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WO2008098163A2 - Procédé pour faciliter les ventes d'un réseau confidentiel - Google Patents

Procédé pour faciliter les ventes d'un réseau confidentiel Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008098163A2
WO2008098163A2 PCT/US2008/053409 US2008053409W WO2008098163A2 WO 2008098163 A2 WO2008098163 A2 WO 2008098163A2 US 2008053409 W US2008053409 W US 2008053409W WO 2008098163 A2 WO2008098163 A2 WO 2008098163A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
buyer
service provider
transaction service
transaction
request
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2008/053409
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English (en)
Other versions
WO2008098163A3 (fr
Inventor
Robert M. Hopton
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of WO2008098163A2 publication Critical patent/WO2008098163A2/fr
Publication of WO2008098163A3 publication Critical patent/WO2008098163A3/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/12—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3821—Electronic credentials
    • G06Q20/38215—Use of certificates or encrypted proofs of transaction rights

Definitions

  • the invention is directed to a method for executing anonymous financial transactions on a network of communication devices, most notably on the Internet.
  • This information usually comprises the buyer's account number, the security code printed on the card, the name as printed on the card, the expiration date, whether the shipping address matches the billing address on record with the credit card issuer, as well as the buyer's phone number. If the selling site is fraudulent, this information is (of course) used to transfer cash illegally from the would-be buyer to the perpetrators (or to purchase goods illegally in the would-be buyer's name). Once the fraud has been consummated, the perpetrators simply deactivate the existing fraudulent site and set it up again at a different web address. Because the fraud can be executed from anywhere in the world that has access to the Internet, and because credit card companies pride themselves on their world-wide acceptance, it is no wonder that network-based fraud has ballooned to astronomical proportions.
  • the invention is directed to a process that enables confidential financial transactions to be executed over the Internet (or any other type of computer network).
  • the process takes place in real-time or very close to real-time, essentially instantaneously in the eyes of the buyers.
  • the process includes four (4) distinct parties: the buyer 10, a content provider 12, a transaction service provider 16, and a bank (or other financial services company) 24.
  • the content provider wants to provide its content (typically access to its proprietary website or the sale of goods) to its customers for a fee, but on a confidential basis.
  • the buyer wants to access the content provider's website (or purchase a good), also on a confidential, anonymous basis. Both the content provider and the buyer want to safeguard the secrecy of the buyers' financial information.
  • the present process enables this transaction to occur using a one-time, electronic certificate (e-certif ⁇ cate) that the buyer tenders to the content provider in exchange for goods or services provided by the content provider (e.g., access to the content provider's website).
  • e-certificate designates any type of negotiable, electronic signal, entry, or document, without limitation, that evidences monetary value and/or a buyer's financial capacity to consummate a proposed sale.
  • the e-certificate is exhausted (in the same fashion as a regular paper check once it clears the bank). Of critical importance, however, is that the e-certificate is totally devoid of any personal information of the buyer.
  • the order 22 that is placed with the bank for the e-certificate is made in the name of the transaction service provider 16, not in the name of the buyer 10.
  • the e-certificate is also totally devoid of any information of any sort relating to the underlying transaction at the time the e-certificate is issued.
  • the e-certificate is issued in the name of the transaction service provider, not the buyer. None of the buyer's personal information appears on the e-certificate, and thus the content provider not only cannot identify the buyer, but the content provider does not have a database of buyers' personal or financial information. Nor does the bank.
  • neither the transaction service provider nor the bank maintains a permanent database of buyers' personal and/or financial information.
  • the bank (24) never receives any personal and/or financial information of any sort regarding the buyer.
  • the transaction service provider 16 will have the buyer's personal information and only enough of the buyer's financial information to confirm that the buyer can pay for the proposed e-certificate purchase. Once the buyer's ability to pay is confirmed, the transaction service provider discards the buyer's financial information. In the case of the transaction service provider, no financial information of any sort regarding the buyer is retained once the buyer's identity and capacity to pay are confirmed (more of which below).
  • the buyer's biographical information and his financial information remain secure because no single entity in the chain (neither the content provider, the transaction service provider, nor the bank) has all of the buyer's personal and financial information residing within a single database.
  • a hacker would have to compromise three different computer systems: the transaction service provider's, the bank's, and the content provider's.
  • the hacker would have to compromise all three computer systems at the same time - during the lifetime of the e-certificate. Once the e-certificate is returned to the bank and settled, the corresponding information embodied in the e-certificate is no longer in the system.
  • the content provider 12 contracts with the transaction service provider 16 to allow the confidential payment option to appear as a link on the content provider's website 12.
  • a link to the content provider 12 may also appear on the transaction service provider's website, thereby allowing the transaction service provider to act as a portal to direct potential buyers to content providers that transact business using e-certificates.
  • a buyer decides to purchase confidentially, he or she clicks on the link and is connected to the transaction service provider's website 16. It is here that the buyer enters his personal and financial information, including a credit card number, and the amount of the purchase to be consummated, into an electronic form.
  • the transaction service provider verifies the buyer's information and ability to pay.
  • the transaction service provider 16 processes the buyer's request to be issued an e-certificate for a set amount of funds.
  • the buyer's 10 credit card is then charged the sum of money the buyer designated on the form he submitted to the transaction service provider.
  • the charge that appears on the buyer's card will be in the name of the transaction service provider, not the content provider.
  • the transaction service provider 16 then submits an order 22 to the bank 24 for an e-certificate in the amount specified by the buyer.
  • the transaction service provider 16 places the order with the bank 24 and pays for the e-certificate in its own name.
  • the financial particulars of the buyer have already been confirmed by the transaction service provider, and the buyer's funds are already available to the transaction service provider.
  • the thus- verified financial information when transmitted to an affiliated bank 24, is processed immediately, in real time.
  • the bank issues to the transaction service provider a corresponding e-certificate, preferably in the exact amount of the purchase.
  • the e-certificate which is utterly devoid of any personal or financial information of the buyer's, is electronically transmitted to the transaction service provider 16.
  • the transaction service provider 16 then issues the e- certificate to the buyer.
