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WO2017026114A1 - Terminal de communication, station de base, dispositif réseau, procédé de communication de données, et procédé de réglage de sécurité - Google Patents

Terminal de communication, station de base, dispositif réseau, procédé de communication de données, et procédé de réglage de sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017026114A1
WO2017026114A1 PCT/JP2016/003615 JP2016003615W WO2017026114A1 WO 2017026114 A1 WO2017026114 A1 WO 2017026114A1 JP 2016003615 W JP2016003615 W JP 2016003615W WO 2017026114 A1 WO2017026114 A1 WO 2017026114A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
algorithm
security
message
enb
old
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PCT/JP2016/003615
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English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
直明 鈴木
アナンド ラガワ プラサド
田村　利之
尚 二木
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NEC Corp
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NEC Corp
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/047—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] without using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0471—Key exchange
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a communication terminal, a base station, a network device, a data communication method, and a security setting method, and particularly to a communication terminal, a base station, a network device, a data communication method, and a security setting method for performing security settings in wireless communication.
  • the IoT device periodically transmits several tens of bytes of data to a server or the like via a network.
  • IoT devices For IoT devices, it is desired to operate for a long time by realizing power saving. For example, when a certain company manages a large number of IoT devices, it is desirable that the number of times of performing a battery replacement operation or a battery charging operation from the viewpoint of management cost is small.
  • Non-Patent Document 1 a communication procedure is defined mainly assuming that a mobile phone terminal or a smartphone is accommodated. Yes. Mobile phone terminals or smartphones frequently transmit and receive data having a larger data capacity than the data transmitted by the IoT device. That is, the communication system currently specified in 3GPP cannot be said to be an optimal communication system for accommodating IoT devices that are required to save power. Therefore, it is desired to construct an optimal communication system for accommodating IoT devices for which power saving is desired.
  • Non-Patent Document 1 In order to save power in the IoT device, it is conceivable to reduce messages transmitted and received by the IoT device. For example, in the sequence relating to the transfer of an IP (Internet Protocol) packet disclosed in Non-Patent Document 1, it is considered to omit the procedure for establishing a security association. Specifically, it is considered to omit the Security Mode Command message and Security Mode Complete message. As shown in Non-Patent Document 2 (Section 7.2.4.5), the Security Mode Command message includes a security algorithm used in the security association.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a communication terminal, a base station, a network device, a data transmission method, and a security setting method that can reduce messages related to security between the communication terminal and the base station and prevent a decrease in security level. There is.
  • the communication terminal includes a security information holding unit that holds a security algorithm used in a previous RRC (Radio Resource Control) connection state, and a transition from an RRC idle state to an RRC connection state.
  • a communication unit that transmits the security algorithm or information related to the security algorithm to a network device, and further transmits or receives data secured by using the security algorithm and key information to or from the network device. are provided.
  • the base station is currently in the RRC idle state with the communication terminal, and the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state is at least one security applicable to the communication terminal.
  • a determination unit that determines whether or not to be included in an algorithm, and further determines whether or not to select a security algorithm used in a previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal;
  • a communication unit that transmits a security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal to the communication terminal when it is determined to be used.
  • a network device includes a receiving unit that receives a security algorithm used in a previous RRC connection state between a communication terminal that is currently in an RRC idle state and a base station from the communication terminal; A determination unit that determines whether or not a security algorithm used in the RRC connection state is included in at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal; and at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal; A transmission unit that transmits the security algorithm received from the communication terminal to a base station.
  • the data communication method retains the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state, and after the transition from the RRC idle state to the RRC connection state, the security algorithm or the security algorithm
  • the related information is transmitted to the network device, and the data in which security is ensured by using the security algorithm and the key information is transmitted to or received from the network device.
  • the security setting method is such that at least one security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state is applicable to the communication terminal, and the communication terminal is currently in the RRC idle state. Determining whether or not to be included in a security algorithm, determining whether or not to select a security algorithm used in a previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal; When it is determined to select and use the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the security algorithm, the security algorithm transmitted from the communication terminal and the key information are used. Seki by Data is transmitted to or received from the communication terminal, and an algorithm other than the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state is selected and used from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal. If it is determined, a security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal is transmitted to the communication terminal.
  • a communication terminal a base station, a network device, a data transmission method, and a security setting method that can reduce messages related to security between the communication terminal and the base station and prevent a decrease in security level. it can.
  • FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a communication terminal according to a first embodiment.
  • FIG. 3 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to a second exemplary embodiment. It is a block diagram of UE (User
  • FIG. It is a block diagram of MME (Mobility Management Entity) according to the second embodiment. It is a block diagram of eNB concerning Embodiment 2.
  • FIG. It is a figure explaining the holding
  • FIG. It is a figure which shows the flow of the security setting process concerning Embodiment 2.
  • FIG. It is a block diagram of eNB concerning Embodiment 3.
  • FIG. FIG. is a block diagram of eNB concerning Embodiment 3.
  • FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a flow of security setting processing according to the third exemplary embodiment. It is a figure explaining the holding
  • FIG. It is a figure which shows the flow of the security setting process concerning Embodiment 4.
  • FIG. It is a figure which shows the establishment procedure of the general radio link prescribed
  • the communication terminal 10 may be a computer device that operates when a processor executes a program stored in a memory.
  • the communication terminal 10 may be, for example, an IoT device, an MTC (Machine Type Communication) device, or an M2M (Machine to Machine) device.
  • the communication terminal 10 performs radio communication with the network device 20 (for example, a base station) by performing RRC (Radio Resource Control) connection.
  • the state in which the RRC connection is released is referred to as an RRC idle state (RRC (Idle).
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • the communication terminal 10 transitions to the RRC idle state when communication is not performed for a predetermined period in the RRC connected state (RRC Connected). Further, the communication terminal 10 transitions to the RRC connection state when transmission data is generated in the RRC idle state.
  • the communication terminal 10 includes a security information holding unit 11 and a communication unit (note that the communication unit may be referred to as a transmission and reception unit) 12.
  • the security information holding unit 11 and the communication unit 12 may be software, a module, or the like that is processed by a processor executing a program stored in a memory.
  • the security information holding unit 11 and the communication unit 12 may be hardware such as a circuit or a chip.
  • the security information holding unit 11 holds a security algorithm.
  • the security algorithm includes, for example, an algorithm used for integrity assurance (hereinafter referred to as an integrity assurance algorithm (Integrity algorithm or Integrity protection algorithm)) and an algorithm used for encryption (hereinafter referred to as an encryption algorithm (Confidentiality algorithm, Ciphering algorithm). Or encryption / decryption (algorithm)).
  • an integrity assurance algorithm Integrity algorithm or Integrity protection algorithm
  • an encryption algorithm Confidentiality algorithm, Ciphering algorithm
  • the security information holding unit 11 continues to hold without deleting the security algorithm when the communication terminal 10 transitions from the RRC connected state to the RRC idle state.
  • the security information holding unit 11 may be a memory in the communication terminal 10 or the like.
  • the communication unit 12 transmits the security algorithm held in the security information holding unit 11 to the network device 20 after the communication terminal 10 transitions from the RRC idle state to the RRC connected state.
  • the network device 20 may be a base station or a control device that controls the base station.
  • the base station may be an eNB (evolved NodeB) defined in 3GPP.
