WO2014208627A1 - ユーザ認証システム、ユーザ認証方法、プログラム及び情報記憶媒体 - Google Patents
ユーザ認証システム、ユーザ認証方法、プログラム及び情報記憶媒体 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2014208627A1 WO2014208627A1 PCT/JP2014/066900 JP2014066900W WO2014208627A1 WO 2014208627 A1 WO2014208627 A1 WO 2014208627A1 JP 2014066900 W JP2014066900 W JP 2014066900W WO 2014208627 A1 WO2014208627 A1 WO 2014208627A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
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- the present invention relates to a user authentication system, a user authentication method, a program, and an information storage medium, and relates to password cracking countermeasures.
- the upper limit count is set unless the upper limit count is set to a very small value. There is no denying the risk that other users will succeed in user authentication due to incorrect input.
- the present invention has been made in view of the above problems, and its purpose is to provide a user authentication system, a user authentication method, and a user authentication method that can prevent the other person from succeeding in user authentication even if the user information is known to the other person. It is to provide a program and an information storage medium.
- a user authentication system includes an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires a user input password, a user authentication unit that performs authentication of the user based on the input password, and the user The authenticity password and a password candidate based on information associated with the user are determined to match or similar to each other, the user authentication fails, the input password, and the password candidate And an authentication procedure changing means for changing the authentication procedure of the user by the user authentication means in accordance with a determination result by the determination means.
- the user authentication method acquires an input password of a user, executes authentication of the user based on the input password, and a password based on the authentic password of the user and information associated with the user. It is determined whether or not the candidate matches or is similar, and when the user authentication fails and the input password and the password candidate match or are similar, the authentic password and the password candidate The user authentication procedure is changed according to whether or not the two match or are similar.
- the program according to the present invention is associated with an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires an input password of a user, a user authentication unit that executes authentication of the user based on the input password, an authentic password of the user, and the user.
- a determination means for determining whether or not a password candidate based on the received information matches or is similar, and when the user authentication fails, and the input password and the password candidate match or are similar,
- a program for causing a computer to function as an authentication procedure changing unit that changes a procedure for authenticating the user by the user authenticating unit according to a determination result by the determining unit.
- an information storage medium includes an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires a user input password, a user authentication unit that performs authentication of the user based on the input password, a genuine password of the user, and A determination unit that determines whether or not a password candidate based on the associated information matches or is similar, and the user authentication fails, and the input password and the password candidate match or are similar And an information storage medium storing a program for causing a computer to function as an authentication procedure changing means for changing the user authentication procedure by the user authentication means in accordance with a determination result by the determination means.
- the user authentication system includes an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires an input password of a user, a user authentication unit that executes authentication of the user based on the input password, and authentication of the user fails. Further, when the password and a password candidate based on information associated with the user match or are similar, depending on whether or not the user's authentic password and the password candidate match or similar, An authentication procedure changing unit that changes a procedure for authenticating the user by the user authentication unit.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a computer network including a user authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the server 10 is a server computer system for providing web services to a large number of users using the communication network 12 such as electronic commerce, and includes a user authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the server 10 is connected to a communication network 12 such as the Internet.
- a number of user devices 14 are also connected to the communication network 12 to receive services provided by the server 10.
- the user device 14 is a computer such as an Internet television, a personal computer, a tablet computer, a smartphone, or a feature phone, and a web browser is installed.
- the server 10 includes the user authentication system, and when there is an access from the user device 14, the server 10 requests the input of a user ID and password pair (authentication information). Then, it is determined whether or not the user of the user device 14 is a valid user, that is, user authentication is performed based on the input authentication information.
- the server 10 provides services via the communication network 12 only to users who have been successfully authenticated by the user authentication system.
- the server 10 stores a password table shown in FIG. 2 for user authentication.
- the password table shown in the figure is related to a user ID for identifying a valid user of the server 10 and the number of times that user authentication may fail due to continuous input of a hash value of the user's password and incorrect authentication information (failure upper limit). Count), the current number of consecutive failures, and a flag indicating whether the account is locked or not. If the account lock flag is 1, it indicates that the account is locked, and if it is 0, it indicates that the account is not locked. If the account is locked, even if the correct user ID and password are entered, the server 10 no longer provides service to the user of that account.
