WO2018133686A1 - Method and device for password protection, and storage medium - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed are a method and device for password protection. The method for password protection comprises: a server obtaining a user identifier and a first plaintext password; using a pre-set salt value to salt the first plaintext password to obtain a first key; taking the first key as an encryption key for a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) operation, and taking a secure hash algorithm (SHA) as a cryptographic hash function for the HMAC operation to carry out the HMAC operation so as to obtain a first ciphertext password; and correspondingly storing the user identifier and the first ciphertext password in a database.

Description

Password protection method, device and storage medium

The present application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. PCT Application No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. .

Technical field

The embodiment of the present invention relates to the field of information security technologies, and in particular, to a password protection method, apparatus, and storage medium.

background

The existing account system generally stores the password in plain text. This storage method can easily lead to password leakage, which brings great security risks to users. In order to protect the password security, some account systems encrypt and store the password using Message Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5). It is confirmed that the MD5 encryption algorithm can be cracked, and the MD5 algorithm cannot prevent collisions. After the MD5 password, the crack is only a matter of time, that is, the security of the password cannot be guaranteed in this way, and the risk of the password being compromised is still very large.

Technical content

The embodiment of the present application provides a password protection method, including:

The server obtains the user identifier and the first plaintext password;

The server uses a preset salt value to add salt to the first plaintext password to obtain a first key;

The server uses the first key as an encryption key for the hash message authentication code HMAC operation, and uses the secure hash algorithm SHA as a hash function for HMAC operation to perform an HMAC operation to obtain a first ciphertext password;

The server stores the user identifier in the database corresponding to the first ciphertext password.

The embodiment of the present application further provides a password protection apparatus, including:

An obtaining unit, configured to obtain a user identifier and a first plaintext password;

a salt adding unit, configured to add a salt to the first plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain a first key;

a first encryption unit, configured to use the first key as an encryption key of a hash message authentication code HMAC operation, and use a secure hash algorithm SHA as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and perform an HMAC operation to obtain a first Ciphertext password;

And a storage unit, configured to store the user identifier in the database corresponding to the first ciphertext password.

The present application also proposes a non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing computer readable instructions that cause at least one processor to perform the methods described above.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly described below. It is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application. Other drawings can also be obtained from those skilled in the art based on these drawings without paying any creative effort.

1 is a schematic diagram of a scenario of a password protection method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

2 is a schematic flowchart of a password protection method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 3a is a schematic diagram of a registration process provided by an embodiment of the present application; FIG.

FIG. 3b is a schematic diagram of an original ciphertext password generation process provided by an embodiment of the present application; FIG.

4a is a schematic diagram of a verification process provided by an embodiment of the present application;

4b is a schematic diagram of a real-time ciphertext password generation process provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a password protection apparatus according to an embodiment of the present application; FIG.

FIG. 6 is another schematic structural diagram of a password protection apparatus according to an embodiment of the present application.

detailed description

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application are clearly and completely described in the following with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. It is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by a person skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present application without creative efforts are within the scope of the present application.

Due to the existing password storage method, there is a large risk of password leakage, and password security cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application provides a password protection method and device, which can protect password security and reduce the risk of password being leaked. The password protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can be implemented in a password protection device, and the password protection device can be a server. An implementation scenario of the password protection method in this embodiment may be as shown in FIG. 1 , including a server 101 and a client 102. The server 101 may obtain a user identifier and an original plaintext password from the client 102, and use the preset salt value to the original plaintext. The password is added to the salt to obtain the original key, and then the original key is used as an encryption key of a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) operation, and a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is used as a security hash algorithm (SHA). The hash function of the HMAC operation is performed by performing an HMAC operation to obtain an original ciphertext password, and finally storing the user identifier in the database corresponding to the original ciphertext password. It is verified that the SHA algorithm itself is difficult to be cracked, and the original key obtained by adding the original plaintext password is quite complicated. Therefore, the original key is used as an encryption key, and the SHA is used as an encryption hash. The original ciphertext password obtained by the function of the HMAC operation, even if it is exhaustive, it is difficult to crack the original plaintext password. Therefore, the method of the embodiment of the present application can protect the password security and reduce the risk of the password being leaked. Here, the original plaintext password is used. It may also be referred to as a first plaintext password, and the original ciphertext password may also be referred to as a first ciphertext password, and the original key may also be referred to as a first key.

As shown in FIG. 2, the method in this embodiment of the present application includes the following steps:

Step 201: Obtain a user identifier and an original plaintext password.

In some embodiments, when the client registers, the server obtains the user identifier and the original plaintext password from the client, and the user identifier may also be referred to as a user name, a registered account, etc., and the original plaintext password is the registration password provided by the client when registering. .

