WO2019144350A1 - Communication method and communication apparatus - Google Patents

Abstract

Provided are a communication method and a communication apparatus for improving the security of transmission. The method comprises: an authentication server receiving an encrypted first random number from a terminal; the authentication server determining an anchor key according to the encrypted first random number, a second random number and a third random number; and the authentication server sending the anchor key to a mobility management device.

Description

Communication method and communication device Technical field

The present application relates to the field of communications and, more particularly, to communication methods and communication devices in the field of communications.

Background technique

In a future network system, an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) is used for authentication. Specifically, the authentication server generates a hash value according to the stored password of the saved terminal, and the terminal generates a hash according to the saved password stored by the terminal. If the hash value generated by the authentication server is consistent with the hash value generated by the terminal, the authentication is considered to be passed. When the authentication is passed, the anchor key of the terminal used in the authentication may be used to determine the anchor key, and then the anchor is used. The key is used for communication. However, if the registration password of the terminal is cracked, the attacker can easily obtain the anchor key, so that the communication content of the terminal is easily leaked, and the security of the transmission cannot be guaranteed.

Summary of the invention

The present application provides a communication method and apparatus to help improve the security of transmission.

In a first aspect, a communication method is provided, comprising: an authentication server receiving an encrypted first random number from a terminal; the authentication server according to the encrypted first random number, second random number, and third random number And determining an anchor key; the authentication server transmitting the anchor key to the mobility management device.

Therefore, in the embodiment of the present application, the first random number is used to replace the registration password of the terminal to determine the anchor key. Since the random number has randomness and can be changed frequently, for example, it can be generated by the terminal every time the session is established. The security problem caused by the long-term use of the registered password of the fixed terminal is avoided.

As an alternative embodiment, the anchor key is used by the mobility management device to communicate.

Specifically, the mobility management device may communicate with the terminal according to the anchor key, or the mobility management device sends the anchor key to the access network device, and the access network device according to the anchor key The terminal communicates. Further, for example, the mobility management device may generate a lower layer key by using the anchor key, for example, the mobility management device communicates with the terminal using the lower layer key, or the mobility management device And transmitting the lower layer key to the access network device, where the access network device communicates with the terminal by using the lower layer key. For another example, the mobility management device sends the anchor key to an access network device, and the access network device generates a lower layer key according to the anchor key, where the access network device uses the terminal and the terminal The lower layer key communicates.

Optionally, the authentication server may generate one or more lower layer keys according to the anchor key, and the lower layer key may be used for communication of control plane data or for communication of user plane data, for example, a lower layer key. It can be used for communication between control data communication and/or user plane data between the terminal and the mobility management device. The lower layer key can be used for control plane data communication between the terminal and the access network device and/or for surface communication. data communication. Moreover, the lower layer key between the terminal and the mobility management device may be different from the lower layer key between the terminal and the access network device. Optionally, the lower layer key used by the control plane data communication between the terminal and the mobility management device may be the same as or different from the lower layer key used by the user plane data. Optionally, the lower layer key used by the control plane data between the terminal and the access network device may be the same as or different from the lower layer key used by the user plane data, which is not limited in this embodiment.

In some implementations, the second random number is generated by a terminal generated by the authentication server or generated by the mobility management device or by a data management device.

Optionally, the method further includes: the authentication server receives the second random number sent by the terminal, and if the third random number is generated by the mobility management device, the authentication server receives the third random number sent by the mobility management device; The three random numbers are generated by the data management device, and the authentication server receives the third random number sent by the data management device.

In this way, the authentication server can determine the anchor key according to the second random number generated by the terminal, the third random number generated by the network side device, and the encrypted first random number sent by the terminal, and can improve the randomness of the random number. Determine the security of the anchor key.

In some implementations, the authentication server acquires a first verification value and a second verification value from a data management device; the authentication server authenticates the terminal according to the first verification value; If the result of the terminal authentication is legal, the second verification value is sent to the terminal, so that the terminal can authenticate the authentication server according to the second verification value. Optionally, before the determining the anchor key according to the encrypted first random number, the authentication server acquires a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device; the authentication server is configured according to the The first verification value authenticates the terminal.

In some implementations, the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, specifically: sending, by the authentication server, the terminal identifier of the terminal to the data management device, a second random number and the third random number, wherein the first verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number; The second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number; the authentication server receives the first verification value from the data management device and The second verification value. The verification value is generated by the data management device and is transmitted to the authentication server. When the authentication value is generated by the authentication server in the prior art, the user registration password needs to be obtained from the data management device, thereby preventing the user sensitive information from being transmitted in the network, thereby improving the System security.

In some implementations, the method further includes: the authentication server receiving a third verification value sent by the terminal, where the third verification value is determined by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and Determining, by the authentication server, the authentication password of the terminal, wherein the authentication server authenticates the terminal according to the first verification value, if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value, The authentication server determines that the terminal is legitimate. Optionally, if the first verification value is not equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is invalid.

Optionally, the first verification value and the third verification value are calculated by using the same authentication method, for example, by using a preset authentication method, or by using an authentication method determined by the terminal and the authentication server.

Optionally, the first verification and the third verification value may be obtained by using a hash algorithm.

In some implementations, before the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, the method further includes: the authentication server receiving one of the terminal support from the terminal Or two or more authentication methods; the authentication server determines, according to one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server, The first method of authentication. Optionally, the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, including: the authentication server acquiring, by the data management device, the first verification determined according to the first authentication method a value and the second verification value. In the N2 message sent by the terminal to the authentication server, the authentication method supported by the terminal can be added, so that the authentication server can select the authentication method to be used at one time, and avoid the problem of large authentication delay caused by multiple negotiation.

In some implementations, the authentication server receives one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal by the terminal, including: the authentication server receives the terminal support from the terminal. One or two or more authentication methods and a priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods; wherein the authentication server is based on one or both of the terminal support The above authentication method and the authentication method supported by the authentication server determine a first authentication method used for performing authentication on the terminal, including: the authentication server is based on one or two or more types of authentication supported by the terminal The first authentication method is determined by a priority of each authentication method in the method and an authentication method supported by the authentication server. In the N2 message sent by the terminal to the authentication server, the authentication method supported by the terminal and the corresponding priority information may be added, wherein the priority information may be used to indicate an authentication method that the terminal desires to use, so that the authentication server can select the need at a time. The authentication method used avoids the problem of large authentication delay caused by multiple negotiation.

Optionally, the terminal carries one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal in the registration message sent by the terminal, where the authentication server receives the registration message sent by the terminal, and obtains the registration message in the registration message. One or more authentication methods supported by the terminal. For example, the authentication server may take an intersection in one or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server itself. If the intersection includes only one element, that is, an authentication method, the authentication method is In an authentication method, if the intersection includes more than two elements, that is, two or more authentication methods, the authentication method may be any one of the two or more authentication methods. Alternatively, the authentication server determines the first authentication method used for authenticating the terminal among the two or more authentication methods according to the priority of each of the one or more authentication methods supported by the terminal.

In some implementations, the encrypted first random number is obtained by encrypting the first random number with the first key; the authentication server is configured according to the encrypted first random number, the second random number, and And determining, by the third random number, the anchor key, comprising: the authentication server decrypting the encrypted first random number by using the second key, to obtain the first random number, wherein the second secret The key is a key corresponding to the first key; the authentication server determines the anchor key by using the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number.

Optionally, the authentication server may save the decrypted keys of the multiple terminals. After the authentication server receives the encrypted first random number sent by the terminal, the authentication server may be in the multiple keys saved by the terminal according to the identifier of the terminal. Determining a second key for decrypting the encrypted first random number, that is, the second key is a key corresponding to the first key.

Optionally, the first key and the second key may be a pair of asymmetric keys, the first key is a public key, and the second key is a private key.

Optionally, the first key and the second key are a pair of symmetric keys, that is, the first key and the second key are the same.

In some implementations, the first key and the second key are a pair of keys generated according to a Diffie-Hellman DH algorithm.

A second aspect provides a communication method, including: a terminal generating a first random number; and determining, by the terminal, an anchor key according to the first random number, the second random number, and a third random number, the anchor A point key is used for the terminal communication. In the present application, the terminal uses a random number instead of the registration password in the prior art to generate an anchor key, which effectively improves the security of determining the anchor key.

Optionally, the anchor key is used for communication by the terminal, and the terminal may communicate with the mobility management device according to the anchor key, or the terminal may be dense according to the anchor point. The key communicates with the access network device. Optionally, the anchor key may be a key used to transmit control plane data, or may be a key used to transmit user plane data; optionally, a lower layer key may be generated according to the anchor key, and the lower layer is dense. The key can be used to transfer control plane data or user plane data.

In some implementations, the method further includes: the terminal encrypting the first random number to obtain an encrypted first random number; and the terminal sending the encrypted first random to an authentication server number.

In some implementations, the second random number is generated by a terminal, and the third random number is generated by the authentication server or a mobility management device or a data management device.

Optionally, the method further includes: receiving, by the terminal, a third random number sent by the authentication server.

In some implementations, the terminal receives a second verification value sent by the data management device by using the authentication server, where the second verification value is determined by a terminal identifier of the terminal and saved by the data management device. Determining, by the terminal, the registration password of the terminal and the second random number; the terminal determining a fourth verification value according to the terminal identifier, the registration password saved by the terminal, and the second random number; The second verification value and the fourth verification value authenticate the authentication server. Specifically, if the second verification value is the same as the fourth verification value, the terminal determines that the authentication server is legal. If the second verification value is different from the fourth verification value, the terminal determines the authentication. The server is not legal.

