A portable safe-room
The present invention relates generally
to a portable safe-room and a method of assembling a
safe-room and finds particular, although not exclusive,
utility in the provision of safe-rooms on merchant ships.
Maritime piracy, which has been
on-going in one form or another for centuries, is now
demonstrating a revival in the public consciousness with
high profile captures of major vessels and/or their crews
becoming regular news. Furthermore, the levels of ransom
being paid out by insurance companies and shipping lines is
ever increasing. This aggressive expeditionary piracy is
not only commonplace off the coast of Somalia and the Horn
of Africa but occurs to a lesser extent on the West coast of
Africa (Nigeria), Latin America (including the Caribbean)
and the South China seas (Straits of Malacca).
Recent successful attacks include the
MV Sirius Star, a 330 metre long Saudi Arabian owned tanker
carrying some £66M worth of oil, which was eventually
released after her owners paid a reputed £17M ransom.
There has been a wide scale shipping
and security industry response to this piracy issue. This
response includes preventative measures such as armed (and
non-armed) guarding, laser dazzle systems, acoustic devices,
and ship modification, together with activities such as
conduct-after-capture training for crews and ransom
negotiation services.
By comparing case studies of hijackings
going back over several years it is clear that whilst no one
approach to countering the problem is fool proof, or indeed
without risk, once pirates have successfully boarded the
vessel the only technique that has proved routinely
successful is for the crew to shut down the main engines and
retreat to a safe area or ‘Citadel’ where they can await the
potential arrival of maritime security forces (typically 1-7
hours in the internationally recognised safe transit
corridor (Horn of Africa).
For instance, the German heavy lift
ship Beluga Fortune, a 12,744 dwt vessel, was apparently
boarded by pirates about 1,200 nautical miles off the coast
of Kenya on 24 October 2010. However, the pirates were
apparently unable to navigate the ship towards the African
coast because the engine and bunker feed systems had been
shut down by the ship’s crew, who were hiding in a citadel
room. The attackers fled when the British frigate HMS
Montrose arrived at the scene.
Another German Vessel, the MV Magellan
Star, was attacked and boarded in September 2010. Again the
crew managed to secrete themselves within a secure part of
the vessel and await the arrival of the security forces.
Although there is some evidence that
the use of citadels or safe-rooms is successful, there are
issues faced by the shipping companies such as the cost and
time involved. For instance, it typically takes around 4-5
days to fit and would then require an assessment by a
maritime architect. The actual cost of the modifications is
not the only factor however, as the charges relating to
being docked and the loss of revenue must also be taken into
account. It is understood that it typically costs
US$45,000-60,000 per day to operate a supertanker.
DE20315249U1 describes a reinforced
air-raid type shelter. WO0123261 describes a method for
using modules with containers. WO03080966 and WO2008150174
describe various ways in which reinforcement may be added to
a shipping container. However, none of these documents
disclose ways of providing a relatively inexpensive,
portable safe room for use on ships.
Accordingly, there is a need for a much
easier, quicker and less expensive way of providing a
safe-room on a ship.
In this regard, although the
description is directed to a ship the concept is
transferrable to other environments and locations such as
remote oil, gas and mining facilities on land or at sea.
In a first aspect, the invention
provides a portable safe-room comprising a standard ISO
shipping container, the container having armour plate
located substantially adjacent its inside wall, the
container including a citadel located inside of the armour
plate, the citadel including communication means for
communicating with remote locations, and water storage
means, the safe-room including air conditioning equipment
for providing conditioned air to the interior of the
citadel.
In this regard, a standard High Cube
ISO container has a standardised width of 2.4m, a
standardised height of 2.695m and a length selectable from
6.1, 12, 14, 15, or 16m, although other dimensions exist for
standard ISO containers. The ISO container may be known as
a twenty foot equivalent unit or “TEU”.
The container may be camouflaged in
that it appears from the outside to be a regular freight
container such that when it is stacked in amongst other
containers it is difficult to know in which container the
crew may be hiding.
