WO2014102707A1

WO2014102707A1 - Method of realization of a bank check and bank check realized with said method

Info

Publication number: WO2014102707A1
Application number: PCT/IB2013/061273
Authority: WO
Inventors: Claudio Santacesaria
Original assignee: ROTOTYPE SpA
Current assignee: ROTOTYPE SpA
Priority date: 2012-12-28
Filing date: 2013-12-23
Publication date: 2014-07-03
Anticipated expiration: 2015-06-28
Also published as: IN2014MN01971A; ITMI20122258A1

Abstract

A method is provided for realising (10) a bank cheque (1) comprising an issuing procedure (20) of a blank cheque (1a) by an issuing body (5) comprising: a generation step (21), in which the issuing body (5) preferably calculates the basic information (2) to be inserted in the blank cheque (1a), a certification step (22) in which said basic information (2) is signed by means of an asymmetric encryption procedure, with a private key (50), to obtain signed basic information (2a), a transformation step (23), in which the signed basic information (2a) is transformed into a machine legible format, a printing step (24) in which the signed basic information (2a) in a machine legible format is printed on the blank cheque (1a). The method (10) further comprises a compilation procedure (30) of a blank cheque (1a), comprising: an initial step (31), in which the values of the compilation information (3) to be inserted in the blank cheque (1a) are decided, a computing step (32) in which a resulting string (3b) is computed connected to the values of said compilation information (3), the computing step (32) comprising an encryption step (33) in which the information (3) is encrypted, and a writing step (35), in which it is copied onto the cheque (1) together with the resulting string (3b).

Description

DESC RI PT ION

METHOD OF REALIZATION OF A BANK CHEQUE AND BANK CHEQUE REALISED WITH SAID METHOD

The present invention relates to a method of realising a bank cheque, a bank cheque realised with said method and also means of implementing said method, as described in the preamble of the independent claims.

As known, currently a bank cheque is an instrument of payment issued by a bank; technically defined as a negotiable financial instrument, in the sense that it may be used for payment in place of cash, on condition that the bank issuing it acknowledges it as negotiable: it does not consequently have an intrinsic value but acquires value from the moment that the bank acknowledges its validity.

Cheques have existed since the banking system was invented in that they were one of the first financial instruments issued by the first banks. According to some sources the first cheque was issued in 763 by Hoare's bank in London but it is not clear whether similar instruments had been used even prior to such date.

Today it remains an important alternative form of payment to cash for payments between private individuals and to small businesses.

A cheque consists of a pre-printed form ready for compilation and is issued in the form of a book containing from 10 to 50 cheques, by the issuing bank to its customer, defined in the jargon as the drawer. At the moment of issue the cheque is already associated with a specific current account held in the issuing bank. The cheque is identified by a progressive number, which is unique to each single cheque even from the same book, by codes identifying the issuing bank and the holder's current account: all these codes are printed on the cheque and generally coded in a so-called "codeline" printed with magnetic ink and in special characters. The codeline is read by a magnetic head like those used in tape recorders; the characters used comply with one of the two most common standards known as E13b and CMC7. In the cheque book, each cheque is accompanied by a stub on which the holder may make notes when the cheque is detached.

The drawer compiles the blank cheque described above by completing the fields usually provided; the date, the amount to be written in letters and num- bers, the payee and the drawer's signature.

This way the drawer may make a payment to the payee by giving him the duly compiled cheque: in the jargon it is said that the cheque is torn off to recall the fact that it is physically detached from the stub to which it is usually attached by a punching of the paper.

The payee may give the cheque to the issuing bank, to his own bank or to any bank, for its conversion into cash after withdrawal from the drawer's current account.

Recent legislation permits the dematerialisation or processing of the cheque in the form of an electronic image eliminating the paper object at the moment of deposit and making the electronic image of the cheque circulate within the banking circuit in place of the physical object. This paves the way for automatic deposit mechanisms using self-service ATMs and image scanning technologies.

Such methods of payment by means of dematerialised cheques are described for example in the patent application WO-A-2010/091184, in which it is hy- pothesised that the image of the cheque may be captured directly by the drawer and sent to the payee in electronic format. The patent applications EP-A- 1980984 and WO-A-2009/045998 hypothesise that the drawer may directly generate a cheque by means of an electronic instrument such as a smartphone or more general EPS "Electronic Payment System", while actual printing of the instrument and sending to the payee are referred to a centralised system.