Optionally, the second verification value and the fourth verification value are calculated by using the same authentication method, for example, by using a preset authentication method, or by using an authentication method determined by the terminal and the authentication server.

Optionally, the second verification and the fourth verification value may be generated by using a hash algorithm.

In some implementations, the method further includes: the terminal sending the authentication method supported by the terminal to the authentication server, where the authentication method supported by the terminal may include one, two, or two.

In some implementations, the terminal sends one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal to the authentication server, where the terminal sends the terminal to the authentication server to send the terminal supported by the terminal. Or two or more authentication methods and the priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods. By setting different priorities for different authentication methods, the authentication server may be instructed to select the authentication method desired by the terminal at one time according to the instruction of the terminal.

A third aspect provides a communication method, including: receiving, by a data management device, a terminal identifier, a second random number, and a third random number of a terminal sent by an authentication server; and the data management device according to the terminal identifier, the Determining, by the second random number and the third random number, a first verification value and a second verification value; the data management device transmitting the first verification value and the second verification value to the authentication server, to facilitate the The authentication server and the terminal perform mutual authentication using the first verification value and the second verification value.

In some implementations, the data management device determines the first verification value and the second verification value according to the terminal identifier, the second random number, and the third random number, including: the data management device is configured according to The terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number determine the second verification value; the data management device saves according to the terminal identifier and the data management device The registration password of the terminal and the third random number determine the first verification value.

Optionally, the method further includes: the data management device receives an identifier of the first authentication method sent by the authentication server, and the data management device determines, according to the identifier of the first authentication method, a first verification value and The first authentication method adopted by the second verification value, the data management device calculates the first verification value and the second verification value by using the first authentication method.

A fourth aspect provides a communication method, including: an authentication server acquiring a first verification value and a second verification value from a data management device; the authentication server authenticating the terminal according to the first verification value; The authentication server sends the second verification value to the terminal if the result of authenticating the terminal is legal.

In some implementations, the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, specifically: sending, by the authentication server, the terminal identifier of the terminal to the data management device, a second random number and the third random number, wherein the first verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number; The second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number; the authentication server receives the first verification value from the data management device and The second verification value.

In some implementations, the method further includes: the authentication server receiving a third verification value from the terminal, the third verification value by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and Determining, by the authentication server, the authentication password of the terminal, wherein the authentication server authenticates the terminal according to the first verification value, if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value, The authentication server determines that the terminal is legal; if the first verification value is not equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is invalid.

A fifth aspect provides a communication method, including: a terminal generating a first random number; and determining, by the terminal, an anchor key according to the first random number, the second random number, and a third random number; Encrypting the first random number to obtain an encrypted first random number; the terminal transmitting the encrypted first random number to an authentication server; and the authentication server is configured according to the encrypted first random number The second random number and the third random number determine the anchor key.

In some implementations, the second random number is generated by the terminal, and the third random number is generated by the authentication server or generated by the mobility management device or by a data management device.

In some implementations, the method further includes: the authentication server receiving a third verification value from the terminal, the third verification value by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and Determining, by the terminal, the registration password saved by the terminal; the authentication server acquiring the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device; the authentication server is configured according to the first verification value and the third verification value The terminal performs authentication; the authentication server sends the second verification value to the terminal when the result of authenticating the terminal is legal; the terminal saves itself according to the terminal identifier and the terminal The registration password and the second random number determine a fourth verification value; the terminal authenticates the authentication server according to the second verification value and the fourth verification value.

In some implementations, the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, specifically: sending, by the authentication server, the terminal identifier of the terminal to the data management device, a second random number and the third random number, wherein the first verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number; The second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number; the authentication server receives the first verification value from the data management device and The second verification value.

In a sixth aspect, a communication apparatus is provided for performing the method of any of the first aspect or the first aspect of the first aspect. In particular, the apparatus comprises means for performing the method of any of the first aspect or the first aspect of the first aspect described above.

In a seventh aspect, a communication apparatus is provided for performing the method of any of the possible implementations of the second aspect or the second aspect. In particular, the apparatus comprises means for performing the method of any of the possible implementations of the second aspect or the second aspect described above.

In an eighth aspect, there is provided a communication apparatus for performing the method of any of the possible implementations of the third aspect or the third aspect described above. In particular, the apparatus comprises means for performing the method of any of the possible implementations of the third aspect or the third aspect described above.

According to a ninth aspect, there is provided a communication apparatus for performing the method of any of the above-described fourth or fourth possible implementations. In particular, the apparatus comprises means for performing the method of any of the above-described fourth or fourth aspects of the fourth aspect.

In a tenth aspect, a communication device is provided, the device comprising: a transceiver (which may include a transmitter and a receiver), a memory, and a processor. Wherein the transceiver, the memory and the processor are in communication with each other via an internal connection path for storing instructions for executing instructions stored in the memory to control the receiver to receive signals and to control the transmitter to transmit signals The apparatus is caused to perform the method of the first aspect or any of the possible implementations of the first aspect.

Optionally, the memory may be a device other than the communication device.

In an eleventh aspect, a communication device is provided, the device comprising: a transceiver (which may include a transmitter and a receiver), a memory, and a processor. Wherein the transceiver, the memory and the processor are in communication with each other via an internal connection path for storing instructions for executing instructions stored in the memory to control the receiver to receive signals and to control the transmitter to transmit signals The apparatus is caused to perform the method of any of the possible implementations of the second aspect or the second aspect.

Optionally, the memory may be a device other than the communication device.

Optionally, the communication device comprises a chip in a terminal or a terminal.

In a twelfth aspect, a communication device is provided, the device comprising: a transceiver (which may include a transmitter and a receiver), a memory, and a processor. Wherein the transceiver, the memory and the processor are in communication with each other via an internal connection path for storing instructions for executing instructions stored in the memory to control the receiver to receive signals and to control the transmitter to transmit signals The apparatus is caused to perform the method of any of the possible implementations of the third aspect or the third aspect.

Optionally, the memory may be a device other than the communication device.

In a thirteenth aspect, a communication device is provided, the device comprising: a transceiver (which may include a transmitter and a receiver), a memory, and a processor. Wherein the transceiver, the memory and the processor are in communication with each other via an internal connection path for storing instructions for executing instructions stored in the memory to control the receiver to receive signals and to control the transmitter to transmit signals The apparatus is caused to perform the method of any of the possible implementations of the fourth aspect or the fourth aspect.

Optionally, the memory may be a device other than the communication device.

In a fourteenth aspect, a communication device is provided, the device comprising: a transceiver (which may include a transmitter and a receiver), a memory, and a processor. Wherein the transceiver, the memory and the processor are in communication with each other via an internal connection path for storing instructions for executing instructions stored in the memory to control the receiver to receive signals and to control the transmitter to transmit signals The apparatus is caused to perform the method of any of the possible implementations of the fifth aspect or the fifth aspect.

Optionally, the memory may be a device other than the communication device.

A fifteenth aspect, a communication system comprising the apparatus of the sixth aspect or any alternative implementation thereof, and the apparatus of the seventh aspect or any alternative implementation thereof, optionally, further An apparatus in an eighth aspect, or any alternative implementation thereof. Or the system comprises the apparatus of the eighth aspect or any alternative implementation thereof and the apparatus of the ninth aspect or any alternative implementation thereof. Alternatively, the system includes the apparatus of the tenth aspect or any alternative implementation thereof, and the apparatus of the eleventh aspect or any alternative implementation thereof, optionally, further comprising the twelfth aspect or A device in any of the alternative implementations. Alternatively, the system comprises the apparatus of the twelfth aspect or any alternative implementation thereof and the apparatus of the thirteenth aspect or any alternative implementation thereof.

In a sixteenth aspect, a computer readable storage medium is provided, the instructions being stored in a computer readable storage medium, when executed on a computer, causing the computer to perform any of the first aspect or the first aspect The method in the implementation.

In a seventeenth aspect, a computer readable storage medium is provided, the instructions being stored in the computer readable storage medium, when executed on a computer, causing the computer to perform any of the possible aspects of the second aspect or the second aspect The method in the implementation.

In an eighteenth aspect, a computer readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer readable storage medium stores instructions that, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform any of the third or third aspects The method in the implementation.

In a nineteenth aspect, a computer readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer readable storage medium stores instructions that, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform any of the fourth or fourth aspects The method in the implementation.

In a twentieth aspect, a computer readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer readable storage medium stores instructions that, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform any of the fifth or fifth aspects The method in the implementation.

In a twenty-first aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any of the first aspect or the first aspect of the first aspect.

In a twenty-second aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any of the above-described second or second aspect.

In a twenty-third aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any of the above-described third or third aspect.

In a twenty-fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any of the above-described fourth or fourth aspects.

In a twenty-fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any of the above fifth or fifth possible implementations.

In a twenty-sixth aspect, the present application provides a communication chip in which an instruction is stored, when it is run on an authentication server or a terminal or a data management device, causing an authentication server or terminal or data management device to perform the above aspects Any method.

DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a system architecture diagram provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of still another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of still another communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of a communication apparatus provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of another communication apparatus provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram of still another communication apparatus provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram of a communication system provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 13 is a schematic block diagram of still another communication apparatus provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 14 is a schematic block diagram of still another communication apparatus provided by an embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 15 is a schematic block diagram of still another communication apparatus provided by an embodiment of the present application.

Detailed ways

The technical solutions in the present application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as a Global System of Mobile communication (GSM) system, a Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system, and a wideband code division multiple access. (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access, WCDMA) system, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Long Term Evolution (LTE) system, LTE Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) system, LTE Time Division Duplex (TDD), Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS), Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) communication system, and the future fifth generation (5th Generation, 5G) system or new radio (New Radio, NR) and so on.

