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WO2014201585A1 - Procédé d'authentification bidirectionnelle rfid sur la base d'une clé asymétrique et d'une fonction de hachage - Google Patents

Procédé d'authentification bidirectionnelle rfid sur la base d'une clé asymétrique et d'une fonction de hachage Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014201585A1
WO2014201585A1 PCT/CN2013/000716 CN2013000716W WO2014201585A1 WO 2014201585 A1 WO2014201585 A1 WO 2014201585A1 CN 2013000716 W CN2013000716 W CN 2013000716W WO 2014201585 A1 WO2014201585 A1 WO 2014201585A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
hash function
function value
tag
reader
public key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2013/000716
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
苑津莎
胡岳
戚银城
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
North China Electric Power University
Original Assignee
North China Electric Power University
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by North China Electric Power University filed Critical North China Electric Power University
Priority to PCT/CN2013/000716 priority Critical patent/WO2014201585A1/fr
Priority to CN201380003846.4A priority patent/CN104115442B/zh
Publication of WO2014201585A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014201585A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and in particular relates to an RFID two-way authentication method based on an asymmetric key and a Hash function. Background technique
  • the Internet of Things is an important part of a new generation of information technology. "The Internet of Things is the Internet of Things", and its client extends and extends between any item and item for information exchange and communication.
  • the Internet of Things is an application of the Internet through the application of intelligent sensing, recognition technology and pervasive computing, and ubiquitous networks.
  • the Internet of Things RFID system generally consists of three parts: identity information system (EPC-IS), reader (Reader), tag (Tag) built on the Internet.
  • EPC-IS identity information system
  • Reader Reader
  • Tag tag built on the Internet.
  • EPC-IS can be replaced by a local database.
  • the communication between the RFID reader and the tag is performed through the air interface, which poses a security risk.
  • the security issues of the RFID system itself can be summarized into two aspects of privacy and authentication: the privacy is mainly traceability.
  • the research finds that in the open RFID system, the types of attacks that may be suffered are: 1. Eavesdropping; Label tracking; 3, spoofing attacks; 4, replay attacks; 5, denial of service attacks; 6, man-in-the-middle attacks; 7, tag replication; 8, physical attacks; 9, location-based attacks.
  • the current research proposes a variety of solutions and protection measures, which can be divided into physical mechanisms, cryptographic mechanisms and a combination of the two.
  • the security authentication mechanism based on cryptographic algorithm has become the research focus of researching and solving RFID security problems because of its security and other advantages.
  • RFID With the development of RFID, there have been many typical Hash function-based RFID security protocols.
  • Document 3 (Mlyako Ohkubo, Koutarou Suzuki and Shingo Kinoshita., Cryptographic Approach to Privacv-Friendly Tags, http://www.r_dprivacy.org/2003/papers.ohkubo.pdf) proposes a hash chain with tags that have the ability to update themselves. It has indistinguishability and forward security, avoiding tracking, spoofing and replay attacks caused by fixed outputs.
  • the protocol is a one-way authentication protocol and does not enable the tag to authenticate the legal identity of the reader. To implement the protocol, two hash functions are integrated into the tag, increasing the cost. And when authenticating in a database with N tag IDs, N records, 2N Hash calculations, and N comparisons are read from the database. The computer processing load increases linearly with the number of times the tag is authenticated, so this method is not suitable for the IoT EPC-IS database environment with a large number of RF tags.
  • the attacker sends an inquiry command to the tag, records the response of the tag, and sends the response to the legitimate reader, which makes it easy for the background to update the ID, so that the data in the tag and the database are out of sync, and the tag cannot be In the future communication, it cannot be correctly recognized by the reader, that is, it cannot prevent the man-in-the-middle attack.
  • the object of the present invention is to propose an RFID two-way authentication method based on an asymmetric key and a Hash function, which is used to solve the existing problems of the Hash function-based RFID security protocol.
