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WO2016122224A1 - Procédé et appareil d'exécution de commande d'accès et de commande de transfert intercellulaire d'équipements utilisateur - Google Patents

Procédé et appareil d'exécution de commande d'accès et de commande de transfert intercellulaire d'équipements utilisateur Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016122224A1
WO2016122224A1 PCT/KR2016/000931 KR2016000931W WO2016122224A1 WO 2016122224 A1 WO2016122224 A1 WO 2016122224A1 KR 2016000931 W KR2016000931 W KR 2016000931W WO 2016122224 A1 WO2016122224 A1 WO 2016122224A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
iops
base station
allowed
information
network
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PCT/KR2016/000931
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English (en)
Inventor
Lixiang Xu
Hong Wang
Xiaowan KE
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Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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Publication of WO2016122224A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016122224A1/fr
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/08Reselecting an access point
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/02Access restriction performed under specific conditions

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to wireless communications, and particularly, to a method and an apparatus of performing access control and handover control of UEs.
  • FIG.1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a structure of a system architecture evolution (SAE) system.
  • SAE system architecture evolution
  • a user equipment (UE) 101 is a terminal device which receives data.
  • Evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN) 102 is a wireless access network which includes macro base stations (eNodeBs/NodeB) which provide UEs with interfaces for accessing the radio access network.
  • Mobility management entity (MME) 103 manages mobility context, session context and security information of UEs.
  • Serving gateway (SGW) 104 provides user plane functions. MME 103 and SGW 104 may reside in the same physical entity.
  • Packet data network (PDN) gateway (PGW) 105 implements functions including accounting, lawful interception and so on, and may reside in the same physical entity with SGW 104.
  • PDN Packet data network gateway
  • PCRF Policy and charging rule functions
  • PCRF Policy and charging rule functions
  • SGSN Serving GPRS support node
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • 3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project has agreed on a research subject about providing safe and reliable services for public safety UE in an isolated access network or in an access network having limited band width to a core network.
  • An isolated radio access network refers to a radio access network having no connection to the core network of a macro network.
  • An isolated radio access network may be formed in the following circumstances.
  • a base station has lost a backhaul network connection with the core network, thus becomes isolated with no connection to the core network.
  • One or plural isolated base stations may form an isolated radio access network.
  • Some nomadic base stations may be temporarily deployed in an area without radio access network coverage for providing public safety communication services for public safety UEs.
  • the base stations have no connection with core network entities in a macro network.
  • One or plural nomadic base stations may form an isolated radio access network.
  • One or plural isolated stationary base stations and isolated nomadic base stations may form an isolated radio access network.
  • an isolated radio access network enables a local core network to provide services for public safety UEs. If a stationary base station or a nomadic base station supports local core network functions, the base station may enable the local core network to provide UEs with reliable local bearers after becoming isolated. Alternatively, an isolated base station may discover an accessible local core network, establish a connection with the local core network, and then provide services for UEs. The local core network may have no connection with the core network of a macro network.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating the structure of a conventional Isolated E-UTRAN Operation for Public Safety (IOPS) network when there is no backhaul network.
  • the network on the left is a normal network.
  • the public safety apps (PSA) server is for providing public safety applications, e.g., mission-critical Push To Talk (MCPTT).
  • MCPTT mission-critical Push To Talk
  • the IOPS network on the right, including the local core network, is composed of MME, SGW, PGW and eNodeB.
  • the local core network may also include a home subscriber server (HSS) and/or a PSA server.
  • HSS home subscriber server
  • a base station may broadcast an indication that the base station is working under an isolated mode or broadcast a special public land mobile network (PLMN) identity of the base station, and a UE may decide on its own as to whether the UE can access the IOPS network. If the UE determines the UE can access the IOPS network, the UE may initiate a process to access the IOPS network.
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • Various examples of the present disclosure provide a method and an apparatus for performing access control of UEs to prevent illegal UEs or unauthorized UEs from accessing an isolated access network and disturbing the normal operation of the isolated access network and wasting radio resources.
  • Various examples also provide a method and an apparatus for performing handover control to achieve service continuity when a UE moves between cells in an isolated access network with reduced unnecessary handover and handover failures.
  • a method of performing access control of UEs may include:
  • An apparatus of performing access control of UEs may include a receiving module and an access control module, and
  • the receiving module is configured to receive information on whether a UE is entitled to an IOPS
  • the access control module is configured to perform access control of the UE according to the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS.