FIG. 1 is a system architecture diagram provided by an embodiment of the present application, including:

The terminal 110 may be referred to as a user equipment (UE), a mobile station (MS), a mobile terminal, or a terminal in a future 5G network, and the terminal may pass through a radio access network (radio). The access network (RAN) device communicates with one or more core network devices, for example, the terminal may be a mobile phone (or "cellular" phone) or a computer with a mobile terminal, etc., for example, the terminal may be a next generation family A next generation-residential gateway (NG-RG), for example, the terminal may also be a portable, pocket-sized, handheld, computer-integrated or in-vehicle mobile device that exchanges voice and/or data with the wireless access network. The terminal 110 can be used to negotiate with the authentication server 120 to determine an authentication method used to authenticate the terminal 110. The terminal 110 can also be used to authenticate the authentication server 120. Terminal 110 can also be used to generate an anchor key.

The authentication server 120 is configured to negotiate with the terminal 110 to determine an authentication method used to authenticate the terminal 110. The authentication server 120 can also be used to authenticate the terminal 110. The authentication server 120 can also be used to generate an anchor key.

In one possible implementation, the terminal 110 negotiates with the authentication server 120 to determine an authentication method used to authenticate the terminal 110. The terminal 110 and the authentication server 120 authenticate each other using the authentication method. When the terminal 110 determines that the authentication server 120 is legitimate and the authentication server 120 determines that the terminal 110 is legitimate, the terminal 110 and the authentication server 120 may generate an anchor key for the terminal to communicate with other devices.

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application, including: a terminal 110, an access network device 130, and a core network device 140.

The access network device 130 may be a base station controller (BSC) in GSM or CDMA, or a radio node controller (RNC) in WCDMA, or may be an evolved type in LTE. The base station (evolved node B, eNB or e-NodeB) may also be a new type of base station in the future 5G network (for example, an evolved LTE Node B, an eLTE NB, or an next generantion node B, gNB). The access network device 120 may be The shared access network device may be, for example, an access network device shared by a plurality of public land mobile networks (PLMNs).

The core network device 140 may include: an access and mobility management function (AMF) device 141, an authentication server function (AUSF) device 142, and a unified data management (UDM) device. 143. Optionally, the core network device may further include a mobility management entity (MME), a policy control function (PCF) device, a user port function (UPF) device, and an AF. At least one of a home subscriber server (HSS) and the like.

Specifically, the AMF 141 is configured to transparently pass the authentication message, and encrypt and protect the user plane data and the signaling plane data according to the anchor key generated by the AUSF 142. As the EAP authentication server, the AUSF 142 can authenticate the terminal or generate an anchor key to be sent to the AMF 141, so that the AMF protects the signaling plane data and the user plane data according to the anchor key. The UDM 143 may return an authentication message to the corresponding terminal according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, for example, a message indicating whether the authentication is passed.

Alternatively, the authentication server 120 in FIG. 1 may be the AUSF 142 in FIG. 2.

It should be understood that, in the embodiment of the present application, the mobility management device (the mobility management device may be AMF or MME), the authentication server, the data management device, and the like are only one name, and the name itself does not limit the entity. For example, the mobility management device may also be replaced with an "access and mobility management function" or other name. Moreover, the mobility management device may also correspond to a network element that includes other functions in addition to the access and mobility management functions. The authentication server may also be replaced with an "authentication service function" or other name, and the authentication server may also correspond to an network element including other functions in addition to the authentication service. A unified explanation is given here, and will not be described below.

It should also be understood that in the description of the present application, unless otherwise indicated, "/" means or means, for example, A/B may mean A or B; "and/or" herein is merely a description of the associated object. The association relationship indicates that there may be three relationships, for example, A and/or B, which may indicate that there are three cases in which A exists separately, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists separately. Also, in the description of the present application, "a plurality" means two or more than two unless otherwise stated. In addition, in order to facilitate the clear description of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, in the embodiments of the present application, the words "first", "second", and the like are used to distinguish the same items or similar items whose functions and functions are substantially the same. Those skilled in the art can understand that the words "first", "second" and the like do not limit the number and execution order, and the words "first", "second" and the like are not necessarily limited.

Before the terminal and the access network device or the core network device transmit data, the EAP is used for authentication. For example, as shown in FIG. 3, in a possible authentication method 200, the terminal is NG-RG in the method 200. The authentication server is an AUSF, and the data management device is a UDM as an example. However, the embodiment of the present application does not limit the method. The method 200 includes the following steps:

S201: The terminal sends an EAP message to the AUSF, where the EAP message carries the terminal identifier of the terminal, for example, may be an identity (ID) of the terminal.

S202. The AUSF receives the EAP message sent by the terminal, and selects an authentication method for the terminal.

For example, the authentication method may be an EAP-challenge handshake authentication protocol (EAP-CHAP) based on account password authentication, and an EAP-CHSCH protocol version 2 (EAP-mschapv2). The EAP-Password Authentication Protocol (EAP-PAP) authentication method may also be an extensible authentication protocol method for third generation based on a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) card. Authentication and key agreement (EAP-AKA') or EAP-authentication and key agreement (EAP-AKA) extensible authentication protocol - EAP-Subscriber Identity Module (EAP-SIM), authentication The method may also be an EAP-transport layer security (EAP-TLS) based on certificate authentication, and an EAP-tunnel transport layer security (EAP-TT) based on certificate authentication. LS).

S203, the AUSF generates a random number RAND-ausf.

S204, the AUSF sends a first message to the terminal, where the first message carries the random number RAND-ausf generated by the AUSF. For example, when the AUSF selects EAP-mschapv2 in S202, the first message may be a challenge message in EAP-MschapV2.

S205: The terminal receives the first message sent by the AUSF, and determines the first hash value according to the RAND-ausf carried in the first message, the terminal identifier of the terminal, and the registration password saved by the terminal, for example, the RFC draft-kamath- Pppext-eap-mschapv2-02" calculates the hash value.

S206. The terminal generates a random number RAND-rg.

S207. The terminal sends a second message to the AUSF, where the second message carries the RAND-rg and the first hash value. For example, when the first message is the challenge message of the EAP-MschapV2, the second message may be the response of the EAP-MschapV2. Message.

S208, the UDM stores the registration password of the terminal, and the UDM sends the registration password of the terminal to the AUSF. For example, the UDM may actively send the registration password of the terminal to the AUSF, or may send the registration password of the terminal to the AUSF based on the AUSF request.

S209. The AUSF receives the second message sent by the terminal, and determines a second hash value according to the RAND-ausf, the terminal identifier of the terminal, and the registration password of the terminal acquired by the AUSF, and the method for determining the second hash value and determining the first hash. The method of the Greek value is the same. The AUSF authenticates the terminal with the first hash value and the second hash value.

Specifically, if the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, the AUSF considers the terminal legal. If the first hash value is not equal to the second hash value, the AUSF considers that the terminal is invalid, and returns a reject message to the terminal.

S210, the AUSF determines the third hash value by using the RAND-rg, the terminal identifier of the terminal, and the registration password of the terminal acquired by the AUSF, and the method for determining the third hash value is the same as the method for determining the first hash value.

S211. The AUSF sends a third message to the terminal. The third message has a third hash value. If the AUSF selects the EAP-mschapv2 method in S202, the third message may be a success request message of the EAP-MschapV2.

S212: The terminal receives the third message sent by the AUSF, and determines the fourth hash value by using the RANG-rg, the terminal identifier of the terminal, and the AUSF, and the terminal authenticates the AUSF by using the third hash value and the fourth hash value.

Specifically, if the third hash value is equal to the fourth hash value, the terminal considers the AUSF to be legal. If the third hash value is not equal to the fourth hash value, the terminal considers the AUSF to be illegal.

S213. The terminal determines the anchor key by using RANG-rg, RAND-ausf, and the registration password saved by itself. For the specific determination method, refer to RFC 2759 "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2".

S214. The terminal sends an authentication pass message to the AUSF, to indicate that the AUSF verification is passed.

S215, the AUSF determines the anchor key by using RANG-rg, RAND-ausf, and the acquired registration password of the terminal.

S216. The AUSF sends an anchor key to the AMF, so that the terminal and the AMF use the anchor key to transmit the signaling plane data and the user plane data.

It should be understood that the order of execution of the above steps is not uniquely determined. For example, S213 may precede S207 after S206, and S215 may also wait before S207 and after S208. For example, S208 may be any step before S209, which is not limited by the embodiment of the present application.

In method 200, the following problems are likely to exist:

1. It is possible that in S202, the authentication method selected by the AUSF may not be the authentication method supported by the terminal. In this case, the AUSF and the terminal are required to perform multiple signaling interactions to determine the final authentication method, which will increase. The signaling overhead and the delay are high. For example, the process of signaling interaction is as shown in FIG. 4, and includes the following steps:

S301. The terminal sends the terminal identifier of the terminal to the AUSF, where the terminal identifier of the terminal may be the ID of the terminal.

S302. After receiving the terminal identifier of the terminal, the AUSF selects the first authentication method according to the terminal identifier of the terminal. It should be understood that it is possible that the AUSF may select different authentication methods according to the terminal identification of the same terminal.

S303, the AUSF sends the start message of the selected first authentication method to the terminal. For example, if the AUSF selects the EAP-SIM as the first authentication method, the start message of the first authentication method is a start message, and the start message indicates that the start message is started. EAP-SIM certification.