The client can directly carry the user identifier and the original plaintext password in the registration request, and the server directly obtains the user identifier and the original plaintext password from the registration request. However, in this way, the password is transmitted between the client and the server in clear text, which is easily intercepted by a third party, resulting in a password leak. Therefore, in the embodiment of the present application, the client may also encrypt the original plaintext password, and carry the encrypted original plaintext password and the user identifier in the registration request to the server. In some embodiments:

The client can first encrypt the original plaintext password by using the asymmetric encryption algorithm RSA public key, and then encrypt the encrypted original plaintext password again by using the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer (HTTPS) public key. The first ciphertext is obtained, and the first ciphertext and the user identifier are carried in the registration request and sent to the server. After receiving the registration request, the server extracts the user identifier and the first ciphertext from the registration request, decrypts the first ciphertext by using an HTTPS private key, and then uses the RSA private key to decrypt the decrypted first ciphertext again. Decrypt to obtain the original plaintext password. In this way, the password is transmitted between the client and the server in the form of cipher text. Even if intercepted by a third party, the third party cannot easily obtain the original plaintext password, thereby further ensuring the password security. Here, the public key and the private key are two kinds of keys in the asymmetric encryption algorithm. The two are a pair of mutually matching keys for encryption and decryption. For example, the HTTPS private key can decrypt the first ciphertext encrypted by the HTTPS public key. .

Step 202: Adding a salt to the original plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain an original key;

The so-called "salt" refers to the security of the password by inserting a specific character string at any fixed position of the password so that the hashed result does not match the hash result of the original password.

Before the step 202 is performed, the preset salt value needs to be obtained first, and the preset salt value may be generated randomly, and may also be generated according to a preset rule. The following describes the preset salt value generated according to the preset rule provided by the embodiment of the present application. Methods as below:

(1) Generate random salt values and random numbers.

The random salt value may be a string generated in any manner, and the length of the string may be customized according to actual needs, in order to balance security and encryption efficiency. In the embodiment of the present application, the length of the string representing the random salt value may be 32 bits. For example, the random salt value can be: fw14Qpl79E6z4&q3! tD0#D2lVT): UNT. The random number can be generated using the Martsett Rotation algorithm (Mersenne Twister), for example, the random number can be: 2101077161. Of course, the above random salt values and random numbers are merely examples and do not constitute a limitation on the specific implementation.

(2) The random salt value is used as an encryption key for HMAC calculation, and SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and the random number is used for HMAC operation to obtain the preset salt value.

HMAC is a key-related hash operation message authentication code. The HMAC operation uses a hash algorithm to input a message digest as an output with a key and a message as input. Defining HMAC requires an encryption hash function and an encryption key. In the embodiment of the present application, the random salt value may be used as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and the random number is used for HMAC operation to obtain the preset salt value. .

SHA is a family of cryptographic hash functions and is a secure hash algorithm certified by Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). The hash function can shuffle the data and recreate a fingerprint called a hash value, which is usually used to represent a string of short random letters and numbers. SHA is an algorithm that can calculate a fixed-length string (also known as a message digest) corresponding to a digital message. If the input message is different, different strings will be obtained, and the probability of obtaining different strings is very high. The SHA algorithm is called "security" and is mainly based on the following two points:

First, it is computationally difficult to reverse the original input message from the message digest;

Second, it is computationally difficult to make two sets of different messages corresponding to the same message digest. Any change to the input message has a high probability of causing a different message digest.

The SHA family includes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, and SHA-3, designed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and studied by the US National Standards and Technology. Published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is the government standard of the United States. Among them, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are sometimes referred to as SHA-2.

In order to balance security and computational cost, in the embodiment of the present application, the SHA-2 type algorithm can be used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operations.

After the predetermined salt value is obtained, the original plaintext password may be salted with the preset salt value to obtain an original key.

Step 203: The original key is used as an encryption key for the hash message authentication code HMAC operation, and the secure hash algorithm SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and an HMAC operation is performed to obtain an original ciphertext password;

Step 204: Store the user identifier corresponding to the original ciphertext password in a database.

Subsequently, when the client sends an authentication request to the server, the server can use the original ciphertext password stored in the database to authenticate the client to identify whether the client is a legitimate user.

In the embodiment of the present application, after obtaining the user identifier and the original plaintext password, the original plaintext password is salted by using a preset salt value to obtain an original key, and then the original key is used as an encryption key of the HMAC operation. The SHA is used as the hash function for the HMAC operation, and the HMAC operation is performed to obtain the original ciphertext password. Finally, the user identifier is stored in the database corresponding to the original ciphertext password. It is verified that the SHA algorithm itself is difficult to be cracked, and the original key obtained by adding the original plaintext password is quite complicated. Therefore, the original key is used as an encryption key, and the SHA is used as an encryption hash. The original ciphertext password obtained by the function of the HMAC operation is difficult to crack out the original plaintext password even if it is exhaustive. Therefore, the method of the embodiment of the present application can protect the password security and reduce the risk of the password being leaked.

