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WO2015001376A1 - Signatures pour communications en champ proche - Google Patents

Signatures pour communications en champ proche Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2015001376A1
WO2015001376A1 PCT/IB2013/001949 IB2013001949W WO2015001376A1 WO 2015001376 A1 WO2015001376 A1 WO 2015001376A1 IB 2013001949 W IB2013001949 W IB 2013001949W WO 2015001376 A1 WO2015001376 A1 WO 2015001376A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
carrying device
signature
ndef
nfc
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/IB2013/001949
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Philip HOYER
Mark Robinton
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Assa Abloy AB
Original Assignee
Assa Abloy AB
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Assa Abloy AB filed Critical Assa Abloy AB
Priority to US14/897,708 priority Critical patent/US10237072B2/en
Priority to EP13776554.1A priority patent/EP3017580B1/fr
Priority to PCT/IB2013/001949 priority patent/WO2015001376A1/fr
Publication of WO2015001376A1 publication Critical patent/WO2015001376A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Priority to US16/265,188 priority patent/US20190165947A1/en
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/108—Source integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/72—Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the present disclosure is generally directed toward creating and managing signatures for Near Field Communications (NFC) Data Exchange Format (NDEF) records.
  • NFC Near Field Communications
  • NDEF Data Exchange Format
  • NFC Near Field Communications
  • RFID radio-frequency identification
  • Bluetooth is a wireless technology standard for exchanging data over short distances (using short- wavelength radio transmissions in the ISM band from 2400-2480 MHz) from fixed and mobile devices, creating personal area networks (PANs) with high levels of security.
  • PANs personal area networks
  • Bluetooth relies on powered devices for both sides of the communication whereas NFC facilitates communications between a powered device and a passive device (e.g., an NFC tag or credential).
  • a passive device e.g., an NFC tag or credential.
  • one device can operate without an internal power source, such as a battery.
  • Card Emulation Mode an NFC-enabled phone emulates a contactless card in accordance with ISO 14443 and/or ISO 15693, each of which are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.
  • Typical applications of the Card Emulation Mode include payment, ticketing, and access control applications.
  • the NFC-enabled phone reads a tag and typically performs some function based on the information obtained from the read tag.
  • Typical applications of the Reader/Writer Mode include reading posters with an NFC tag in proximity thereto, interactive advertising, launching mobile Internet (e.g., automated web- browser activation), automated Short Message Service (SMS), and automated call initiation.
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • Peer-to-Peer Mode two NFC-enabled phones, or similar types of devices, are allowed to exchange data with one another.
  • Typical applications of the Peer-to-Peer Mode include setting up wireless settings (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, etc.), sharing business cards, or sharing inormation between NFC-enabled phones.
  • NFC tags carry NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) records, which have a static cryptographic signature to ensure the integrity of the data written to the tag.
  • NDEF NFC Data Exchange Format
  • an NDEF record is disclosed that can be created with information about the tag itself including a non-random Unique Identifier (UID) (e.g., MAC address, SIM card number, tag ID, IP address, etc.).
  • UID non-random Unique Identifier
  • this data can be included in the signature that is calculated for the NDEF record such that the verifier of the NDEF record could compare the record and UID read from the tag to validate the binding via the signature.
  • a nonce can be provided to the tag, which is ultimately included in the signature calculation. This nonce could be provided in the request to read the tag data or during a separate authenticate command.
  • the tag dynamic signature may be based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) solution (e.g., RSA, ECDS, etc.) and hence also introduces the concept of a tag certificate.
  • PKI Public Key Infrastructure
  • This certificate can be added into the standard NDEF security certificate chain so that the returned NDEF data containing the dynamic signature can be verified without any changes to the verification process of current standard NDEF specifications.
  • the tag certificate could include the unique identifier of the tag (e.g., static UID).
  • the response signature might also return the tag certificate.
  • the introduction of the tag certificate would also allow the concept of a Tag Revocation Service (e.g., a Tag
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram depicting a transaction system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 2 is a flow diagram depicting a method of generating a signature for an NDEF record in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 3 is a flow diagram depicting an authentication process in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram depicting a first data structure in accordance with
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram depicting a second data structure in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • Fig. 6 is a flow diagram depicting a certification method in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • a transaction system 100 is depicted in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • the transaction system 100 is shown to include a reading device 104 and a data-carrying device 108.
  • the reading device 104 and data-carrying device 108 may be configured to exchange data over a wireless
  • the devices 104, 108 may be configured to exchange data 112 with one another using an NFC protocol, a Bluetooth standard (e.g., Bluetooth 4), infrared, or the like. Where an NFC protocol is used, the data 112 may be stored as an NDEF record or collection of NDEF records.