S304. After the terminal receives the start message of the first authentication method, the terminal may not support the first authentication method. For example, the terminal supports the second authentication method, where the second authentication method may be the EAP-MSchapv2 method and the EAP-AKA' The method, the terminal sends an EAP-NAK message to the AUSF, where the EAP-NAK message indicates that the terminal does not support the first authentication method, and the EAP-NAK message carries the second authentication method supported by the terminal (EAP-MSchapv2 method and EAP-AKA' method) ).

S305. The AUSF reselects the authentication method according to the second authentication method supported by the terminal carried in the EAP-NAK message. For example, the reselected authentication method is the EAP-MSchapv2 method.

S306. The AUSF sends a start message of the second authentication method to the terminal. For example, when the EAP-MSchapv2 method is selected, the start message of the second authentication method may be a challenge message.

2. The registration password of the terminal used to calculate the second hash value and the third hash value calculated in S210 in S209 needs to be obtained from the UDM, for example, by S208, so that the registration password of the terminal is in UDM and AUSF. When the transmission is interrupted, it is easily intercepted by the attacker, which may result in the leakage of the terminal registration password, which may further cause the attacker to forge the second hash value and the third hash value, thereby affecting the accuracy of mutual authentication between the terminal and the AUSF.

3. In S213 and S215, the anchor key is determined by using the registration password of the terminal, RAND-rg, and RAND-ausf. Since RAND-rg and RAND-ausf are transmitted in clear text between the terminal and the AUSF, it is easy to leak. If the terminal's registration password is cracked by the attacker, the attacker can forge the anchor key, which will limit the security of the transmitted data.

In the embodiment of the present application, for the foregoing first problem, at least one authentication method supported by the terminal may be carried in the message that the terminal initiates registration with the authentication server, so that the authentication server can be supported by the terminal when selecting the authentication method. At least one authentication method and at least one authentication method supported by the authentication server select an authentication method used to authenticate the terminal. For example, an intersection method is adopted in at least one authentication method supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server, and an authentication method used for authenticating the terminal is selected in the intersection. For the second problem, when the authentication server and the terminal perform mutual authentication, the data management device can calculate the verification value required at the time of authentication, and send the verification value to the authentication server, for example, the verification value can be the second hash value. And the third hash value, in this way, the intercepted situation caused by the transmission of the terminal's registration password between the authentication server and the data management device can be avoided. For the third problem mentioned above, when the terminal and the authentication server calculate the anchor key, the random number can be used to calculate the anchor key, and the random number can be used to replace the registration password of the terminal to avoid when the terminal registration password is intercepted. The situation in which security is limited.

The communication method of the embodiment of the present application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 5 shows a communication method 400 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The method 400 includes:

S410. The terminal acquires a first random number.

Optionally, the first random number may be generated by the terminal or sent by the other device and sent to the terminal.

The first random number is used to generate the anchor key instead of the registration password of the terminal. One possible implementation is that the terminal generates the first random number every time the session is established. Another possible implementation is that the first random number can be periodically updated. For example, the update frequency of the first random number can be determined according to the security requirements of the network. For example, if the security of the current network is good, the first random number is The update frequency of the number is low, and the current network security is poor. The update frequency of the first random number is high. For example, the update frequency of the first random number is fixed, and may be updated every hour.

S420. The terminal determines, according to the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, an anchor key, where the anchor key is used for communication by the terminal.

Optionally, the terminal and the authentication server may also perform mutual authentication by using the second random number and the third random number. Optionally, after the terminal and the authentication server perform mutual authentication by using the second random number and the third random number, the authentication server determines that the terminal is legal, and if the terminal determines that the authentication server is legal, the terminal and the authentication server use the second. The random number and the third random number determine the anchor key.

As an optional embodiment, the second random number may be generated by a terminal.

Optionally, the method further includes: the terminal acquiring the third random number, for example, the terminal receiving the third random number from the authentication server. That is, in the embodiment of the present application, the terminal determines the session key according to the first random number acquired by itself, the second random number generated by itself, and the third random number from the authentication server.

S430. The terminal encrypts the first random number to obtain an encrypted first random number. The terminal sends the encrypted first random number to an authentication server. The authentication server receives the encrypted first random number from the terminal. For example, the authentication server can be an AUSF.

As an optional embodiment, S430 includes: the terminal encrypting the first random number by using a first key to obtain an encrypted first random number.

S440. The authentication server determines an anchor key according to the encrypted first random number, the second random number, and the third random number.

Optionally, the authentication server obtains the second random number and the third random number. Specifically, the authentication server may receive the second random number sent by the terminal, the authentication server itself determines the third random number, or the authentication server receives the data from the data. The third random number of the device is managed, or the authentication service receives a third random number from the mobility management device.

As an optional embodiment, S440 includes: the authentication server decrypts the encrypted first random number by using a second key to obtain the first random number, where the second key is a key corresponding to the first key, that is, the second key is used to decrypt information encrypted using the first key; the authentication server uses the first random number, the second random number, and the first The three random numbers determine the anchor key.

Specifically, the authentication server decrypts the encrypted first random number by using a second key to obtain a first random number, and the authentication server uses the first random number, the second random number, and The third random number generates the anchor key. In this way, the first random number can be used to replace the registration password of the terminal to determine the anchor key, and the accuracy of determining the anchor key can be improved, and the random number is also random, and can be changed frequently, for example, by the terminal. The session is generated when the session is established, which avoids the security problem caused by the long-term use of the fixed terminal registration password.

Optionally, the first key and the second key may be a pair of asymmetric keys, the first key is a public key, and the second key is a private key. Optionally, the first key and the second key are a pair of symmetric keys, that is, the first key and the second key are the same, for example, the first key and the second key are A pair of identical keys generated by the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm.

Optionally, the authentication server needs to provide services for multiple terminals at the same time. Therefore, the authentication server can store keys corresponding to different terminals. After the authentication server receives the encrypted first random number sent by the terminal, the authentication server can Determining a second key for decrypting the encrypted first random number among the plurality of keys saved by the terminal according to the identifier of the terminal.

S450. The authentication server sends the anchor key to the mobility management device. In this way, the mobility management device communicates with the terminal according to the anchor key.

Specifically, the terminal may communicate with the mobility management device according to the anchor key, or the terminal may communicate with the access network device according to the anchor key. Optionally, the anchor key may be a key used to transmit control plane data, or may be a key used to transmit user plane data. Optionally, the lower layer key may be generated according to the anchor key, and different devices use the lower layer key to communicate.

For example, the mobility management device and the terminal may generate a second anchor key and a third anchor key according to the anchor key, where the second anchor key is used for the terminal to communicate with the mobility management device, and second The anchor key is used by the terminal to communicate with the access network device. For another example, the mobility device and the terminal may generate a fourth anchor key, a fifth anchor key, a sixth anchor key, and a seventh anchor key according to the anchor key, and the fourth key is used for the terminal. Controlling surface data communication with the mobility management device, the fifth key is used for communication between the terminal and the mobile device for user plane data, and the sixth key is used for communication between the terminal and the access network device for control plane data, The seven keys are used for communication between the terminal and the access network device for user plane data.

As an optional embodiment, the terminal and the authentication server may perform mutual authentication before the terminal and the authentication server determine the anchor key. Before the terminal and the authentication server perform mutual authentication, an authentication method in which the terminal and the authentication server perform mutual authentication may be determined. The method further includes: the authentication server receiving one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal by the terminal; the authentication server is based on one or two or more supported by the terminal The authentication method and the authentication method supported by itself determine the first authentication method used to authenticate the terminal.

Optionally, the terminal carries one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal in the registration message sent by the terminal, where the authentication server receives the registration message sent by the terminal, in the registration message. Obtain one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal. For example, the authentication server may take the intersection of one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and the authentication method supported by the terminal. If the intersection includes only one element, that is, one authentication method, the authentication method is the first authentication. method. If the intersection includes more than two elements, that is, two or more authentication methods, the authentication method may be any one of the two or more authentication methods. For example, the terminal supports the authentication method 1, the authentication method 2, and the authentication method 3. The authentication server supports the authentication method 2, the authentication method 3, and the authentication method 4. The authentication server may select one of the authentication method 2 and the authentication method 3 as the terminal. The authentication method used for certification.

Optionally, the authentication server receives one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and the priority of each one of the one or two or more authentication methods. Determining, by the authentication server, a first authentication method used for performing authentication on the terminal according to one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server, including: The authentication server determines the first authentication method according to a priority of each of the one or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server. For example, the authentication server may take an intersection in one or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server itself. If the intersection includes only one element, that is, an authentication method, the authentication method is first. In the authentication method, if the intersection includes more than two elements, that is, two or more authentication methods, the authentication server may preferentially select the authentication method with higher priority in the intersection as the first authentication method. The authentication server determines an authentication method used to perform authentication on the terminal according to one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server, so that the terminal and the authentication server can be avoided. Signaling overhead caused by signaling interaction. For example, the terminal supports the authentication method 1, the authentication method 2, and the authentication method 3. The priority of the authentication method 3 is higher than the priority of the authentication method 2, the priority of the authentication method 2 is higher than the priority of the authentication method 1, and the authentication server supports the authentication. In the method 2, the authentication method 3, and the authentication method 4, the authentication server may select the authentication method 3 as the first authentication method in the authentication method 2 and the authentication method 3.

Optionally, after the authentication server determines the first authentication method, the identifier of the first authentication method may be sent to the data management device, so that the data management device saves the identifier of the first authentication method to related information of the terminal. Medium, for example in the context of a terminal. Optionally, the data management device may not receive the identifier of the first authentication method, but determine the first verification value and the second verification value according to the preset authentication method. This embodiment of the present application does not limit this.