  • the control device may be MME (Mobility Management Entity) defined in 3GPP.
  • the communication unit 12 may transmit information related to the security algorithm to the network device 20 after the communication terminal 10 transitions from the RRC idle state to the RRC connection state.
  • the information related to the security algorithm may be, for example, information for identifying the security algorithm, information for instructing use of the security algorithm held in the network device 20, or the like.
  • the communication unit 12 uses the security algorithm held in the security information holding unit 11 and the key information used in the current RRC connection state, and at least one of transmission and reception of secure data with the network device 20. (Hereinafter referred to as transmitting or receiving, or transmitting and receiving). Specifically, the communication unit 12 ensures the security of data to be transmitted / received using a security algorithm and key information.
  • the key information includes, for example, a key used for integrity assurance (hereinafter referred to as an integrity guarantee key (Integrity key or Integrity protection key)) and a key used for encryption (hereinafter referred to as an encryption key (Confidentiality key, Ciphering key) or Encryption / Decryption key)).
  • the data for which security is ensured is, for example, data that has been integrity guaranteed and encrypted using an integrity guarantee key and an encryption key.
  • the communication unit 12 transmits the security algorithm or information related to the security algorithm to the network device 20 and then depends on the operation of the network device 20 described later.
  • a message notifying another new security algorithm (new int (integrity) algorithm and new enc (encryption / ciphering) algorithm) is received from the network device 20.
  • the communication unit 12 receives a Security Mode Command message shown in Non-Patent Document 2 (Section 7.2.4.5).
  • the security information holding unit 11 updates and holds the held security algorithm.
  • the security information holding unit 11 may regenerate the key information used in the current RRC connection state and update the currently held key information to the regenerated key information.
  • the communication unit 12 is provided so as to be able to transmit and receive data (messages) in which security is ensured using the held new int algorithm and new enc algorithm and the key information used in the current RRC connection state.
  • the above message or the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state is used in order to guarantee the integrity of the message or the information (new ⁇ int algorithm and new enc algorithm) notified by the message.
  • the communication unit 12 verifies the integrity using the new integer and the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state, and the integrity is not guaranteed. In this case, the security algorithm and key information may not be updated and held.
  • the communication terminal 10 performs the previous RRC connection without executing the steps of Security Mode Command and Security Mode Complete that establish a security association with the network device 20 (for example, a base station).
  • the security of data transmitted and received can be ensured using the security algorithm used in the state and the key information.
  • the communication terminal 10 can reduce power consumption compared with the case where the procedure of Security (mode) Command and Security (mode) Complete which establishes a security association with a base station is performed.
  • the communication terminal 10 uses the security algorithm held in the security information holding unit 11 and the key information to perform a Security Mode Command and Security Mode Complete procedure for establishing a security association with the base station.
  • the security of data to be transmitted / received can be ensured without executing.
  • the communication terminal 10 and the network device 20 are assumed to have a function according to a known technique, for example, Non-Patent Document 2 (Sections 6 and 7.2.6.2), regarding generation of key information.
  • the communication terminal 10 can change to the new algorithm and ensure the security of data to be transmitted / received.
  • UE 30 User Equipment 30 is used as a general term for communication terminals in 3GPP.
  • the UE 30 corresponds to the communication terminal 10 in FIG.
  • UE30 is demonstrated as an IoT device.
  • the base station apparatus eNB (evolved Node B) 40 performs radio communication with the UE 30.
  • the eNB 40 performs radio communication with the UE 30 using LTE (Long Term Evolution) as a radio communication method.
  • eNB40 relays the control data transmitted / received between UE30 and the mobility management apparatus MME (Mobility * Management * Entity) 50.
  • the eNB may be a RAN (Radio Access R Network), an RNC (Radio Network Controller), a BSC (Base Station Controller), or the like for CIoT (Cellular IoT).
  • the MME 50 may be a mobility management device, a packet switch, a SGSN (ServingSNGeneral Packet Radio Service Support Node), etc. for CIoT.
  • the UE may be a terminal that communicates using a 2G radio technology, a 3G radio technology, an LTE radio technology, or a radio technology dedicated to CIoT.
  • the MME 50 performs UE 30 mobility management, authentication, user data transfer path setting processing, and the like.
  • the MME 50 relays control data transmitted and received between the eNB 40 and the SGW (Serving Gateway) 60.
  • the MME 50 or eNB 40 corresponds to the network device 20 in FIG. Or the function mounted in the network apparatus 20 may be distributed and arranged in the MME 50 and the eNB 40.
  • SGW60 receives the control data regarding UE30 transmitted from MME50. Furthermore, the SGW 60 sets a communication path for transmitting user data related to the UE 30 to and from the PGW (Packet Data Network Gateway) 70.
  • the SGW 60 receives the small data transmitted from the UE 30 via the MME 50 using the control data communication resource (C-Plane).
  • the SGW 60 transmits the received small data to the PGW 70 using C-Plane or using a resource (U-Plane) for user data communication. Further, the SGW 60 may transmit the small data regarding the UE 30 transmitted from the PGW 70 to the MME 50 using C-Plane.
  • the PGW 70 transmits user data destined for the UE 30 transmitted from the IoT server 80 or the like to the SGW 60. Further, the PGW 70 transmits the small data transmitted from the SGW 60 to the IoT server 80 or the like.
  • the MME 50, the SGW 60, and the PGW 70 may be referred to as EPC (Evolved Packet Packet Core) defined in 3GPP.
  • EPC Evolved Packet Packet Core
  • MME50, SGW60, and PGW70 may be called a core network apparatus etc.
  • the IoT server 80 may be a server managed by a carrier different from the carrier that manages EPC, or may be a server managed by a carrier that manages EPC.
  • the IoT server 80 and the PGW 70 may communicate via the Internet, which is a public IP network.
  • the IoT server 80 manages the UE 30 used as an IoT device. Furthermore, the IoT server 80 may receive the small data transmitted from the UE 30 used as the IoT device, and may analyze the small data.
  • the UE 30 includes an IoT application 31, a NAS (Non-Access Stratum) control unit 32, an AS (Access Stratum) control unit 33, a U-Plane (User-Plane) control unit 34, a wireless communication unit 35, and a security information holding unit 36.
  • Each component constituting the UE 30 may be software, a module, or the like in which processing is executed by a processor executing a program stored in a memory.
  • each component which comprises UE30 may be hardware or a chip
  • the security information holding unit 36 corresponds to the security information holding unit 11 in FIG. 1, differences from the security information holding unit 11 in FIG. 1 will be mainly described below.
  • the IoT application 31 generates small data to be transmitted to the IoT server 80.
  • small data For example, when the UE 30 is a smart meter, the IoT application 31 may generate data indicating the amount of power used as small data.
  • the IoT application 31 may produce
  • the small data may be information managed by the UE 30, information detected by the UE 30, or the like.
  • the NAS control unit 32 generates a NAS message transmitted / received to / from the MME 50 via the eNB 40.
  • the NAS message is a message transmitted / received in the NAS layer.
  • the NAS control unit 32 receives a NAS message transmitted from the MME 50 via the eNB 40, and executes a process specified in the NAS message.
  • eNB40 transmits the received NAS message to UE30 or MME50, without performing the process regarding a NAS message. In other words, the eNB 40 transparently transfers the NAS message transmitted from the UE 30 or the MME 50.
  • the NAS message is control data.
