[go: up one dir, main page]

WO2010135892A1 - Procédé et système d'authentification bidirectionnelle basés sur une fonction de hachage - Google Patents

Procédé et système d'authentification bidirectionnelle basés sur une fonction de hachage Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2010135892A1
WO2010135892A1 PCT/CN2009/075490 CN2009075490W WO2010135892A1 WO 2010135892 A1 WO2010135892 A1 WO 2010135892A1 CN 2009075490 W CN2009075490 W CN 2009075490W WO 2010135892 A1 WO2010135892 A1 WO 2010135892A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
field
packet
authentication
reader
response packet
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2009/075490
Other languages
English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
庞辽军
曹军
铁满霞
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
China Iwncomm Co Ltd
Original Assignee
China Iwncomm Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by China Iwncomm Co Ltd filed Critical China Iwncomm Co Ltd
Publication of WO2010135892A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010135892A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a two-way authentication method and system for use in the field of wireless networks, and more particularly to a method and system for mutual authentication based on a hash function. Background technique
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • Electronic tags are usually low-performance devices with low processing power. Devices such as readers and database servers generally have higher performance and unlimited processing power, which can satisfy various operations and operations such as PCs. Therefore, when designing an electronic label application system, the performance of the electronic label becomes a bottleneck, and the design adopted should be determined according to the performance of the electronic label. The design of the safety certification scheme is no exception.
  • the existing wireless network security scheme such as the wireless LAN IEEE802.11i, the wireless metropolitan area network IEEE802.16e, etc., can be used to implement the two-way between the electronic tag and the reader. Certification. If the performance of the electronic tag is low, some special security solutions need to be designed to achieve a compromise between performance and security.
  • Public key system-based authentication schemes while flexible and scalable, do not require the public key operations to be suitable for low-performance electronic tags.
  • the operations involved in the hash function are mainly shift and bit operations, and the performance is high, which can be suitable for low-performance devices.
  • the computational complexity is also Can be one or two orders of magnitude higher. Summary of the invention
  • the present invention provides a hash function-based two-way authentication method that can realize real-time connection between a database and a reader without a secure link, can perform mutual authentication, and utilize device performance reasonably. And system.
  • the invention provides a two-way authentication method based on a hash function, the method comprising the following steps: Step 1. Authentication activation: sending an authentication activation packet to the electronic tag TAG by the reader READER, the content of the packet is empty, and the READER pair is completed. TAG provides energy;
  • Step 2 an authentication request: after the TAG receives the authentication activation packet, the TAG constructs and sends an authentication request packet to the READER;
  • Step 3 The key request: After the READER receives the authentication request packet, construct and send a key request packet to the electronic label application system database DB;
  • Step 4 a certificate authentication request: sending, after the DB receives the key request packet, a certificate authentication request packet to the authentication server AS;
  • Step 5 a certificate authentication response: when the AS receives the certificate authentication request packet,
  • the DB sends a certificate authentication response packet
  • Step 6 Key response: sending, after the DB receives the certificate authentication response packet, a key response packet to the READER;
  • Step 7 the authentication response: sending, after the READER receives the key response packet, an authentication response packet to the TAG;
  • Step 8 Authentication confirmation: when the TAG receives the authentication response packet, the READER Send an authentication confirmation packet.
  • the content of the authentication request packet in the step 2 includes: a PID field, an N1 field, and an MIC1 field;
  • the PID field is a current pseudo identity of the TAG
  • the N1 field is a one-time random number selected by the TAG
  • the MIC1 field is a message integrity check code calculated by the TAG using all of the fields preceding this field by using the pre-shared key SK stored by itself.
  • the key request packet content in the step 3 includes: a PID field, an N1 field, an MIC1 field, an N2 field, a CERT_R field, and a CN2 field;
  • the value of the PID field in the key request packet is the same as the PID field value in the authentication request packet;
  • the value of the N1 field in the key request packet is the same as the value of the N1 field in the authentication request packet;
  • the value of the MIC1 field in the key request packet is the same as the value of the MIC1 field in the authentication request packet;
  • the N2 field in the key request packet is a one-time random number selected by the READER; the CERT_R field in the key request packet is a digital certificate of the READER; CN2 in the key request packet
  • the field is the ciphertext of the N2, and the CN2 is obtained by encrypting N2 using the private key of the READER.
  • the DB in the step 4 After the DB in the step 4 receives the key request packet, the DB recalculates the MIC1 by using the SK corresponding to the PID, and compares the locally recalculated MIC1 with the MIC1 in the received key request packet.
  • the DB Decrypting the reception using the public key of the READER CN2 in the obtained key request packet obtains N2, and compares N2 obtained by CN2 in the received key request packet by the public key of the READER with the N2 value in the received key request packet, If the N2 obtained by decrypting the CN2 in the received key request packet by the public key of the READER is not equal to the received N2, the received key request packet is discarded if decrypted by using the public key of the READER
  • the N2 obtained by the CN2 in the received key request packet is equal to the received N2, and the certificate authentication request packet is constructed and sent to the AS, and the content of the certificate authentication request packet includes: an N2 field, a CERT_R Field, N3 field
  • the value of the N2 field in the certificate authentication request packet is the same as the value of the N2 field in the key request packet;
  • the value of the CERT-R field is the same;