- FIG. 3 to 5 show web pages displayed on the display of the user device 14 in connection with user authentication in the server 10. These web pages are displayed on the user device 14 based on data transmitted from the server 10.
- FIG. 3 shows a login page. As shown in FIG. 3, the login page includes a form for inputting a user ID and a password, and a button for transmitting them to the server 10.
- FIG. 4 shows the re-login page. The re-login page is a page for allowing the user ID and password to be input again when user authentication fails. The re-login page also includes a form for inputting a user ID and a password, and a button for transmitting them to the server 10.
- FIG. 5 shows an account lock notification page. As shown in the figure, the account lock notification page indicates that the user's account is locked and login to the server 10 is prohibited. Yes.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of a warning message transmitted to the user.
- the user authentication system provided in the server 10 determines that there is a possibility that password cracking may be performed for a certain account based on user information such as first name, last name, and date of birth.
- FIG. 7 is a functional block diagram of the user authentication system included in the server 10.
- the user authentication system includes an authentication information acquisition unit 20, a user authentication unit 22, a user information storage unit 24, a password cracking determination unit 26, a message transmission unit 30, and an authentication procedure change unit 28.
- the user authentication unit 22 includes an authentication information storage unit 22a
- the password cracking determination unit 26 includes a password candidate generation unit 26a.
- the program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium such as a CD-ROM, a DVD-ROM, or a semiconductor memory, and may be installed in the server 10 from there or downloaded from the communication network 12.
- the authentication information acquisition unit 20 is mainly configured with a communication interface, a CPU, and a memory included in the server 10, and acquires a user ID and a password. Specifically, the login page data shown in FIG. 3 is transmitted to the user device 14 in response to the login request transmitted from the user device 14. Then, when the user inputs the user ID and password on the form in the login page and presses the login button, the input user ID and password are transmitted to the server 10. Thus, the authentication information acquisition unit 20 acquires the user ID and password from the user device 14.
- the user authentication unit 22 is mainly configured with a CPU, a memory, and a storage device included in the server 10 and executes user authentication based on the user ID and password acquired by the authentication information acquisition unit 20.
- the authentication information storage unit 22a is mainly configured of a storage device, and stores the password table shown in FIG.
- the user authentication unit 22 calculates a password hash and reads the password hash corresponding to the user ID from the authentication information storage unit 22a. Then, it is determined whether or not the calculated password hash matches the password hash read from the authentication information storage unit 22a. If they match, it is determined that user authentication has succeeded, and if they do not match, it is determined that user authentication has failed.
- the number of failed user authentications (number of failures) is managed in the password table. When the number of failures exceeds the upper limit, the account is locked and flag 1 indicating that is recorded in the password table. .
- the account lock may be released by the administrator of the server 10. That is, the account lock flag recorded in the password table may be arbitrarily set to 0 by the administrator. Alternatively, the server 10 may measure an elapsed time after the account lock flag in the password table is changed to 1, and reset the account lock flag to 0 when the elapsed time reaches a predetermined lock time. . In this way, the account can be locked for a predetermined lock time, and then the account lock can be automatically released. Note that when unlocking the account, the upper limit of the password table and the number of failures may be reset to the initial values.
- the user information storage unit 24 is mainly configured of a storage device, and stores the user information shown in FIG. As shown in the figure, the user information storage unit 24 stores a plurality of information items such as the user's last name, first name, date of birth, country of residence, address, and telephone number in association with the user ID of each user. ing. Of course, you may memorize
- a plurality of information items such as the user's last name, first name, date of birth, country of residence, address, and telephone number in association with the user ID of each user.
- the password cracking determination unit 26 is configured around a CPU and a memory included in the server 10.
- the password candidate generation unit 26a is also configured around a CPU and a memory included in the server 10.
- the password candidate generation unit 26 a generates password candidates based on the user information stored in the user information storage unit 24.
- the password cracking determination unit 26 determines whether the password acquired by the authentication information acquisition unit 20 matches the password candidate generated by the password candidate generation unit 26a when the user authentication unit 22 fails in user authentication. to decide. If both passwords match, the password cracking determination unit 26 determines that there is a possibility that password cracking has been performed.
