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WO2018174112A1 - Technologie d'authentification de dispositif sur un réseau - Google Patents

Technologie d'authentification de dispositif sur un réseau Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018174112A1
WO2018174112A1 PCT/JP2018/011231 JP2018011231W WO2018174112A1 WO 2018174112 A1 WO2018174112 A1 WO 2018174112A1 JP 2018011231 W JP2018011231 W JP 2018011231W WO 2018174112 A1 WO2018174112 A1 WO 2018174112A1
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Prior art keywords
client
public key
block
hash
logical
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Japanese (ja)
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WO2018174112A4 (fr
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渡辺浩志
木下敦寛
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/73—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09C—CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
    • G09C1/00—Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/10—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols with particular housing, physical features or manual controls
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a technique for authenticating a device existing on a network.
  • CS client / server
  • core node central node
  • P2P peer-to-peer
  • a network generally consists of nodes (nodes) and communication lines (links).
  • the first node and the second node are linked by a signal transmission path that is a communication line.
  • a first node and a second node exchange protocol data units (PDUs), which are a form of data, via a signal transmission path.
  • PDUs protocol data units
  • Each of the first node and the second node handles a protocol data unit according to a protocol having a certain consistency.
  • these first and second nodes are devices (hardware) that connect to the network and have physical reality, so they are called physical nodes.
  • the first physical node and the second physical node are connected by a signal transmission path having physical reality.
  • Such a signal transmission path transmits a wired / wireless electronic signal or optical signal.
  • a network constructed by a plurality of physical nodes and signal transmission paths in this way is called a physical network.
  • An address used for recognizing a physical node on a physical network is called a physical address. That is, the first physical node has a first physical address, and the second physical node has a second physical address.
  • Sending data from the first physical node to the second physical node means that data (in this case, a frame) is transmitted from the first physical address to the second physical address through a signal transmission path having physical reality. It is sent.
  • a logical node is a node associated with a logical address virtually defined on the network, and is not necessarily associated with specific birdware.
  • a network constructed by a plurality of logical nodes is called a logical network. At this time, the signal transmission path connecting the first logical node and the second logical node does not necessarily have a physical reality.
  • An address used to recognize a logical node on the logical network is called a logical address. That is, sending data from the first logical node to the second logical node is interpreted as sending data from the first logical address to the second logical address.
  • the first logical address and the second logical address are sequentially attached to the transferred data as codes. Therefore, when the transfer is repeated, a list of a plurality of logical addresses is attached to the data. This list of logical addresses includes the latest logical address of this data and the past transfer history. In this way, all logical nodes accessing this data can know where and how this data is transferred and which virtual node is currently defined.
  • data to which a transfer history including the latest logical address is attached is called a block or a logical block. As long as the transfer history is not falsified, the logical block can be properly recognized by the latest logical address.
  • Blockchain is a public ledger system in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network.
  • P2P peer-to-peer
  • all nodes (nodes) connecting to the network are non-core, equal, and secure each other by monitoring each other. It is necessary. That is, it is possible to provide an application that cannot be realized in a client-server network assuming the existence of a core server.
  • Bitcoin cryptocurrency remittance system
  • the processing means is not left to financial institutions.
  • the updated and forwarded processing history is monitored by many other non-core nodes on the network and certified in a manner similar to majority voting.
  • Transfer of process history is synonymous with transfer of currency, and an authorized process history is treated like currency. In this way, processing proceeds without going through a specific core like a bank.
  • the ciphers used for electronic signatures that flow on the network are the simplest to describe with public key cryptography, famous for the metaphor of Alice and Bob.
  • Alice sends Bob her public key in advance. This public key may be stolen by someone on the net.
  • Bob encrypts the letter with Alice's public key and sends it to Alice.
  • the public key may be exposed on the network. Therefore, Alice does not only send Bob the public key. However, only Alice who owns the private key can read the letter by decrypting the cipher encrypted with the public key unless the cipher is decrypted.
  • the public key and private key are always generated as a pair, but it must be practically impossible to reproduce the private key from the public key. In other words, decryption means reproducing the secret key from the public key.
  • a letter encrypted with a private key can also be decrypted with a public key.
  • Another important role of the public key is to become the destination for sending letters to Alice, ie the address on Alice's network.
  • Bob sends an encrypted letter to the network, it goes into the hands of any recipient connected to the network. If it cannot be solved at this time, it cannot be read. If you can't read it anyway, you agree that you didn't receive it. Therefore, being able to unlock only Alice is equivalent to reaching only Alice.
  • another role of the public key is a logical address on the network. Therefore, the public key used in bitcoin is also called a bitcoin address.
  • a logical node is a wallet that stores cryptocurrencies such as bit coins, and a logical address is assigned in advance.
  • the contents of the wallet contain something with some monetary value (data on currency and equivalent coins, etc.).
  • the address and the contents of the wallet can be attached to the wallet as an electronic signature.
  • such a wallet can be used by installing a dedicated application on hardware such as a personal computer, a tablet, a smartphone, or a smart card. At that time, the contents of the wallet are stored as digital data in the hardware storage in which the dedicated application is installed.
  • the hardware manager / owner in digital processing based on P2P, the hardware manager / owner must take responsibility for managing digital data. This point is different from the client / server type. In the client-server type, financial institutions will take responsibility. Electronic processing with P2P does not require the existence of a financial institution having such a core function.
  • FIG. 1 shows a chain of processing (N ⁇ 2, N ⁇ 1), processing (N ⁇ 1, N), processing (N, N + 1),.