The prior art described above has several significant drawbacks.

In fact on the one hand paper cheques are transferable from the drawer to the payee using traditional delivery methods only, such as by post or hand delivery, which are slow, expensive and not secure.

Diversely, the dematerialisation of cheques, which creates new, simplified and more economical handling opportunities of the cheque, also poses new security problems making some of the anti-fraud techniques used in the past and based on the physical nature of the cheque ineffective.

Cheques in addition always have been and still are highly subject to forgery given their possibility of representing consistent sums of money and their flexibility.

For examples, various frauds related to bank cheques have occurred.

A type of fraud exists consisting of generating a forged cheque which may be mistaken for a real cheque. The best forgers, as well as perfectly emulating the graphics of the original cheque, gather information so as to be able to generate a cheque which is very probably a cheque which exists in circulation but which has not yet been paid in so that the bank cannot identify it as invalid or as already cashed.

A second type of fraud consists of the legitimate payee changing the amount so as to make an illegitimate gain.

A further type of fraud consists of stealing the real blank cheque and subsequently compiling and cashing or using it.

A further type of fraud consists of stealing the real cheque filled in and subse- quently changing the payee's name. This type of fraud occurs in particular when cheques are sent by post and in some cases intercepted and stolen; the forger can then change the payee's name and cash the cheque.

Lastly, a fraud exists consisting of issuing a valid cheque without the drawer having sufficient funds to cover it.

On method which partially obviates the problems mentioned is described in the patent application WO-2004090705. Such document illustrates a method for assessing the probability that a discrepancy between the information written in natural language and the information written in a manner optimised for automatic reading is an index of fraud rather than a mere error. However this tech- nique entails generating printed elements at the moment of or after compiling the cheque. It thus makes the technology inapplicable to the traditional use of the cheque which is compiled by the drawer and consigned straight away to the payee.

Another method which partially obviates the problems mentioned is described in the patent application WO-A-97/26615. In such document the critical information of a cheque is protected with control information, coded in one or two decimal digits, preferably printed in the codeline of the cheque. The main limitation of this document consists of the fact that it is not difficult for the forger to alter the codeline itself with magnetic ink.

The patent application GB-A-1404366 introduces the idea of a secret code known only to the drawer of the cheque and of a code alphabet different for each cheque and printed for example on the cheque stub. At the moment of use the user proves his identity by manually encoding the secret code with the alphabet shown on the cheque stub and initials the result of the operation on the cheque. Such method, while entailing important advantages, only protects the drawer's identity and does not protect a cheque issued by the drawer from being fraudulently altered. In addition it does not safeguard the payee in that verification may only be performed by a bank, it being necessary to have secret information available, namely the drawer's password and alphabet associated with the specific cheque.

Other methods which partially obviate the problems mentioned are described in the patent applications US-A-2002/164021A1 and WO-A-2002/052487. Such methods consist of encrypting, by means of a known cryptography, information such as: the amount of the cheque, the name of the payee and so forth. Such information is encrypted by means of an irreversible algorithm with a secret key in the first case or with an algorithm with a public key and a private key in the second case. The encrypted result is converted by the drawer into a barcode, printed and affixed on the cheque. Such methods are extremely secure but very inconvenient for the user who needs to have a computer and printer available for the barcode.

In this situation the technical purpose of the present invention is to overcome the drawbacks of the prior art.

Within the sphere of said technical purpose one important aim of the invention is to realise a bank cheque which is not subject to the methods of fraud de- scribed and which is easy to realise for the drawer. In this situation the technical purpose of the present invention is to devise a bank cheque able to substantially overcome the drawbacks mentioned.

Within the sphere of said technical purpose one important aim of the invention is to realise a bank cheque which is not subject to the methods of fraud de- scribed, which is easy to realise for the drawer and which maintains its characteristics of security and simplicity also in the dematerialised version.

The technical purpose and specified aims are achieved by a bank cheque and related methods and machines as claimed in the appended independent claims. Preferred embodiments are described in the dependent claims.

