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WO2016168654A1 - Gestion d'articles protégés - Google Patents

Gestion d'articles protégés Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016168654A1
WO2016168654A1 PCT/US2016/027834 US2016027834W WO2016168654A1 WO 2016168654 A1 WO2016168654 A1 WO 2016168654A1 US 2016027834 W US2016027834 W US 2016027834W WO 2016168654 A1 WO2016168654 A1 WO 2016168654A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
article
key
indicia
protected
fashion
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2016/027834
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Jane Marie SIEBELS
Bryce Andrew BEAMER
Jeffrey Guy BONAR
Karl Ginter
John Langley REHWINKEL
Derek S. TOLEDO-SILBERT
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siebels Asset Management Research Ltd
Original Assignee
Siebels Asset Management Research Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siebels Asset Management Research Ltd filed Critical Siebels Asset Management Research Ltd
Priority to AU2016248323A priority Critical patent/AU2016248323B2/en
Priority to CN201680035436.1A priority patent/CN107980143B/zh
Priority to HK18113969.0A priority patent/HK1254868B/zh
Priority to JP2018506081A priority patent/JP2018523240A/ja
Priority to EP16723561.3A priority patent/EP3284018A1/fr
Publication of WO2016168654A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016168654A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/08—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
    • G06K19/083—Constructional details
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/20—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof characterised by a particular use or purpose
    • B42D25/29—Securities; Bank notes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
    • G06V20/00—Scenes; Scene-specific elements
    • G06V20/80—Recognising image objects characterised by unique random patterns
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09C—CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
    • G09C1/00—Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/029—Location-based management or tracking services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
    • G06V20/00—Scenes; Scene-specific elements
    • G06V20/95—Pattern authentication; Markers therefor; Forgery detection
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • FIG. 1 For example technology herein provides a fashion article characterized by a component that is integrated as part of the fashion article so that its removal will reduce the fashion value of the fashion article, and an authentication circuit which provides authenticity indicia derived from the component.
  • the authentication circuit may measure the electrical resistance of a portion of the component.
  • the authentication circuit wirelessly reports the authenticity indicia.
  • the authenticity indicia may be unique to the fashion article.
  • the authenticity indicia may be substantially immutably bound to the fashion article.
  • the component may form a structural aspect of the fashion article.
  • the component may provide a decorative aspect of the fashion article.
  • the component may provide a functional aspect of the fashion article that is unrelated to authentication.
  • the authentication circuit may be a part of the component.
  • Example embodiments herein provide an authentication and tracking component for use with collectable artifacts that may be affixed to the article in order to authenticate and track the protected collectable artifact.
  • Articles of this type were in the past typically authenticated manually due to the lack of solutions that could authenticate, provide verifiable provenance, and track the location and status of article in real time.
  • Manual authentication of artifacts is, by its nature, subjective and often takes days or weeks to complete, and "good" forgeries often make it past the examiner.
  • the authentication and tracking component affixed or integrated into the protected article as described herein measures PUAs of the article and uses the PUAs to quickly authenticate the article in an unforgeable manner.
  • the component and system additionally provides provenance and tracking information for the article, which supports the value of the protected article.
  • Additional example embodiments herein provide an authentication and tracking component for use with official and high value documents.
  • Examples of these types of documents include documents related to complex financial transactions, including letters of credit, guarantees, banker and buyer acceptance certificates, and inspection certificates, access credentials, passports, visas, drivers licenses and other similar articles.
  • Each of these types of documents or articles is subject to forgery, misdirection, and loss, and they require mechanisms for mitigating these risks.
  • Still other example embodiments herein provide an authentication component for use with a fashion or other article comprising a component structured to be integrated as part of the article so that an indication the component provides and/or removal of the component from the protected article will reduce the fashion or other value, usefulness or use of the article.
  • the component includes an authentication circuit that provides authenticity indicia derived from the component.
  • reduce the fashion value of the fashion article means to sufficiently alter the structure and/or appearance of the fashion article after manufacture of the fashion article to make it obvious that the fashion article has been altered from its original form.
  • Figure 1G shows an additional protected article with a key attached to an integral portion of the protected article
  • Figure 2 shows a block diagram of an example non-limiting management system able to communicate with a plurality of protection devices
  • Figure 3A illustrates a side view of an exemplary resistive mesh key
  • Figure 3B illustrates a top view of an exemplary resistive mesh key
  • Figure 4 illustrates an exemplary implementation of a resistive mesh key embedded within a cast protected article component (foot of a purse);
  • Figures 5A, 5B illustrate a front and side view of exemplary
  • Figure 6 illustrates an exemplary process flow for creation of a protected article
  • Figure 12 illustrates an exemplary implementation of an optical properties key attached to a protected article
  • Figure 1 A shows an example high value item 10 (in this case, a fashion article such as a purse or, alternatively a commercial courier bag) that embodies the protection system included herein.
  • a protected item 10 may comprise a purse, dress, shoe or other high value item.
  • the purse shown could be a designer purse made out of high quality leather or other material with a distinctive aesthetic design and coloration that enables it to be sold for thousands of dollars.
  • a key that measures and reports unique values based upon one or more protected article PUA is incorporated within high value item 10.
  • the term "key” is shorthand for "key device" and does not per se mean a cryptographic key or information used to identify item 10.
