a public key, and a second optical code comprising a corresponding private key.
  • the second optical code is covered by a removable opaque covering.
  • the (uncovered) public key can be used to associate the key pair (and thus the physical credential) with a target device to control access to it.
  • the target device is then secured, such that further access to the target device is only allowed by presenting the private key.
  • the physical credential can be distributed in any suitable way, and the receiver is assured that, as long as the second optical code has not been uncovered, no third party has had access to the target device. This provides an inherent trust and piece of mind to the user.
  • the second optical code can be read by a smartphone (or similar), which can then communicate with the target device, removing or reducing the need for the target device to provide its own user interface.
  • Fig 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an environment in which
  • a physical credential 1 comprises a first code 10 and a second code 11.
  • the physical credential 1 is also known as a key ticket.
  • Both the first code 10 and the second code 11 are machine-readable optical codes, e.g. matrix barcodes such as QR (Quick Response), PDF (Portable Data File) 417, aztec, or one-dimensional barcodes such as UPC (Universal Product Code), EAN (European Article Number), code 39 or code 128.
  • the first code 10 and the second code 11 could even be printed text that is machine readable using optical character recognition (OCR).
  • OCR optical character recognition
  • the reliability of the barcodes is better for optical machine reading and matrix barcodes can potentially represent larger numbers than the one-dimensional barcodes.
  • a code reader 2 with a connected or integrated camera/scanner can read the first code 10 and the second code n.
  • the code reader 2 can e.g. be a smartphone, a tablet computer, a general purpose computer or an electronic lock.
  • the code reader 2 can communicate with a target device 3 over a
  • the communication link 4 can be local link, e.g. over Bluetooth or BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) to reduce the risk of
  • the communication link 4 can be over a wide area network, such as the Internet, to allow remote communication between the code reader 2 and the target device 3.
  • the target device 3 is any suitable device for which access is to be controlled using the physical credential 1.
  • the target device can be a device in the context of Internet of Things (IoT).
  • IoT Internet of Things
  • the physical credential 1 can optionally be configured for several target devices 3, where each target device would function as described herein. For instance, there can be several target devices 3 being locks of a building, all of which target devices 3 could be controlled using the physical credential 1.
  • Figs 2A-B are schematic diagrams illustrating the physical credential 1 of Fig 1, with and without an opaque covering 12, respectively.
  • the physical credential 1 can be provided e.g. in the form of a card, allowing easy provision e.g. provided in the delivery of a target device, and allows convenient distribution e.g. in letters. If a physical credential is distributed in a letter, the letter can be sent via registered mail with restricted delivery, to thereby ensure the recipient is indeed the desired recipient.
  • the physical credential 1 comprises the first code 10 and the second code 11.
  • both the first code 10 and the second code 11 are machine-readable optical codes.
  • Both the first code 10 and the second code 11 are provided as non-changeable codes.
  • both the first code 10 and the second code 11 can be printed codes.
  • the first code 10 comprises a public key of a cryptographic key pair and the second code n comprises a private key of the same cryptographic key pair.
  • the first code 10 can comprise other data than the public key and the second code li can comprise other data than the private key.
  • the second code n is covered by an opaque covering 12 in Fig 2A.
  • the opaque covering 12 is, at least partly, irreversibly user removable to uncover the second code 11. In this way, anyone can see if the second code 12 of the physical credential 1 has ever been exposed by examining the condition of the opaque covering 12.
  • the opaque covering 12 does not need to be completely removable by the user, as long as the second code 11 can be uncovered.
  • the opaque covering 12 can be a so called scratch covering, similar to those applied in scratch lotteries. The covering is then removable by the user scratching the surface.
  • the opaque covering 12 is in the form of a sticker with many linear perforations, provided such that it virtually impossible to reapply the sticker to cover the second code 11.
  • the first code 10 is provided without any opaque covering and is thus readable without the need for the user to perform any uncovering (e.g.
  • Fig 2B the opaque covering 12 has been removed, whereby the second code 11 is visible and readable by a code reader 2.
  • a first embodiment is related to configuring an electronic lock, where the electronic lock is thus the target device 3.
  • the electronic lock is to be installed at the home of Beatrice. Beatrice is old and is not comfortable with using electronic devices, such as smartphones and computers.
  • the electronic lock can still be securely configured.
  • the electronic lock is delivered with a physical credential 1, described above.
  • the electronic lock is installed by person in the role of an installer, e.g. a locksmith. Once the electronic lock is physically installed, the installer uses a software application (also known as app) in his/her smartphone as a code reader 2 to read the first code 10 of the physical credential 1. The app in the code reader 2 extracts the public key of the key pair of the physical credential 1.
  • the app in the code reader 2 then communicates (e.g. over BLE) with the electronic lock 3 to set the owner of the electronic lock 3.
  • the owner is identified by means of the public key.
  • the electronic lock is thus configured to be in the ownership of the key pair of the physical credential which was shipped in the same box as the electronic lock.
  • the association with the key pair can be performed already as part of the manufacturing process in the factory.
  • the installer gives the physical credential to Beatrice and leaves.
  • Beatrice now gives the physical credential 1 to her daughter Anna to configure the electronic lock.
  • Anna removes the physical covering 12 of the physical credential 1 to uncover the second code 11.
  • Anna uses an app in her smartphone (being another instance of a code reader 2) to read the second code 11 of the physical credential 1.
  • the code reader 2 extracts the private key of the key pair of the physical credential 1 in this way.
  • the app in Anna’s smartphone 2 then communicates (e.g. over BLE) with the electronic lock 3 to authenticate itself using the private key, e.g. by applying an digital signature to data provided by the electronic lock.
  • the electronic lock 3 verifies that the app is in possession of a private key matching the public key, e.g. by verifying the signature using the public key, the electronic lock 3 allows the app in Anna’s smartphone 2 to modify the settings in the electronic lock 3.
  • the electronic lock 3 can e.g. now be configured to set a new owner (e.g. Anna’s smartphone) and install new key devices, e.g. a key fob that Beatrice can use.
  • the physical credential can be used in the same way to configure a new electronic device, i.e. a target device 3.
  • the target device 3 has been associated with the public key of the key pair of the physical credential, e.g. at manufacturing.
  • the physical credential 1 can be supplied in the box containing the target device 3.
