WO2018000787A1 - Terminal, et procédé et système pour identifier une pseudo-station de base - Google Patents
Terminal, et procédé et système pour identifier une pseudo-station de base Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2018000787A1 WO2018000787A1 PCT/CN2016/113380 CN2016113380W WO2018000787A1 WO 2018000787 A1 WO2018000787 A1 WO 2018000787A1 CN 2016113380 W CN2016113380 W CN 2016113380W WO 2018000787 A1 WO2018000787 A1 WO 2018000787A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- base station
- station cell
- cell
- terminal
- pseudo
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
- H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of GSM communication technologies, and in particular, to a pseudo base station identification method and system.
- the invention also relates to a terminal.
- the pseudo base station is a public mobile operator base station forged by criminals.
- the pseudo base station absorbs some mobile phone users by forging part of the network parameters and increasing its own transmission power.
- the pseudo base station can acquire the mobile phone user.
- Figure 1 is a flow chart of the process of the current pseudo base station operation.
- the existing GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) mobile communication system has the defect of one-way authentication, that is, only the network authenticates the terminal, and the terminal cannot identify the legality of the network identity, because the pseudo is not recognized.
- the base station has low security when the user connects to the network and is vulnerable to the intrusion of the pseudo base station.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a method and system for identifying a pseudo base station, which not only can identify a pseudo base station, but also avoids information leakage of the terminal user in the identification process, thereby greatly ensuring network security of the terminal user.
- Another object of the present invention is to provide a terminal having the above effects.
- the present invention provides a pseudo base station identification method for a terminal, including:
- Step s101 After the base station cell reselection occurs on the terminal, receive system information sent by the base station cell after reselection;
- Step s102 Send a location update request to the base station cell
- Step s103 determining, according to the system information, whether the base station cell satisfies a pseudo base station determination criterion, and if yes, proceeding to step s104;
- Step s104 After receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, send the fake identity information to the base station cell.
- Step s105 Determine whether to continue receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, and if yes, mark the address of the base station cell as a pseudo base station; and the terminal reselects into another base station cell.
- the method further includes:
- the address of the base station cell is written into the list of forbidden access cells stored in the terminal.
- the system information includes a location area code and a periodic location update time
- the base station cell satisfies the pseudo base station determining criterion, and the base station cell does not satisfy the pseudo base station determining criterion.
- the method further includes:
- the base station cell does not satisfy the pseudo base station determining criterion, after receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, sending the real identity information to the base station cell;
- the address of the base station cell is marked as a true base station cell, and the terminal is reselected into the base station cell.
- the method further includes:
- the identity request information sent by the base station cell is not continuously received, determining whether the location update rejection information sent by the base station cell is received, and if yes, resending the location update request to the base station cell;
- the address of the base station cell is marked as a true base station cell, and the terminal is reselected into the base station cell.
- the method further includes:
- the address of the base station cell is written into the list of allowed access cells stored in the terminal.
- the base station information receiving module is configured to: after the base station cell reselection occurs in the terminal, receive system information sent by the reselected base station cell, and trigger a location update request sending module;
- the first determining module is configured to determine, according to the system information, whether the base station cell satisfies a pseudo base station determining criterion, and if yes, triggering the first identity information sending module;
- the first identity information sending module is configured to: after receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, send the fake identity information to the base station cell;
- the second determining module is configured to determine whether to continue receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, and if yes, mark the address of the base station cell as a pseudo base station; and the terminal reselects into another base station cell.
- the method further comprises:
- the pseudo base station write module is configured to, when the address of the base station cell is marked as a pseudo base station, write the address of the base station cell into the list of forbidden access cells stored in the terminal.
- the system information includes a location area code and a periodic location update time, determining whether the increased value of the received signal within a preset time exceeds a preset signal threshold when the terminal performs cell reselection of the base station, and Whether the location area code of the base station cell exceeds a preset area code range, and whether the periodic location update time of the base station cell is less than a preset period, and if yes, the base station cell satisfies the pseudo base station determination Standard, triggering the first identity information sending module; otherwise, the base station cell does not satisfy the pseudo base station determining criterion.
- the method further comprises:
- the second identity information sending module is configured to: after receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, send the real identity information to the base station cell, and after the location update, trigger the true base station marking module; wherein, when the first When the determining module determines that the base station cell does not meet the pseudo base station determining criterion, triggering the second identity information sending module;
- the true base station marking module is configured to mark that the address of the base station cell is a true base station cell.
- the method further comprises:
- the second identity information sending module is triggered.