  • the buyer then uses the e-certificate at the content provider 12 to complete the sale.
  • the e-certificate does not contain any information of any sort regarding the buyer, the e-certificate represents an anonymous stored value. That is, the e-certificate is tendered for payment by the content provider (in the same fashion as a check or a credit card entry), but does not contain any information of any sort about the buyer.
  • the content provider then submits the e-certificate to the bank for payment. Once the e-certificate is honored by the bank, the submitted e-certificate is matched to the corresponding record for the issued e-certificate
  • Three points of the transaction system according to the present invention are critically important: (1) once the buyer's information has been verified and the e- certificate has been issued, the buyer's financial information is purged from the transaction service provider's system; (2) the e-certificate does not contain any personal or financial information that would enable the content provider to identify the buyer; and (3) the funds reflected in the e-certificate are guaranteed. In this fashion, a sale from the content provider 12 to the buyer 10 can be consummated without the buyer revealing his identity to the content provider. Moreover, the buyer does not have his personal information linked to a buying history compiled into a database (either by the content provider or the transaction service provider or the bank).
  • the content provider 12 may compile aggregate statistics on the amount and type of goods and services sold using the e-certificate route, but because the e-certificate itself does not identify the buyer or any data regarding the buyer, these sales cannot be matched with buyers (for example, on a name basis, or on any other demographic basis). The process is truly and completely anonymous.
  • the invention is a method for facilitating anonymous access to a website.
  • the method comprises transmitting from a buyer to a transaction service provider a request to process a credit, debit, or check card transaction of the buyer's in payment for access to a website.
  • the buyer's request is received at the transaction service provider, and the transaction service provider processes of the buyer's requested credit, debit, or check card transaction.
  • a request for an electronic certificate is transmitted from the transaction service provider to a financial institution.
  • the requested electronic certificate is indicative of a sum of money corresponding to the buyer's requested credit, debit, or check card transaction.
  • the request from the transaction service provider does not contain any biographical or financial information about the buyer.
  • the requested electronic certificate is transmitted from the financial institution (e.g., a bank, savings and loan, etc.) to the transaction service provider.
  • the electronic certificate is then transmitted from the transaction service provider to the buyer.
  • the electronic certificate is transmitted from the buyer to a content provider in payment for buyer's access to a website operated by the content provider. In this fashion, the buyer gains anonymous access to the website.
  • All of the transmission steps in the process can take place over a global computer network, such as the Internet, or smaller networks (continental, regional, countrywide, wide-area, and/or local-area networks, either hard-wired or wireless, now known or developed in the future).
  • the method can be used to process credit transactions, debit transactions, or check card transactions.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart illustrating one version of the present invention.
  • Fig. 2 is a flow chart illustrating another version of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
  • the present invention is directed to an online payment processing system and a corresponding method to conduct sales over an information network (hereinafter “the Internet") while maintaining the privacy and anonymity of the buyer himself, as well as the confidentiality and security of the buyer's financial information.
  • the Internet an information network
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of the system and the process embodied by the system, the figures show the flow of the buyer's actions and the buyer's confidential information (shown in solid lines), and the generation and settlement of an electronic certificate (hereinafter e-certificate, shown in broken lines) evidencing the buyer's ability to pay for a desired commercial transaction (i.e., the purchase of a good or a service — such as access to a proprietary website).
  • e-certificate shown in broken lines
  • the initial contact between the buyer 10 and the website 12 occurs over the Internet and is represented schematically by the two-headed arrow 14.
  • the buyer 10 accesses website 12 via the network connection 14 (which can be any type of connection without limitation, either now known or developed in the future).
  • the buyer initially evaluates what the website 12 has to offer and decides to purchase access to the contents of the website 12.
  • buyer wishes to remain anonymous, and also wishes to safe guard the confidentiality of his or her personal and financial information.
  • the buyer 10 is thus given an option to pay for access to the website via an alternative, secure, and anonymous transaction service provider 16. This option is shown in Fig. 1 by the words "Pay by eCert?" in box 12.
  • the buyer 10 chooses this alternative payment option by clicking on a corresponding link (or other operational conduit) on the content provider's website 12 (or on the transaction service provider's website 16, see discussion of Fig. 2, below), which then establishes a direct connection between a transaction service provider 16 and the buyer 10. (Likewise, a link to the content provider's website may appear on the transaction service provider's website.)
  • a link to the content provider's website may appear on the transaction service provider's website.
  • the anonymous transaction payment option will, in all likelihood, be one payment option among several. Not all buyers are equally concerned about anonymity and the security of their financial information. Thus, as currently envisioned, most content providers will also provide other payment options on their websites, such as conventional payment by credit card.
  • the buyer when payment is tendered by credit card the buyer provides his information directly to the content provider, thereby revealing the identity of the buyer, the physical address of the buyer, and the confidential information of the buyer.
  • the buyer is also wholly unaware of whether his personal information is permanently archived at the content provider's website 12, and whether his personal information is linked with his financial information.
  • connection 18 A direct, two-way connection 20 is then established between the transaction service provider 16 and the buyer 10. This connection is represented by the two-way arrow 20. At this point in the process, it may appear to the buyer that he is still in contact with the content provider's website, even though the buyer is actually communicating electronically with the transaction service provider 16. Alternatively, it may be made amply clear (e.g., via a warning pop-up box) that the buyer is being transferred to the website of the transaction service provider. In both instances, the buyer's identity and financial information remain wholly unknown to the operators of the website 12.
  • the buyer 10 is linked directly to the transaction service provider 16, the buyer is presented with an order form to purchase an e-certificate in a desired amount. It is envisioned that the buyer 10 purchase an e-certificate in the exact amount of the contemplated purchase (including any added-on fees, such as tax, shipping, and handling, if applicable).
  • the buyer enters his personal and financial information into the form provided by the transaction service provider and transmits the form back to the transaction service provider, as represented by two-headed arrow 20 in the figures.
