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WO2012101598A2 - A portable safe-room - Google Patents

A portable safe-room Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2012101598A2
WO2012101598A2 PCT/IB2012/050372 IB2012050372W WO2012101598A2 WO 2012101598 A2 WO2012101598 A2 WO 2012101598A2 IB 2012050372 W IB2012050372 W IB 2012050372W WO 2012101598 A2 WO2012101598 A2 WO 2012101598A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
room
safe
container
citadel
air
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/IB2012/050372
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2012101598A3 (en
Inventor
Michael Samways
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to CN201280006729.9A priority Critical patent/CN103348070B/en
Priority to AU2012210233A priority patent/AU2012210233B2/en
Priority to ES12706111.7T priority patent/ES2553746T3/en
Priority to EP12706111.7A priority patent/EP2668353B1/en
Publication of WO2012101598A2 publication Critical patent/WO2012101598A2/en
Publication of WO2012101598A3 publication Critical patent/WO2012101598A3/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E04BUILDING
    • E04HBUILDINGS OR LIKE STRUCTURES FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES; SWIMMING OR SPLASH BATHS OR POOLS; MASTS; FENCING; TENTS OR CANOPIES, IN GENERAL
    • E04H9/00Buildings, groups of buildings or shelters adapted to withstand or provide protection against abnormal external influences, e.g. war-like action, earthquake or extreme climate
    • E04H9/04Buildings, groups of buildings or shelters adapted to withstand or provide protection against abnormal external influences, e.g. war-like action, earthquake or extreme climate against air-raid or other war-like actions
    • E04H9/10Independent shelters; Arrangement of independent splinter-proof walls
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E04BUILDING
    • E04BGENERAL BUILDING CONSTRUCTIONS; WALLS, e.g. PARTITIONS; ROOFS; FLOORS; CEILINGS; INSULATION OR OTHER PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS
    • E04B1/00Constructions in general; Structures which are not restricted either to walls, e.g. partitions, or floors or ceilings or roofs
    • E04B1/348Structures composed of units comprising at least considerable parts of two sides of a room, e.g. box-like or cell-like units closed or in skeleton form
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B63SHIPS OR OTHER WATERBORNE VESSELS; RELATED EQUIPMENT
    • B63BSHIPS OR OTHER WATERBORNE VESSELS; EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPPING 
    • B63B29/00Accommodation for crew or passengers not otherwise provided for
    • B63B29/02Cabins or other living spaces; Construction or arrangement thereof
    • B63B29/025Modular or prefabricated cabins
    • BPERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B63SHIPS OR OTHER WATERBORNE VESSELS; RELATED EQUIPMENT
    • B63GOFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS ON VESSELS; MINE-LAYING; MINE-SWEEPING; SUBMARINES; AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
    • B63G13/00Other offensive or defensive arrangements on vessels; Vessels characterised thereby
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05GSAFES OR STRONG-ROOMS FOR VALUABLES; BANK PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFETY TRANSACTION PARTITIONS
    • E05G1/00Safes or strong-rooms for valuables
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05GSAFES OR STRONG-ROOMS FOR VALUABLES; BANK PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFETY TRANSACTION PARTITIONS
    • E05G1/00Safes or strong-rooms for valuables
    • E05G1/005Portable strong boxes, e.g. which may be fixed to a wall or the like
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05GSAFES OR STRONG-ROOMS FOR VALUABLES; BANK PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFETY TRANSACTION PARTITIONS
    • E05G1/00Safes or strong-rooms for valuables
    • E05G1/02Details
    • E05G1/024Wall or panel structure
    • FMECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41WEAPONS
    • F41HARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
    • F41H5/00Armour; Armour plates
    • F41H5/24Armour; Armour plates for stationary use, e.g. fortifications ; Shelters; Guard Booths
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E04BUILDING
    • E04HBUILDINGS OR LIKE STRUCTURES FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES; SWIMMING OR SPLASH BATHS OR POOLS; MASTS; FENCING; TENTS OR CANOPIES, IN GENERAL
    • E04H1/00Buildings or groups of buildings for dwelling or office purposes; General layout, e.g. modular co-ordination or staggered storeys
    • E04H1/12Small buildings or other erections for limited occupation, erected in the open air or arranged in buildings, e.g. kiosks, waiting shelters for bus stops or for filling stations, roofs for railway platforms, watchmen's huts or dressing cubicles
    • E04H2001/1283Small buildings of the ISO containers type
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05GSAFES OR STRONG-ROOMS FOR VALUABLES; BANK PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFETY TRANSACTION PARTITIONS
    • E05G5/00Bank protection devices
    • E05G5/02Trapping or confining mechanisms, e.g. transaction security booths