  • the N3 field in the certificate authentication request packet is a one-time random number selected by the DB; the CERT_D field in the certificate authentication request packet is a digital certificate of the DB; and the SIG in the certificate authentication request packet
  • the -D field is the signature of the DB on all fields before this field.
  • the AS verifies whether the signature of the DB is correct; if not, the AS discards the received certificate authentication request packet. If correct, the AS verifies the validity of CERT_D and CERT_R in the certificate authentication request packet, and constructs and sends the certificate authentication response packet to the DB according to the verification result;
  • the contents of the response packet include: an N2 field, a CERT_R field, an N3 field, a CERT_D field, a RES_R field, a RES_D field, and a SIG_A field;
  • the value of the N2 field in the certificate authentication response packet is the same as the value of the N2 field in the certificate authentication request packet;
  • a value of a CERT_R field in the certificate authentication response packet and the certificate authentication request packet is the same;
  • the value of the N3 field in the certificate authentication response packet is the same as the value of the N3 field in the certificate authentication request packet;
  • the value of the CERT_D field in the certificate authentication response packet is the same as the value of the CERT_D field in the certificate authentication request packet;
  • the RES_R field in the certificate authentication response packet is the verification result of the AS to CERT-R;
  • the RES_D field in the certificate authentication response packet is the verification result of the AS to CERT-D;
  • the SIG_A field in the certificate authentication response packet is the signature of the AS on all fields before this field.
  • the DB verifies whether the received N3 in the certificate authentication response packet is a random number selected by itself; if the DB receives the If the N3 in the certificate authentication response packet is not the random number selected by the DB, the certificate authentication response packet is discarded; if the N3 in the certificate authentication response packet received by the DB is the DB itself If the random number is selected, it is verified whether the signature of the AS is valid; if invalid, the DB discards the received certificate authentication response packet; if valid, the DB determines the certificate authentication response by The RES_R field determines whether the READER certificate is legal; if the certificate is not legal, the DB performs error processing and notifies the READER; if the certificate is legal, the DB constructs and sends the key response packet to the READER; The contents of the key response packet include: N2 field, N3 field, CERT_D field, RES_R field, RES_D field, SIG_A field,
  • the value of the N2 field in the key response packet is the same as the value of the N2 field in the key request packet
  • the value of the CERT_D field in the key response packet is the same as the value of the CERT_D field in the certificate authentication response packet;
  • the value of the RES_R field in the key response packet is the same as the value of the RES_R field in the certificate authentication response packet;
  • the value of the RES_D field in the key response packet is the same as the value of the RES_D field in the certificate authentication response packet;
  • the value of the SIG_A field in the key response packet is the same as the value of the SIG_A field in the certificate authentication response packet; for example, the calculation method of CK is: First, three keys K1 and ⁇ 2 are derived by using SK. And ⁇ 3, then, using the public key of the READER to encrypt Kl
  • the R field in the key response packet is a one-time random number selected by the DB, and is used for updating PID and SK.
  • the update method is to use a hash function to update the PID and R using a hash function to obtain a hash value.
  • the SIG_D field in the key response packet is the signature of the DB to all fields before the field.
  • the READER After the READER receives the key response packet in step 7, the READER verifies whether the N2 in the key response packet is a random number selected by itself; if the key response packet is in the packet If the N2 is not a random number selected by itself, the READER discards the received key response packet; if N2 in the key response packet is a random number selected by itself, the READER verifies the AS Whether the signature is valid; if the signature of the AS is invalid, discarding the received key response packet; if the signature of the AS is valid, the READER determines according to the RES-D in the key response packet Determining whether the DB certificate is legal; if the DB certificate is invalid, the READER discards the received key response packet; if the DB certificate is legal, the READER verifies the signature of the DB Whether it is valid; if the signature of the DB is invalid, then The READER discards the received key response packet; if the signature of the DB is valid, the REA
  • the value of the N1 field in the authentication response packet is the same as the value of the N1 field in the authentication request packet;
  • the value of the R field in the authentication response packet is the same as the value of the R field in the key response packet;
  • the N4 field in the authentication response packet is a one-time random number selected by the READER;
  • the MIC2 field in the authentication response packet is an integrity check code calculated by the READER for all fields before the field, and the MIC2 passes through the pair of N1 , R, VABC, N4, Kl, K2, ⁇ 3, Wl, and W2 are obtained using a hash function to find the hash value.
  • the TAG After the TAG receives the authentication response packet, the TAG verifies whether the N1 in the authentication response packet is a random number selected by itself; if the N1 in the authentication response packet is not selected by itself The TAG discards the received authentication response packet; if the N1 in the authentication response packet is a random number selected by itself, the TAG uses the SK derived key K1, ⁇ 2, ⁇ 3, Obtaining VA, VB, and VC according to VABC, recalculating W1 and W2; then locally recalculating MIC2, comparing whether the locally recalculated MIC2 is equal to the received MIC2 in the authentication response packet; if not, then Determining, by the TAG, the received authentication response packet; if equal, the TAG constructs and sends the authentication confirmation packet to the READER, and simultaneously updates the PID and the SK according to R in the authentication response packet, respectively By using hashes for PID and R The function obtains the hash value to obtain the updated PID, and obtains the updated SK
  • VD ( PID+ID ) ⁇ W1 ⁇ W2; ID is the identity of the TAG;
  • the MIC3 field in the authentication confirmation packet is an integrity check code calculated by the READER for all fields before the field, and the MIC3 obtains a hash value by using a hash function for N4, VD, Kl, ⁇ 2, ⁇ 3, W1, and W2. .