Alternatively, the container may be
deliberately marked so that it is immediately recognisable
as a safe-room. This may be useful to avoid injury to the
crew in the safe-room if the ship is attacked by anti-pirate
agencies. Also, it may act as a deterrent in that pirates
may consciously avoid ships which have such a safe-room as
they know it will cause them problems.
In one embodiment, the invention
provides for a safe-room or citadel to be at least partially
manufactured, or assembled, prior to insertion into a
container. This allows for greater freedom in designing the
safe room and/or citadel, such as the amount, location and
characteristics of the armour plate, and in the provision of
equipment such as for communication and air treatment. It
also allows for the citadel to be moved from one container
to another if required. Another advantage is that the
integrity of the citadel may be ascertained and/or tested
prior to insertion into a container thus avoiding any damage
to the container.
The container and armour plate may
include a first vent for communication with the air
conditioning equipment, an additional piece of armour plate
being provided inside of the first vent, the additional
piece including a second vent off-set from the first vent to
prohibit direct line of sight through said first and second
vents. In this way bullets cannot be fired through the
first vent thus damaging the air conditioning equipment
and/or any other equipment or personnel within the container.
The first and/or second vents may be
provided by one or more holes. The holes may be provided in
the armour plate.
A fan may be provided between the
armour plate and the additional piece of armour plate. This
may prevent stalling of the air in the void therein to
promote the efficiency and efficacy of the air conditioning equipment.
The armour plate around the inside of
the side walls may be arranged immediately adjacent the
walls. It has been found that if a gap is provided between
the armour plate and the container wall a high velocity
rifle bullet (especially one fired from an AK47 - 7.62mm x
39mm) may have its outer copper layer stripped by the
container wall without any substantial loss of velocity
enabling the narrower bullet to pass through the armour plate.
However, because the container wall is
often corrugated there will be some gaps between it and
armour plate. The stripping effect has been found to only
occur on rare occasions and with strict conditions such as
temperature, thickness of container wall and most
importantly the angle of attack on the container wall. In
one embodiment, material will be inserted within these gaps.
The material may be affixed to the inside surface of the
container wall at these points. Such materials include
ceramics, gravel, plate, tubes and rods, possible of steel,
resin and so on. Any one or more of these materials may
make the bullet tumble or deform which thus prevents its
penetration through the armour plating.
The armour plate may be held in place
by a frame including clamps. This removes the need for
welding which is expensive and can weaken the armour plate.
Accordingly, in one embodiment the armour plate includes no
direct welding.
A further benefit observed is that when
containers are lifted (or slung) some twisting and minor
deformation is possible, with welded plates there is not
sufficient movement for them to flex and cracking of welds
or the plate edges can occur. This problem is not
experienced when the plates are clamped as they have the
necessary ability to move fractionally as the weight of the
container is experienced.
The safe-room may further include
armour plate arranged beneath, and spaced from, the top of
the container. A gap may be provide between the armour
plate and the container to promote ventilation as will be
discussed below.
The tops of containers typically have
thinner steel (1.5mm) than the walls and it has been found
that the stripping effect discussed above does not occur and
therefore the need for not having a gap between the
container and the armour plate is diminished.
The container may include doors at one
end thereof and an armour plated door is arranged
immediately inside said doors. The container doors may be
the standard ones supplied with such containers. The armour
plated door may be a sliding door.
A vestibule may be arranged between the
container and the citadel, inside of the armour plated door,
and at least some of the air conditioning equipment may be
located within said vestibule.
This vestibule may be useful in
camouflaging the citadel in that goods may be stacked in the
vestibule so that if the container is opened it appears to
be a regular freight container. Other uses for the
vestibule are also possible.
The citadel may include an air-tight
door openable outwardly only. The door may open outwardly
into the vestibule.
The safe-room may further include a
first layer of insulation provided between the citadel and
the armour plate.
The first layer of insulation may
include an acoustic layer of insulation and a heat layer of
insulation. The acoustic layer of insulation may include a
rubber layer. This may be 5mm thick. It may also include a
25mm class “O” acoustic dense foam. The heat layer of
insulation may be a class “O” foil.
The first layer of insulation may not
be structural in that it is not providing any structural
integrity to the safe-room nor any significant armouring.