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to a portable safe-room and a method of assembling a safe-room and finds particular, although not exclusive, utility in the provision of safe-rooms on merchant ships.
  • Recent successful attacks include the MV Sirius Star, a 330 metre long Saudi Arabian owned tanker carrying some £66M worth of oil, which was eventually released after her owners paid a reputed £17M ransom.
  • This response includes preventative measures such as armed (and non-armed) guarding, laser dazzle systems, acoustic devices, and ship modification, together with activities such as conduct-after-capture training for crews and ransom negotiation services.
  • citadels or safe-rooms Although there is some evidence that the use of citadels or safe-rooms is successful, there are issues faced by the shipping companies such as the cost and time involved. For instance, it typically takes around 4-5 days to fit and would then require an assessment by a maritime architect. The actual cost of the modifications is not the only factor however, as the charges relating to being docked and the loss of revenue must also be taken into account. It is understood that it typically costs US$45,000-60,000 per day to operate a supertanker.
  • DE20315249U1 describes a reinforced air-raid type shelter.
  • WO0123261 describes a method for using modules with containers.
  • WO03080966 and WO2008150174 describe various ways in which reinforcement may be added to a shipping container.
  • none of these documents disclose ways of providing a relatively inexpensive, portable safe room for use on ships.
  • the invention provides a portable safe-room comprising a standard ISO shipping container, the container having armour plate located substantially adjacent its inside wall, the container including a citadel located inside of the armour plate, the citadel including communication means for communicating with remote locations, and water storage means, the safe-room including air conditioning equipment for providing conditioned air to the interior of the citadel.
  • a standard High Cube ISO container has a standardised width of 2.4m, a standardised height of 2.695m and a length selectable from 6.1, 12, 14, 15, or 16m, although other dimensions exist for standard ISO containers.
  • the ISO container may be known as a twenty foot equivalent unit or “TEU”.
  • the container may be camouflaged in that it appears from the outside to be a regular freight container such that when it is stacked in amongst other containers it is difficult to know in which container the crew may be hiding.
  • the container may be deliberately marked so that it is immediately recognisable as a safe-room. This may be useful to avoid injury to the crew in the safe-room if the ship is attacked by anti-pirate agencies. Also, it may act as a deterrent in that pirates may consciously avoid ships which have such a safe-room as they know it will cause them problems.
  • the invention provides for a safe-room or citadel to be at least partially manufactured, or assembled, prior to insertion into a container. This allows for greater freedom in designing the safe room and/or citadel, such as the amount, location and characteristics of the armour plate, and in the provision of equipment such as for communication and air treatment. It also allows for the citadel to be moved from one container to another if required. Another advantage is that the integrity of the citadel may be ascertained and/or tested prior to insertion into a container thus avoiding any damage to the container.
  • the container and armour plate may include a first vent for communication with the air conditioning equipment, an additional piece of armour plate being provided inside of the first vent, the additional piece including a second vent off-set from the first vent to prohibit direct line of sight through said first and second vents. In this way bullets cannot be fired through the first vent thus damaging the air conditioning equipment and/or any other equipment or personnel within the container.
  • the first and/or second vents may be provided by one or more holes.
  • the holes may be provided in the armour plate.
  • a fan may be provided between the armour plate and the additional piece of armour plate. This may prevent stalling of the air in the void therein to promote the efficiency and efficacy of the air conditioning equipment.
  • the armour plate around the inside of the side walls may be arranged immediately adjacent the walls. It has been found that if a gap is provided between the armour plate and the container wall a high velocity rifle bullet (especially one fired from an AK47 - 7.62mm x 39mm) may have its outer copper layer stripped by the container wall without any substantial loss of velocity enabling the narrower bullet to pass through the armour plate.
  • a high velocity rifle bullet especially one fired from an AK47 - 7.62mm x 39mm
  • the container wall is often corrugated there will be some gaps between it and armour plate.
  • the stripping effect has been found to only occur on rare occasions and with strict conditions such as temperature, thickness of container wall and most importantly the angle of attack on the container wall.
  • material will be inserted within these gaps.
  • the material may be affixed to the inside surface of the container wall at these points.
  • Such materials include ceramics, gravel, plate, tubes and rods, possible of steel, resin and so on. Any one or more of these materials may make the bullet tumble or deform which thus prevents its penetration through the armour plating.
  • the armour plate may be held in place by a frame including clamps. This removes the need for welding which is expensive and can weaken the armour plate. Accordingly, in one embodiment the armour plate includes no direct welding.
  • a further benefit observed is that when containers are lifted (or slung) some twisting and minor deformation is possible, with welded plates there is not sufficient movement for them to flex and cracking of welds or the plate edges can occur. This problem is not experienced when the plates are clamped as they have the necessary ability to move fractionally as the weight of the container is experienced.
  • the safe-room may further include armour plate arranged beneath, and spaced from, the top of the container.
  • a gap may be provide between the armour plate and the container to promote ventilation as will be discussed below.
  • tops of containers typically have thinner steel (1.5mm) than the walls and it has been found that the stripping effect discussed above does not occur and therefore the need for not having a gap between the container and the armour plate is diminished.
  • the container may include doors at one end thereof and an armour plated door is arranged immediately inside said doors.
  • the container doors may be the standard ones supplied with such containers.
  • the armour plated door may be a sliding door.
  • a vestibule may be arranged between the container and the citadel, inside of the armour plated door, and at least some of the air conditioning equipment may be located within said vestibule.
  • This vestibule may be useful in camouflaging the citadel in that goods may be stacked in the vestibule so that if the container is opened it appears to be a regular freight container. Other uses for the vestibule are also possible.
  • the citadel may include an air-tight door openable outwardly only.
  • the door may open outwardly into the vestibule.
  • the safe-room may further include a first layer of insulation provided between the citadel and the armour plate.
  • the first layer of insulation may include an acoustic layer of insulation and a heat layer of insulation.
  • the acoustic layer of insulation may include a rubber layer. This may be 5mm thick. It may also include a 25mm class “O” acoustic dense foam.
  • the heat layer of insulation may be a class “O” foil.
  • the first layer of insulation may not be structural in that it is not providing any structural integrity to the safe-room nor any significant armouring.
  • An air gap may be provided between the first layer of insulation and the armour plate.
  • the citadel may include a second layer of insulation adjacent its inner wall.
  • a 50mm insulation board such as Kingspan (RTM).
  • the citadel may include a pitched roof. This may assist in directing any condensation dripping off the underside of the top of the container onto the citadel beneath. This may prevent water ponding thus removing the breeding grounds for bacteria.
  • the safe-room may further include a power supply.
  • the power supply may be a generator, such as a petrol or diesel generator, and/or batteries.
  • batteries are the primary source of electrical power, being assisted or superseded by the generator as necessary.
  • a means for connecting the safe-room to another source of electrical power may also be provided. For instance, a cable for connecting to a ship’s electricity supply may be provided.
  • the batteries may provide a period of 8 hours minimum of silent running before the generator is required.
  • the acoustic layers described above may help to prevent the noise of such a generator leaving the container and thus reduce the risk of it being found amongst other containers.
  • the generator may be arranged substantially within the vestibule. This may reduce the effects, such as gases, noise and heat emanating from it, on the personnel within the citadel.
  • the citadel may includes air vents. These may be located at low and/or high points within it to promote ventilation.