  • the target device can only be configured (e.g. via a smartphone as described for the first embodiment) by providing the private key. In this way, the user can be assured that nobody has previously configured the device by verifying that the covering 12 over the second code of the physical credential 1 is intact.
  • the physical credentials of all such target devices could be supplied to a third party to allow the third party to perform the task of configuring the target devices.
  • the physical credential 1 is supplied in a registered letter with restricted delivery. This allows the supplier to be certain that only a specific person is given access to configure the target device.
  • the second embodiment can be used for any suitable electronic device. This is particularly applicable in the Internet of Things concept, where each home and user becomes responsible for more and more electronic devices.
  • the target device can be provided without any user interface, since the app of the smartphone can be used to configure the target device.
  • the physical credential l can be used as a fallback access credential.
  • a target device can be configured using methods of the prior art or by means of a first physical credential as described above.
  • a second physical credential can then be configured to be allowed access, which is configured using the public key of the second physical credential as described above.
  • the second physical credential can then be stored in a safe place and if the user forgets a password or otherwise has lost access to the target device, the user can get the second physical credential, remove the opaque covering 12 and use the exposed second code 11 of the second physical credential (e.g. using an app on a smartphone) to thereby regain access to configuring the target device.
  • the third physical credential can be configured to provide a new fallback access, using the first code 10 (containing the public key) of the third physical credential.
  • the public key and the covered private key on the same physical credential, it becomes very convenient to configure a target device without compromising trust.
  • the user can trust that no party has exercised control over the target device using the private key, e.g. to gain ownership control.
  • the public key can be used before anyone has ever seen the corresponding private key, while the receiver of a physical credential can deduce that no one has seen the private key, even though the public key has been used.
  • the physical credentials can be manufactured in advance in bulk and each physical credential can be associated with a specific target device when needed, using the public key as described above.
  • Fig 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a credential provider 5 for providing the physical credential of Fig 1, according to one embodiment.
  • the credential provider 5 is used to provide, i.e. manufacture, physical credentials 1 from credential blanks 15.
  • the credential blanks 15 have neither the first code 10 nor the second code 11.
  • the credential blanks can be manufactured in a way that makes them difficult to forge, e.g. like bank notes. For instance, techniques such as watermarks, special paper, holograms, etc. could be utilised to make sure that nobody else can manufacture forged credential blanks, and thus physical credentials, that appear to be manufactured by the credential provider. This improves trust when a person receives a physical credential comprising the first code and a covered second code, in that the person can rely on the credential provider that nobody has been able to use the private code.
  • the credential provider For each credential blank 15 provided to the credential provider 5, the credential provider prints the first code 10, the second code 11 and further provides the opaque covering 12 over the second code 11.
  • Fig 4 is a flow chart illustrating for providing (i.e. manufacturing) the physical credential of Fig 1, according to one embodiment. The method is performed in the credential provider of Fig 3.
  • credential provider obtains a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key.
  • This obtaining can be based on the credential provider generating the key pair.
  • the key pair can be generated based on a random number from a dedicated random number generator implemented in hardware.
  • nRF,52 from Nordic
  • the credential provider can thus be configured such that the key pair, or at least the private key of the key pair, only exists on the physical credential itself.
  • the private key does not need to exist anywhere except as part of the second code under the opaque covering on the physical credential.
  • the credential provider can be provided without network access to reduce the risk of any attackers gaining access to the private keys.
  • the private key is generated first, and the public key is computed based on the private key.
  • credential provider provides a first code as a machine-readable optical code on a credential blank, wherein the first code comprises the public key. This can e.g. be done by printing the first code on the credential blank.
  • credential provider provides a second code as a machine-readable optical code on the credential blank, wherein the second code comprises the private key. This can e.g. be done by printing the second code on the credential blank.
  • credential provider provides an opaque covering over the second optical code, the opaque covering being irreversibly user removable, and the first code is provided without any opaque covering.
  • Fig 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating components of the credential provider 5 of Fig 3 according to one embodiment.
  • a processor 60 is provided using any combination of one or more of a suitable central processing unit (CPU), multiprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal processor (DSP), application specific integrated circuit etc., capable of executing software instructions 67 stored in a memory 64, which can thus be a computer program product.
  • the processor 60 can be configured to execute the method described with reference to Fig 4 above.
  • the memory 64 can be any combination of random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM).
  • the memory 64 also comprises persistent storage, which, for example, can be any single one or combination of magnetic memory, optical memory, solid-state memory or even remotely mounted memory.
  • a data memory 66 is also provided for reading and/or storing data during execution of software instructions in the processor 60.
  • the data memory 66 can be any combination of random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM).
  • the credential provider 5 further optionally comprises an I/O interface 62 for communicating with other external entities.
  • the I/O interface 62 also includes a user interface.
  • a printer 61 comprises components to print machine-readable optical codes on credential blanks.
  • the printer 61 also comprises components for providing the opaque covering over the second optical code.
  • Fig 6 shows one example of a computer program product comprising computer readable means.
  • a computer program 91 can be stored, which computer program can cause a processor to execute a method according to embodiments described herein.
  • the computer program product is an optical disc, such as a CD (compact disc) or a DVD (digital versatile disc) or a Blu-Ray disc.
  • the computer program product could also be embodied in a memory of a device, such as the computer program product 64 of Fig 5.
  • the computer program 91 is here schematically shown as a track on the depicted optical disk, the computer program can be stored in any way which is suitable for the computer program product, such as a removable solid state memory, e.g. a Universal Serial Bus (USB) drive.
  • USB Universal Serial Bus