As an optional embodiment, the method 400 further includes: the authentication server acquiring a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device; the authentication server authenticating the terminal according to the first verification value . The authentication server sends the second verification value to the terminal when the result of authenticating the terminal is legal, so that the terminal can authenticate the authentication server according to the second verification value. Optionally, the foregoing determining the anchor key may be after the authentication server authenticates the terminal according to the first verification value, that is, when the authentication server authenticates the terminal, the authentication server and the terminal determine the anchor again. Point key.

As an optional embodiment, the authentication server obtains the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, specifically: sending, to the data management device, the terminal identifier of the terminal, the second random number, and The third random number receives the first verification value and the second verification value sent by the data management device. The first verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number. For example, the first verification value is used by the data management device to use the first authentication. The method is determined according to the terminal identifier, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number. The second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number. For example, the second verification value is determined by the data management device using the first authentication method according to the terminal identification, the registration password of the terminal held by the data management device, and the second random number.

Specifically, the authentication process of the authentication server to the terminal includes the following steps:

1. The authentication server sends the third random number to the terminal.

2. The terminal receives the third random number from the authentication server, and determines a third verification value according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, the third random number, and a registration password saved by the terminal. For example, the third authentication value is determined according to the terminal identifier, the third random number, and the registration password saved by the terminal by using the first authentication method.

The terminal sends the third verification value to the authentication server, the authentication server receives a third verification value sent by the terminal, and pairs the terminal according to the third verification value and the first verification value. Validity of the legality. Specifically, if the third verification value is equal to the first verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is legal; if the third verification value is not equal to the first verification value, the authentication The server determines that the terminal is illegal. Optionally, when the authentication server determines that the terminal is not legal, the authentication server sends a reject message to the terminal, to indicate that the terminal is rejected by the authentication server because it is illegal.

It should be understood that the first verification value and the third verification value are obtained by the same authentication method. For example, the first verification value and the third verification value may be obtained by using a preset authentication method or the foregoing first authentication method.

Specifically, the authentication process of the terminal to the authentication server includes the following steps:

1. The data management device determines a second verification value according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and a second random number.

2. The data management device sends the second verification value to the authentication server.

3. The authentication server receives the second verification value sent by the data management device, and sends the second verification value to the terminal.

The terminal receives the second verification value sent by the authentication server, and the terminal determines a fourth verification value according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, the registration password saved by the terminal, and the second random number.

5. The terminal authenticates the validity of the authentication server according to the second verification value and the fourth verification value. Specifically, if the second verification value is equal to the fourth verification value, the terminal determines that the authentication server is legal; if the second verification value is not equal to the fourth verification value, the terminal It is determined that the authentication server is illegal. Optionally, when the terminal determines that the authentication server is invalid, the terminal sends a reject message to the authentication server, to indicate that the authentication server is rejected by the terminal because it is illegal.

It should be understood that the second verification value and the fourth verification value are obtained by the same authentication method. For example, the second verification value and the fourth verification value may be obtained by using the foregoing first authentication method or a preset authentication method.

Optionally, the terminal and the authentication server may mutually authenticate each other. After the mutual authentication is legal, each of the anchor keys is determined, that is, step 420 and step 440 are performed, where the second random number and the first use of the anchor key are determined. The three random numbers are the random numbers used in the mutual authentication process.

It should be noted that the first verification value and the third verification value are obtained by the same authentication method. The second verification value and the fourth verification value are obtained by the same authentication method. The same authentication method may be a preset authentication method, or an authentication method determined by the authentication server and the terminal. Optionally, the foregoing first verification value, second verification value, third verification value, and fourth verification value may be four hash values obtained by using a hash algorithm. Certainly, the foregoing first verification value, the second verification value, the third verification value, and the fourth verification value may also be obtained by using another authentication algorithm, and the authentication algorithm used by the terminal and the authentication server in the authentication process in the embodiment of the present application. No restrictions.

It should be understood that in the method 400, the first random number generated by the terminal is generated, and the encrypted first random number can be sent to the authentication server. In an actual application, the authentication server may also generate a first random number, and send the encrypted first random number to the terminal. Alternatively, the third-party device may generate the first random number, and send the encrypted first random number to the authentication server and the terminal. The method for generating the first random number is not limited in this embodiment.

It should also be understood that, in the embodiment of the present application, the algorithm used to determine the anchor key may be a hash algorithm or a pseudo-random function (PRF) algorithm. There is no limit to what algorithm is used to calculate the anchor key.

FIG. 6 shows a communication method 500 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The method 500 includes:

S510, the authentication server sends the terminal identifier, the second random number, and the third random number of the terminal to the data management device; the data management device receives the terminal identifier of the terminal sent by the authentication server, Two random numbers and the third random number.

Optionally, before S510, the method further includes: the authentication server acquiring the terminal identifier, the second random number, and the third random number of the terminal. Optionally, the registration message sent by the terminal to the authentication server carries the terminal identifier of the terminal, and the authentication server obtains the terminal identifier of the terminal in the registration message. Optionally, the second random number may be generated by the terminal, where the terminal sends the second random number to the authentication request message sent by the authentication server, where the authentication server obtains the second random number in the authentication request message. . Optionally, the terminal may send the terminal identifier of the terminal and the second random number to the authentication server in the same message. Certainly, the embodiment of the present application does not limit the manner in which the authentication server obtains the terminal identifier and the second random number of the terminal. Optionally, the third random number may be generated by the authentication server, or may be generated by other devices on the network side and sent to the authentication server.

S520. The data management device determines a first verification value and a second verification value according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, the second random number, and the third random number.

As an optional embodiment, S520, the data management device determines the second verification according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number. a value, for example, determining, by the first authentication method, the second verification value according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number, the first authentication method The method may be a preset authentication method, or may be determined by the authentication server and the terminal to be determined and sent to the data management device; the data management device is configured according to the terminal identifier of the terminal, and the terminal registration of the data management device The password and the third random number determine the first verification value, for example, using a first authentication method according to a terminal identifier of the terminal, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number The number determines the first verification, the first authentication method may be a preset authentication method, or the authentication server negotiates with the terminal to determine and Sent to the data management device.

S530. The data management device sends the first verification value and the second verification value to the authentication server.

S540. The authentication server authenticates the terminal according to the first verification value.

S550. The authentication server sends a second verification value to the terminal when the result of authenticating the terminal is legal, and the terminal receives the second verification value sent by the authentication server.

S560. The terminal authenticates the authentication server according to the second verification value.

In the embodiment of the present application, the data management device may generate the first verification value and the second verification value. When generating the first verification value and the second verification value, the first verification may be generated by using the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device. The value and the second verification value, so that the leakage of the registration password caused by the transmission password of the terminal between the authentication server and the data management device can be avoided, thereby improving data security.

FIG. 7 shows a communication method 600 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The following describes an example in which the terminal is an NG-RG, the authentication server is an AUSF, and the data management device is a UDM. The method 600 includes:

S601, the NG-RG determines the first key, and the AUSF determines the second key.

Optionally, the first key and the second key are a pair of asymmetric keys, that is, the first key may be a public key, and the second key may be a private key.

Optionally, the first key and the second key may also be the same pair of symmetric keys. For example, the first key and the second key may be a pair of identical keys determined by the DH algorithm.

S602. When sending the registration message to the AUSF, the NG-RG carries the ID of the NG-RG and the authentication method supported by the NG-RG in the registration message, for example, the registration message may be an EAP message.

S603. The AUSF receives the registration message sent by the AN-RG, obtains the ID of the NG-RG and the authentication method supported by the NG-RG in the registration message, and selects the NG- according to the authentication method supported by the NG-RG and the authentication method supported by the AUSF. The authentication method used by RG for certification.

S604. The AUSF obtains a random number RAND-ausf, where RAND-ausf may be the foregoing third random number.

The AUSF obtains the random number RAND-ausf, which may include the following methods: AUSF may generate RAND-ausf by itself; or AUSF may request a random number from UDM, UDM generates RAND-ausf, and sends RAND-ausf to AUSF; or The AUSF requests a random number from the AMF, and the AMF generates a RAND-AUSF, and sends the generated RAND-ausf to the AUSF. The embodiment of the present application does not limit how the AUSF obtains the RAND-ausf.

S605, the AUSF sends a first message to the NG-RG, where the first message carries RAND-ausf, and the first message is used to request the NG-RG to authenticate the NG-RG. Optionally, the first message carries an authentication method used by the AUSF to authenticate the NG-RG.

For example, if it is determined in S603 that EAP-MSchapv2 is an authentication method used for authenticating NG-RG, the first message may be an EAP-MschapV2 challenge message indicating that the AUSF has selected EAP-MSchapv2. An authentication method for authenticating NG-RG.

S606. The NG-RG receives the first message sent by the AUSF, and acquires RAND-ausf in the first message. Further, the first hash value may be determined according to the ID of the NG-RG, the registration password of the NG-RG, and the obtained RAND-ausf. For example, the calculation method can be referred to RFC "draft-kamath-pppext-eap-mschapv2-02". Optionally, the first hash value may be the foregoing third verification value.

S607, NG-RG generates a random number RAND-rg. For example, RAND-rg may be the aforementioned second random number.

S608, the NG-RG sends a second message to the AUSF, where the second message carries the RAND-rg and the first hash value. If the SAP determines that the EAP-MSchapv2 is the authentication method used for authenticating the NG-RG, The second message carries the EAP-MschapV2-Response message. For example, the second message may be a response message of the first message, and the second message is used to indicate that the NG-RG accepts the authentication of the AUSF.