The following is a detailed description of the password protection method provided by the present application. The description process of the embodiment of the present application is divided into two phases, namely, a registration phase and a verification phase. The process of the registration phase will be described below, as shown in Figure 3a. The registration phase includes the following steps:

Step 301: Receive a registration request sent by a client, where the registration request includes a user identifier and a first ciphertext, where the first ciphertext is obtained by the client encrypting the original plaintext password by using a preset encryption algorithm.

The user ID can also be called a user name, a registered account, etc., and the original plain text password is the registration password provided by the client at the time of registration.

In some embodiments, the client may first encrypt the original plaintext password by using the RSA public key, and then encrypt the encrypted original plaintext password with the HTTPS public key to obtain the first ciphertext, and carry the first ciphertext and the user identifier. Sent to the server in the registration request, the server receives the registration request sent by the client.

Step 302: Obtain a user identifier from the registration request, and use a preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm to decrypt the first ciphertext included in the registration request to obtain the original plaintext password.

After receiving the registration request, the server may extract the user identifier and the first ciphertext from the registration request, decrypt the first ciphertext by using an HTTPS private key, and then use the RSA private key pair to decrypt the first The ciphertext is decrypted again to obtain the original plaintext password. In this way, the password is transmitted between the client and the server in the form of cipher text. Even if intercepted by a third party, the third party cannot easily obtain the original plaintext password, thereby further ensuring the security of the password.

Step 303: Generate a random salt value and a random number;

The random salt value may be a string generated in any manner, and the length of the string may be customized according to actual requirements. For the sake of security and encryption efficiency, in the embodiment of the present application, the length of the string representing the random salt value may be 32 bits. For example, the random salt value can be: fw14Qpl79E6z4&q3! tD0#D2lVT): UNT. Random numbers can be generated using the Marsett Rotation algorithm (Mersenne Twister). For example, the random number can be: 2101077161. Of course, the above random salt values and random numbers are merely examples and do not constitute a limitation on the specific implementation.

Step 304: Using a random salt value as an encryption key for HMAC operation, using SHA as a hash function for HMAC operation, and performing HMAC operation using the random number to obtain a preset salt value;

SHA is a family of cryptographic hash functions and is a secure hash algorithm certified by the Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS. The SHA algorithm is called "security" and is mainly based on the following two points:

First, it is computationally difficult to reverse the original input message from the message digest;

Second, it is computationally difficult to make two sets of different messages corresponding to the same message digest. Any change to the input message has a high probability of causing a different message digest.

Therefore, the embodiment of the present application adopts SHA as a hash function for encryption of HMAC operation.

The SHA family includes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, and SHA-3. Among them, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are sometimes referred to as SHA-2. In order to balance security and computational cost, in the embodiment of the present application, the SHA-2 type algorithm can be used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operations.

Step 305: Adding a salt to the original plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain an original key;

In some embodiments, a spliced string such as "preset salt value + original plaintext password" may be used as the original key.

Step 306: The original key is used as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and SHA is used as an encryption function for HMAC operation, and an HMAC operation is performed to obtain an original ciphertext password.

The process of generating the original ciphertext password can be seen in the schematic diagram of Figure 3b.

Step 307: Store the user identifier in the database corresponding to the original ciphertext password.

It is verified that the SHA algorithm itself is difficult to be cracked. In the registration process, the original plaintext password is changed to the original key through two steps of salting. The original key is quite complicated, so the original key is used as the encryption key. The original ciphertext password obtained by performing the HMAC operation by using the SHA as a hash function for encryption, and it is difficult to crack the original plaintext password even if it is exhaustive. Therefore, the method of the embodiment of the present application can ensure password security and reduce password leakage. The risks, especially for defensive profit cracking, man-in-the-middle attacks, hijacking and reverse decryption have a good effect.

The flow of the verification phase is described below. As shown in Figure 4a, the verification phase includes the following steps:

Step 401: Receive an authentication request sent by the client, where the verification request includes a user identifier and a second ciphertext, where the second ciphertext is obtained by the client using a preset encryption algorithm to encrypt the real-time plaintext password.

In some embodiments, when the client needs to perform certain operations, the verification request may be sent to the server, such as login, recharge, etc., which is not specifically limited herein. The real-time plaintext password, that is, the password to be verified provided by the client during verification, wherein the real-time plaintext password may also be referred to as a second plaintext password.

In some embodiments, the client may first encrypt the real-time plaintext password by using the RSA public key, and then encrypt the encrypted real-time plaintext password with the HTTPS public key to obtain the second ciphertext, and carry the second ciphertext and the user identifier. Sent to the server in the verification request, the server receives the verification request sent by the client.

Step 402: Obtain a user identifier from the verification request, and use a preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm to decrypt the second ciphertext included in the verification request to obtain a real-time plaintext password.