  • NFC protocol e.g., Bluetooth 4
  • infrared e.g., infrared
  • the communication path 116 does not necessarily have to be wireless.
  • a wire or cable e.g., Universal Serial Bus (USB) cable
  • USB Universal Serial Bus
  • the reading device 104 and data-carrying device 108 may each be equipped with NFC interfaces that enable the devices 104, 108 to exchange data in accordance with the NFC protocol.
  • the devices 104, 108 may exchange data using any type of NFC communication mode (e.g., a Card Emulation Mode, a Reader/Writer Mode, or a Peer-to-Peer Mode).
  • the data-carrying device 108 may emulate a card and the reading device 104 may correspond to a reader of the data-carrying device.
  • the reading device 104 When operating in the Reader/Writer Mode, the reading device 104 may write data to the data-carrying device 108 or the data-carrying device may write data to the reading device 104.
  • the devices 104, 108 may only be allowed to communicate data with one another when the physical distance between the devices 104, 108,
  • the devices 104, 108 is less than a predetermined distance.
  • the devices 104, 108 can be configured to exchange wireless communications with one another via NFC as long as the devices are close enough to support such communications (e.g., between approximately
  • the mobile devices 104, 108 may communicate with one another as long as the devices are between approximately 0.01m and 2.0m of one another.
  • other protocols such as Wi-Fi, Zigbee, Wi-Max, and the like may be used to exchange data between devices 104, 108.
  • the data-carrying device 108 may correspond to any type of communication device such as a telephone, a mobile telephone, a cellular phone, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a tablet, a thin client computing device, a netbook, a watch, a key fob, a portable card-shaped credential, or the like.
  • the reading device 104 may correspond to a telephone, a mobile telephone, a cellular phone, a PDA, a tablet, a thin client computing device, a netbook, a watch, a key fob, or the like.
  • the reading device 104 may correspond to a traditional access control reader that may or may not be mounted to a wall or permanent location.
  • the reading device 104 may correspond to a mobile access control reader and/or writer.
  • the data-carrying device 108 may have data 112 maintained thereon (e.g., stored in memory of the data-carrying device 108).
  • the reading device 104 may also comprise data 112 stored thereon.
  • the data 112 may be used by the data-carrying device 108 to obtain access to one or more assets (e.g., logical and/or physical assets) protected by the reading device 104.
  • the data-carrying device 108 may provide some or all of the data 112 to the reading device 104 to access one or more assets protected by the reading device 104.
  • some or all of the data 112 may be stored in a secure area of memory, such as a Secure Element (SE), a Secure Access Module (SAM), a Subscriber
  • SE Secure Element
  • SAM Secure Access Module
  • Subscriber a Subscriber
  • the data 112 be stored as an NDEF record or collection of NDEF records along with one or more signatures that can validate the NDEF record or NDEF records.
  • NDEF records are a light-weight binary format, used to encapsulate typed data. NDEF records are specified by the NFC Forum, for transmission and storage with NFC, however, NDEF records are transport agnostic.
  • an NDEF record may include one or more of: typed data, such as MIME -type media, a URI, or a custom application payload. More specifically, an NDEF record may be configured to contain a 3 -bit TNF
  • Type Name Field that provides high level typing for the rest of the record.
  • the remaining fields are variable length and not necessarily present: type - detailed typing for the payload; id - identifier meta-data; and/or payload - the actual payload.
  • a method of generating a signature for an NDEF record begins when it is determined that a new NDEF record is to be created and/or an NDEF record is to be updated (step 204). Thereafter, the method continues by determining information about the device (e.g., data-carryng device 108) on which the NDEF record will be stored (step 208).
  • the device e.g., data-carryng device 108
  • the determining step may include determining a UID, a site code, a card type, information about a user of the device, a hash value generated with one or a combination of such information, an XOR value generated with one or a combination of such information, some other non-random data, or some other value generated from non-random data.
  • the information determined in step 208 is then used to calculate a signature for the NDEF record (step 212).
  • the signature generated for the NDEF record or collection of NDEF records is generated by combining the determined information with some or all of the NDEF record.
  • the determined information may be a hash value generated with a combination of the determined information and the NDEF record.
  • the signature can simply be generated by calculating a hash value with the determined information only.
  • the signature can simply correspond to a concantenation of the different information obtained in step 208 or a concantenation of the determined information with the NDEF record. It should be appreciated that the mechanism(s) used to generate the signature can vary without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.
  • the signature is stored in the data-carrying device 108 along with the NDEF record (step 216).
  • both the NDEF record and signature may be stored in a secure area of memory.
  • the NDEF record may be stored in a secure area of memory while the signature may be stored in a non-secure area of memory.
  • the signature can be used to validate the binding of the NDEF record with the device on which the NDEF record is stored.