An air gap may be provided between the
first layer of insulation and the armour plate.
The citadel may include a second layer
of insulation adjacent its inner wall. For instance, a 50mm
insulation board such as Kingspan (RTM).
The citadel may include a pitched roof.
This may assist in directing any condensation dripping off
the underside of the top of the container onto the citadel
beneath. This may prevent water ponding thus removing the
breeding grounds for bacteria.
The safe-room may further include a
power supply. The power supply may be a generator, such as
a petrol or diesel generator, and/or batteries. In one
embodiment, batteries are the primary source of electrical
power, being assisted or superseded by the generator as
necessary. A means for connecting the safe-room to another
source of electrical power may also be provided. For
instance, a cable for connecting to a ship’s electricity
supply may be provided. The batteries may provide a period
of 8 hours minimum of silent running before the generator is
required. The acoustic layers described above may help to
prevent the noise of such a generator leaving the container
and thus reduce the risk of it being found amongst other containers.
The generator may be arranged
substantially within the vestibule. This may reduce the
effects, such as gases, noise and heat emanating from it, on
the personnel within the citadel.
The citadel may includes air vents.
These may be located at low and/or high points within it to
promote ventilation.
The container may also include air
vents. Air may then circulate between the citadel, the
inside of the container and the outside of the container.
The armour plate arranged at the top of
the container may include a vent and an additional piece of
armour plate may be arranged spaced from said vent to
prohibit direct line of sight through said vent. For
example, the additional piece of armour may be placed 20 to
25 mm directly below the vent in the armour plate and may be
larger than the vent.
The citadel may be ventilated by a
passive stack ventilation system. This is where the air
within the citadel, heated by its inhabitants, rises and
exits the citadel at the top, with fresh air being drawn-in
through vents at the base of the citadel. Because the
container includes vents towards the upper ends of the side
walls, air may flow through the container across the top of
the citadel. This flow of air may entrain the heated air
rising from within the citadel and draw it out.
The armour plate may be of the type
that is substantially bullet-proof. In this regard it may
be able to stop penetration by bullets fired from a
Kalashnikov AK-47 (7.62mm x 39mm) or assault weapons of
similar type including those firing 7.62 x 51 NATO Ball.
The characteristics of the armour plate may be varied as
required. The Ballistic Standard for the plate may be
EN1063 standard with (7.62mm x 51mm ball rounds). The steel
plates may be any of the EN1063 standards.
The safe-room of any preceding claim,
wherein the citadel includes means for sliding it into the
container. Such means may include a pallet underneath. The
pallet may take any form and may be armour plated. The
citadel may be erected and/or assembled onto the pallet for
ease of transport. In this regard, the pallet may include
sleds, and/or rollers, for sliding the citadel into the
container after it has been fitted with armour plate, and/or
lifting attachment means for lifting the citadel with a
crane. Another possibility is the provision of external
slots for accommodating tines, of the type used with
telehandlers and fork lift trucks, such that the citadel is
insertable into a standard ISO shipping container relatively easily.
The safe-room may further include
sealing means for effecting air-tightness of the citadel.
The safe-room may include sealing means for providing a
substantially air-tight chamber within the safe-room and/or citadel.
The citadel may include under floor
storage located between a base liner and the base of the ISO
shipping container. This storage may take the form of
containers or voids, possibly lockable.
The safe-room may include wall storage
located outwardly of a side wall of the citadel. In other
words, voids and/or cupboards may be provided in the space
between the side wall and the insulation and/or the
container internal wall surface.
The safe-room may include treatment
means for treating the air inside, and/or entering, the safe-room.
The treatment means may include one or
more of a carbon dioxide treatment means for removing or
reducing the presence of carbon dioxide, a carbon monoxide
treatment means for removing or reducing the presence of
carbon monoxide, a humidity treatment means for controlling
the humidity of the air, and a temperature treatment means
for controlling the temperature of the air. The treatment
means may contain a system of filters for purifying the
incoming air and reducing or removing potentially harmful
gases, smokes or urticants (pain causing gases) such as CS gas.
Modifications to the container may be
necessary to allow some of these means to operate correctly.
