[go: up one dir, main page]

WO2008051365A2 - Système de registre de courrier avec vérification de l'identité de l'origine - Google Patents

Système de registre de courrier avec vérification de l'identité de l'origine Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2008051365A2
WO2008051365A2 PCT/US2007/021526 US2007021526W WO2008051365A2 WO 2008051365 A2 WO2008051365 A2 WO 2008051365A2 US 2007021526 W US2007021526 W US 2007021526W WO 2008051365 A2 WO2008051365 A2 WO 2008051365A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
register system
postal
permission
code
mail
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2007/021526
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2008051365A3 (fr
Inventor
Michael Hu
Original Assignee
Michael Hu
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Michael Hu filed Critical Michael Hu
Publication of WO2008051365A2 publication Critical patent/WO2008051365A2/fr
Publication of WO2008051365A3 publication Critical patent/WO2008051365A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/10—Office automation; Time management
    • G06Q10/107—Computer-aided management of electronic mailing [e-mailing]
    • E—FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E21—EARTH OR ROCK DRILLING; MINING
    • E21B—EARTH OR ROCK DRILLING; OBTAINING OIL, GAS, WATER, SOLUBLE OR MELTABLE MATERIALS OR A SLURRY OF MINERALS FROM WELLS
    • E21B7/00—Special methods or apparatus for drilling
    • E21B7/26—Drilling without earth removal, e.g. with self-propelled burrowing devices
    • E21B7/267—Drilling devices with senders, e.g. radio-transmitters for position of drilling tool
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L51/00—User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
    • H04L51/21—Monitoring or handling of messages
    • H04L51/212—Monitoring or handling of messages using filtering or selective blocking

