USRE42314E1 - Functional interrupt mitigation for fault tolerant computer - Google Patents
Functional interrupt mitigation for fault tolerant computer Download PDFInfo
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- USRE42314E1 USRE42314E1 US04/590,147 US59014709A USRE42314E US RE42314 E1 USRE42314 E1 US RE42314E1 US 59014709 A US59014709 A US 59014709A US RE42314 E USRE42314 E US RE42314E
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- microprocessor
- instruction
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/30—Arrangements for executing machine instructions, e.g. instruction decode
- G06F9/38—Concurrent instruction execution, e.g. pipeline or look ahead
- G06F9/3861—Recovery, e.g. branch miss-prediction, exception handling
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
Definitions
- microprocessors may be exposed to external conditions which may cause internal data bits within or being processed by the microprocessor to change. Commonly, these events are classified as single event upsets (SEU). Conditions giving rise to SEU may include ambient radiation (including protons, x-rays, neutrons, cosmic rays, electrons, alpha particles, etc.), electrical noise (including voltage spikes, electromagnetic interference, wireless high frequency signals, etc.), and/or improper sequencing of electronic signals or other similar events. The effects of SEU conditions can include the processing of incorrect data or the microprocessor may temporarily or permanent hang, which may be reference to as single event functional interrupt (SEFI), for a temporary or permanent condition.
- SEFI single event functional interrupt
- microprocessor may utilize temporal redundancy or spatial redundancy in an effort to mitigate the likelihood of SEUs. While these systems have proven somewhat effective in reducing or avoiding SEU and SEFI events, several shortcomings have been identified. For example, using spatial redundancy in a triple modular redundant design allows three microprocessors to operate in parallel to detect and correct for single event upsets and functional interrupts, but require two additional microprocessors and support circuits (e.g. memory) causing additional power and synchronization problems.
- Another solution is to manufacture the microprocessor integrated circuits (IC) on radiation tolerant processes, which historically lag commercial devices by two to three generations. More specifically, today's radiation-tolerant IC production processes produce devices utilizing 0.35 micrometer geometries while non-radiation tolerant devices typically utilize 0.13 micro-meter geometry. The effect of the larger geometry is much slower performance and higher power consumption for the microprocessor.
- SEFI single event functional interrupt
- a computer system with improved fault tolerance from microprocessor hangs includes a microprocessor, a fault tolerant software maintenance routine configured to send a periodic output signal from the microprocessor to a separate circuit (termed a “Hardened Core” or “H-Core”) in communication with the microprocessor, the Hardened Core circuit configured to monitor the periodic signal, the control lines (reset, non-maskable interrupt, interrupts, etc.) of the microprocessor wired through the Hardened Core circuit in a manner that allows the Hardened Core to selectively and sequentially activate each control line when periodic signal from microprocessor is not received on periodic schedule, and a set of software repair routines comprised of known instructions which provide a stop to all existing microprocessor instructions and force a controlled restart, where repair routines are operational at the control line interrupt vector memory addresses of the microprocessor.
- a computer system with improved fault tolerance from microprocessor hangs includes a microprocessor, a fault tolerant software maintenance routine configured to send a periodic output signal from the microprocessor to a separate circuit (termed “Hardened Core with Power Cycle”) in communication with the microprocessor, the Hardened Core with Power Cycle configured to monitor the periodic signal, the control lines (reset, non-maskable interrupt, interrupts, etc.) of the microprocessor wired through the Hardened Core with Power Cycle circuit in a manner that allows the Hardened Core with Power Cycle circuit to selectively and sequentially activate each control line when periodic signal from microprocessor is not received on a periodic schedule, the power supply lines of the microprocessor wired through the Hardened Core with Power Cycle circuit in a manner that allows the Hardened Core with Power Cycle circuit to selectively turn off and then on the power supply lines when the periodic signal from the microprocessor is not received on a periodic schedule, and a set of software repair routines comprised of known instructions which provide a stop to all existing microprocessor instructions and
- a software and hardware computer system with improved fault tolerance from microprocessor data errors and microprocessor hangs includes a very long instruction word microprocessor, a fault tolerant software routine comprising a first instruction and a second instruction, each inserted into two spatially separate functional computational units in the VLIW microprocessor at two different clock cycles and stored in a memory device in communication with the microprocessor, the first and second instructions being identical, a software instruction to compare the first and second instruction in the memory device in communication with a VLIW microprocessor compare or branch units, and configured to perform an action if the first and second instruction match, the fault tolerant software routine comprising a third inserted into a third spatially separate functional computational units in the VLIW microprocessor at a third different clock cycles and stored in a third memory device in communication with the microprocessor, the first, second, and third instructions being identical, and the software instruction to compare the first, second, and third instructions in the memory devices in communication with a VLIW microprocessor compare or branch units, and configured to
- FIG. 1 shows an operational schematic of a typical microprocessor
- FIG. 2 shows an operational schematic of a Hardened Core hardware system architecture using a Hardened Core circuit with a microprocessor
- FIG. 3 shows an operational schematic of a Hardened Core circuit
- FIG. 4 shows an operational flowchart of a Hardened Core software maintenance routine
- FIG. 5 shows an operational flowchart of a Hardened Core software repair routine
- FIG. 6 shows an operational schematic of a very long instruction word (VLIW) microprocessor
- FIG. 7 shows an operational schematic of an embodiment of a TTMR redundant architecture
- FIG. 8 shows an operational schematic of an embodiment of a TTMR redundant architecture using a Master/Shadow architecture
- FIG. 9 shows an embodiment of a development flowchart used for developing TTMR software
- the Hardened Core system disclosed herein is a fault detection and correction system capable of being implemented with any microprocessor.
