[go: up one dir, main page]

WO2007036399A1 - Procede et dispositif pour empecher la reception de messages indesirables dans un reseau de communication sur ip - Google Patents

Procede et dispositif pour empecher la reception de messages indesirables dans un reseau de communication sur ip Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2007036399A1
WO2007036399A1 PCT/EP2006/065503 EP2006065503W WO2007036399A1 WO 2007036399 A1 WO2007036399 A1 WO 2007036399A1 EP 2006065503 W EP2006065503 W EP 2006065503W WO 2007036399 A1 WO2007036399 A1 WO 2007036399A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
subscriber
terminal
transaction number
list
transaction
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2006/065503
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Joachim Charzinski
Original Assignee
Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co. Kg
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co. Kg filed Critical Nokia Siemens Networks Gmbh & Co. Kg
Publication of WO2007036399A1 publication Critical patent/WO2007036399A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04MTELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M3/00Automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
    • H04M3/42Systems providing special services or facilities to subscribers
    • H04M3/436Arrangements for screening incoming calls, i.e. evaluating the characteristics of a call before deciding whether to answer it
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H04L63/0838Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using one-time-passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066Session management
    • H04L65/1076Screening of IP real time communications, e.g. spam over Internet telephony [SPIT]
    • H04L65/1079Screening of IP real time communications, e.g. spam over Internet telephony [SPIT] of unsolicited session attempts, e.g. SPIT
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04MTELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M7/00Arrangements for interconnection between switching centres
    • H04M7/006Networks other than PSTN/ISDN providing telephone service, e.g. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), including next generation networks with a packet-switched transport layer