  • the NAS control unit 32 generates a NAS message including the security algorithm held in the security information holding unit 36. Furthermore, the NAS control unit 32 generates a NAS message including small data when transmitting the small data together with the control data using C-Plane.
  • the AS control unit 33 generates an AS message that is transmitted to and received from the eNB 40. Furthermore, the AS control unit 33 receives the AS message transmitted from the eNB 40, and executes the process specified in the AS message.
  • the AS message may be referred to as an RRC message.
  • the RRC message is a message transmitted / received in the RRC layer.
  • the U-Plane control unit 34 executes a process of establishing a communication line or channel used for transmitting / receiving user data to / from the eNB 40.
  • the NAS control unit 32 and the AS control unit 33 may be collectively referred to as a C-Plane (Control-Plane) control unit (not shown).
  • the C-Plane control unit executes processing for establishing a communication line or channel used for transmitting and receiving control data to and from the eNB 40.
  • the wireless communication unit 35 performs processing for performing wireless communication with the eNB 40.
  • the radio communication unit 35 generates a radio signal by modulating a signal including transmission data to a desired frequency, and transmits the generated radio signal to the eNB 40.
  • the radio communication unit 35 demodulates the radio signal transmitted from the eNB 40 and outputs the demodulated signal to the NAS control unit 32, the AS control unit 33, or the U-Plane control unit 34.
  • the security information holding unit 36 holds a security algorithm.
  • the security information holding unit 36 holds an integrity guarantee algorithm (hereinafter referred to as old int algorithm) and an encryption algorithm (hereinafter referred to as old enc algorithm) used in the previous RRC connection state.
  • old int algorithm an integrity guarantee algorithm
  • old enc algorithm an encryption algorithm
  • new int algorithm a new integrity guarantee algorithm
  • new enc algorithm a new encryption algorithm
  • the security information holding unit 36 generates key information K_eNB used for security setting of the AS message by using the key information K_ASME commonly held in the UE 30 and the MME 50 and NAS COUNT that is the NAS message count identification information. To do. A different value is set in NAS COUNT for each NAS message.
  • key information (key information K_eNB, key information K_RRCint derived from key information K_eNB, key information K_RRCenc, etc.) used in the current RRC connection state is the initial NAS message (Initial NAS message) Generated using the value of NAS COUNT after transmission / reception.
  • the security information holding unit 36 holds the generated key information K_eNB.
  • the security information holding unit 36 generates key information K_RRCint used for guaranteeing the integrity of the AS message from the key information K_eNB. Further, the security information holding unit 36 generates key information K_RRCenc used for encryption of the AS message from the key information K_eNB. The security information holding unit 36 holds the generated key information K_RRCint and K_RRCenc. The key information K_RRCint and K_RRCenc are set to different values each time the RRC connection process is executed.
  • the AS control unit 33 uses the key information K_RRCint and old intgorithm held in the security information holding unit 36 or the key information K_RRCint and new intgorithm to execute processing for guaranteeing message integrity. Further, the AS control unit 33 executes message encryption using the key information K_RRCenc and old enc algorithm held in the security information holding unit 36, or the key information K_RRCenc and new enc algorithm.
  • the MME 50 includes a base station communication unit 51, a control unit 52, a network communication unit 53, and a security information holding unit 54.
  • Each component that configures the MME 50 may be software, a module, or the like that is processed by a processor executing a program stored in a memory.
  • each component which comprises MME50 may be hardware or a chip
  • the base station communication unit 51 receives the NAS message transmitted from the UE 30 via the eNB 40.
  • the base station communication unit 51 outputs the received NAS message to the control unit 52. Further, the base station communication unit 51 may output the small data to the network communication unit 53 when the small data is included in the NAS message.
  • the base station communication unit 51 receives the S1 message transmitted from the eNB 40.
  • S1 is a reference point defined by 3GPP.
  • the base station communication unit 51 outputs the received S1 message to the control unit 52.
  • the security information holding unit 54 generates key information K_eNB used for security setting of the AS message, using the key information K_ASME held in common in the UE 30 and the MME 50 and NAS COUNT that is the count identification information of the NAS message.
  • the security information holding unit 54 holds the generated key information K_eNB.
  • the security information holding unit 54 holds a security algorithm applicable in the UE 30 as UE EPS security capabilities.
  • the UE EPS security capabilities may include a plurality of security algorithms applicable in the UE 30.
  • the MME 50 may acquire and hold UE EPS security capabilities related to the UE 30 in advance from an HSS (Home Subscriber Server) not illustrated in FIG. 2.
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • the security information holding unit 54 holds the security algorithm set in the NAS message.
  • the security algorithms set in the NAS message are an integrity guarantee algorithm (hereinafter referred to as old int algorithm) and an encryption algorithm (hereinafter referred to as old enc algorithm).
  • the control unit 52 may determine whether or not the UE EPS security capabilities related to the UE30 include the old intgoralgorithm and oldgorenc algorithm that are the security algorithms held by the UE30.
  • the fact that old int algorithm and old enc algorithm are included in UE EPS security capabilities means that the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm currently held by UE 30 are valid.
  • the control unit 52 determines that the UE EPS security capabilities include old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, or if the determination is not performed, the UE EPS security capabilities held in the security information holding unit 54, old int algorithm and old enc algorithm are transmitted to the eNB 40 via the base station communication unit 51.
  • the network communication unit 53 transmits the small data output from the base station communication unit 51 to the SGW 60 using a GTP (General Packet, Radio Service, Tunneling Protocol) -C message message.
  • GTP General Packet, Radio Service, Tunneling Protocol
  • the control unit 52 performs an exception operation at the time of abnormality and does not establish a security association when it is determined that the old “int” algorithm is not included in the UE “EPS” security “capabilities”. As an exceptional operation at the time of abnormality, for example, the control unit 52 discards the NAS message from the UE 30 or transmits a NAS message (error response) to the UE 30.
  • the eNB 40 includes a wireless communication unit 41, a control unit 42, and a network communication unit 43.
  • Each component that configures the eNB 40 may be software, a module, or the like that is processed by a processor executing a program stored in a memory.
  • each component which comprises eNB40 may be hardware or a chip
  • the radio communication unit 41 executes processing for performing radio communication with the UE 30. For example, the radio communication unit 41 generates a radio signal by modulating a signal including transmission data to a desired frequency, and transmits the generated radio signal to the UE 30. Alternatively, the radio communication unit 41 demodulates the radio signal transmitted from the UE 30 and outputs the demodulated signal to the control unit 42.
  • the network communication unit 43 is used as an interface for communicating with the MME 50. For example, the network communication unit 43 transmits / receives control data to / from the MME 50.
  • the control unit 42 selects a security algorithm from the UE EPS security capabilities related to the UE 30 transmitted from the MME 50. In the selection, it is determined whether or not old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, which are security algorithms held by the UE 30 transmitted from the MME 50, are selected.
  • control unit 42 determines to select old int algorithm and old enc algorithm that are security algorithms held by the UE 30 transmitted from the MME 50 from the UE EPS security capabilities, the control unit 42 uses the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm. Execute processing and encryption related to integrity assurance. Further, the control unit 42 omits a process of transmitting old int algorithm and old enc algorithm to the UE 30 as a security algorithm. The control unit 42 may arbitrarily determine the determination. When it is decided to select the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, the effect of the present invention can be obtained.