  • Processing (N-2, N-1) is some processing from wallet (N-2) to wallet (N-1)
  • processing (N-1, N) is from wallet (N-1) to wallet (N )
  • the process (N, N + 1) is some process from the wallet (N) to the wallet (N + 1).
  • N is an arbitrary natural number of 3 or more.
  • the wallet (N-1) is the contents of the wallet of 1,000 yen, its digital signature, the private key (N-1) used to create the next digital signature, and a unique public key that makes a pair with it. (N-1).
  • the public key (N-1) is an address on the network of the wallet (N-1). As an example, a bit coin address is raised.
  • the hash value (N-1) is obtained from the public key (N-1), the contents of the wallet (N-1), and the digital signature (N-2) using a hash function (SHA-256 as an example). Is generated.
  • This hash value (N-1) is sent to the wallet (N), and the wallet (N) stores it as the contents of the wallet (N).
  • the public key (N) as the address of the wallet (N) and the hash value (N-1) as the contents are encrypted by using the private key (N-1) of the transfer source, and an electronic signature (N-1 ) Is generated and transferred to the wallet (N) together with the hash value (N-1).
  • the wallet (N) forms a pair of a hash value (N-1), an electronic signature (N-1), and a pair of a public key (N) and a private key (N) unique to the wallet (N). It will consist of This completes the process of transferring 1000 yen from the wallet (N-1) to the wallet (N).
  • the hash value (N-1) should contain information that this 1000 yen came from the wallet (N-1). However, since a hash cannot be reversely converted unlike a cipher, the hash value (N-1) cannot be reversely converted (signed) and read. Therefore, an electronic signature (N-1) is attached. This electronic signature (N-1) is obtained by encrypting a public key (N) and a hash value (N-1) together using a secret key (N-1). Therefore, in order to confirm whether or not this electronic signature really came from the wallet (N-1), the digital signature (N-1) was decrypted with the public key (N-1) and the wallet ( Compare with the public key (N) and hash value (N-1) stored in N).
  • the digital signature is certainly signed with the private key (N-1). If they do not match, the electronic signature is false. Alternatively, if it coincides with the result of decryption with another public key, for example, the public key (Q), it can be understood that the wallet (Q) having the public key (Q) as an address has illegally processed.
  • the hash function (SHA-256 as an example) is subsequently obtained from the contents of the public key (N), the wallet (N) (in this case, the hash value (N-1)), and the electronic signature (N-1).
  • the wallet (N) transmits this hash value (N) to the wallet (N + 1), and the wallet (N + 1) stores it as the contents of the wallet (N + 1).
  • the wallet (N) uses the private key (N) to encrypt the public key (N + 1), which is the address of the wallet (N + 1), and this hash value (N), and to create an electronic signature (N) Is generated. Subsequently, the electronic signature (N) is sent to the wallet (N + 1) together with the hash value (N).
  • the contents (N-1, N) from the wallet (N-1) to the wallet (N) are recorded as the hash value (N-1) in the contents of the wallet (N).
  • the contents (N, N + 1) from the wallet (N) to the wallet (N + 1) are recorded as the hash value (N) in the contents of the wallet (N + 1).
  • the contents of an arbitrary wallet include all past processing histories in a chain. That is, the latest past hash value represents all past histories.
  • the number of wallets to be transferred to one wallet is not limited to one as in the example of FIG. In fact, you will often transfer money from multiple wallets to a single wallet. There are also many cases where money is transferred from one wallet to multiple wallets.
  • the root of Merkuru As shown in FIG. 2, it is like a tree diagram that branches off from the root of Merkuru. This is called the Mercle tree diagram. In this way, the Merkuru tree is a collection of all past histories arranged in chronological order. That is, this corresponds to the logical block described above.
  • the root of the Merkuru which is the latest history is a code characterizing the logical block.
  • the hash value (ABCD) which is the root of Merck is connected to the history corresponding to the hash value (AB) and the hash value (CD).
  • the hash value (AB) is further connected to the past history corresponding to the hash value (A) and the hash value (B), that is, the process (A) and the process (B).
  • the hash value (CD) is further linked to the past history corresponding to the hash value (C) and the hash value (D), that is, the process (C) and the process (D), respectively.
  • the public key (N-2) of the wallet (N-2) including the hash value (N-3) can also be searched by the same method. By repeating this operation, the processing history can be traced back.
  • M and N are arbitrary natural numbers.
  • the time stamp confirms that there is a collection of past processes represented by the roots of Merkuru (in the above example, hash value (ABCD)).
  • the logical block thus approved is released on the network. Therefore, this is called a public ledger.
  • This approval is a work (work) similar to date authentication in which a document is brought into a notary public office and sealed with a date.
  • Approving a collection of unapproved processes as a new logical block is called “book entry”, and a person who has made a book is given a certain reward in bit coins as a consideration for authentication work.
  • Obtaining bit coins in this way is called mining, and the user of the mining bit coin is called a miner. However, since only one miner can be booked at a time, miners mine ahead.
  • the mined Bitcoin is distributed in the market on the logical network.
  • this approval work will be briefly described with reference to FIG.
  • a collection of unapproved processes existing on the network is found, and the root (hash value) of the Mercle of the collection is acquired.
  • a variable nonce value is added to these two hash values, and further hashed to create a block hash.
  • SHA-256 is used as a hash function in Bitcoin.
  • the nonce value is generally an arbitrary value of 32 bits.
  • a hash value (block hash here) generated including the nonce value is a 256-bit value. 2 to the 256th power is larger than 10 to the 77th power, and it can be seen that the block hash has a huge degree of freedom. Adjusting the nonce value can zero out the first few bits of the block hash. As an example, the probability that the first 16 bits of a newly generated block hash are all zero is 1/16, that is, 1 / 65,536. That is, it can hardly happen by chance.
