US20130247033A1 - System and method for managing virtual machine configurations - Google Patents
System and method for managing virtual machine configurations Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US20130247033A1 US20130247033A1 US12/636,414 US63641409A US2013247033A1 US 20130247033 A1 US20130247033 A1 US 20130247033A1 US 63641409 A US63641409 A US 63641409A US 2013247033 A1 US2013247033 A1 US 2013247033A1
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- command messages
- command
- policies
- control proxy
- operations
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/74—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
Definitions
- This disclosure relates in general to the field of security and, more particularly, to managing virtual machine configurations in a virtual environment.
- Virtualization is a software technology allowing an operating system (OS) to run in an isolated virtual environment (typically referred to as a virtual machine), where a platform's physical characteristics and behaviors are reproduced. More specifically, a virtual machine can represent an isolated, virtual environment running its own operating system and applications and being equipped with virtual hardware (processor, memory, disks, network interfaces, etc.). Commonly, the virtual machine is managed by a virtualization product.
- OS operating system
- a virtual machine can represent an isolated, virtual environment running its own operating system and applications and being equipped with virtual hardware (processor, memory, disks, network interfaces, etc.).
- the virtual machine is managed by a virtualization product.
- a virtual machine monitor is the virtualization software layer that manages hardware requests from a guest OS (e.g., simulating answers from real hardware).
- a hypervisor is computer software/hardware platform virtualization software that may run on bare hardware and allows multiple operating systems to run on a host computer concurrently.
- ESX and ESXi by VMware, Inc. of Palo Alto, Calif., Xen by Citrix Systems, Inc. of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., and Hyper-V by Microsoft Corp. of Redmond, Wash., represent forms of VMMs and these VMMs can be managed to better protect computers and systems from authorized and unauthorized manipulations that may affect system stability and security.
- FIG. 1 is a pictorial representation of one embodiment of a network environment in which a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented;
- FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of one embodiment of a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations, which may be implemented as a control proxy;
- FIG. 3 is a simplified block diagram illustrating one example implementation of a server in a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations
- FIG. 4 is a simplified block diagram of one example embodiment of a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations.
- FIG. 5 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps associated with a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations in accordance with one embodiment.
- a method in one example implementation includes receiving a plurality of command messages through a control channel.
- the plurality of command messages may have one or more criteria.
- the method also includes reconstructing the plurality of command messages to determine an intended command for configuring one or more virtual machines on a server device.
- the intended command has a corresponding operation in a policy database and the operation may have one or more associated policies.
- the method further includes determining if the operation is permitted by comparing one or more policies associated with the operation to the one or more criteria.
- the method also includes sending the plurality of command messages to the server device if the operation is permitted.
- the operation may include one of creating, cloning, deleting, starting, stopping, and modifying the one or more virtual machines.
- the server device is adapted to perform the operation only if a control proxy sends the plurality of command messages to the server device, and the control proxy is adapted to receive only the plurality of command messages through the control channel.
- FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram of a network environment 100 in which a system for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented.
- Network environment 100 may include a server 300 accessed by different clients through a communication link provided by network 130 .
- the different clients may include client devices 110 a and 110 b , which represent users having administrative privileges to configure server 300 , and end user devices 120 a and 120 b , which represent end users who access applications or services provided by server 300 .
- server 300 may be configured to host one or more virtual machines.
- a control proxy 200 may be operably connected to client devices 110 a and 110 b for receiving configuration commands through a control channel.
- Control proxy 200 may also be operably connected to server 300 , for sending permitted configuration commands received from client devices 110 a and 110 b to server 300 .
- Server 300 may send and receive data messages across a data channel for communicating with end user devices 120 a and 120 b.
- a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented in network environment 100 , providing control proxy 200 for intercepting command messages being sent from a user of client device 110 a or 110 b to configure virtual machines in server 300 .
- Control proxy 200 interprets the particular protocol command messages to determine which command was intended by the user.
- Control proxy 200 checks selected criteria of the command messages against predefined policies to determine whether an operation corresponding to the intended command is permitted. If the operation is permitted, then control proxy 200 sends the command messages to server 300 .
- the following foundational information may be viewed as a basis from which the present disclosure may be properly explained. Such information is offered earnestly for purposes of explanation only and, accordingly, should not be construed in any way to limit the broad scope of the present disclosure and its potential applications.
- Protecting a virtual computer environment presents certain complexities that are not associated with a purely physical computer environment.
- physical computers When physical computers are initially configured within a network, physical wires may be connected to the computers, wiring arrangements to appropriate physical components may be configured, memory components may be added, external devices may be added, and the like. Appropriate security may also be included. For example, firewalls may be configured in both hardware and software, proxy servers may be configured between computers, and any other desired security mechanism may be implemented. Modifications to the physical computer may require adding or removing physical components and adding, removing, or rerouting wiring. Thus, such procedures may be labor intensive and consequently, may be performed only as time and manual labor allows. Such changes in a physical environment may necessitate planning and deliberation.