For instance, specialised ventilation ducts may be required.
The carbon dioxide treatment means may
include a carbon dioxide absorption system based on Lithium
Hydroxide or Soda Lime CO2 absorbent material. The carbon
dioxide treatment means may include a carbon dioxide
scrubbing system of the type found in hyperbaric
recompression chambers.
The safe-room may also include a
reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or pressurised air.
Sealing means for the doors may be
included such as rubber seals to ensure air-tightness. Any
door may be armour plated.
The safe-room may also include a second
access/egress point. This may be located at one end of the
safe-room opposite the doors of the container, or might be
in another wall, the floor, or ceiling. Appropriate holes,
if necessary may be cut in the container to allow access
therethrough as required. If a hole is cut in the top of a
container and the second access/egress is located in the top
of the citadel adjacent this hole then personnel may escape
through this second access/egress point if necessary. This
would only be possible if either there is nothing on top of
the second access/egress point, such as another container,
or if there is a corresponding hole cut in the container
above to allow access thereto. In one embodiment,
therefore, the invention contemplates interconnected containers/safe-rooms.
A layer of condensation reducing paint
may be provided on the underside of the top of the
container. This may be a Grafo-therm (RTM) product.
The communication means may be arranged
to receive images and sounds from monitors remote and/or
external to the safe-room.
The safe-room may include control means
for controlling certain aspects of remote facilities. The
remote facility may be a ship, or offshore installation.
The control means may include drive
control means for preventing the ship’s engine(s) from
driving the ship.
The control means may include steering
control means for preventing the ship’s steering means from
steering the ship.
The safe-room may include GPS means for
providing the location of the safe-room.
The safe-room may include any one or
more of charts/maps, medical supplies, food, toilet
facilities, batteries, hammock, and electricity.
The safe-room may include remote
monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
In a second aspect, the invention
provides a method of assembling a safe-room comprising the
steps of: providing an ISO shipping container; erecting a
frame inside of said container and using it to hold armour
plate in place substantially adjacent three of the four side
walls and the top of said container; providing a citadel;
sliding said citadel into said container; arranging armour
plate on said fourth wall; and arranging sliding doors
inside said container doors.
The method step of inserting the
citadel into the container may be effected by using a
fork-lift truck or telehandler.
The method may further comprise the
step of installing in the safe-room any one or more of air
treatment means, a reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or
pressurised air, a sealable first access/egress point with
an air-tight door, a second access/egress point,
communication means for communicating with remote locations,
control means for controlling certain aspects of a ship
on/in which the safe-room is located when in use, GPS means,
charts/maps, medical supplies, food, water, toilet
facilities, lighting and an electricity supply, and remote
monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
In a third aspect the invention
provides an air conditioning system for a portable safe-room
including a bullet proof vent. The features of this may be
discerned from the description herein.
The safe-room may include a frame
having armour plate attachment means to which the armour
plate is attachable. The frame may be affixed to the floor
of the container. The frame may be comprised of mild steel
or aluminium although other materials are contemplated. The
frame members may be square and/or round in cross-section.
Other shapes such as “I” or RHS beams are contemplated. The
armour plate attachment means may be in the form of clamps
or other members projecting outwardly from the frame, the
armour plate being affixed by these clamps and held in place
against the container walls. The plates may abut one another.
In one embodiment, the citadel is
constructed in a modular manner having standard lengths of
frame elements which may be assembled to create one of
several standard sized citadels. For instance, the final
citadel may comprise two smaller units.
The armour plate may also comprise
standard sized panels. For instance, the panels may be
approximately 8’ x 4’ in size and may be 5mm thick. They
may be 300mm wide. Other thicknesses are contemplated such
as 6mm and 6.5mm. The plate may be steel and may have at
least 500 Brunel hardness. This may allow use of industrial
wear plate instead of ballistic steel and may help to reduce
its price. Although undesirable in one embodiment, the
plates may be welded together thus making it extremely
difficult to remove the plates from outside the safe room
when in-situ inside a container.
To reduce the cost of the safe-room
armour plate may only be arranged along one wall which will
be exposed externally, the other walls, floor and ceiling
being protected by other containers and/or part of the
ship’s structure.