  • the high value item 10 is in communication with, or may also include, a communicator that communicates between a key and an external management system. Such communication can be encrypted or otherwise secured using PUA-derived unique device IDs and cryptographic keys in order to form an end-to-end secure communication channel between the management system and the key(s) of the protected article. This secured channel connects known and validated endpoints, e.g. the management server, and a key that is identified and authenticated using PUA-derived cryptographic information.
  • Figures 1C and ID show an additional protected article 10a, in this case a women's shoe.
  • the shoe 10a includes structures 18a, 18b, 18c, 18d which can be used by keys 14 to produce protected article indicia. These structures 18 are integrated within the shoe 10a so that removal of the structure will reduce the fashion value of the shoe.
  • Such key structures 18 may be electronically queried to detect protected article properties (e.g. PUA's) comprising at least one measurable aspect of the protected article.
  • Multiple keys may be incorporated within a given protected article, each producing one or more (unique) indicium.
  • Figure IF shows an additional protected article 24 in exploded view showing an inter-sole structure 26 or other substrate that may be used as the protected article key.
  • any attempts to remove the structure of key 26 will destroy or reduce the fashion value of the protected article 24.
  • the key 26 is physically bound to a protected article substrate in a manner such that substitution attempts become impossible or impractical.
  • Figure 1G shows an additional protected article 24, in this case, a key attached by adhesive to an integral portion of the protected article.
  • the bonding interface between the key and the article is monitored by e.g. an electrical properties measuring sensor to detect tampering and/or removal/separation of the key from the protected article by detecting the change in electrical properties of the adhesive interface.
  • Wireless networking such as Bluetooth or WiFi (e.g. 802.11 -based networking), for communication between the keys, indicator(s), and at least one communicator.
  • the keys and indicators may be connected to the communicator using wires in lieu of wireless networking.
  • PUA-derived cryptographic key pairs and PUA-derived challenge/response information (e.g. indicia). Any of these PUA-derived materials may be used to authenticate a key endpoint. PUA-derived indicia are a preferred method because they provide further assurance that the key device and the protected article are still together.
  • Some keys may have limited wide area communications capabilities and rely on fixed access points (e.g. WiFi) or mobile peering (e.g. BLE peering) with communicators that provide the wide area communications needed.
  • the fixed access points and peered communicators serve to pass network traffic between keys and PAMS servers. They may also provide store and forward and related communications services.
  • An additional non-limiting feature of the system architecture is that a single indicator and/or key may interact with more than one communicator in order to communicate with a PAMS server, as illustrated by interactions 135b and 135z, in which indicator 160a interacts with two disparate communicators. Being able to communicate with a plurality of communicators affords advantages when a communicator is lost or a protected article is lost or stolen. Specifically, the indicators and keys associated with a protected article may re-establish
  • a specific key, indicator, or communicator can be associated with one or more management servers. This permits different systems to monitor a protected article, for example, a
  • a key device may simply be reinitialized for communications with the repaired PAMS server in order to create new initial values, cryptographic materials, and indicia for the key device.
  • the PAMS server may provide to an authorized searcher the current and/or last known location of the protected article. As the searcher comes within short term radio range of the protected article, the PAMS server may instruct the key(s) to communicate with the searcher' s communicator so that direction and distance between the
  • information about a protected article is added to the PAMS management server when the article is created and the key(s) initialized, at which time, the persistent association between the protected article, its key(s) and one or more protected article indicium are created and recorded within the management system.
  • the key device/protected article association is persistent because keys measure intrinsic, physical, or structural attributes of the protected article (e.g. PUA) and are integrated within the item or attached to the item itself in such a way that removal of the key disables the key and/or changes the indicia reported by a key. Since the keys measure and report upon intrinsic characteristics (e.g. PUA) of the protected item, a remote system is able to determine that 1) the key is not spoofing the protected article information, and 2) that the key has not been removed from the protected article with which it is associated.
  • the PAMS also maintains associations between the protected article and indicators. In particular, if indicia, as measured and/or calculated, and then reported by the key, do not match with the information on file for the protected article, the PAMS directs one or more communicator(s) to set the status of at least one indicator associated with the protected article to indicate validation failure.
  • management systems servers include a server running
  • Example data elements of the information stored in the management system databases are provided below.
  • the data element lists are not presented in a formal schema or database layout. The conversion from the element list to a schema used by the selected database application used on a particular PAMS server instance may be performed by those skilled in the art.
  • Owner information Current owner details, including name and contact information.
  • Key/indicia sets List of key/indicia to be used associated with the protected article.
  • Authentication info permitting the communicator to authenticate to other PAMS elements (servers, indicators, keys)
  • a secure communicator interfaces to, and communicates securely between, key, indicators, and the management system.
  • a secure communicator may interrogate key device(s) for indicia and collects the response(s) from keys and indicators in order to forward them to the management system, and receives and forwards commands from the management system to keys and indicators.
  • Secure communicators also serve as devices that may be used to identify and locate keys and indicators associated with lost or missing protected articles.
  • a secure communicator interfaces with keys and indicators using a wireless communications means, such as optical, WiFi,
  • a secure communicator is electrically connected to one or more keys and indicators and directly communicates with the keys/indicators using that connection.
  • a secure communicator provides additional services, such as WiFi, cellular tower, and/or GPS or other location reporting.