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a device for preventing the reception of unwanted messages, in particular so-called spam over Internet telephony messages, abbreviated SPIT messages, in an IP communication network.
  • spammming refers to the mass sending of unwanted messages (“spam”).
  • spamm benefits from easy and affordable access to electronic media, which can usually be used to send messages to a large number of recipients at low cost and time, and the content of such "spam” messages is often more commercial "Spam” is the most prevalent type of "spam.”
  • a very well-known form of "spam” is mass mailing of e-mails for advertising purposes.
  • e-mail "spam” there are other forms such as "spam” regarding instant messaging, Usenet newsgroups, WWW search engines, weblogs or mobile communications.
  • spammming causes now high costs that are borne by the general public. These are on the one hand indirect costs that arise, for example, through loss of productivity or overcrowded electronic mailboxes.
  • the respective infrastructure providers concerned such as Internet Service Providers (ISP)
  • ISP Internet Service Providers
  • VoIP Voice over IP
  • SPIT Packet over Internet telephony
  • PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
  • VoIP subscribers can be conducted almost free of charge for the caller due to the deviating billing model, which can be expected to generate a massive amount of SPIT for the future.
  • the ability to send recorded voice files in bulk at virtually no cost to the sender may be interesting for advertisers. It can be assumed that the affected VoIP subscribers will ask their respective VoIP provider for appropriate measures to be protected against unwanted calls.
  • a whitelist contains for a participant X subscriber-specific information on such other participants Y in the communication network that has been classified as trustworthy and thus authorized to call subscriber X.
  • the object of the invention is to provide a method and a device for preventing the reception of unwanted messages in an IP communication network.
  • the invention relates to a method for preventing the reception of unwanted messages, in particular so-called spam over Internet telephony messages, abbreviated SPIT messages, in an IP communication network, accordingly from a terminal of a first subscriber for the purpose of establishing a communication connection, a connection request to a Terminal of a second subscriber is transmitted, being transmitted from the terminal of the first subscriber to prove its trustworthiness in the course of the connection request, a transaction number to the terminal of the second subscriber and the connection request is accepted only if the transaction number is valid.
  • unwanted messages in particular so-called spam over Internet telephony messages, abbreviated SPIT messages
  • the invention relates to a device for carrying out the illustrated method.
  • the invention has the advantage that the reception of unwanted messages is considerably reduced.
  • An embodiment of the invention is illustrated in the drawings and will be described in more detail below.
  • Fig. 1 A method for transmitting a transaction number by Cha11enge response transmission
  • Fig. 2 A method for transmitting a transaction number with immediate entry of the transaction number
  • 5 shows a method for transmitting a transaction number by means of an interception box
  • FIG. 6 shows a method for transmitting a transaction number by means of an interception box and server system TPS
  • FIG. 1 shows an embodiment of the inventive method with a first subscriber A and a second subscriber B.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates the basic method with integration of the transmission of a transaction number into the SIP connection setup, whereby the input of the transaction number is performed manually by the first subscriber Participant A over one
  • Numeric keypad is made.
  • the second participant B hands over in step 1 to his business partner, the first subscriber A, a business card with a printed transaction number, which entitles the first subscriber A to a one-time call.
  • the first subscriber A starts a connection attempt to the second subscriber B, in which the first subscriber A dials the telephone number of the second subscriber B.
  • the terminal of the second subscriber B equipped with a list of valid transaction numbers sends back in step 3 a SIP response "409 TAN required" to the terminal of the first subscriber A and sends a challenge according to the challenge-response method.
  • ge value x for encrypting the transaction number with.
  • the list of valid transaction numbers may be stored on a signaling entity in the communication network.
  • the first subscriber A enters the transaction number printed on the business card via a number pad in his terminal.
  • the terminal of the first subscriber A encrypts the entered transaction number using the challenge value x and in step 5 transmits the result y in an INVITE message in an additional header to the terminal of the second subscriber B.
  • the second subscriber B transmits the message received in step 6
  • the validity of the transaction number is checked against the list of valid transaction numbers. If the transmitted transaction number is valid, this transaction number is deleted from the list of valid transaction numbers in step 7 and the call is signaled to the second subscriber B by a ringing tone.
  • subscriber-specific data relating to the first subscriber A are stored in a whitelist of the second subscriber B, ie in a list associated with the second subscriber B for the administration of subscriber-specific data of trusted subscribers. After the second party B has answered the call, the telephone conversation is performed in step 8.
  • the first subscriber A does not transmit a valid transaction number in step 4.
  • the terminal of the second subscriber B forwards the call, for example, to an answering machine (see steps 2 and 3, FIG. 3).
  • the call is rejected in the case of an invalid transaction number.
  • the INVITE message is acknowledged in step 3 by the terminal of the second subscriber B with the SIP response "407 Proxy Authorization Required", whereupon the first subscriber A delivers the challenge information x supplied with this SIP reply used to encrypt the transaction number.
  • SIP response "407 Proxy Authorization Required”
  • an alternate SIP response may be used instead of the SIP response "407 Proxy Authorization Required".
  • FIG. 2 shows an embodiment of the inventive method for transmitting a transaction number with immediate entry of the transaction number.
  • the transaction number x is transmitted in step 2 simultaneously with the telephone number of the second subscriber B.
  • the terminal of the second party B checks the transmitted transaction number x and accepts the call if the transaction number x is valid.
  • the further course of the method corresponds to that shown in FIG.
  • FIG. 3 shows an embodiment of the method according to the invention for the case where the first subscriber A does not transmit a transaction number.
  • the first party A calls the second party B.
  • the absence of the transaction number in the respective transmitted INVITE message is recognized in step 2 by the terminal of the second subscriber B and the call is diverted to an answering machine in step 3, for example.
  • FIG. 4 shows an embodiment of the method according to the invention in the case of a negative transaction number.
  • the second subscriber B carries, in addition to the list of valid transaction numbers, a second list of negative transaction numbers, ie transaction numbers that are invalid and thus in the case of transmission in the course of a transmission Communication attempts lead to a rejection of the communication attempt. If the first subscriber A transmits a negative transaction number x in the course of a communication attempt in step 2, the terminal after checking the transaction number x in step 3 returns the relevant call in step 4. Alternatively, the communication attempt in question in step 4, for example, be redirected to an answering machine.
  • Another age native provides to store subscriber-specific data of the first subscriber A in the case of transmission of a negative transaction number x in a list associated with the second subscriber B to manage subscriber-specific data for untrusted subscriber (English Black list) to recognize future communication attempts of the first subscriber A. and reject it.
  • negative transaction numbers can be used, for example, to reject unwanted business contacts by, for example, distributing a business card printed with a negative transaction number in step 1. After its first use, the negative transaction number x preferably remains on the list of negative transaction numbers, so that this transaction number x can continue to be used to reject unwanted calls.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment of the inventive method, wherein the terminal of the second subscriber B an Interception Box IB is connected upstream.
  • Steps 1 and 2 correspond to the previously described variants of the method according to the invention.
  • the interception box IB generates an outgoing message which is transmitted to the first subscriber A.
  • the content of the announcement text is, for example, a request to enter a transaction number.
  • the first party A transmits the requested transaction number x. This can be done for example by means of a tone dialing.
  • the interception box IB takes over the verification of the transmitted transaction number x in step 5. In the case of a valid transaction number x, the interception box IB forwards the call in step 6 to the terminal of the second party B, wherein the first caller A an internal dial tone is signaled.
  • the second subscriber B the incoming call is signaled by a bell, for example.
  • the second party B receives the conversation.
  • the interception box IB deletes the transaction number x transmitted by the first subscriber A from the List of valid transaction numbers.
  • subscriber-specific data relating to the first subscriber A are stored in the whitelist of the second subscriber B.
  • an invalid transaction number x in a further variant of the inventive method, for example, a rejection of the communication attempt or alternatively the diversion to, for example, an answering machine.
  • the Interception Box IB can be connected via an interface to a data device for managing lists of valid transaction numbers.
  • Another option for generating and transmitting valid transaction numbers is a software program that automatically generates valid transaction numbers and, for example, enters the list of valid transaction numbers and an e-mail at the same time, through which the recipient of the e-mail has the option of sending the sender of the e-mail E-mail to reach by phone.
  • FIG. 6 shows an embodiment of the method according to the invention, in which the variant illustrated in FIG. 5 additionally has a network-based server system TPS for checking a
  • Steps 1 to 4 in the variant of the presented method shown in FIG. 6 proceed according to steps 1 to 4 of FIG. 5.
  • the interception box IB sends the transaction number transmitted by the first subscriber A to the
  • step 6 the server system TPS checks the validity of the transmitted transaction number. In the case of a valid transaction number, the server system TPS sends in step 7 a positive response to the interception box IB. The following steps 8 and 9 correspond to steps 6 to 7 of FIG. 5. In the case of an invalid transaction number, the server system TPS transmits a negative response to the interception box IB, which then rejects the communication attempt or optionally redirects the call to an answering machine.
  • the interception box IB manages the whitelist of the second subscriber B. In the case of In the case of a positive response from the server system TPS in step 7, the interception box IB stores subscriber-specific data relating to the first subscriber A after receiving the positive answer in the white list.
  • connection establishment takes place between the interception box IB and the server system TPS by means of a trust relationship, preferably via public key infrastructure, abbreviated PKI or alternatively based on a shared secret method.
  • a trust relationship preferably via public key infrastructure, abbreviated PKI or alternatively based on a shared secret method.
  • the verification of the transmitted transaction number is performed by a service provider.
  • the entry of subscriber-specific data relating to the first subscriber A into the black list of the second subscriber B takes place after a previously determined maximum number of communication attempts rejected due to invalid transaction numbers. This advantageously prevents the first subscriber A from trying out a large number of transaction numbers in the course of a large number of communication attempts.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé pour empêcher la réception de messages indésirables, en particulier de messages indésirables utilisant la téléphonie sur Internet (messages SPIT, de l'anglais 'Spam over Internet Telephony'), dans un réseau de communication sur IP. Selon ce procédé, une demande de connexion est transmise d'un terminal d'un premier abonné à un terminal d'un second abonné en vue de l'établissement d'une liaison de communication, un numéro de transaction étant transmis au terminal du second abonné par le terminal du premier abonné à la suite de cette demande de connexion pour prouver que ce premier abonné est digne de confiance.
PCT/EP2006/065503 2005-09-28 2006-08-21 Procede et dispositif pour empecher la reception de messages indesirables dans un reseau de communication sur ip WO2007036399A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102005046376.2 2005-09-28
DE200510046376 DE102005046376B4 (de) 2005-09-28 2005-09-28 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Vermeidung des Empfangs unerwünschter Nachrichten in einem IP-Kommunikationsnetzwerk