  • the container may also include air vents. Air may then circulate between the citadel, the inside of the container and the outside of the container.
  • the armour plate arranged at the top of the container may include a vent and an additional piece of armour plate may be arranged spaced from said vent to prohibit direct line of sight through said vent.
  • the additional piece of armour may be placed 20 to 25 mm directly below the vent in the armour plate and may be larger than the vent.
  • the citadel may be ventilated by a passive stack ventilation system. This is where the air within the citadel, heated by its inhabitants, rises and exits the citadel at the top, with fresh air being drawn-in through vents at the base of the citadel. Because the container includes vents towards the upper ends of the side walls, air may flow through the container across the top of the citadel. This flow of air may entrain the heated air rising from within the citadel and draw it out.
  • the armour plate may be of the type that is substantially bullet-proof. In this regard it may be able to stop penetration by bullets fired from a Kalashnikov AK-47 (7.62mm x 39mm) or assault weapons of similar type including those firing 7.62 x 51 NATO Ball.
  • the characteristics of the armour plate may be varied as required.
  • the Ballistic Standard for the plate may be EN1063 standard with (7.62mm x 51mm ball rounds).
  • the steel plates may be any of the EN1063 standards.
  • the citadel includes means for sliding it into the container.
  • Such means may include a pallet underneath.
  • the pallet may take any form and may be armour plated.
  • the citadel may be erected and/or assembled onto the pallet for ease of transport.
  • the pallet may include sleds, and/or rollers, for sliding the citadel into the container after it has been fitted with armour plate, and/or lifting attachment means for lifting the citadel with a crane.
  • Another possibility is the provision of external slots for accommodating tines, of the type used with telehandlers and fork lift trucks, such that the citadel is insertable into a standard ISO shipping container relatively easily.
  • the safe-room may further include sealing means for effecting air-tightness of the citadel.
  • the safe-room may include sealing means for providing a substantially air-tight chamber within the safe-room and/or citadel.
  • the citadel may include under floor storage located between a base liner and the base of the ISO shipping container. This storage may take the form of containers or voids, possibly lockable.
  • the safe-room may include wall storage located outwardly of a side wall of the citadel.
  • voids and/or cupboards may be provided in the space between the side wall and the insulation and/or the container internal wall surface.
  • the safe-room may include treatment means for treating the air inside, and/or entering, the safe-room.
  • the treatment means may include one or more of a carbon dioxide treatment means for removing or reducing the presence of carbon dioxide, a carbon monoxide treatment means for removing or reducing the presence of carbon monoxide, a humidity treatment means for controlling the humidity of the air, and a temperature treatment means for controlling the temperature of the air.
  • the treatment means may contain a system of filters for purifying the incoming air and reducing or removing potentially harmful gases, smokes or urticants (pain causing gases) such as CS gas.
  • Modifications to the container may be necessary to allow some of these means to operate correctly. For instance, specialised ventilation ducts may be required.
  • the carbon dioxide treatment means may include a carbon dioxide absorption system based on Lithium Hydroxide or Soda Lime CO2 absorbent material.
  • the carbon dioxide treatment means may include a carbon dioxide scrubbing system of the type found in hyperbaric recompression chambers.
  • the safe-room may also include a reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or pressurised air.
  • Sealing means for the doors may be included such as rubber seals to ensure air-tightness. Any door may be armour plated.
  • the safe-room may also include a second access/egress point. This may be located at one end of the safe-room opposite the doors of the container, or might be in another wall, the floor, or ceiling. Appropriate holes, if necessary may be cut in the container to allow access therethrough as required. If a hole is cut in the top of a container and the second access/egress is located in the top of the citadel adjacent this hole then personnel may escape through this second access/egress point if necessary. This would only be possible if either there is nothing on top of the second access/egress point, such as another container, or if there is a corresponding hole cut in the container above to allow access thereto. In one embodiment, therefore, the invention contemplates interconnected containers/safe-rooms.
  • a layer of condensation reducing paint may be provided on the underside of the top of the container. This may be a Grafo-therm (RTM) product.
  • RTM Grafo-therm
  • the communication means may be arranged to receive images and sounds from monitors remote and/or external to the safe-room.
  • the safe-room may include control means for controlling certain aspects of remote facilities.
  • the remote facility may be a ship, or offshore installation.
  • the control means may include drive control means for preventing the ship’s engine(s) from driving the ship.
  • the control means may include steering control means for preventing the ship’s steering means from steering the ship.
  • the safe-room may include GPS means for providing the location of the safe-room.
  • the safe-room may include any one or more of charts/maps, medical supplies, food, toilet facilities, batteries, hammock, and electricity.
  • the safe-room may include remote monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
  • the invention provides a method of assembling a safe-room comprising the steps of: providing an ISO shipping container; erecting a frame inside of said container and using it to hold armour plate in place substantially adjacent three of the four side walls and the top of said container; providing a citadel; sliding said citadel into said container; arranging armour plate on said fourth wall; and arranging sliding doors inside said container doors.
  • the method step of inserting the citadel into the container may be effected by using a fork-lift truck or telehandler.
  • the method may further comprise the step of installing in the safe-room any one or more of air treatment means, a reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or pressurised air, a sealable first access/egress point with an air-tight door, a second access/egress point, communication means for communicating with remote locations, control means for controlling certain aspects of a ship on/in which the safe-room is located when in use, GPS means, charts/maps, medical supplies, food, water, toilet facilities, lighting and an electricity supply, and remote monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
  • the invention provides an air conditioning system for a portable safe-room including a bullet proof vent. The features of this may be discerned from the description herein.
  • the safe-room may include a frame having armour plate attachment means to which the armour plate is attachable.
  • the frame may be affixed to the floor of the container.
  • the frame may be comprised of mild steel or aluminium although other materials are contemplated.
  • the frame members may be square and/or round in cross-section. Other shapes such as “I” or RHS beams are contemplated.
  • the armour plate attachment means may be in the form of clamps or other members projecting outwardly from the frame, the armour plate being affixed by these clamps and held in place against the container walls. The plates may abut one another.
  • the citadel is constructed in a modular manner having standard lengths of frame elements which may be assembled to create one of several standard sized citadels.
  • the final citadel may comprise two smaller units.
  • the armour plate may also comprise standard sized panels.
  • the panels may be approximately 8’ x 4’ in size and may be 5mm thick. They may be 300mm wide. Other thicknesses are contemplated such as 6mm and 6.5mm.
  • the plate may be steel and may have at least 500 Brunel hardness. This may allow use of industrial wear plate instead of ballistic steel and may help to reduce its price. Although undesirable in one embodiment, the plates may be welded together thus making it extremely difficult to remove the plates from outside the safe room when in-situ inside a container.
  • the safe-room armour plate may only be arranged along one wall which will be exposed externally, the other walls, floor and ceiling being protected by other containers and/or part of the ship’s structure.
  • the safe-room may include heat-resistant material located outwardly of the citadel to substantially prevent or hinder the use of cutting equipment from cutting through the container walls/ceiling/floor, thus providing greater protection for the occupants of the safe-room. It may also provide some defence against fires.
  • a water-filled jacket is provided between the armour and the citadel.
  • the armour plate located on at least one wall may be inclined relative to the vertical and/or the horizontal. In this way, the cross-sectional thickness in a plane parallel to either the horizontal or vertical respectively is increased thus providing greater protection against arms fire.