  • the step 8 may further include a step 9, when the READER receives the authentication confirmation score; if the N4 in the authentication confirmation packet is not a random number selected by itself, the READER discards the received The authentication confirmation packet; if the N4 in the authentication confirmation packet is a random number selected by itself, the READER locally recalculates the MIC3, and determines whether the locally recalculated MIC3 is equal to the MIC3 in the received authentication confirmation packet; If not equal, the READER discards the received authentication acknowledgment packet; if equal, the READER calculates a real identity ID of the TAG.
  • the invention also provides a two-way authentication system based on a hash function, comprising an electronic tag TAG, a reader/writer READER, and an electronic tag application system database DB for realizing the TAG and the READER based two-way authentication by a hash function.
  • a hash function comprising an electronic tag TAG, a reader/writer READER, and an electronic tag application system database DB for realizing the TAG and the READER based two-way authentication by a hash function.
  • an authentication server AS the TAG and the READER are connected; the DB is respectively connected to the AS and the READER.
  • the two-way authentication method between the electronic tag and the database provided by the invention is mainly performed between wireless communication networks, for databases and reading No secure links are required between the writers.
  • the present invention enables two-way authentication between electronic tags and databases, as well as databases and readers.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a two-way authentication method based on a hash function according to the present invention. detailed description
  • TAG refers to passive electronic tags
  • READER stands for reader/writer
  • DB stands for electronic tag application system database
  • ID is the identity of TAG
  • PID is the pseudo-identity of electronic tag TAG
  • SK is the pre-shared key of TAG storage, , data pair ⁇ PID, SK> is stored securely on DB
  • CERT-R is a digital certificate of READER
  • CERT-D is a digital certificate of DB
  • CERT-A is a digital certificate of AS
  • MIC is a message integrity check code
  • EP ( m; X ) encrypts the message m using the public key of the entity X
  • ES m; X
  • H ml; m2; ...
  • m3 Is to use hash function H to find the hash value of ml, m2, m3;
  • SIG-D is the signature of DB;
  • SIG-A is the signature of AS;
  • RES-R is the verification result of AS to CERT-R;
  • RES-D is AS verifies the result of CERT-D;
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a two-way authentication method based on a hash function according to the present invention.
  • Step 1. Authentication activation: The authentication activation packet is sent by the reader READER to the electronic tag TAG. The contents of this sub-group are empty, mainly completing the reader READER to provide energy to the electronic tag TAG.
  • Step 2 Authentication Request: After receiving the authentication activation packet, the TAG constructs and sends an authentication request packet to the READER.
  • the authentication request packet is sent by the TAG to the READER.
  • the content of the authentication request packet includes:
  • the PID field in the PID N1 MIC1 authentication request packet is the current pseudo identity of the TAG.
  • the N1 field in the authentication request packet is a one-time random number selected by the TAG.
  • the MIC1 field in the authentication request packet is the message integrity check code that the TAG uses SK to calculate for all fields before this field.
  • the key request packet is sent by the READER to the DB.
  • the key request packet content includes: The value of the PID field in the key request packet is the same as the value of the PID field in the authentication request packet.
  • the value of the N1 field in the key request packet is the same as the value of the N1 field in the authentication request packet.
  • the value of the MIC1 field in the key request packet is the same as the value of the MIC1 field in the authentication request packet.
  • the N2 field in the key request packet is a one-time random number selected by READER.
  • the CERT-R field in the key request packet is a digital certificate for READER.
  • Step 4 Certificate authentication request: After receiving the key request packet, the DB recalculates the MIC1 by using the SK corresponding to the PID, and compares the locally recalculated MIC1 with the received MIC1. If they are not equal, error processing is performed and notified.
  • READER If equal, decrypt the CN2 with the public key of READER to get N2, and decrypt the N2 obtained by CN2 with the public key of READER The N2 values in the received key request packet are compared. If not equal, the DB discards the packet, and if equal, the DB constructs and sends a certificate authentication request packet to the authentication server AS.
  • the certificate authentication request packet is sent by the DB to the AS.
  • the contents of the certificate authentication request packet include:
  • the value of the N2 field in the certificate authentication request packet is the same as the value of the N2 field in the key request packet.
  • the value of the CERT_R field in the certificate authentication request packet is the same as the value of the CERT-R field in the key request packet.
  • the N3 field in the certificate authentication request packet is a one-time random number selected by the DB.
  • the CERT-D field in the certificate authentication request packet is the digital certificate of the DB.
  • the SIG_D field in the certificate authentication request packet is the DB's signature on all fields before this field.
  • Step 5 Certificate authentication response: After receiving the certificate authentication request packet, the AS verifies that the DB signature is correct. If not, the DB discards the received certificate authentication request packet; if correct, the DB verifies the certificate authentication request CERT – the validity of D and CERT—R, and construct and send a certificate packet authentication response to the DB based on the verification result.
  • the certificate authentication response packet is sent by the AS to the DB.
  • the certificate authentication response packet includes: The value of the N2 field in the certificate authentication response packet is the same as the value of the N2 field in the certificate authentication request packet.
  • the value of the CERT_R field in the certificate authentication response packet is the same as the value of the CERT-R field in the certificate authentication request packet.
  • the value of the N3 field in the certificate authentication response packet is the same as the value of the N3 field in the certificate authentication request packet.