  • the hash function is irreversible. Accordingly, it is generally impossible to obtain a nonce value by inverse transformation so as to generate a hash value (here, a block hash) in which the first few bits (16 bits in this example) are zero. In other words, it is necessary to repeat hashing while changing the nonce value until the first few bits of the generated hash value are all zero.
  • a hash value here, a block hash
  • the use of a certain computer or more is indispensable for determining a nonce value for generating a block hash in which the first 16 bits are all zero.
  • the reliability of currency is the reliability of past processing history.
  • blockchain guarantees its reliability. The longer the blockchain extends, the more difficult it is to tamper. For example, when data of a part of logical blocks is rewritten, the connection condition with the logical block connected to the logical block (the first few bits of the block hash are all zero) is not satisfied. Therefore, the nonce value of the logical block must be corrected so that this condition is satisfied. As described above, since the hash function is irreversible, it requires a corresponding calculation. However, when the nonce value of the logical block is adjusted, the nonce value of the subsequent logical block must also be adjusted.
  • the fraudulent chain may be longer than the regular chain when the fraudulent side's computing power outweighs the computing power distributed to other minors around the world. This is called “51% attack”.
  • the powers that will be attacked will need to join the blockchain. If multiple nations participate and no one can attack 51%, the problem will disappear. In this way, the blockchain is P2P, but it will also have an aspect of international information and communication infrastructure.
  • the secret key is a product of software and has nothing to do with the physical reality.
  • software is designed to function even when installed on any hardware designed and manufactured according to the same standard. In other words, it is required to move in the same way regardless of the difference in individual physical reality. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the physical reality.
  • the IoT network is composed of a myriad of hardware and wired wireless signal transmission paths that connect them to exchange electronic data. Here is both the reason for associating the private key with the physical reality and one hint.
  • the public key and the physical address are linked by some method that is not falsified.
  • the physical address required here must be non-rewritable unlike the MAC address. (Physical address that cannot be rewritten)
  • the method for realizing it may be any software technology, network technology, or hardware technology. In any case, it suffices to be able to relate to a chip that has some form of physical reality by software technology, network technology, hardware technology, or some combination of these technologies.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining the relationship between a physical network in which hardware having (non-rewritable physical address) participates and a logical network utilizing a public ledger.
  • the hardware is a physical node because it has a physical reality and becomes a node constituting a physical network.
  • the preset physical address is linked one-to-one with the secret key by some method.
  • a logical node whose logical address is a public key that forms a pair with the secret key by public key cryptography is paired with the physical node or hardware corresponding thereto.
  • the hash value (N-1) that is the contents of the wallet (N) is the hash value (N-2) that is the contents of the wallet (N-1), the public key (N-1) that is the logical address, and the electronic signature. (N-2) is hashed together.
  • the public key (N-1) is hashed into a hash value (N-1) together with a hash value (N-2) and an electronic signature (N-2). Therefore, alteration of the public key (N-1) is also alteration of the hash value (N-1).
  • the hash value (N-1) is not necessarily the latest hash value, that is, the root of Merck. However, if you tamper with the Merkul tree, that is, some of the logic blocks, you agree that the roots of Merkul have been tampered with.
  • the block hash (N) constituting the contents of the logical block (N + 1) is a hashed form of all the logical blocks (N).
  • the logic block (N) contains the roots of Merkuru. Assuming that the root of this Mercle is altered as described above, the connection condition between the logical block (N) and the logical block (N + 1) is broken. Therefore, it is necessary to readjust the nonce value of the logical block (N) to recover the connection condition. For example, the nonce value of the logical logic block (N) must be recalculated so that the first 16 bits of the block hash (N + 1) are all zero again.
  • the hash function is irreversible, this calculation requires a certain level of calculation capability.
  • a method of generating a public key that makes a pair with the private key will be described.
  • a method using an RSA type key generation device that generates a private key and a public key that form a pair with each other from a certain input, and a public key that forms a pair with the private key by inputting the private key
  • Elgamal type key generation devices to be generated. In any case, it is very difficult to reproduce the secret key from at least the public key.
  • These key generation devices may be a kind of program recorded in a memory, or may be an embedded circuit mounted on a semiconductor chip.
  • Rivest Shamir Edelman ( reference. ) Rivest, Ronald L. Shamir, Adi. Adelman, Len M. (1977-07-04), “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signature and Public-key Cryptsystems”, MIT-LCS-TM-082 (MIT Laboratory for Computer Science) .
  • an appropriate non-negative integer e is prepared. Usually, 2 to the 16th power plus 1 is adopted, but other positive natural numbers can be adopted.
  • ⁇ e, n ⁇ is a public key.
  • a secret integer d is obtained by further dividing a positive integer whose remainder is 1 by dividing the product of (p ⁇ 1) and (q ⁇ 1) by e.
  • ⁇ p, q ⁇ is known in addition to ⁇ e, n ⁇ , d can be obtained by calculation.
  • ⁇ p, q ⁇ must be discarded or not leaked to the outside. If the set of prime numbers ⁇ p, q ⁇ is stored so as not to leak to the outside, it can be considered that the set ⁇ d, p, q ⁇ is a secret key.
  • a positive integer e can be generated by adding 1 to the physical address displayed in code.
  • prime number ⁇ p, q ⁇ is also possible to generate the prime number ⁇ p, q ⁇ from the physical address.
  • 1 is added to the physical address indicated by the code to check whether it is a prime number. If it is a prime number, let p be the prime number. If it is not a prime number, add 1 to see if it is a prime number. This is repeated to determine the prime number p. After determining the prime number p, the same procedure is repeated to determine the prime number q.