The characteristics and advantages of the invention are clearly evident from the following detailed description of a preferred embodiment thereof, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

Fig. 1 shows, in brief, the method according to the invention;

Fig. 2 shows, the main steps of the method according to the invention;

Fig. 3 shows the printing steps of the cheque by the issuing bank;

Fig. 4 shows the steps of compiling a cheque by a drawer; and

Fig. 5 shows the steps of controlling the cheque by a payee or receiving bank.

With reference to said drawings, reference numeral 1 globally denotes the bank cheque according to the invention.

Said bank cheque 1 may be a paper cheque or a dematerialised cheque, that is to say a digital image of the cheque. In the present text the term bank cheque 1 is understood to mean both types of cheque.

The bank cheque 1 is issued as a blank cheque 1a by an issuing body 5, such as a bank or similar body, and consigned to a drawer 6. The blank cheque 1a is then detached by the drawer, that is compiled and separated from the stub, and becomes a compiled check 1 b. The bank cheque 1 is then consigned to the payee 7 and cashed by the latter at a receiving bank 8, that is, the negotiating bank, or other similar body.

The method of realization of a bank cheque according to the invention is globally denoted by reference numeral 10 and comprises, in brief, at least one of the following: an issuing procedure 20 of the blank cheque 1a, a compilation procedure 30 of the cheque by the drawer and a control procedure 40 of the blank cheque 1 a or compiled cheque 1 b by the payee or receiving bank.

The issuing procedure 20 of the blank cheque by the issuing body 5. The term blank cheque is understood to mean that the check does not yet have the data to be added by the drawer, such as the payee, the amount paid and the issue date.

Such issuing procedure 20 is realised by printing means.

In a first generation step 21 , the issuing body 5 preferably calculates the basic information 2 to be inserted in the blank cheque 1a.

In particular the basic information 2 is: information on the issuing body 5, information on the drawer 6 and univocal information making each single cheque unique.

Such basic information 2 is the same as that already present on each cheque, in particular the so-called codeline of the cheque itself includes at least some of the basic information 2.

In detail the information on the bank consists of the name of said issuing body 5, or of a code related to such name, for example the ABI (Italian Banking As- sociation) code. The information on the drawer is in particular information on the current account, which is univocally connected to the drawer or drawers 6.

The univocal information on the cheque is a progressive number usually also included in the codeline.

Such basic information 2 thus univocally identifies, worldwide, the bank cheque 1 , the issuing body 5 and drawer 6.

Said basic information 2, and possibly, further information at the bank's discretion, is then entered in a computer in the form of alphanumerical strings, in particular in the form of alphanumerical strings in XML format.

In a subsequent certification step 22 the alphanumerical string is signed by means of a known asymmetric encryption procedure with a public and private key, in particular with a PGP standard protocol according to the RFC4880 published by IETF with use of an RSA public and private key.

Such procedures, as is known, permit the creation of a private key 50, with which a series of operations may be performed, and a public key 51 , with which other operations may be performed. The two keys are, in addition, functionally connected.

In particular such procedures, when used in signature mode, permit only the owner of the private key 50, in this case the issuing body 5, to generate an en- crypted sequence of bytes, said digital signature, depending on an unencrypted text. Such procedure further permits all those in possession of the public key 51 to verify that the encrypted sequence has been generated by someone holding the private key 50 and to also verify that said encrypted sequence is related to said unencrypted text.

Said asymmetric algorithms in signature mode thus make it possible to univo- cally establish the source and completeness of the information, given that only the owner of the private key is able to generate the digital signature.

The certification step 22 then makes it possible to safely determine that the cheque has been issued by the issuing body and the completeness and source of the basic information 2, inserted in the blank cheque.

A digital signature is then obtained which is entered, together with the basic information 2 in unencrypted form, in an XML file which contains the signed basic information 2a.

The procedure then comprises a transformation step 23, in which the signed basic information 2a is transformed into a machine legible format, more in particular into a format easily legible by a machine by means of an image, more in particular a barcode and even more in particular a barcode of the QR type.

The QR code including the signed basic information 2a is thus easily legible by a machine even in a dematerialised cheque and makes it possible to safely de- termine that the cheque has been issued by the issuing body and the completeness and source of the information 2a.