The safe-room may include
heat-resistant material located outwardly of the citadel to
substantially prevent or hinder the use of cutting equipment
from cutting through the container walls/ceiling/floor, thus
providing greater protection for the occupants of the
safe-room. It may also provide some defence against fires.
In one embodiment, a water-filled jacket is provided between
the armour and the citadel.
The armour plate located on at least
one wall may be inclined relative to the vertical and/or the
horizontal. In this way, the cross-sectional thickness in a
plane parallel to either the horizontal or vertical
respectively is increased thus providing greater protection
against arms fire. In one embodiment, adjacent sections of
armour plates may be arranged in a zigzag pattern.
The communication means may be for
communicating with locations remote from the ship, such as
ports, anti-pirate agencies, ship owners, and the coast
guard. The means may also allow communication with places
within the ship such as the bridge, engine room etc. Such
communication means may be arranged to receive images and
sounds from monitors remote and/or external to the
safe-room. For example, CCTV cameras positioned around the
ship, including outside the safe-room, may transmit their
images to the safe-room. These transmissions may be
wireless and or wired.
The safe-room has been designed and
developed to remedy the problem of hostages being taken.
The safe-room is portable, easily deployable and based
within a standard ISBU (ISO) shipping container.
In outline, ISO container units are
common to every major port in the world and marine cranage
systems allow them to be rapidly fitted to ships without the
need for external modification. The unit is armoured and
may be bulletproof, and may contain its own air supply,
electrical system, communications suite and a facility to
shut down most marine diesel systems remotely from within
the unit. Each unit can accommodate up to approximately 24
personnel for up to 96 hours if required, although 48 hour
is preferred.
The safe-room may have certain
advantages when compared to a citadel internal of the ship,
in that from the outside it retains the general appearance
of a standard ISO container and could be made covert if
necessary. It avoids the need for expensive and lengthy
structural work to shipping making it suitable for
deployment on a temporary basis for ‘one off transits’ of
dangerous areas. Additionally due to the highly portable
nature of the invention it is possible to deliver a
stand-alone functioning safe room either at land or sea in a
comparatively short space of time.
The safe-room may have a lockable
external door by which access to it may be controlled. It
may be locked from within to secure the safe-room. The
safe-room may also contain a separate emergency door to
provide an alternative means of exit.
In an emergency where the safe-room air
supply is compromised by physical obstruction or by external
attempts to influence the air supply entering, a facility
may exist to isolate the safe-room from the external
atmosphere and provide a breathable internal atmosphere for
a limited period of time.
The safe-room may contain, if required,
a device capable of transmitting a signal to shut down the
main propulsion system of the host ship (if being used at sea).
Provision of a safe-room on a ship may
reduce insurance premiums for the ship’s owner.
The term “portable” refers to the fact
that the safe-room may be lifted and moved by typically
available cranage and fork-lifts.
The above and other characteristics,
features and advantages of the present invention will become
apparent from the following detailed description, taken in
conjunction with the accompanying drawings, which
illustrate, by way of example, the principles of the
invention. This description is given for the sake of
example only, without limiting the scope of the invention.
The reference figures quoted below refer to the attached drawings.
Figure 1 is a perspective partially
cut-away view of a general arrangement of a safe-room;
Figure 2 is a plan view of a safe-room
in a container;
Figure 3 is a perspective view of a
portion of a wall of a safe-room;
Figure 4 is a cross-sectional elevation
of a safe-room;
Figure 5 is a side view of a portion of
a safe-room;
Figure 6 is an elevational view of part
of Figure 5; and
Figure 7 is a plan view of a portion of
a different safe-room.
The present invention will be described
with respect to particular embodiments and with reference to
certain drawings but the invention is not limited thereto
but only by the claims. The drawings described are only
schematic and are non-limiting. In the drawings, the size
of some of the elements may be exaggerated and not drawn to
scale for illustrative purposes. The dimensions and the
relative dimensions do not correspond to actual reductions
to practice of the invention.