- the microprocessor control signals typically reset(s) and interrupt(s) are electrically connected through the Hardened Core circuit, wherein the signals are activated when the Hardened Core circuit does not receive a periodic timer signal from the microprocessor, which is generated by software routine(s) in the microprocessor software.
- FIG. 1 shows a typical microprocessor.
- the microprocessor 10 typically includes a group of external input interrupt control signals 12 and reset control signals 14 .
- the interrupt control signal(s) 12 When activated, the interrupt control signal(s) 12 typically cause the microprocessor to jump from its current software execution to predetermined software routine(s) stored at a specific location (vector address), where the priority and actions of the interrupt are based on the specific design of the individual interrupt control function.
- the reset control signal(s) 14 typically cause the microprocessor to clear all, or a predetermined subset area of the microprocessor, hardware functions and restart the microprocessor to execute software at its predetermined startup address.
- Hardware circuits may operate and activate the interrupt control 12 and reset control 14 signals externally by providing an activation signal with the proper voltage and timing.
- Exemplary microprocessors include, for example, the Pentium III manufactured by Intel Corporation, although those skilled in the art will appreciate that the Hardened Core system disclosed herein is configured to operate with a variety of different microprocessors having
- FIG. 2 illustrates an operational schematic of an embodiment of the Hardened Core hardware system 100 .
- the interrupt and reset control signals 102 of the microprocessor 104 are electrically connected to the Hardened Core circuit 106 and the Normal Reset and Interrupt Logic 108 , which generate normal interrupt and reset control signals, is electrically connected to the Hardened Core circuit 106 .
- FIG. 3 illustrates an operational schematic of an embodiment of the Hardened Core circuit 200 in detail.
- the Hardened Core circuit 200 will be designed and manufactured in a manner that provides for tolerance against the environmental sources (radiation hardened, electromagnetic interference, electrical noise, etc.) of the functional interrupts and/or internal data errors.
- the interrupt and reset control signals 202 enter the Hardened Core circuit 200 and are connected to the input of the Interrupt Out H-Core Enable/Disable unit 204 .
- the function of the Interrupt Out H-Core Enable/Disable unit 204 is to allow either the Normal Interrupt and Reset Logic 108 or H-Core State Machine 206 with Interrupt Pulse Control 208 length activate the microprocessor's 104 Interrupt and Reset Logic 102 .
- the microprocessor 104 When the microprocessor 104 is functionally interrupted (or hangs), it will not operate and will result in the Timer Signal 210 to be sent on its pre-selected time period (or at all), the H-Core State Machine 206 will determine it did not receive the Timer Signal 210 and the H-Core State Machine 206 with Interrupt Pulse Control 208 length will activate the microprocessor's 104 Interrupt and Reset Logic 102 , causing the microprocessor 104 to return from its functionally interrupted state.
- the H-Core State Machine 206 may also be designed activate each Interrupt Output signal(s) 212 in any sequence or combination, allowing for maximum potential of providing fault correction to the microprocessor 104 ; and additionally may provide output status signals indicating whether a fault has occurred, which may be read by the microprocessor 104 after successful return from interrupt or reset.
- Internal to the Interrupt Out H-Core Enable/Disable unit 204 is a multiplexing function allowing either source to activate the unit, which then provides the appropriate Interrupt Output signal(s) 212 to the microprocessor 104 .
- the Timer Signal 210 period and Interrupt Pulse Control 208 pulse width(s) may be controlled by the Configuration Logic 214 unit, which can be designed to create programmable analog or digital timing durations using industry standard circuit techniques (resistors/capacitors on analog timing circuits, programmable read-only memory for digital, etc.).