After receiving the verification request, the server may extract the user identifier and the second ciphertext from the verification request, decrypt the second ciphertext by using an HTTPS private key, and then use the RSA private key pair to decrypt the second ciphertext. The ciphertext is decrypted again to obtain the real-time plaintext password.

Step 403: Add a salt to the real-time plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain a real-time key;

The preset salt value is the preset salt value obtained in step 304. In some embodiments, the splicing string such as “preset salt value + real-time plaintext password” may be used as the real-time key, wherein the real-time key is also It can be called a second key.

Step 404: The real-time key is used as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and the SHA is used as an encryption function for HMAC operation, and an HMAC operation is performed to obtain a real-time ciphertext password.

Here, the real-time ciphertext password can also be referred to as a second ciphertext password, and the process of generating a real-time ciphertext password can be referred to the schematic diagram of FIG. 4b.

Step 405: Obtain an original ciphertext password corresponding to the user identifier from the database.

Step 406, it is determined whether the real-time ciphertext password and the original ciphertext password are the same, if the same, step 407 is performed, otherwise, step 408 is performed;

Step 407, confirming that the verification is successful;

If the verification is successful, the client is allowed to perform the corresponding operation.

Step 408, confirming that the verification fails.

If the verification is successful, the client is not allowed to perform the corresponding operation.

In the embodiment of the present application, in the process of verification, the ciphertext is transmitted between the client and the server, so that the password can be prevented from being intercepted and cracked by the third party, and when the verification is performed, the password of the real-time password is directly compared. The ciphertext of the original password stored in the text and the database, thus ensuring password security and reducing the risk of the password being leaked.

In order to better implement the above method, the embodiment of the present application further provides a password protection apparatus. As shown in FIG. 5, the password protection apparatus of this embodiment includes: one or more memories; one or more processors; The one or more memory modules are stored by one or more instruction modules, and are configured to be executed by the one or more processors; wherein the one or more instruction modules include: an obtaining unit 501, a salting unit 502, The first encryption unit 503 and the storage unit 504 are as follows:

The obtaining unit 501 is configured to obtain a user identifier and an original plaintext password.

In some embodiments, the obtaining unit 501 may obtain the user identifier and the original plaintext password from the client when the client registers, and the user identifier may also be referred to as a user name, a registered account, etc., and the original plaintext password is provided by the client when registering. sign up password.

The device of the embodiment of the present application may further include a receiving unit, where the client may directly carry the user identifier and the original plaintext password in the registration request, the receiving unit receives the registration request, and the obtaining unit 501 directly obtains the user identifier and the original from the registration request. Clear text password. However, in this way, the password is transmitted between the client and the server in clear text, which is easily intercepted by a third party, resulting in a password leak. Therefore, in the embodiment of the present application, the client may also encrypt the original plaintext password, and carry the encrypted original plaintext password and the user identifier in the registration request to the server. In some embodiments:

The client can first encrypt the original plaintext password by using the asymmetric encryption algorithm RSA public key, and then encrypt the encrypted original plaintext password again by using the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer (HTTPS) public key. The first ciphertext is obtained, and the first ciphertext and the user identifier are carried in the registration request and sent to the server. After the receiving unit receives the registration request, the obtaining unit 501 may extract the user identifier and the first ciphertext from the registration request, decrypt the first ciphertext by using an HTTPS private key, and then decrypt the decrypted using the RSA private key pair. The first ciphertext is decrypted again to obtain the original plaintext password. In this way, the password is transmitted between the client and the server in the form of ciphertext, and even if intercepted by a third party, the third party cannot easily obtain the original plaintext password.

The salt adding unit 502 is configured to add the salt to the original plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain an original key.

The so-called "salt" refers to the security of the password by inserting a specific character string at any fixed position of the password so that the hashed result does not match the hash result of the original password.

Before adding salt, you need to make a preset salt value. The preset salt value may be randomly generated, and may be generated according to a preset rule. The following describes the method for generating a preset salt value according to the preset rule provided by the embodiment of the present application, that is, the device of the embodiment of the present application further includes a generating unit and The second encryption unit is as follows:

A generating unit for generating random salt values and random numbers.

The random salt value may be a string generated in any manner, and the length of the string may be customized according to actual requirements. For the sake of security and encryption efficiency, in the embodiment of the present application, the length of the string representing the random salt value may be 32 bits. For example, the random salt value can be: fw14Qpl79E6z4&q3! tD0#D2lVT): UNT. The random number can be generated using the Martsett Rotation algorithm (Mersenne Twister), for example, the random number can be: 2101077161. Of course, the above random salt values and random numbers are merely examples and do not constitute a limitation on the specific implementation.

The second encryption unit is configured to use the random salt value as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and use SHA as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and perform HMAC operation using the random number to obtain the preset salt value.