  • the role of the transaction service provider 16 is to verify the legitimacy of the buyer, the ability of the buyer to pay for the e-certificate in the amount requested by the buyer, and to process the buyer's credit card to purchase the e-certificate in the transaction service provider's name (as a proxy for the buyer). Thus, the charge that will appear on the buyer's credit card is in the name of the transaction service provider 16, not the content provider 12.
  • the transaction service provider's duties include confirming the legitimacy of the credit or debit card and whether the card has been reported missing or stolen, confirming that the credit or debit card account is in good standing, confirming that there are no other irregularities in the request made by the buyer (irregularities that suggest that the request may be fraudulent), and then processing the buyer's requested credit or debit transaction.
  • the transaction service provider 16 then processes the credit card of the buyer 10 to pay for an e-certificate in the amount specified by the buyer.
  • an order 22 for an e- certificate in the amount requested by the buyer is transmitted directly from the transaction service provider to a bank or other service provider 24.
  • the order 22 is placed in the name of the transaction service provider, not the buyer.
  • the bank 24 never learns the buyer's identity, and the bank never learns or has possession of any of the buyer's financial information.
  • the bank then transmits the e-certificate 28 back to the transaction service provider.
  • the bank sends a duplicate copy of the e-certificate 28' into its own database 30 so that the outgoing e-certificates can be matched with the incoming e-certificates submitted by the content providers 12.
  • the transaction service provider 16 does not create or maintain a permanent database containing the financial information of the buyer.
  • there is no such "hackable" database at the bank 24 because the bank never has the buyer's identity or financial information.
  • the order 22 that goes to the bank 24 includes only the transaction service provider's information and the transaction service provider's ability to pay (so that the bank can comply with anti-money laundering statutes).
  • the bank 24 acts on the order 22 immediately because confirmation of the buyer's identity and ability to pay has already been completed by the transaction service provider 16.
  • the bank's only function is to issue the e-certificate to the transaction service provider, and to negotiate and settle the e-certificate when it is ultimately returned to the bank to consummate the transaction.
  • the bank Upon receiving the order 22, the bank then generates an e-certificate corresponding to the order as issued by the transaction service provider.
  • the outgoing e-certificate is represented by the dashed line 28.
  • a duplicate copy of the outgoing e-certificate 28' is stored in a database 30 maintained by the bank 24.
  • the transaction service provider 16 and the bank 24 are shown as separate boxes. Note that the boxes in the figures denote functionality and order of execution. The boxes do not designate ownership and/or control. Thus, the transaction service provider 16 and the bank 24 may be owned by or controlled by the same or related entities (individuals or legal entities). [034] In the present invention, the e-certificate 28 is generated and transmitted
  • the transaction service provider 16 issues the e- certificate to the buyer.
  • the e-certificate itself does not contain any personal or financial information linked to the buyer. (The bank may use any serial numbering scheme it wishes to track the issuance and the redemption of the e-certificates.)
  • the buyer then completes the order form on the content provider's web site and transmits the e- certificate to the content provider 12, as shown by dashed line 28 at the bottom of Fig. 1 to pay for the purchase.
  • the e-certificate must be converted into a corresponding credit in its account.
  • the content provider submits the e-certificate to the bank (preferably electronically) for payment, as shown by the dash-dot line 28 (which represents the incoming e-certificate).
  • the incoming e-certificate is negotiated by the bank (and a corresponding credit made to the content provider's accounts receivable ledger), and then settled by matching the incoming e-certificate 28, with the duplicate copy of the outgoing e-certificate 28' within the database 30. Once the e-certificate has been settled, the e-certificate transaction is completed.
  • the present system thus avoids the risks inherent in using a credit or debit card that can be used repeatedly. Such cards can be stolen, which cannot happen in the present invention.
  • the ultimate result is an anonymous, network-based, credit-based transaction that functions more like buying in cash, than buying with a credit card. From the buyer's perspective, he can gain access to a proprietary website entirely anonymously, and in real time. Moreover, the transaction service provider likewise has no database of the transaction being contemplated by the buyer. The only information that the transaction service provider receives is the buyer's credit card information and a sufficient amount of the buyer's biographical information to enable the transaction service provider to confirm the good faith and legitimacy of the buyer and to process the buyer's credit card. In the present invention, this information is never sent to the content provider. Nor is this information ever sent to the bank. Thus, the buyer's identity remains perfectly anonymous to the content provider and to the bank. And the credit card statement of the buyer's shows only the name of the transaction service provider, not the content provider's name.
  • the bank has no personal information of the buyer. Further still, the e-certificate is not issued in the name of the buyer, but either in the name of the bank or in the name of the transaction service provider. Thus, there is no means for the content provider to discover the identity of the buyer.
  • the process can be anonymous in that the content provider will not have any financial information and only a shipping address (as a name is not required for shipping). An address is a required piece of information because the goods must be shipped from the content provider to the buyer.
  • the process proceeds in the same fashion as above, with the exception that when the buyer 10 transmits the e-certificate to the content provider (in payment for the goods), the buyer must also supply a shipping address. Note, however, the transaction is still consummated without the content provider ever having seen any of the buyer's credit card information.
  • the buyer 10 may contact the transaction service provider 16 directly to purchase an e-certificate in a desired amount.
  • the network connection between buyer 10 and transaction service provider 16 is shown by the two-headed arrow 20 in Fig. 2.
  • the transaction service provider 16 may act as a secure payment portal for content providers that want to have the option of transacting business using e-certificates.
  • buyer 10 can locate participating content providers 12 directly from the transaction service provider 16.
  • the transaction service provider 16 presents to the buyer 10 a selection of content providers 12 that accept payment for web content, services, or goods using an e-certificate.
  • the buyer 10 visits those content providers he finds interesting. If the buyer then decides to purchase from any of the content providers supplied by the transaction service provider, the purchase is consummated using an e-certificate. Thus, the buyer first contacts the transaction service provider, as represented by the two-headed arrow 20. The transaction service provider then presents to the buyer a selection of content providers 12 that transact business using e-certificates. If the buyer finds a content provider of interest, the buyer may then consummate his purchase using an e-certificate.