- the similarity between both passwords may be calculated, and it may be determined that password cracking may be performed even when the similarity exceeds a predetermined threshold, that is, when both passwords are similar. If the password entered by the user matches or resembles a past genuine password, the password cracking determination unit 26 does not perform password cracking even if they are created based on user information. It may be determined that there is no possibility that this has been done. This is because it is considered that the user himself / herself has input a past genuine password due to misunderstanding of the user.
- FIGS. 9A and 9B show examples of password candidate generation rules used by the password candidate generation unit 26a.
- the password candidate generation unit 26a sequentially reads each line of the password candidate generation rules shown in FIGS. 5A and 5B and generates password candidates accordingly.
- FIGS. 7C and 7D show examples of password candidates A and B generated according to the rules A and B shown in FIGS. (C) and (d) show the results of applying the rules A and B shown in (a) and (b) to the user information of the user whose user ID is 002 shown in FIG. Yes.
- the password candidate generation rule A in FIG. 6A is a rule for generating a password candidate A that is easy to hack
- the password candidate generation rule B in FIG. 5B is a password candidate B that is difficult to crack.
- the password candidate B is composed of more user information elements than the password candidate A, and is composed of user information elements that are difficult to obtain for others.
- the password candidate B is input by a third party, it is considered that the person is grasping extremely detailed and difficult-to-obtain information of the user, and it can be said that the probability of password cracking is high.
- the password candidate generation unit 26a may use the entire information item as a password candidate as it is.
- the entire information items such as first name and last name may be used as password candidates as they are.
- the password candidate generator 26a generates at least a part of each information item included in the user information.
- Password candidates may be generated by combining.
- a password candidate may be generated by combining all of a plurality of information items as they are so that the first name and last name are combined to form “YamadaTaro”.
- the first character of the name, the first character of the sex, and the date of birth are combined to form “TY20000520”.
- Password candidates may be generated by combining.
- the password candidate generation unit 26a divides one information item into a plurality of elements so that “05202000” is obtained by exchanging the first four characters of the date of birth and the last four characters. Password candidates may be generated by selection or replacement of multiple elements.
- the password candidate generation unit 26a generates a password that is expected to be attempted when the Service-to-Self obtains other person's user information as a password candidate based on the user information of each user. Then, the password cracking determination unit 26 indicates that there is a possibility that password cracking has been performed when the password generated in this way and the erroneous password actually transmitted from the user device 14 match or are similar. to decide.
- a plurality of password candidate generation rules A and B are provided according to the difference in cracking difficulty.
- the input password matches or resembles password candidate B, which is difficult to crack, there is a possibility that a more serious password cracking is being performed by a Service-to-Self who grasps detailed and difficult-to-obtain information of the user. It is determined that there is a password, and the upper limit number of failure times of user authentication is greatly reduced as compared with the case where the password candidate A is easy to crack or matches or is similar. That is, the change mode of user authentication is made different according to the contents of password candidates that match or are similar to the input password. This makes it easier to perform account lock. This makes it possible to take stronger measures for preventing cracking when there is a possibility of serious password cracking.
- the authentication procedure changing unit 28 is configured mainly with the CPU and the memory included in the server 10, and when the password cracking determination unit 26 determines that there is a possibility that password cracking is performed, the user authentication unit 22 changes the user authentication procedure. Specifically, the failure upper limit stored in the authentication information storage unit 22a is reduced. For example, a value smaller than an initial value such as 1 or 2 (here, 4) is set. Alternatively, each time the password cracking determination unit 26 determines that there is a possibility that password cracking is being performed, the failure upper limit value may be sequentially decreased from the initial value by a predetermined value.
- the authentication procedure changing unit 28 changes the user authentication procedure only when the authentic password of the user matches or is similar to either of the password candidates A and B generated by the password candidate generating unit 26a. That is, the authentication procedure changing unit 28 holds the plain text of the user's authentic password in addition to or instead of the hash value, and whether the authentic password matches or is similar to the password candidates A and B. Judge whether or not. Then, if they match or are similar, the user authentication procedure by the user authentication unit 22 is changed. In this way, the user authentication procedure can be changed only when there is a high possibility that password cracking will be successful.