- the H-Core State Machine 206 may also generate an activation signal to the Power Cycle Control unit 216 , which drives a power switch connected to the microprocessor's 104 power supply lines and provides for removal and return of its power supplies.
- the Hardened Core circuit 200 may include an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or other electronic circuit implementation.
- ASIC application specific integrated circuit
- FIG. 4 illustrates an operational flowchart of an embodiment of a Hardened Core software maintenance routine.
- software operation is split between two major elements: software for normal operation 300 and fault recovery 302 .
- Normal operation 300 software contains both application code 304 (software that operates the computer for its “normal” function) and maintenance routines 306 , 308 .
- Maintenance software routines include the software necessary to send the Hardened Core Timer Signal 306 to the microprocessor 104 on a pre-selected time period and software routines that send application data, selected by each application, as maintenance data 308 , such as stored instructions & data, to memory for future use by the recovery software 302 .
- the fault recovery software 302 is located at the interrupt or reset vector address locations and is activated upon receipt of a hardware interrupt or reset, as shown in FIG. 2 and FIG. 3 .
- FIG. 5 illustrates an operational flowchart of an embodiment of a Hardened Core software repair routine.
- software operation of the repair routines occurs within the fault recovery software 400 .
- the microprocessor 104 Upon receipt of a H-Core Interrupt or Reset 402 signal, the microprocessor 104 will begin to execute software at its appropriate interrupt/reset vector address location.
- the microprocessor 104 will Read the Status 404 output from the H-Core State Machine 206 section of the Hardened Core circuit 200 using the Return from SEFI (functional interrupt) routine 406 and will determine if the interrupt or reset signal is the result of normal operation (for example: an external reset or interrupt from a peripheral) or a functional interrupt. In the case of normal operation, the “No” case, the software will return to normal operation 408 software routines.
- SEFI functional interrupt
- KILL KILL
- the next routine is the KILL Existing Process Threads 410 , consisting of software that halts and ends (KILL) all existing software on the microprocessor 104 in order to prevent continuation or return of the software fault.
- KILL KILL
- the software determines if this is a Single or Multiple SEFI (fault) 412 and branches based upon application dependent requirements (such as number of functional interrupts within a predetermined time period, or similar criteria) to Restart All Software 414 routine or Read Stored Maintenance Data 416 .
- the case of Restart All Software 414 routine ends all attempts to continue with any Normal Operation software 408 and restarts all software routines without an attempt to save any existing data.
- the case of Read Stored Maintenance Data 416 routine provides the ability to read the data previously stored during the Normal Operation 300 , 408 during the Store Maintenance 308 software routine, allowing the microprocessor application to recover data or instruction locations lost during the functional interrupt. Additionally, the Read Stored Maintenance Data 416 can be utilized for restarting existing Normal Operation 300 , 408 application software code 304 . Further software may be added providing the ability to Cleanup Application Code 418 by operating software routines that verify each application thread is in its proper state (example: no missing interim data values) or may need to be restarted due to application requirements.
- Hardened Core repair software is comprised of identifying occurrence of a functional interrupt 406 , stopping all existing software threads 410 , recovering maintenance data from memory 416 and restarting the application software routines 414 then 408 , with many similar variations possible.
- TTMR Time-Triple Modular Redundancy
- VLIW very long instruction word
- the VLIW microprocessor includes specialized software routines known as “ultra long instruction word” and/or “software controlled instruction level parallelism.” These software routines include parallel functional units configured to execute instructions simultaneously wherein the instruction scheduling decisions are moved to the software compiler.
- the TTMR systems combines time redundant and spatially redundant (including TMR and/or Master/Shadow architectures) instruction routines together on a single VLIW microprocessor.
- FIG. 6 shows a typical VLIW microprocessor.
- the VLIW microprocessor 500 includes a first data path 502 and at least a second data path 504 .
- the first and second data paths 502 , 504 may operate in parallel.
- the first and second data paths 502 , 504 may operate in series.
- the first data path 502 includes or is otherwise in communication with a first arithmetic logic unit L 1 , a first auxiliary logic unit S 1 , a first multiplier unit M 1 , and first floating-point capabilities D 1 .
- the second data path 504 includes or is otherwise in communication with a second arithmetic logic unit L 2 , a second auxiliary logic unit S 2 , a second multiplier unit M 2 , and second floating-point capabilities D 2 .
- Exemplary VLIW microprocessors include, for example, the 320C6201 manufactured by the Texas Instrument's Corporation, although those skilled in the art will appreciate that the TTMR system disclosed herein is configured to operate with a variety of different VLIW microprocessors having varying architectures.