- a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor may control the operation of one or more virtual machines, each having an associated operating system and one or more associated applications.
- the hypervisor is the basic abstraction layer of software that may sit directly on the hardware of a virtual machine host below operating systems. It is responsible for central processing unit (CPU) scheduling and memory partitioning of the various virtual machines running on a hardware device.
- the hypervisor not only abstracts the hardware for the virtual machines, but also controls the execution of virtual machines as they share the common processing environment.
- the initial configuration and any subsequent modifications of a virtual machine may occur by simply sending electronic commands to a virtual machine host. Such commands may be issued by anyone with appropriate privileges who can access the virtual machine host.
- virtual machines may be configured (e.g., created, cloned, deleted, started, stopped, modified, etc.) simply by an authorized user typing in commands, which are received and performed on the virtual machine host.
- Such configurations may be accomplished with greater speed and frequency than in a physical environment.
- multiple individuals with appropriate privileges could actually issue conflicting commands, thereby potentially causing frequent and perhaps undesirable changes to the virtual machines.
- Virtual machines may also incur substantial damage if a security hacker or other unauthorized user penetrates the virtual environment, at least in part because the hacker may have access to multiple operating systems and applications.
- virtual machines may, on the other hand, be more easily manipulated by network administrators and other authorized users than in a purely physical environment.
- virtual machine environments such as VMware ESX or VMware ESXi
- any individual such as a network administrator, with appropriate privileges may be allowed to simply type in commands to edit hardware configurations for any of the virtual machines on a host server.
- a virtual machine may be created, cloned, or deleted, or any virtual machine hardware configurations (e.g., processors, CD/DVD drives, floppy drives, memory, SCSI devices, network adapters, parallel ports, serial ports, etc.) may be added, removed or modified.
- Such configuration commands may be issued at any time, from any device so long as the user is authorized (e.g., has a valid password).
- the potential for such commands to be issued during a time that disrupts business activities is great.
- configuration commands may be issued from various locations, authorized users could issue conflicting commands that cause problems for the end users and disruptions to associated business activities.
- IT information technology
- many companies or organizations that conduct their businesses using large network systems may outsource their information technology (IT) support to a separate IT organization.
- IT information technology
- the company may have limited control over the activities undertaken by the IT organization to configure the virtual machines used by the company.
- Even well-intentioned configuration changes have the potential to disrupt business activities when performed during working hours without prior approval from and notice to the network owner.
- many companies in this scenario would benefit from a way to define policies that control the IT support organization's ability to modify virtual machine configurations within the network.
- a system for managing virtual machine configurations can resolve many of these issues.
- a company or other organization that provides applications or services on network servers configured as virtual machine hosts can define policies that determine, for example, when and by whom particular configuration commands may be sent to the servers. These policies may be defined and evaluated in a control proxy that receives the configuration commands through a control channel from client devices. Also, the servers may be disabled from performing operations in response to configuration commands unless the commands are received from the control proxy. Thus, such a system would give companies or other organizations control over when and how their servers could be configured by network administrators and other users with administrative privileges.
- virtual machine monitors e.g., VMware ESX, VMware ESXi, Xen, Hyper-V, etc.
- hypervisors that can be employed to manage virtual machines and guest operating system (OS) instances.
- OS guest operating system
- virtual machine monitor is meant to include any such hypervisors, or other devices that can operate to manage one or more virtual machines.
- a system for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented in network environment 100 , which may include additional servers, client devices, control proxies, and other devices not shown.
- Network environment 100 may be configured in any form including, but not limited to, local area networks (LANs), intranets, and wide area networks (WANs) such as the Internet.
- client devices 110 a and 110 b and end user devices 120 a and 120 b may be operably coupled to network 130 (e.g., the Internet) by an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or through an Internet Server with dedicated bandwidth.
- ISP Internet Service Provider
- connections to network 130 may include any appropriate medium such as, for example, digital subscriber lines (DSL), telephone lines, T1 lines, T3 lines, wireless, satellite, fiber optics, cable, Ethernet, etc. or any combination thereof.
- DSL digital subscriber lines
- gateways, routers, and the like may be used to facilitate electronic communication between client devices 110 a and 110 b and control proxy 200 and between end user devices 120 a and 120 b and server 300 .
- appropriate firewalls may be provided between network 130 and control proxy 200 and server 300 .
- network 130 may represent a LAN to which client devices 110 a and 110 b are operably connected to communicate with control proxy 200 and to which end user devices 120 a and 120 b are operably connected to communicate with server 300 .
- Network 130 may, in further embodiments, be implemented as a number of different combinations of networks, including for example, client device 110 a and end user device 120 a connected through a LAN and client device 110 b and end user device 120 b connected through the Internet.
- Control proxy 200 and server 300 are operably connected to network 130 .
- network 130 may be connected to control proxy 200 through the control channel for sending configuration command messages to control proxy 200 from client devices 110 a and 110 b .
- Network 130 may also be logically connected to server 300 through the data channel for sending data messages between end user devices 120 a and 120 b and server 300 .