  • the value of the CERT-D field in the certificate authentication response packet and the certificate authentication request packet has the same value.
  • the RES_R field in the certificate authentication response packet is the result of the AS verification of CERT-R.
  • the RES_D field in the certificate authentication response packet is the result of the AS verification of CERT-D.
  • the SIG_A field in the certificate authentication response packet is the signature of the AS on all fields before this field.
  • the key response packet is sent by the DB to the READER.
  • the key response packet content includes: The value of the N2 field in the key response packet is the same as the value of the N2 field in the key request packet.
  • the value of the N3 field in the Key Response Packet is the same as the value of the N3 field in the Certificate Authentication Response Packet.
  • the value of the CERT_D field in the Key Response Packet is the same as the value of the CERT-D field in the Certificate Authentication Response Packet.
  • the value of the RES_R field in the Key Response Packet is the same as the value of the RES_R field in the Certificate Authentication Response Packet.
  • the value of the RES_D field in the Key Response Packet is the same as the value of the RES-D field in the Certificate Authentication Response Packet.
  • the value of the SIG_A field in the Key Response Packet is the same as the value of the SIG_A field in the Certificate Authentication Response Packet.
  • the CK field in the key response packet is the key ciphertext sent by the DB to the READER.
  • the CK calculation method is as follows: First, three keys K1, ⁇ 2, and ⁇ 3 are derived by using SK, and then READER is used.
  • the R field in the key response packet is a one-time random number selected by the DB for updating the PID and the SK.
  • the updated PID is obtained by using the hash function for the PID and R to obtain the hash value, and is used for SK and R.
  • the SIG_D field in the key response packet is the DB's signature on all fields before this field.
  • Step 7 Authentication response: After receiving the key response packet, the READER verifies whether the N2 in the key response packet is a random number selected by itself, and if the N2 in the key response packet is not a random number selected by itself, the packet is discarded. The received key response packet; if N2 in the key response packet is a random number selected by itself, the READER verifies whether the signature of the AS is valid. If the signature of the AS is invalid, the READER discards the received key response packet. If the signature of the AS is valid, the READER determines whether the DB certificate is legal according to the RES_D field in the key response packet. If the DB certificate is not valid, the READER discards the received key response packet.
  • the READER verifies that the DB signature is valid. If the DB's signature is invalid, the READER discards the received key response packet. If the DB's signature is valid, the READER uses the private key to decrypt the keys Kl, K2, and K3. Finally, the READER constructs and sends an authentication response packet to the TAG.
  • the authentication response packet is sent by the READER to the TAG.
  • the contents of the authentication response packet include:
  • the value of the N1 field in the authentication response packet is the same as the value of the N1 field in the authentication request packet.
  • the value of the R field in the authentication response packet is the same as the value of the R field in the key response packet. information.
  • W1 and W2 are secret and secret random numbers randomly selected by the reader READER.
  • the N4 field in the authentication packet response is a one-time random number selected by READER.
  • Step 8 Authentication confirmation: After receiving the authentication response packet, the TAG verifies whether the N1 in the authentication response packet is a random number selected by itself. If the N1 in the authentication response packet is not a random number selected by itself, the TAG discards the packet. If N1 in the authentication response packet is a random number selected by itself, the TAG uses the SK derived keys K1, ⁇ 2, ⁇ 3, obtains VA, VB, and VC according to VABC, and recalculates W1 and W2. Then, the MIC2 is recalculated locally to compare whether the locally recalculated MIC2 is equal to the received MIC2. If they are not equal, the TAG discards the received authentication response packet.
  • the TAG constructs and sends an authentication acknowledgement packet to the READER.
  • the PID and the SK are updated, and the updated PID is obtained by using the hash function for the PID and the R, and the hash function is used to obtain the hash value for the SK and R.
  • the authentication confirmation packet is sent by the TAG to the READER.
  • the certification confirmation packet includes:
  • VD ( PID+ID ) ® W1 ® W2.
  • the MIC3 field in the authentication confirmation packet is the integrity check code calculated by the READER for all the fields before this field.
  • Step 8 may further include step 9, that is, after receiving the authentication confirmation packet, the READER verifies whether the N4 in the authentication confirmation packet is a random number selected by itself, and if not, the READER loses The received authentication confirmation packet is discarded, and if so, the MIC3 is recalculated locally, and whether the locally recalculated MIC3 is equal to the MIC3 in the received authentication confirmation packet. If they are not equal, the received authentication confirmation packet is discarded. If they are equal, the real identity ID of the TAG is calculated. The READER completes the authentication of the TAG.
  • TAG and READER implement the two-way authentication READER to obtain the real identity ID of the TAG; at the same time, TAG and DB implement synchronous update of PID and SK for the next authentication; and share between TAG and READER.
  • Keys K1, K2, K3, W1, and W2 which can be used to encrypt messages or perform message integrity operations.
  • the key request and the key response packet should appear in pairs, and is optional, and only when there is no key SK on the READER, the two group requests are used to obtain the key SK from the DB;
  • the certificate authentication request and the certificate authentication response packet should appear in pairs and are optional, and will only be used if the DB needs to perform certificate validity verification.
  • the present invention provides a two-way authentication method based on a hash function, and also provides an authentication system for implementing the two-way authentication method, the system comprising: TAG, READER, for implementing TAG and READER based on The library DB and AS of the two-way authentication of the Greek function; TAG and READER connection; DB is connected with AS and READER respectively.
  • the invention belongs to a pre-shared key based authentication method in an electronic label system (Shared-key based
  • SRAP RFID Authentication Protocol