  • the protected article includes a further embedded contactless electronic authentication device such as an RFID or NFC chip, and the secure communicator is designed to use frequencies, power levels, and other
  • a plurality of communicators may interface with one or more protected articles and their keys.
  • a communicator is integrated within the protected article.
  • a communicator may be shared between a plurality of protected articles, and may be freestanding, handheld, or may be integrated with support infrastructure such as wired or wireless charging systems.
  • each communicator is made up of a processor, a key, a battery and power harvester, and at least a BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) transceiver. Additional 802.11 (WiFi) or telephony (e.g. GSM, CDMA) transceivers may be added to the embodiment as needs dictate or applications prefer.
  • WiFi WiFi
  • GSM Global System for Mobile communications
  • CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
  • That combination is acted upon by an external wireless signal, causing the communicator's processor to interrogate the key in order to receive transmitted indicia values from the key over a BLE connection, and then to forward the received indicia to a management server utilizing an available communications link.
  • the communications between PAMS management servers and a communicator may be protected for integrity, privacy, and/or authenticity using these and other cryptographic techniques.
  • a protected article can in one non-limiting application comprise a commercial item that has high intrinsic value and a high resale value, but is generally hard to individually identify and authenticate. These classes of commercial items are often the subject of forgeries, theft and resale within the supply chain. Examples of such protected articles include designer clothing (e.g. purses, shoes, watches and dresses), high value household goods (e.g. rugs, furniture, antiques, artwork, artifacts, collectables), historical, official, and/or tracked document copies, and cases/covers for high value goods.
  • a given PAMS system could be used to track certain types of articles, or a variety of different types of articles, or some subset of different article types.
  • one PAMS system might be used to track artworks while another PAMS system might be used to track official documents or the same PAMS system could be used to track both official documents and artworks.
  • the PAMS systems can be expandable, with an initial implementation being directed at one type of article, and then the same system later expanded to track additional article types.
  • a protected article becomes protected by PAMS by registering the protected article and its keys within PAMS, persistently associating one or more key device(s)/indicia with the protected article, and periodically checking the protected article to ensure that the key device(s) are reporting the correct indicia for that article.
  • PAMS may request a communicator to communicate with the at least one key associated with a protected article in order to obtain the now current indicia.
  • the key or communicator may periodically and/or autonomously initiate this communication and send indicia to the PAMS management server for validation.
  • indicia are derived by the key(s), at least in part, from PUA measurements by a key, the presence of indicia that match previously stored indicia indicates that the same protected article is associated with the reporting key(s); effectively assuring that the protected article is still present with the key.
  • the PUA measured is associated with an aspect the integrity of the item (e.g. that the item has not been cut, ripped, or disassembled)
  • receiving the correct indicia from a key assures that the protected article has not been tampered with in a way that disturbs the PUA being measured.
  • the indicator may be embedded within a functional or decorative aspect of the protected article, such as a clasp or strap fitting of a purse. Again, if the indicator is removed, it significantly devalues the protected article by damaging it.
  • an indicator may be affixed to a protected article using means that deface the protected article by removing part of the protected article along with the indicator, or by leaving behind an indelible mark or residue on the protected article.
  • a key device is associated with a protected article such that the association cannot be modified, removed or altered without changing the response of the key device to an electronic interrogation requesting the current indicia or damaging the protected article.
  • a key device may be embedded within a structural or decorative element of the protected article in such a way that removing the key device damages or reduces the value of the protected article (in the same way that removing an indicator damages or reduces the value of the protected article).
  • the key device may be attached to the protected article in such a way that its removal leaves damaging traces or residual on the protected article, marking and devaluing it.
  • the indicia returned by the key may be used as an authenticator for the protected article. In other words, if the key is present and responds with a correct set of indicia in response to the electronic challenge, the protected article may be presumed or inferred to be present and authentic.
  • a key in one example non-limiting embodiment is an assembly of components comprising a key controller and the one or more sensors associated with that key controller.
  • a single key controller may be connected to one or more sensors and manages these sensors by setting their parameters and reading values from the sensors.
  • Each sensor differentiates at least one type of protected article physical attributes that can be measured, e.g. electrical properties, optically distinguishable features of a material (e.g., paper, leather, fabric or other materials surface imperfections or variations).
  • the key controller interfaces the key assembly to one or more communicators (and/or wireless networks) and is connected to the sensors using appropriate wires and circuits.
  • the key controller may be connected to a sensor using wireless means.
  • the key controller comprises a processor executing one or more programs to convert sensed information into indicia unique or distinctive to the protected article, executing one or more programs to control and manage the sensors, and programs that provide the communications interface with other components of the PAMS in order to communicate indicia and receive challenges and/or instructions.
  • the key controller comprises an embedded processor (910) such as a CPU or FPGA and one or more memories, such a RAM, ROM, or EEPROM that store the control program executed by the processor. Both persistent and transient memories are possible.
  • processor controlled voltage regulators Connected to the battery and the processor are a number of processor controlled voltage regulators the processor controls in order to provide a varying amount of power from the battery to one or more interface components.
  • These regulators include regulator 940b, which controls the power to one or more indicators (960), and regulator 940d, which controls the amount of power to a low power Bluetooth communications component (970).
  • a key sensor interface provides the interface between the processor of the key controller and the hardware that measures and reports one or more physical attributes of protected article to the processor.
