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WO2011003352A1 - Procédé et dispositif pour protéger une confidentialité de terminal - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif pour protéger une confidentialité de terminal Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011003352A1
WO2011003352A1 PCT/CN2010/075041 CN2010075041W WO2011003352A1 WO 2011003352 A1 WO2011003352 A1 WO 2011003352A1 CN 2010075041 W CN2010075041 W CN 2010075041W WO 2011003352 A1 WO2011003352 A1 WO 2011003352A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
terminal
base station
request message
calculation value
security calculation
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2010/075041
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
冯成燕
滕志猛
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
ZTE Corp
Original Assignee
ZTE Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by ZTE Corp filed Critical ZTE Corp
Publication of WO2011003352A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011003352A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/062—Pre-authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular to a method and apparatus for protecting terminal privacy.
  • IEEE 802.16 standard system is mainly for metropolitan area networks. Its main objective is to develop the physical layer of the air interface of the wireless access system operating in the 2 ⁇ 66 GHz band. (Physical, referred to as PHY) and Media Access Control (MAC) specifications, as well as conformance testing related to air interface protocols and coexistence specifications between different wireless access systems. According to whether it supports mobile characteristics, the IEEE 802.16 standard can be divided into fixed broadband wireless access air interface standard and mobile broadband wireless access air interface standard.
  • 802.16d belongs to the fixed wireless access air interface standard, which was in 2004. It was approved by the IEEE 802 committee in June and released under the name IEEE 802.16-2004.
  • 802.16e is a mobile broadband wireless access air interface standard. It was adopted by the IEEE 802 committee in November 2005 and is released under the name IEEE 802.16-2005.
  • WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
  • WiMAX is based on the IEEE 802.16 air interface specification and has become the most influential broadband wireless access technology in the world.
  • WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
  • ITU International Telecommunication Unit
  • IMT-Advanced International Mobile Telecommunication
  • SRD 802.16m System Requirement Document
  • AMS MAC Address the terminal media access control address
  • STID the official mobile station identifier
  • the terminal reports its own AMS MAC Address to the base station in the RNG-REQ message.
  • the base station sends the TSTID allocated for the terminal to the terminal in the Ranging Response (RNG-RSP) message, and the subsequent message interaction uses the TSTID to identify the terminal until the base station distributes the STID allocated for the terminal to the terminal during the registration process.
  • the transmission of STID requires a protection mechanism.
  • the base station then releases the TSTID and uses the STID to identify the terminal in a subsequent flow.
  • this method only protects the mapping relationship between AMS MAC Address and STID, and still does not solve the risk of AMS MAC Address plaintext transmission. Since the attacker can intercept the address, it will forge or track the user's whereabouts. Summary of the invention
  • the present invention has been made in the prior art without solving the problem of the risk caused by the AMS MAC Address transmission. Therefore, the main object of the present invention is to provide a protection scheme for terminal privacy to solve the above problem.
  • a method of protecting a terminal privacy includes: when the terminal initially enters the network or re-enters the network, the base station receives the ranging request message from the terminal, where the ranging request message carries the media connection calculated by the terminal.
  • the security calculation value is used to protect the real terminal media access control address and identify the terminal; after the terminal successfully completes the authentication and is authorized, the base station calculates the air interface key by using the above security calculation value.
  • a protection device for terminal privacy is provided.
  • the device for protecting the security of the terminal includes: a first receiving module, configured on the base station side, configured to receive a ranging request message from the terminal when the terminal initially enters the network or re-enters the network, where the ranging request message is carried
  • the security calculation value of the media access control address calculated by the terminal is used to protect the real terminal media access control address and identify the terminal;
  • the first calculation module is set on the base station side, and is used to successfully complete the authentication at the terminal.
  • the air interface key is calculated using the security calculation value received by the first receiving module.