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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé pour faciliter l'accès anonyme à un site Web. Le procédé passe par les étapes de transmission d'un acheteur à un fournisseur de service de transaction d'une requête pour traiter un crédit, un débit ou une transaction par carte-chèque de l'acheteur pour le paiement de l'accès à un site Web. La requête de l'acheteur est reçue chez le fournisseur du service de transaction et le fournisseur de service de transaction traite le crédit, le débit ou la transaction par carte-chèque demandé de l'acheteur. Une requête de certificat électronique est transmise du fournisseur de service de transaction à une institution financière. Le certificat électronique demandé indique une somme d'argent correspondant à la transaction demandée de l'acheteur. La requête du fournisseur du service de transaction ne contient aucune information financière ou personnelle sur l'acheteur. Le certificat électronique demandé est transmis de l'institution financière au fournisseur de service de transaction. Le certificat électronique est ensuite transmis du fournisseur de service de transaction à l'acheteur. Le certificat électronique est ensuite transmis de l'acheteur à un fournisseur de contenu pour payer l'accès de l'acheteur à un site Web géré par le fournisseur de contenu. De cette manière, l'acheteur obtient un accès anonyme au site Web.
PCT/US2008/053409 2007-02-09 2008-02-08 Procédé pour faciliter les ventes d'un réseau confidentiel Ceased WO2008098163A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US88910407P 2007-02-09 2007-02-09
US60/889,104 2007-02-09

