WO2008052470A1 - Method for establishing mobile ip security mechanism, security system and the relevant device - Google Patents

Abstract

A method for establishing mobile IP security mechanism, a security system and a relevant device are disclosed, which belong to wireless communication field and enable the HA to process all of the valid binding requests properly. In the invention, when a mobile IP agent is performing IP binding, a binding request for registering mobile IP would be sent to the HA by means of a PMN-AAA key between the HAAA and the agent, and a PMN-HA key between the agent and the HA is generated based on the PMN-AAA key. By interacting with the HAAA, the HA authenticates the binding request, obtains the PMN-HA key, returns a binding response to the agent after passing the authentication, and carries the SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key in the binding response. The agent and HA would protect the integrity of the following mobile IP messages by means of the PMN-HA key and the SPI.

Description

 The present invention claims to be submitted to the Chinese Patent Office on October 27, 2006, the application number is 200610143418.3, and the invention name is "Proxy Mobile IP Security Mechanism Establishment Method, Security System and The priority of the Chinese Patent Application, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference. Technical field

 The present invention relates to the field of wireless communications, and more particularly to mobile IP technologies.

Background technique

Code Division Multiple Access 2000 ("CDMA2000") is one of the three mainstream wireless interface standards for 3G communication determined by the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"). The other two standards are respectively Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) and Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) ₀

 Existing CDMA2000 networks, including CDMA2000 lx and High Rate Packet Data ("HRPD") systems, require their packet domains to support mobile IP technologies, specifically, mobile IPv4 and mobile IPv6.

 The following is a brief description of mobile IP technology.

 In mobile IP technology, the mobile node (Mobile Node, referred to as "MN") has two kinds of addresses: Home Address (referred to as 'ΉοΑ') and Care-of Address ("CoA").

 Among them, HoA - remains unchanged, so when the MN moves to the foreign network, the address is still used to maintain communication continuity and reachability. The CoA is different. It is assigned to the MN by the foreign network. When the MN obtains a new CoA, it needs to bind this address to the HoA Home Agent (' Home'), so that HA can other entities. The message sent to the MN is forwarded to the MN by using a tunnel between the MN and the HA, and the message sent by the MN to other entities is forwarded.

 For Mobile IPv4 (MIP4), the message used is the "RRQ-Registration Request" message sent by the MN to the HA and the "RRP-Registration Reply" message sent by the HA.

For Mobile IPv6 (MIP6), the message used by this binding process is sent by the MN to the HA. The "BU-Binding Update" message and the "BA-Binding Acknowledgement" message returned by the HA. In the MIP6 scenario defined in the X.S0011 CDMA2000 Wireless IP Network Standard, the mobile terminal MS can perform the address binding process after obtaining the HA address and the HoA.

 It should be noted that in the main standard RFC3775 of MIP6, IPsec SA (IPsec SA) is established between MS and HA, and BU and BA messages are protected by this SA.

 However, the binding process shown in Figure 1 does not follow the above requirements. Instead, the authentication protocol defined in RFC4285 is used. See Figure 1 for the specific process.

As shown in the figure, in step 101, the MS performs a link layer establishment process. The MS obtains bootstrap information about the MIP from the RADIUS server by means of a Packet Data Serving Node (PDSN); Step 102, if a new HoA is allocated to the MS in step 101, the MS This HoA will be used. Otherwise, the MS automatically generates a global unicast address as the HoA according to the home link prefix obtained in step 101; Step 103, the MS sends a binding update to the HA, where the BU message includes the MS and the authentication, authorization, Message Summary Server (Authentication, Authorization, Account, referred to as "AAA") shared key calculation message digest - MN-AAA mobile authentication option for HA to check the integrity of the message; MS's NAI The logo) is also included in the BU. Step 104: The HA obtains parameters such as the NAI of the MS and the MN-AAA authentication option from the BU message, and the HA sends the parameters to the RADIUS server of the home network by using the RADIUS "Access Request"message; Step 105; The RADIUS server of the home network will use the key shared between the MS and the server to verify the correctness of the MN-AAA mobile authentication option. If it is correct, the message is not tampering and the MS is a legitimate user. Therefore, the binding operation is performed, and then the RADIUS server calculates the key IK for protecting the subsequent MS and HA binding process; at the same time, the MS can perform the same calculation to obtain the IK; in step 106, the RADIUS server sends "Access Accept". (Accept Access) "Message to HA, the "MIP6-Session Key" extension of the message contains the key IK calculated in step 105; Step 107, HA saves the received key IK. The HA performs a replay attack check according to the Mesg-ID mobility option in the BU; in step 108, the HA sends a BA message to the MS. This message contains the MN-HA mobile message authentication option calculated with IK, the MN-NAI move option, and the Mesg-ID move option. Step 109, when the MS receives the BA, The integrity of the message is checked with IK.

 It should be added that in the subsequent communication process, if the MN's CoA changes, the binding process needs to be performed again, and it will protect the message using the key IK shared with the HA.

 Currently, the specification being developed "X.P0044 Mobile IPv4 Enhancement^ (provisionally translated as "X.P0044 Mobile IPv4 Enhanced Edition") is an enhancement to MIP4 in X.S0011. The specification primarily defines how to dynamically assign HA to the MS on the visited network, how to perform MIP registration, and the security mechanism for registration.

Referring to FIG. 2, first, in step 201, a Point To Point Protocal ("PPP") connection is established between the MS and the PDSN. In step 202, the PDSN sends an "Agent Advertisements" message to the MS, including the MN. - FA Challenge extension (the challenge extension of the MN and the foreign agent FA); Step 203, the MS sends the RRQ to the PDSN, which includes the MN-NAI Extension (the extension of the MN and the NAI), the MN-FA Challenge Extension, and the MN-AAA Authentication Extension ( MN and AAA authentication extension). The MN-AAA authentication extension is calculated using a pre-shared key between the MS and HAAA (Home AAA). The addresses of the HA and HoA in the RRQ are set to 0.0.0.0, indicating that the MS wishes to request dynamic HA and HoA; in step 204, the PDSN sends a "RADIUS Access-Request" message to the VAAA (Visit AAA), and then Forwarded by VAAA to HAAA. The purpose is to authenticate the MN-AAA authentication extension sent by the MS. In addition, the PDSN also indicates support for local, that is, the ability to allocate HA on the visited network in the request; Step 205, HAAA verifies that the MN-AAA is successful, and therefore sends a "RADIUS Access-Accept" message to the PDSN. The message further includes an indication that the PDSN is authorized to allocate the HA locally; in step 206, the PDSN allocates the HA to the MS based on the policy of the visited network; in step 207, the PDSN sends the RRQ to the allocated HA again, and the MN is still included in the message. - AAA authentication extension; Step 208, HA allocates HoA to the MS; Step 209, the HA sends a "RADIUS Access-Request" message to the HAAA, and then checks the MN-AAAauthenticator (MN-AAA authentication) sent by the MS. The message also contains the MN-HA SPI (Security Parameter Index) VSA, which is used to request the MN-HA key. The parameters for calculating the key also include the HoA, and the Identification field in the RRQ, ie the timestamp, which is placed in the MIP4-Mesg-ID VSA; in step 210, the HAAA verifies the MN-AAA authenticator again. If successful, HAAA will calculate the MN-HA key, that is, IK, for MS and HA to protect subsequent registration messages; Step 211, HAAA will MN-HA secret The key is sent to the HA by using a "RADIUS Access-Accept" message. In step 212, the HA binds the HoA of the MS to the CoA. And generate RRQ, where the MN-HA authentication extension is calculated using the MN-HA key. The HA sends the RRQ to the MS. In step 213, the MS also calculates the MN-HA key in the same way as the HAAA, and verifies the MN-HA authentication extension in the received RRP. If successful, the binding process ends.