HMAC is a key-related hash operation message authentication code. The HMAC operation uses a hash algorithm to input a message digest as an output with a key and a message as input. Defining HMAC requires an encryption hash function and an encryption key. In the embodiment of the present application, the random salt value may be used as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and the random number is used for HMAC operation to obtain the preset salt value. .

SHA is a family of cryptographic hash functions and is a secure hash algorithm certified by Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). SHA is an algorithm that can calculate a fixed length string (also known as a message digest) corresponding to a digital message. If the input message is different, different strings will be obtained, and the probability of obtaining different strings is very high. The SHA algorithm is called "security" and is mainly based on the following two points:

First, it is computationally difficult to reverse the original input message from the message digest;

Second, it is computationally difficult to make two sets of different messages corresponding to the same message digest. Any change to the input message has a high probability of causing a different message digest.

The SHA family includes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, and SHA-3, designed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and studied by the US National Standards and Technology. Published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is the government standard of the United States. Among them, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are sometimes referred to as SHA-2.

In order to balance security and computational cost, in the embodiment of the present application, the SHA-2 type algorithm can be used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operations.

After the predetermined salt value is obtained, the salting unit 502 can salt the original plaintext password with the preset salt value to obtain the original key.

The first encryption unit 503 is configured to use the original key as an encryption key for the hash message authentication code HMAC operation, and use the secure hash algorithm SHA as a hash function for HMAC operation to perform an HMAC operation to obtain an original secret. Text password.

The storage unit 504 is configured to store the user identifier in the database corresponding to the original ciphertext password.

Further, the receiving unit is further configured to receive an authentication request sent by the client, where the verification request includes the user identifier and a second ciphertext, where the second ciphertext is adopted by the client The preset encryption algorithm encrypts the real-time plaintext password.

In some embodiments, when the client needs to perform certain operations, the verification request may be sent to the server, such as login, recharge, etc., which is not specifically limited herein. Real-time plaintext password, which is the password to be verified provided by the client during authentication.

The obtaining unit 501 is further configured to: obtain the user identifier from the verification request, and decrypt the second ciphertext included in the verification request by using a preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm. Obtaining the real-time plaintext password;

The salting unit 502 is further configured to: obtain a real-time key by adding salt to the real-time plaintext password by using the preset salt value;

The first encryption unit 503 is further configured to use the real-time key as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and use the SHA as a hash function for HMAC operation to perform an HMAC operation to obtain a real-time ciphertext password;

The device also includes:

The extracting unit 505 is configured to retrieve the original ciphertext password corresponding to the user identifier from the database;

The determining unit 506 is configured to determine whether the real-time ciphertext password is the same as the original ciphertext password;

The confirmation unit 507 is configured to confirm that the verification is successful when the real-time ciphertext password is the same as the original ciphertext password, and the verification succeeds to allow the client to perform a corresponding operation; and the real-time ciphertext password and the original secret If the passwords are different, the verification fails. If the verification fails, the client is not allowed to perform the corresponding operations.

It should be noted that, when the password protection device provided by the foregoing application embodiment implements password protection, only the division of each functional module described above is used for example. In an actual application, the function distribution may be completed by different functional modules as needed. The internal structure of the device is divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. In addition, the password protection device and the password protection method provided by the foregoing application embodiments are in the same concept, and the implementation process thereof is described in the method application embodiment, and details are not described herein again.

In the embodiment of the present application, after the obtaining unit obtains the user identifier and the original plaintext password, the salting unit may use the preset salt value to add salt to the original plaintext password to obtain the original key, and then the first encryption unit will use the original secret. The key is used as the encryption key of the HMAC operation, and the SHA is used as the hash function for the HMAC operation to perform the HMAC operation to obtain the original ciphertext password. Finally, the storage unit stores the user identifier and the original ciphertext password in the database. in. It is verified that the SHA algorithm itself is difficult to be cracked, and the original key obtained by adding the original plaintext password is quite complicated. Therefore, the original key is used as an encryption key, and the SHA is used as an encryption hash. The function of the original ciphertext password obtained by the HMAC operation, even if it is exhaustive, it is difficult to crack the original plaintext password. Therefore, the device in the embodiment of the present application can protect the password security and reduce the risk of the password being leaked, especially for the defensive profit cracking, Man-in-the-middle attacks, hijacking, and reverse decryption all have good results.

The embodiment of the present application further provides a password protection device, as shown in FIG. 6 , which shows a schematic structural diagram of a device involved in the embodiment of the present application, specifically:

The apparatus may include one or more processing core processor 601, one or more computer readable storage medium memories 602, a radio frequency (RF) circuit 603, a power source 604, an input unit 605, and a display unit 606, etc. component. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the device structure illustrated in FIG. 6 does not constitute a limitation to the device, and may include more or less components than those illustrated, or some components may be combined, or different component arrangements. among them:

Processor 601 is the control center of the device, connecting various portions of the entire device using various interfaces and lines, by running or executing software programs and/or modules stored in memory 602, and recalling data stored in memory 602, Performing various functions and processing data of the device to thereby perform overall monitoring of the device. In some examples, the processor 601 can include one or more processing cores; in some examples, the processor 601 can integrate the application processor and modem A processor, wherein the application processor primarily processes an operating system, a user interface, an application, etc., and the modem processor primarily processes wireless communications. It can be understood that the above modem processor may not be integrated into the processor 601.