- FIG. 7 illustrates an operational flowchart of an embodiment of the TTMR software routine.
- an instruction may be repeated any number of times across different internal parallel cores in a triple modular redundant (TMR) fashion to provide a basis of comparing one instruction to at least another instruction. However, each repeated instruction is completed during a later clock cycle(s), thereby providing temporal and spatial redundancy.
- TMR triple modular redundant
- a first instruction 556 is sent from a software controller unit 550 to a first arithmetic logic unit 558 within or in communication with a CPU 552 . Thereafter, the first instruction is retained by a first memory device in communication therewith.
- At some later clock cycle or time interval T 2 at least a second instruction 560 is sent from a software controller unit 550 to a second arithmetic logic unit 562 within or in communication with a CPU 552 and retained in a second memory device in communication therewith.
- a third instruction 564 is sent from a software controller unit 550 to a third arithmetic logic unit 566 within or in communication with a CPU 552 and retained in a third memory device in communication therewith.
- the instructions 556 , 560 , 564 are identical instructions sent at different time intervals, T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , respectively.
- Those skilled in the art will appreciate any number greater than 1 of instructions may be sent from the software controller unit 550 to the CPU 552 thereby permitting a comparison of instructions to occur within the CPU 552 .
- a compare instruction 568 is then sent from the software controller unit 550 to the branch or compare unit 570 within or in communication with the CPU 552 .
- Exemplary branch or compare units 570 may include, without limitation, at least one comparator in communication with the CPU 552 .
- the branch or compare unit 570 accesses and compares the three instructions retained within the individual memory device in communication with the arithmetic logic units 558 , 562 , 566 , respectively. If all three instructions stored within the individual memory device in communication the arithmetic logic units 558 , 562 , 566 match no error has occurred and the instruction is accepted and performed.
- the arithmetic logic units 558 , 562 , 566 are polled to determine which two instructions match. Like TMR and time redundancy systems, in the present system the two matching instructions are assumed to be. Additionally, the TTMR system disclosed herein permits a second instruction 580 and a third instruction 590 to be completed in parallel with the first instruction 556 when three or more parallel functional units are available.
- FIG. 8 shows an alternate embodiment of a TTMR system using a spatial technique similar to the Master/Shadow method in combination with a time redundancy architecture.
- a TTMR sequence for an instruction is repeated twice across different internal parallel cores, such as arithmetic logic units, in a Master/Shadow fashion. However, each repeated instruction is completed during a later clock cycle or time interval, similar to a time redundancy architecture.
- a first instruction 606 is sent from a software controller unit 600 to a first arithmetic logic unit 608 within or in communication with a CPU 602 . Thereafter, the first instruction is retained within a first memory device in communication therewith.
- At some later clock cycle or time interval T 2 at least a second instruction 610 is sent from a software controller unit 600 to a second arithmetic logic unit 612 within or in communication with a CPU 602 and retained a second memory device in communication therewith.
- a compare instruction 616 is then sent from the software controller unit 600 to the branch or compare unit 618 within or in communication with the CPU 602 .
- Exemplary branch or compare units 620 may include, without limitation, at least one comparator in communication with the CPU 602 .
- the branch or compare unit 620 accesses and compares the two instructions retained within the memory devices in communication with arithmetic logic units 608 , 612 , respectively. If the two instructions stored within the memory devices in communication with the arithmetic logic units 608 , 612 match no error has occurred and the instruction is accepted and performed.
- a third instruction 620 is sent from a software controller unit 600 to a third arithmetic logic unit 622 within or in communication with a CPU 602 and retained within a third memory device in communication therewith.
- the third instruction 620 is sent from the software controller unit 600 to the third arithmetic logic unit 622 at a later clock cycle or time interval T 4 as compared with time interval T 3 .
- the instructions 606 , 610 , 620 are identical instructions sent at different time intervals, T 1 , T 2 , T 4 , respectively.
- any number greater than 1 of instructions may be sent from the software controller unit 600 to the CPU 602 thereby permitting a comparison of instructions to occur within the CPU 602 .
- the instructions stored within the memory devices in communication with the respective arithmetic logic units 608 , 612 , 622 are compared and any match therein is assumed to be a correct instruction, thereafter, the instruction may be performed.
- the TTMR system disclosed herein permits a second instruction 630 and a third instruction 640 to be completed in parallel with the first instruction 606 when three or more parallel functional units are available.