 Referring to Figure 2 above, the process of dynamically assigning HA to the MS and the MIP registration process and the registration security mechanism according to the specification "X.P0044 Mobile IPv4 Enhancements") are introduced.

 In the handover between PDSNs of the previous lx system, when the MS moves to the target PDSN, a PP (peer-to-peer) connection is established between the target PDSN and the serving PDSN, so that the service data is transmitted between the source PDSN and the target PDSN, thereby securing the PPP endpoint. Still at the source PDSN, the MS's address is not updated, thereby maintaining business continuity.

 However, this creates additional problems. Specifically, if the endpoint of the point-to-point protocol is maintained at the source PDSN without change, the PP connection between the A10 connection and the PDSN exists simultaneously during the active packet session, thereby increasing the burden on the source PDSN and consuming the source PDSN. Handle link resources between resources and PDSNs.

 In view of this, 3GPP2 is currently developing a fast handover process for HRPD.

 During the inter-PDSN handover of the HRPD network, the session state of the source PDSN is transferred to the switched target PDSN, so that the network access point of the MS becomes the target PDSN.

 Figure 3 shows the HRPD fast handover reference architecture.

 As shown in the figure, HA is the home agent in the mobile IP. S-PDSN is the source PDSN,

The T-PDSN is the target PDSN. The S-AN is the source access network device, and the T-AN is the target access network device.

 Fast handoff consists of three parts: P-P tunnel establishment, MS context transfer and execution agent mobility IP, and conversion of data access points. Among them, the context transfer of the MS and the execution of the proxy mobile IP are optional procedures.

Specifically, the PP interface in FIG. 3 is used to encapsulate user data tunnels and pass between AGWs (access gateways) during fast handover. After performing the context transfer process, the MS will transfer to the target access network in the source access gateway, and the target access gateway becomes the endpoint of the data link. When the point-to-point protocol is used as the data link layer, that is, the point The endpoint of the point protocol. After the transfer, the signaling between the access gateway and the MS will be handled by the switched target access gateway. MS session state includes point to Point protocol status, QoS (Quality of Service) parameters, mobility status, and more.

 The execution of the proxy mobile IP is a process in which the PDSN replaces the terminal with the mobile IP signaling to register and bind to the HA. Used to update the route from HA to PDSN.

 Figure 4 shows the fast handover procedure of HRPD being developed by 3GPP2. As shown in the figure: First, in step 401, the MS establishes a point-to-point protocol connection with the source PDSN. If the MS supports mobile IP, it also needs to obtain information required to register the mobile IP, such as HA address, HoA, and the like. The source PDSN performs the proxy mobile IP, binding the address of the MS with its own address (the proxy mobile IP is not performed for the MS of the mobile IP4). The PDSN allocates an IP address to the MS; Step 402, the MS is in an active state, and the source AN finds that the handover needs to be performed, so the parameters required for the handover are sent to the target AN; Step 403, the target AN establishes an A10 connection with the target PDSN; Step 404, Target The PDSN initiates a request for establishing a point-to-point connection to the source PDSN, and the source PDSN accepts the request and transmits the context of the MS to the target PDSN, where the context includes a point-to-point protocol state, a mobile IP state, a mobile IP security parameter, a QoS parameter, etc.; Passing between the HA-source PDSN-target PDSN-T-AN; Step 405, the target PDSN performs binding of the proxy mobile IP, binding the address of the MS with its own address, and changing the routing of the data.

 At this time, the service data is transmitted between the HA-target PDSN-T-AN.

 The PDSN performs the proxy mobile IP to perform the binding instead of the terminal, so that in the case of a simple IP, the address remains unchanged when the terminal switches between PDSNs. According to the change of the proxy mobile IP binding, the service data is switched from the source PDSN to the target PDSN, thereby maintaining the continuity of the session. For MSs that support mobile IP, this also ensures that after the MS switch, it will not initiate mobile IP binding and reduce the delay.

 However, there are still two issues worth noting. First, the guarantee mechanism for the security of the proxy mobile IP has not been determined. Second, the proxy mobile IP is also involved in other fields than wireless cellular communication, for example, through proxy mobile IP. Local mobility, etc., but the final specification for these applications has not yet been determined. Among these specifications, it is conceivable that security mechanisms will be an important part of them.

 Figure 5 shows a proxy mobile IP security mechanism that has been proposed. The MS in this process only supports Simple IPv6 (SIPv6), as shown in the figure: First,

Step 501: The PDSN establishes a link layer connection with the MS, the PDSN initiates authentication of the MS, and the MS returns the authentication information. Step 502: The PDSN sends a "RADIUS Access-Request" message to the AAA to check the authentication response returned by the MS, and the PDSN indicates that it can support the proxy mobile IP;

 Step 503, AAA returns an "Access-Accept" message, which includes the address of the allocated HA, and the root key PMN-HA-RK for deriving the PMN-HA key. PMN-HA is used to handle message protection between IP clients (here PDSN) and HA; PMN-HA is generated by PMN-HA-RK, HA address, and PDSN address calculation.

 In step 504, the PDSN sends an "Initial Proxy Binding Update" message to the HA, and the PDSN uses the PMN-HA key to generate a PMN-HA Mobility Message Authentication Option (PMN-HA Mobile Information Authentication Option). The SPI in is PMN-SPI, this value is a fixed value;

 Step 505, there is no binding for the MS on the HA, so the HA sends a "RADIUS Access-Request" message to the HAAA, requesting the key PMN-HA-RK;

 Step 506, the AAA sends a response, and returns a PMN-HA-RK, so that the HA can calculate the PMN-HA key according to the key;

 Step 507: After receiving the response, the HA calculates the PMN-HA key, verifies the integrity of the BU, and if successful, sends a BA message to the PDSN. The BA message includes the new SPI value generated by HA, PMIP SPL, the MN-HA Mobility Message Authentication option calculated with the PMN-HA key, and the assigned Home Address option. );

 Step 508: After receiving the BA, the PDSN uses the PMN-HA key to verify the integrity of the BA message. And save the SPI value sent by the HA for use in subsequent binding; the PDSN also sends an RA (router advertisement) to the MS according to the content of the Home Address option, and the MS automatically configures the address according to the prefix value in the RA;

 Step 509, the service data of the MS is delivered by the PDSN and the HA;

In addition, for a terminal that supports MIP6, the process is similar to that of simple IPv6. However, when the PDSN authenticates the MS, when the AAA returns the authentication result, it also carries two sets of information required to register the mobile IP, and one set is used for client mobility. IP registration, another set of proxy mobile IP registration, each set of mobile IP information includes HA address, HoA, HL (home location). The addresses of the two HAs are different. When the PDSN performs the registration of the proxy mobile IP, it will use the proxy mobile IP related letter. Interest. In addition to performing the above process, the MS will initiate the BU/BA with the HA itself after obtaining the client HoA and HA addresses.