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to: registers; more particularly to register systems controlled by data bearing records; and most particularly to mail systems, for both electronic and physical mail, providing origin verification with use of coding generated by computer from information sensed from the records controlled by the register system.
  • Physical mail i.e. postal; systems are well known in having existed throughout modern times.
  • One fundamental aspect of the historical origins of physical mail is considered of interest presently: only the literate, by definition, could either write or read mail or messages between literates. Carriers were illiterate and, if faithful in making personal delivery to the intended recipient was assured confidentiality.
  • Latin was the language of the literate and, in being a wholly different language than the vulgar tongue used in any particular region, Latin provided an effective barrier to teasing the meaning out of these messages by illiterates which, together with reliable service, assured confidentiality in the mail.
  • Electronic mail is relatively new. But it has achieved in less than two decades a quotidian importance to communications. A measure of the recent growth and current prevalence of e-mail is provided by the ubiquity enjoyed, and iniquity instilled, by the same. How many users of the Internet lost the entire contents of their sole computer to the Melissa virus alone?
  • E-mail as opposed to 'chat room' discussion, is as of October 2005 legally confidential thanks to an act of Congress setting forth penalties of five years imprisonment for: 'Unlawful Access to Stored Communications' (Title 18 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 121, Section 2701). Prior this, for a year and a half, e-mail was fair game legally due to a unanimous decision by the Washington, D.C., U.S. Court of Appeals in 2004: reversing the same court's decision the year before finding violation of the Wiretapping Act of 1934; because e-mail is copied while 'in storage' and hence is not in transmission. It is noted that the title of the relevant section of this recent law specifies 'stored communications'. The law regarding e-mail, in brief, has been in a state of flux recently and legislation required to effect what is considered a fundamental public expectation with all mail: confidentiality.
  • the intended recipient is considered to be at a severe disadvantage with regard to the sender because the former does not know who the sender might actually be and what actually will be in the mail when opened which, in the case of malicious code or anthrax spores, is too late to avert disaster.
  • e-mail one has only an address prior opening. Physical mail arrives in an envelope that often contains nothing more than an address if that. Registered mail can necessitate a trip to the local customer service center and a wait in line to receive mail that has been identified only by a registration number.
  • Viruses and other forms of malicious digital code are generally acquired through unknown and unsolicited electronic communications, inclusive of spam, often disguised as ordinary e-mail.
  • the only means available of distinguishing 'safe' and desirable e-mail from malicious code vectors and otherwise undesirable communications in the guise of e-mail is the address of the sender. But if all unknown senders are ignored, i.e. deleted without opening, there is another problem: the intended recipient is incapable of receiving honest enquiries, or other messages in good faith, from people including potential clients and customers, that not only provide potential benefit but may well be necessary for the operation of a business or one's death.
  • the problem is generally characterized by an overload of spam that is not readily distinguishable by the intended recipient from mail that might be of interest or even of importance to the intended recipient who, generally, cannot easily and reliably determine without 'opening' the e-mail whether a particular e-mail is of potential utility or, at best, a waste of time. And once the e-mail is opened, as far as any insidious or malicious computer code is concerned, contamination has already occurred.
  • a need is recognized for a means of diminishing the amount of unwanted mail, be it spam or junk mail, without closing the door to honest and potentially beneficial enquiries or advertising.
  • a need is recognized for a means of inhibiting fraud particularly in e-mail, largely because it is still fairly new and unfamiliar to people perhaps, but also in physical mail.
  • Unsolicited e-mail or 'spam 1 is a modern phenomenon, and a large problem for many people worldwide who may hope for a technological solution to the problem, while others, e.g. Germany, have taken a legislative approach. But, in the U.S. at least, First Amendment rights must be recognized and it is considered that spam is fundamentally an economic problem: cost vs. benefit; hence requiring an economic solution. When the cost of sending ten million e-mails is less than a few hundred dollars even instances of fraud considered obvious by most will find enough 'buyers' to make the effort worthwhile.
  • a need is hence recognized for a means of determining which mail is opened and read by intended recipients in addition to the other needs defined above.
  • Pre-texting in a mail system context, is generally simple fraud but a minor distinction between assuming another's address and identity for the purpose of stealing their property: usually financial assets; and pretending to be someone else to obtain private information used to damage a reputation is recognized.
  • repudiation and pre-texting are considered aspects of the larger problem, extending beyond but inclusive of mail as a vehicle, commonly known as identity theft, and a need is recognized for deterring the use of mail, electronic or physical, as a vehicle for repudiation of, and pre-texting, origin identity.
  • a first object of the present invention is prevention of contamination:
  • a second object of the present invention is the inhibition of fraud, particularly in e- mail, but also in physical mail.
  • a third object of the present invention is reduction of the amount of undesired mail: 'spam' or 'junk mail 1 depending on format; presented for reception.
  • a fourth object of the present invention is a means of providing timely 'feedback' to the senders of unsolicited mail from the intended recipients: of answering the question of whether the mail was opened or read or not; thus enabling senders to focus upon responsive recipients rather than rely upon mass, relatively blind, mailings.
  • a fifth object of the present invention is facilitation of mail from unknown addresses that is neither insidious nor malicious and particularly mail from addresses unknown to the intended recipient that are potentially of interest, or beneficial to, the intended recipient in comprising honest business enquiries: e.g. an enquiry from a potentially new client or buyer or advertising of goods or services pertinent to the business of the intended recipient.