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2008098163A2 true WO2008098163A2 (fr) 2008-08-14
WO2008098163A3 WO2008098163A3 (fr) 2008-10-02

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Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8688574B2 (en) 2009-01-08 2014-04-01 Visa Europe Limited Payment system
US8706577B2 (en) 2009-01-06 2014-04-22 Visa Europe Limited Payment system
WO2015048338A1 (fr) * 2013-09-26 2015-04-02 Publicover Mark W Fourniture de contenu ciblé sur base des valeurs morales d'un utilisateur
WO2017012047A1 (fr) * 2015-07-21 2017-01-26 深圳市银信网银科技有限公司 Procédé, dispositif et système de transmission d'informations d'exécution de certificat électronique
US20170178128A1 (en) * 2015-12-17 2017-06-22 Mastercard International Incorporated Method and system for distribution, use and validation of electronic entitlement certificates

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001008066A1 (fr) * 1999-07-26 2001-02-01 Iprivacy Llc Achat electronique de biens sur un reseau de communication comprenant une livraison physique tout en assurant la securite des informations privees et a caractere personnel
AU6500400A (en) * 1999-07-29 2001-02-19 Privacash.Com, Inc. Method and system for transacting an anoymous purchase over the internet
WO2001065502A2 (fr) * 2000-02-29 2001-09-07 E-Scoring, Inc. Systemes et procedes permettant d'effectuer des transactions de credit anonymes
US20050240490A1 (en) * 2001-03-07 2005-10-27 Mackey Danny J Secure e-commerce and browsing methods, systems and tools
US20030028470A1 (en) * 2001-07-26 2003-02-06 International Business Machines Corporation Method for providing anonymous on-line transactions

Cited By (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8706577B2 (en) 2009-01-06 2014-04-22 Visa Europe Limited Payment system
US8942997B2 (en) 2009-01-06 2015-01-27 Visa Europe Limited Payment system
US8688574B2 (en) 2009-01-08 2014-04-01 Visa Europe Limited Payment system
US11669816B2 (en) 2009-01-08 2023-06-06 Visa Europe Limited Payment system
WO2015048338A1 (fr) * 2013-09-26 2015-04-02 Publicover Mark W Fourniture de contenu ciblé sur base des valeurs morales d'un utilisateur
US10546326B2 (en) 2013-09-26 2020-01-28 Mark W. Publicover Providing targeted content based on a user's preferences
US10580043B2 (en) 2013-09-26 2020-03-03 Mark W. Publicover Computerized method and system for providing customized entertainment content
US11127048B2 (en) 2013-09-26 2021-09-21 Mark W. Publicover Computerized method and system for providing customized entertainment content
US11687976B2 (en) 2013-09-26 2023-06-27 Mark W. Publicover Computerized method and system for providing customized entertainment content
WO2017012047A1 (fr) * 2015-07-21 2017-01-26 深圳市银信网银科技有限公司 Procédé, dispositif et système de transmission d'informations d'exécution de certificat électronique
US20170178128A1 (en) * 2015-12-17 2017-06-22 Mastercard International Incorporated Method and system for distribution, use and validation of electronic entitlement certificates
US10769626B2 (en) * 2015-12-17 2020-09-08 Mastercard International Incorporated Method and system for distribution, use and validation of electronic entitlement certificates

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