  • a method of performing handover control may include:
  • An apparatus of performing handover control may include an obtaining module and a handover control module, and
  • the obtaining module is configured to obtain IOPS mode information of a neighboring base station.
  • the handover control module is configured to perform handover control of the UE according to the IOPS mode information of the neighboring base station.
  • the entity in the isolated access network may perform access control of a UE according to information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS.
  • normal operation of the standalone access network can be protected from disturbance, and a waste of radio resources can be avoided.
  • a serving base station of a UE may directly obtain IOPS mode information of a neighboring base station, and perform handover control of the UE according to the IOPS mode information.
  • IOPS mode information of a neighboring base station
  • FIG.1 is a schematic diagram illustrating the structure of a conventional SAE system
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating the structure of a conventional IOPS without a backhaul network
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with an example of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with an example of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with example one of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with example two of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control according to an example of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating the structure of an apparatus of performing handover control according to an example of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control according to example one of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 10 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control according to example two of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control according to an example of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with an example of the present disclosure.
  • Various examples adopts an entity in an isolated access network to perform access control of a UE according to information on whether a UE is entitled to an Operation for Public Safety(IOPS) to avoid an illegal UE or an unauthorized UE to access the isolated access network.
  • the entity may be a mobility management entity (MME) or a base station.
  • MME mobility management entity
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with an example of the present disclosure. The method may include the following procedures.
  • an entity in an isolated access network may receive information on whether a UE is entitled to an IOPS.
  • the entity may perform access control of the UE according to the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating the structure of an apparatus of performing access control of a UE.
  • the apparatus may include a receiving module and an access control module.
  • the receiving module may receive information on whether a UE is entitled to an IOPS.
  • the access control module may perform access control of the UE according to the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS.
  • the entity in the isolated access network is an MME.
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with example one of the present disclosure. The method may include the following procedures.
  • the MME may receive information on whether a UE is entitled to an IOPS.
  • the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS may be information on whether the UE is allowed to use the IOPS network, or a list of PLMN ID of IOPS E-UTRAN networks allowed to be used by the UE, or a network identity of an IOPS that is allowed to be used by the UE.
  • the network identity of the IOPS may uniquely identify an IOPS E-UTRAN.
  • the MME may obtain the information on whether a UE is entitled to an IOPS from a home subscriber server (HSS).
  • HSS home subscriber server
  • the MME may store the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS received from the HSS.
  • the MME may perform access control of the Ue according to the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS.
  • the MME may perform access control of the UE after receiving a message of the UE sent by a base station working under an IOPS mode.
  • the MME may determine the UE is connected to a base station working under the IOPS mode according to, but not limited to, the following manners.
  • the MME is a local MME, thus various messages, e.g., tracking area update (TAU), or service request, or Attach message, received by the MME are all received from base stations working under the IOPS mode.
  • TAU tracking area update
  • Attach message Attach message
  • a base station may send a message to the MME when working under the IOPS mode to inform the MME that the base station is working under the IOPS mode.
  • the base station may send an eNB configuration update message to the MME.
  • the eNB configuration update message may include information indicating the base station is working under the IOPS mode.
  • the information indicating the base station is working under the IOPS mode may be an indication of the base station is working under the IOPS mode, or a list of PLMN IDs for the IOPS mode, or an identity of an isolated E-UTRAN.
  • an initial UE message may include information indicating the base station is working under the IOPS mode.
  • the base station may also send the information of the IOPS mode to the MME via another S1 message.
  • the information indicating the base station is working under the IOPS mode may be the same with that in the above example, thus is not elaborated herein.
  • a base station working under the IOPS mode refers to the base station has lost connection with the core network, or has restricted connection with the core network, or a nomadic base station serves UEs via a local core network.
  • the MME may allow the UE to access the network. If the information indicates the UE is not allowed to use the IOPS network, the MME may reject the access of the UE.
  • the MME may check whether the PLMN ID of the cell currently accessed by the UE is a PLMN ID of an IOPS allowed to be accessed by the UE, and allow the UE to access if the PLMN ID of the cell is a PLMN ID allowed to be accessed for IOPS operation by the UE, or reject the access of the UE if the PLMN ID of the cell is not a PLMN ID allowed to be accessed for IOPS operation by the UE.