 When the terminals of SIPv6 and MIP6 are switched, the target PDSN obtains the PMN-HA-RK from the source PDSN, and calculates a new PMN-HA key according to its own IP address and the IP address of the HA, and sends a BU message to the HA. The SPI used is also the aforementioned PMN-SPI. When the HA is connected to the BU, the new PMN-HA is recalculated. The newly generated SPI value is also carried when the BA is sent.

 For a simple IPv4 terminal, similar to the above process, the PDSN also performs proxy MIP instead of MS. The required key PMN-HA-RK is also obtained from HAAA through the access authentication process. The PMN-HA key is calculated using PMN-HA-RK.

 For terminals that support MIP4, in order to simplify processing, it is currently considered that proxy mobile IP is not supported. When the handover of the SIPv4 terminal occurs, the process is similar to that of IPv6. The target PDSN also obtains the PMN-HA-RK from the source PDSN, calculates a new PMN-HA, and performs binding.

 In the above scheme, the source PDSN and the target PDSN use a fixed value SPI, that is, PMN-SPI, to initiate an initial mobile IP binding to the HA, and the value is a value of 0 - 255. After receiving such a binding request, the HA triggers the update of the PMN-HA key.

 However, the problem is that there is not a suitable value to use in the current technology. In other words, no fixed SPI value is assigned to the MN-HA authentication option/extension. In addition, if a new value is applied and the prior art changes are large, the implementation of the program will be extended.

 In addition to the above solution, when the MS accesses the network for the first time, the source PDSN also obtains the required key PMN-HA-RK from HAAA in the access authentication process, and also obtains the SPI generated by the AAA. The source PDSN uses this SPI value when performing proxy mobile IP. When a handover occurs, the source PDSN passes both the PMN-HA-RK and the SPI to the target PDSN. When the target PDSN sends a BU/RRQ, it continues to use the SPI sent from the source PDSN.

 The problem with this method is that, since the target PDSN sends the BU/RRQ, the key has already used the newly generated PMN-HA. If the original SPI is used, the old key will be used for verification on the HA side, but the check is performed. Will not pass. At this time, HA will update the PMN-HA key. Or, after the HA finds the address change of the PDSN, it actively updates the PMN-HA key. These methods are different from the current HA processing, and all need to modify HA.

Summary of the invention The main technical problem to be solved by various embodiments of the present invention is to provide a method for establishing a security mechanism for a proxy mobile IP, a security system, and related devices.

 To solve the above technical problem, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism, including:

 The agent of the mobile IP obtains the PMN-AAA key shared between the corresponding home authentication, authorization, accounting server HAAA and the agent, and protects the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the PMN-AAA key, and then sends the To the home agent HA;

 The agent of the mobile IP receives the binding response sent by the HA, and calculates a key PMN-HA key shared with the HA according to the obtained PMN-AAA key, and uses the PMN-HA key pair. The binding response is verified; wherein the binding response is a message that the HA is protected by a PMN-HA key, and the PMN-HA key is the PMN-AAA that is utilized by the HAAA After the key is verified by the binding request, the PMN-AAA key or the PMN-AAA root key is a key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy of the mobile IP; and the binding The response further carries a security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key; after performing the verification, the agent of the mobile IP uses the PMN-HA key and the SPI to perform subsequent movements. The integrity of IP messages is protected.

 The embodiment of the present invention further provides a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism, including: the home agent HA receives a binding mobile IP binding request sent by a mobile IP proxy, where the binding request is the mobile IP The agent uses the PMN-AAA key between the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server HAAA and the agent to protect the message;

 The HA verifies the binding request by using the PMN-AAA key that the HAAA has by interacting with the HAAA;

After the verification is passed, the HA adopts a shared key PMN-HA between the agent and the HA generated by the agent of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA key or the PMN-AAA key. a key, configured to protect a binding response message sent by the proxy of the mobile IP, where the binding response message carries a security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key, the PMN - the HA key and the SPI for the mobile IP agent calculate the PMN-HA using the PMN-AAA obtained by the proxy, and use the PMN-HA to verify the binding response, after the subsequent movement is adopted The key and index of the integrity of the IP message. The embodiment of the invention further provides a mobile IP proxy, the proxy comprising:

 a PMN-AAA key acquisition module, configured to: obtain a PMN-AAA key between the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server HAAA and the proxy corresponding to the proxy;

 a binding request sending module, configured to: protect the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the acquired PMN-AAA key, and send the binding request to the home agent HA;

 a verification module, configured to: after the mobile IP proxy receives the binding response sent by the HA, calculate the PMN-HA by using the acquired PMN-AAA, and use the PMN-HA to bind the binding Responding to the verification; wherein, the binding response is a message that the HA is protected by using a PMN-HA key, and the PMN-HA key is a pair of the PMN-AAA pair that is used by the HAAA After the request is verified, the key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA root key; and the binding response further carries an index for indexing The security parameter index SPI of the PMN-HA key;

 And a protection module, configured to: protect the integrity of the subsequent mobile IP message by using the PMN-HA key and the SPI.

 The embodiment of the invention also provides a home agent, comprising:

 a binding request receiving module, configured to: receive a binding request of a registered mobile IP sent by a proxy of the mobile IP, where the binding request is used by the agent of the mobile IP to use the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server acquired by the proxy a message that is protected by the PMN-AAA key between the HAAA and the proxy; a binding response sending module, configured to: use the PMN that the HAAA has by the home agent through interaction with the HAAA After the AAA authenticates the binding request, the PMN-HA key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy for the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key is used. Protecting, by the binding of the mobile IP, a binding response message carrying a security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key; wherein the PMN-HA key and the SPI are the mobile IP The agent uses the PMN-AAA obtained by the proxy to calculate the PMN-HA, and after using the PMN-HA to verify the binding response, the key used to protect the integrity of the subsequent mobile IP message is index

The embodiment of the present invention further provides a proxy mobile IP security system, the system comprising: a mobile IP proxy, a home agent HA, and a home authentication, authorization, and accounting server HAAA, where: the mobile IP proxy is used : Obtaining a PMN-AAA key between the corresponding HAAA and the agent of the mobile IP, and protecting the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the PMN-AAA key, and then sending the request to the home agent HA;

 Receiving the binding response sent by the HA, calculating the PMN-HA by using the acquired PMN-AAA, verifying the binding response by using the PMN-HA, and performing the Afterwards, the integrity of the subsequent Mobile IP message is protected by using the PMN-HA key and the SPI carried in the binding response;

 The HA is used to:

 After the binding request is verified by using the PMN-AAA that the HAAA has, by using the interaction with the HAAA, adopting according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA root key The PMN-HA key between the proxy and the HA generated by the agent of the mobile IP, and the binding response sent to the proxy of the mobile IP carrying the security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key Message protection;

 The HAAA is used to: provide the PMN-AAA key.

 By comparison, it can be found that the main difference between the technical solution of the present invention and the prior art is that, when the proxy of the mobile IP, such as the PDSN, the access gateway, or the control access node, performs the proxy mobile IP binding for the first time, such as establishing and When the MS connection or the MS switches to the agent, the PMN-AAA key between the HAAA and the agent is used to protect the binding request for registering the mobile IP sent to the HA, and the agent is generated according to the PMN-AAA key. Key PMN-HA key with HA. The HA authenticates the binding request and obtains the PMN-HA key through interaction with the HAAA, returns a binding response to the proxy after the verification is passed, and carries the binding for carrying the PMN-HA key in the binding response. SPI. The agent and the HA protect the integrity of subsequent mobile IP messages through the PMN-HA key and SPI. Enables HA to correctly process all legal binding requests without modifying the existing protocol, update the key and generate the corresponding SPI according to different situations, ensuring the accuracy of message verification between the agent and the HA, and satisfying the mobile IP security.