Furthermore, the terms first, second,
third and the like in the description and in the claims, are
used for distinguishing between similar elements and not
necessarily for describing a sequence, either temporally,
spatially, in ranking or in any other manner. It is to be
understood that the terms so used are interchangeable under
appropriate circumstances and that the embodiments of the
invention described herein are capable of operation in other
sequences than described or illustrated herein.
Moreover, the terms top, bottom, over,
under and the like in the description and the claims are
used for descriptive purposes and not necessarily for
describing relative positions. It is to be understood that
the terms so used are interchangeable under appropriate
circumstances and that the embodiments of the invention
described herein are capable of operation in other
orientations than described or illustrated herein.
It is to be noticed that the term
“comprising”, used in the claims, should not be interpreted
as being restricted to the means listed thereafter; it does
not exclude other elements or steps. It is thus to be
interpreted as specifying the presence of the stated
features, integers, steps or components as referred to, but
does not preclude the presence or addition of one or more
other features, integers, steps or components, or groups
thereof. Thus, the scope of the expression “a device
comprising means A and B” should not be limited to devices
consisting only of components A and B. It means that with
respect to the present invention, the only relevant
components of the device are A and B.
Similarly, it is to be noticed that the
term “connected”, used in the description, should not be
interpreted as being restricted to direct connections only.
Thus, the scope of the expression “a device A connected to a
device B” should not be limited to devices or systems
wherein an output of device A is directly connected to an
input of device B. It means that there exists a path
between an output of A and an input of B which may be a path
including other devices or means. “Connected” may mean that
two or more elements are either in direct physical or
electrical contact, or that two or more elements are not in
direct contact with each other but yet still co-operate or
interact with each other.
Reference throughout this specification
to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a
particular feature, structure or characteristic described in
connection with the embodiment is included in at least one
embodiment of the present invention. Thus, appearances of
the phrases “in one embodiment” or “in an embodiment” in
various places throughout this specification are not
necessarily all referring to the same embodiment, but may
refer to different embodiments. Furthermore, the particular
features, structures or characteristics of any embodiment or
aspect of the invention may be combined in any suitable
manner, as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the
art from this disclosure, in one or more embodiments.
Similarly it should be appreciated
that in the description of exemplary embodiments of the
invention, various features of the invention are sometimes
grouped together in a single embodiment, figure, or
description thereof for the purpose of streamlining the
disclosure and aiding in the understanding of one or more of
the various inventive aspects. This method of disclosure,
however, is not to be interpreted as reflecting an intention
that the claimed invention requires more features than are
expressly recited in each claim. Rather, as the following
claims reflect, inventive aspects lie in less than all
features of a single foregoing disclosed embodiment. Thus,
the claims following the detailed description are hereby
expressly incorporated into this detailed description, with
each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment of
this invention.
Furthermore, while some embodiments
described herein include some features included in other
embodiments, combinations of features of different
embodiments are meant to be within the scope of the
invention, and form yet further embodiments, as will be
understood by those skilled in the art. For example, in the
following claims, any of the claimed embodiments can be used
in any combination.
In the description provided herein,
numerous specific details are set forth. However, it is
understood that embodiments of the invention may be
practised without these specific details. In other
instances, well-known methods, structures and techniques
have not been shown in detail in order not to obscure an
understanding of this description.
The invention will now be described by
a detailed description of several embodiments of the
invention. It is clear that other embodiments of the
invention can be configured according to the knowledge of
persons skilled in the art without departing from the true
spirit or technical teaching of the invention, the invention
being limited only by the terms of the appended claims.
In Figure 1 a general arrangement is
shown of a safe-room 10. It does not show all of the
features and in particular some of the walls have been
removed for the sake of clarity. It comprises a container
20, being a standard shipping container, including a citadel
30 within. The safe-room has a sliding door 40 within the
conventional doors (not shown) of the container. A door 50
is provided within these doors allowing access to the
citadel 30. An air vent 60 is provided at one end for the
air conditioning unit as described below.
In Figure 2 the plan of the container
20 is depicted including within it a liner 70. This liner
70 includes armour plate and insulation as will be described
with reference to Figure 3 below.