  • origin verification means of verifying the origin of the mail electronic or physical; delivered or presented for reception, be provided in a form assuring the intended recipient that the origin is either that of a party known:
  • this identity information be inclusive of: (a) name; (b) addresses: electronic, physical, mailing; (c) telephone numbers: land line and/or cellular, facsimile; and (d) an account with a bank or other financial institution.
  • a stamp comprised of a string of encrypted code generated using factors or keys specific to the intended recipient and sender be utilized in a manner corresponding to the division above: with the sender either known and selected by the intended recipient or known to the mail provider as being accountable. It is suggested that a 'permission stamp' for mail addresses both known and specified by an intended recipient be utilized to ensure that the mail did originate from these known and specified addresses and further suggested that permission stamps be available to the senders specified without charge or other financial obligation to the sender.
  • a value stamp be available for unsolicited mail, having technical attributes: i.e. coding; similar to that used for a permission stamp, which provides a credit to the recipient if opened or read. It is for this reason that bank account information is desired of the sender.
  • a basic irredeemable charge for value stamps is suggested as opposed to free permission stamps. And a redemption code within the content of mail bearing a value stamp is further suggested that can be returned to the mail provider or stamp issuer as proof that the mail was opened or read.
  • the charge for each value stamp include a the cost of a credit, available to each of the intended recipients demonstrating that the mail has been opened or read, additional to the basic charge for a value stamp.
  • the redemption code be returned on line for either electronic or physical mail bearing a value stamp, and that the credit be redeemable as cash, applied toward an account the intended recipient has with the mail provider, stamp issuer, or the sender, or donated to a charity specified by the recipient.
  • the redemption code can be returned to the mail provider in any manner desired including entering the same in a computer in a kiosk at the local post office, for example, or even handwritten on the envelope in which the physical mail arrived and handed back to the carrier in another envelope bearing a permission stamp provided by the sender.
  • the face, i.e. credit, value of the value stamp be redeemable using direct deposit with, for example, Automatic Clearing House: an existing direct deposit system utilizing the Internet.
  • the intended recipient of mail, electronic or physical, bearing a value or permission stamp enters the code, or a specified portion thereof, into an origin identity verification software program having a decryption key, i.e. a mathematical algorithm, that verifies the stamp: i.e. the pertinent code string; as genuine or highly unlikely, mathematically, to have been generated without a coding key, i.e. encryption, that is conjugate with the decoding key, i.e. decryption, held by or assigned to the intended recipient.
  • a decryption key i.e. a mathematical algorithm
  • the encryption for this purpose is generally separate and distinguished from any encryption used for the content of any mail. It is suggested that the code string for stamps, permission or value, be generated using data reflecting:
  • stamp face value i.e. amount available with redemption; as necessary but insufficient to recreate the encrypted code string in an economic manner without the encryption coding key or algorithm used for this encryption.
  • the face value of a permission stamp is presumed, generally, to be zero and it is suggested that this value be utilized in computer processing of data to distinguish between permission and value stamps with the two being virtually identical in other regards. In addition to these data a virtually irreversible mathematical operation is recommended for generation of each encrypted string code. A modulo operator is specifically recommended. It is also suggested that single or double key encryption be utilized including: public, secret, and single keys in private/public key encryption; in a manner similar to the use of encryption disclosed in U.S.
  • a 'virtuous cycle' is created whereby the prospective sender restricts the addressee list used to those considered to have a high level of potential interest and the prospective recipient, in turn, is presented with less mail of greater interest, thereby increasing the likelihood of it being opened and of value to the sender.
  • the unknown sender is at least accountable and the mail quite possibly of genuine interest to the recipient in addition to offering some small remuneration for one's time and attention.
  • the intended recipient is accorded, in a word, respect by the sender and this simple but indispensable token of civility is considered to comprise a large benefit directly attributed to a system or method in accordance with the principles relating to the present invention.
  • the intended recipient is assured that mail from known addresses is actually from the parties expected and that no unwanted surprises inclusive of deliberately insidious and malicious digital code or biological vector will be found in mail bearing permission or value stamps.
  • the intended recipient Rather than being deluged by mail that is difficult to distinguish into 'friend or foe', and having to tread a virtual, i.e. electronic, minefield in the attempt to retrieve all accountable and potentially beneficial e-mail, the intended recipient now has mail clearly identifiable as being from parties known and selected by them or accountable parties not only willing to provide verifiable identification information but also willing to pay for the intended recipient's attention.
  • the present invention is: related to register systems controlled by data bearing records, particularly mail register systems, electronic or physical, "providing origin verification with use of coding generated by computer from, and controlled by, information sensed from the records"; and while various encryption techniques are mentioned in the summary of the present principles above, there is nearly no mention of records or register systems other than the definition of data required. This is largely the result of describing the register system in terms applicable to a mail system, to which the present invention is considered to most nearly resemble, including data definitions primarily comprised of names and addresses.
  • the present invention is considered to provide a new paradigm to mail systems, not wholly dissimilar to that of globalization vs. colonial and fidal societies, while encouraging human values commonly associated withaloodal society by eliminating surreptitious use of the mail system and rewarding discretion, courtesy, and honesty.
  • This relies upon the first tasks given to modern technology: data management and mathematics; in the compilation of data and generation of encrypted codes in accordance with data held in records and enabling instant verification with the use of decryption.