Moreover, since the proxy uses the PMN-AAA key to perform integrity protection on the binding request, the HA can authenticate the binding request through the HAAA, and the HAAA can also use the identity identifier of the MS to the corresponding PMN-AAA key. Verifying the binding request so that the registration of the proxy mobile IP does not require major changes to the existing device (especially HA), thereby enabling the present invention to have Larger application value.

 When the MS establishes the connection with the proxy for the first time, the proxy needs to send the authentication information of the MS to the HAAA, and the HAAA sends the PMN-AAA key (or PMN-) to the proxy after the authentication of the authentication information is passed. The root key of the AAA key, the PMN-AAA key is obtained by the proxy based on the root key, and the information required for proxy mobile IP registration and client mobile IP registration. After the registration of the proxy mobile IP is completed, if the MS supports the mobile IP, the proxy may request the information required for the client mobile IP registration, and complete the registration of the client mobile IP according to the information, so that the present invention can further The prior art is compatible.

DRAWINGS

 Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the binding process for IPv6 in the MIP6 scenario defined in the X.S0011 cdma2000 Wireless IP Network Standard;

 Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the security mechanism involved in the X.P0044 Mobile IPv4 Enhancement^, which is dynamically allocated HA, MIP registration and registration for the MS in the visited network;

 Figure 3 shows the reference architecture of the fast handover procedure of HRPD being developed by 3GPP2; Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the fast handover procedure of HRPD being developed by 3GPP2;

 5 is a schematic diagram of a security mechanism of a proxy mobile IP that has been proposed so far; FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a relationship between key derivation and delivery according to the present invention;

 7 is a flow chart showing a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism according to a first embodiment of the present invention;

 FIG. 8 is a flow chart showing a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism according to a fifth embodiment of the present invention.

detailed description

 In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

 In the present invention, when the MS accesses the network for the first time, the agent of the mobile IP, such as the PDSN,

The HAAA obtains the PMN-AAA key (or obtains the PMN-AAA root key, and obtains the PMN-AAA key according to the root key) instead of the PMN-HA key, and the PDSN uses the PMN-AAA key to send to the HA. A binding request BU or RRQ message for registering a mobile IP, the PMN-AAA key used to calculate a MN-AAA authentication extension (used in MIP4) or an authentication option in a BU or RRQ message (used in MIP6), and carries a fixed SPI value that has been assigned to these extensions or options in the BU or RRQ message. After receiving the BU or RRQ message, the HA authenticates the MN-AAA authentication extension or authentication option in the BU or RRQ message through HAAA. If the authentication succeeds, the HAAA generates a PMN-HA key for the HA and the PDSN for subsequent use. Bind, and send the PMN-HA to the HA. The PDSN can calculate the PMN-HA key according to the PMN-AAA key and other parameters (such as PDSN address, HA address, etc.).

 When the HA sends a Binding Response BA or RRP message to the PDSN, it uses the PMN-HA key to calculate the MN-HA authentication extension/authentication option. At the same time, the HA also includes the SPI value in the BA or RRP message. The SPI can be a random and guaranteed unique value generated by HAAA or HA, or it can be a fixed value agreed with the PDSN, or a calculated value. . After receiving the BA or RRP message, the PDSN verifies the BA or RRP message according to its calculated PMN-HA key. If the verification is successful, the SPI value sent by HA is saved. The PDSN and the HA use the MIP-HA key and the SPI carried in the binding response to protect the integrity of subsequent mobile IP messages in subsequent bindings.

 After the PDSN handover occurs, the source PDSN sends the PMN-AAA key (or the PMN-AAA root key) to the target PDSN, and the target PDSN still uses the PMN-AAA (if the MN-HAAA root density is obtained from the source PDSN) The key obtains the MN-AAA authentication extension/authentication option based on the root key to obtain the PMN-AAA key, and sends a BU or RRQ message to the HA. The SPI used for indexing is also a fixed value defined in the protocol. When the HA receives a BU or RRQ message, it still uses HAAA to verify the message and generate a new PMN-HA key. After receiving the new PMN-HA key, the HA calculates the MN-HA authentication extension/authentication option with the PMN-HA key and returns a BA or RRP message containing the new SPI value. The SPI can be HA. A random and guaranteed unique value is generated, which can also be a fixed value agreed with the PDSN. In subsequent bundling, the target PDSN and HA can use the PMN-HA key and SPI value to protect the integrity of subsequent mobile IP messages.

The relationship between the birth and delivery of the key is shown in Figure 6. HAAA uses the shared key between the MS and HAAA as the proxy MIP client PMIP Client (such as PDSN) and the HA derived PMN-HA key, or static. Save a PMN-AAA key. HAAA will pass the PMN-AAA key to the first proxy MIP client (PMIP Clientl). When PMIP Clientl initially performs mobile IP binding, PMN-AAA key is used, followed by HA The PMN-HA1 key can be obtained from HAAA. PMIP Clientl can also calculate and use the PMN-HA1 key by itself. When the handover occurs, PMIP Clientl passes the PMN-AAA key to PMIP Client2 (if the source PDSN passes the PMN-AAA key to the target PDSN). The initial registration of PMIP Client2 also uses the PMN-AAA key, HAAA generates PMN-HA2 to pass to HA, and subsequent HA and PMIP Client2 use PMN-HA2.

 An example of key derivation is given above, but there are other possibilities as well. For example, the HAAA is transmitted to the PMIP Client by the PMN-AAA root key PMN-AAA-RK. When the PMIP Client performs initial binding, it needs to derive PMN-AAA from PMN-AAA-RK. In addition, HAAA can also directly pass PMN-AAA to HA, so that HA can calculate the required PMN-HA by itself, without having to calculate it through HAAA every time.

 Of course, the mobile IP proxy can also be an access gateway or other network entity such as an access point. The following is a detailed description of the first embodiment of the present invention. The present embodiment relates to a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism. In this embodiment, the MS supports both simple IPv6 and mobile IPv6, and the mobile IP proxy is a PDSN. MIP6, the specific process is shown in Figure 7.

 In step 701, the MS establishes a connection with the PDSN for the first time, the PDSN initiates authentication to the MS, and the MS returns an authentication response.

 Then, proceeding to step 702, the PDSN sends the authentication response of the MS to the HAAA, and indicates that it supports the function of the proxy mobile IP.

 Next, proceeding to step 703, the HAAA authentication MS, if successful, and allowing the PDSN to perform the function of the proxy mobile IP, returns an indication that the PDSN is authorized to perform the proxy mobile IP. The HAAA also sends the PDSN a PMN-AAA key between the PDSN and HAAA required to register the Proxy Mobile IP. In this embodiment, the MS supports both the mobile IP and the simple IP. Therefore, the HAAA also sends information such as the HA address, HoA, HL and the like required for proxying the mobile IP registration and the client mobile IP registration to the PDSN. It should be noted that, in this step, the HAAA may not send the PMN-AAA key to the PDSN, but send the key of the PMN-AAA key to the PDSN, and the PDSN calculates according to the root key. The PMN-AAA key is obtained to further improve the security of the proxy mobile IP.