  • control unit 42 is provided so as to be able to transmit and receive data (messages) in which security is ensured using the old integer and old key algorithm and the key information used in the current RRC connection state.
  • control unit 42 decides to select an algorithm other than old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, which are security algorithms held by the UE 30, from UE EPS security capabilities, UE EPS different from old int algorithm and old enc algorithm A Security Mode message message that notifies the new new int algorithm and new enc algorithm included in the security capabilities is transmitted to the UE 30.
  • control unit 42 uses the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state and the new int algorithm to guarantee the integrity of the message or the information (new int algorithm and new enc algorithm) notified by the message.
  • K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state
  • new int algorithm used in the current RRC connection state
  • MAC-I Message Authentication Code Code for Integrity
  • the control unit 42 may arbitrarily determine the above determination. If it is decided to select an algorithm other than the above old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, the effect of the present invention cannot be obtained, but the security algorithm is transferred from the eNB 40 to the UE 20 as in Non-Patent Document 2 (Section 7.2.4.5). It can also provide traditional functionality to notify and specify security algorithms from the network side.
  • control unit 42 is provided so that data (message) in which security is ensured can be transmitted / received using the new integer and new key algorithm and key information used in the current RRC connection state.
  • a general radio link establishment procedure defined in 3GPP will be described with reference to FIGS. It is assumed that the UE 30 has transitioned to the RRC idle state by not performing communication for a predetermined period. In the RRC idle state, the UE 30 and the eNB 40 are in a state in which the radio bearer is released.
  • the UE 30 transmits an RRC Connection Request message to the eNB 40 in order to start communication with the eNB 40 (S11).
  • the eNB 40 transmits an RRC Connection Setup message to the UE 30 as a response to the RRC Connection Request message (S12).
  • the UE 30 transmits an RRC Connection Complete message to the eNB 40 (S13).
  • the UE 30 transmits an RRCeNBConnection Setup Complete message including the NAS message (Initial NAS message) used in the NAS protocol to the eNB 40.
  • UE30 transmits the RRC message which multiplexed the NAS message to eNB40.
  • the RRC Connection Setup Complete message includes, for example, a Service Request message as a NAS message (Initial NAS message).
  • the UE 30 transmits a Service request message to the MME 50 with the intention of starting UDP (User Datagram Protocol) / IP packet communication.
  • UDP User Datagram Protocol
  • the eNB 40 transmits a NAS message (Initial NAS message) to the MME 50 (S14).
  • a Service request message is transmitted as a NAS message (Initial NAS message).
  • the MME 50 transmits an Initial Context Setup Request message to the eNB 40 to instruct the setting of the Traffic Channel used for transmitting and receiving user data between the UE 30 and the eNB 40 (S15).
  • the MME 50 includes, for example, key information K_eNB and UE EPS security capabilities used for security setting between the UE 30 and the eNB 40 in the Initial Context Setup Request message.
  • the eNB 40 transmits a Security Mode Command message to the UE 30 in order to perform security settings with the UE 30 (S16).
  • the eNB 40 for example, among the UE EPS security capabilities, the Security Mode in which new int algorithm and enc algorithm included in the UE EPS security capabilities are set regardless of the int algorithm and enc algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state.
  • a Command message is transmitted to UE30.
  • the UE 30 transmits a Security Mode Complete message to the eNB 40 as a response to the Security Mode Command message (S17).
  • the eNB 40 transmits an RRC Connection Reconfiguration message to the UE 30 in order to transmit and receive user data using the RRC connection with the UE 30 (S18).
  • the UE 30 transmits an RRC Connection Reconfiguration Complete message to the eNB 40 as a response to the RRC Connection Reconfiguration message (S19).
  • the eNB 40 transmits an Initial Context Setup Response message to the MME 50 as a response to the Initial Context Setup Request message in step S15 (S20).
  • the MME 50 transmits a Modify Bearer Request message to the SGW 60 in order to instruct the setting of a path for transmitting and receiving user data between the eNB 40 and the SGW 60 (S21).
  • the SGW 60 further transmits a ModifyModBearer Request message to the PGW 70 in order to set a path for transmitting / receiving user data to / from the PGW 70.
  • the UE 30 transmits a UDP (User Datagram Protocol) / IP (Internet Protocol) packet to the eNB 40 (S22). Further, the eNB 40 transmits a UDP / IP packet to the SGW 60 (S23). Further, the MME 50 receives a ModifyModBearer Response message from the SGW 60 as a response to the Modify Bearer Request message in step S21 (S24).
  • UDP User Datagram Protocol
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • the SGW 60 transmits a UDP / IP packet destined for the UE 30 to the eNB 40 (S25).
  • the eNB 40 transmits the received UDP / IP packet to the UE 30 (S26).
  • the UE 30 transmits a Measurement Report message indicating the result of measuring the reception quality and the like of signals transmitted from the eNBs around the eNB 40 to the eNB 40 (S27).
  • the eNB 40 releases the Inactivity Timer indicating the radio communication period with the UE 30, or detects that the Inactivity Timer has expired (S28).
  • the eNB 40 transmits a UE Context Release Request message to the MME 50 in order to request release of the radio bearer set with the UE 30 (S29).
  • the MME 50 transmits to the eNB 40 a UE Context Release Command message instructing to release a radio bearer between the UE 30 and the eNB 40 (S30).
  • the eNB 40 transmits an RRC Connection Release message to the UE 30 in order to release the radio bearer with the UE 30 (S31).
  • the eNB 40 transmits a UEMContext Release Complete message indicating that the radio bearer with the UE 30 has been released to the MME 50 (S32).
  • the UE 30 and the MME 50 delete the security algorithm (old int algorithm and old enc ⁇ algorithm) used for the processing relating to integrity guarantee and encryption.
  • the UE 30 that is the IoT device deletes the security algorithm together with the release of the radio bearer. Therefore, when the process of steps S16 and S17 is omitted in order to reduce the number of messages transmitted and received in the UE 30, the UE 30 cannot perform the process related to integrity guarantee and the encryption for the message transmitted thereafter.
  • Steps S29 to S32 in FIG. 6 are procedures for releasing the radio bearer, and are the same as steps S29 to S32 in FIG. In FIG. 6, the processing from steps S11 to S28 in FIGS. 12 and 13 is not shown.
  • AS Access Stratym
  • step S31 the UE 30 receives the RRC Connection Release message instructing the release of the radio bearer, in other words, canceling the RRC connection state, and uses the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm as the security algorithms used. It is held in the security information holding unit 36 without being released (S33). In other words, the UE 30 continues to hold the security algorithm old int algorithm and old enc algorithm without deleting the security algorithms old int algorithm and old enc algorithm.
  • old int algorithm and old enc algorithm may be referred to as AS Algorithms, and they may be stored in AS Security context.
  • Steps S41 and S42 are the same as steps S11 and S12 of FIG.
  • the UE 30 transmits an RRC Connection Connection Request message at Step S41 and receives an RRC Connection Setup message at Step S42 to transition to the RRC connection state, and transmits an RRC Connection Setup Complete message to the eNB 40 (S43).
  • the UE 30 sets old int algorithm and old enc algorithm held in step S33 of FIG. 6 in the Service Request message that is a NAS message.
  • the UE 30 transmits an RRC Connection Setup Complete message including the Service ⁇ Request message to the eNB 40 (S43).