  • the MME may check whether the PLMN ID of the cell currently accessed by the UE is a PLMN ID of an IOPS not allowed to be accessed by the UE, and allow the UE to access if the PLMN ID of the cell is not a PLMN ID not allowed to be accessed by the UE, or reject the access of the UE if the PLMN ID of the cell is a PLMN ID not allowed to be accessed by the UE.
  • the entity in the isolated access network may check whether the IOPS ID of the base station currently accessed by the UE is allowed to be used by the UE, and allow the UE to access if the IOPS ID of the base station is allowed to be accessed by the UE, or reject the access of the UE if the IOPS ID of the base station is not allowed to be accessed by the UE.
  • the MME allow the UE to access if the IOPS ID of the base station currently accessed by the UE is allowed to be accessed by the UE, or reject the access of the UE if the IOPS ID of the base station is not allowed to be accessed by the UE.
  • the MME may perform proper access control of a UE according to information of authorized IOPS of the UE, so as to prevent an illegal or an unauthorized UE from accessing the network.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with example two of the present disclosure. The method may include the following procedures.
  • a base station may receive information on whether a UE is entitled to an IOPS from an MME.
  • the MME may obtain information on whether IOPS is allowed from an HSS.
  • the detailed process is the same with that in example one, thus will not be described further.
  • the information on whether the IOPS is allowed may be information on whether the UE is allowed to use the IOPS network, or a list of PLMN IDs of IOPS E-UTRAN networks allowed to be used by the UE, or a network identity of an IOPS that is allowed to be used by the UE.
  • An IOPS network identity may uniquely identify an IOPS E-UTRAN.
  • the MME may send the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS to the base station via an initial context setup request, or a handover request, or a path switch request acknowledgement, or a UE context modification message, or a downlink direct transfer message, or the like.
  • the base station may store the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS received from the MME.
  • the base station may perform access control of the UE according to the information on whether the UE is entitled to the IOPS.
  • the base station may perform access control of the UE after receiving an access request from the UE when working under the IOPS mode.
  • the base station may allow the UE to access the network. If the information indicates the UE is not allowed to use the IOPS network, the base station may reject the access of the UE.
  • the base station may check whether the PLMN ID of the cell currently accessed by the UE is a PLMN ID of an IOPS allowed to be accessed by the UE, and allow the UE to access if the PLMN ID of the cell is a PLMN ID of an IOPS allowed to be accessed by the UE, or reject the access of the UE if the PLMN ID of the cell is not a PLMN ID of an IOPS allowed to be accessed by the UE.
  • the base station may check whether the PLMN ID of the cell currently accessed by the UE is a PLMN ID of an IOPS not allowed to be accessed by the UE, and reject the access of the UE if the PLMN ID of the cell is a PLMN ID of an IOPS not allowed to be accessed by the UE, or the entity in the isolated access network may allow the UE to access if the PLMN ID of the cell is not a PLMN ID not allowed to be accessed by the UE.
  • the base station may allow the access of the UE if the isolated E-UTRAN identity of the base station is allowed to be accessed by the UE, or reject the access of the UE if the isolated E-UTRAN identity of the base station is not allowed to be accessed by the UE.
  • the entity in the isolated access network may reject the access of the UE if the IOPS ID of the base station currently accessed by the UE is not allowed to be used by the UE, or allow the access of the UE if the IOPS ID of the base station is allowed to be accessed by the UE.
  • the base station may directly release a connection wth the UE.
  • the base station may request a UE to reconnect if the UE is allowed to work under the IOPS mode or is allowed to use the IOPS network or is allowed to use the IOPS PLMN ID of the base station.
  • a base station may judge whether a PLMN ID of a neighboring base station is an IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE, and initiate a handover of the UE to the neighboring base station if the PLMN ID of the neighboring base station is an IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE, or not initiate the handover of the UE to the neighboring base station if the PLMN ID of the neighboring base station is not an IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE.
  • the MME may send authorized IOPS information of the UE to the base station, and the base station may perform proper access control of a UE according to authorized IOPS information of the UE, so as to prevent an illegal or an unauthorized UE from accessing the network.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control according to an example of the present disclosure.
  • the method may include the following procedures.
  • a serving base station of a UE may obtain information on an IOPS mode of a neighboring base station.