After the authentication of the MS authentication information is passed, the HAAA sends a PMN-AAA key (or a root key of the PMN-AAA key, and the PDSN obtains the PMN-AAA key according to the root key) to the PDSN, Information required for proxy mobile IP registration and client mobile IP registration is also sent to the PDSN. So that after the registration of the proxy mobile IP is completed, the MS can request the client to move the IP note to the PDSN. The required information is registered, and the registration of the client mobile IP is completed based on the information, so that the present invention can be further compatible with the prior art. The HA address information in the information required for the proxy mobile IP registration and the client mobile IP registration is different, and the registration of the mobile IP by different HA addresses is the proxy mobile IP registration or the client mobile IP registration.

 Next, proceeding to step 704, the PDSN performs a binding registration process of the proxy mobile IP. Specifically, the PDSN performs integrity protection on the binding request BU message for registering the mobile IP by using the PMN-AAA key obtained in step 703, that is, the MN-AAA authentication option is included in the message, which is carried. The SPI value is a fixed value defined in the protocol.

 Then, proceeding to step 705, after receiving the binding request BU message, the HA needs to verify the correctness of the MN-AAA authentication option by using HAAA, and therefore forwards the request to the HAAA, requesting the HAAA to perform the authentication on the BU message.

 Then, proceeding to step 706, after receiving the HA request, the HAAA uses the identity identifier of the MS to the corresponding PMN-AAA key to verify the message. If successful, the PMN-HA key is calculated. Marked as PMN-HA1. HAAA will return a message that the verification was successful, and the message contains the key PMN-HA1. This eliminates the need to make major changes to existing equipment (especially HA), which in turn makes the invention more valuable.

 Then, proceeding to step 707, the HA sends a binding response BA message to the PDSN, where the message is integrity protected by the PMN-HA1, and the message further includes a new SPI value, and the SPI may be a random generated by the HA. And the value of the uniqueness, or a fixed value agreed with the PDSN. After receiving the response, the PDSN verifies the PMN-HA authentication option with its own calculated PMN-HA key, which is based on the PMN-AAA key obtained in step 703, and other parameters (such as PDSN). Address, HA address, etc.) are calculated. If the PMN-HA authentication option is verified correctly, the binding registration process ends and the PDSN saves the received SPI value. The PDSN uses the SPI values assigned by PMN-HA1 and HA in subsequent bindings to protect the subsequent mobile IP messages integrity.

 Next, proceeding to step 708, the PDSN performs a process of assigning an address to the MS according to the proxy mobile IP information obtained from the HAAA.

Then, proceeding to step 709, the MS and the PDSN execute a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol ("DHCP"), which is required for the MS to request client mobile IP registration. The process of information, so that the MS completes the registration of the client mobile IP based on the information, so that the present invention can be further compatible with the prior art.

 Next, proceeding to step 710, the MS completes the MIP binding registration process with the HA according to the obtained client mobile IP registration required information.

 Then, proceeding to step 711, the MS moves, and the switching between the PDSNs needs to be performed, that is, from the

The PDSN (source PDSN) is switched to the target PDSN.

 Then, proceeding to step 712, the source PDSN establishes a PP interface with the target PDSN, and the source PDSN forwards all context information of the MS to the target PDSN, where the MIP security related parameter is mainly a PMN-AAA key, that is, the target PDSN is The PMN-AAA key is obtained at the source PDSN. Of course, the source PDSN may not directly send the PMN-AAA key to the target PDSN, but send the root key of the PMN-AAA key to the target PDSN, and the target PDSN obtains the PMN-AAA secret according to the root key. Key to further improve the security of the proxy mobile IP.

 Next, proceeding to step 713, the target PDSN completes the installation of the context.

 Next, proceeding to step 714, the target PDSN performs a binding registration process of the proxy mobile IP, and still uses the PMN-AAA key to calculate the MN-AAA authentication option, and performs integrity protection on the binding request BU message for registering the mobile IP, that is, The MN-AAA authentication option calculated using the PMN-AAA key is included in the BU message, and the carried SPI value is a fixed value defined in the protocol.

 Then, proceeding to step 715, after receiving the binding request BU message of the target PDSN, the HA does not include the MN-HA authentication option, but the MN-AAA authentication option, and therefore forwards the request to the HAAA, requesting the HAAA to the BU. The message is verified.

 Then, proceeding to step 716, after the HAAA receives the request from the HA, it verifies the correctness of the BU request message. If it is correct, it calculates a new PMN-HA key for the HA, that is, PMN-HA2, and the HAAA transmits the PMN-HA2 to Target PDSN.

Next, proceeding to step 717, the HA sends a binding response BA message to the target PDSN, where the message is integrity protected with a new PMN-HA2 key, and the BA message further includes a new SPI value, and the SPI may be A random and guaranteed unique value generated by the HA may also be a fixed value agreed with the PDSN. After receiving the response, the target PDSN verifies the response message with its own calculated PMN-HA key, and the PMN-HA key is It is calculated based on the PMN-AAA key obtained in step 712, and some other parameters (such as PDSN address, HA address, etc.). If successful, then The target PDSN holds the received SPI value. The target PDSN uses the SPI values assigned by PMN-HA2 and HA in subsequent bindings to perform integrity protection on subsequent Mobile IP messages.

 Next, proceeding to step 718, the data is switched from the source PDSN to the target PDSN, thus deleting the P-P interface.

 Therefore, in this embodiment, the integrity protection of the BU message is performed by using the PMN-AAA, so that the HA can correctly process all legal binding requests without modifying the existing protocol, and update the confidentiality according to different situations. The key and the corresponding SPI are generated to ensure the accuracy of the message verification between the agent and the HA, and the security of the mobile IP is satisfied.

 A second embodiment of the present invention relates to a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism. The present embodiment is substantially the same as the first embodiment except that in the first embodiment, the BU message from the PDSN is verified by the HAAA, and A PMN-HA key is sent to the HA. In this embodiment, the HA uses the identity of the MS to request the HAAA-AAA key to be sent to the HAAA, and the HA uses the PMN-AAA key to verify the BU message, and the HA is based on the PMN. - The AAA key gets the PMN-HA key. Therefore, when the PDSN is switched, the HA can perform the message verification and the key update independently in the subsequent processing, and the interaction with the HAAA is no longer needed, which simplifies the process.

 In addition, in the preferred embodiment of the present invention, the HA or HAAA may also generate the PMN-HA key in the PMN-AAA key, and does not affect the implementation of the embodiment of the present invention. In a specific application, the PMN-HA key or the PMN-AAA key may also be calculated by using the IP address of the proxy, the IP address of the HA, and/or the timestamp as input.

The third embodiment of the present invention relates to a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism. The present embodiment is substantially the same as the first embodiment except that in the first embodiment, the HAAA authenticates the MS authentication information. After the information required for the proxy mobile IP registration and the client mobile IP registration sent to the PDSN, the HA address information is different, and the registration of the mobile IP by different HA addresses is the proxy mobile IP registration or the client mobile IP registration. In the present embodiment, the same HA address information can still be used, that is, the HAAA is not required to send the information of the two HA addresses to the PDSN, but an HA address is used. However, in the BA message of the BU and HA response sent by the PDSN and the MS, the registration with different identifiers to distinguish the mobile IP is the proxy mobile IP registration or the client mobile IP registration. The fourth embodiment of the present invention relates to a method for establishing a security mechanism of a proxy mobile IP. The present embodiment is substantially the same as the first embodiment, except that the MS supports only simple IPv6 in this embodiment, and therefore the HAAA authenticates the MS. After the authentication is passed, there is no need to send two sets of mobile IP information, and only the information required for proxy mobile IP registration is sent to the PDSN, and the MS does not need to perform the registration binding process of the mobile IP of the client.