- the genuine password matches or resembles one of the password candidates A and B, it is highly likely that password cracking will eventually succeed by inputting the passwords analogized based on the user information one after another. .
- the user convenience can be improved by changing the user authentication procedure only in such a case.
- the authentication procedure changing unit 28 may change the genuine password when it is determined that password cracking may be performed.
- the password hash stored in the authentication information storage unit 22a is rewritten.
- the new authentic password is preferably difficult to guess from the user information stored in the user information storage unit 24.
- the authentication procedure changing unit 28 may generate a new password based on a random number.
- the password hash is stored as authentic password information in the authentication information storage unit 22a, and user authentication is performed using the password hash.
- the authentic password is stored in plain text in the authentication information storage unit 22a. User authentication may be performed. In this case, when the authentic password is changed, the plain text of the authentic password stored in the authentication information storage unit 22a is rewritten.
- the message transmission unit 30 is mainly configured with a communication interface, a CPU, and a memory included in the server 10.
- the password cracking determination unit 26 determines that password cracking may be performed, A warning message shown in FIG. 6 is transmitted to the registered user's mail address.
- FIG. 10 and 11 are operation flowcharts of the user authentication system included in the server 10.
- the processing shown in the figure is executed by the server 10 when the user ID and password are transmitted from the user device 14 via the page shown in FIG. 3 or 4.
- the authentication information acquisition unit 20 acquires the user ID and password (S101)
- the user authentication unit 22 refers to the password table, and the account lock flag associated with the user ID is 1 ( It is checked whether it is already locked (S102). If the flag is 1, the user authentication unit 22 transmits the data on the account lock notification page shown in FIG. 5 to the user device 14 (S120 in FIG. 11), and ends the process. If the flag is 0, the user authentication unit 22 performs user authentication (S103).
- the number of failures stored in the password table is reset to zero (S122). At this time, the failure upper limit may also be reset to the initial value. Thereafter, the data of the top page (not shown) of the web service is transmitted to the user device 14 (S123), and the process ends.
- the user authentication unit 22 increments the number of failures in the password table by 1 (S105).
- the password candidate generation unit 26a of the password cracking determination unit 26 generates a password candidate (S106).
- the authentication procedure changing unit 28 determines whether or not the user's authentic password matches either of the password candidates A and B (S107). If they do not match, the password cracking determination unit 26 determines whether or not the input password acquired in S101 matches either of the generated password candidates A and B (S116). If they match, the message transmission unit 30 transmits the message shown in FIG. 6 to the user device 14 (S117). On the other hand, if it is determined in S116 that they do not match, S117 is skipped and the process proceeds to S118.
- the password cracking determination unit 26 determines whether or not the input password acquired in S101 matches the user's past authentic password. Judgment is made (S108). If they match, the process proceeds to S121, and if they do not match, the process proceeds to S109.
- the password cracking determination unit 26 determines whether or not the input password acquired in S101 matches any of the generated password candidates A. If they match, the message transmission unit 30 transmits the message shown in FIG. 6 to the user device 14 (S110). Further, the authentication procedure changing unit 28 changes the user authentication procedure. That is, the failure upper limit stored in the password table in association with the user ID acquired in S101 is reduced by the numerical value NA (S111).
- the password cracking determination unit 26 determines which of the generated password candidates B is the input password acquired in S101. It is determined whether or not they match (S113). If they match, the message transmission unit 30 transmits the message shown in FIG. 6 to the user device 14 (S114). Further, the authentication procedure changing unit 28 changes the user authentication procedure. That is, the failure upper limit stored in the password table in association with the user ID acquired in S101 is reduced by the numerical value NB (S115).
- the numerical values NA and NA are values smaller than the default failure upper limit, and NA is a value smaller than NB.
- the default failure upper limit is 3, NA is 1, and NB is 2. In other words, when the password candidate B of a trap that is difficult to crack is actually input, the failure upper limit is reduced by a relatively large numerical value NB, and the account is immediately locked.
- the authentication procedure changing unit 28 may rewrite the password hash stored in the password table in association with the user ID acquired in S101 to the hash of the new password.