  • adjacent sections of armour plates may be arranged in a zigzag pattern.
  • the communication means may be for communicating with locations remote from the ship, such as ports, anti-pirate agencies, ship owners, and the coast guard.
  • the means may also allow communication with places within the ship such as the bridge, engine room etc.
  • Such communication means may be arranged to receive images and sounds from monitors remote and/or external to the safe-room. For example, CCTV cameras positioned around the ship, including outside the safe-room, may transmit their images to the safe-room. These transmissions may be wireless and or wired.
  • the safe-room has been designed and developed to remedy the problem of hostages being taken.
  • the safe-room is portable, easily deployable and based within a standard ISBU (ISO) shipping container.
  • ISO container units are common to every major port in the world and marine cranage systems allow them to be rapidly fitted to ships without the need for external modification.
  • the unit is armoured and may be bulletproof, and may contain its own air supply, electrical system, communications suite and a facility to shut down most marine diesel systems remotely from within the unit.
  • Each unit can accommodate up to approximately 24 personnel for up to 96 hours if required, although 48 hour is preferred.
  • the safe-room may have certain advantages when compared to a citadel internal of the ship, in that from the outside it retains the general appearance of a standard ISO container and could be made covert if necessary. It avoids the need for expensive and lengthy structural work to shipping making it suitable for deployment on a temporary basis for ‘one off transits’ of dangerous areas. Additionally due to the highly portable nature of the invention it is possible to deliver a stand-alone functioning safe room either at land or sea in a comparatively short space of time.
  • the safe-room may have a lockable external door by which access to it may be controlled. It may be locked from within to secure the safe-room.
  • the safe-room may also contain a separate emergency door to provide an alternative means of exit.
  • a facility may exist to isolate the safe-room from the external atmosphere and provide a breathable internal atmosphere for a limited period of time.
  • the safe-room may contain, if required, a device capable of transmitting a signal to shut down the main propulsion system of the host ship (if being used at sea).
  • Provision of a safe-room on a ship may reduce insurance premiums for the ship’s owner.
  • the term “portable” refers to the fact that the safe-room may be lifted and moved by typically available cranage and fork-lifts.
  • Figure 1 is a perspective partially cut-away view of a general arrangement of a safe-room
  • Figure 2 is a plan view of a safe-room in a container
  • Figure 3 is a perspective view of a portion of a wall of a safe-room
  • Figure 4 is a cross-sectional elevation of a safe-room
  • Figure 5 is a side view of a portion of a safe-room
  • Figure 6 is an elevational view of part of Figure 5.
  • Figure 7 is a plan view of a portion of a different safe-room.
  • a device A connected to a device B should not be limited to devices or systems wherein an output of device A is directly connected to an input of device B. It means that there exists a path between an output of A and an input of B which may be a path including other devices or means.
  • Connected may mean that two or more elements are either in direct physical or electrical contact, or that two or more elements are not in direct contact with each other but yet still co-operate or interact with each other.
  • FIG. 1 a general arrangement is shown of a safe-room 10. It does not show all of the features and in particular some of the walls have been removed for the sake of clarity. It comprises a container 20, being a standard shipping container, including a citadel 30 within.
  • the safe-room has a sliding door 40 within the conventional doors (not shown) of the container.
  • a door 50 is provided within these doors allowing access to the citadel 30.
  • An air vent 60 is provided at one end for the air conditioning unit as described below.
  • FIG 2 the plan of the container 20 is depicted including within it a liner 70.
  • This liner 70 includes armour plate and insulation as will be described with reference to Figure 3 below.
  • Liners 70 are provided along the four side walls. A gap is shown between the inside of the container walls and the liner 70 but this may not be present in one embodiment.
  • the container 20 includes two conventional doors 25 which open outwardly. One may be welded, or otherwise fixed, permanently closed after assembly is complete.
  • a sliding door 40 is provided inside the conventional doors 25.
  • the citadel 30 is shown within the container, although it will be noted that a vestibule 45 is formed at the door end since the citadel 30 is somewhat shorter in length than the container 20.
  • the citadel 30 includes a door 50 which opens outwardly into the vestibule 45.
  • the vestibule 45 includes an air conditioning unit 82.
  • This unit 82 is linked to the outside environment via an air vent system 80, which will be described below with reference to Figures 5 and 6.
  • a generator (not shown) may be located above or below the air conditioning unit 82.
  • Batteries (not shown) may be located within the citadel 30 for, not least, the purpose of temperature control.
  • FIG. 3 An example of the liner 70 is shown in Figure 3.
  • the container wall 20 includes an armour plate 74 pushed up against it. This is held in place by clamps (not shown) at the top of each plate 74.
  • the clamps are attached to a frame (not shown) which is attached to the base of the container and extends around the inside of the container 20.
  • insulation 76 Inside of the armour plate 74 is an arrangement of insulation 76. This may comprise both acoustic and heat insulation in the form of various foams, rubbers and foils. An air gap 75 is maintained between the liner 70 and the insulation 76.
  • the wall of the citadel 30 is shown inside of the layer of insulation 76.
  • the insulation may be affixed to the wall of the citadel such that the whole assembly of citadel 30 and insulation layer 76 is slid inside the container after the armour plate has been erected within.
  • the gaps 71, inside the corrugations, between the wall of the container 20 and the armour plate 74 may be filled with material to produce tumbling of bullets fired therethrough.
  • air vents 100 may be provided at the base of the walls of the container, or in its base, as shown in Figure 4. Air may also be drawn in and/or exit via air vents 120 provided at the top of citadel 30 walls. Air will be heated by the occupants and equipment in within the citadel 30 and will rise. It will exit via the vents 130, 140 provided in the roof of the citadel 30.
  • the air will then exit through air vents 150 provided in the armour plate 74 above the citadel 30.
  • the air flow is aided by the passive stack ventilation effect whereby wind 160 on the side of the container will blow in through a vent 110 provided above the armour plate 74 and pass across and out of vents 110 provide on the other side of the container. This movement of air will pull the heated air, rising from the citadel 30, with it and out of the container 20. Arrows depict the movement of air.
  • the air vents 150 in the armour plate include baffle plates 79 beneath each vent to prevent direct line of sight into the citadel 30 from outside to ensure that the armouring effect is maintained.
  • a gap of 20-25mm between the baffles 79 and the vents 150 is contemplated.
  • FIG. 5 shows the air vent system 80 in more detail. It comprises an air conditioning unit 82 which, as is customary in indirect air conditioning units, requires access to air at a different temperature to function correctly. Although no air actually flows from outside the container 20 to the inside of the citadel via the air conditioning unit 82, the unit 82 does cool, or warm the air circulating within the citadel via its heat exchanger/condenser.
  • an air conditioning unit 82 which, as is customary in indirect air conditioning units, requires access to air at a different temperature to function correctly. Although no air actually flows from outside the container 20 to the inside of the citadel via the air conditioning unit 82, the unit 82 does cool, or warm the air circulating within the citadel via its heat exchanger/condenser.
  • a vent 83 in the form of an array of holes is formed through the armour plate 74 and the container 20 wall.
  • a baffle plate 77 is provided inside of the vent 83.
  • This plate 77 includes an array of holes 87 which are off-set from the array of holes in the vent 83 in the container 20.
  • a fan 86 is provided within the gap between the baffle plate 77 and the armour plate 74 to prevent air stalling and to thus promote air flow through the holes 87 and vent 83. Thus air can reach the air conditioning unit 82 without it being damaged by arms fire.
  • the holes 87 may be 20-25mm in diameter.
  • Figure 6 shows an elevational view of the armour plate 74 and the baffle 77. Each comprises an array of eight holes 83, 87. These are off-set as shown.
  • Figure 7 shows an embodiment in which the armour plates 74 along the side walls of the citadel 30 are arranged in a zigzag manner, as viewed from above. This arrangement may aid the deflection of bullets and prevent them penetrating the armour.