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un système d'authentification bidirectionnelle basés sur une fonction de hachage. Le procédé comprend les étapes suivantes: un paquet d'activation d'authentification est envoyé à une étiquette électronique (ETIQUETTE) par un lecteur (LECTEUR); l'ETIQUETTE forme un paquet de demande d'authentification et l'envoie au LECTEUR; un paquet de demande de clé de chiffrement est formé et envoyé à une base de données de système d'application d'étiquettes électroniques (DB); un paquet de demande d'authentification de certificat est envoyé à un serveur d'authentification (AS); un paquet de réponse d'authentification de certificat est envoyé à la DB; un paquet de réponse de clé de chiffrement est envoyé au LECTEUR; un paquet de réponse d'authentification est envoyé à l'ETIQUETTE; un paquet de confirmation d'authentification est envoyé au LECTEUR. L'invention concerne un procédé et un système d'authentification bidirectionnelle basés sur une fonction de hachage, qui permettent d'effectuer une authentification bidirectionnelle sans nécessiter de liaison sécurisée entre la base de données et le lecteur, et d'utiliser de manière rationnelle l'efficacité de l'équipement.
PCT/CN2009/075490 2009-05-27 2009-12-11 Procédé et système d'authentification bidirectionnelle basés sur une fonction de hachage Ceased WO2010135892A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN200910022747 2009-05-27
CN200910022747.6 2009-05-27