  • the prime number ⁇ p, q ⁇ can be obtained.
  • Prime number q Another example of how to determine the prime number q is to add 2 to the physical address to see if it is a prime number. If it is a prime number, let the prime number be q. If it is not a prime number, add 2 to see if it is a prime number. The prime number q is determined by repeating this.
  • the number added to the physical address to obtain the prime number p or q is not limited to 1 or 2, but an arbitrary integer (for example, k) can be adopted.
  • k can be a security parameter.
  • both p and q are sufficiently large prime numbers, and the selection of the security parameter k becomes more diverse.
  • the method of synthesizing the physical address indicated by code and k can perform all arithmetic operations and combinations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, or any bit operation as much as possible.
  • N physical address
  • k is sufficiently large as a numerical value
  • p is a sufficiently large prime number.
  • the k may be an internal input or an external input.
  • a method for obtaining a prime number p or q from a physical address includes, as an example, a synthesis step for synthesizing a physical address and an appropriately given variable, and a determination step for determining whether or not the synthesized number is a prime number. And the synthesis step and the determination step are repeated until a prime number is actually obtained. See FIG.
  • a large prime number p and its primitive root g are determined.
  • the prime number p and the primitive root g can be selected according to design specifications.
  • a non-negative integer x smaller than p ⁇ 1 is randomly selected as a secret key.
  • a remainder obtained by dividing the x-th power of the primitive root g by p is set as a public key.
  • the physical address and the secret key can be linked.
  • the secret address may be a physical address represented by a code or a remainder obtained by adding an integer of 1 or more to the physical address and dividing by p ⁇ 1.
  • the difference is whether to generate a public key from a secret key, or to generate a public key and a secret key from different input variables. Or there are differences in algebraic problems used for variable transformation. For example, prime factorization, discrete logarithm problem, random oracle assumption, elliptic curve problem, etc. (System integration)
  • the physical address of the hardware to be replaced is different from the failed hardware, the physical address is also replaced. This is the same as falsifying the physical address. In this way, the logical blocks constituting the block chain are falsified. As a result, the logical block connection condition cannot be satisfied, and the block chain is also destroyed.
  • SSDs are hardware and cannot escape mechanical failure. Regardless of how reliable and failure frequency is, the number of SSDs is enormous, so SSDs must be replaced on a daily basis for maintenance and inspection. Due to the nature of the blockchain, if even one SSD is replaced, the blockchain will be destroyed. This makes it difficult to protect large systems from malicious hackers using blockchain. Even if the information necessary for preventing the blockchain from being broken can be remarkably extracted from the failed hardware, it takes time and labor to actually extract such information, which is not economical.
  • the present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and provides a network management technology in which a logical block is not tampered with even when hardware that is a part of a component is replaced, and a secure intranet using a block chain is provided.
  • the purpose is to build at low cost.
  • the present invention employs the following means in order to solve the above problems.
  • the server has an input / output interface for exchanging data with each client, Each of the plurality of clients has a unique physical address, sends the physical address to the server through the input / output interface,
  • the server further includes a key generation device and a synthesis device, The key generation device and the synthesis device generate a secret key and a public key corresponding to each client from the physical address, The secret key and the public key are each passed to the corresponding client,
  • the server generates an authentication variable consisting of a combination of the physical address, the secret key, and the public key for each of the plurality of clients. Collecting authentication variables corresponding to the plurality of clients and recording them in a private ledger; It is characterized by About the network.
  • the plurality of clients include a first client, a second client, and a third client different from each other,
  • the key generation device generates a first public key from a first secret key corresponding to the first client;
  • the synthesizing device generates a second secret key corresponding to the second client from the first public key and a second physical address corresponding to the second client;
  • the key generation device generates a second public key corresponding to the second client from the second secret key,
  • the synthesizing device generates a third secret key corresponding to the third client from the second public key and a third physical address corresponding to the third client,
  • the key generation device generates a third public key from the third secret key;
  • the first public key and the first secret key form a pair with each other,
  • the second public key and the second secret key form a pair with each other,
  • the third public key and the third secret key form a pair with each other; It is characterized by About the network.
  • the second client is replaced by a fourth client having a fourth physical address;
  • the fourth physical address is transmitted to the server through the input / output interface;
  • the authentication variable corresponding to the second client is replaced with a combination including the fourth physical address, the second secret key, and the second public key,
  • the fourth client is passed the second secret key and the second public key from the server, and is passed the second hash value and the second electronic signature from the first client. It is characterized by About the network.
  • the attached third logic block is connected to form part or all of the block chain,
  • the first time stamp is at least a part of a record of a public ledger that collectively approves the first logical block, a first block hash, and a first nonce value;
  • the second time stamp is at least part of a record of a public ledger that collectively approves the second logical block, a second block hash, and a second nonce value;
  • the third time stamp is at least part of a record of a public ledger that collectively approves the third logical block, a third block hash, and a third nonce value;
  • the first block hash is generated by hashing the second block, the second block hash, and the second nonce value together,
  • the second block hash is generated by hashing the
  • a plurality of physical nodes constitute a system regardless of the size.
  • Each of the plurality of physical nodes is a kind of hardware, and functions as a system while exchanging data with each other via a signal transmission path.
  • a plurality of physical nodes constituting such a large-scale system can be broadly classified into a core node in charge of core functions and peripheral nodes in charge of some functions in cooperation with the core nodes.
  • the network structure is a client-server type, and therefore, the core node will be referred to as a server and the peripheral nodes as clients.