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Abstract

To reduce the effect of, or to act as a deterrent to, the threat of piracy, the invention provides a portable safe-room 10 comprising a standard or high cube ISO shipping container 20, the container 20 having armour plate 74 located substantially adjacent its inside wall, the container including a citadel 30 located inside of the armour plate 74, the citadel 30 including communication means for communicating with remote locations, and water storage means, the safe-room 10 including air conditioning equipment 82 for providing conditioned air to the interior of the citadel 30. The safe-room 10 may be used by a ship's personnel to await rescue and avoid capture. This invention can be used exclusively or in conjunction with other measures for protecting a vessel.

Description

A portable safe-room
The present invention relates generally to a portable safe-room and a method of assembling a safe-room and finds particular, although not exclusive, utility in the provision of safe-rooms on merchant ships.
Maritime piracy, which has been on-going in one form or another for centuries, is now demonstrating a revival in the public consciousness with high profile captures of major vessels and/or their crews becoming regular news. Furthermore, the levels of ransom being paid out by insurance companies and shipping lines is ever increasing. This aggressive expeditionary piracy is not only commonplace off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa but occurs to a lesser extent on the West coast of Africa (Nigeria), Latin America (including the Caribbean) and the South China seas (Straits of Malacca).
Recent successful attacks include the MV Sirius Star, a 330 metre long Saudi Arabian owned tanker carrying some £66M worth of oil, which was eventually released after her owners paid a reputed £17M ransom.
There has been a wide scale shipping and security industry response to this piracy issue. This response includes preventative measures such as armed (and non-armed) guarding, laser dazzle systems, acoustic devices, and ship modification, together with activities such as conduct-after-capture training for crews and ransom negotiation services.
By comparing case studies of hijackings going back over several years it is clear that whilst no one approach to countering the problem is fool proof, or indeed without risk, once pirates have successfully boarded the vessel the only technique that has proved routinely successful is for the crew to shut down the main engines and retreat to a safe area or ‘Citadel’ where they can await the potential arrival of maritime security forces (typically 1-7 hours in the internationally recognised safe transit corridor (Horn of Africa).
For instance, the German heavy lift ship Beluga Fortune, a 12,744 dwt vessel, was apparently boarded by pirates about 1,200 nautical miles off the coast of Kenya on 24 October 2010. However, the pirates were apparently unable to navigate the ship towards the African coast because the engine and bunker feed systems had been shut down by the ship’s crew, who were hiding in a citadel room. The attackers fled when the British frigate HMS Montrose arrived at the scene.
Another German Vessel, the MV Magellan Star, was attacked and boarded in September 2010. Again the crew managed to secrete themselves within a secure part of the vessel and await the arrival of the security forces.
Although there is some evidence that the use of citadels or safe-rooms is successful, there are issues faced by the shipping companies such as the cost and time involved. For instance, it typically takes around 4-5 days to fit and would then require an assessment by a maritime architect. The actual cost of the modifications is not the only factor however, as the charges relating to being docked and the loss of revenue must also be taken into account. It is understood that it typically costs US$45,000-60,000 per day to operate a supertanker.
DE20315249U1 describes a reinforced air-raid type shelter. WO0123261 describes a method for using modules with containers. WO03080966 and WO2008150174 describe various ways in which reinforcement may be added to a shipping container. However, none of these documents disclose ways of providing a relatively inexpensive, portable safe room for use on ships.
Accordingly, there is a need for a much easier, quicker and less expensive way of providing a safe-room on a ship.
In this regard, although the description is directed to a ship the concept is transferrable to other environments and locations such as remote oil, gas and mining facilities on land or at sea.
In a first aspect, the invention provides a portable safe-room comprising a standard ISO shipping container, the container having armour plate located substantially adjacent its inside wall, the container including a citadel located inside of the armour plate, the citadel including communication means for communicating with remote locations, and water storage means, the safe-room including air conditioning equipment for providing conditioned air to the interior of the citadel.
In this regard, a standard High Cube ISO container has a standardised width of 2.4m, a standardised height of 2.695m and a length selectable from 6.1, 12, 14, 15, or 16m, although other dimensions exist for standard ISO containers. The ISO container may be known as a twenty foot equivalent unit or “TEU”.
The container may be camouflaged in that it appears from the outside to be a regular freight container such that when it is stacked in amongst other containers it is difficult to know in which container the crew may be hiding.
Alternatively, the container may be deliberately marked so that it is immediately recognisable as a safe-room. This may be useful to avoid injury to the crew in the safe-room if the ship is attacked by anti-pirate agencies. Also, it may act as a deterrent in that pirates may consciously avoid ships which have such a safe-room as they know it will cause them problems.
In one embodiment, the invention provides for a safe-room or citadel to be at least partially manufactured, or assembled, prior to insertion into a container. This allows for greater freedom in designing the safe room and/or citadel, such as the amount, location and characteristics of the armour plate, and in the provision of equipment such as for communication and air treatment. It also allows for the citadel to be moved from one container to another if required. Another advantage is that the integrity of the citadel may be ascertained and/or tested prior to insertion into a container thus avoiding any damage to the container.
The container and armour plate may include a first vent for communication with the air conditioning equipment, an additional piece of armour plate being provided inside of the first vent, the additional piece including a second vent off-set from the first vent to prohibit direct line of sight through said first and second vents. In this way bullets cannot be fired through the first vent thus damaging the air conditioning equipment and/or any other equipment or personnel within the container.
The first and/or second vents may be provided by one or more holes. The holes may be provided in the armour plate.
A fan may be provided between the armour plate and the additional piece of armour plate. This may prevent stalling of the air in the void therein to promote the efficiency and efficacy of the air conditioning equipment.
The armour plate around the inside of the side walls may be arranged immediately adjacent the walls. It has been found that if a gap is provided between the armour plate and the container wall a high velocity rifle bullet (especially one fired from an AK47 - 7.62mm x 39mm) may have its outer copper layer stripped by the container wall without any substantial loss of velocity enabling the narrower bullet to pass through the armour plate.
However, because the container wall is often corrugated there will be some gaps between it and armour plate. The stripping effect has been found to only occur on rare occasions and with strict conditions such as temperature, thickness of container wall and most importantly the angle of attack on the container wall. In one embodiment, material will be inserted within these gaps. The material may be affixed to the inside surface of the container wall at these points. Such materials include ceramics, gravel, plate, tubes and rods, possible of steel, resin and so on. Any one or more of these materials may make the bullet tumble or deform which thus prevents its penetration through the armour plating.
The armour plate may be held in place by a frame including clamps. This removes the need for welding which is expensive and can weaken the armour plate. Accordingly, in one embodiment the armour plate includes no direct welding.
A further benefit observed is that when containers are lifted (or slung) some twisting and minor deformation is possible, with welded plates there is not sufficient movement for them to flex and cracking of welds or the plate edges can occur. This problem is not experienced when the plates are clamped as they have the necessary ability to move fractionally as the weight of the container is experienced.
The safe-room may further include armour plate arranged beneath, and spaced from, the top of the container. A gap may be provide between the armour plate and the container to promote ventilation as will be discussed below.
The tops of containers typically have thinner steel (1.5mm) than the walls and it has been found that the stripping effect discussed above does not occur and therefore the need for not having a gap between the container and the armour plate is diminished.
The container may include doors at one end thereof and an armour plated door is arranged immediately inside said doors. The container doors may be the standard ones supplied with such containers. The armour plated door may be a sliding door.
A vestibule may be arranged between the container and the citadel, inside of the armour plated door, and at least some of the air conditioning equipment may be located within said vestibule.
This vestibule may be useful in camouflaging the citadel in that goods may be stacked in the vestibule so that if the container is opened it appears to be a regular freight container. Other uses for the vestibule are also possible.
The citadel may include an air-tight door openable outwardly only. The door may open outwardly into the vestibule.
The safe-room may further include a first layer of insulation provided between the citadel and the armour plate.
The first layer of insulation may include an acoustic layer of insulation and a heat layer of insulation. The acoustic layer of insulation may include a rubber layer. This may be 5mm thick. It may also include a 25mm class “O” acoustic dense foam. The heat layer of insulation may be a class “O” foil.
The first layer of insulation may not be structural in that it is not providing any structural integrity to the safe-room nor any significant armouring.
An air gap may be provided between the first layer of insulation and the armour plate.
The citadel may include a second layer of insulation adjacent its inner wall. For instance, a 50mm insulation board such as Kingspan (RTM).
The citadel may include a pitched roof. This may assist in directing any condensation dripping off the underside of the top of the container onto the citadel beneath. This may prevent water ponding thus removing the breeding grounds for bacteria.
The safe-room may further include a power supply. The power supply may be a generator, such as a petrol or diesel generator, and/or batteries. In one embodiment, batteries are the primary source of electrical power, being assisted or superseded by the generator as necessary. A means for connecting the safe-room to another source of electrical power may also be provided. For instance, a cable for connecting to a ship’s electricity supply may be provided. The batteries may provide a period of 8 hours minimum of silent running before the generator is required. The acoustic layers described above may help to prevent the noise of such a generator leaving the container and thus reduce the risk of it being found amongst other containers.