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2010135892A1 true WO2010135892A1 (fr) 2010-12-02

Family

ID=41790174

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2009/075490 Ceased WO2010135892A1 (fr) 2009-05-27 2009-12-11 Procédé et système d'authentification bidirectionnelle basés sur une fonction de hachage

Country Status (2)

Country Link
CN (1) CN101662366B (fr)
WO (1) WO2010135892A1 (fr)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102377572A (zh) * 2011-11-23 2012-03-14 广东南方信息安全产业基地有限公司 基于线性移位的双向认证方法
CN114978548A (zh) * 2022-05-24 2022-08-30 贵州大学 一种基于国密sm2和sm3算法的rfid双向认证方法及系统
CN115412378A (zh) * 2022-11-02 2022-11-29 北京锘崴信息科技有限公司 隐私数据及金融隐私数据相关服务的可信认证方法及装置

Families Citing this family (15)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101783732B (zh) * 2010-03-12 2012-03-07 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 基于预共享密钥可离线的双向认证方法及系统
CN101814991B (zh) * 2010-03-12 2012-05-09 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 基于身份的双向认证方法及系统
CN101853369B (zh) * 2010-04-01 2012-09-26 西北工业大学 基于随机哈希的双向认证方法
US9065632B2 (en) * 2013-02-20 2015-06-23 Qualcomm Incorporated Message authentication using a universal hash function computed with carryless multiplication
CN103279775B (zh) * 2013-05-03 2016-08-03 无锡昶达信息技术有限公司 能够保证秘密性和数据完整性的rfid系统及其实现方法
CN104506554B (zh) * 2015-01-04 2017-11-24 西安电子科技大学 一种手机终端访问云存储服务器的安全方法
ES2597808B1 (es) * 2015-07-22 2017-11-07 José Carlos SANCHO PITARCH Método y sistema de autentificación de elementos de identificación por radiofrecuencia, y programa de ordenador
CN106572065B (zh) 2015-10-10 2019-11-22 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 一种多ttp参与的实体身份有效性验证方法及装置
CN106572066B (zh) 2015-10-10 2019-11-22 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 一种实体身份有效性验证方法及其装置
CN106572064B (zh) 2015-10-10 2019-10-29 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 一种多ttp参与的实体身份有效性验证方法及装置
CN105429941B (zh) * 2015-10-27 2018-07-27 西安电子科技大学 多接收者身份匿名签密方法
CN106850566B (zh) * 2016-12-29 2020-04-03 北京奇艺世纪科技有限公司 一种数据一致性校验的方法及装置
CN108616531B (zh) * 2018-04-26 2021-10-08 深圳市盛路物联通讯技术有限公司 一种射频信号安全通信方法及系统
CN109063523B (zh) * 2018-06-29 2021-06-11 浙江工商大学 一种射频识别安全认证方法及系统
CN111327397B (zh) * 2020-01-21 2021-02-02 武汉大学 一种信息数据纵向冗余校验纠错编解码方法