  • the method for calculating the air interface key by using the security calculation value of the media access control address calculated by the terminal from the terminal is used by the base station, and the related art does not solve the problem caused by the AMS MAC Address plaintext transmission.
  • the issue of risk which in turn increases the security of the system.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for protecting terminal privacy according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is an interaction of an implementation method for terminal privacy protection in a wireless communication system according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • 3 is a schematic diagram of generating an airborne derived key according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is an interaction flowchart according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is an interaction flow according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention
  • Figure 6 is a block diagram showing the interaction of the terminal privacy protection apparatus according to the sixth embodiment of the present invention
  • Figure 7 is a block diagram showing the structure of the terminal privacy protection apparatus according to the embodiment of the present invention
  • a preferred block diagram of the protection device is a flowchart of a method for protecting terminal privacy according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Embodiment 1 This embodiment considers that the terminal privacy defined by 802.16m (AMS Privacy) does not solve the problem caused by the AMS MAC Address plaintext transmission, and provides a terminal privacy protection scheme, which is initially implemented in the terminal.
  • the terminal When accessing the network or re-entering the network, the terminal calculates the security operation value of the terminal MAC address, and sends the terminal MAC address security operation value to the ranging request message. Base station.
  • step S102 initial network access in the terminal Or the re-entry network
  • the base station receives the ranging request message from the terminal, where the ranging request message carries the security calculation value of the media access control address calculated by the terminal, and the security calculation value is used to protect the real terminal MAC address and Identify the terminal.
  • the security calculation value may include at least one of the following: a hash value, an encryption operation value, and the like.
  • the base station sends a measurement response message to the terminal, and carries the security calculation value therein to indicate the measurement giant.
  • the response message belongs to the terminal.
  • the input parameters for calculating the terminal MAC address security operation value are: a terminal MAC address, and/or a random number Random AMS generated by the terminal, and/or a random number Random ABS generated by the base station, and/or a base station identifier ABSID, that is, The terminal may calculate the security operation value according to at least one of the terminal MAC address and the other three parameters mentioned above.
  • Step S104 After the terminal successfully completes the authentication/authorization, the base station calculates the air interface key using the security calculation value. Preferably, at the same time, the terminal calculates the air interface key using the security calculation value.
  • the air interface key may include at least one of the following: ⁇ an authorization key (Authorization Key, abbreviated as AK), a Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CM AC) KEY, and a transmission encryption key.
  • AK authorization Key
  • CM AC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
  • KEK Key Encrypt Key
  • the method may further include the following operations: after successfully completing the three-way handshake process, the terminal may In the registration request message REG-REQ, ⁇ ! takes its own AMS MAC Address and reports it to the base station. The transmission of the AMS AMC Address needs to be encrypted.
  • the base station receives the registration request message from the terminal, where the registration request message carries the media of the terminal.
  • FIG. 2 is a wireless communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Method for implementing terminal privacy protection in system includes the following steps S201 to S211: Step S201, the terminal scans a downlink (downlink, DL for short) channel, and The base station establishes synchronization and acquires an Up Link (UL) parameter. Step S202, the terminal calculates a hash value of the AMS MAC Address, that is, the AMS MAC.
  • AMS MAC Address* F(AMS MAC Address, Random AMS
  • AMS MAC Address* F(AMS MAC Address, ABSID
  • Random ABS , 48), or AMS MAC Address* F(AMS MAC Address, Random ABS
  • AMS MAC Address* F(AMS MAC Address, ABSID
  • AMS MAC Address* F(AMS MAC Address ,
  • Random AB S Random AMS
  • ABSID 48.
  • F can be any hash function, for example, Message-Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5) algorithm, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) algorithm, CMAC algorithm (Ciphertext packet link message) Authentication code), Dotl6KDF algorithm defined by IEEE 802.16, etc.