S609. The AUSF receives the second message sent by the NG-RG, and obtains the RAND-rg and the first hash value in the second message. The AUSF sends a fourth message to the UDM, where the fourth message carries the ID of the NG-RG, RAND-rg and RAND-ausf, and the fourth message is used to request the UDM for the parameters required for authenticating the NG-RG.

S610. The UDM receives the fourth message sent by the AUSF, and obtains the ID, RAND-rg, and RAND-ausf of the NG-RG in the fourth message. Further, the UDM determines the second hash value and the third hash value according to the ID of the NG-RG, the RAND-rg, the RAND-ausf, and the registration password of the NG-RG saved by the UDM. For example, the second hash value may be The foregoing first verification value, the third hash value may be the foregoing second verification value.

Specifically, the UDM determines a second hash value by using an ID of NG-RG, RAND-ausf, and a registration password of the NG-RG saved by the UDM; the UDM is saved by using the ID of NG-RG, RAND-rg, and UDM The registration password of the NG-RG determines the third hash value.

S611. The UDM sends a fifth message to the AUSF, where the fifth message is used to send a parameter required for authenticating the NG-RG to the AUSF.

Specifically, the fifth message carries the second hash value and the third hash value determined in S610.

S612. The AUSF receives the fifth message sent by the UDM, and obtains the second hash value and the third hash value in the fifth message. Further, the AUSF verifies the legality of the NG-RG by using the second hash value and the first hash value obtained in S609. If the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, the AUSF determines the NG-RG. legitimate. If the first hash value is not equal to the second hash value, the AUSF determines that the NG-RG is invalid.

S613. The AUSF sends a third message to the NG-RG, where the third message carries a third hash value. For example, the third message is used to request the NG-RG to authenticate the AUSF.

S614. The NG-RG receives the third message sent by the AUSF, and obtains the third hash value in the third message.

Further, the NG-RG determines the fourth hash value using the ID of the NG-RG, RAND-rg, and its own registration password.

Optionally, the NG-RG determines that the fourth hash value may be used before or after the NG-RG receives the third message sent by the AUSF, which is not limited by the embodiment of the present application.

S615. The NG-RG authenticates the legality of the AUSF by using the third hash value and the fourth hash value.

For example, if the third hash value is equal to the fourth hash value, the NG-RG determines that the AUSF is legal, and if the third hash value is not equal to the fourth hash value, the NG-RG determines that the AUSF is invalid.

S616, the NG-RG obtains a random number pre-master-key, for example, the pre-master-key may be the foregoing first random number.

Optionally, the embodiment of the present application does not limit the sequence of S616. For example, S616 may precede any step in S601-S615. That is to say, S616 may be generated after the NG-RG and the AUSF mutually authenticate each other, or may be generated before the NG-RG and the AUSF mutually authenticate pass. One possible implementation is that the NG-RG maintains a random number (ie, pre-master-key) for generating an anchor key, and the random number is periodically updated. For example, the random number can be updated every 1 hour. When the NG-RG needs to generate an anchor key, the random number is obtained.

S617, the NG-RG determines the anchor key according to the random numbers pre-master-key, RAND-ausf, and RAND-rg. For example, the anchor key may be calculated by using a hash algorithm or a PRF algorithm.

Optionally, the embodiment of the present application does not limit the sequence of S617, as long as the NG-RG obtains three random numbers, for example, S617 may be after S607 and before S608. Optionally, S617 may be performed after the NG-RG verifies that the AUSF is legal. It should be noted that the specific method for generating an anchor key for the NG-RG is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.

S618, the NG-RG encrypts the random number pre-master-key by using the first key in S601 to obtain an encrypted pre-master-key, and the encrypted pre-master-key may be referred to as a pre-master- Secret.

The random number used to generate the anchor key is encrypted and transmitted first, which can effectively ensure that the random number used to generate the anchor key is not leaked during transmission.

S619. The NG-RG sends a sixth message to the AUSF, where the sixth message carries a pre-master-secret.

Optionally, the sixth message is further used to indicate that the NG-RG passes the AUSF authentication. Of course, the sixth message may be the verification pass message in S214 in method 200.

S620: The AUSF receives the sixth message sent by the NG-RG, obtains the pre-master-secret in the sixth message, and decrypts the pre-master-secret by using the second key in S601 to obtain a pre-master-key.

Specifically, the authentication server needs to provide services for multiple NG-RGs at the same time. Therefore, the authentication server can store keys corresponding to different NG-RGs. After the authentication server receives the pre-master-secret, the authentication server can perform the NG according to the NG. The identifier of the -RG determines a second key for decrypting the encrypted first random number among the plurality of keys stored by itself, thereby decrypting the pre-master-secret with the second key to obtain a pre-master- Key.

S621, the AUSF determines the anchor key using the pre-master-key, RAND-ausf, and RAND-rg obtained by S620.

S622, the AUSF sends the anchor key to the AMF device, and the AMF communicates with the NG-RG according to the anchor key. For example, communication between the control plane data and the user plane data can be performed.

It should be understood that the order of execution of the various steps in method 600 is not uniquely determined, and the order of the various steps may be determined in accordance with the logical relationship.

Optionally, in S601, the first key determined by the NG-RG and the second key determined by the AUSF, the first key and the second key may be a pair of symmetric keys, for example, according to the DH algorithm. a pair of keys. As shown in FIG. 8, the process of determining the first key and the second key includes the following steps:

S701, in S601, the registration message sent by the NG-RG to the AUSF may carry the supported capability set of the DH, and the capability set supported by the DH includes some common parameters used to generate the key, for example, the common parameters may be multiple prime numbers. And multiple original roots.

S702: The AUSF receives the registration message sent by the NG-RG, and obtains the capability set supported by the DH in the registration message, and the AUSF determines the “selected DH capability” and the NG-RG “initiated DH capability” in the capability set supported by the DH. The AUSF generates a first parameter AUSF-priv and a second parameter AUSF-pub of the DH according to the "selected DH capability" and the NG-RG "initiated DH capability".

S703. The AUSF sends the second parameter AUSF-pub and the "selected DH capability" and the NG-RG "initiated DH capability" to the NG-RG through the first message in S605.

S704, the NG-RG receives the first message sent by the AUSF, and obtains the prime number and the original root selected by the AUSF and the second parameter AUSF-pub in the first message, and the NG-RG generates the DH according to the prime number selected by the AUSF and the original root. The three parameters RG-priv and the fourth parameter RG-pub.

S705. The NG-RG generates a first key according to the third parameter RG-priv and the second parameter AUSF-pub.

S706. The NG-RG may send the fourth parameter RG-pub to the AUSF by using the second message in S608.

S707. The AUSF generates a second key according to the fourth parameter RG-pub and the first parameter AUSF-priv, where the second key is the same as the first key. Thus, in S618, the NG-RG may encrypt the first random number by using the first key, and in S620, the AUSF may decrypt the encrypted first random number by using the second key to obtain the first random number. number.

The communication method according to the embodiment of the present application is described in detail above with reference to FIG. 1 to FIG. 8. The communication device according to the embodiment of the present application will be described in detail below with reference to FIG. 9 to FIG.

FIG. 9 shows a communication device 800 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The device 800 includes:

The transceiver unit 810 is configured to receive the encrypted first random number from the terminal;

The processing unit 820 is configured to determine, according to the encrypted first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, an anchor key;

The transceiver unit 810 is further configured to send the anchor key to the mobility management device.

As an alternative embodiment, the anchor key is used by the mobility management device to communicate.

As an optional embodiment, the second random number is generated by a terminal, the third random number being generated by the device or generated by the mobility management device or generated by a data management device.

As an optional embodiment, the transceiver unit 810 is further configured to: acquire a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device; the processing unit is further configured to perform, according to the first verification value, the terminal The transceiver unit is further configured to send the second verification value to the terminal if the result of authenticating the terminal is legal.

As an optional embodiment, the transceiver unit 810 is further configured to: send the terminal identifier of the terminal, the second random number, and the third random number to the data management device; receive the data management from the terminal The first verification value and the second verification value of the device, wherein the first verification value is identified by the terminal, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number Determining; the second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number.

As an optional embodiment, the transceiver unit 810 is further configured to: receive a third verification value sent by the terminal, where the third verification value is determined by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and The processing unit 820 is configured to determine that the terminal is legal if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value.

As an optional embodiment, the transceiver unit 810 is further configured to: before receiving the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, receive one or two of the terminal support from the terminal, and The above-mentioned authentication method is further configured to: determine, according to one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal, and an authentication method supported by the authentication server, determine the authentication used by the terminal The first method of authentication.

As an optional embodiment, the transceiver unit 810 is further configured to: receive one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal from the terminal, and the one or two or more authentication methods. The priority of each authentication method;

The processing unit 820 is specifically configured to: determine the first authentication method according to a priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal, and an authentication method supported by the authentication server. .

As an optional embodiment, the encrypted first random number is obtained by encrypting the first random number by using the first key; the processing unit 820 is specifically configured to: use the second key to pair the encrypted Decrypting the first random number to obtain the first random number, wherein the second key is a key corresponding to the first key; using the first random number, the second random number, and the first The three random numbers determine the anchor key.

As an optional embodiment, the first key and the second key are a pair of keys generated according to a Diffie-Hellmann DH algorithm.