  • the eNB 40 transmits an Initial NAS message to the MME 50 (S44).
  • the eNB 40 sets the Service Request message included in the RRC Connection Setup Complete message to Initial NAS message.
  • UE30 generates the key information K_eNB used in the current RRC connection state after transmitting the RRC Connection Complete message in step S43, and further generates key information K_RRCint and key information K_RRCenc from the key information K_eNB (S45).
  • the UE 30 can transmit and receive data (messages) with secured security using the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm held in step S33 of FIG. 6 and the key information used in the current RRC connection state. Prepare.
  • step S44 the MME 50 generates key information K_eNB after receiving the initial NAS message (S46).
  • the MME 50 transmits a UEeNBEPS securityScapabilities related to the generated key information K_eNB and UE30 (S1-AP) Initial Context Setup Request message to the eNB 40 (S47). Further, the MME 50 sets old int algorithm and old enc algorithm set in the Service Request message in the Initial Context Setup Request message.
  • the MME 50 determines whether the UE EPS security capabilities including a plurality of security algorithms include old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, and the UE EPS security capabilities includes old int algorithm and old enc algorithm. If it is determined that the security association has not been established, an exception operation is performed at the time of abnormality, and the security association is not established. As an exceptional operation at the time of abnormality, for example, the MME 50 discards the Initial NAS message or transmits an error response to the Initial NAS message to the UE 30 via the eNB 40.
  • the eNB 40 determines whether or not to apply the old intithalgorithm and old enc algorithm, which are the security algorithms used in the previous RRC connection state, in order to establish a security association with the UE 30 ( S48). Specifically, the eNB 40 selects a security algorithm from UE EPS security capabilities including a plurality of security algorithms. In the selection, the eNB 40 determines whether to select old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, which are security algorithms held by the UE 30 transmitted from the MME 50.
  • the eNB 40 decides to select an algorithm other than old_int_algorithm and old_enc_algorithm which are security algorithms held by the UE 30 from the UE-EPS security capabilities, the eNB 40 performs the processing from step S49.
  • the eNB 40 determines from the UE EPS security capabilities to select an algorithm other than the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm that are the security algorithms held by the UE30, the eNB 40 is a security algorithm included in the UE EPS security capabilities, A Security Mode Command message in which new int algorithm and new enc algorithm included in UE EPS security capabilities different from int algorithm and old enc algorithm is transmitted to UE 30 (S49).
  • the eNB 40 uses the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state and the new int algorithm in order to guarantee the integrity of the message or the notification information (new int algorithm and new enc algorithm) of the message.
  • K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state
  • the new int algorithm in order to guarantee the integrity of the message or the notification information (new int algorithm and new enc algorithm) of the message.
  • -I Message Authentication Authentication Code for Integrity
  • the eNB 40 is provided with a function to send and receive data (messages) in which security is ensured using the new int ⁇ ⁇ algorithm and the new enc algorithm and the key information used in the current RRC connection state.
  • the UE 30 updates and holds the held security algorithm.
  • the UE 30 again generates, updates, and holds key information (key information K_eNB, key information K_RRCint and key information K_RRCenc that are generated by deriving from the key information K_eNB) used in the current RRC connection state. May be.
  • the communication unit verifies integrity using new int algorithm and key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state and guarantees integrity. If not, the security algorithm and key information may not be updated and retained.
  • the UE 30 is provided with a function to send and receive data (messages) in which security is ensured using the new int algorithm and new enc algorithm and the key information used in the current RRC connection state.
  • the UE 30 transmits a Security Mode Complete message to the eNB 40 as a response message to the Security Mode Command message (S51).
  • step S48 when the eNB 40 determines to select old_int_algorithm and old_enc_algorithm, which are the security algorithms held by the UE 30, from the UE_EPS_security_capabilities, the processing of steps S49 to S51 is omitted. Since UE30 has old int algorithm and old enc algorithm, it is not necessary to notify UE30 of old int algorithm and old enc algorithm. Therefore, the processing of steps S49 to S51 can be omitted.
  • the eNB 40 is equipped to transmit and receive data (messages) in which security is ensured by using the old integer and old key algorithm and the key information used in the current RRC connection state.
  • MAC-I (hereinafter referred to as old MAC-I) may be generated using the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state. Further, the eNB 40 may include the old MAC-I in the message, and may encrypt the message by using the old key algorithm and the key information K_RRCenc used in the current RRC connection state.
  • the UE 30 adds the old int algorithm and the current int goralgorithm to the message to ensure the integrity of the message or the information notified by the message (new When the old MAC-I using the key information K_RRCint used in the RRC connection state is included, the UE 30 verifies the integrity using the old int algorithm and the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state. If the integrity is not guaranteed, the UE 30 may not update and hold the security algorithm and key information.
  • the UE 30 uses the message for the old enc algorithm and the key information K_RRCEnc used in the current RRC connection state. And may be used for decoding.
  • step S45 the UE 30 is prepared to be able to transmit and receive data (messages) in which security is ensured by using the held old int algorithm and old enc algorithm and the key information used in the current RRC connection state. Therefore, it is assumed that the data (message) for which security is ensured is a message that matches the preparation. Therefore, when the message of step S49 is transmitted as data (message) in which security is ensured, the eNB 40 secures security by using old int algorithm and old enc algorithm and key information used in the current RRC connection state. Data is sent as a message (message).
  • the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state is used in the current RRC connection state, so that the UE 30 and the eNB 40 can be connected.
  • Security Mode Command message and Security Mode Complete message sent and received in can be omitted.
  • the eNB 40 notifies the UE30 of the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm when it determines to apply the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm The procedure can be omitted.
  • the UE 30 can reduce power consumption as compared with the case where the Security Mode Command message and the Security Mode Complete message are always transmitted and received every time the RRC connection state is entered each time the UE 30 transitions to the RRC connection state.
  • the UE 30 and the eNB 40 may perform processing and encryption for guaranteeing the integrity of a message to be transmitted / received by using the retained old int algorithm and old enc algorithm and the key information K_RRCint and K_RRCenc. it can. Thereby, it is possible to prevent a decrease in security when the Security Mode Command message and the Security Mode Complete message are omitted.
  • the eNB 40 in FIG. 8 has a configuration in which a security information holding unit 44 is added to the eNB 40 in FIG.
  • the radio communication unit 41, the control unit 42, and the network communication unit 43 in the eNB 40 in FIG. 8 are the same as those in FIG.
  • the security information holding unit 44 holds the old intgorithm and old engorithm set in the RRC message (AS message).
  • AS message RRC message
  • the control unit 42 determines that the UE EPS security capabilities transmitted from the MME 50 include the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm held in the security information holding unit 44, and the old int algorithm and old If it is decided to select enc algorithm, processing and encryption for guaranteeing the integrity of the transmitted / received message are executed using old int algorithm and old enc algorithm. Further, the control unit 42 omits a process of transmitting old int algorithm and old enc algorithm to the UE 30 as a security algorithm.
  • the control unit 42 When it is determined that the UE EPS security capabilities transmitted from the MME 50 do not include the old int algorithm and the old enc algorithm held in the security information holding unit 44, the control unit 42 performs an exception operation at the time of abnormality. Do not establish security associations. As an exceptional operation at the time of abnormality, for example, the control unit 42 discards a signal from the MME 50 or transmits an error response to the MME 50.