  • the reading device 104 can validate the data-carrying device 108 as being the intended (and possibly sole) keeper of the NDEF record because the NDEF record was bound with the data-carrying device 108 via the signature.
  • the utilization of such a signature effectively prevents the unauthorized moving valid data 112 from an authorized data-carrying device 108 to an unauthorized data-carrying device.
  • the method begins when either the reading device 104 or the data-carrying device 108 initiate an authentication process (step 304).
  • the authentication process is initiated by the reading device 104 when the data-carrying device 108 is placed within a predetermined distance from the reading device 104 (e.g., within a read range of the reading device 104).
  • the method continues with the reading device 104 providing the data-carrying device with a nonce value, for example (step 308). While a nonce value may correspond to a random or pseudo-random number generated at the reading device 104, a nonce word may be used instead of a nonce value. In other words, any arbitrary number or string may be provided to the data-carrying device 108 to perform the authentication process. It should also be noted that the nonce value can be provided in the request to read data from the data-carrying device 108 or it can be provided in a separate authenticate command (e.g., before or after the data 112 is read from the data-carrying device 108).
  • the data-carrying device 108 may use the nonce value to generate a dynamic signature (step 312).
  • the nonce value is brought within a secure element (SE) of the data-carrying device 108 and the signature is calculated within the SE.
  • SE secure element
  • the dynamically-generated signature is then provided back to the reading device 104 (step 316). It should be noted that since this mechanism can be independent of the data-carrying device 108, this authentication protocol can be used for devices having random UIDs whereas the signature-creation process described in Fig. 2 is suited for devices having non-random UIDs.
  • the method continues with the data-carrying device 108 providing one or more NDEF records to the reading device 104 (step 320) and then the reading device 104 analyzing the NDEF record(s) and dynamically-generated signature (step 324).
  • the reading device 104 may first ask the data-carrying device 108 for one or more NDEF records and then ask the reading device 104 for a signature.
  • the nonce value used by the data-carrying device 108 to generate the signature may be provided before or after the reading device 104 receives the NDEF records.
  • the reading device 104 may first perform the authentication process (e.g., provide a nonce value to the data- carrying device and verify authenticity of the dynamic signature received back from the data-carrying device 108) prior to obtaining an NDEF record from the data-carrying device 108.
  • the signature and NDEF record may be provided at the same time and the reading device 104 may validate both the signature and NDEF record at the same time.
  • the data-carrying device 108 may be configured to embed the nonce in the NDEF record and dynamically generate a signature.
  • Figs. 4 and 5 depict two examples of the structure in which the data 112 may be stored on the data-carrying device 108.
  • Fig. 4 depicts a data structure having four data fields: a first data field 404 for a first NDEF record that describes the information obtained in step 208 (e.g., tag data, tag UID, etc.); a second data field 408 for a second NDEF record that include the nonce value; a third data field 412 for the actual data to be analyzed by the reading device 104; and a fourth data field 416 for the signature.
  • the NDEF signature stored in the fourth data field 416 may be used to validate one of the other NDEF records stored in the data structure.
  • the NDEF signature provides a validation that the NDEF records are used to validate the data- carrying device 108. Specifically, the NDEF signature (whether dynamic or based on non- random data) can validate the binding between the NDEF record and the data-carrying device 108 that is intended or authorized to store the NDEF record.
  • Fig. 5 depicts a data structure having three data fields: a first data field 504 for a first NDEF record that describes the information obtained in step 208 along with a nonce value (or some combination of the two values); a second data field 508 for the actual data to be analyzed byt eh reading device 104; and a third data field 512 for the signature.
  • the data structure depicted in Fig. 5 may correspond to a compressed version of the data structure depicted in Fig. 4.
  • the method begins when the reading device 104 transmits a command to the data-carrying device for a tag certificate (step 604).
  • the data- carrying device 108 In response to receiving the command from the reading device 104, the data- carrying device 108 generates and transmits a tag certificate to the reading device 104 (step 608).
  • the tag certificate may correspond to a dynamically- generated signature, such as those described above.
  • the tag certificate may correspond to a public signature from a public-private key pair.
  • the reading device 104 may maintain the private key and the data-carrying device 108 may provide the public key corresponding to the private key in a key pair.
  • the tag certificate may have been added to the standard NDEF security certificate chain, so that an NDEF record containing the dynamic signature can be verified by the reading device 104 without any changes to the verification process defined in current NDEF specifications.
  • the tag certificate could include the non-random data (e.g., static UID). It should also be appreciated that the tag certificate could be provided to the reading device 104 during authentication (e.g., in step 316 or 320).