  • Random_ABS is a random number generated by the base station, and the random number is broadcasted by a mapping message (A-MAP), or when the terminal performs step S201, the base station allocates for the terminal, and CDMA_Allocation_IE (This information element is used by the base station to allocate bandwidth to the terminal, the terminal Sending a ranging request message to the base station on the bandwidth is sent to the terminal; Random_AMS is a random number generated by the terminal.
  • MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm 5
  • SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
  • CMAC algorithm Ciphertext packet link message
  • Random_ABS and Random_AMS can be 16 bits, 32 bits, 48 bits, 64 bits, 128 bits, and the like.
  • Step S203 The terminal sends an RNG-REQ message to the base station, where the RNG-REQ message carries the following parameters: AMS MAC Address * who goes to the base station, where the RNG-RSP message carries the parameter AMS. MAC address *, the parameter is used to identify which terminal the test 3 macro response message belongs to.
  • Step S205 the terminal and the base station perform a pre-authentication capability negotiation process, and negotiate parameters required for the later authentication process.
  • Step S206 the terminal and the network The authentication and authorization operations are performed on the side.
  • Step S207 The terminal and the base station calculate the air interface key AK by using the AMS MAC Address*, and derive the CMAC KEY, and/or KEK from the AK.
  • Step S208 the terminal and the network side perform a three-way handshake process, and verify Authorization key AK.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of generating an airborne derived key according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in FIG.
  • AK ⁇ Dotl6KDF (PMK, AMS MAC Address*) ABSID
  • AMS MAC Address* is the hash of the terminal MAC address. value. ABSID ⁇ & station identification information. "', indicating that the content is a string, "AK” means the string corresponding to the letter combination of AK. "160” indicates the length of AK, the unit is bit.
  • PMK can be derived by MSK It is concluded that the MSK is a key in the IEEE 802.16 specification, which is generated by the mobile station and the base station at both ends in the initial authentication process. It should be noted that in the embodiment of the present invention, the same symbol represents The same meaning.
  • the CMAC KEY U and CMAC KEY D are generated by the following formula: First, determine CMAC PREKEY U and CMAC PREKEY D, CMAC PREKEY U and CMAC PREKEY D to derive an intermediate parameter of CMAC KEY U and CMAC KEY D. Among them, CMAC_PREKEY_U and CMAC PREKEY D are generated as follows:
  • CMAC PREKEY D ⁇ Dotl6KDF ( AK, AMS MAC Address*
  • "CMAC KEYS” , 256 ) the character string corresponding to the CMACJ EYS character combination. 256 means 4 dance
  • the length of the result is 256 bits.
  • the result of the above formula is the concatenation value of CMAC_PREKEY_U and CMAC PREKEY D, and the value of CMAC_PREKEY_U and CMAC PREKEY D is 128 bits before and after.
  • CMAC PREKEY U and CMAC PREKEY D generation methods can also be implemented by: CMAC PREKEY U
  • KEK ⁇ Dotl6KDF ( AK,
  • CMAC KEY D ⁇ AESCMAC PREKEY D ( CMAC KEY COUNT ) where AES is the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm.
  • TEK ⁇ Dotl6KDF ( AK, SAID
  • AK is the authorization key generated in the foregoing manner
  • COUNTER_TEK is a counter, and the counter is initialized or heavy at the terminal each time.
  • Authentication ⁇ ⁇ is reset when authorized, and each pair is updated once, and the value is incremented by 1.
  • the SAID is the SA identity, and is assigned by the base station to the mobile station. For the generation of this parameter, refer to the relevant provisions in IEEE 802.16m, which is not mentioned here.
  • TEK means the string corresponding to the letter combination of TEK. 128 indicates that the length of the TEK is 128 bits. The way TEK is generated can also be achieved by:
  • TEK ⁇ Dotl6KDF ( AK, SAID
  • the meanings of the parameters in the formula are exactly the same as those in the aforementioned TEK generation formula, and are not mentioned here.
  • the terminal when the terminal needs to perform handover between the base stations, the terminal sends the updated terminal MAC address security calculation value to the target base station.