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR20070003205A (ko) * 2005-07-01 2007-01-05 강원대학교산학협력단 Ｒｆｉｄ 시스템에서의 상호인증 및 데이터통신 보안방법
CN101038619A (zh) * 2007-02-06 2007-09-19 中国科学院研究生院 射频识别系统隐私认证方法
CN101051903A (zh) * 2007-03-30 2007-10-10 中山大学 一种符合epc c1g2标准的rfid随机化密钥双向认证方法
CN101132280A (zh) * 2007-10-16 2008-02-27 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 一种wapi证书鉴别方法

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR20070003205A (ko) * 2005-07-01 2007-01-05 강원대학교산학협력단 Ｒｆｉｄ 시스템에서의 상호인증 및 데이터통신 보안방법
CN101038619A (zh) * 2007-02-06 2007-09-19 中国科学院研究生院 射频识别系统隐私认证方法
CN101051903A (zh) * 2007-03-30 2007-10-10 中山大学 一种符合epc c1g2标准的rfid随机化密钥双向认证方法
CN101132280A (zh) * 2007-10-16 2008-02-27 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 一种wapi证书鉴别方法

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102377572A (zh) * 2011-11-23 2012-03-14 广东南方信息安全产业基地有限公司 基于线性移位的双向认证方法
CN102377572B (zh) * 2011-11-23 2014-01-29 广东南方信息安全产业基地有限公司 基于线性移位的双向认证方法
CN114978548A (zh) * 2022-05-24 2022-08-30 贵州大学 一种基于国密sm2和sm3算法的rfid双向认证方法及系统
CN114978548B (zh) * 2022-05-24 2023-10-20 贵州大学 一种基于国密sm2和sm3算法的rfid双向认证方法及系统
CN115412378A (zh) * 2022-11-02 2022-11-29 北京锘崴信息科技有限公司 隐私数据及金融隐私数据相关服务的可信认证方法及装置
CN115412378B (zh) * 2022-11-02 2023-01-31 北京锘崴信息科技有限公司 隐私数据及金融隐私数据相关服务的可信认证方法及装置

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN101662366B (zh) 2011-09-21
CN101662366A (zh) 2010-03-03

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
WO2010135892A1 (fr) Procédé et système d'authentification bidirectionnelle basés sur une fonction de hachage
US12047519B2 (en) Physical unclonable function based mutual authentication and key exchange
EP2416524B1 (fr) Système et procédé de transaction sécurisée de données entre un dispositif de communication sans fil et un serveur
CN1846398B (zh) 基于成对主密钥的验证式密钥交换
EP2629558B1 (fr) Procédé et système d'authentification d'entité sur la base d'un algorithme de chiffrement symétrique
JP5318879B2 (ja) ２ウェイのアクセス認証方法
WO2010135890A1 (fr) Fig. 1: procédé d'authentification bidirectionnelle et système basé sur un algorithme de chiffrement symétrique
US9392453B2 (en) Authentication
JP5524336B2 (ja) 事前共有鍵に基づくネットワークセキュリティアクセス制御方法及びそのシステム
CN108768608B (zh) 在区块链pki下支持瘦客户端的隐私保护身份认证方法
JP5399404B2 (ja) 一方向アクセス認証の方法
WO2008034360A1 (fr) Procédé d'authentification et d'autorisation d'accès au réseau et procédé de mise à jour de clé d'autorisation
JP2003005641A (ja) 無線ｌａｎシステムにおける認証方法と認証装置
KR101485279B1 (ko) 링크 계층 보안 전송을 지원하는 스위칭 장치 및 그의 데이터 처리 방법
WO2011109960A1 (fr) Procédé et système d'authentification mutuelle basée sur des identités
CN110012467B (zh) 窄带物联网的分组认证方法
CN102045716B (zh) 一种无线局域网中端站的安全配置方法和系统
CN110020524A (zh) 一种基于智能卡的双向认证方法
JP5540111B2 (ja) 交換デバイス間の安全な接続の構築方法及びシステム
WO2009074092A1 (fr) Procédé et système allégés d'authentification d'accès
CN111654481A (zh) 一种身份认证方法、装置和存储介质
CN113747433B (zh) 一种雾网络中基于区块侧链结构的设备认证方法
JP5835162B2 (ja) 暗号通信システム及び暗号通信方法
WO2009129683A1 (fr) Procédé d’authentification d’accès pour système wimax, appareil et système l’utilisant
Clancy et al. Extensible authentication protocol (EAP) password authenticated exchange

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 09845108

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 09845108

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1