The procedure 20 lastly comprises a printing step 24, on a paper medium or the like, or solely at a digital level, in which the basic information and the QR code are printed by the issuing body 5, or with its consent, on a blank cheque 1a, appropriately together with the traditional print and filigrees.

The method 50 further comprises the compilation procedure 30 of the blank cheque 1a by the drawer 6, to make it into a compiled cheque 1b.

Such compilation procedure 30 requires the support of an electronic processor such as a computer, or telephone with computing abilities such as a smart- phone or tablet or the like, provided with dedicated software, provided by said bank or by related bodies. In particular the procedure 20 is highly advantageous when used on a portable device.

In such procedure 30, preferably at an initial stage, first of all 31 the drawer 6 decides the values of the information to be inserted in the blank cheque 1a. In particular the values of the following compilation information 3: information on the payee 7, such as the name thereof, information on the amount to be transferred, such as its numerical value in the currency pre-printed on said cheque, and preferably information on the moment of compilation, such as in particular the date of compilation.

After which in a computing step 32, the drawer computes a resulting string 3b, further specified below.

The computing step 32 comprises a preliminary simplification step of the data in which special expedients are applied to prevent errors in the special characters or in the point or comma separating units and decimals. In particular such ex- pedients provide for removing from the payee's name all the spaces and characters other than current characters and numerical digits and provide that the amounts are expressed as whole numbers, for example in hundredths of currency.

The computing step 32 comprises an encryption step 33 in which at least part of the compilation information 3, and preferably all, preferably together with a part of the basic information 2 such as specifically the information making each single cheque unique, is encrypted and an encrypted string 3a is computed. The encrypted string 3a is then connected to at least part of the compilation information 3 and preferably also to part of the basic information 2.

The computing step 32 preferably further comprises a compression step 34, in which the encrypted string 3a is compressed, preferably irreversibly, into a resulting string 3b of reduced dimensions. The resulting string 3b is obtained by means of a Hash function, in particular by means of the Hash function known as R16, in itself known. Such function makes it possible to obtain a resulting string 3b consisting of a string in hexadecimal numbers of four digits.

The encryption 33 and compression 34 steps are preferably in the order described but may also be simply inverted. They may in addition also be performed off-line given that the secret code 52, further defined below, is suitably already present in the processor in the local memory.

More specifically, the computing step 32 preferably takes place by means of said software loaded on the electronic processor.

The drawer enters the compilation information 3 on a dedicated software interface in dedicated alphanumerical characters. The basic information 2 is preferably acquired by the software by means of scanning the signed basic infor- mation 2a easily legible by a machine.

The encrypted string 3a is preferably encrypted using a symmetric algorithm, simpler and faster than asymmetric algorithms. In particular an AES type algorithm at 128 bit is used, for which both the drawer 6 and the issuing body 5 have a secret code 52.

In one alternative, a procedure of the public key-private key type is also used in the encryption step 33, for which in any case the private key is shared by the drawer 6 and by the issuing body 5 and in this case represents the secret key 52, while the public key is not used.

In particular the secret key 52 is entered in the software and installed therewith or subsequently. The bank also keeps a copy of the secret key 52 which is univocally destined to the drawer and more specifically to a current account. Lastly there follows a writing step 35, in which the drawer copies the compilation information 3 onto the cheque by merely writing, by hand, by printing or the like, or analogous digital method on a dematerialised cheque.

In addition, together with the information 3, the drawer writes on the cheque 1 the resulting string 3b and in particular the string described, simple to copy since in hexadecimal and thus without symbols or ambiguities between upper case and lower case letters and also because consisting of only four hexadecimal digits.

Having terminated such step 35 the compilation procedure 30 is terminated and the drawer 6 can tear off the compiled cheque 1 b, physically or virtually, and give it to the payee 7 physically or virtually.

The issuing 20 and compilation 30 procedures are connected to the control procedure 40 of the bank cheque 1. Such control procedure 40 may be carried out on the compiled cheque 1 b but also, at least in part, on the blank cheque 1a and both by the payee 7 and by the receiving bank 8.