  • the reading device 104 may compare the tag certificate with a revocation list that has been provided or made available to the reading device 104 (step 612). In other embodiments, the reading device 104 may provide the tag certificate to a third party for comparison with a revocation list. Based on the comparison of the tag certificate with the revocation list, the reading device 104 or some other device may determine and execute one or more actions or decide to perform no action (step 616).
  • the reading device 104 or some other device may cause an alarm to be sounded, light one or more lights, the presenting data-carrying device 108 may be considered and treated as untrusted, security personnel may be notified, etc.
  • the tag revocation list may contain an identification of tag certificates that are either revoked or on hold. A tag certificate may be revoked irreversibly if it is discovered that the certificate authority improperly issued a certificate or if a private key is thought to be compromised. If this is the case, then the tag certificate may be added to the certificate revocation list.
  • a tag certificate may also be considered temporarily invalid if the whereabouts of the certificate are unknown.
  • the revocation list may also list these types of certificates that are currently being held. If a data-carrying device 108 presents a tag certificate that is listed on the revocation list, then actions consistent with identifying an untrusted data-carrying device 108 may be performed.
  • machine-executable instructions may be stored on one or more machine readable mediums, such as CD-ROMs or other type of optical disks, floppy diskettes, ROMs, RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, SIMs, SAMs, magnetic or optical cards, flash memory, or other types of machine-readable mediums suitable for storing electronic instructions.
  • machine readable mediums such as CD-ROMs or other type of optical disks, floppy diskettes, ROMs, RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, SIMs, SAMs, magnetic or optical cards, flash memory, or other types of machine-readable mediums suitable for storing electronic instructions.
  • the methods may be performed by a combination of hardware and software.
  • embodiments may be implemented by hardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description languages, or any combination thereof.
  • the program code or code segments to perform the necessary tasks may be stored in a machine readable medium such as storage medium.
  • a processor(s) may perform the necessary tasks.
  • a code segment may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements.
  • a code segment may be coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention porte sur un dispositif porteur de données et sur des procédés pour son authentification. Le dispositif porteur de données est décrit comme étant apte à communiquer par l'intermédiaire du protocole de communication en champ proche (NFC) et peut avoir un ou plusieurs enregistrements au format d'échange de données NFC (NDEF) stockés dans sa mémoire. Le dispositif porteur de données comprend également, ou a la capacité de générer, une signature qui prouve que le dispositif porteur de données est le dispositif autorisé pour stocker le ou les enregistrements NDEF. Un dispositif porteur de données qui tente de transmettre un enregistrement NDEF sans signature valide peut être identifié comme étant un dispositif porteur de données non autorisé.
PCT/IB2013/001949 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 Signatures pour communications en champ proche Ceased WO2015001376A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US14/897,708 US10237072B2 (en) 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 Signatures for near field communications
EP13776554.1A EP3017580B1 (fr) 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 Signatures pour communications en champ proche
PCT/IB2013/001949 WO2015001376A1 (fr) 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 Signatures pour communications en champ proche
US16/265,188 US20190165947A1 (en) 2013-07-01 2019-02-01 Signatures for near field communications

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/IB2013/001949 WO2015001376A1 (fr) 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 Signatures pour communications en champ proche

Related Child Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US14/897,708 A-371-Of-International US10237072B2 (en) 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 Signatures for near field communications
US16/265,188 Continuation US20190165947A1 (en) 2013-07-01 2019-02-01 Signatures for near field communications

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2015001376A1 true WO2015001376A1 (fr) 2015-01-08

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EP (1) EP3017580B1 (fr)
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US9703968B2 (en) 2014-06-16 2017-07-11 Assa Abloy Ab Mechanisms for controlling tag personalization
WO2021055704A1 (fr) 2019-09-19 2021-03-25 Visa International Service Association Système et procédé d'utilisation de contenu d'étiquette dynamique
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WO2015092953A1 (fr) * 2013-12-16 2015-06-25 パナソニックＩｐマネジメント株式会社 Système d'authentification et procédé d'authentification
WO2016009245A1 (fr) 2014-07-15 2016-01-21 Assa Abloy Ab Plateforme d'application de carte en nuage
US10462666B2 (en) * 2016-08-19 2019-10-29 Jason Dean Hart Method of communicating and authenticating credentials between a portable computing device and multiple radio frequency identification enabled readers
WO2018187596A1 (fr) * 2017-04-06 2018-10-11 Walmart Apollo, Llc Système d'authentification utilisant des étiquettes nfc
US11363455B2 (en) * 2019-01-11 2022-06-14 Qualcomm Incorporated Near field communication forum data exchange format (NDEF) messages with authenticated encryption
US10643420B1 (en) * 2019-03-20 2020-05-05 Capital One Services, Llc Contextual tapping engine
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US10237072B2 (en) 2019-03-19

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