 A fifth embodiment of the present invention relates to a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism. In this embodiment, the MS supports a simple Ipv4, the mobile IP proxy is a PDSN, and the PDSN uses a MIP4. The specific process is as shown in FIG. 8.

 In step 801, the MS establishes a connection with the PDSN for the first time, the PDSN initiates authentication to the MS, and the MS returns an authentication response.

 Next, proceeding to step 802, the PDSN sends the authentication response of the MS to the HAAA, and indicates that it supports the function of the proxy mobile IP.

 Next, proceeding to step 803, the HAAA authentication MS, if successful, and allowing the PDSN to perform the function of the proxy mobile IP, returns an indication authorizing the PDSN to perform proxy mobile IP. The HAAA also sends the PDSN a PMN-AAA key and other information (such as an HA address) between the PDSN and the HAAA required to register the proxy mobile IP. It should be noted that, in this step, the HAAA may not send the PMN-AAA key to the PDSN, but send the certificate key of the PMN-AAA key to the PDSN, and the PDSN according to the root density. The key is calculated to obtain the PMN-AAA key to further improve the security of the proxy mobile IP.

 Next, proceeding to step 804, the PDSN performs a binding registration process of the proxy mobile IP. Specifically, the PDSN performs integrity protection on the binding request RRQ message for registering the mobile IP by using the PMN-AAA key obtained in step 803, that is, the MN-AAA authentication extension is included in the message, where SPI is a fixed value defined in the protocol, HoA is all 0s.

 Then, in step 805, after receiving the binding request message RRQ, the HA needs to use HAAA to verify the correctness of the MN-AAA authentication extension, and therefore forwards the request to the HAAA, requesting the HAAA to verify the RRQ message.

Next, proceeding to step 806, after receiving the HA request, the HAAA uses the identity identifier of the MS to the corresponding PMN-AAA key to verify the message, and if successful, calculates the PMN-HA key, which may be Marked as PMN-HA1. HAAA will return a message that the verification was successful, the message contains The key PMN-HA1. In this way, the registration of the proxy mobile IP does not need to make major changes to the existing device (especially HA), thereby making the invention have greater application value.

 Next, proceeding to step 807, the HA allocates the HoA, and sends a binding response RRP message to the PDSN, the message is integrity-protected by the PMN-HA1, and the message further includes a new SPI value, and the SPI may be HA. Generate a random and guaranteed unique value. After receiving the response, the PDSN verifies the PMN-HA authentication extension with its own calculated PMN-HA key. If correct, the binding ends and the PDSN saves the received HoA and SPI values. The PDSN uses the SPI values assigned by PMN-HA1 and HA in subsequent bindings to protect the integrity of subsequent mobile IP messages.

 Next, proceeding to step 808, the PDSN allocates an address for the MS, and the address is the HoA obtained by the PDSN from the HAAA.

 Next, proceeding to step 809, the MS moves, and switching between PDSNs needs to be performed, that is, switching from the PDSN (source PDSN) to the target PDSN.

 Next, proceeding to step 810, the source PDSN establishes a P-P interface with the target PDSN, and the source PDSN forwards all context information of the MS to the target PDSN, where the parameters related to the MIP security aspect are mainly PMN-AAA keys. That is, the target PDSN obtains the PMN-AAA key from the source PDSN. Of course, the source PDSN may not directly send the PMN-AAA key to the target PDSN, but send the root key of the PMN-AAA key to the target PDSN, and the target PDSN obtains the PMN-AAA secret according to the root key. Key to further improve the security of the proxy mobile IP.

 Next, proceeding to step 811, the target PDSN completes the installation of the context.

 Then, proceeding to step 812, the target PDSN performs the binding registration process of the proxy mobile IP, and still uses the PMN-AAA key to calculate the MN-AAA authentication extension, and performs integrity protection on the binding request RRQ message, that is, includes in the RRQ message. The MN-AAA authentication extension calculated using the PMN-AAA key carries the SPI value which is a fixed value defined in the protocol.

 Then, in step 813, after receiving the binding request RRQ message of the target PDSN, the HA does not include the MN-HA authentication extension, but the MN-AAA authentication extension, and therefore forwards the request to the HAAA, requesting the HAAA to the RRQ. The message is verified.

Then, proceeding to step 814, after receiving the HA request, the HAAA verifies the correctness of the RRQ message. If correct, the HA calculates a new PMN-HA key, that is, PMN-HA2, and the HAAA transmits the PMN-HA2 to the target. PDSN. Next, proceeding to step 815, the HA sends a binding acknowledgement RRP message to the target PDSN, where the message is integrity protected with a new PMN-HA2 key, and the RRP message further includes a new SPI value, and the SPI may be A random and guaranteed unique value generated by the HA; after receiving the response, the target PDSN verifies the response message with its own calculated PMN-HA key. If successful, the target PDSN saves the received SPI value. The target PDSN uses PMN-HA2 and HA-assigned SPI values in subsequent bindings to integrity protect subsequent Mobile IP messages.

 Next, proceeding to step 816, the data is switched from the source PDSN to the target PDSN, thus deleting the P-P interface.

 Therefore, in this embodiment, the integrity protection of the RRQ message is performed by using the PMN-AAA, so that the HA can correctly process all legal binding requests without modifying the existing protocol, and update the confidentiality according to different situations. The key and the corresponding SPI are generated to ensure the accuracy of the message verification between the agent and the HA, and the security of the mobile IP is satisfied.

 A sixth embodiment of the present invention relates to a method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism. The present embodiment is substantially the same as the fifth embodiment except that in the fifth embodiment, the RRQ message from the PDSN is verified by the HAAA, and A PMN-HA key is sent to the HA. In this embodiment, the HA uses the identity of the MS to request the HAAA-AAA key to be sent to the HAAA, and the HA uses the PMN-AAA key to verify the RRQ message, and the HA is based on the PMN. - The AAA key gets the PMN-HA key. Therefore, when the PDSN is switched, the HA can perform the message verification and the key update independently in the subsequent processing, and the interaction with the HAAA is no longer needed, which simplifies the process.

 A seventh embodiment of the present invention relates to a proxy mobile IP security system, including a mobile IP proxy, HAAA, and HA.

 The mobile IP proxy includes: a binding request module, configured to use the PMN-AAA between the HAAA and the proxy when the proxy mobile IP binding is performed for the first time, such as when establishing a connection with the MS or when the MS switches to the proxy. The key protects a binding request sent to the HA for registering the mobile IP; and a key generation module is configured to generate a PMN-HA key between the agent and the HA according to the PMN-AAA key.

The HA includes: an authentication request module, configured to verify a binding request from the proxy by interacting with the HAAA; a key obtaining module, configured to acquire a PMN-HA key through interaction with the HAAA; and a binding response module , used to return a binding response to the proxy after the validation is passed, and the binding is ringing The security parameter index SPI used to index the PMN-HA key should be carried.