  • the control unit 42 determines that the UE EPS security capabilities transmitted from the MME 50 include the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm held in the security information holding unit 44, and the old int algorithm and old When it is determined that an algorithm other than enc algorithm is selected, new new int algorithm and new enc algorithm included in UE EPS security capabilities different from old int algorithm and old enc algorithm are transmitted to UE30. Further, in order to guarantee the integrity of the message or the information (new int algorithm and new enc algorithm) notified by the message, the control unit 42 uses the new int algorithm and key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state. May be used to generate MAC-I (Message Authentication Code for Integrity) and include it in the message.
  • K_RRCint Key information
  • Steps S61 and S62 are the same as steps S11 and S12 of FIG.
  • the UE 30 Upon receiving the RRC Connection Setup message in step S62, the UE 30 transmits an RRC Connection Setup complete message including the NAS message (Initial NAS message) to the eNB 40 (S63). For example, a Service request message is included as a NAS message (Initial NAS message). The UE 30 sets old int algorithm and old enc algorithm held in step S33 of FIG. 6 in the RRC Connection Setup Complete message that is an RRC message.
  • the UE 30 may set the old_int_algorithm and old_enc_algorithm in the RRC_Connection_Requesst message (S61).
  • the UE 30 uses the old int algorithm and key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state to perform MAC-I (hereinafter, old). (Referred to as MAC-I) may be generated and included in the message. That is, since the notification information is included in the AS message instead of the NAS message in the third embodiment, the UE 30 uses the old MAC-I to guarantee the integrity of the notification information in the message of S61 (or S63). May be included.
  • the UE 30 obtains the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state. Need to be generated. The UE 30 predicts in advance that the NAS COUNT value will increase by one by sending a message in S63, that is, a NAS message (Initial NAS message), and this time, based on the NAS COUNT value increased by one in advance.
  • the key information K_RRCint used in the RRC connection state may be generated to generate the old MAC-I.
  • the UE 30 is provided with a function to send and receive data (messages) in which security is ensured using the old integer and old key algorithm and the key information used in the current RRC connection state.
  • the eNB 40 holds in the security information holding unit 44 the old int algorithm and old en algorithm set in the RRC Connection Setup Complete message (S64).
  • the eNB 40 sets the RRC Connection Request message (S61) at the timing of receiving the RRC Connection Request message (S61) when the UE30 sets the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm in the RRC Connection Request message (S61).
  • the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm may be held in the security information holding unit 44.
  • the eNB 40 guarantees the integrity of the information (old int algorithm and old enc algorithm) notified to the message upon reception of the message of S61 (or S63) in which old int algorithm and old enc algorithm are set. Therefore, when the old MAC-I using the old int algorithm and the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state is included, the eNB 40 completely uses the old int algorithm and the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state. If the integrity is not verified and the integrity is not guaranteed, the security algorithm may not be updated and retained.
  • the eNB 40 uses the old MAC-I to guarantee the integrity of the notification information in the message of S61 (or S63). The integrity may be verified with The eNB 40 receives key information K_eNB necessary for generating key information K_RRCint used for integrity verification from the MME 50 in step S68. Therefore, when executing the verification of the integrity of the notification information, the eNB executes the verification of the integrity following the reception of the message in step S68.
  • the eNB 40 transmits the NAS message (Initial NAS message) included in the RRC Connection Setup Complete message (S63) to the MME 50 (S66). For example, the eNB 40 transmits a Service request message as a NAS message (Initial NAS message).
  • step S65 Since the process of the UE 30 in step S65 is the same as the process in step S45 of FIG. 7, detailed description thereof is omitted.
  • step S66 the MME 50 generates the key information K_eNB after receiving the Initial NAS message (S67).
  • the MME 50 transmits an InitialeNBContext Setup Request message in which the UE EPS security capabilities related to the UE 30 of the generated key information K_eNB and UE30 is set to the eNB 40 (S68).
  • the eNB 40 determines whether or not to apply the old intgorithm and old engorithm held in the security information holding unit 44 in order to establish a security association with the UE 30 (S69). Specifically, eNB 40 determines whether or not old int algorithm and old enc algorithm held in security information holding unit 44 are included in UE EPS security capabilities including a plurality of security algorithms, and Decide whether to select old int algorithm and old enc algorithm. Steps S70 to S72 after the determination process in the eNB 40 are the same as steps S49 to S51 in FIG.
  • the MME 50 can be used without changing the functions and operations of known techniques shown in Non-Patent Document 2 (Section 7.2.6.2).
  • a sequence in which the Security Mode Command message and the Security Mode Complete message transmitted and received between the UE 30 and the eNB 40 are omitted can be realized.
  • the MME 50 receives the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm transmitted from the UE 30, and holds the old int algorithm and the old int algorithm transmitted from the eNB 40. It is not necessary to have a function of receiving old enc algorithm (S66) and transmitting old int algorithm and old enc algorithm (S68) to the eNB 40.
  • Steps S29 to S32 in FIG. 10 are the same as steps S29 to S32 in FIG.
  • a process for holding the security algorithm used by the eNB 40 in the RRC connection state is added between steps S31 and S32 (S81).
  • the eNB 40 continues to hold the security algorithms old int algorithm and old enc algorithm without deleting the security algorithms old int algorithm and old enc algorithm.
  • the eNB 40 may execute a process for holding the security algorithm before Step S31 or after Step S32.
  • Steps S91 and S92 are the same as steps S11 and S12 of FIG.
  • the UE 30 When the UE 30 receives the RRC Connection Setup message in step S92, the UE 30 transmits an RRC Connection Setup message to the eNB 40 (S93).
  • the UE 30 uses an RRC ⁇ Connection Request message or RRC as an identifier, a flag, or an information element (hereinafter referred to as an algorithm reuse indicator) that instructs the eNB 40 to reuse the old int algorithm and old enc algorithm held in step S81 of FIG. Set to Connection Setup Complete message.
  • the UE 30 uses the old int algorithm and the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state to perform MAC-I (hereinafter referred to as old MAC-I). May be generated and included in the message. That is, since the notification information is included in the AS message instead of the NAS message in the fourth embodiment, the UE 30 uses the old MAC-I to guarantee the integrity of the notification information in the message of S91 (or S93). May be included.
  • the eNB 40 extracts the retained security algorithm in accordance with the algorithm reuse indicator set in the RRC Connection Request or RRC Connection Setup Complete message (S94).
  • the eNB 40 In receiving the message, the eNB 40 uses the old ⁇ int algorithm and the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state to guarantee the integrity of the information (algorithm reuse indicator) notified by the message in the message.
  • the eNB 40 verifies the integrity using the old int algorithm and the key information K_RRCint used in the current RRC connection state, and does not update or hold the security algorithm if the integrity is not guaranteed. You may do it.
  • the eNB 40 since the notification information is included in the AS message instead of the NAS message, the eNB 40 uses the old MAC-I to guarantee the integrity of the notification information in the message of S91 (or S93). The integrity may be verified with
  • steps S95 to S102 are the same as steps S65 to S72 of FIG. 9, detailed description thereof is omitted.