  • key sensor interfaces include a resistive mesh interface and an optical sensor (both described later).
  • the key sensor interface is controlled by the processor using separate control circuits, as illustrated in the figure.
  • Figure 9B illustrates a implementation of an integrated device, comprising key (e.g. controller and sensors), a communicator, and zero or more indicators.
  • the integrated device includes the circuitry of the key controller of Figure 9A, and adds additional regulator controlled communication components for wireless communication, including WiFi controller 980 and antenna 985, GPS (Global Positioning System) circuit 990, with active antenna 994 and super capacitor power backup 992, and wireless telephony circuits (such as a CDMA or GSM chip set) 996 and its associated antenna(s) 998.
  • WiFi controller 980 and antenna 985 GPS (Global Positioning System) circuit 990
  • active antenna 994 and super capacitor power backup 992 GPS (Global Positioning System) circuit 990
  • wireless telephony circuits such as a CDMA or GSM chip set
  • a key While communicating with the communicators, a key may be identified by a unique identifier (e.g. a key ID) or a derived unique identifier (such as the values of a selected set of indicia). It is preferable in some embodiments for ease of manufacturing and retail sale of the protected article that a key not require factory programming to include unique information such as public/private key pairs and key-specific globally unique identifiers (e.g. GUID); rather that these items be internally generated during key initialization.
  • An integrated device may have a single unique identifier for the device, or may have unique identifiers for each of the integrated components (e.g. one unique ID for the communicator, one for each key controller, one for each indicator). Alternatively, the device ID, cryptographic information, and unique identifiers, and the like may be unique only for a specific registration between a key device and a management server.
  • Each key may generate a plurality of indicia.
  • a key may produce a large number of indicia so that it is harder to "spoof indicia returned in response to a query from a management server.
  • a management server may request one or more indicium from a key by sending a request to the key including the indicium tags for the requested indicia. The key device responds with the requested indicium values.
  • Indicia have two parts: a tag and a value.
  • the tag is a unique (to the device) randomly generated (at initialization) value that is used to identify an indicia value.
  • the value of the indicia is the result of processing protected article attributes through a function that uses as input the PUA and key device
  • the indicium tag is an ID that could refer to physical position, sequence in time, sequence in order, or any other arbitrary identification that distinguishes one indicium produced by a key from another indicium produced by the same key device. From one use of the key to the next, the meaning of the tag does not change, however, tags are unique to a specific initialization of a key device.
  • One challenge in creating keys is that they preferably generate a sufficiency of indicia and that the range of the generated indicia values is preferably fairly large, non-clustered, and sparsely populated. A large unclustered range makes the returned indicium value distinct from other indicium values, and thus harder to guess. Sparsely populated ranges decrease the likelihood of a chance of a random guess being successful.
  • a third challenge is that an attacker should not be able to determine what is being measured by the key device / sensors in order to produce indicia results. This limits spoofing of inputs to the key device.
  • a fifth challenge is that the key device, the indicia it generates, and its association with a protected article is able to stand up to changes to the protected article as a result of everyday use and cleaning.
  • the key device should respond with indicia that can be repeatedly created within acceptable measurement limits when the protected article is in use within its normal everyday usage, and after normal cleaning processes are performed.
  • a key device associated with a high value dress must be able to operate to produce verifiable indicia during and after normal use (wearing) of the dress and after any required cleaning of the dress (e.g. washing or dry cleaning).
  • One method of attacking a key might be to communicate with the key device and observe the results, both in the responses to the communication, and in the key device interaction with the protected article. Key device communications are designed to defeat these types of observations. Key device operation is similarly designed to defeat correlation between a specific requested indicia tag and the externally visible actions of the key device and its sensors.
  • the key maintains an internal cache of "valid" indicia values (see indicia table example below).
  • a valid indicium tag e.g. one that is known to the device
  • the key either selects the value from the indicia table and returns that indicia value without accessing a sensor (or randomly accessing one or more sensors to obfuscate its actions), or accesses one or more sensors (including accessing some sensors and ignoring the results) and computes a new indicium value.
  • the key computes a random indicium value and returns that value. If space permits, the invalid indicium tag and return value are stored in the indicia table and a counter of invalid indicium requests is
  • the key device breaks any causal relationship between a particular indicium tag and a particular sensor activity and/or sensor response.
  • the key device By reading some or all of the sensors each time a requested sensor value is obtained, and then selecting a subset of the sensor readings to use in the sets of inputs for producing the indicium value(s), the key device breaks the relationship between particular indicium and the sensor value(s) it uses as inputs.
  • the key device creates new random indicium tags for each instance of the key (when a key device is associated with a PAMS server). This limits attacks based upon the indicia tag space and removes attacks against a second key device based upon known indicia tags of a first key device.
  • the key device associates (maps) the indicia tags to the calculated indicia values differently for each key device. This limits the ability of an attacker to guess at the settings or readings associated with a particular indicium tag (or tag position), and further prevents attacks across key devices based upon this information.
  • the key controller maintains at least one internal table of indicia information for use in computing, responding to indicia requests, and validating indicia.
  • one table is maintained for each PAMS management server that the key device is registered with.
  • the indicia table contains information required by the key device to respond to indicia requests by a PAMS management server. Example table columns are illustrated below:
  • the index column indicates the indicia tag order for certain communications with the PAMS management server.