- the message transmission unit 30 may transmit a message including the new password to the user device 14 in S110.
- the authentication procedure changing unit 28 may rewrite the password hash stored in the password table in association with the user ID acquired in S101 to the hash of the new password.
- the message transmission unit 30 may transmit a message including the new password to the user device 14 in S114.
- such a forced change of the authentic password may be performed only in S115, not in S111. By doing so, the authentic password can be forcibly changed within the range considered to be the minimum necessary according to the probability of cracking.
- the user authentication unit 22 compares the number of failures stored in the password table with the failure upper limit (S118). If the number of failures is greater than or equal to the upper limit of failure, the account lock flag in the password table is changed to 1 (S119), and the password lock notification page data shown in FIG. 5 is transmitted to the user device 14 (S120). The process is terminated. If the number of failures is less than the upper limit of failure, the data of the re-login page shown in FIG. 4 is transmitted to the user device 14 (S121), and the process ends.
- a password candidate that is expected to be attempted by a Service-to-Self is generated based on user information, and whether the password candidate and the password actually transmitted from the user device 14 match or are similar to each other. Therefore, it can be suitably determined whether or not there is a possibility that password cracking is being performed. Further, when there is a possibility that password cracking has been performed, the user authentication procedure is changed by changing the upper limit of the password or user authentication failure, so that login by a Service-to-Self can be prevented.
- this invention is not limited to the said embodiment, A various deformation
- the possibility of unauthorized access is determined based on various information such as the time when the user ID and password are acquired, the network address of the user device 14, the model of the user device 14, and the like. Such processing may be executed.
- the account lock duration that is, the lock time may be extended.
- the lock time or the time to be added to the lock time is managed for each account, and each time the lock time or the addition time becomes Y in S109, S113, and S116 in FIG. You can increase it. Note that the number of cracking times, the lock time, and the addition time may be reset to initial values when the account lock is released.
- the authentication information storage unit 22a may store an auxiliary password for each account. In this case, before the process of S121, if it is determined that the answer is already yes (Y) in S109, S113, and S116 of FIG. 11, or the answer is already yes for two or more predetermined times. If it is determined, the user may be requested to input an auxiliary password. And the user authentication part 22 may perform user authentication by the input auxiliary password. In this case, unless the user authentication by the auxiliary password is successful, the data of the re-login page shown in FIG. 4 is not transmitted to the user device 14, and the user authentication using the user ID and the (original) password is not executed. In this way, it is possible to prevent the Service-to-Self from successfully logging in when there is a possibility of password cracking.
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Abstract
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Claims (14)
- ユーザの入力パスワードを取得する認証情報取得手段と、
前記入力パスワードに基づいて前記ユーザの認証を実行するユーザ認証手段と、