  • the technical solution proposed by the present invention is an RFID two-way authentication method based on an asymmetric key and a Hash function, wherein the method includes:
  • Step 1 The reader sends the request information to the tag
  • Step 2 After receiving the request information, the tag sends the tag identifier DID encrypted by the public key to the reader;
  • Step 3 The reader receives the tag identifier DID of the public key encryption and decrypts with the private key to obtain the tag identifier ID;
  • Step 4 The reader searches the database connected to the reader for the numeric string num corresponding to the tag identifier ID according to the tag identifier ID, and determines whether the tag is a legal tag. If the tag is a legal tag, step 5 is performed; otherwise, , the tag is an illegal tag, ending the authentication process;
  • Step 5 Update the numeric string num.
  • the step 4 includes:
  • Step 101 The reader forwards the tag identifier ID to the database, and the database searches the corresponding public key encrypted digital string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM according to the tag identifier ID, and encrypts the public key.
  • the digit string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM are sent to the reader;
  • Step 102 The reader decrypts the public key encrypted digital string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM with the private key, to obtain the numeric string num and the item information M;
  • Step 103 The reader generates a first random number 1 ⁇ and calculates a first hash function value H ⁇ H CnumllR!), and then sends the first random number 1 ⁇ to the label; where H 0 represents a Hash function operation, "
  • Step 105 After receiving the second hash function value, the reader determines whether the second hash function value is equal to the first hash function value H, if the second hash function value H 2 and the first hash function value If they are not equal, the label is determined to be an illegal label; if the second hash function value H 2 is equal to the first hash function value H, the label is a legal label.
  • the update number string num includes:
  • Step 202 The reader sends a first data frame including a third hash function value H 3 , a second random number R2, and an updated digital string num command to the label;
  • Step 205 The tag sends a second data frame including the operation ten, the third random number R 3 and the fifth hash function value H 5 to the reader;
  • Step 207 Send the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum to the database, and update the public key encrypted digital string Dnum with the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum.
  • the update number string num includes:
  • Step 302 The reader sends a second data frame including a third hash function value H 3 , a second random number R 2 , and an operation ⁇ to the label; wherein, the operation ten represents addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, or exclusive OR operation;
  • Step 305 The tag sends a third data frame including a third random number R 3 , a fifth hash function value H 5 and update success information to the reader;
  • Step 306 The reader receives the third data frame, and calculates a sixth hash function value.
  • H 6 H(Nnum
  • Step 307 Send the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum to the database, and update the public key encrypted digital string Dnum with the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum.
  • the database includes a local database and also includes an EPC-IS data environment.
  • EPC-IS database stores the digital string Dnum encrypted with the public key, which can be effectively used for Hash function anti-stealing and attack;
  • the public key can be used to encrypt product information, which is more secure when product information needs to be kept confidential;
  • the hash of the numeric string num is used to authenticate the label, and the irreversibility of the hash function ensures the security of the digital string num update while maintaining the label identification ID unchanged;
  • Embodiment 1 is a flowchart of an RFID bidirectional authentication method based on an asymmetric key and a Hash function provided in Embodiment 1;
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of an RFID bidirectional authentication method based on an asymmetric key and a hash function provided in Embodiment 2. detailed description
  • a random number generation module is introduced in the reader (Reader), and an asymmetric key pair (private key L, public key P) is stored, and the private key L is used to verify the identity of the reader, and the public key P is simultaneously publicly present on the Internet.
  • the tag and reader write the same Hash algorithm.
  • the reader is usually connected to a computer and can access EPC-IS data of the Internet of Things via the Internet.
  • the EPC-IS data includes fields: (1) a data field for storing a tag (Tag) unique identifier ID; (2) a Dnum field for storing a public key P encrypted num number string for hash function calculation (3) Field DM, used to store the information of the public key P encrypted item.
  • the digital string num and the product information M are encrypted and stored in the EPC-IS by the public key. Whether the item information M is encrypted or not can be determined according to the specific situation.