  • the index column is set to for cached indicium tags that do not correspond to a known (computed by the key device) tag (e.g. a bad tag or probing request from a potential counterfeiter).
  • the features/properties selected may be a single feature/property, may be a set of features/properties, or may be all of the features/properties.
  • the indicia generation algorithm selects an order for these selected feature/properties to be used in indicia generation. Permuting the order greatly changes the resulting indicium values. For example, a selected order may be ascending in the order presented, may be descending in the order presented, may be alternating feature/properties in the order presented, etc.
  • the same set of feature/properties may be ordered in different ways to produce different indicium values, increasing the number of indicia that may be generated from a set of features/properties.
  • the feature/properties are passed thru a position sensitive function to compute the indicium value(s).
  • a position sensitive function to compute the indicium value(s).
  • Examples of such algorithms include cryptographic hashes such as MD5 and CRC.
  • the algorithm is position sensitive so that altered order of inputs produce differing results, permitting each set of feature/properties to be used to produce many indicia.
  • a simple indicium generation algorithm is a CRC- 16 across the bytes of an array for feature/properties.
  • a CRC- 16 calculation of the bytes in increasing index order yields a different result than a calculation using bytes in decreasing index order.
  • the table below illustrates the wide variance in an indicium values calculated using a CRC- 16 calculations based upon feature/property (PUA) input order.
  • the above table illustrates how a relatively small number of feature/property values can be used to produce a large number of unique indicia that uniquely identify a protected article.
  • the sensor ID column identifies the sensor to be used by the key controller.
  • the sensor parameters column identifies the parameters to be used to configure the sensor.
  • the sensor parameters vary based upon the type of sensor, and may be randomly selected for some types of sensors. For example:
  • sensor parameters may include lighting, sensor exposure, and lens settings.
  • sensor parameters may include the settings for the control pins (e.g. which pins to set to a specific voltage, which pins to set to ground, which pins to leave unconnected).
  • Figure 10 illustrates an effect of this ordering and how it masks the underlying sensor mappings.
  • the key is able to withstand tampering or to fail in known ways in response to tamper detection. It is further desirable that any such key device failure is detectable via the normal querying and communication of the key devices.
  • a resistive mesh key comprises an electrical properties sensor (e.g. a resistance sensor, a voltage measurement sensor), a mesh of measurement points between which the electrical properties varies based upon attributes or aspect of a protected article (a resistive mesh circuit), and processing techniques provided by the sensor and/or key controller to expose and read the unique values produced by the resistive mesh circuit.
  • an electrical properties sensor e.g. a resistance sensor, a voltage measurement sensor
  • a mesh of measurement points between which the electrical properties varies based upon attributes or aspect of a protected article a resistive mesh circuit
  • processing techniques provided by the sensor and/or key controller to expose and read the unique values produced by the resistive mesh circuit.
  • Resistive mesh keys are useful when the protected article has independent electrical characteristics that vary with the construction of the protected article and that can be measured, or for when a component of the protected article that has these electrical characteristics is embedded within solid components of a protected item, such as purse bottoms, clasps, strap mounts, shoe bottoms and heels. Other places that resistive mesh keys may be applicable are dictated by the design of the protected article and may be utilized.
  • a generic electrical properties sensor that operates with resistive meshes, and in general, with resistance networks provides a common circuit for
  • each lead in a set of leads are connected to one of: ground, a known supply voltage (e.g. Vcc), or a high resistance (high-Z).
  • Vcc a known supply voltage
  • high-Z a high resistance
  • the body of the resistive network produces a resulting voltage and the resulting voltage is read off a second lead.
  • This uses the electrical characteristics being measured as a voltage divider, which has many advantages. First, thermal changes in resistance are cancelled out, which eliminates temperature-based repeatability problems. Similarly, changes in voltage (for example, caused by low battery) are also cancelled out. Lastly, it produces a large number of testable combinations, with an 8 lead arrangement yielding at least 15446 possible combinations and a 10 lead arrangement yielding at least 186600 combinations.
  • the microcontroller of the key controller (at
  • initialization randomly determines the initialization values associated with each of the leads connected for electrical properly measurement.
  • the initialization values define whether each of the leads is:
  • the initializations values can be encoded and stored as two bits per lead, or be stored as specific voltages / resistances to use.
  • the randomly generated initial values are checked for validity (at least one ground, at least one Vcc, and exactly one analog input), and for results that are reproducible (e.g. not too close to a measurement boundary condition) and invalid entries are regenerated if necessary until a valid initialization vector is created.
  • the validated initial values are stored in a memory of the key for later use.
  • Spoofing values may also be generated and stored using similar means.
  • the electrical property measurement leads are extended from the integrated device controller/measuring resistance array to a set of contacts attached to the protected article.
  • These contacts may be in the form of a connector, a set of contact plates or a set of pins, depending upon their intended use.
  • FIG. 3A A first example of a resistive mesh key is shown in Figures 3 A and 3B.
  • Figure 3A a schematic of a resistive mesh key is shown in side view. It comprises key controller (205), resistive mesh key circuit board (210), with
  • the key controller (205) comprises a key sensor interface that further comprises a sensitive electrical properties measuring circuit, a driver circuit that applies known electrical properties (e.g. voltages, grounds, resistances) to at least one component of the resistive mesh.