Such control procedure 40 is also preferably implemented by means of an electronic processor equipped with dedicated software, suitably also available for portable devices such as smartphones, tablets and the like.

Said software, suitably provided by said banks, comprises the public key 51 , associated with the private key 50 which has generated the signed basic information 2a, of all the banks. Alternatively the public keys 51 are housed in an on-line portal which the control software automatically accesses. The software can in addition preferably be remotely connected to a issuing body or to an as- sociation which is familiar with the secret key 52 for realising the string 3b. The control procedure 40 provides for at least one out of a verification process 41 of the authenticity of the blank cheque 1a, which in actual fact may also be implemented on the compiled cheque 1b, and a process of ascertaining 42 the correctness of the compilation information 3.

The verification process 41 comprises a reading step 43 in which the electronic processor reads the machine legible code, in particular the QR code, including the signed basic information 2a, preferably by means of a photo camera or by simply analysing a digital image.

The reading step 43 is followed by a decoding step 44, in which the electronic processor performs verification of the signed basic information 2a. The same software then extracts the basic information 2 and ascertains the source and completeness thereof, by means of a public key 51.

The decoding step 44 may be performed off-line if the software already includes the public key 51 of the issuing bank 5, or alternatively on-line. In the lat- ter case the decoding step may include controlling the possible cashing of a cheque with the same progressive number.

The verification process 41 lastly provides for a notification step 45, in which the electronic processor notifies the controller, that is the payee 7 or receiving bank 8, that the cheque 1 is authentic, confirming the source and completeness of the basic information 2.

The process of ascertaining 42 comprises an initial acquisition step 46 in which at least part and preferably all the information 3, the resulting string 3b and possibly some basic information 2 is entered.

Substantially the payee 7 uses the same electronic processor and the same software used by the drawer for the compilation procedure 30, but not provided with the secret key 32.

In the acquisition step 46 the payee 7 or the receiving bank 8 compiles the compilation information 3 on a dedicated interface provided by the software. The resulting string 3b is also entered with the compilation information 3. The software acquires the basic information 2 of the machine legible code, in particular the QR code, including the signed basic information 2a to extract the data relative to the cheque number, issuing body and/or codeline without typing it in.

The electronic processor, suitably remotely connectable, for example via Inter- net, sends the compilation information 3 indicated herein and resulting string 3b to a special reserved area, connected to the issuing body 5 or the like.

The acquisition step 46 is followed by a comparison step 47, in which, through the reserved area and using the secret key 52, the resulting string 3b is newly computed starting from the compilation information 3, together with the parts of basic information 2 such as the codeline or merely the cheque number, provided by the payee 7 or by the receiving bank 8, and is compared to the resulting string 3b reported by the payee 7 or by the receiving bank 8.

In such comparison step it may also be seen whether the amount indicated is covered by the drawer's 5 available funds or if the cheque is overdrawn. Such last operation would always take place by means of a reserved area.

If the two resulting strings 3b coincide then in a subsequent confirmation step 48 the electronic processor declares that the compiled cheque 1 b is authentic or else reports a discrepancy.

Preferably, the software permits various compilation attempts, it is thus possible to carry out the ascertainment procedure 42 several times, give the possibility of incurring in transcription errors. However said software permits a finite number of attempts, in particular a number from two to ten and more in particular equal to three. In fact the resulting string 3b as described permits 65536 different combinations and it is best for it not to be possible to control too many times given that such number of combinations is not sufficiently high to counter an attack based on so-called brute strength.

The invention achieves some important advantages.

In fact, the method 10 permits an optimal balance of security and ease of compilation to be achieved.

The cheque may thus be compiled in a substantially standard manner and also be used in a dematerialised format.

In particular, the issuing procedure 20 achieves the realization of a blank cheque 1a with maximum security and little further commitment by the issuing body 5.

In particular the cheque described is able to prevent all the attacks listed above. Forgery of the cheque is in fact extremely problematic and, at the same time, even the compilation of a cheque which one is not the owner of or the alteration of the compilation information 3 by a payee or by third parties, is not possible.

The compilation procedure instead provides for optimised procedures to achieve an optimal compromise between the security of the cheque and ease of compilation thereof.