  • Accountability in a mail system in accordance with the present invention is attained by providing a mail participant in the capacity of intended recipient with virtually instant means of verifying the origin of mail as that of another mail participant selected by the intended recipient: i.e. a 'selected sender 1 ; or as that of an 'accountable sender 1 : i.e. a party that has provided verifiable identity data inclusive of name, addresses, and account information as necessary to provide remuneration to the recipient for taking the time to at least open and preferably read the mail.
  • a redemption code can be included in the mail and redemption of the value to be transferred made in a similar manner as that for mail from an accountable sender except that there is no basic charge as for a value stamp.
  • Origin verifiable mail is categorized into only two categories: (a) mail with an origin having express permission; and (b) mail from accountable senders each presumed to be unknown to the intended recipient but having provided verifiable identity data including that of a financial account in addition to name, addresses, physical and e-mail; and preferably other communication access including fixed and portable telephone, and facsimile numbers.
  • Two types of 'stamps' are generated accordingly: permission stamps and value stamps, each bearing a postal code that is verifiable by the recipient as valid with a decryption key preferably contained in software operable upon a computer or smaller digital device and recognized by the mail register system as valid for mail delivery.
  • Value stamps bear a value code, separate from or incorporated into the postal code, recognizable by the mail register system.
  • the postal code borne by a value stamp is preferably mathematically related to a value code preferably mathematically related to the verifiable data provided by the accountable sender.
  • the postal code contains an encrypted code string enabling verification of the origin by the intended recipient with a decryption key. This decryption preferably confirms a visible redemption value amount and the identity of the sender.
  • the postal code, redemption code found in the text of the mail, and value code each preferably depend upon a single time factor resulting in an invalid code after a predetermined time duration preferably selectable by the accountable sender from a plurality of available duration periods.
  • a time factor operable on a permission stamp is also preferably selectable by the intended recipient from a plurality of available durations.
  • Permission stamps bear a permission code, separate from or incorporated into the postal code, recognizable by the mail register system.
  • the permission code is preferably related mathematically to the identity verification codes of the selected sender and the intended recipient through encryption that is continued, mathematically, through generation of the postal code from the permission code if only a single level of encryption is utilized, as the final encryption must contain an encrypted code string that can be decrypted by the decryption key used by the intended recipient.
  • All postal codes must contain an encrypted code string that can be decrypted by the intended recipient with a decryption key.
  • One decryption key can be used for all postal codes if desired in which case double or single private key public key encryption is recommended.
  • double private key public key encryption of a code string contained in the postal code generated from a permission code each private key assigned to one mail participant is preferably utilized. This is most preferred for postal codes derived from permission codes and further facilitates use of a single decryption key for each intended recipient for all mail with mail sent by accountable senders preferably having single key encryption with the private key associated with a public key conjugate to the intended recipient utilized alone.
  • Single private key public key encryption can also be utilized for all mail sent to a given mail participant in the role of intended recipient in a very similar manner, by simply using the private key associated with the intended recipient alone for the postal codes borne by permission stamps as well as the postal codes borne by value stamps. If desired, one decryption key for postal codes carried by all value stamps and one decryption key for all postal codes carried on permission stamps is easily facilitated by use of single private key public key encryption. Bijective, one on one, simple reversal encryption is recommended for generation of permission codes between an intended recipient and a single selected sender, particularly, with the decryption key selected in accordance with the name.
  • the type of encryption used for the code string borne by every valid postal code decrypted by a decryption key held by the intended recipient does not preclude use of a second encryption, moreover, and association between the two encryptions utilized only in a record of the mail register system facilitates multiple levels of encryption as well as full use of double private key public key encryption whereby each mail participant has both a private key for encryption of an outgoing mail address, if not also the content of the mail, and also a public key that is operable upon the postal codes borne by all valid incoming mail.
  • Permission codes are preferably generated directly from the identity verification codes of the two mail participants involved using the encryption key assigned to the intended recipient as a modulo operator operating upon the mathematical identity verification codes which are associated with the identity verification data for both participants.
  • the intended recipient selected these selected senders, i.e. identified these mail participants in a manner sensible to the mail register system such that a record of selected senders controls operability of the encryption key assigned to the intended recipient, said system can safely utilize bijective, one on one reversible, encryption in addition to single and double private key public key encryption.
  • Accountable senders purchasing value stamps are preferably verifiable and identifiable directly through use of another decryption key operable on valid postal codes borne by value stamps conjugate to a private encryption key held by the mail register system operator. This is as opposed to a postal code borne by a permission stamp in a system utilizing double private key public key encryption with each mail participant of a correspondent pair having a private encryption key utilized for mail sent to the other participant.
  • the single private key preferably held by the system operator, and conjugate public keys held by intended recipients, are preferably different for different mail participants but not exclusively: it is preferred that a large number of key pairs be used and randomly distributed among the larger population of mail participants.
  • a record in the register system must control, of course, the generation of value, redemption, and postal codes accordingly.