  • a driver circuit that applies known electrical properties (e.g. voltages, grounds, resistances) to at least one component of the resistive mesh.
  • an optional multiplexor selects various electrical paths through the circuit by selecting which pins of the contact/connected are being measured.
  • no multiplexor is used and defined inputs are applied to all but one of the leads connected to the circuit, and the remaining lead is read for the value of the entire circuit.
  • a variably resistive mesh circuit is implemented as a circuit board (210) that preferably has a plurality of traces, each trace electrically connected to a different pin of the key connector.
  • Conductive fibers (240) are randomly scattered over the traces to provide intermittent electrical conduction between each of the pairs of traces. In essence, the fibers form bridging elements that electrically bridge the traces on the circuit board at randomly selected locations with material of varying conductivity.
  • the conductive fibers comprise carbon fiber of various lengths and diameters.
  • the circuit board, traces, and conductive strands are encased in an epoxy or other non-conductive polymer coating (250) to affix the strands to the traces, prevent movement of the conductive fibers, and to limit tampering with the resistive mesh key.
  • Figure 3B shows a schematic of the exemplary key in top view.
  • a variably resistive mesh circuit may be
  • both the traces and the bridging elements may be printed using a pattern of the traces and bridging elements selected by the printing program. This selection may be random or may be based upon one or more templates along with a randomization factor.
  • the placement and electrical characteristics of the printed components of the chip may be varied by adjusting the line size (width, thickness) and ink characteristics using the printing program.
  • the printing of the "bridging" elements may use different types of ink or by varying the ink used to include inks with differing electrical characteristics in order to further alter the electrical characteristics of the printed resistive mesh circuit.
  • a circuit board is created with traces and connectors (and other parts as necessary) as described above. Conductive material is spattered (or printed in a random spatter-like pattern) on the circuit board to form
  • conductive paths between the traces, and the resulting circuit board is coated with an epoxy or polymer as described above.
  • variable resistive mesh glue layer may take the place of any glue or adhesive used in the construction of a protected article, or may be used to affix portions of the PAMS system to a protected article.
  • Each lead may be set by the key controller to a specific voltage, to ground, or high resistance (e.g. unconnected), or may be connected to a sensor that reads the electrical characteristics of the lead based upon the sensors initialization values. For example, with a first setting of the key controller, lead 1 may be powered with +5V, and lead 2 may be read; while in a second setting, lead 2 may be powered with +5 V and lead 1 may be read. In still another example
  • lead 1 may be set to ground
  • lead 2 may be set to +5V
  • lead 3 may be left unconnected
  • lead 4 may be read. Based upon the number of leads available, a large number of permutations of powered, grounded, and unconnected leads may be made.
  • the key operates by applying a voltage to each pin of the connector and reading the resulting electrical characteristics (e.g.
  • digital to analog and analog to digital signal converters (not shown, in the key controller logic circuit) and communication components are made a part of the key.
  • the resulting set of readings provides a unique signature of the electrical characteristics of the protected article as measured by the key device that is hard to replicate and replay.
  • the key power with known voltages on one or more measurement leads and the resulting voltage from the measured electrical circuits is created by the mesh read using another lead.
  • Each of the analog conductive paths through the resistive mesh will contribute a portion of the resulting voltage being read, and overall characteristic of the resistive mesh computed. Changing the resistance of any one of the resistive paths through the resistive mesh will change the resulting voltage measurements.
  • the key controller operates by determining one or more lead configuration settings, associating the determined settings with a specific indicia request, and saving these settings within the controller. Each time the key controller is asked for a particular indicium, the key controller configures the measuring leads in accordance with the settings for the requested indicia and reads the resulting value(s) from the circuit. The read value(s) are used as an input to an indicia generating calculation performed by the key controller. Again, changing or tampering with the resistive mesh circuit will result in changed readings, which in turn will result in different indicium being generated.
  • indicia generated from an electrical properties key may be derived by taking a set of readings from various leads associated with a set of selected settings.
  • each reading of the key requires a plurality of settings for each of the leads and reading the electrical properties (e.g. the PUA) for each setting by the processor of the key, with the PUA results stored in an ordered list or array of readings.
  • This list of readings is then used to produce the indicia for the key using selection of specific PUA using an algorithm based upon the list or array and permutations of skip, and offset settings as described herein.
  • a random number generator and initial value seed may be used by the processor to generate the list of electrical property settings for each lead, with the resulting set of settings tested to ensure that exactly one lead is selected for reading, at least one lead is selected with nonzero power input, and all remaining leads are set to a power input, a resistance, or ground. The resulting list of settings is then used to generate the requested indicia. Integration of key into protected article
  • the resulting key may be made a part of the protected article, cast into parts of the protected article, or may be otherwise integrated in such a way as to make it hard to remove the key from the protected item without damaging one of the key or the protected article.
  • a resistive mesh key may be constructed as part of the protected article in a way that prevents the resistive mesh key from operating or that will change the PUA measurements provided by the resistive mesh key if the protected article is tampered with.
  • the resistive mesh key may be integrated as part of a hard sheet-like component of a protected item, such as the bottom of a purse or handbag, a clasp backing plate, and in similar applications.
  • the resistive mesh that is measured by the resistive mesh key is provided by the material making up the portion of the protected article that the key is attached to, e.g. the material making up the bottom stiffer for a handbag or the backing plate of the clasp.