前記ユーザの真正パスワードと、前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報に基づくパスワード候補と、が一致又は類似するか否かを判断する判断手段と、
前記ユーザの認証に失敗し、更に前記入力パスワードと、前記パスワード候補と、が一致又は類似する場合に、前記判断手段による判断結果に応じて、前記ユーザ認証手段による前記ユーザの認証の手順を変更する認証手順変更手段と、
を含むユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項1に記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記入力パスワードが前記ユーザの過去の真正パスワードと一致する場合に、前記認証手順変更手段による変更を制限する、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項1又は2に記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記認証手順変更手段は、前記パスワード候補の内容に応じて、前記変更の内容を異ならせる、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項1乃至3のいずれかに記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記認証手順変更手段は、前記ユーザの前記真正パスワードを変更する手段を含む、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項1乃至4のいずれかに記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記ユーザ認証手段は、前記ユーザの認証に連続して所定の上限回数だけ失敗した場合に、前記ユーザの認証を停止し、
前記認証手順変更手段は、前記上限回数を減らす手段を含む、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項1乃至5のいずれかに記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記ユーザの認証に失敗し、更に前記入力パスワードと、前記パスワード候補と、が一致又は類似する場合に、前記ユーザにメッセージを送信するメッセージ送信手段をさらに含む、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項1乃至6のいずれかに記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報に基づいて前記パスワード候補を生成するパスワード候補生成手段をさらに含む、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項7に記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報は少なくとも1つの情報項目を含み、
前記パスワード候補生成手段は、前記情報項目を複数の要素に分割し、一部の要素の選択又は前記複数の要素の置換により、前記パスワード候補を生成する、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項7に記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報は少なくとも2つの情報項目を含み、
前記パスワード候補生成手段は、前記各情報項目の少なくとも一部を結合することにより、前記パスワード候補を生成する、ユーザ認証システム。 - 請求項1乃至9に記載のユーザ認証システムにおいて、
不正アクセスの可能性を判断する不正アクセス判断手段を含み、
前記不正アクセス判断手段による判断結果に応じて、前記判断手段による判断、及び前記認証手順変更手段による変更を行う、ユーザ認証システム。 - ユーザの入力パスワードを取得し、
前記入力パスワードに基づいて前記ユーザの認証を実行し、
前記ユーザの真正パスワードと、前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報に基づくパスワード候補と、が一致又は類似するか否かを判断し、
前記ユーザの認証に失敗し、更に前記入力パスワードと、前記パスワード候補と、が一致又は類似する場合に、前記真正パスワードと前記パスワード候補とが一致又は類似するか否かに応じて、前記ユーザの認証の手順を変更する、
ユーザ認証方法。 - ユーザの入力パスワードを取得する認証情報取得手段、
前記入力パスワードに基づいて前記ユーザの認証を実行するユーザ認証手段、 前記ユーザの真正パスワードと、前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報に基づくパスワード候補と、が一致又は類似するか否かを判断する判断手段、及び
前記ユーザの認証に失敗し、更に前記入力パスワードと、前記パスワード候補と、が一致又は類似する場合に、前記判断手段による判断結果に応じて、前記ユーザ認証手段による前記ユーザの認証の手順を変更する認証手順変更手段
としてコンピュータを機能させるためのプログラム。 - ユーザの入力パスワードを取得する認証情報取得手段、
前記入力パスワードに基づいて前記ユーザの認証を実行するユーザ認証手段、
前記ユーザの真正パスワードと、前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報に基づくパスワード候補と、が一致又は類似するか否かを判断する判断手段、及び
前記ユーザの認証に失敗し、更に前記入力パスワードと、前記パスワード候補と、が一致又は類似する場合に、前記判断手段による判断結果に応じて、前記ユーザ認証手段による前記ユーザの認証の手順を変更する認証手順変更手段
としてコンピュータを機能させるためのプログラムを記憶した情報記憶媒体。 - ユーザの入力パスワードを取得する認証情報取得部と、
前記入力パスワードに基づいて前記ユーザの認証を実行するユーザ認証部と、
前記ユーザの認証に失敗し、更に前記パスワードと、前記ユーザに関連づけられた情報に基づくパスワード候補と、が一致又は類似する場合に、前記ユーザの真正パスワードと、前記パスワード候補と、が一致又は類似するか否かに応じて、前記ユーザ認証部による前記ユーザの認証の手順を変更する認証手順変更部と、
を含むユーザ認証システム。
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| JP2014556666A JP5700897B1 (ja) | 2013-06-25 | 2014-06-25 | ユーザ認証システム、ユーザ認証方法、プログラム及び情報記憶媒体 |
| US14/392,235 US11188625B2 (en) | 2013-06-25 | 2014-06-25 | User authentication system, user authentication method, program, and information storage medium |
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| PCT/JP2013/067411 WO2014207826A1 (ja) | 2013-06-25 | 2013-06-25 | ユーザ認証システム、ユーザ認証方法、プログラム及び情報記憶媒体 |
| JPPCT/JP2013/067411 | 2013-06-25 |
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| JP2022098927A (ja) * | 2020-12-22 | 2022-07-04 | Necプラットフォームズ株式会社 | 認証装置、認証方法及びプログラム |
| JP2023160067A (ja) * | 2022-04-21 | 2023-11-02 | 株式会社デンソー | 電子制御装置 |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US11188625B2 (en) | 2021-11-30 |
| US20160275272A1 (en) | 2016-09-22 |
| WO2014207826A1 (ja) | 2014-12-31 |
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