Liners 70 are provided along the four
side walls. A gap is shown between the inside of the
container walls and the liner 70 but this may not be present
in one embodiment.
The container 20 includes two
conventional doors 25 which open outwardly. One may be
welded, or otherwise fixed, permanently closed after
assembly is complete.
A sliding door 40 is provided inside
the conventional doors 25.
The citadel 30 is shown within the
container, although it will be noted that a vestibule 45 is
formed at the door end since the citadel 30 is somewhat
shorter in length than the container 20. The citadel 30
includes a door 50 which opens outwardly into the vestibule 45.
The vestibule 45 includes an air
conditioning unit 82. This unit 82 is linked to the outside
environment via an air vent system 80, which will be
described below with reference to Figures 5 and 6. A
generator (not shown) may be located above or below the air
conditioning unit 82. Batteries (not shown) may be located
within the citadel 30 for, not least, the purpose of
temperature control.
An example of the liner 70 is shown in
Figure 3. The container wall 20 includes an armour plate 74
pushed up against it. This is held in place by clamps (not
shown) at the top of each plate 74. The clamps are attached
to a frame (not shown) which is attached to the base of the
container and extends around the inside of the container 20.
Inside of the armour plate 74 is an
arrangement of insulation 76. This may comprise both
acoustic and heat insulation in the form of various foams,
rubbers and foils. An air gap 75 is maintained between the
liner 70 and the insulation 76.
The wall of the citadel 30 is shown
inside of the layer of insulation 76. The insulation may be
affixed to the wall of the citadel such that the whole
assembly of citadel 30 and insulation layer 76 is slid
inside the container after the armour plate has been erected within.
The gaps 71, inside the corrugations,
between the wall of the container 20 and the armour plate 74
may be filled with material to produce tumbling of bullets
fired therethrough.
To maintain air flow through the
citadel for the inhabitants, air vents 100 may be provided
at the base of the walls of the container, or in its base,
as shown in Figure 4. Air may also be drawn in and/or exit
via air vents 120 provided at the top of citadel 30 walls.
Air will be heated by the occupants and equipment in within
the citadel 30 and will rise. It will exit via the vents
130, 140 provided in the roof of the citadel 30.
The air will then exit through air
vents 150 provided in the armour plate 74 above the citadel
30.
The air flow is aided by the passive
stack ventilation effect whereby wind 160 on the side of the
container will blow in through a vent 110 provided above the
armour plate 74 and pass across and out of vents 110 provide
on the other side of the container. This movement of air
will pull the heated air, rising from the citadel 30, with
it and out of the container 20. Arrows depict the movement
of air.
The air vents 150 in the armour plate
include baffle plates 79 beneath each vent to prevent direct
line of sight into the citadel 30 from outside to ensure
that the armouring effect is maintained. A gap of 20-25mm
between the baffles 79 and the vents 150 is contemplated.
Figure 5 shows the air vent system 80
in more detail. It comprises an air conditioning unit 82
which, as is customary in indirect air conditioning units,
requires access to air at a different temperature to
function correctly. Although no air actually flows from
outside the container 20 to the inside of the citadel via
the air conditioning unit 82, the unit 82 does cool, or warm
the air circulating within the citadel via its heat
exchanger/condenser.
A vent 83 in the form of an array of
holes is formed through the armour plate 74 and the
container 20 wall. A baffle plate 77 is provided inside of
the vent 83. This plate 77 includes an array of holes 87
which are off-set from the array of holes in the vent 83 in
the container 20. A fan 86 is provided within the gap
between the baffle plate 77 and the armour plate 74 to
prevent air stalling and to thus promote air flow through
the holes 87 and vent 83. Thus air can reach the air
conditioning unit 82 without it being damaged by arms fire.
The holes 87 may be 20-25mm in diameter.
Figure 6 shows an elevational view of
the armour plate 74 and the baffle 77. Each comprises an
array of eight holes 83, 87. These are off-set as shown.
Figure 7 shows an embodiment in which
the armour plates 74 along the side walls of the citadel 30
are arranged in a zigzag manner, as viewed from above. This
arrangement may aid the deflection of bullets and prevent
them penetrating the armour.