It should be understood that the apparatus 800 herein is embodied in the form of a functional unit. The term "unit" as used herein may refer to an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a processor (eg, a shared processor, a proprietary processor, or a group) for executing one or more software or firmware programs. Processors, etc.) and memory, merge logic, and/or other suitable components that support the described functionality. In an optional example, those skilled in the art may understand that the device 800 may be specifically an authentication server in the foregoing method embodiment, and the device 80 may be used to execute various processes and/or steps corresponding to the authentication server in the foregoing method embodiment. To avoid repetition, we will not repeat them here.

FIG. 10 shows a communication device 900 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The device 900 includes:

The processing unit 910 is configured to generate a first random number.

The processing unit 910 is further configured to determine, according to the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, an anchor key, where the anchor key is used for the terminal communication.

As an optional embodiment, the processing unit is further configured to: encrypt the first random number to obtain an encrypted first random number; and the device further includes: a first transceiver unit 920, configured to authenticate The server sends the encrypted first random number.

As an optional embodiment, the second random number is generated by the apparatus, and the third random number is generated by the authentication server or a mobility management device or a data management device.

In an optional embodiment, the apparatus further includes: a second transceiver unit, configured to receive a second verification value sent by the data management device by the authentication server, where the second verification value is used by the device of the device The identifier, the registration password of the device saved by the data management device, and the second random number determined.

The processing unit is further configured to: determine a fourth verification value according to the device end identifier, the registration password saved by the device, and the second random number; according to the second verification value and the fourth verification The value authenticates the authentication server.

As an optional embodiment, the device further includes: a third transceiver unit, configured to send, by the authentication server, one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal.

As an optional embodiment, the third transceiver unit is specifically configured to: send, to the authentication server, one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal, and the one or two or more authentications. The priority of each authentication method in the method.

It should be understood that the apparatus 900 herein is embodied in the form of a functional unit. The term "unit" as used herein may refer to an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a processor (eg, a shared processor, a proprietary processor, or a group) for executing one or more software or firmware programs. Processors, etc.) and memory, merge logic, and/or other suitable components that support the described functionality. In an alternative example, those skilled in the art may understand that the device 900 may be specifically the terminal in the foregoing method embodiment, and the device 900 may be used to perform various processes and/or steps corresponding to the terminal in the foregoing method embodiment. Avoid repetition and we will not repeat them here.

FIG. 11 shows a communication device 1000 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The device 1000 includes:

The transceiver unit 1010 is configured to obtain a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device.

The processing unit 1020 is configured to perform authentication on the terminal according to the first verification value.

The transceiver unit 1010 is further configured to send the second verification value to the terminal if the result of authenticating the terminal is legal.

As an optional embodiment, the transceiver unit 1010 is further configured to: send the terminal identifier of the terminal, the second random number, and the third random number to the data management device; receive the data management from the terminal The first verification value and the second verification value of the device, wherein the first verification value is identified by the terminal, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the third random number It is determined that the second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number.

As an optional embodiment, the transceiver unit 1010 is further configured to: receive a third verification value from the terminal, where the third verification value is determined by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and The terminal's own registered password is determined.

The processing unit 1020 is further configured to: if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is legal; if the first verification value is not equal to the third verification value And the authentication server determines that the terminal is illegal.

It should be understood that the apparatus 1000 herein is embodied in the form of a functional unit. The term "unit" as used herein may refer to an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a processor (eg, a shared processor, a proprietary processor, or a group) for executing one or more software or firmware programs. Processors, etc.) and memory, merge logic, and/or other suitable components that support the described functionality. In an optional example, those skilled in the art may understand that the device 1000 may be specifically an authentication server in the foregoing method embodiment, and the device 1000 may be used to execute various processes and/or steps corresponding to the authentication server in the foregoing method embodiment. To avoid repetition, we will not repeat them here.

FIG. 12 shows a communication system 1100 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The system 1100 includes: a device 800 and a device 900.

The device 800 is completely corresponding to the authentication server in the method embodiment, and the device 900 completely corresponds to the terminal in the method embodiment. The device 1000 completely corresponds to the data management device in the method embodiment, and the corresponding unit performs the corresponding steps. For example, the transceiver unit method performs the transceiving step in the method embodiment, and the steps other than transceiving may be performed by the processing module. For the function of the specific module, reference may be made to the corresponding method embodiment, which is not described in detail.

The authentication server, the terminal, and the data management device of the foregoing solutions have the functions of implementing the corresponding steps performed by the authentication server, the terminal, and the data management device in the foregoing method; the functions may be implemented by hardware or by executing corresponding software through hardware. The hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions; for example, the transmitting unit may be replaced by a transmitter, the receiving unit may be replaced by a receiver, and other units such as a determining unit may be replaced by a processor and executed separately Transceiver operations and associated processing operations in various method embodiments.

In the embodiment of the present application, the device in FIG. 9-11 may also be a chip or a chip system, for example, a system on chip (SoC). Correspondingly, the receiving unit and the sending unit may be transceiver circuits of the chip, which are not limited herein.

FIG. 13 shows still another communication device 1200 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The apparatus 1200 includes a processor 1210, a transceiver 1220, and a memory 1230. The processor 1210, the transceiver 1220, and the memory 1230 communicate with each other through an internal connection path. The memory 1230 is configured to store instructions, and the processor 1210 is configured to execute instructions stored by the memory 1230 to control the transceiver 1220 to send signals and / or receive signals.

The transceiver 1220 is configured to receive the encrypted first random number from the terminal, and the processor 1210 is configured to determine, according to the encrypted first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, an anchor key. The transceiver 1220 is further configured to send the anchor key to the mobility management device.

Optionally, the memory 1230 can be a device other than the communication device 1200.

It should be understood that the device 1200 may be specifically an authentication server in the foregoing method embodiment, and may be used to perform various steps and/or processes corresponding to the terminal in the foregoing method embodiment. Optionally, the memory 1230 can include read only memory and random access memory and provides instructions and data to the processor. A portion of the memory may also include a non-volatile random access memory. For example, the memory can also store information of the device type. The processor 1210 can be configured to execute instructions stored in a memory, and when the processor 1210 executes instructions stored in the memory, the processor 1110 is configured to perform the various steps of the method embodiment corresponding to the authentication server described above and/or Or process.

FIG. 14 shows still another communication device 1300 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The apparatus 1300 includes a processor 1310, a transceiver 1320, and a memory 1330. The processor 1310, the transceiver 1320, and the memory 1330 communicate with each other through an internal connection path. The memory 1330 is configured to store instructions, and the processor 1310 is configured to execute instructions stored by the memory 1330 to control the transceiver 1320 to send signals and / or receive signals.

The processor 1310 is configured to generate a first random number, and determine an anchor key according to the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, where the anchor key is used for the terminal communication.

Optionally, the memory 1330 can be a device other than the communication device 1300.

It should be understood that the device 1300 may be specifically the terminal in the foregoing method embodiment, and may be used to perform various steps and/or processes corresponding to the terminal in the foregoing method embodiment. Optionally, the memory 1330 can include read only memory and random access memory and provides instructions and data to the processor. A portion of the memory may also include a non-volatile random access memory. For example, the memory can also store information of the device type. The processor 1310 can be configured to execute instructions stored in a memory, and when the processor 1310 executes instructions stored in the memory, the processor 1310 is configured to perform the various steps of the method embodiments corresponding to the terminal described above and/or Process.

FIG. 15 shows still another communication device 1400 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The apparatus 1400 includes a processor 1410, a transceiver 1420, and a memory 1430. The processor 1410, the transceiver 1420, and the memory 1330 communicate with each other through an internal connection path. The memory 1430 is configured to store instructions, and the processor 1410 is configured to execute instructions stored by the memory 1430 to control the transceiver 1420 to send signals and / or receive signals.

The transceiver 1420 is configured to obtain a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device. The processor 1410 is configured to authenticate the terminal according to the first verification value. The transceiver 1320 is further configured to When the result of the terminal authentication is legal, the second verification value is sent to the terminal.

Alternatively, the memory 1430 can be a device other than the communication device 1400.

It should be understood that the device 1400 may be specifically the data management device in the foregoing method embodiment, and may be used to perform various steps and/or processes corresponding to the data management device in the foregoing method embodiment. Optionally, the memory 1430 can include read only memory and random access memory and provides instructions and data to the processor. A portion of the memory may also include a non-volatile random access memory. For example, the memory can also store information of the device type. The processor 1410 can be configured to execute instructions stored in a memory, and when the processor 1310 executes instructions stored in the memory, the processor 1410 is configured to perform the various steps of the method embodiment corresponding to the data management device described above and / or process.

It should be understood that the transceiver described above can include a transmitter and a receiver. The transceiver may further include an antenna, and the number of antennas may be one or more. The memory can be a separate device or integrated into the processor. The above various devices or parts of the device can be integrated into the chip for implementation, such as integration into a baseband chip.

In the embodiment of the present application, the transceiver in FIG. 13 to FIG. 15 may also be a communication interface, which is not limited herein.

In the various embodiments of the present application, various examples are set forth for the purposes of understanding. However, these examples are merely examples and are not meant to be the best implementation of the present application.

It should also be understood that, in the embodiment of the present application, the processor of the foregoing device may be a central processing unit (CPU), and the processor may also be another general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP). ), application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, and the like. The general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor or any conventional processor or the like.

In the implementation process, each step of the above method may be completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in a processor or an instruction in a form of software. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application may be directly implemented as a hardware processor, or may be performed by a combination of hardware and software units in the processor. The software unit can be located in a conventional storage medium such as random access memory, flash memory, read only memory, programmable read only memory or electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, and the like. The storage medium is located in a memory, and the processor executes instructions in the memory, in combination with hardware to perform the steps of the above method. To avoid repetition, it will not be described in detail here.