 The HAAA includes: an interaction module, configured to perform authentication on the binding request with the HA and related interaction of the HA to acquire the PMN-HA key.

 The mobile IP agent and HA protect the integrity of subsequent mobile IP messages based on the PMN-HA key and SPI.

 It can be seen that HA can correctly process all legal binding requests without modifying the existing protocol, update the key according to different situations and generate corresponding SPI, which ensures the accuracy of message verification between the agent and the HA. Meet the security of mobile IP.

 Specifically, the agent of the mobile IP can obtain the PMN-AAA key by: if the binding request module needs to send a binding request when establishing a connection with the mobile terminal, the proxy forwards the authentication information of the MS to the HAAA, After the authentication of the authentication information is performed by the HAAA, the PMN-AAA key is sent to the proxy to obtain the PMN-AAA key; or the authentication of the authentication information by the HAAA is passed, and the PMN is sent to the proxy. The key of the AAA key, the agent obtains the PMN-AAA key based on the root key.

 If the binding request module needs to send a binding request when the MS switches to the proxy, obtain a PMN-AAA key from the source proxy, or obtain a root key of the PMN-AAA key from the source proxy, according to the root key, Obtain the PMN-AAA key.

 The HA's authentication request module can interact with the HAAA interaction module to verify the binding request:

 The verification request module of the HA requests the interaction module of the HAAA to verify the binding request, and the interaction module uses the identity identifier of the MS to index the corresponding PMN-AAA key, and uses the PMN-AAA key to perform integrity verification on the binding request. , to verify the binding request.

 Alternatively, the verification requesting module uses the identifier of the MS to request the interaction module to deliver the corresponding PMN-AAA key, and after obtaining the PMN-AAA key, use the PMN-AAA key to perform integrity verification on the binding request. , to verify the binding request.

 The key acquisition module of the HA interacts with the interaction module of the HAAA to obtain the PMN-HA key:

The key acquisition module directly requests the interaction module to deliver the PMN-HA key. Alternatively, the key acquisition module requests the interaction module to deliver the PMN-AAA key, and obtains the PMN-HA according to the PMN-AAA key. Key.

 An eighth embodiment of the present invention relates to a mobile IP proxy, the proxy comprising:

 a PMN-AAA key acquisition module, configured to: obtain a PMN-AAA key between the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server HAAA and the proxy corresponding to the proxy;

 a binding request sending module, configured to: protect the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the acquired PMN-AAA key, and send the binding request to the home agent HA;

 a verification module, configured to: after the mobile IP proxy receives the binding response sent by the HA, calculate the PMN-HA by using the acquired PMN-AAA, and use the PMN-HA to bind the binding Responding to the verification; wherein, the binding response is a message that the HA is protected by using a PMN-HA key, and the PMN-HA key is a pair of the PMN-AAA pair that is used by the HAAA After the request is verified, the key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA root key; and the binding response further carries an index for indexing The security parameter index SPI of the PMN-HA key;

 And a protection module, configured to: protect the integrity of the subsequent mobile IP message by using the PMN-HA key and the SPI.

 A ninth embodiment of the present invention relates to a home agent, including:

 a binding request receiving module, configured to: receive a binding request of a registered mobile IP sent by a proxy of the mobile IP, where the binding request is used by the agent of the mobile IP to use the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server acquired by the proxy a message that is protected by the PMN-AAA key between the HAAA and the proxy; a binding response sending module, configured to: use the PMN that the HAAA has by the home agent through interaction with the HAAA After the AAA authenticates the binding request, the PMN-HA key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy for the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key is used. Protecting, by the binding of the mobile IP, a binding response message carrying a security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key; wherein the PMN-HA key and the SPI are the mobile IP The agent uses the PMN-AAA obtained by the proxy to calculate the PMN-HA, and after using the PMN-HA to verify the binding response, the key used to protect the integrity of the subsequent mobile IP message is index

A tenth embodiment of the present invention relates to a proxy mobile IP security system, the system comprising: a mobile IP proxy, a home agent HA, and a home authentication, authorization, and accounting server HAAA, wherein: The mobile IP agent is used to:

 Obtaining a PMN-AAA key between the corresponding HAAA and the proxy of the mobile IP, and protecting the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the PMN-AAA key, and sending the request to the home agent HA;

 Receiving the binding response sent by the HA, using the obtained PMN-AAA calculation

PMN-HA, using the PMN-HA to verify the binding response, and after performing the risk pass, using the PMN-HA key, and the SPI pair carried in the binding response The integrity of subsequent mobile IP messages is protected;

 The HA is used to:

 After the binding request is verified by using the PMN-AAA that the HAAA has, by using the interaction with the HAAA, adopting according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA root key The PMN-HA key between the proxy and the HA generated by the agent of the mobile IP, and the binding response sent to the proxy of the mobile IP carrying the security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key Message protection;

 The HAAA is used to: provide the PMN-AAA key.

 Although the invention has been illustrated and described with reference to the preferred embodiments of the present invention, it will be understood The spirit and scope of the invention.