The memory 602 can be used to store software programs and modules, and the processor 601 executes various functional applications and data processing by running software programs and modules stored in the memory 602. The memory 602 may mainly include a storage program area and a storage data area, wherein the storage program area may store an operating system, an application required for at least one function (such as a sound playing function, an image playing function, etc.), and the like; the storage data area may be stored according to Data created by the use of the device, etc. Moreover, memory 602 can include high speed random access memory, and can also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one magnetic disk storage device, flash memory device, or other volatile solid state storage device. Accordingly, memory 602 can also include a memory controller to provide processor 601 access to memory 602.

The RF circuit 603 can be used for receiving and transmitting signals during the process of transmitting and receiving information. Specifically, after receiving the downlink information of the base station, the downlink information is processed by one or more processors 601. In addition, the data related to the uplink is sent to the base station. Generally, the RF circuit 603 includes, but is not limited to, an antenna, at least one amplifier, a tuner, one or more oscillators, a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, a transceiver, a coupler, and a Low Noise Amplifier (LNA). , duplexer, etc. In addition, RF circuit 603 can also communicate with the network and other devices via wireless communication. The wireless communication may use any communication standard or protocol, including but not limited to Global System of Mobile communication (GSM), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA). , Code Division Multiple Access), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), Long Term Evolution (LTE), e-mail, Short Messaging Service (SMS), and the like.

The apparatus also includes a power source 604 (such as a battery) that supplies power to the various components. In some examples, the power source 604 can be logically coupled to the processor 601 via a power management system to manage charging, discharging, and power management through the power management system. Features. The power supply 604 can also include any one or more of a DC or AC power source, a recharging system, a power failure detection circuit, a power converter or inverter, a power status indicator, and the like.

The apparatus can also include an input unit 605 that can be used to receive input numeric or character information and to generate keyboard, mouse, joystick, optical or trackball signal inputs related to user settings and function controls. In one embodiment, input unit 605 can include a touch-sensitive surface as well as other input devices. Touch-sensitive surfaces, also known as touch screens or trackpads, collect touch operations on or near the user (such as the user using a finger, stylus, etc., any suitable object or accessory on a touch-sensitive surface or touch-sensitive Operation near the surface), and drive the corresponding connecting device according to a preset program. In some examples, the touch sensitive surface can include both portions of the touch detection device and the touch controller. Wherein, the touch detection device detects the touch orientation of the user, and detects a signal brought by the touch operation, and transmits the signal to the touch controller; the touch controller receives the touch information from the touch detection device, converts the touch information into contact coordinates, and sends the touch information. The processor 601 is provided and can receive commands from the processor 601 and execute them. In addition, touch-sensitive surfaces can be implemented in a variety of types, including resistive, capacitive, infrared, and surface acoustic waves. In addition to the touch-sensitive surface, the input unit 605 can also include other input devices. In some embodiments, other input devices may include, but are not limited to, one or more of a physical keyboard, function keys (such as volume control buttons, switch buttons, etc.), trackballs, mice, joysticks, and the like.

The apparatus can also include a display unit 606 that can be used to display information entered by the user or information provided to the user and various graphical user interfaces of the device, which can be represented by graphics, text, icons, video, and It is composed of any combination. The display unit 606 can include a display panel. In some examples, the display panel can be configured in the form of a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), an Organic Light-Emitting Diode (OLED), or the like. Further, the touch-sensitive surface may cover the display panel, and when the touch-sensitive surface detects a touch operation thereon or nearby, it is transmitted to the processor 601 to determine the type of the touch event, and then the processor 601 displays the type according to the touch event. A corresponding visual output is provided on the panel. Although in FIG. 6, the touch-sensitive surface and display panel are implemented as two separate components to implement input and input functions, in some embodiments, the touch-sensitive surface can be integrated with the display panel to implement input and output functions.

Although not shown, the device may further include a camera, a Bluetooth module, and the like, and details are not described herein again. In the embodiment of the present application, the processor 601 in the device loads the executable file corresponding to the process of one or more application programs into the memory 602 according to the following instructions, and is executed by the processor 601 to be stored in the memory. The application in 602, thus implementing various functions, as follows:

Obtain the user ID and the original plain text password;

Extracting the original plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain an original key;

The original key is used as an encryption key for the hash message authentication code HMAC operation, and the secure hash algorithm SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and an HMAC operation is performed to obtain an original ciphertext password;

The user identifier is stored in the database corresponding to the original ciphertext password.