  • the client is an SSD as an example. If the system is an SSD, the client is NAND flash as an example and the server is the controller. When the system is a controller, the server is an arithmetic processing unit, and the client is a cache memory or the like.
  • FIG. 6 shows the client (N ⁇ 1), the client (N), and the client (N + 1) before being incorporated into the system.
  • a physical address (N-1), a physical address (N), and a physical address (N + 1) are respectively assigned.
  • N is a natural number of 2 or more.
  • FIG. 7 shows a method for authenticating and registering these clients in the server. Incorporating the client into the system for the first time is called initial setting, and resetting authentication registration for maintenance and management is called resetting.
  • the server assigns an input / output interface (I / F) corresponding to each client. Each client transmits a physical address (N-1), a physical address (N), and a physical address (N + 1) to the server via the I / F.
  • I / F input / output interface
  • the server uses the physical address (N) received from each client and generates a secret key (N) by an appropriate method.
  • the server further includes a key generation device, and the key generation device generates a public key (N) from the secret key (N) in accordance with an El Gamal type encryption key generation method.
  • the secret key (N) and the public key (N) form a pair. A specific description will be given below in order.
  • N 2
  • the secret key (1) is generated from the physical address (1).
  • the key generation device generates a public key (1) from the secret key (1).
  • the private key (1) and the public key (1) are passed to the client (1).
  • a combination of (physical address (1), secret key (1), public key (1)) is formed in the client (1).
  • a combination of (physical address (1), secret key (1), public key (1)) corresponding to client (1) remains in the server.
  • This combination authentication variable is called and registered in the ledger in the server. Since this ledger is kept private outside the server, it can be called a private ledger.
  • the server further includes a synthesizer.
  • This synthesizing device synthesizes the public key (1) and the physical address (2), and generates a secret key (2) from the synthesis result.
  • the key generation device generates a public key (2) from the secret key (2).
  • the private key (2) and the public key (2) are passed to the client (2).
  • a combination of (physical address (2), secret key (2), public key (2)) is formed in the client (2).
  • the authentication variables (physical address (2), secret key (2), public key (2)) corresponding to the client (2) remain in the server and are registered in the private ledger in the server.
  • the synthesizing device synthesizes the physical address (N) and the public key (N-1), and generates a secret key (N) from the synthesis result.
  • the key generation device generates a public key (N) from the secret key (N). Pass the private key (N) and public key (N) to the client (N).
  • a combination of (physical address (N), secret key (N), public key (N)) is formed in the client (N).
  • the authentication variables (physical address (N), secret key (N), and public key (N)) corresponding to the client (N) remain in the server and are registered in the private ledger in the server.
  • a specific method for generating a secret key by the synthesizing apparatus will be described.
  • a large prime number p is prepared by an appropriate method.
  • a combination of the physical address (N) and the public key (N-1) is hashed, the result of the synthesis is divided by p-1, and the remainder is used as the secret key (N).
  • the combining device combines the physical address and the public key. For example, addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, a combination of these arithmetic operations, a logical operation, and any other bit operation as much as possible can be used.
  • a set of (physical address (N), secret key (N), and public key (N)) is stored in the client (N).
  • This private ledger is stored and managed by the server, and is not disclosed to the outside in order to enhance safety.
  • FIG. 8 shows a method of forming logical blocks by connecting clients after initial setting and resetting by hashing.
  • the logical block generation method is the same as that for bit coins. That is, the combination of the public key (N-1), hash value (N-2) and digital signature (N-2) of the client (N-1) corresponds to the bit coin purse (N-1). In this application, it is a logical node (N-1). This logical node (N-1) is hashed to generate a hash value (N-1). Subsequently, the hash value (N-1) and the public key (N) of the client (N) are collectively encrypted with the secret key (N-1) to generate an electronic signature (N-1).
  • the client (N-1) sends both the hash value (N-1) and the electronic signature (N-1) to the client (N).
  • a logical node (N) is formed from the public key (N), the hash value (N-1), and the electronic signature (N-1).
  • the logical node (N) is hashed to generate a hash value (N).
  • the hash value (N) and the public key (N + 1) of the client (N + 1) are collectively encrypted with the secret key (N) to generate an electronic signature (N).
  • the client (N) sends both the hash value (N) and the electronic signature (N) to the client (N + 1).
  • a logical node (N + 1) is formed from the public key (N + 1), the hash value (N), and the electronic signature (N).
  • a logical block composed of a plurality of logical nodes is formed.
  • the method of transferring a hash value between clients by the method as described above is one method of transferring data between clients.
  • the data In the case of cryptocurrency, the data is something with a monetary value, and in the case of bitcoin, it is a processing record. (It is actually a hashed hash value.)
  • the client If the client is a storage such as SSD, this data does not necessarily need a monetary value. Simply hashed data is only transferred between SSDs. Nevertheless, it is possible to form a logical block in this way. That is, a logical block can be formed regardless of the contents of data.
  • the client including the logical block is hardware
  • a method for dealing with hardware mechanical failure is required as described above. That is, the failed hardware must be replaced with new hardware.
  • the private ledger stored in the server records (physical address (N), private key (N), public key (N)). This is an authentication variable corresponding to the client (N).
  • the physical address (N ′) is input to the server via the I / F connecting the failed client (N) and the server.
  • the server edits the private ledger and modifies the authentication variables to (physical address (N ′), secret key (N), public key (N)).
  • FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating a state after the failed hardware is replaced. Compared with FIG. 8, it can be seen that the logical nodes are exactly the same. That is, the logical node does not have to be tampered with. Thus, by using the server relating to the present embodiment, it is possible to replace the failed hardware without falsifying the logical block.