  • the UE 30 and the eNB 40 In addition to the effect of the third embodiment of the present invention described in paragraph 0125, when the RRC connection state is canceled, the UE 30 and the eNB 40 The security algorithm used in the RRC connection state is retained. Furthermore, in step S93 in FIG. 11, the UE 30 does not transmit the security algorithm that was used last time, but transmits an algorithm “reuse” indicator that instructs the reuse of the security algorithm held in the eNB 40. It is not necessary to set a security algorithm in.
  • the RRC Connection Setup Complete message transmitted in step S93 is not encrypted before the RRC layer security association is established. Therefore, in FIG. 11, since the security algorithm notified from UE30 is not transmitted / received between UE30 and eNB40, it can prevent that a security algorithm is read by the third party.
  • FIG. 14 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the network device 20 and the eNB 40.
  • the network device 20 and the eNB 40 include an RF transceiver 1001, a network interface 1003, a processor 1004, and a memory 1005.
  • the RF transceiver 1001 performs analog RF signal processing to communicate with UEs.
  • the RF transceiver 1001 may include multiple transceivers.
  • RF transceiver 1001 is coupled to antenna 1002 and processor 1004.
  • the RF transceiver 1001 receives modulation symbol data (or OFDM symbol data) from the processor 1004, generates a transmission RF signal, and supplies the transmission RF signal to the antenna 1002. Further, the RF transceiver 1001 generates a baseband received signal based on the received RF signal received by the antenna 1002, and supplies this to the processor 1004.
  • the network interface 1003 is used to communicate with network nodes (e.g., other eNBs, Mobility Management Entity (MME), Serving Gateway (S-GW), and TSS or ITS server).
  • the network interface 1003 may include, for example, a network interface card (NIC) compliant with IEEE 802.3 series.
  • the processor 1004 performs data plane processing including digital baseband signal processing for wireless communication and control plane processing.
  • the digital baseband signal processing by the processor 1004 may include signal processing of a PDCP layer, an RLC layer, a MAC layer, and a PHY layer.
  • the signal processing by the processor 1004 may include GTP-U / UDP / IP layer signal processing at the X2-U interface and the S1-U interface.
  • the control plane processing by the processor 1004 may include processing of the X2AP protocol, the S1-MME protocol, and the RRC protocol.
  • the processor 1004 may include a plurality of processors.
  • the processor 1004 includes a modem processor (eg, DSP) that performs digital baseband signal processing, a processor that performs signal processing of the GTP-U / UDP / IP layer in the X2-U interface and the S1-U interface (eg, DSP) and a protocol stack processor (eg, CPU or MPU) that performs control plane processing may be included.
  • DSP modem processor
  • a processor that performs signal processing of the GTP-U / UDP / IP layer in the X2-U interface and the S1-U interface eg, DSP
  • a protocol stack processor eg, CPU or MPU
  • the memory 1005 is configured by a combination of a volatile memory and a nonvolatile memory.
  • the memory 1005 may include a plurality of physically independent memory devices.
  • the volatile memory is, for example, Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), Dynamic RAM (DRAM), or a combination thereof.
  • the non-volatile memory is a mask Read Only Memory (MROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory, hard disk drive, or any combination thereof.
  • Memory 1005 may include storage located remotely from processor 1004. In this case, the processor 1004 may access the memory 1005 via the network interface 1003 or an I / O interface not shown.
  • the memory 1005 may store a software module (computer program) including an instruction group and data for performing processing by the eNB 40 described in the plurality of embodiments.
  • the processor 1004 may be configured to perform the processing of the eNB 40 described in the above-described embodiment by reading the software module from the memory 1005 and executing the software module.
  • FIG. 15 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the communication terminal 10 and the UE 30.
  • the Radio-Frequency (RF) transceiver 1101 performs analog RF signal processing in order to communicate with the eNB 40. Analog RF signal processing performed by the RF transceiver 1101 includes frequency up-conversion, frequency down-conversion, and amplification.
  • RF transceiver 1101 is coupled with antenna 1102 and baseband processor 1103. That is, the RF transceiver 1101 receives modulation symbol data (or OFDM symbol data) from the baseband processor 1103, generates a transmission RF signal, and supplies the transmission RF signal to the antenna 1102. Further, the RF transceiver 1101 generates a baseband received signal based on the received RF signal received by the antenna 1102 and supplies this to the baseband processor 1103.
  • modulation symbol data or OFDM symbol data
  • the baseband processor 1103 performs digital baseband signal processing (data plane processing) and control plane processing for wireless communication.
  • Digital baseband signal processing consists of (a) data compression / decompression, (b) data segmentation / concatenation, (c) ⁇ transmission format (transmission frame) generation / decomposition, and (d) transmission path encoding / decoding.
  • E modulation (symbol mapping) / demodulation
  • IFFT Inverse Fast Fourier Transform
  • control plane processing includes layer 1 (eg, transmission power control), layer 2 (eg, radio resource management, hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) processing), and layer 3 (eg, attach, mobility, and call management). Communication management).
  • the digital baseband signal processing by the baseband processor 1103 includes signal processing of Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer, Radio Link Control (RLC) layer, MAC layer, and PHY layer. But you can. Further, the control plane processing by the baseband processor 1103 may include Non-Access Stratum (NAS) protocol, RRC protocol, and MAC ⁇ CE processing.
  • PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
  • RLC Radio Link Control
  • MAC Medium Access Stratum
  • PHY Packet Data Convergence Protocol
  • the control plane processing by the baseband processor 1103 may include Non-Access Stratum (NAS) protocol, RRC protocol, and MAC ⁇ CE processing.
  • NAS Non-Access Stratum
  • the baseband processor 1103 includes a modem processor (eg, Digital Signal Processor (DSP)) that performs digital baseband signal processing and a protocol stack processor (eg, Central Processing Unit (CPU) that performs control plane processing, or Micro Processing Unit. (MPU)).
  • DSP Digital Signal Processor
  • protocol stack processor eg, Central Processing Unit (CPU) that performs control plane processing, or Micro Processing Unit. (MPU)
  • CPU Central Processing Unit
  • MPU Micro Processing Unit.
  • a protocol stack processor that performs control plane processing may be shared with an application processor 1104 described later.
  • the application processor 1104 is also called a CPU, MPU, microprocessor, or processor core.
  • the application processor 1104 may include a plurality of processors (a plurality of processor cores).
  • the application processor 1104 is a system software program (Operating System (OS)) read from the memory 1106 or a memory (not shown) and various application programs (for example, a call application, a web browser, a mailer, a camera operation application, music playback)
  • OS Operating System
  • the baseband processor 1103 and the application processor 1104 may be integrated on a single chip, as shown by the dashed line (1105) in FIG.
  • the baseband processor 1103 and the application processor 1104 may be implemented as one System on Chip (SoC) device 1105.
  • SoC System on Chip
  • An SoC device is sometimes called a system Large Scale Integration (LSI) or chipset.
  • the memory 1106 is a volatile memory, a nonvolatile memory, or a combination thereof.
  • the memory 1106 may include a plurality of physically independent memory devices.
  • the volatile memory is, for example, Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), Dynamic RAM (DRAM), or a combination thereof.
  • the non-volatile memory is a mask Read Only Memory (MROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory, hard disk drive, or any combination thereof.
  • the memory 1106 may include an external memory device accessible from the baseband processor 1103, the application processor 1104, and the SoC 1105.
  • Memory 1106 may include an embedded memory device integrated within baseband processor 1103, application processor 1104, or SoC 1105.