  • the tag stores the DID, that is, the tag identifier encrypted with the public key P, the numeric string num and the Hash function, and introduces a random number generating module.
  • the authentication steps of the RFID system are as shown in FIG. 1 and FIG. 2, and steps 1001 to 1008 (steps 2001 to 2008) are processes for authenticating and reading information, and steps 1009 to 1015 (steps 2009 to 2015) are used.
  • Update the numeric string num There are two ways to update the numeric string num in a tag. One is to generate a new numeric string Nnum ( Figure 1), and the other is to generate a new numeric string Nnum ( Figure 2).
  • the RFID two-way authentication method based on the asymmetric key and the Hash function includes:
  • Step 1001 The reader sends a request message to the tag.
  • Step 1002 After receiving the request information, the tag sends the tag identifier DID encrypted with the public key to the reader.
  • Step 1003 The reader receives the public key encrypted tag identifier DID and decrypts it with the private key to obtain the tag. Identifier ID.
  • Step 1004 The reader forwards the tag identifier ID to the database, and the database searches the corresponding public key encrypted digital string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM according to the tag identifier ID, and encrypts the public key.
  • the digit string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM are sent to the reader.
  • Step 1005 The reader decrypts the public key encrypted digital string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM with the private key to obtain the numeric string num and the item information 1 ⁇ .
  • Step 1006 The reader generates a first random number Ri and calculates a first hash function value. H corpse H
  • II indicates operations such as before and after string concatenation, displacement, and so on.
  • Step 1008 After receiving the second hash function value H 2 , the reader determines whether the second hash function value H 2 is equal to the first hash function value, if the second hash function value H 2 and the first hash If the function values are not equal, the tag is determined to be an illegal tag; if the second hash function value is equal to the first hash function value H, the tag is a legal tag.
  • Step 1010 reader transmitter comprises a third hash function value H 3, R 2 the second random number and the first string of digital data updating num command frame to the tag.
  • Step 1013 The tag transmits a second data frame including the operation ⁇ , the third random number R 3 and the fifth hash function value ⁇ 5 to the reader.
  • Step 1015 Send the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum to the database, and update the public key encrypted digital string Dnum with the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum.
  • the RFID two-way authentication method based on the asymmetric key and the Hash function includes:
  • Step 2001 The reader sends a request message to the tag.
  • Step 2002 After receiving the request information, the tag sends the tag identifier DID encrypted with the public key to the reader.
  • Step 2003 The reader receives the public key encrypted tag identifier DID and decrypts it with the private key to obtain the tag identifier ID.
  • Step 2004 The reader forwards the tag identifier ID to the database, and the database searches the corresponding public key encrypted digital string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM according to the tag identifier ID, and encrypts the public key.
  • the digit string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM are sent to the reader.
  • Step 2005 The reader decrypts the public key encrypted digital string Dnum and the public key encrypted item information DM with the private key to obtain the numeric string num and the item information M.
  • Step 2006 The reader generates a first random number and calculates a first hash function value ⁇
  • Step 2008 After receiving the second hash function value H 2 , the reader determines whether the second hash function value H 2 is equal to the first hash function value, if the second hash function value H 2 and the first hash If the value of the function is not equal, then the tag is determined to be an illegal tag; if the value of the second hash function is equal to the value of the first hash function, the tag is a legal tag.
  • Step 2010 The reader sends a second data frame including a third hash function value 3 ⁇ 4, a second random number R2, and a ten operation to the label; wherein, the operation ten represents an operation of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, or exclusive OR.
  • Step 2013 The tag transmits a third data frame including the third random number R 3 , the fifth hash function value H 5 and the update success information to the reader.
  • H 6 H(Nnum
  • Step 2015 Send the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum to the database, and update the public key encrypted digital string Dnum with the public key encrypted digital string Dnnum.