  • FIG. 8 Assume that before the hardware breaks down, the collection of logical nodes and their data transfer history shown in FIG. 8 are disclosed as logical blocks. A minor who digs up this logical block or a wider range of logical blocks that contain this logical block records it in a public ledger (for example, a block chain). Thereafter, the hardware breaks down, and the hardware is replaced by the method shown in FIG. However, as shown in FIG. 10, in this embodiment, there is no change in the logical node of the client whose hardware has been replaced. Therefore, the logical block is not falsified, and there is no fear of breaking the block chain connection condition.
  • a public ledger for example, a block chain
  • the logic block also changes. If the time axis is taken on the vertical axis, this change is divided at an appropriate time interval, and a time stamp is attached, it is possible to stack logical blocks that change from bottom to top as shown in FIG. The latest one is the logical block (M), and the last one approved is the logical block (M-1). The previous block is a logical block (M-2). However, in the present embodiment, this time stamp is issued to a server to which a client constituting a logical block is connected. The time stamp is issued at predetermined time intervals determined for the convenience of client maintenance using the server according to the present embodiment.
  • the server issues a time stamp, it means that the server approves the logical block at that time on behalf of the public ledger (eg, blockchain).
  • the public ledger eg, blockchain
  • this approval work is performed by an arbitrary minor.
  • the approval of the logical block according to the present embodiment is fundamentally different from the conventional method using the block chain. That is, the chain of logical blocks that are vertically continuous in FIG. 11 is different from a normal block chain.
  • FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating an example of an approval operation by the server according to the present embodiment.
  • the transition of logic blocks and time stamps are arranged from left to right in the figure. The latest one is the time stamp (M), going back one at a time (M-1), time stamp (M-2), and so on. Similarly, it can be traced back to logical block (M), logical block (M-1), logical block (M-2).
  • the block hash (M-2) is generated by combining the logical block (M-2) with the block hash (M-3) and an appropriately selected nonce value and hashing them.
  • the block hash (M-1) is generated by combining the block hash (M-2) and an appropriately selected nonce value with the logical block (M-1) and hashing it.
  • the block hash (M-1) may be hashed together with the logical block (M) and an appropriately selected nonce value.
  • the nonce value is generally an arbitrary value of 32 bits.
  • a hash value (block hash here) generated including the nonce value is a 256-bit value. 2 to the 256th power is larger than 10 to the 77th power, and it can be seen that the block hash has an enormous degree of freedom.
  • the first few bits of the block hash can be made zero.
  • the probability that the first 16 bits of a newly generated block hash are all zero is 1/16, that is, 1 / 65,536. It is almost impossible to happen by chance, and in order to find such a nonce value, a corresponding work is required.
  • the first 16 bits of the block hash are set to zero as a connection condition for connecting a new logical block to an existing logical block.
  • the reason why the number of bits set to zero first is 16 is to adjust so that the frequency at which a new logical block is approved is once every 10 minutes worldwide.
  • the 16-bit connection condition is for maintaining the reliability of data transfer in the P2P network without management by the server, and the reliability of data transfer between specific clients connected via the server as in the present application. 16 bits is considered to be sufficient to maintain the above. Rather, it may be necessary to reduce the number of bits and shorten the average time required for the server for this embodiment to approve a new logical block.
  • the logical block connection condition in the present application is to set all the first L bits of the block hash to zero.
  • L is a natural number smaller than 16.
  • the nonce value relating to the present application is adjusted to satisfy this connection condition.
  • the nonce value can be adjusted, a new logical block can be approved, and a time stamp can be issued as shown in FIG.
  • This operation is preferably performed by a server related to the present application.
  • the block chain related to the present application is different from the conventional block chain used for bit coins and the like.
  • the maintenance management of a server that approves a new logical block is appropriate, it is possible to prevent alteration of the processing history from the outside.
  • the public encryption that makes the public key and the private key correspond one-to-one is not broken, the logical address and the physical address can be linked as shown in FIG.
  • SSD is an example of the client of the present application
  • the history of data exchange between the SSDs is hashed and managed so that it cannot be tampered with in the block chain related to the present application.
  • This management is substantially management by a server that stores a private ledger.
  • the logical block is updated on the server that controls the data center activities.
  • the electronic signature technology and the private ledger stored in the server related to the present application the physical address of the SSD once initialized by the server can be prevented from being tampered with from the outside. (Physical address that cannot be rewritten from the outside) Also, by using the private ledger inside the server, it is possible to replace a failed SSD without destroying the block chain. (Third embodiment)
  • the physical address can be generated from some physical randomness extracted from a cell array in a semiconductor chip having physical reality.
  • a chip is called an authentication chip.
  • FIG. 13 shows an example of a cell array composed of word lines and bit lines.
  • An authentication element is arranged where the word line and the bit line intersect.
  • the number of rows (number of word lines) is N
  • the number of columns (number of bit lines) is M.
  • rows and columns can be interchanged at any time.
  • each authentication element has at least two terminals (a first terminal and a second terminal), one of a word line and a bit line is connected to the first terminal, and the other is connected to the second terminal. Connecting.
  • the word line is connected to the first control gate and the bit line is connected to the second control gate.
  • the bit line is connected to the first control gate, and the word line is connected to the second control gate. In any case, access between the first terminal and the authentication element can be controlled in this way.
  • the second terminal is dropped to the source line, the substrate electrode, or the ground as necessary.
  • the authentication element is a resistor (or a conductor).
  • a capacitor or it is a PN junction. Or it is a Schottky junction.