  • 4 is an interaction flowchart according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention. The specific operation is as shown in FIG.
  • Step S402 The terminal sends a terminal handover command (AAI_HO_CMD) message to the current serving base station, In order to notify the monthly base station, the terminal needs to switch to the target base station.
  • Step S406 the terminal calculates a security calculation value (AMS MAC Address*) of the updated terminal MAC address, and sends a ranging request (RNG-REQ) message to the target base station, where the message carries the parameter: AMS MAC Address*, step S408, target The base station sends a measurement macro response (RNG-RSP) message to the terminal.
  • AMS MAC Address* security calculation value
  • RNG-REQ ranging request
  • step S408 target The base station sends a measurement macro response (RNG-RSP) message to the terminal.
  • RNG-RSP measurement macro response
  • FIG. 5 is an interaction flowchart of Embodiment 5 of the present invention. As shown in FIG.
  • the method includes the following steps S502 to S508: Step S502: Before the terminal sends a handover command message to the base station, calculate the terminal MAC address. The security calculation value is sent to the serving base station in the handover indication message. Step S504: The serving base station performs a handover confirmation message interaction process with the target base station, and confirms to the target base station that the terminal is about to switch. In the process, the monthly base station transmits the security calculation value of the terminal MAC address to the target base station. Step S506: The terminal sends a ranging request (RNG-REQ) message to the target base station. Step S508, the target base station sends a measurement response (RNG-RSP) message to the terminal.
  • RNG-REQ ranging request
  • RNG-RSP measurement response
  • FIG. 6 is an interaction flowchart of the sixth embodiment of the present invention, as shown in FIG.
  • the method mainly includes the following steps S602 to S604: Step S602, when the Idle mode re-entry network trigger condition is satisfied, the terminal calculates a security calculation value of the terminal MAC address, and sends a ranging request message to the base station.
  • the message carries parameters: a secure calculated value of the terminal MAC address.
  • Step S604 The base station sends a ranging response message to the terminal.
  • Embodiment 7 This embodiment provides a protection device for terminal privacy.
  • FIG. 7 This embodiment provides a protection device for terminal privacy.
  • each module of the device is disposed on both sides of the base station 4 and the terminal 6, wherein the base station 4 side includes:
  • the receiving module 42 and the first calculating module 44 are described below.
  • the first receiving module 42 is disposed on the side of the base station 44, and is configured to receive a ranging request message from the terminal 6 when the terminal 6 initially enters the network or re-enters the network, where the ranging request message carries the media connection calculated by the terminal 6.
  • FIG. 8 is a block diagram of a preferred structure of a device for protecting privacy of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the base station 4 includes: a first sending module 46, a second receiving module 48, and the terminal 6 includes: a second computing module 62.
  • the second sending module 64 and the third calculating module 66 The foregoing structure is described below.
  • the first sending module 46 is disposed on the base station 4 side, and is configured to send a ranging response message to the terminal 6, and carry a security calculation value therein to indicate that the ranging response message belongs to the terminal 6;
  • the second receiving module 48 is disposed at the base station 4.
  • the side is configured to receive a registration request message from the terminal 6, where the registration request message carries the media access control address of the terminal 6, and the registration request message is encrypted by the terminal 6 according to the air interface key.
  • the second calculation module 62 is disposed on the terminal 6 side for calculating a security calculation value of the media access control address.
  • the second sending module 64 is connected to the second calculation module 62 and is disposed on the terminal 6 side for the base station 4 Sending a ranging request message carrying the security calculation value calculated by the second calculation module 62; the third calculation module 66 is connected to the second calculation module 62, and is disposed on the terminal 6 side for security calculated by using the second calculation module 62. Calculate the value to calculate the air interface key.