In the above embodiments, it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, it may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in accordance with embodiments of the present application are generated in whole or in part. The computer can be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transferred from one computer readable storage medium to another computer readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions can be from a website site, computer, server or data center Transmission to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wire (eg, coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless (eg, infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The readable storage medium can be any available media that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, or the like that includes one or more available media. The available media can be magnetic media (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, Magnetic tape), optical medium (for example, DVD), or semiconductor medium (such as solid state disk (SSD)).

Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the elements and algorithm steps of the various examples described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the solution. A person skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each particular application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of the present application.

A person skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and brevity of the description, the specific working process of the system, the device and the unit described above can refer to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiment, and details are not described herein again.

In the several embodiments provided by the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices, and methods may be implemented in other manners. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of the unit is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be another division manner, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.

The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

The functions may be stored in a computer readable storage medium if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present application, which is essential or contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, may be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium, including The instructions are used to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present application. The foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and the like, which can store program codes. .

The foregoing is only a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application. It should be covered by the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims (38)

A communication method, comprising: The authentication server receives the encrypted first random number from the terminal; Determining, by the authentication server, an anchor key according to the encrypted first random number, the second random number, and the third random number; The authentication server sends the anchor key to the mobility management device. The method of claim 1 wherein said anchor key is used by said mobility management device to communicate. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the second random number is generated by the terminal, and the third random number is generated by the authentication server or generated by the mobility management device or by Data management device generation. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the method further comprises: The authentication server acquires a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device; The authentication server authenticates the terminal according to the first verification value; The authentication server sends the second verification value to the terminal if the result of authenticating the terminal is legal. The method according to claim 4, wherein the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, specifically includes: Sending, by the authentication server, the terminal identifier, the second random number, and the third random number of the terminal to the data management device; The authentication server receives the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, wherein the first verification value is identified by the terminal, and the terminal saved by the data management device The registration password and the third random number are determined; the second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number. The method according to claim 4 or 5, wherein the method further comprises: The authentication server receives a third verification value from the terminal, where the third verification value is determined by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and a registration password saved by the terminal; The authentication server performs authentication on the terminal according to the first verification value, and includes: And if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is legal. The method according to any one of claims 4 to 6, wherein before the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, the method further comprises: The authentication server receives one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal from the terminal; The authentication server determines, according to one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server, a first authentication method used to perform authentication on the terminal. The method according to claim 7, wherein the authentication server receives one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and sent by the terminal, including: The authentication server receives one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal from the terminal and a priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods; The first authentication method used by the authentication server to determine the authentication of the terminal according to the one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and the authentication method supported by the authentication server includes: The authentication server determines the first authentication method according to a priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the encrypted first random number is obtained by encrypting the first random number with the first key; Determining, by the authentication server, the anchor key according to the encrypted first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, including: The authentication server decrypts the encrypted first random number by using a second key to obtain the first random number, where the second key is a key corresponding to the first key ; The authentication server determines the anchor key by using the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number. The method of claim 9, wherein the first key and the second key are a pair of keys generated according to a Diffie-Hellmann DH algorithm. A communication method, comprising: The terminal generates a first random number; And determining, by the terminal, an anchor key according to the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, where the anchor key is used for communication by the terminal. The method of claim 11 wherein the method further comprises: The terminal encrypts the first random number to obtain an encrypted first random number; The terminal sends the encrypted first random number to an authentication server. The method according to claim 11 or 12, wherein the second random number is generated by a terminal, and the third random number is generated by the authentication server or a mobility management device or a data management device. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 13, wherein the method further comprises: Receiving, by the terminal, a second verification value from the data management device, where the second verification value is determined by a terminal identifier of the terminal, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number ; Determining, by the terminal, a fourth verification value according to the terminal identifier, a registration password saved by the terminal, and the second random number; The terminal authenticates the authentication server according to the second verification value and the fourth verification value. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 14, wherein the method further comprises: Transmitting, by the terminal, one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal to the authentication server; or The terminal sends, to the authentication server, one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and a priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods. A communication method, comprising: The authentication server acquires the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device; The authentication server authenticates the terminal according to the first verification value; The authentication server sends the second verification value to the terminal if the result of authenticating the terminal is legal. The method according to claim 16, wherein the obtaining, by the authentication server, the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, specifically includes: Sending, by the authentication server, the terminal identifier, the second random number, and the third random number of the terminal to the data management device; The authentication server receives the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, wherein the first verification value is identified by the terminal, and the terminal saved by the data management device The registration password and the third random number are determined; the second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and the second random number. The method according to claim 16 or 17, wherein the method further comprises: The authentication server receives a third verification value from the terminal, where the third verification value is determined by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and a registration password saved by the terminal; The authentication server performs authentication on the terminal according to the first verification value, and includes: And if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is legal; And if the first verification value is not equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is invalid. A communication device, comprising: a transceiver unit, configured to receive the encrypted first random number from the terminal; a processing unit, configured to determine an anchor key according to the encrypted first random number, the second random number, and the third random number; The transceiver unit is further configured to send the anchor key to the mobility management device. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein the second random number is generated by a terminal, the third random number being generated by the apparatus or generated by the mobility management device or generated by a data management device. The device according to claim 19 or 20, wherein the transceiver unit is further configured to: Obtaining a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device; The processing unit is further configured to authenticate the terminal according to the first verification value; The transceiver unit is further configured to send the second verification value to the terminal if the result of authenticating the terminal is legal. The device according to claim 21, wherein the transceiver unit is further configured to: Transmitting, to the data management device, a terminal identifier of the terminal, the second random number, and the third random number; Receiving the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, wherein the first verification value is identified by the terminal, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and The third random number is determined; the second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal and the second random number saved by the data management device. The device according to claim 21 or 22, wherein the transceiver unit is further configured to: Receiving, by the terminal, a third verification value, where the third verification value is determined by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and a registration password saved by the terminal; The processing unit is specifically configured to: And if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value, determining that the terminal is legal. The device according to any one of claims 21 to 23, wherein the transceiver unit is further configured to: Receiving one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal from the terminal before acquiring the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device; The processing unit is further configured to: determine, according to one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal, and an authentication method supported by the authentication server, a first authentication method used to perform authentication on the terminal. The device according to claim 24, wherein the transceiver unit is specifically configured to: Receiving one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal from the terminal and a priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods; The processing unit is specifically configured to: The first authentication method is determined according to a priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal and an authentication method supported by the authentication server. The apparatus according to any one of claims 19 to 25, wherein the encrypted first random number is obtained by encrypting the first random number with the first key; The processing unit is specifically configured to: Decrypting the encrypted first random number by using a second key to obtain the first random number, where the second key is a key corresponding to the first key; The anchor key is determined using the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number. A terminal, comprising: a processing unit, configured to generate a first random number; The processing unit is further configured to determine an anchor key according to the first random number, the second random number, and the third random number, where the anchor key is used for communication by the terminal. The terminal according to claim 27, wherein the processing unit is further configured to: Encrypting the first random number to obtain an encrypted first random number; The terminal further includes: The first transceiver unit is configured to send the encrypted first random number to the authentication server. The terminal according to claim 27 or 28, wherein the second random number is generated by the terminal, and the third random number is generated by the authentication server or a mobility management device or a data management device. The terminal according to any one of claims 27 to 29, wherein the terminal further comprises: a second transceiver unit, configured to receive a second verification value that is sent by the data management device by using the authentication server, where the second verification value is determined by a terminal identifier of the terminal, and the terminal that is saved by the data management device a registration password and the second random number determined; The processing unit is further configured to: determine, according to the terminal identifier, a registration password saved by the terminal, and the second random number, a fourth verification value; according to the second verification value and the fourth verification value Authenticate the authentication server. The terminal according to any one of claims 27 to 30, wherein the terminal further comprises: The third transceiver unit is configured to: send one or two or more authentication methods supported by the terminal to the authentication server; or send one or two or more authentications supported by the terminal to the authentication server. The method and the priority of each of the one or two or more authentication methods. A communication device, comprising: a transceiver unit, configured to acquire a first verification value and a second verification value from the data management device; a processing unit, configured to authenticate the terminal according to the first verification value; The transceiver unit is further configured to send the second verification value to the terminal if the result of authenticating the terminal is legal. The device according to claim 32, wherein the transceiver unit is further configured to: Transmitting, to the data management device, a terminal identifier of the terminal, the second random number, and the third random number; Receiving the first verification value and the second verification value from the data management device, wherein the first verification value is identified by the terminal, a registration password of the terminal saved by the data management device, and The third random number is determined; the second verification value is determined by the terminal identifier, the registration password of the terminal and the second random number saved by the data management device. The device according to claim 32 or 33, wherein the transceiver unit is further configured to: Receiving a third verification value from the terminal, where the third verification value is determined by the third random number, a terminal identifier of the terminal, and a registration password saved by the terminal; The processing unit is further configured to: And if the first verification value is equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is legal; And if the first verification value is not equal to the third verification value, the authentication server determines that the terminal is invalid. A communication device, comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory for storing computer execution instructions, the processor executing the computer execution instructions stored by the memory when the device is running The apparatus for performing the communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 10. A communication device, comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory for storing computer execution instructions, the processor executing the computer execution instructions stored by the memory when the device is running The apparatus for performing the communication method according to any one of claims 11-15. A communication device, comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory for storing computer execution instructions, the processor executing the computer execution instructions stored by the memory when the device is running And causing the apparatus to perform the communication method according to any one of claims 16-18. A communication system comprising the apparatus of any one of claims 19 to 26 and the apparatus of any one of claims 27 to 31.

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