  • all valid postal codes contain a code string that can be decrypted by the intended recipient in verification of the mail origin as either a selected sender or an accountable sender.
  • Postal codes borne by value stamps from accountable senders preferably confirm the identity of the sender in addition to verifying the same as an accountable sender and also preferably contain a value code that preferably indicates the redeemable value with the decryption verifying the sender as accountable.
  • Mail from an accountable sender includes a redemption code recognizable by the mail register system, preferably with confirmation of the recipient identity, as necessary and sufficient for transfer of credit from a financial account held by the accountable sender to the recipient.
  • the recipient identifies, or returns to a specified address, the redemption code in an action sensible to the mail register system as indicating that this mail has been opened and preferably read by the recipient intended. It is noted that in electronic mail (e-mail) recipient identification of the redemption code can be done instantly while with physical mail the redemption code can be written on the envelope received, or circled and returned, via the mail carrier to the postal service or the accountable sender or most preferably to a third party that functions as a financial clearing house which effects transfer of the value redeemed from a financial account specified by the accountable sender to an account in the name of the redeemer who preferably provides the register system with account information necessary for crediting or deposits preferably held in a data bearing record controlling the crediting of accounts with redeemed value.
  • While redemption of value stamps preferably distinguishes value stamps from permission stamps the more fundamental distinction is between selected senders and accountable senders presumed to be unknown to the intended recipient and having provided verifiable data inclusive of account information.
  • a parent or some other person known to the intended recipient might prefer the convenience of including a redemption code in the content of mail bearing a permission stamp, as opposed to a physical cheque or other form of fund transfer, particularly if the amount is comparatively small: i.e. less than ten times the fee associated with a conventional fund transfer performed by a bank; and a permission stamp is still considered wholly appropriate, as opposed to a value stamp, because the origin is one known to and selected by the intended recipient.
  • the main intent is to ensure that the mail received is first verifiable as from either a selected sender who is known and was selected by the recipient or an accountable sender who has provided verifiable information including name, address, and an account from which some small compensation for opening or preferably reading the mail sent is available. This promotes the virtuous cycle of senders focusing advertisements upon those who might actually be interested in the same and reduction in the amount of advertisement sent out blindly in broadsides.
  • the identity of the accountable sender be discernable through the postal code borne by a value stamp and that this information be available to the intended recipient, along with the postal code verification and hence assurance that the mail is from an accountable sender, before opening the mail. But the fact that the origin of the mail is verifiable prior opening is sufficient. And, at minimum, this verification is obtained by at least one encryption for which the intended recipient has an operable decryption key. But encryption is simply coding, and inclusive of 'pig Latin', and while the use of computers necessarily requires digital code, this isn't encryption, not in the ordinary sense used herein. Encryption entails use of an algorithm that is fundamentally mathematical even if applicable to alphabetic characters, as in pig Latin, as the transposition of alphabetic characters is dictated by character position.
  • Algorithms can be of various mathematical types as distinguished by the mathematics utilized.
  • An arithmetic algorithm is technically still algebraic but as commonly understood and intended herein algebraic algorithms make use of multiplication and division in addition to addition and subtraction.
  • Digit transposition or operation upon values in accordance with predetermined digit position is another type of algorithm coding that is still algebraic, fundamentally, and in contrast to the preferred type of encryption used to provide verification of origin identity: virtually irreversible 'one way 1 functions typically utilized in secure hash algorithms and inclusive of modulo operators and other elevated mathematics as compared with the four basic operations of algebra: addition, subtraction, multiplication and division.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Human Resources & Organizations (AREA)
  • Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Entrepreneurship & Innovation (AREA)
  • Geology (AREA)
  • Mining & Mineral Resources (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • Geochemistry & Mineralogy (AREA)
  • General Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
  • Fluid Mechanics (AREA)
  • Environmental & Geological Engineering (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Marketing (AREA)
  • Operations Research (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Tourism & Hospitality (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un courrier, électronique ou physique, qui porte soit un timbre d'autorisation contenant un code d'autorisation pour des expéditeurs sélectionnés par le destinataire prévu, soit un timbre de valeur contenant un code de valeur pour tous les autres expéditeurs. Les codes d'autorisation et de valeur reflètent les données d'identification pour les participants au courrier et contiennent une chaîne de code cryptée qui peut être décodée avec une clé postale d'autorisation ou de valeur par le destinataire. Les timbres d'autorisation n'étant disponibles que pour les expéditeurs sélectionnés par le destinataire prévu, les codes d'autorisation ne doivent refléter que les données d'identification du destinataire prévu tandis que les codes de valeur, utilisés par les participants au courrier, présumés inconnus du e destinataire prévu, doivent refléter l'identité de l'expéditeur. Les timbres de valeur doivent, de plus, être achetés et produire un crédit remboursable pour le destinataire, pour l'ouverture ou la lecture. L'identification des données pour les expéditeurs responsables doit pouvoir être vérifiée et inclure des informations pour un compte à partir duquel des crédits sont disponibles pour les destinataires. Les clés postales vérifient l'identité de l'origine du courrier reçu comme étant soit un expéditeur sélectionné, connu du destinataire prévu, soit un expéditeur de confiance, connu du système d'inscription de courrier.
PCT/US2007/021526 2006-10-19 2007-10-09 Système de registre de courrier avec vérification de l'identité de l'origine WO2008051365A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US58390606A 2006-10-19 2006-10-19
US11/583,906 2006-10-19