Further, the processor 601 is further configured to:

Before the user identifier and the original plaintext password are obtained, the registration request sent by the client is received, where the registration request includes the user identifier and the first ciphertext, and the first ciphertext adopts a preset encryption algorithm by the client. Encrypting the original plaintext password to obtain;

In some embodiments, the processor 601 can obtain the user identification and the original plaintext password as follows:

The processor 601 obtains the user identifier from the registration request, and decrypts the first ciphertext included in the registration request to obtain the original by using a preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm. Clear text password.

In some embodiments, the encrypting the original plaintext password by the client by using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain the first ciphertext includes:

The client encrypts the original plaintext password by using an asymmetric encryption algorithm RSA public key, and then encrypts the encrypted original plaintext password by using a secure hypertext transfer protocol HTTPS public key to obtain the first ciphertext;

In some embodiments, the processor 601 uses a preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm, and the decrypting the first ciphertext included in the registration request to obtain the original plaintext password includes:

The processor 601 decrypts the first ciphertext by using an HTTPS private key, and then decrypts the decrypted first ciphertext again by using an RSA private key to obtain the original plaintext password.

Further, the processor 601 is further configured to: after obtaining the user identifier and the original plaintext password,

Generate random salt values and random numbers;

The random salt value is used as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and the random number is used for HMAC operation to obtain the preset salt value.

Further, the processor 601 is further configured to:

Receiving the verification request sent by the client, where the verification request includes the user identifier and the second ciphertext, and the second ciphertext is obtained by the client by using the preset encryption algorithm to encrypt the real-time plaintext password;

Acquiring the user identifier from the verification request, and using the preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm, decrypting the second ciphertext included in the verification request to obtain the real-time plaintext password;

And realizing a real-time key by adding salt to the real-time plaintext password by using the preset salt value;

The real-time key is used as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and HMAC operation is performed to obtain a real-time ciphertext password;

Extracting, from the database, the original ciphertext password corresponding to the user identifier;

Determining whether the real-time ciphertext password is the same as the original ciphertext password;

If they are the same, confirm that the verification is successful. If they are different, confirm that the verification failed.

In some embodiments, the SHA includes: a SHA-1 class algorithm, a SHA-2 class algorithm, or a SHA-3 class algorithm.

It can be seen that, after obtaining the user identifier and the original plaintext password, the device in the embodiment of the present application adds the salt to the original plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain the original key, and then uses the original key as the HMAC operation. The encryption key is used as an encryption function for HMAC operation, and the HMAC operation is performed to obtain an original ciphertext password. Finally, the user identifier is stored in the database corresponding to the original ciphertext password. It is verified that the SHA algorithm itself is difficult to be cracked, and the original key obtained by adding the original plaintext password is quite complicated. Therefore, the original key is used as an encryption key, and the SHA is used as an encryption hash. The function of the original ciphertext password obtained by the HMAC operation, even if it is exhaustive, it is difficult to crack the original plaintext password. Therefore, the device in the embodiment of the present application can protect the password security and reduce the risk of the password being leaked, especially for the defensive profit cracking, Man-in-the-middle attacks, hijacking, and reverse decryption all have good results.

In the several embodiments provided by the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed system, apparatus, and method may be implemented in other manners. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of the unit is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be another division manner, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the object of the embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit. The integrated unit, if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present application, in essence or the contribution to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium. A number of instructions are included to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, device, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present application. The foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and the like. .

Therefore, the embodiment of the present application further provides a storage medium in which a data processing program is stored, and the data processing program is used to execute any one of the foregoing methods in the embodiments of the present application.

The above embodiments are only used to explain the technical solutions of the present application, and are not limited thereto; although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still The technical solutions described in the embodiments are modified, or the equivalents of the technical features are replaced by the equivalents. The modifications and substitutions of the embodiments do not depart from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims (13)