  • the serving base station may perform handover control according to the information on the IOPS mode of the neighboring base station.
  • the serving base station may not perform the handover of the UE to the neighbor base station.
  • the serving base station may perform the handover of the UE to the neighbor base station.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating an apparatus of performing handover control in accordance with an example of the present disclosure.
  • the apparatus may include an obtaining module and a handover control module.
  • the obtaining module may obtain information on an IOPS mode of a neighboring base station.
  • the handover control module may perform handover control of the UE according to the information on the IOPS mode of the neighboring base station.
  • the method of performing handover control may be implemented according to the following examples.
  • FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control according to example one of the present disclosure.
  • the method may include the following procedures.
  • base station 1 may send IOPS mode information to base station 2.
  • base station 2 may be the serving base station of a UE.
  • Base station 1 may be a neighboring base station, and may be a base station to which the UE is to be handed over in the following procedures.
  • the IOPS mode information may be an indication of whether base station 1 is working under the IOPS mode, and/or a identity of an isolated E-UTRAN network to which base station 1 belongs.
  • Plural isolated base stations may form an isolated E-UTRAN uniquely identified by an isolated E-UTRAN ID.
  • Base station 1 may send the IOPS mode information to base station 2 during an X2 setup process or an eNB configuration update process. Base station 1 may send the information to base station 2 via a core network.
  • a base station working under the IOPS mode refers to the base station has lost connection with the core network, or has limited connection with the core network, or a nomadic base station serves UEs via a local core network.
  • base station 2 stores the received information, and determines whether to initiate handover of a UE to base station 1.
  • base station 2 when base station 2 is working under an IOPS mode and base station 1 is not working under the IOPS mode, base station 2 may determine not to initiate handover of the UE to a cell of base station 1.
  • neighboring base stations may exchange IOPS mode information, and a base station may initiate handover when the UE moves within the IOPS network to achieve IOPS service continuity. Unnecessary handover when the UE moves out of the IOPS network may be avoided.
  • FIG. 10 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control in accordance with example two of the present disclosure. The method may include the following procedures.
  • a cell of base station 1 may broadcast IOPS mode information.
  • base station 2 may be the serving base station of a UE.
  • Base station 1 may be a neighboring base station, and may be a base station to which the UE is to be handed over in the following procedures.
  • the IOPS mode information may be an indication of whether base station 1 is working under the IOPS mode, and/or a identity of an isolated E-UTRAN network to which base station 1 belongs.
  • a base station working under the IOPS mode refers to the base station has lost connection with the core network, or has limited connection with the core network, or a nomadic base station serves UEs via a local core network.
  • a UE may obtain IOPS mode information broadcasted in a cell of base station 1.
  • the UE may send the IOPS mode information of the cell of base station 1 to the serving base station of the UE, i.e., base station 2.
  • Base station 1 is a neighboring base station of base station 2, or the cell of base station 1 is a neighboring cell of a cell of base station 2 where the UE is located.
  • Base station 2 may store the received information. Base station 2 may determine whether to initiate a handover of the UE to base station 1 according to the information.
  • base station 2 when base station 2 is working under an IOPS mode and base station 1 is not working under the IOPS mode, base station 2 may determine not to initiate the handover of the UE to a cell of base station 1.
  • a UE may obtain IOPS mode information of a neighboring base station, and a base station may initiate a handover when the UE moves within the IOPS network to achieve IOPS service continuity. Unnecessary handover when the UE moves out of the IOPS network may be avoided.
  • the following are two examples of the method of performing access control and handover control of a UE.
  • FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing handover control according to example one of the present disclosure. The method may include the following procedures.
  • base station 1 may obtain IOPS mode information of base station 2.
  • the method of obtaining the IOPS mode may be the same with the method described in FIG. 9 or FIG. 10, and is not elaborated herein.
  • base station 1 determines whether to initiate a handover of the UE.
  • base station 1 when base station 1 is working under an IOPS mode and base station 2 is not working under the IOPS mode, base station 1 may determine not to initiate the handover of the UE to a cell of base station 2. In an example, when base station 1 is not working under the IOPS mode and base station 2 is working under the IOPS mode, base station 1 may determine not to initiate the handover of the UE to a cell of base station 2.