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2008051365A2 true WO2008051365A2 (fr) 2008-05-02
WO2008051365A3 WO2008051365A3 (fr) 2008-12-11

Family

ID=39325099

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2007/021526 WO2008051365A2 (fr) 2006-10-19 2007-10-09 Système de registre de courrier avec vérification de l'identité de l'origine

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2008051365A2 (fr)

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5999967A (en) * 1997-08-17 1999-12-07 Sundsted; Todd Electronic mail filtering by electronic stamp
US7085745B2 (en) * 2003-03-05 2006-08-01 Klug John R Method and apparatus for identifying, managing, and controlling communications

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2008051365A3 (fr) 2008-12-11

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Moore et al. The economics of online crime
US6805288B2 (en) Method for generating customer secure card numbers subject to use restrictions by an electronic card
US8452715B2 (en) Secure transfer of value via electronic stamp
US20080255992A1 (en) Double recognizing method by means of telephone number and identification code for online credit card transactions over the internet
US20030061168A1 (en) Method for generating customer secure card numbers
Makeri Cyber security issues in Nigeria and challenges
EA003027B1 (ru) Система для кредитных карточек и способ
US8209755B2 (en) Signaling a security breach of a protected set of files
WO2007143059A2 (fr) Surveillance de l'état d'une base de données par introduction d'un faux identifiant dans la base de données
Saputra A survey of cyber crime in Indonesia
Usman cyber crime: Pakistani perspective
Sadekin et al. Security of e-banking in Bangladesh
Rajendran Data breach fraudulence and preventive measures in e-commerce platforms
Weber See what you sign secure implementations of digital signatures
Mahdi et al. Credit fraud detection in the banking sector in UK: a focus on e-business
Grabosky et al. Digital crime in the twenty-first century
WO2008051365A2 (fr) Système de registre de courrier avec vérification de l'identité de l'origine
Nirwan et al. A Comprehensive Study Cyber Attacks and Countermeasures
Kryshevych et al. Modern methods of computer-related fraud: legal characteristics and qualification.
Menezes et al. Banking Frauds and Ways to Prevent Them
Grabosky et al. Digital Crime in the Twenty-First Century 1
Mouallem Oh no, grandma has a computer: How internet fraud will take the place of telemarketing fraud targeting the elderly
Menezes et al. Banks and Frauds–An Analysis
Kharazian et al. Int'l Securities Enforcement, Transnational Organized Crime, and Cybercrime
Adebayo et al. Electronic commerce in Nigeria: The exigency of combatting cyber frauds and insecurity

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
DPE2 Request for preliminary examination filed before expiration of 19th month from priority date (pct application filed from 20040101)
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 07852591

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2

DPE2 Request for preliminary examination filed before expiration of 19th month from priority date (pct application filed from 20040101)
NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 07852591

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2