  • the memory 1106 may include a memory in a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC).
  • UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card
  • the memory 1106 may store a software module (computer program) including an instruction group and data for performing processing by the UE 40 described in the plurality of embodiments.
  • the baseband processor 1103 or the application processor 1104 is configured to read and execute the software module from the memory 1106 to perform the processing of the communication terminal 10 and the UE 30 described in the above embodiment. May be.
  • FIG. 16 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the MME 50.
  • the MME 50 includes a network interface 1201, a processor 1202, and a memory 1203.
  • the network interface 1201 is used to communicate with a network node (e.g., eNodeB 130, MME, P-GW).
  • the network interface 1201 may include, for example, a network interface card (NIC) compliant with IEEE 802.3 series.
  • NIC network interface card
  • the processor 1202 reads the software (computer program) from the memory 1203 and executes it, thereby performing the processing of the MME 50 described using the sequence diagram and the flowchart in the above-described embodiment.
  • the processor 1202 may be, for example, a microprocessor, MPU, or CPU.
  • the processor 1202 may include a plurality of processors.
  • the memory 1203 is configured by a combination of a volatile memory and a nonvolatile memory.
  • Memory 1203 may include storage located remotely from processor 1202. In this case, the processor 1202 may access the memory 1203 via an I / O interface not shown.
  • the memory 1203 is used for storing software module groups.
  • the processor 1202 can perform the processing of the network device 10 and the MME 50 described in the above-described embodiment by reading these software module groups from the memory 1203 and executing them.
  • each of the processors included in the communication terminal 10, the network device 20, the UE 30, the eNB 40, and the MME 50 in the above-described embodiment uses the algorithm described with reference to the drawings as a computer.
  • One or a plurality of programs including a group of instructions to be executed is executed.
  • Non-transitory computer readable media include various types of tangible storage media (tangible storage medium).
  • Examples of non-transitory computer-readable media include magnetic recording media (eg flexible disks, magnetic tapes, hard disk drives), magneto-optical recording media (eg magneto-optical discs), CD-ROMs (Read Only Memory), CD-Rs, CD-R / W, semiconductor memory (for example, mask ROM, PROM (Programmable ROM), EPROM (Erasable ROM), flash ROM, RAM (Random Access Memory)) are included.
  • the program may also be supplied to the computer by various types of temporary computer-readable media. Examples of transitory computer readable media include electrical signals, optical signals, and electromagnetic waves.
  • the temporary computer-readable medium can supply the program to the computer via a wired communication path such as an electric wire and an optical fiber, or a wireless communication path.
  • a security information holding unit for holding a security algorithm After transition from RRC (Radio Resource Control) idle state to RRC connection state, the security algorithm or information related to the security algorithm is transmitted to the network device, and further security is ensured by using the security algorithm and key information.
  • a communication terminal comprising: a communication unit that transmits or receives the received data to and from the network device.
  • the security algorithm is: The communication terminal according to appendix 1, including an integrity guarantee algorithm and an encryption algorithm.
  • the communication unit is The communication terminal according to appendix 1 or 2, wherein the security algorithm or information related to the security algorithm is transmitted to the network device via at least one of a NAS layer and an RRC layer.
  • the communication unit is When the security algorithm is held in the network device, the instruction information for instructing the use of the security algorithm held in the network device is transmitted to the network device as information related to the security algorithm.
  • the communication terminal according to any one of 1 to 3.
  • the communication unit is When a new security algorithm different from the security algorithm held in the security information holding unit is received from the network device, data secured using the new security algorithm and key information is transferred to the network
  • the communication terminal according to any one of appendices 1 to 4, wherein the communication terminal transmits or receives data to or from the device.
  • Appendix 6 Whether or not the communication terminal is currently in an RRC (Radio Resource Control) idle state and the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state is included in at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal.
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • a determination unit for determining whether to select a security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal; When it is determined to select and use the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal, the security algorithm and key information transmitted from the communication terminal; The data secured by using the communication terminal is transmitted to or received from the communication terminal, and an algorithm other than the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state is selected from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal.
  • a base station comprising: a communication unit that transmits a security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal to the communication terminal when it is determined to be selected and used.
  • the communication unit is The base station according to appendix 6, wherein the base station receives the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state transmitted from the communication terminal.
  • the communication unit is The base station according to appendix 7, wherein the security algorithm is received via an RRC layer.
  • a security information holding unit that holds the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state; The determination unit When the instruction information instructed to use the security algorithm held in the security information holding unit transmitted from the communication terminal is received, the security algorithm held in the security information holding unit is transmitted to the communication terminal.
  • the communication unit is The base station according to appendix 9, wherein the instruction information is received via an RRC layer.
  • a network apparatus comprising: at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal; and a transmission unit that transmits the security algorithm received from the communication terminal to a base station.
  • (Appendix 12) Preserve security algorithms, After transition from RRC (Radio Resource Control) idle state to RRC connection state, the security algorithm or information related to the security algorithm is transmitted to the network device, A data communication method for transmitting or receiving data secured with the network device using the security algorithm and key information. (Appendix 13) Whether or not the communication terminal is currently in an RRC (Radio Resource Control) idle state, and whether or not the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state is included in at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal.
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • Judgment Determining whether to select a security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal; When it is determined to select and use the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal, the security algorithm and key information transmitted from the communication terminal; To transmit or receive data secured by using the communication terminal, When it is decided to select and use an algorithm other than the security algorithm used in the previous RRC connection state from at least one security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal, the security algorithm applicable to the communication terminal is A security setting method for transmitting to the communication terminal.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'objectif de la présente invention est de fournir un terminal de communication pouvant réduire les messages se rapportant à la sécurité entre le terminal de communication et une station de base et prévenir une diminution du niveau de sécurité. Ce terminal de communication (10) comprend : une unité de conservation d'informations de sécurité (11) permettant de maintenir un algorithme de sécurité ; et une unité de communication (12) permettant de transmettre l'algorithme de sécurité ou des informations relatives à l'algorithme de sécurité à un dispositif réseau (20) après la réalisation d'une transition d'un état de veille RRC à un état connecté RRC, et en outre de transmettre ou recevoir des données dont la sécurité est assurée par l'utilisation de l'algorithme de sécurité et des informations de clé vers ou depuis le dispositif réseau (20).
PCT/JP2016/003615 2015-08-13 2016-08-05 Terminal de communication, station de base, dispositif réseau, procédé de communication de données, et procédé de réglage de sécurité Ceased WO2017026114A1 (fr)

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2019096075A1 (fr) * 2017-11-14 2019-05-23 华为技术有限公司 Procédé et appareil de protection de messages

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102223632A (zh) * 2010-04-15 2011-10-19 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种接入层安全算法同步方法和系统
JP2012095305A (ja) * 2007-08-12 2012-05-17 Lg Electronics Inc リンク障害復旧のためのハンドオーバー方法とこの方法を具現するための無線機器及び基地局

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2012095305A (ja) * 2007-08-12 2012-05-17 Lg Electronics Inc リンク障害復旧のためのハンドオーバー方法とこの方法を具現するための無線機器及び基地局
CN102223632A (zh) * 2010-04-15 2011-10-19 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种接入层安全算法同步方法和系统

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2019096075A1 (fr) * 2017-11-14 2019-05-23 华为技术有限公司 Procédé et appareil de protection de messages

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