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2007036399A1 true WO2007036399A1 (fr) 2007-04-05

Family

ID=37603211

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2006/065503 WO2007036399A1 (fr) 2005-09-28 2006-08-21 Procede et dispositif pour empecher la reception de messages indesirables dans un reseau de communication sur ip

Country Status (2)

Country Link
DE (1) DE102005046376B4 (fr)
WO (1) WO2007036399A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2009043682A1 (fr) * 2007-09-27 2009-04-09 Siemens Enterprise Communications Gmbh & Co. Kg Procédé et dispositif pour établir une communication voix sur ip

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102006047275A1 (de) * 2006-10-04 2008-04-10 Nec Europe Ltd. Verfahren zum Aufbau einer verbindungsorientierten Kommunikation
US11863704B2 (en) 2021-07-06 2024-01-02 International Business Machines Corporation Call limiting using burst detection

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19718103A1 (de) * 1997-04-29 1998-06-04 Kim Schmitz Verfahren zur Autorisierung in Datenübertragungssystemen
DE10045924A1 (de) * 2000-09-14 2002-04-04 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Verfahren zum Absichern einer Transaktion auf einem Computernetzwerk
EP1378843A1 (fr) * 2002-07-04 2004-01-07 Fiducia AG Karlsruhe/Stuttgart Méthode et système de traitement de données pour la communication sécurisée entre l' administration et le public

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19832069A1 (de) * 1998-07-16 2000-01-20 Siemens Ag Verfahren und Einrichtung zum Betreiben eines Telekommunikations-Endgerätes mit akustischer Ausgabe von Kenndaten
WO2005031625A1 (fr) * 2003-09-29 2005-04-07 Tapsell, Yvonne, Erima Procede et systeme de cryptographie a clefs publiques
GB2411086B (en) * 2004-02-12 2006-12-06 Vodafone Plc Secure communications between terminals