The generator may be arranged substantially within the vestibule. This may reduce the effects, such as gases, noise and heat emanating from it, on the personnel within the citadel.
The citadel may includes air vents. These may be located at low and/or high points within it to promote ventilation.
The container may also include air vents. Air may then circulate between the citadel, the inside of the container and the outside of the container.
The armour plate arranged at the top of the container may include a vent and an additional piece of armour plate may be arranged spaced from said vent to prohibit direct line of sight through said vent. For example, the additional piece of armour may be placed 20 to 25 mm directly below the vent in the armour plate and may be larger than the vent.
The citadel may be ventilated by a passive stack ventilation system. This is where the air within the citadel, heated by its inhabitants, rises and exits the citadel at the top, with fresh air being drawn-in through vents at the base of the citadel. Because the container includes vents towards the upper ends of the side walls, air may flow through the container across the top of the citadel. This flow of air may entrain the heated air rising from within the citadel and draw it out.
The armour plate may be of the type that is substantially bullet-proof. In this regard it may be able to stop penetration by bullets fired from a Kalashnikov AK-47 (7.62mm x 39mm) or assault weapons of similar type including those firing 7.62 x 51 NATO Ball. The characteristics of the armour plate may be varied as required. The Ballistic Standard for the plate may be EN1063 standard with (7.62mm x 51mm ball rounds). The steel plates may be any of the EN1063 standards.
The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel includes means for sliding it into the container. Such means may include a pallet underneath. The pallet may take any form and may be armour plated. The citadel may be erected and/or assembled onto the pallet for ease of transport. In this regard, the pallet may include sleds, and/or rollers, for sliding the citadel into the container after it has been fitted with armour plate, and/or lifting attachment means for lifting the citadel with a crane. Another possibility is the provision of external slots for accommodating tines, of the type used with telehandlers and fork lift trucks, such that the citadel is insertable into a standard ISO shipping container relatively easily.
The safe-room may further include sealing means for effecting air-tightness of the citadel. The safe-room may include sealing means for providing a substantially air-tight chamber within the safe-room and/or citadel.
The citadel may include under floor storage located between a base liner and the base of the ISO shipping container. This storage may take the form of containers or voids, possibly lockable.
The safe-room may include wall storage located outwardly of a side wall of the citadel. In other words, voids and/or cupboards may be provided in the space between the side wall and the insulation and/or the container internal wall surface.
The safe-room may include treatment means for treating the air inside, and/or entering, the safe-room.
The treatment means may include one or more of a carbon dioxide treatment means for removing or reducing the presence of carbon dioxide, a carbon monoxide treatment means for removing or reducing the presence of carbon monoxide, a humidity treatment means for controlling the humidity of the air, and a temperature treatment means for controlling the temperature of the air. The treatment means may contain a system of filters for purifying the incoming air and reducing or removing potentially harmful gases, smokes or urticants (pain causing gases) such as CS gas.
Modifications to the container may be necessary to allow some of these means to operate correctly. For instance, specialised ventilation ducts may be required.
The carbon dioxide treatment means may include a carbon dioxide absorption system based on Lithium Hydroxide or Soda Lime CO2 absorbent material. The carbon dioxide treatment means may include a carbon dioxide scrubbing system of the type found in hyperbaric recompression chambers.
The safe-room may also include a reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or pressurised air.
Sealing means for the doors may be included such as rubber seals to ensure air-tightness. Any door may be armour plated.
The safe-room may also include a second access/egress point. This may be located at one end of the safe-room opposite the doors of the container, or might be in another wall, the floor, or ceiling. Appropriate holes, if necessary may be cut in the container to allow access therethrough as required. If a hole is cut in the top of a container and the second access/egress is located in the top of the citadel adjacent this hole then personnel may escape through this second access/egress point if necessary. This would only be possible if either there is nothing on top of the second access/egress point, such as another container, or if there is a corresponding hole cut in the container above to allow access thereto. In one embodiment, therefore, the invention contemplates interconnected containers/safe-rooms.
A layer of condensation reducing paint may be provided on the underside of the top of the container. This may be a Grafo-therm (RTM) product.
The communication means may be arranged to receive images and sounds from monitors remote and/or external to the safe-room.
The safe-room may include control means for controlling certain aspects of remote facilities. The remote facility may be a ship, or offshore installation.
The control means may include drive control means for preventing the ship’s engine(s) from driving the ship.
The control means may include steering control means for preventing the ship’s steering means from steering the ship.
The safe-room may include GPS means for providing the location of the safe-room.
The safe-room may include any one or more of charts/maps, medical supplies, food, toilet facilities, batteries, hammock, and electricity.
The safe-room may include remote monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
In a second aspect, the invention provides a method of assembling a safe-room comprising the steps of: providing an ISO shipping container; erecting a frame inside of said container and using it to hold armour plate in place substantially adjacent three of the four side walls and the top of said container; providing a citadel; sliding said citadel into said container; arranging armour plate on said fourth wall; and arranging sliding doors inside said container doors.
The method step of inserting the citadel into the container may be effected by using a fork-lift truck or telehandler.
The method may further comprise the step of installing in the safe-room any one or more of air treatment means, a reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or pressurised air, a sealable first access/egress point with an air-tight door, a second access/egress point, communication means for communicating with remote locations, control means for controlling certain aspects of a ship on/in which the safe-room is located when in use, GPS means, charts/maps, medical supplies, food, water, toilet facilities, lighting and an electricity supply, and remote monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
In a third aspect the invention provides an air conditioning system for a portable safe-room including a bullet proof vent. The features of this may be discerned from the description herein.
The safe-room may include a frame having armour plate attachment means to which the armour plate is attachable. The frame may be affixed to the floor of the container. The frame may be comprised of mild steel or aluminium although other materials are contemplated. The frame members may be square and/or round in cross-section. Other shapes such as “I” or RHS beams are contemplated. The armour plate attachment means may be in the form of clamps or other members projecting outwardly from the frame, the armour plate being affixed by these clamps and held in place against the container walls. The plates may abut one another.
In one embodiment, the citadel is constructed in a modular manner having standard lengths of frame elements which may be assembled to create one of several standard sized citadels. For instance, the final citadel may comprise two smaller units.
The armour plate may also comprise standard sized panels. For instance, the panels may be approximately 8’ x 4’ in size and may be 5mm thick. They may be 300mm wide. Other thicknesses are contemplated such as 6mm and 6.5mm. The plate may be steel and may have at least 500 Brunel hardness. This may allow use of industrial wear plate instead of ballistic steel and may help to reduce its price. Although undesirable in one embodiment, the plates may be welded together thus making it extremely difficult to remove the plates from outside the safe room when in-situ inside a container.
To reduce the cost of the safe-room armour plate may only be arranged along one wall which will be exposed externally, the other walls, floor and ceiling being protected by other containers and/or part of the ship’s structure.
The safe-room may include heat-resistant material located outwardly of the citadel to substantially prevent or hinder the use of cutting equipment from cutting through the container walls/ceiling/floor, thus providing greater protection for the occupants of the safe-room. It may also provide some defence against fires. In one embodiment, a water-filled jacket is provided between the armour and the citadel.
The armour plate located on at least one wall may be inclined relative to the vertical and/or the horizontal. In this way, the cross-sectional thickness in a plane parallel to either the horizontal or vertical respectively is increased thus providing greater protection against arms fire. In one embodiment, adjacent sections of armour plates may be arranged in a zigzag pattern.
The communication means may be for communicating with locations remote from the ship, such as ports, anti-pirate agencies, ship owners, and the coast guard. The means may also allow communication with places within the ship such as the bridge, engine room etc. Such communication means may be arranged to receive images and sounds from monitors remote and/or external to the safe-room. For example, CCTV cameras positioned around the ship, including outside the safe-room, may transmit their images to the safe-room. These transmissions may be wireless and or wired.
The safe-room has been designed and developed to remedy the problem of hostages being taken. The safe-room is portable, easily deployable and based within a standard ISBU (ISO) shipping container.
In outline, ISO container units are common to every major port in the world and marine cranage systems allow them to be rapidly fitted to ships without the need for external modification. The unit is armoured and may be bulletproof, and may contain its own air supply, electrical system, communications suite and a facility to shut down most marine diesel systems remotely from within the unit. Each unit can accommodate up to approximately 24 personnel for up to 96 hours if required, although 48 hour is preferred.
The safe-room may have certain advantages when compared to a citadel internal of the ship, in that from the outside it retains the general appearance of a standard ISO container and could be made covert if necessary. It avoids the need for expensive and lengthy structural work to shipping making it suitable for deployment on a temporary basis for ‘one off transits’ of dangerous areas. Additionally due to the highly portable nature of the invention it is possible to deliver a stand-alone functioning safe room either at land or sea in a comparatively short space of time.
The safe-room may have a lockable external door by which access to it may be controlled. It may be locked from within to secure the safe-room. The safe-room may also contain a separate emergency door to provide an alternative means of exit.