Claims

Rights request  A method for establishing a proxy mobile IP security mechanism, comprising:  The agent of the mobile IP obtains the PMN-AAA key shared between the corresponding home authentication, authorization, accounting server HAAA and the agent, and protects the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the PMN-AAA key, and then sends the To the home agent HA;  The agent of the mobile IP receives the binding response sent by the HA, and calculates a key PMN-HA key shared with the HA according to the obtained PMN-AAA key, and uses the PMN-HA key pair. The binding response is verified; wherein the binding response is a message that the HA is protected by a PMN-HA key, and the PMN-HA key is the PMN-AAA that is utilized by the HAAA a key between the agent and the HA generated by the key of the mobile IP agent after the key is verified by the binding request, and the key is generated by the PMN-AAA key or the PMN-AAA root key; and the binding The fixed response further carries a security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key; after performing the verification, the agent of the mobile IP uses the PMN-HA key and the SPI pair to follow The integrity of mobile IP messages is protected.  The method according to claim 1, wherein when the agent of the mobile IP establishes a connection with the mobile terminal, the specific implementation of the agent of the mobile IP to obtain the PMN-AAA key is: the mobile IP The agent forwards the authentication information of the mobile terminal to the HAAA;  After the HAAA authenticates the authentication information, the agent of the mobile IP receives the PMN-AAA key sent by the HAAA; or, after the authentication of the authentication information by the HAAA is passed, The agent of the mobile IP receives the root key of the PMN-AAA key sent by the HAAA, and the agent of the mobile IP calculates the PMN-AAA key according to the root key.  The method according to claim 2, wherein after the HAAA authenticates the authentication information of the mobile terminal, the agent of the mobile IP receives the proxy mobile IP registration sent by the HAAA Required information, including the address of the HA, the home address HoA, and the home link prefix.  The method according to claim 3, wherein after the registration of the proxy mobile IP is completed, the proxy of the mobile IP sends the information required by the mobile terminal to perform mobile IP registration to the mobile terminal. . The method according to claim 1, wherein the mobile terminal moves the IP from the source When the proxy switches to the proxy of the mobile IP as the proxy of the target mobile IP, the specific implementation of the proxy of the target mobile IP to obtain the PMN-AAA key is:  The agent of the target mobile IP acquires the PMN-AAA key from the agent of the source mobile IP; or the agent of the target mobile IP obtains the PMN-AAA from the agent of the source mobile IP The root key of the key, and the PMN-AAA key is calculated according to the root key.  The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the specific implementation of verifying the binding request by using the PMN-AAA key of the HAAA is: The HAAA verifies the binding request by: using an identity index of the mobile terminal to the corresponding PMN-AAA key, and performing integrity verification on the binding request by using the PMN-AAA key;  The specific implementation of the key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key is:  The HAAA generates the PMN-HA according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key, and sends the PMN-HA to the HA.  The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the utilizing the The specific implementation of the binding request verification by the PMN-AAA that the HAAA has is:  The binding request is verified by the HA by: using the identity of the mobile terminal to obtain the PMN-AAA key from the HAAA request or calculating the PMN-AAA key according to the obtained root key, The HA performs the integrity-risk certificate on the binding request by using the PMN-AAA key;  The specific implementation of the key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key is:  The HA calculates the PMN-HA by using the PMN-AAA key or the PMN-AAA root key obtained by the request.  The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the SPI is a random and unique value generated by the HAAA or the HA, or is fixed by an agent agreed with the mobile IP. Value, or a value obtained by calculation. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the PMN-HA key is calculated by using an IP address of the proxy, an IP address of the HA, and/or a timestamp as an input. A method for establishing a security mechanism of a proxy mobile IP, comprising: receiving, by a home agent HA, a binding request of a registered mobile IP sent by a proxy of a mobile IP, wherein the binding request is the mobile IP The agent uses the PMN-AAA key between the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server HAAA and the agent to obtain the protected message;  Passing the HA with the HAAA, utilizing the The PMN-AAA key verifies the binding request;  After the verification is passed, the HA adopts a shared key PMN-HA between the agent and the HA generated by the agent of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA key or the PMN-AAA key. a key, configured to protect a binding response message sent by the proxy of the mobile IP, where the binding response message carries a security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key, the PMN - the HA key and the SPI for the mobile IP agent calculate the PMN-HA using the PMN-AAA obtained by the proxy, and use the PMN-HA to verify the binding response, after the subsequent movement is adopted The key and index of the integrity of the IP message.  The method according to claim 10, wherein the specific implementation of the HA and the line verification is:  Sending, by the HA, the binding request to the HAAA;  The HAAA uses the identity index of the mobile terminal to the corresponding PMN-AAA key, and uses the PMN-AAA key to perform integrity verification on the binding request; or the HAAA index to the corresponding root key, and utilizes The root key calculates a PMN-AAA key, and the PMN-AAA key is used to perform integrity verification on the binding request;  The specific implementation of the PMN-HA key generated by the proxy for the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key is:  The HAAA generates the PMN-HA with the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key, and sends the PMN-HA to the HA.  The method according to claim 10, wherein the specific implementation of the HA pass and the line verification is: After receiving the binding request, the HA uses the identity of the mobile terminal from the HAAA Requesting the PMN-AAA key, the HA performing integrity verification on the binding request by using the PMN-AAA key; or the HA requesting the PMN-AAA root key from the HAAA request, Calculating the PMN-AAA key by using the root key, and performing integrity verification on the request;  The specific implementation of generating the PMN-HA key for the agent of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA root key is:  The HA calculates the PMN-HA by using the PMN-AAA key or the PMN-AAA root key obtained by the request.  The method according to any one of claims 10 to 12, wherein when the agent of the mobile IP establishes a connection with the mobile terminal, the specific implementation of the agent of the mobile IP to obtain the PMN-AAA key is :  The agent of the mobile IP forwards the authentication information of the mobile terminal to the HAAA;  After the HAAA authenticates the authentication information, the PMN-AAA key is sent to the agent of the mobile IP; or, after the authentication of the authentication information by the HAAA, the mobile IP is sent to the mobile IP. The proxy sends the key of the PMN-AAA key, and the proxy of the mobile IP resides in the root key, and the PMN-AAA key is calculated.  The method according to any one of claims 10 to 12, wherein, when the mobile terminal switches from a proxy of the source mobile IP to a proxy of the mobile IP as a proxy of the target mobile IP, the mobile IP The specific implementation of the proxy to obtain the PMN-AAA key is:  The agent of the mobile IP acquires the PMN-AAA key from an agent of the source mobile IP; or the agent of the mobile IP acquires the PMN-AAA key from an agent of the source mobile IP The root key, based on the root key, calculates the PMN-AAA key.  15. A mobile IP proxy, characterized in that the proxy comprises:  a PMN-AAA key acquisition module, configured to: obtain a PMN-AAA key between the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server HAAA and the proxy corresponding to the proxy;  a binding request sending module, configured to: protect the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the obtained PMN-AAA key, and send the binding request to the home agent HA; a verification module, configured to: after the mobile IP proxy receives the binding response sent by the HA, calculate, by using the acquired PMN-AAA, the PMN-HA, and use the PMN-HA to bind the Verifying that the binding response is a message that the HA is protected by a PMN-HA key, and the PMN-HA key is the PMN-AAA pair that is used by the HAAA After the binding request is verified, the key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy of the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA root key; and the binding response is further carried in the binding response Indexing the security parameter index SPI of the PMN-HA key;  And a protection module, configured to: protect the integrity of the subsequent mobile IP message by using the PMN-HA key and the SPI.  16. A home agent, characterized by comprising:  a binding request receiving module, configured to: receive a binding request of a registered mobile IP sent by a proxy of the mobile IP, where the binding request is used by the agent of the mobile IP to use the home authentication, authorization, and accounting server acquired by the proxy a message that is protected by the PMN-AAA key between the HAAA and the proxy; a binding response sending module, configured to: use the PMN that the HAAA has by the home agent through interaction with the HAAA After the AAA authenticates the binding request, the PMN-HA key between the proxy and the HA generated by the proxy for the mobile IP according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA key is used. Protecting, by the binding of the mobile IP, a binding response message carrying a security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key; wherein the PMN-HA key and the SPI are the mobile IP The agent uses the PMN-AAA obtained by the proxy to calculate the PMN-HA, and after using the PMN-HA to verify the binding response, the key used to protect the integrity of the subsequent mobile IP message is index  17. A proxy mobile IP security system, characterized in that the system comprises: a mobile IP proxy, a home agent HA, and a home authentication, authorization, accounting server HAAA, wherein:  The mobile IP agent is used to:  Obtaining a PMN-AAA key between the corresponding HAAA and the proxy of the mobile IP, and protecting the binding request of the registered mobile IP by using the PMN-AAA key, and sending the request to the home agent HA; Receiving the binding response sent by the HA, calculating the PMN-HA by using the acquired PMN-AAA, verifying the binding response by using the PMN-HA, and performing the Afterwards, the integrity of the subsequent Mobile IP message is protected by using the PMN-HA key and the SPI carried in the binding response; The HA is used to:  After the binding request is verified by using the PMN-AAA that the HAAA has, by using the interaction with the HAAA, adopting according to the PMN-AAA or PMN-AAA root key The PMN-HA key between the proxy and the HA generated by the agent of the mobile IP, and the binding response sent to the proxy of the mobile IP carrying the security parameter index SPI for indexing the PMN-HA key Message protection;  The HAAA is used to: provide the PMN-AAA key.  18. The system of claim 17, the mobile IP proxy being a packet data serving node, an access gateway, or a control intervention point.