- the method further comprises:
- the present invention also provides a terminal, comprising the pseudo base station identification system according to any of the above.
- the processor invokes the pseudo base station identification system in the memory to perform a pseudo base station identification operation through the bus.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a pseudo base station identification system according to the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal provided by the present invention.
- the core of the present invention is to provide a pseudo base station identification method and system, which can not only identify the pseudo base station, but also avoid the information leakage of the end user in the identification process, thereby greatly ensuring the network security of the end user.
- Another core of the present invention is to provide a terminal having the above effects.
- Step s101 After the base station cell reselection occurs in the terminal, receive system information sent by the reselected base station cell;
- Step s102 Send a location update request to the base station cell
- Step s104 After receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, sending the fake identity information to the base station cell;
- Step s105 Determine whether to continue receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell. If yes, the address of the marked base station cell is a pseudo base station; and the terminal reselects the other base station cell.
- the present invention provides a pseudo base station identification method. Since the purpose of the pseudo base station is to obtain the identity information of the terminal user for illegal information transmission, in the present invention, after the terminal performs cell reselection of the base station, it is first determined whether the base station cell is It may be a pseudo base station (ie, whether the base station cell satisfies the pseudo base station determination criterion). If possible, the terminal sends the false identity information to test the base station cell. If the base station cell continues to send the identity request information, it indicates that the base station cell is a pseudo base station. (The true base station cell will send location update reject information). Therefore, the present invention can not only identify the pseudo base station, but also avoid the information leakage of the end user in the identification process, thereby greatly ensuring the network security of the end user.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a process of another pseudo base station identification method according to the present invention; the method includes:
- Step s101 After the base station cell reselection occurs in the terminal, receive system information sent by the reselected base station cell;
- Step s102 Send a location update request to the base station cell
- Step s103 judging whether the base station cell satisfies the pseudo base station determination criterion according to the system information, if yes, proceeding to step s104; if not, proceeding to step s111;
- the system information includes a location area code (LAC) and a periodic location update time T3212;
- LAC location area code
- T3212 periodic location update time
- the transmission power is suddenly increased, that is, the transmission signal of the pseudo base station is stronger than the transmission signal of the real base station cell, and the transmission signal of the pseudo base station usually appears suddenly, thereby causing
- the signal received by the terminal will suddenly increase in a short period of time, so a short preset time (for example, a few seconds) can be set, and it is judged whether the signal received by the terminal increases in the preset time.
- the preset signal threshold is exceeded to initially determine whether the base station cell is a pseudo base station.
- Step s104 After receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, sending the fake identity information to the base station cell;
- the identity request information refers to the base station cell used to request the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number), TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity), and IMEI (International).
- Mobile Equipment Identity information such as the International Mobile Equipment Identity is used to authenticate to verify whether the identity of the end user can access the network.
- the fake identity information is sent to test the base station cell, which further avoids leakage of user identity information and improves network security.
- Step s106 marking the address of the base station cell as a pseudo base station
- Step s108 the terminal reselects into another base station cell
- Step s109 determining whether the location update rejection information sent by the base station cell is received, and if yes, proceeding to step s110;
- Step s110 Resending the location update request to the base station cell
- Step s111 After receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, sending the real identity information to the base station cell;
- Step s112 After the location update succeeds, the address of the marked base station cell is a true base station cell;
- Step s113 Write the address of the base station cell into the list of allowed access cells stored in the terminal;
- the operation enables the terminal to discover in time when re-selecting the cell into the real base station, and does not need to perform the foregoing determining operation, thereby improving the efficiency of the terminal accessing the base station cell.
- Step s114 The terminal reselects into the base station cell.
- the embodiment further increases the step of transmitting the real identity information to the base station cell when determining that the base station cell is a true base station, so that the terminal normally accesses the real base station cell after the pseudo base station identification process is completed, thereby avoiding The pseudo base station identification process has an impact on the normal networking of the terminal; and in this embodiment, after the identification is completed, the address of the base station cell is correspondingly written into the list of the forbidden access cells stored in the terminal or allowed to access the cell list, so that the terminal is enabled. After reselecting to the base station cell, the type of the base station cell can be known in time without repeating the identification operation, thereby improving the working efficiency of the terminal accessing the base station cell.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a pseudo base station identification system according to the present invention.