In an emergency where the safe-room air supply is compromised by physical obstruction or by external attempts to influence the air supply entering, a facility may exist to isolate the safe-room from the external atmosphere and provide a breathable internal atmosphere for a limited period of time.
The safe-room may contain, if required, a device capable of transmitting a signal to shut down the main propulsion system of the host ship (if being used at sea).
Provision of a safe-room on a ship may reduce insurance premiums for the ship’s owner.
The term “portable” refers to the fact that the safe-room may be lifted and moved by typically available cranage and fork-lifts.
The above and other characteristics, features and advantages of the present invention will become apparent from the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, which illustrate, by way of example, the principles of the invention. This description is given for the sake of example only, without limiting the scope of the invention. The reference figures quoted below refer to the attached drawings.
Figure 1 is a perspective partially cut-away view of a general arrangement of a safe-room;
Figure 2 is a plan view of a safe-room in a container;
Figure 3 is a perspective view of a portion of a wall of a safe-room;
Figure 4 is a cross-sectional elevation of a safe-room;
Figure 5 is a side view of a portion of a safe-room;
Figure 6 is an elevational view of part of Figure 5; and
Figure 7 is a plan view of a portion of a different safe-room.
The present invention will be described with respect to particular embodiments and with reference to certain drawings but the invention is not limited thereto but only by the claims. The drawings described are only schematic and are non-limiting. In the drawings, the size of some of the elements may be exaggerated and not drawn to scale for illustrative purposes. The dimensions and the relative dimensions do not correspond to actual reductions to practice of the invention.
Furthermore, the terms first, second, third and the like in the description and in the claims, are used for distinguishing between similar elements and not necessarily for describing a sequence, either temporally, spatially, in ranking or in any other manner. It is to be understood that the terms so used are interchangeable under appropriate circumstances and that the embodiments of the invention described herein are capable of operation in other sequences than described or illustrated herein.
Moreover, the terms top, bottom, over, under and the like in the description and the claims are used for descriptive purposes and not necessarily for describing relative positions. It is to be understood that the terms so used are interchangeable under appropriate circumstances and that the embodiments of the invention described herein are capable of operation in other orientations than described or illustrated herein.
It is to be noticed that the term “comprising”, used in the claims, should not be interpreted as being restricted to the means listed thereafter; it does not exclude other elements or steps. It is thus to be interpreted as specifying the presence of the stated features, integers, steps or components as referred to, but does not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps or components, or groups thereof. Thus, the scope of the expression “a device comprising means A and B” should not be limited to devices consisting only of components A and B. It means that with respect to the present invention, the only relevant components of the device are A and B.
Similarly, it is to be noticed that the term “connected”, used in the description, should not be interpreted as being restricted to direct connections only. Thus, the scope of the expression “a device A connected to a device B” should not be limited to devices or systems wherein an output of device A is directly connected to an input of device B. It means that there exists a path between an output of A and an input of B which may be a path including other devices or means. “Connected” may mean that two or more elements are either in direct physical or electrical contact, or that two or more elements are not in direct contact with each other but yet still co-operate or interact with each other.
Reference throughout this specification to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the present invention. Thus, appearances of the phrases “in one embodiment” or “in an embodiment” in various places throughout this specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment, but may refer to different embodiments. Furthermore, the particular features, structures or characteristics of any embodiment or aspect of the invention may be combined in any suitable manner, as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art from this disclosure, in one or more embodiments.
Similarly it should be appreciated that in the description of exemplary embodiments of the invention, various features of the invention are sometimes grouped together in a single embodiment, figure, or description thereof for the purpose of streamlining the disclosure and aiding in the understanding of one or more of the various inventive aspects. This method of disclosure, however, is not to be interpreted as reflecting an intention that the claimed invention requires more features than are expressly recited in each claim. Rather, as the following claims reflect, inventive aspects lie in less than all features of a single foregoing disclosed embodiment. Thus, the claims following the detailed description are hereby expressly incorporated into this detailed description, with each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment of this invention.
Furthermore, while some embodiments described herein include some features included in other embodiments, combinations of features of different embodiments are meant to be within the scope of the invention, and form yet further embodiments, as will be understood by those skilled in the art. For example, in the following claims, any of the claimed embodiments can be used in any combination.
In the description provided herein, numerous specific details are set forth. However, it is understood that embodiments of the invention may be practised without these specific details. In other instances, well-known methods, structures and techniques have not been shown in detail in order not to obscure an understanding of this description.
The invention will now be described by a detailed description of several embodiments of the invention. It is clear that other embodiments of the invention can be configured according to the knowledge of persons skilled in the art without departing from the true spirit or technical teaching of the invention, the invention being limited only by the terms of the appended claims.
In Figure 1 a general arrangement is shown of a safe-room 10. It does not show all of the features and in particular some of the walls have been removed for the sake of clarity. It comprises a container 20, being a standard shipping container, including a citadel 30 within. The safe-room has a sliding door 40 within the conventional doors (not shown) of the container. A door 50 is provided within these doors allowing access to the citadel 30. An air vent 60 is provided at one end for the air conditioning unit as described below.
In Figure 2 the plan of the container 20 is depicted including within it a liner 70. This liner 70 includes armour plate and insulation as will be described with reference to Figure 3 below.
Liners 70 are provided along the four side walls. A gap is shown between the inside of the container walls and the liner 70 but this may not be present in one embodiment.
The container 20 includes two conventional doors 25 which open outwardly. One may be welded, or otherwise fixed, permanently closed after assembly is complete.
A sliding door 40 is provided inside the conventional doors 25.
The citadel 30 is shown within the container, although it will be noted that a vestibule 45 is formed at the door end since the citadel 30 is somewhat shorter in length than the container 20. The citadel 30 includes a door 50 which opens outwardly into the vestibule 45.
The vestibule 45 includes an air conditioning unit 82. This unit 82 is linked to the outside environment via an air vent system 80, which will be described below with reference to Figures 5 and 6. A generator (not shown) may be located above or below the air conditioning unit 82. Batteries (not shown) may be located within the citadel 30 for, not least, the purpose of temperature control.
An example of the liner 70 is shown in Figure 3. The container wall 20 includes an armour plate 74 pushed up against it. This is held in place by clamps (not shown) at the top of each plate 74. The clamps are attached to a frame (not shown) which is attached to the base of the container and extends around the inside of the container 20.
Inside of the armour plate 74 is an arrangement of insulation 76. This may comprise both acoustic and heat insulation in the form of various foams, rubbers and foils. An air gap 75 is maintained between the liner 70 and the insulation 76.
The wall of the citadel 30 is shown inside of the layer of insulation 76. The insulation may be affixed to the wall of the citadel such that the whole assembly of citadel 30 and insulation layer 76 is slid inside the container after the armour plate has been erected within.
The gaps 71, inside the corrugations, between the wall of the container 20 and the armour plate 74 may be filled with material to produce tumbling of bullets fired therethrough.
To maintain air flow through the citadel for the inhabitants, air vents 100 may be provided at the base of the walls of the container, or in its base, as shown in Figure 4. Air may also be drawn in and/or exit via air vents 120 provided at the top of citadel 30 walls. Air will be heated by the occupants and equipment in within the citadel 30 and will rise. It will exit via the vents 130, 140 provided in the roof of the citadel 30.
The air will then exit through air vents 150 provided in the armour plate 74 above the citadel 30.
The air flow is aided by the passive stack ventilation effect whereby wind 160 on the side of the container will blow in through a vent 110 provided above the armour plate 74 and pass across and out of vents 110 provide on the other side of the container. This movement of air will pull the heated air, rising from the citadel 30, with it and out of the container 20. Arrows depict the movement of air.
The air vents 150 in the armour plate include baffle plates 79 beneath each vent to prevent direct line of sight into the citadel 30 from outside to ensure that the armouring effect is maintained. A gap of 20-25mm between the baffles 79 and the vents 150 is contemplated.
Figure 5 shows the air vent system 80 in more detail. It comprises an air conditioning unit 82 which, as is customary in indirect air conditioning units, requires access to air at a different temperature to function correctly. Although no air actually flows from outside the container 20 to the inside of the citadel via the air conditioning unit 82, the unit 82 does cool, or warm the air circulating within the citadel via its heat exchanger/condenser.
A vent 83 in the form of an array of holes is formed through the armour plate 74 and the container 20 wall. A baffle plate 77 is provided inside of the vent 83. This plate 77 includes an array of holes 87 which are off-set from the array of holes in the vent 83 in the container 20. A fan 86 is provided within the gap between the baffle plate 77 and the armour plate 74 to prevent air stalling and to thus promote air flow through the holes 87 and vent 83. Thus air can reach the air conditioning unit 82 without it being damaged by arms fire. The holes 87 may be 20-25mm in diameter.
Figure 6 shows an elevational view of the armour plate 74 and the baffle 77. Each comprises an array of eight holes 83, 87. These are off-set as shown.
Figure 7 shows an embodiment in which the armour plates 74 along the side walls of the citadel 30 are arranged in a zigzag manner, as viewed from above. This arrangement may aid the deflection of bullets and prevent them penetrating the armour.