  • a transistor or it is a DRAM cell composed of a transistor and a capacitor.
  • a variable resistance memory cell which consists of a transistor and a variable resistance.
  • MRAM magnetoresistive memory cell
  • STT-MRAM spin torque type MRAM
  • it is a non-volatile memory cell with a charge storage layer.
  • the charge storage layer may be either a charge trapping layer or a floating gate.
  • it is a nonvolatile memory cell with a charge storage layer arranged on a NAND type array in which the bit line terminals are intentionally excluded as shown in FIG.
  • the transistors are arranged on a NAND type array in which the bit line terminals are intentionally excluded.
  • a bit line terminal is connected to one end of a group of authentication elements in series in the bit line direction, and a source line terminal is connected to the other end.
  • a transfer voltage is applied to the word lines (non-selected word lines) of all other authentication elements connected to the bit line (selected bit line) including the authentication element (selected cell) to be read, and other than the selected cell. Turn all switches on. Then, a voltage (read gate voltage) lower than the transfer voltage may be applied to the word line (selected word line) of the selected cell. At this time, an appropriate voltage (read drain voltage) may be applied between the bit line terminal and the source line terminal, and the current flowing between them may be measured.
  • a word line is selected using a word line decoder
  • a bit line is selected using a bit line decoder
  • an authentication element selected by each selected word line (selected word line) and bit line (selected bit line). Is the selected cell.
  • the first type is easy to flow current when a read voltage is applied when it is broken, and it is difficult to flow current when it is not broken.
  • Major examples are capacitors, PN junctions, and Schottky junctions.
  • the destruction determination current value is higher than the non-destruction determination current value.
  • the second type is less likely to pass current when a read voltage is applied when it is destroyed, and more likely to pass current if it is not destroyed.
  • the main example is a resistor (or conductor). In order to determine whether or not it has been destroyed, it is only necessary to check whether the absolute value of the current when the destruction determination voltage is applied is higher than the nondestructive determination current value or lower than the breakdown determination current value. However, the destruction determination current value is lower than the nondestructive determination current value.
  • a plurality of destruction bits are generally found.
  • a defective bit is found that does not exhibit the specified characteristics.
  • the position information on the cell array of the destruction bit or the defective bit is an array composed of a word line number and a bit line number. If the position information of the plurality of broken bits or defective bits is arranged and displayed as a code, an authentication code corresponding to the distribution of the broken bits or defective bits can be obtained. As long as the occurrence of the destruction bit or defective bit is physically random, this authentication code is expected to be unique to the semiconductor chip and physically random.
  • the format of the authentication code is appropriately formed to be a physical address used in the present application.
  • Q be the number of broken bits or defective bits
  • R be the number of selected cells.
  • Q is a number smaller than R.
  • the number of authentication codes is equal to the number when Q is selected from R. That is, if R is sufficiently large and the probability of existence of a broken bit or defective bit is not small enough to be ignored, the number of authentication codes is very large.
  • a Q of 1 G and an R of 1 km corresponds to a defective rate of 1 / 1,000,000. That is, even if it is assumed that the defect rate is so low that the semiconductor chip achieves six sigma (3.4 / 1,000,000 or less), the probability that the authentication codes of the two semiconductor chips will coincide is almost zero. I can say that.
  • the stress includes various types such as an electrical stress, an optical stress, a mechanical stress, and an electromagnetic field stress.
  • authentication cells in a part of a region selected for generating an authentication code are simultaneously selected from all cell arrays, and a high voltage pulse is applied to all the selected cells.
  • a high voltage pulse is applied to all the selected cells.
  • optical stress As an example of optical stress, a certain amount of X-rays, ultraviolet rays, or the like is irradiated to the authentication element cell array before assembly. The amount of irradiation is adjusted so that the number of non-destructive bits and destructive bits is approximately the same. However, when the area of the cell array for authentication elements is very narrow, stress is similarly applied to other elements. This is a relatively effective method when the entire chip is used as a cell array for authentication elements.
  • An example of electromagnetic field stress is exposing the authentication chip to a strong electromagnetic field. However, stress is similarly applied to a cell array other than the authentication element cell array. Therefore, this method is effective only when all the chips are used as the authentication element cell array.
  • the authentication code is physically generated randomly. Further, as long as the probability that the authentication codes of the two semiconductor chips are coincidentally coincidentally is practically zero, the authentication code is sufficiently used as a physical address unique to the semiconductor chip.
  • the physical address of the present embodiment can be generated from the distribution of the destruction bits in the cell array.
  • the physical address of the present embodiment can be generated from the distribution of defective bits in the cell array.
  • the physical address of the present embodiment can be generated from the distribution of broken bits and defective bits in the cell array.
  • Some memory chip products are provided with a redundant bit line for replacing the bit line in which the defective bit is generated in consideration of the fact that the defective bit is generated in the memory cell at a predetermined ratio or less in advance. Yes.
  • the causes of such defects are various and depend on manufacturing variations in the manufacturing stage of the semiconductor chip (memory chip in this example) and naturally occurring variations in the physical formation process of the members. In general, these variations are uncontrollable. Redundant bit lines are usually not included in the bit capacity of memory chip products. See FIG. 18 as an example.
  • the bit line group arranged in the row direction is divided into two groups.
  • One is a redundant bit line group consisting of a plurality of redundant bit lines
  • the other is a normal bit line group consisting of normal bit lines.
  • N be the number of rows in the normal bit line group
  • L be the number of rows in the redundant bit line group.
  • N and L are non-negative integers, and N is larger than L.
  • the bit capacity of the memory chip product corresponds to the number of cells included in this normal bit line group.