- the system includes:
- the base station information receiving module 11 is configured to receive the system information sent by the reselected base station cell after the base station cell reselection occurs, and trigger the location update request sending module 12;
- the location update request sending module 12 is configured to send a location update request to the base station cell
- the first determining module 13 is configured to determine, according to the system information, whether the base station cell satisfies the pseudo base station determining criterion, and if so, triggering the identity information sending module 14;
- the first identity information sending module 14 is configured to: after receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, send the fake identity information to the base station cell;
- the second judging module 15 is configured to determine whether to continue receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell. If yes, the address of the marked base station cell is a pseudo base station; and the terminal reselects the other base station cell.
- the first judging module 13 here is specifically set as:
- the system information includes the location area code and the periodic location update time
- the system further comprises:
- the pseudo base station write module 16 is configured to write the address of the base station cell into the list of forbidden access cells stored in the terminal when the address of the marked base station cell is a pseudo base station.
- the system further comprises:
- the second identity information sending module 18 is configured to: after receiving the identity request information sent by the base station cell, send the real identity information to the base station cell, and after the location update, trigger the true base station marking module 19; wherein, when the first determining module 13 determines When the base station cell does not meet the pseudo base station determination criterion, the second identity information sending module 18 is triggered;
- the true base station marking module 19 is configured to mark the address of the base station cell as a true base station cell.
- system further includes:
- the third determining module 17 is configured to: when the second determining module 15 determines that the identity request information sent by the base station cell is not continuously received, determine whether the location update rejection information sent by the base station cell is received, and if yes, trigger the location update request sending module. 12 resending the location update request to the base station cell;
- the second identity information sending module 18 is triggered.
- the system further comprises:
- the true base station write module 20 is configured to write the address of the base station cell into the list of allowed access cells stored in the terminal when the address of the marked base station cell is a true base station cell.
- the present invention provides a pseudo base station identification system. Since the purpose of the pseudo base station is to obtain the identity information of the terminal user for illegal information transmission, in the present invention, after the base station cell reselection occurs in the terminal, it is first determined whether the base station cell is It may be a pseudo base station (ie, whether the base station cell satisfies the pseudo base station determination criterion). If possible, the terminal sends the false identity information to test the base station cell. If the base station cell continues to send the identity request information, it indicates that the base station cell is a pseudo base station. (The true base station cell will send location update reject information). Therefore, the present invention can not only identify the pseudo base station, but also avoid the information leakage of the end user in the identification process, thereby greatly ensuring the network security of the end user.
- the base station cell may be a pseudo base station (ie, whether the base station cell satisfies the pseudo base station determination criterion). If possible, the terminal sends the false identity information to test the base station cell. If
- FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal according to the present invention; the terminal includes the pseudo base station identification system.
- the terminal specifically includes a processor 31, an input device 35 and an output device 36 respectively connected to the processor 31 through the interface 32, and a memory 34 connected to the processor 31 via the bus 33;
- the pseudo base station identification system is stored in the memory
- the processor performs a pseudo base station identification operation by calling a pseudo base station identification system in the memory through the bus.
- terminal shown in FIG. 5 can be used to implement the method implemented by the embodiments of the present invention shown in FIG. 2 to FIG. 3, and for the convenience of description, only the parts related to the embodiments of the present invention are shown. For details not disclosed, please refer to the embodiments of the present invention shown in FIGS. 2 to 3.
- the memory 34 is used to store a pseudo base station identification system, which is a set of program codes.
- the processor 31 is configured to call the program code to perform the following operations:
- the system information sent by the reselected base station cell is received by the input device 35;
- the input device 35 It is judged whether the input device 35 continues to receive the identity request information sent by the base station cell, and if so, the address of the marked base station cell is a pseudo base station; the terminal reselects the other base station cell.
- the processor 31 is configured to invoke the program code, and is also used to perform the following operations:
- the address of the base station cell is written into the list of the forbidden access cells stored in the terminal.
- the processor 31 is configured to invoke the program code, and is also used to perform the following operations:
- the input device 35 receives the identity request information sent by the base station cell, and then sends the real identity information to the base station cell;
- the address of the marked base station cell is a true base station cell; the terminal is reselected into the base station cell.
- the processor 31 is configured to invoke the program code, and is also used to perform the following operations:
- the identity request information sent by the base station cell is not continuously received by the input device 35, it is determined whether the location update rejection information sent by the base station cell is received by the input device 35, and if so, the location update request is retransmitted by the output device 36 to the base station cell;
- the address of the marked base station cell is a true base station cell; the terminal is reselected into the base station cell.
- the processor 31 is configured to invoke the program code, and is also used to perform the following operations:
- the address of the base station cell is written into the list of allowed access cells stored in the terminal.
- the pseudo base station can be identified to prevent the terminal from accessing the pseudo base station, and the identified pseudo base station address can be stored in the access cell list in the terminal.