- TTMR software code can be developed using a variety of methods, which are dependent upon the individual microprocessor development environment and operating system(s). As shown in FIG. 9 , TTMR software may be developed in high level programming languages (examples: Fortran, C, C++, Basic, etc.) or at the microprocessor assembly language (also known as machine code). As shown, the source module 702 may simultaneously sent to the compiler module 704 and the TTMR compiler module 716 . The TTMR pre-compiler module 716 amends the data received from the source module to include the TTMR instruction set and sends the modified data module to the compiler module 704 .
- the compiler module 704 compiles both the source data and the modified source data producing an assembler source module 706 and a TTMR pre-assembler module 718 .
- the assembler source module 706 is sent to the assembler module 708 .
- the TTMR pre-assembler module 718 scheduled and insert a TTMR format into the data received from the assembler source module 706 and forward the modified data to the assembler module 708 .
- the assembler module 708 produces an object data module 710 which may be forwarded to a linker module 712 .
- the linker module outputs an executable file module 714 .
- TTMR instruction sets and cycles may be accomplished by the addition of a “Pre-Compiler” or “Pre-Assembler”, where the original (no TTMR) software code is automatically duplicated and scheduled in a TTMR format, (for a C code language system as an example).
- the TTMR system may include or otherwise incorporate a Hardened Core system, where the microprocessor 104 of FIG. 2 is a VLIW microprocessor and the Reset and Interrupt Controls 102 , plus Timer Signal 110 are connected as previously described herein.
- the microprocessor 104 of FIG. 2 is a VLIW microprocessor and the Reset and Interrupt Controls 102 , plus Timer Signal 110 are connected as previously described herein.
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Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US04/590,147 USRE42314E1 (en) | 2002-09-05 | 2009-06-24 | Functional interrupt mitigation for fault tolerant computer |
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| US40820502P | 2002-09-05 | 2002-09-05 | |
| US10/656,720 US7237148B2 (en) | 2002-09-05 | 2003-09-08 | Functional interrupt mitigation for fault tolerant computer |
| US04/590,147 USRE42314E1 (en) | 2002-09-05 | 2009-06-24 | Functional interrupt mitigation for fault tolerant computer |
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| US10/656,720 Reissue US7237148B2 (en) | 2002-09-05 | 2003-09-08 | Functional interrupt mitigation for fault tolerant computer |
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| US20110078498A1 (en) * | 2009-09-30 | 2011-03-31 | United States Of America As Represented By The Administrator Of The National Aeronautics And Spac | Radiation-hardened hybrid processor |
| US20110099421A1 (en) * | 2009-09-30 | 2011-04-28 | Alessandro Geist | Radiation-hardened hybrid processor |
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| US7318169B2 (en) * | 2002-05-15 | 2008-01-08 | David Czajkowski | Fault tolerant computer |
| US7237148B2 (en) * | 2002-09-05 | 2007-06-26 | David Czajkowski | Functional interrupt mitigation for fault tolerant computer |
| US7260742B2 (en) * | 2003-01-28 | 2007-08-21 | Czajkowski David R | SEU and SEFI fault tolerant computer |
| US7552360B2 (en) * | 2005-03-21 | 2009-06-23 | Texas Instruments Incorporated | Debug and test system with format select register circuitry |
| JP4330547B2 (en) * | 2005-03-17 | 2009-09-16 | 富士通株式会社 | Information processing system control method, information processing system, information processing system control program, and redundant configuration control device |
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| US20150067312A1 (en) * | 2013-08-29 | 2015-03-05 | Jeffrey Lewandowski | Automated power cycling unit of a data processing device |
| US11762742B2 (en) | 2020-03-31 | 2023-09-19 | Honeywell International Inc. | Process control system with different hardware architecture controller backup |
| US11989084B2 (en) | 2020-09-23 | 2024-05-21 | Honeywell International Inc. | Self-healing process control system |
| US11874938B2 (en) | 2020-11-03 | 2024-01-16 | Honeywell International Inc. | Admittance mechanism |
| CN113918386B (en) * | 2021-10-25 | 2025-09-26 | 北京理工雷科空天信息技术有限公司 | An autonomous fault tolerance and failure recovery method for on-orbit processing systems |
| US11966284B1 (en) | 2023-10-10 | 2024-04-23 | Montana State University | Fault-tolerant computer for reconfigurable hardware devices |
| US12050688B1 (en) | 2024-02-15 | 2024-07-30 | Montana State University | Malware-resistant obfuscated computer hardware for reconfigurable hardware devices and methods thereof |
| US12287713B1 (en) | 2024-11-18 | 2025-04-29 | Montana State University | Fault-tolerant computer system with configurable coprocessor component and methods thereof |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
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| US7237148B2 (en) | 2007-06-26 |
| US20050055607A1 (en) | 2005-03-10 |
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