Claims (45)

  1. A portable safe-room comprising a standard ISO shipping container, the container having armour plate located substantially adjacent its inside wall, the container including a citadel located inside of the armour plate, the citadel including communication means for communicating with remote locations, and water storage means, the safe-room including air conditioning equipment for providing conditioned air to the interior of the citadel.
  2. The portable safe-room of claim 1, wherein the container and armour plate include a first vent for communication with the air conditioning equipment, an additional piece of armour plate being provided inside of the first vent, the additional piece including a second vent off-set from the first vent to prohibit direct line of sight through said first and second vents.
  3. The portable safe-room of claim 2, wherein the first and/or second vents are provided by one or more holes.
  4. The portable safe-room of either one of claims 2 and 3, wherein a fan is provided between the armour plate and the additional piece of armour plate.
  5. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the armour plate around the inside of the side walls is arranged immediately adjacent the walls.
  6. The safe-room of claim 5, wherein the armour plate is held in place by a frame including clamps.
  7. The safe-room of any preceding claim, further including armour plate arranged beneath, and spaced from, the top of the container.
  8. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the container includes doors at one end thereof and an armour plated door is arranged immediately inside said doors.
  9. The safe-room of claim 8, wherein the armour plated door is a sliding door.
  10. The safe-room of either one of claims 8 and 9, wherein a vestibule is arranged between the container and the citadel, inside of the armour plated door, and at least some of the air conditioning equipment is located within said vestibule.
  11. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel includes an air-tight door openable outwardly only.
  12. The safe-room of any preceding claim, further including a first layer of insulation provided between the citadel and the armour plate.
  13. The safe-room of claim 12, wherein the first layer of insulation includes an acoustic layer of insulation and a heat layer of insulation.
  14. The safe-room of claim 13, wherein the acoustic layer of insulation includes a rubber layer.
  15. The safe-room of any one of claims 12 to 14, wherein an air gap is provided between the first layer of insulation and the armour plate.
  16. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel includes a second layer of insulation adjacent its inner wall.
  17. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel includes a pitched roof.
  18. The safe-room of any preceding claim, further including a power supply.
  19. The safe-room of claim 18, wherein the power supply is a generator.
  20. The safe-room of claim 19, when dependent directly or indirectly on claim 10, wherein the generator is arranged substantially within the vestibule.
  21. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel includes air vents.
  22. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the container includes air vents.
  23. The safe-room of any preceding claim, when directly or indirectly dependent on claim 7, wherein the armour plate arranged at the top of the container includes a vent and an additional piece of armour plate is arranged spaced from said vent to prohibit direct line of sight through said vent.
  24. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel is ventilated by a passive stack ventilation system.
  25. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the armour plate is of the type that is substantially bullet-proof.
  26. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel includes means for sliding it into the container.
  27. The safe-room of any preceding claim, further including sealing means for effecting air-tightness of the citadel.
  28. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the citadel includes under floor storage located between a base liner and the base of the ISO shipping container.
  29. The safe-room of any preceding claim, including air treatment means being one or more of a carbon dioxide treatment means for removing or reducing the presence of carbon dioxide, a carbon monoxide treatment means for removing or reducing the presence of carbon monoxide, a humidity treatment means for controlling the amount of moisture present, a temperature treatment means for controlling the temperature of the air, and a system of filters for purifying the air and reducing or removing potentially harmful gases, smokes or urticants (pain causing gases).
  30. The safe-room of any preceding claim, including a reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or pressurised air.
  31. The safe-room of any preceding claim, including a second access/egress point.
  32. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein a layer of condensation reducing paint is provided on the underside of the top of the container.
  33. The safe-room of any preceding claim, wherein the communication means are arranged to receive images and sounds from monitors remote and/or external to the safe-room.
  34. The safe-room of any preceding claim, including control means for controlling certain aspects of remote facilities.
  35. The safe-room of claim 34, wherein the remote facility is a ship, or offshore installation.
  36. The safe-room of claim 35, wherein the control means includes drive control means for preventing the ship’s engine(s) from driving the ship.
  37. The safe-room of either one of claims 35 and 36, wherein the control means includes steering control means for preventing the ship’s steering means from steering the ship.
  38. The safe-room of any preceding claim, including GPS means for providing the location of the safe-room.
  39. The safe-room of any preceding claim, including any one or more of charts/maps, medical supplies, food, toilet facilities, and electricity.
  40. The safe-room of any preceding claim, including remote monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
  41. A method of assembling a safe-room comprising the steps of: (a) providing an ISO shipping container; (b) erecting a frame inside of said container and using it to hold armour plate in place substantially adjacent three of the four side walls and the top of said container; (c) providing a citadel; (d) sliding said citadel into said container; (e) arranging armour plate on said fourth wall; and (f) arranging sliding doors inside said container doors.
  42. The method of claim 41, wherein the step of inserting the citadel into the container is effected by using a fork-lift truck or telehandler.
  43. The method of either one of claims 41 and 42, further comprising the step of installing in the safe-room any one or more of air treatment means, a reserve of oxygen, oxygen enriched air or pressurised air, a sealable first access/egress point with an air-tight door, a second access/egress point, communication means for communicating with remote locations, control means for controlling certain aspects of a ship on/in which the safe-room is located when in use, GPS means, charts/maps, medical supplies, food, water, toilet facilities, lighting and an electricity supply, and remote monitoring equipment for monitoring an area outside of the safe-room.
  44. A portable safe-room as hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
  45. A method of assembling a safe-room substantially as hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
PCT/IB2012/050372 2011-01-26 2012-01-26 A portable safe-room Ceased WO2012101598A2 (en)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201280006729.9A CN103348070B (en) 2011-01-26 2012-01-26 A kind of portable secured room
AU2012210233A AU2012210233B2 (en) 2011-01-26 2012-01-26 A portable safe-room
ES12706111.7T ES2553746T3 (en) 2011-01-26 2012-01-26 A portable security room
EP12706111.7A EP2668353B1 (en) 2011-01-26 2012-01-26 A portable safe-room

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB1101328.1 2011-01-26
GB1101328.1A GB2487554A (en) 2011-01-26 2011-01-26 A portable safe-room for installation in iso shipping container

Publications (2)

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WO2012101598A2 true WO2012101598A2 (en) 2012-08-02
WO2012101598A3 WO2012101598A3 (en) 2013-01-03

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PCT/IB2012/050372 Ceased WO2012101598A2 (en) 2011-01-26 2012-01-26 A portable safe-room

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EP (1) EP2668353B1 (en)
CN (1) CN103348070B (en)
AU (1) AU2012210233B2 (en)
ES (1) ES2553746T3 (en)
GB (1) GB2487554A (en)
WO (1) WO2012101598A2 (en)

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WO2017002119A1 (en) * 2015-06-29 2017-01-05 Klein Amos Multi layered protection system
US9797153B2 (en) 2015-06-01 2017-10-24 Simply IV Safety LLC Refuge
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CN115288365A (en) * 2022-04-13 2022-11-04 杭州巨力绝缘材料有限公司 High-strength high-toughness high-hardness bulletproof fast-assembled wall column and manufacturing method thereof
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CN111039173A (en) * 2018-10-12 2020-04-21 中冶宝钢技术服务有限公司 Communication system between electric clamp and crane
CN110243618B (en) * 2019-06-17 2021-10-08 中国船舶科学研究中心(中国船舶重工集团公司第七0二研究所) Safeguard box for field test of manned submersible and test method thereof
CN110217353A (en) * 2019-07-01 2019-09-10 上海外高桥造船有限公司 Main deck is taken refuge in one's power comprising its offshore floating type production oil storage ship
CN110789691A (en) * 2019-11-10 2020-02-14 荆门一天阁动力机械科技有限责任公司 Rescue cabin for ship
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US9797153B2 (en) 2015-06-01 2017-10-24 Simply IV Safety LLC Refuge
US10017953B2 (en) 2015-06-01 2018-07-10 Simply IV Safety LLC Refuge
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CN115288365A (en) * 2022-04-13 2022-11-04 杭州巨力绝缘材料有限公司 High-strength high-toughness high-hardness bulletproof fast-assembled wall column and manufacturing method thereof

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU2012210233B2 (en) 2016-08-18
CN103348070A (en) 2013-10-09
AU2012210233A1 (en) 2013-09-19
WO2012101598A3 (en) 2013-01-03
EP2668353B1 (en) 2015-08-26
ES2553746T3 (en) 2015-12-11
GB2487554A (en) 2012-08-01
GB201101328D0 (en) 2011-03-09
CN103348070B (en) 2015-11-25
EP2668353A2 (en) 2013-12-04

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