- ROM Read-Only Memory
- RAM Random Access Memory
- PROM Programmable Read-Only Memory
- EPROM Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
- OTPROM One-time Programmable Read-Only Memory
- EEPROM Electronically-Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
- CD-ROM Compact Disc Read- Only Memory
- CD-ROM Compact Disc Read- Only Memory
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
L'invention concerne un procédé et un système d'identification d'une pseudo-station de base applicables à un terminal. Le procédé consiste : lors de l'apparition d'une resélection d'une cellule de station de base, à recevoir, par un terminal, des informations de système transmises par une cellule de station de base resélectionnée ; à transmettre une requête de mise à jour d'emplacement à la cellule de station de base ; à déterminer, selon les informations de système, si la cellule de station de base satisfait ou non un critère de détermination de pseudo-station de base, et si tel est le cas, après avoir reçu des informations de requête d'identification transmises par la cellule de station de base, à transmettre des informations de pseudo-identification à la cellule de station de base ; à déterminer si les informations de requête d'identification sont ou non reçues en continu à partir de la cellule de station de base, et si tel est le cas, à marquer une adresse de la cellule de station de base comme pseudo-station de base ; et à resélectionner et à accéder, par le terminal, à une autre cellule de station de base. L'invention peut non seulement identifier une pseudo-station de base mais également empêcher que des informations d'un utilisateur de terminal soient divulguées pendant un processus d'identification, ce qui permet ainsi d'assurer considérablement la sécurité du réseau pour l'utilisateur de terminal. L'invention concerne également un terminal comprenant le système ci-dessus pour identifier une pseudo-station de base. Étant donné que le terminal a également les avantages ci-dessus, aucune description répétitive n'est donnée sur ce dernier.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610486479.3A CN106211167B (zh) | 2016-06-28 | 2016-06-28 | 一种终端、伪基站识别方法及系统 |
| CN201610486479.3 | 2016-06-28 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2018000787A1 true WO2018000787A1 (fr) | 2018-01-04 |
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Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/CN2016/113380 Ceased WO2018000787A1 (fr) | 2016-06-28 | 2016-12-30 | Terminal, et procédé et système pour identifier une pseudo-station de base |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN106211167B (fr) |
| WO (1) | WO2018000787A1 (fr) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112889315A (zh) * | 2018-10-31 | 2021-06-01 | 深圳市欢太科技有限公司 | 小区信息处理方法、装置、电子设备及可读取存储介质 |
| CN113068192A (zh) * | 2021-03-17 | 2021-07-02 | Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 | 伪基站的识别方法及装置、终端、存储介质 |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN107241721A (zh) * | 2016-03-29 | 2017-10-10 | 努比亚技术有限公司 | 移动终端网络重选控制方法及装置 |
| CN107241781A (zh) * | 2016-03-29 | 2017-10-10 | 努比亚技术有限公司 | 移动终端开机注册网络的方法及装置 |
| CN106211167B (zh) * | 2016-06-28 | 2019-08-02 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | 一种终端、伪基站识别方法及系统 |
| CN106792709B (zh) * | 2017-01-13 | 2020-03-31 | 北京元心科技有限公司 | 防范伪基站的方法、装置及终端 |
| CN109474932A (zh) * | 2017-09-08 | 2019-03-15 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种伪基站识别以及防御方法和终端 |
| WO2019047943A1 (fr) * | 2017-09-08 | 2019-03-14 | 华为技术有限公司 | Procédé d'identification et de défense de pseudo-station de base, et terminal |
| CN109495891B (zh) * | 2017-09-13 | 2021-11-12 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 伪基站识别方法、设备及计算机可读存储介质 |
| CN107889112B (zh) * | 2017-12-13 | 2019-11-26 | 维沃移动通信有限公司 | 一种伪基站的识别方法及移动终端 |
| CN110087243B (zh) * | 2018-01-25 | 2020-12-04 | 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 | 一种伪基站判定方法和装置 |
| CN112272378A (zh) * | 2020-10-23 | 2021-01-26 | 上海共进信息技术有限公司 | 一种针对无mme连接的lte伪基站识别方法 |
| CN112203283A (zh) * | 2020-10-23 | 2021-01-08 | 上海共进信息技术有限公司 | 一种针对tau模式lte伪基站识别方法 |
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| CN113068192A (zh) * | 2021-03-17 | 2021-07-02 | Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 | 伪基站的识别方法及装置、终端、存储介质 |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN106211167A (zh) | 2016-12-07 |
| CN106211167B (zh) | 2019-08-02 |
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