  • the key may measure the characteristics of at least some of the material that the protected article is constructed of, such as the resistance of a lining within a purse or courier bag. In each of these cases, the key is thus measuring at least an aspect of the protected article when determining the metric used, in part, to create indicia.
  • a key may similarly measure the one or more electrical properties (e.g. resistance, conductance, capacitance) across an adhesive layer, clasp, closure, or seal of an protected article, which determines whether the clasp or closure has been opened and/or a seal broken, and the subsequent indicia used to determine if the measured part of the article has been tampered with or broken since the indicia were originally created.
  • a resistive mesh key may be constructed within an integral part of a solid component of a protected article, such as being cast into heel of a shoe or molded into a handbag handle.
  • the resistive mesh key electrodes measure the resistance of the solid component material cast around the key.
  • Figures 4 and 5A, 5B illustrate specific integrations of keys into protected articles.
  • Figures 5A, 5B illustrate various locations on an example purse that a key may be integrated. Keys may be integrated within hard components such as a backplate (440), clasp (430), foot (300), or a bottom plate (420).
  • Figure 4 is an example of a cross section of a key cast into a foot of a purse, and demonstrates how the key can be constructed to measure aspects of the materials used to construct a protected article.
  • the key may be encased within the article and may take any of the forms described herein, for example, the protected article part may be cast with a variable resistance circuit in it, or if using variable resistance polymers, cast with a key controller chip embedded in it that reads the attributes of the variable resistance polymers that comprise the protected article part.
  • the key is measuring a structure that is part of the protected article and each protected article instance has structures that naturally yield different PUA, so substitution attacks against the key itself will only result in unexpected values being returned to PAMS (and the protected article failing its tests).
  • one aspect of the article that is appropriate for producing PUAs is to monitor the attachment bond integrity.
  • the bonding agent used is partially and/or variably conductive
  • a key controller with an electrical property measuring sensor interface may be used to measure the electrical characteristics across the bond. If the bond is tampered with (e.g. the key is removed from the article), the electrical properties (e.g. resistance) of the bonding material as measured between two leads will change and this change will be detected by the key. Other means of verifying the integrity of the bond may be used, such as embedded resistive wires.
  • the key (1110) is affixed to a protected article (140) that contains an RFID chip.
  • the key is configured with an RFID sensor (13300 and optional protective shielding (1340).
  • the RFID sensor is positioned so it may interrogate the RFID chip using a very low power setting.
  • the shielding blocks external RF signals in order to increase the sensitivity of the RFID sensor and to inhibit spoofing attacks directed at the RFID sensor from outside (interfering) RF sources.
  • an RFID chip (1350) may be added to an adhesive layer (1320) that binds the key to the protected article.
  • step 6030 Perform the initialization of the keys (step 6030) (as described below). This step varies based upon the type of each key being initialized.
  • Step 7020 comprises setting the status of the protected article/ indicia values to (unassociated), and clearing any previously established communicator / key associations. This step resets any previously
  • Step 7060 associates the key, protected article, and communicator (if not pre-associated) in the PAMS database.
  • step 8020 receiving, by the communicator, one or more key interrogation instruction from PAMS management server, the key interrogation instructions including the indicium tags for one or more desired indicium.
  • the unique transaction ID may also be received for subsequent use by the communicator.
  • the communicator forwards the requested indicium tags to the key devices(s).
  • Step 8030 involves the key receiving the key interrogation instructions, looking up a requested indicium tag to determine the sensor and sensor settings to use, transforming the key interrogation instruction to identify pairs of (the type of interrogation to be performed, setting to use to perform the interrogation).
  • a key may be asked for all the indicia values, some of the indicium values, or even a different group of indicium values from one request to the next. In some cases, the key may be asked for non-existent indicium values to check its response (and confuse potential attackers).
  • step 8060 transmit from the key device via a
  • the communicator to the PAMS server the requested indicium response value(s) in requested response order.
  • the requested indicium response value(s) in requested response order.
  • transmit the interrogation instructions for stateless operation of the database
  • the communicator ID for stateless operation of the database
  • the transaction ID previously received if required.
  • the PAMS management server calculates the validity of the received information and makes a validity determination regarding the received indicia. The validity determination is made based upon matching one or more of the received indicia against the stored indicia in the PAMS management server. Note that not all received indicia values must be validated by the PAMS server for a validity determination to be made. Some values may be ignored (they were requested for obfuscation purposes) and, in some cases, a small percentage of indicia value mismatches may be permitted (in cases where the feature detection is not completely reliable).
  • the PAMS management server may optionally log the validity determination in the database. In step 8070, the communicator receives a validation response from the PAMS management server.
  • the communicator sets one or more indicators associated with the protected article in response to the receipt (or non-receipt) of the validation response and/or its contents in step 8080.
  • the PAMS management server upon receiving indicia from a key, compares the indicia to previously stored indicia in the PAMS database.
  • FIG 15 illustrates an example for using the integrated device 1000 (with any or all of the disclosed sensor modes) to affix the key device 1004 to easily mislaid or stolen official documents, such as a passport 1002.
  • An integrated device 1002 permits the location of the passport 1002 to be determined when it has been separated from the person to whom it is issued and provides a mechanism for tracking stolen or lost passport 1002 before they can be used improperly, and further identifies the document as to its current status.