  • the invention has the following advantages:
  • the identifier ID of the tag is not used as the basis for authentication, but is used to query the data in the EPC-IS data. Assume that there are N tags in the RFID system. In each authentication process, Tag only needs to perform one calculation, and the database only needs to perform one search. Reader can determine the legality of the label only by making two calculations, which is suitable for the EPC-IS environment. Hash chain and other methods need to calculate and compare 2N Hash functions. The EPC-IS data has hundreds of N values and cannot be completed. The solution system has low load, high security, and avoids Hash conflicts.
  • the public-private key is written to the reader in advance, even if the packet DID (the tag identifier encrypted with the public key P) is intercepted, if the attack If the user does not know the private key L, the information cannot be decrypted, effectively preventing privacy leakage.
  • DID the tag identifier encrypted with the public key P
  • Table 1 compares and analyzes various security issues such as anti-tracking and anti-eavesdropping of RFID systems by using Hash lock protocol, random Hash lock protocol, Hash chain protocol, ID change protocol and self-updated RFID protocol proposed in this paper. .
  • Table 2 below compares the number of Hash calculations required for the existing protocols and the protocols in this document in the authentication process.
  • T H represents the time taken for the calculation of the hash function
  • the time required for the T R to generate the random number the time required for the T D to be decrypted with the asymmetric key.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention, qui se rapporte au domaine technique de la sécurité des informations, concerne un procédé d'authentification bidirectionnelle RFID sur la base d'une clé asymétrique et d'une fonction de hachage. Ledit procédé comprend les étapes suivantes : un lecteur envoie des informations de demande à une étiquette; après la réception des informations de demande, l'étiquette envoie au lecteur un identifiant d'étiquette (DID) chiffré par une clé publique; le lecteur reçoit l'identifiant d'étiquette (DID) chiffré par la clé publique et le déchiffre avec une clé privée afin d'obtenir un identifiant d'étiquette ID; le lecteur obtient, selon l'identifiant d'étiquette ID, une chaîne numérique (num) en vue de l'authentification de la fonction de hachage, et estime si l'étiquette est une étiquette légale, et lorsque l'étiquette est une étiquette légale ou non, met à jour la chaîne numérique (num). La présente invention évite efficacement le vol et une attaque d'une fonction de hachage sans augmenter le nombre de calculs d'une étiquette, garantit la sécurité de la mise à jour de la chaîne numérique (num), et résout le problème des collisions de hachage.
PCT/CN2013/000716 2013-06-20 2013-06-20 Procédé d'authentification bidirectionnelle rfid sur la base d'une clé asymétrique et d'une fonction de hachage Ceased WO2014201585A1 (fr)

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PCT/CN2013/000716 WO2014201585A1 (fr) 2013-06-20 2013-06-20 Procédé d'authentification bidirectionnelle rfid sur la base d'une clé asymétrique et d'une fonction de hachage
CN201380003846.4A CN104115442B (zh) 2013-06-20 2013-06-20 基于非对称密钥和Hash函数的RFID双向认证方法

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CN105447430B (zh) * 2015-11-19 2017-10-03 中南大学 一种标签及利用harn协议识别该标签的方法
CN105357015B (zh) * 2015-12-02 2018-11-30 华北电力大学（保定） 一种物联网安全认证方法
CN106712962B (zh) * 2016-12-23 2019-12-24 西安电子科技大学 移动rfid系统双向认证方法及其系统
KR101809974B1 (ko) * 2017-05-22 2017-12-19 주식회사 에프엔에스벨류 다중 사용자의 인증요소를 조합하여 보안키를 생성하는 보안인증시스템 및 보안인증방법
CN108199851B (zh) * 2018-02-01 2022-03-04 北京华大智宝电子系统有限公司 一种数据安全传输方法、装置及系统
CN108900293B (zh) * 2018-05-08 2021-05-25 西安理工大学 一种基于哈希函数和椭圆曲线的rfid安全认证协议
CN110492992A (zh) * 2019-07-22 2019-11-22 哈尔滨工程大学 一种基于无线射频识别技术的数据加密传输方法
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