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19718103A1 (de) * 1997-04-29 1998-06-04 Kim Schmitz Verfahren zur Autorisierung in Datenübertragungssystemen
DE10045924A1 (de) * 2000-09-14 2002-04-04 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Verfahren zum Absichern einer Transaktion auf einem Computernetzwerk
EP1378843A1 (fr) * 2002-07-04 2004-01-07 Fiducia AG Karlsruhe/Stuttgart Méthode et système de traitement de données pour la communication sécurisée entre l' administration et le public

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
EDELSON E: "Voice over IP: security pitfalls", NETWORK SECURITY, ELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, vol. 2005, no. 2, February 2005 (2005-02-01), pages 4 - 7, XP004771596, ISSN: 1353-4858 *
KOOPMANN G: "Mobile Transaktionsnummern(TAN)", IP.COM JOURNAL, IP.COM INC., WEST HENRIETTA, NY, US, 23 July 2003 (2003-07-23), XP013012161, ISSN: 1533-0001 *
ROSENBERG C JENNINGS CISCO J PETERSON NEUSTAR J: "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam", IETF STANDARD-WORKING-DRAFT, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, IETF, CH, vol. sipping, no. 1, 17 July 2005 (2005-07-17), XP015040689, ISSN: 0000-0004 *

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2009043682A1 (fr) * 2007-09-27 2009-04-09 Siemens Enterprise Communications Gmbh & Co. Kg Procédé et dispositif pour établir une communication voix sur ip
US8848692B2 (en) 2007-09-27 2014-09-30 Siemens Enterprise Communications Gmbh & Co. Kg Method and arrangement for providing VoIP communication

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102005046376B4 (de) 2007-07-05
DE102005046376A1 (de) 2007-04-12

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US8150002B2 (en) Method and apparatus for controlling unsolicited messaging in real time messaging networks
EP2103096B1 (fr) Procédé pour la protection contre des publicités verbales indésirables pour des réseaux de communication orientés paquets
US20090044013A1 (en) Systems and Methods for Preventing Spam
EP1935151A1 (fr) Procede et dispositif pour verifier une adresse d'expediteur transmise au cours d'une demande de liaison pour etablir une liaison de communication dans un reseau de communication ip
US20100111276A1 (en) Trusted environment for communication between parties
Azad et al. Systems and methods for SPIT detection in VoIP: Survey and future directions
US8577009B2 (en) Automatic complaint registration for violations of telephonic communication regulations
WO2007036399A1 (fr) Procede et dispositif pour empecher la reception de messages indesirables dans un reseau de communication sur ip
DE102006012439B4 (de) Verfahren und Vorrichtungen zur Vermeidung einer fehlerhaften Klassifizierung von erwünschten Nachrichten als Spam over Internet Telephony-Nachrichten, abgekürzt SPIT-Nachrichten, in einem Kommunikationsnetzwerk
DE102005046745A1 (de) Verfahren und Kommunikationssystem zum Aktivieren eines Leistungsmerkmals einer Kommunikationsendeinrichtung
WO2007036400A1 (fr) Procede et dispositifs pour empecher la reception de messages indesirables dans un reseau de communication sur ip
Ono et al. Have I met you before? Using cross-media relations to reduce SPIT
DE102006026924B4 (de) Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Abwehr von störenden Telefonanrufen
DE102006010538A1 (de) Verfahren und Vorrichtungen zu einer selektiven Behandlung unerwünschter Nachrichten, insbesondere sogenannter Spam over Internet Telephony-Nachrichten, abgekürzt SPIT-Nachrichten, in einem Kommunikationsnetzwerk
DE102006047275A1 (de) Verfahren zum Aufbau einer verbindungsorientierten Kommunikation
DE102006012658A1 (de) Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Erkennung von Spam over Internet Telephony-Nachrichten versendenden Teilnehmern, abgekürzt SPIT-Versender, in einem IP-Kommunikationsnetzwerk
WO2007096684A1 (fr) Procédé, système de communication et terminal pour la réduction des communications non souhaitées
DE102023100866A1 (de) Authentizitätsprüfung von Kommunikationspartnern in einem Kommunikationsnetz
EP2198580B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif pour établir une communication voix sur ip
WO2007125025A1 (fr) Prevention spit par des listes positives sécurisées par des clés cryptographiques
DE102019134869A1 (de) Verfahren zur Überprüfung von eingehenden Anrufen mit Rufnummernunterdrückung
Ludlam A perspective on regulation and users' experience
Clayton Can CLI be trusted?
DE102009008534A1 (de) Verfahren und Gerät zum Bereitstellen einer anruferspezifischen Funktion
Bila Dealing with Spam in Voice Over IP

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 06778291

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1