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un justificatif physique comportant: un premier code, qui est un code optique lisible par machine, le premier code comportant une clé publique d'une paire de clés cryptographiques; et un second code, qui est un code optique lisible par machine, le second code comportant une clé privée de la paire de clés cryptographiques. Le second code est recouvert par une couverture opaque. La couverture opaque peut, au moins en partie, être retirée de façon irréversible pour révéler le second code. Le premier code est fourni sans aucune couverture opaque.
PCT/EP2018/084213 2017-12-11 2018-12-10 Justificatif physique comportant une paire de clés cryptographiques Ceased WO2019115469A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP17206424 2017-12-11
EP17206424.8 2017-12-11

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2019115469A1 true WO2019115469A1 (fr) 2019-06-20

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PCT/EP2018/084213 Ceased WO2019115469A1 (fr) 2017-12-11 2018-12-10 Justificatif physique comportant une paire de clés cryptographiques

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CN (1) CN207884641U (fr)
WO (1) WO2019115469A1 (fr)

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2509275A1 (fr) * 2011-04-04 2012-10-10 Buntinx Procédé et système d'authentification d'entités au moyen de terminaux mobiles

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2509275A1 (fr) * 2011-04-04 2012-10-10 Buntinx Procédé et système d'authentification d'entités au moyen de terminaux mobiles

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
BALA KRISHNA M ET AL: "Product Authentication Using QR Codes: A Mobile Application to Combat Counterfeiting", WIRELESS PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, SPRINGER, DORDRECHT, NL, vol. 90, no. 1, 1 August 2016 (2016-08-01), pages 381 - 398, XP036050425, ISSN: 0929-6212, [retrieved on 20160801], DOI: 10.1007/S11277-016-3374-X *

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