A password protection method, the method comprising: The server obtains the user identifier and the first plaintext password; The server uses a preset salt value to add salt to the first plaintext password to obtain a first key; The server uses the first key as an encryption key of a hash message authentication code HMAC operation, and uses a secure hash algorithm SHA as an encryption hash function of the HMAC operation to perform an HMAC operation to obtain a first ciphertext. Password; and The server stores the user identifier in the database corresponding to the first ciphertext password. The method according to claim 1, before the obtaining the user identifier and the first plaintext password, the method further includes: Receiving a registration request sent by the client, where the registration request includes the user identifier and the first ciphertext, where the first ciphertext is encrypted by the client by using a preset encryption algorithm to encrypt the first plaintext password. get; The obtaining the user identifier and the first plaintext password includes: Obtaining the user identifier from the registration request; The first ciphertext included in the registration request is decrypted to obtain the first plaintext password by using a preset decryption algorithm, where the preset decryption algorithm corresponds to the preset encryption algorithm. The method of claim 2, wherein Decrypting the first ciphertext included in the registration request to acquire the first plaintext password includes: using a preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm: Decrypting the first ciphertext by using a secure hypertext transfer protocol HTTPS private key, and then decrypting the decrypted first ciphertext again by using an asymmetric encryption algorithm RSA private key to obtain the first plaintext password, where The first ciphertext is encrypted by the client by using the RSA public key to encrypt the first plaintext password, and then the encrypted first plaintext password is encrypted again by using an HTTPS public key. The method of claim 1, wherein after obtaining the user identifier and the first plaintext password, the method further comprises: Generate random salt values and random numbers; The random salt value is used as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and the SHA is used as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and the random number is used for HMAC operation to obtain the preset salt value. The method of claim 2 or 3, wherein the method further comprises: Receiving the verification request sent by the client, where the verification request includes the user identifier and the second ciphertext, where the second ciphertext is encrypted by the client by using the preset encryption algorithm. Clear text password to; Obtaining the user identifier from the verification request, and using the preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm, decrypting the second ciphertext included in the verification request to obtain the second plaintext password; Adding a salt to the second plaintext password by using the preset salt value to obtain a second key; Using the second key as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and using SHA as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, performing HMAC operation to obtain a second ciphertext password; Extracting, by the database, the first ciphertext password corresponding to the user identifier; Determining whether the second ciphertext password is the same as the first ciphertext password; If they are the same, confirm that the verification is successful. If they are different, confirm that the verification failed. The method of claim 1, wherein the SHA comprises: a SHA-1 class algorithm, a SHA-2 class algorithm, or a SHA-3 class algorithm. A password protection device comprising: One or more memories; One or more processors; among them, The one or more memories storing one or more instruction modules configured to be executed by the one or more processors; wherein The one or more instruction modules include: An obtaining unit, configured to obtain a user identifier and a first plaintext password; a salt adding unit, configured to add a salt to the first plaintext password by using a preset salt value to obtain a first key; a first encryption unit, configured to use the first key as an encryption key of a hash message authentication code HMAC operation, and use a secure hash algorithm SHA as an encryption hash function of the HMAC operation, and perform an HMAC operation to obtain an HMAC operation. First ciphertext password; And a storage unit, configured to store the user identifier in the database corresponding to the first ciphertext password. The apparatus of claim 7 wherein said apparatus further comprises: a receiving unit, configured to receive a registration request sent by the client, where the registration request includes the user identifier and the first ciphertext, where the first ciphertext is encrypted by the client by using a preset encryption algorithm. The first plaintext password is obtained; The obtaining unit is configured to: obtain the user identifier from the registration request, and decrypt the first ciphertext included in the registration request to obtain the first plaintext password by using a preset decryption algorithm, where The preset decryption algorithm corresponds to the preset encryption algorithm. The device according to claim 8, wherein The obtaining unit further decrypts the first ciphertext by using a secure hypertext transfer protocol HTTPS private key, and then decrypts the decrypted first ciphertext again by using an asymmetric encryption algorithm RSA private key to obtain the first ciphertext. A plaintext password, wherein the first ciphertext is encrypted by the client by using an RSA public key, and then the encrypted first plaintext password is encrypted again by using an HTTPS public key. The apparatus of claim 7 wherein said apparatus further comprises: a generating unit, configured to generate a random salt value and a random number after the obtaining unit acquires the user identifier and the first plaintext password; The second encryption unit is configured to use the random salt value as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and use SHA as an encryption hash function for HMAC operation, and perform HMAC operation using the random number to obtain the preset salt value. The device according to claim 8 or 9, wherein The receiving unit is further configured to receive the verification request sent by the client, where the verification request includes the user identifier and the second ciphertext, and the second ciphertext is adopted by the client by using the preset The encryption algorithm encrypts the second plaintext password to obtain; The obtaining unit is further configured to: obtain the user identifier from the verification request, and decrypt the second ciphertext included in the verification request by using a preset decryption algorithm corresponding to the preset encryption algorithm. Obtaining the second plaintext password; The salting unit is further configured to: add a salt to the second plaintext password by using the preset salt value to obtain a second key; The first encryption unit is further configured to use the second key as an encryption key for HMAC operation, and use the SHA as a hash function for HMAC operation to perform an HMAC operation to obtain a second ciphertext password; The device also includes: An extracting unit, configured to retrieve, from the database, the first ciphertext password corresponding to the user identifier; a determining unit, configured to determine whether the second ciphertext password is the same as the first ciphertext password; a confirming unit, configured to confirm that the verification is successful when the second ciphertext password is the same as the first ciphertext password, and confirm the verification when the second ciphertext password is different from the first ciphertext password failure. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the SHA comprises: a SHA-1 class algorithm, a SHA-2 class algorithm, or a SHA-3 class algorithm. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing computer readable instructions for causing at least one processor to perform the method of any of claims 1-6.

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