Modifications and variations may be made to the invention described herein without departing from the scope of the inventive concept. All details may be replaced with equivalent elements and the scope of the invention includes all other materials, shapes and dimensions.

Claims

C LA I MS

1. Method of realising (10) a bank cheque (1) comprising an issuing procedure (20) of a blank cheque (1a) by an issuing body (5) comprising: a generation step (21), in which said issuing body (5) calculates basic information (2) to be in- serted in said blank cheque (1a), characterised in that it further comprises a certification step (22) in which said basic information (2) is signed by means of an asymmetric encryption procedure, with a private key (50), to obtain signed basic information (2a), a transformation step (23), in which the signed basic information (2a) is transformed into a machine legible format, a printing step (24) in which said signed basic information (2a) is printed on said blank cheque (1a) in a machine legible format.

2. Method according to the previous claim, in which said machine legible format is a two-dimensional barcode.

3. Method according to the previous claim, in which said machine legible format is a two-dimensional barcode of the QR type.

4. Method according to one or more of the preceding claims, comprising a compilation procedure (30) of said blank cheque (1a), comprising: an initial step (31), in which the values of the compilation information (3) to be inserted in said blank cheque (1a) are decided, a computing step (32) in which a resulting string (3b) is computed connected to at least some of said values of said compilation information (3), said computing step (32) comprising an encryption step (33) in which said at least part of said values of said compilation information (3) are encrypted, and a writing step (35), in which said compilation information (3) is copied onto said cheque (1) together with said resulting string (3b).

5. Method according to the previous claim, in which in said encryption step (33) said compilation information (3) is encrypted by means of a symmetric algorithm with secret key (52), and in which said secret key (52) is in the possession of said issuing body (5) and of said drawer (6).

6. Method according to claim 4 or 5, in which said computing step (32) com- prises a compression step (34), in which an encrypted string (3a) is compressed into said resulting string (3b) of reduced dimensions.

7. Method according to one or more of the preceding claims, comprising a control procedure (40) comprising a verification process (41) comprising: a reading step (43) in which said signed basic information (2a) in machine legible format is read by means of an electronic processor, a decoding step (44) in which said signed basic information (2a) is verified by means of a public key (51), a notification step (45), in which the possible authenticity of said bank cheque (1) is confirmed, confirming the source and completeness of the basic information (2).

8. Method of realising (10) a bank cheque (1) comprising a compilation procedure (30) of a blank cheque (1a), comprising: an initial step (31), in which the values of the compilation information (3) to be inserted in said blank cheque (1a) are decided, and characterised in that it comprises: a computing step (32) in which a resulting string (3b) is computed connected to at least some of said values of said compilation information (3), a computing step (32) comprising an encryption step (33) in which said at least part of said values of said compilation information (3) are encrypted, and a writing step (35), in which said compilation information (3) is copied onto said cheque (1) together with said resulting string (3b).

9. Method according to the previous claim, in which in said encryption step (33) said compilation information (3) is encrypted by means of a symmetric algo- rithm with secret key (52), and in which said secret key (52) is in the possession of said issuing body (5) and of said drawer (6).

10. Method according to one or more of the claims from 8 to 9, in which said computing step (32) comprises a compression step (34), in which an encrypted string (3a) is compressed into said resulting string (3b) of reduced dimensions.

11. Method according to one or more of the claims from 8 to 10, in which said resulting string (3b) is also connected to at least part of said basic information (2).

12. Method according to one or more of the claims from 8 to 11 , comprising a control procedure (40) comprising a process of ascertaining (42) comprising: an acquisition step (46) in which said resulting string (3b) and at least part of said compilation information (3) is entered in said electronic processor, said information entered is sent to a reserved area, connected to said issuing body (5), a comparison step (47) in which, by means of said secret key (52), said resulting string (3b) is newly calculated starting from said at least part of said compilation information (3) and is compared to said resulting string (3b) reported in said acquisition step (46).

13. Method according to claim 12, in which said information entered in said electronic processor also comprises at least part of said basic information (2).

14. Bank cheque (1) realised according to the method of realization (10) ac- cording to one or more of the preceding claims.

15. Printing means suitable to implement the method according to one or more of the preceding claims,