  • the normal bit line including the defective bit is changed to one redundant bit line in the redundant bit line group. assign. Such replacement (reading replacement A, replacement B in the figure) is performed for each normal bit line including a defective bit, and the defective bit can be substantially removed.
  • a peripheral memory for example, a fuse memory or the like in which a bit line number of a bit line that has been found defective in a pre-shipment inspection and a bit line number of a redundant bit line that replaces the bit line are mixedly loaded in the peripheral area ).
  • This peripheral memory is referred to when accessing the memory cell.
  • information recorded in the peripheral memory is displayed as a code, and is formed into a predetermined format to play the role of a physical address.
  • a memory chip product that satisfies such conditions is a DRAM.
  • a flash memory a phase change memory, a resistance change memory, a magnetoresistance change memory (MRAM), a spin torque type MRAM, and the like can be considered.
  • MRAM magnetoresistance change memory
  • the number in that case is a combination of selecting m from N. That is, C (N, m).
  • C (N, m) the number of cases must be further multiplied by the number of permutations that are arranged from L. That is, C (N, m) P (L, m). In other words, the number of cases even when underestimated is about C (N, m).
  • the number of redundant bit lines is about 153,000 with respect to the total number of bit lines of 6,550,000.
  • the maximum number of rows in which defective bits are generated on the bit lines in the regular bit line group for some reason is acceptable as a mass production DRAM of up to about 153,000.
  • the number in the case of reassignment to the redundant bit line is equal to the combination of selecting 153,000 out of 6,550,000.
  • the calculation is about 10 to the power of 315, 289 (1E315, 289). That is, even if 100 trillion DRAM chips are supplied, the probability that the authentication codes of the two DRAM chips coincide by chance is 1E-315 and 275. It is practically almost zero.
  • the bit line and the word line can be interchanged. That is, the number of redundant word lines is about 3,044 with respect to the total number of word lines of 4.4 million. Assuming that all redundant word lines are used for replacement, the number in that case is approximately 2.9E10, 938. Although it is much less than the number in the former case, it is still a radically large number. That is, even if 100 trillion DRAM chips are supplied, the probability that the authentication codes of the two authentication chips will coincide is 1E-10,924. It is practically almost zero.
  • an authentication code having a very large information entropy can be generated.
  • no extra bit is allocated to generate the authentication code. That is, the redundant bit line (or redundant word line) is already mounted on the memory chip product, and the same applies to the peripheral memory that records the replacement information.
  • the probability that the authentication codes of the two semiconductor chips will coincide is small enough to be practically almost zero. This authentication code is sufficient as the physical address of the present application.
  • the physical address related to the present application is code information assigned to hardware. Or it is the code information allocated to some of the components which comprise hardware. Or it is chip
  • the chip authentication is generated based on a physical disorder unique to the semiconductor chip.
  • the semiconductor chip is composed of a plurality of elements, and the plurality of elements are stochastically destroyed by applying a predetermined stress, and a set (distribution) of position information of the destroyed elements is unique to the semiconductor chip. It is characterized by a physical disorder. Alternatively, a plurality of elements constituting the semiconductor chip become probabilistic defective bits due to uncontrollable variations in the manufacturing process. A set (distribution) of position information of the defective bits is a physical disorder unique to the semiconductor chip.
  • the predetermined stress is an electrical stress, a mechanical stress, an electromagnetic field stress, an optical stress, or the like.
  • this block chain uses what is recorded by an arbitrary minor from an external logical network. In other words, it is consistent with the conventional block chain, and can maintain and manage the data center efficiently and safely using an external network.
  • a server that stores a private ledger records logical blocks and configures a unique block chain.
  • hashing is frequently used.
  • a hash function may be used for hashing.
  • hash functions such as MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPE-MD160, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
  • SHA-256 is used in bitcoin as an example.
  • the technical scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiment, and various modifications can be made without departing from the spirit of the present invention.
  • the figure explaining the mechanism of remittance of a cryptocurrency The figure explaining the dendrogram of Merkuru.
  • the figure explaining the example which is the non-volatile memory cell which the authentication element in connection with this application consists of a transistor with a charge storage layer, and has arranged in NAND type.
  • the figure explaining the example which the authentication element in connection with this application is a transistor, and has arranged in the NAND type.

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Abstract

Le problème décrit par la présente invention est d'améliorer la fiabilité d'un réseau matériel à l'aide d'une chaîne de blocs, de permettre le remplacement d'un matériel défaillant à l'aide d'un registre privé, et de maintenir et de gérer de manière économique un système qui est un réseau matériel. À cet effet, selon l'invention, une chaîne de blocs et un registre privé qui sont fournis dans un serveur sont utilisés en combinaison pour empêcher la falsification d'un historique de transmission et de réception de données entre des nœuds logiques reliant un matériel tout en garantissant que, même si un matériel défaillant est remplacé, la chaîne de blocs liée audit matériel n'est pas affectée.
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US12225006B2 (en) 2020-04-22 2025-02-11 Kyndryl, Inc. Secure resource access by amalgamated identities and distributed ledger
JP2021190980A (ja) * 2020-05-26 2021-12-13 浩志 渡辺 電子装置のネットワーク及び電子装置
WO2021241590A1 (fr) * 2020-05-26 2021-12-02 渡辺浩志 Réseau de dispositifs électroniques et dispositif électronique
US12328301B2 (en) 2020-05-26 2025-06-10 Yukiko Watanabe Electronic apparatus and network of electronic apparatus
JP7692555B2 (ja) 2020-05-26 2025-06-16 浩志 渡辺 電子装置のネットワーク及び電子装置

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