  • base station 1 may determine not to initiate the handover of the UE to a cell of base station 2. If base station 1 and base station 2 belong to different isolated E-UTRANs, base station 1 may determine not to initiate the handover of the UE to a cell of base station 2.
  • an X2 or S1 handover process to the cell of base station 2 may be performed.
  • base station 1 may determine to initiate the handover of the UE to the cell of base station 2
  • FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing access control of a UE in accordance with an example of the present disclosure. The method may include the following procedures.
  • a UE may send a NAS message to a base station via an RRC message.
  • the base station may send an initial UE message or a direct transfer message to an MME.
  • the base station may send information indicating the base station is working under the IOPS mode to the MME.
  • the information indicating the base station is working under the IOPS mode may be the same with that in block 502, thus is not elaborated herein.
  • the MME may send an initial context setup request to the base station.
  • the MME may perform access control of the UE.
  • the MME may perform access control of the UE according to information indicating the base station is working under the IOPS mode and subscription information of the UE. The detailed process is the same with that in block 502, thus will not be described further. If the access control fails or the UE is not allowed to use IOPS, the MME may directly reject the UE in this procedure without having to send the initial context setup request to the base station.
  • the MME may send the initial context setup request to the base station.
  • the message may include an IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE.
  • the base station may store the IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE.
  • the base station when the base station is to initiate a handover of a UE, the base station may judge whether a PLMN ID of a neighboring base station is an IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE, and initiate a handover of the UE to the neighboring base station if the PLMN ID of the neighboring base station is an IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE, or determine not to initiate the handover of the UE to the neighboring base station if the PLMN ID of the neighboring base station is not an IOPS PLMN ID allowed to be used by the UE.
  • the base station may configure a radio bearer (RB) over the air interface.
  • RB radio bearer
  • the base station may send an initial context setup response to the MME.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé et un appareil d'exécution de commande d'accès et de commande de transfert intercellulaire d'équipements d'utilisateur (UE). Une entité dans un réseau d'accès isolé peut recevoir des informations s'il faut qu'un UE soit autorisé à une instruction isolée d'E-UTRAN destinée à la sécurité publique (IOPS) et exécuter la commande d'accès de l'UE selon les informations. En tant que tels, des instructions normales du réseau d'accès isolé peuvent être protégées contre les perturbations, et un gaspillage de ressources radio peut être évité. En outre, une station de base de desserte d'un UE peut obtenir directement des informations de mode d'IOPS d'une station de base voisine et exécuter une commande de transfert intercellulaire de l'UE selon les informations de mode d'IOPS. Ainsi, la continuité de service de l'UE peut être réalisée avec un transfert intercellulaire inutile et un échec de transfert intercellulaire réduits lorsque l'UE se déplace entre des cellules dans un réseau d'accès isolé.
PCT/KR2016/000931 2015-01-28 2016-01-28 Procédé et appareil d'exécution de commande d'accès et de commande de transfert intercellulaire d'équipements utilisateur Ceased WO2016122224A1 (fr)

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CN201510044060.8 2015-01-28
CN201510044060.8A CN105992302A (zh) 2015-01-28 2015-01-28 一种对ue进行接入控制和切换控制的方法及装置

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EP3562188A1 (fr) * 2018-04-27 2019-10-30 Airbus DS SLC Procede de configuration pour un acces a des services de repli de communication et systeme associe
FR3080730A1 (fr) * 2018-04-27 2019-11-01 Airbus Ds Slc Procede de configuration pour un acces a des services de repli de communication et systeme associe
US11121866B2 (en) 2018-04-27 2021-09-14 Airbus Ds Slc Method for configuring access to fallback communication services and associated system
JP2022504432A (ja) * 2018-10-08 2022-01-13 テレフオンアクチーボラゲット エルエム エリクソン(パブル) マルチメディアブロードキャストマルチキャストサービス(mbms)を用いた公共安全のための隔離e-utran動作(iops)の認識
JP7341228B2 (ja) 2018-10-08 2023-09-08 テレフオンアクチーボラゲット エルエム エリクソン(パブル) マルチメディアブロードキャストマルチキャストサービス(mbms)を用いた公共安全のための隔離e-utran動作(iops)の認識
US12144006B2 (en) 2018-10-08 2024-11-12 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Isolated E-UTRAN operations for public safety (IOPS) awareness with multimedia broadcast multicast services (MBMS)

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