  • the foregoing embodiment of the present invention provides a protection scheme for terminal privacy. When the terminal initially enters the network or re-enters the network, the terminal calculates a security operation value of the terminal MAC address, and secures the terminal MAC address. The calculated value is sent to the base station in the ranging request message.
  • the terminal and the network side calculate the relevant air interface key by using the terminal MAC address security calculation value when calculating the derived key of the air interface, and solve the terminal privacy defined by 802.16m (AMS Privacy).
  • AMS Privacy 802.16m
  • the invention is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.
  • the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not limited to the IEEE 802.16 system. Its associated mode can be applied to other wireless communication systems. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and changes can be made in the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and scope of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention porte sur un procédé pour protéger une confidentialité de terminal qui comprend les opérations suivantes : lorsqu'un terminal accède à un réseau initialement ou ré-accède au réseau, une station de base reçoit un message de demande de télémétrie provenant du terminal, le message de demande de télémétrie portant une valeur de calcul sûre d'une adresse de commande d'accès au support (MAC) calculée par le terminal et la valeur de calcul sûre est utilisée pour protéger l'adresse MAC de terminal réelle et identifier le terminal ; et la station de base calcule une clé d'interface radio par utilisation de la valeur de calcul sûre après que le terminal achève avec succès une authentification/autorisation. L'invention porte également sur un dispositif pour protéger une confidentialité de terminal. La présente invention résout le problème selon lequel la transmission en texte en clair de l'adresse MAC comporte des risques, et améliore la sécurité d'un système.
PCT/CN2010/075041 2009-07-08 2010-07-07 Procédé et dispositif pour protéger une confidentialité de terminal Ceased WO2011003352A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CNA2009101593412A CN101610511A (zh) 2009-07-08 2009-07-08 终端私密性的保护方法及装置
CN200910159341.2 2009-07-08

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WO2011003352A1 true WO2011003352A1 (fr) 2011-01-13

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2017026930A1 (fr) * 2015-08-11 2017-02-16 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procédés et dispositifs permettant une amélioration de confidentialité dans des réseaux

Families Citing this family (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101610511A (zh) * 2009-07-08 2009-12-23 中兴通讯股份有限公司 终端私密性的保护方法及装置
CN102196532A (zh) * 2010-03-05 2011-09-21 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种网络接入方法及系统
CN110177371B (zh) * 2019-04-04 2022-06-21 创新先进技术有限公司 生成设备标识信息的方法及装置
WO2024092827A1 (fr) * 2022-11-04 2024-05-10 北京小米移动软件有限公司 Procédé et appareil de télémétrie

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CN1677919A (zh) * 2004-03-29 2005-10-05 三洋电机株式会社 无线传送装置、相互认证方法以及相互认证程序
CN101014185A (zh) * 2005-08-23 2007-08-08 华为技术有限公司 一种测距请求消息校验方法及无线接入网络
WO2008153284A2 (fr) * 2007-06-14 2008-12-18 Lg Electronics Inc. Procédé pour réaliser une protection de confidentialité de la signalisation de commande au moyen de certificat
CN101610511A (zh) * 2009-07-08 2009-12-23 中兴通讯股份有限公司 终端私密性的保护方法及装置

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CN1677919A (zh) * 2004-03-29 2005-10-05 三洋电机株式会社 无线传送装置、相互认证方法以及相互认证程序
CN101014185A (zh) * 2005-08-23 2007-08-08 华为技术有限公司 一种测距请求消息校验方法及无线接入网络
WO2008153284A2 (fr) * 2007-06-14 2008-12-18 Lg Electronics Inc. Procédé pour réaliser une protection de confidentialité de la signalisation de commande au moyen de certificat
CN101610511A (zh) * 2009-07-08 2009-12-23 中兴通讯股份有限公司 终端私密性的保护方法及装置

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2017026930A1 (fr) * 2015-08-11 2017-02-16 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procédés et dispositifs permettant une amélioration de confidentialité dans des réseaux

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