  • One challenge of using an integrated device 1000 in this way is affixing the key device 1004 to the passport so that it is not easily removable without leaving a trace. Typically, this is accomplished using strong adhesives such as an epoxy. Hard setting adhesives affixed to flexible substrates such as a passport cover often experience issues with bond strength, including the ability to "peel away" the cover from the adhesive, permitting the integrated device to be separated from the passport.
  • the integrated device may monitor an internal inertial/shock sensor and take an action if shocks greater than a
  • the inertial sensor may trigger on shocks greater than 5G or alternatively 25G (or any setting between 5G and 25G).
  • the inertial sensor may trigger if movements of the integrated device consistent with a predetermined pattern are observed.
  • the integrated device may be pre-programmed with inertial movement patterns that are indicative of the twisting and turning of the integrated device being detached from a passport, and be programmed to notify the PAMS server if inertial movements matching a preprogrammed pattern are detected.
  • the integrated device may record the inertial movements and forward information regarding the movements to the PAMS server, where the recorded movement information is matched against one or more patterns to determine if the integrated device is likely being separated from the passport.
  • a conductive adhesive layer is used, and the integrated device monitors one or more electrical characteristics of the adhesive layer.
  • the adhesive layer is variably electrically conductive, and the integrated device has measuring pins or leads inserted into the adhesive layer.
  • the integrated device takes an action as described above.
  • the adhesive layer may have fine electrical wires embedded within it. This is particularly useful when using a strippable adhesive layer and causing the wires to cross the relatively weaker interface layer.
  • Separating the adhesive layers causes the wires to stretch and/or break, changing their electrical characteristics. Again, if the electrical characteristics of the wires embedded within the adhesive layer change by more than a specified amount, the integrated device takes an action as described above.
  • a set of keys and indicators may be integrated into an article container such as a courier bag used to transfer high value documents used in complex international financial transactions.
  • an article container such as a courier bag used to transfer high value documents used in complex international financial transactions.
  • a protected article courier bag or other container addresses protecting these documents while they are in transit.
  • a first key is configured to measure PUAs related to the integrity of the courier bag itself and a second key is configured to measure PUAs related to the integrity of the courier bag closure.
  • In indicator and communicator may be optionally integrated, or may be used independently.
  • a bag seal may be constructed using a variably conductive adhesive, a tape using a variably conductive adhesive, a conductive wire interlaced into a seal produced using traditional sealing techniques (any of which may have their PUAs measured and monitored by a resistive mesh key or an optical key), or by using traditional sealing techniques for which the PUA are measured and monitored by an optical key.
  • the courier bag is loaded with the documents to be protected, the bag is sealed, and the keys are initialized and registered with PAMS.
  • PAMS PAMS

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Abstract

L'invention concerne des systèmes et procédés de gestion d'articles, de suivi et d'identification, destinés à déterminer de manière fiable et répétée une ou plusieurs instances d'attributs ne pouvant pas être physiquement copiés (de types identiques ou différents) à partir d'un article de fabrication ou inhérents à celui-ci, en utilisant le ou les attributs physiques ne pouvant pas être copiés afin de produire une identité infalsifiable pour l'article, puis à intégrer cette identité infalsifiable dans des systèmes de suivi basés sur ordinateur d'une manière qui permette au système de suivi de suivre et de surveiller des articles pour lesquels les informations d'identité sont connues. Des applications comprennent, sans s'y limiter, des documents, des accessoires de mode, des œuvres d'art et d'autres composants.
PCT/US2016/027834 2015-04-16 2016-04-15 Gestion d'articles protégés Ceased WO2016168654A1 (fr)

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AU2016248323A AU2016248323B2 (en) 2015-04-16 2016-04-15 Protected article management
CN201680035436.1A CN107980143B (zh) 2015-04-16 2016-04-15 受保护物品的管理
HK18113969.0A HK1254868B (zh) 2015-04-16 2016-04-15 受保护物品的管理
JP2018506081A JP2018523240A (ja) 2015-04-16 2016-04-15 被保護物品管理
EP16723561.3A EP3284018A1 (fr) 2015-04-16 2016-04-15 Gestion d'articles protégés

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US201562148528P 2015-04-16 2015-04-16
US62/148,528 2015-04-16
US201662295914P 2016-02-16 2016-02-16
US62/295,914 2016-02-16
US201615099378A 2016-04-14 2016-04-14
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EP4323758A1 (fr) 2021-04-12 2024-02-21 LDVS, Inc. Surveillance d'états et d'état de santé d'oeuvres artistiques
GB2630653A (en) * 2023-06-30 2024-12-04 Quantum Base Ltd Method of reading an optically readable security element

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KR102523147B1 (ko) * 2021-02-03 2023-04-21 광주과학기술원 피유에프 아이디, 및 피유에프 아이디 리더기
CN114022071A (zh) * 2021-11-01 2022-02-08 中国东方航空股份有限公司 用于实时管理行李的运输的方法、装置及存储介质

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CN107980143B (zh) 2021-11-30
CN107980143A (zh) 2018-05-01
AU2016248323B2 (en) 2020-07-23
HK1254868A1 (zh) 2019-07-26
AU2016248323A1 (en) 2017-12-07
EP3284018A1 (fr) 2018-02-21

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