- control proxy 200 does not receive data messages from client devices 110 a and 110 b or end user devices 120 a and 120 b . Rather, control proxy 200 is configured to only receive messages through the control channel, which include configuration command messages.
- One example embodiment includes network 130 supporting Simple Object Access Protocol (i.e., SOAP) messaging framework.
- SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
- SOAP is a protocol that may combine remote procedure calls (i.e., RPC) and Hypertext Transport Protocol (i.e., HTTP), allowing HTTP to be used as the transport for RPC messages.
- RPC remote procedure calls
- HTTP Hypertext Transport Protocol
- SOAP messages may be used in this example implementation, it will be apparent that the broad scope of the present disclosure could also be applied using other protocols.
- control proxy 200 and server 300 may be implemented in an IT Headquarters of an organization or a data center, with client devices 110 a and 110 b being computers operated by individual users having network administrator privileges (e.g., authorization to configure and maintain computers, servers, and any other devices within a computer network).
- end user devices 120 a and 120 b may be computers operated by users without administrative privileges, who remotely or locally access applications or services provided by server 300 .
- Server 300 may provide applications or services only to end users within the organization that controls server 300 (e.g., employees) or it may provide applications or services to end users outside the organization (e.g., customers, Internet surfers, other businesses).
- Client devices 110 a and 110 b may include computers such as desktops, laptops, or any other computing device or console capable of sending configuration command messages to control proxy 200 , using, for example the SOAP protocol.
- End user devices 120 a and 120 b may include computers such as desktops, laptops, or mobile or handheld computing devices (e.g., personal digital assistants (PDAs) or mobile phones) or any other computing device capable of receiving and sending data messages to server 300 through network 130 .
- PDAs personal digital assistants
- FIG. 1 is intended as an example and should not be construed to imply architectural limitations in the present disclosure.
- Control proxy 200 may include hardware elements such as a memory element 210 and a processor 220 suitably configured to provide a platform for associated modules of control proxy 200 .
- a suitable operating system (not shown) may be configured in control proxy 200 to appropriately manage the operation of hardware components therein.
- Control proxy 200 may include a protocol message module 230 for receiving configuration command messages. Protocol message module 230 understands the particular protocol (e.g., SOAP, etc.) of the command messages and determines the intended command of a user sending the command messages.
- Also included in control proxy 200 could be a policy database 240 , a policy module 250 and an administration module 260 .
- Policy database 240 may include entries corresponding to operations capable of being performed in server 300 and also may include entries corresponding to predefined policies associated with the operations.
- a management console 270 may be operably coupled to control proxy 200 for creating and/or updating policy database 240 with administration module 260 .
- management console 270 may be a McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator®.
- server 300 may be configured with, for example, VMware ESX or ESXi, SAP or other web services.
- server 300 may include a virtual machine 310 and a virtual machine 320 , which have respective operating systems 314 and 324 running respective applications 312 and 322 .
- Server 300 may also include a virtual machine monitor (VMM) 330 , which is, in one embodiment, a hypervisor that runs on hardware and which provides the capability of running multiple instances of operating systems 314 and 324 and associated applications 312 and 322 , concurrently, by dynamically allocating the hardware resources to the operating systems 314 and 324 and applications 312 and 322 as needed.
- VMM virtual machine monitor
- applications 312 and 322 are logically run on top of respective operating systems 314 and 324 , which are associated with respective virtual machines 310 and 320 , and are provided with virtual hardware (e.g., processors, CD/DVD drives, floppy drives, memory, SCSI devices, network adapters, parallel ports, serial ports, etc.).
- virtual hardware e.g., processors, CD/DVD drives, floppy drives, memory, SCSI devices, network adapters, parallel ports, serial ports, etc.
- Hardware components 340 beneath virtual machine monitor 330 may include a memory element 342 and a processor 344 .
- Hardware components 340 may also include additional components such as, for example, network interface cards and disk drives.
- the entire configuration may be provided in a server (or some other network appliance). This implementation is only representing one possible example to which the present disclosure can apply. Any number of additional hypervisors or virtual elements could similarly benefit from the broad teachings discussed herein.
- server virtualization typically, in server virtualization an authorized user is provided with an interface to manage a complete setup of virtual machines and the associated applications, operating systems, and virtual hardware. This management includes the hypervisor configuration and virtual machine configuration, including creation, deletion, modification, shutdown, startup, etc.
- server 300 is configured in “local access lockdown” such that even authorized users cannot successfully issue configuration commands directly to server 300 . Instead, only configuration commands received from control proxy 200 will be performed. Thus, even if a user with administrative privileges bypasses control proxy 200 and connects directly to server 300 , any configuration commands attempted by the user will not be executed because only configuration commands received in messages from control proxy 200 will be executed by server 300 .
- Additional hardware may be suitably coupled to control proxy processor 220 and server processor 344 .
- Additional hardware may be in the form of memory management units (MMU), additional symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) elements, physical memory, Ethernet, peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus and corresponding bridges, small computer system interface (SCSI)/integrated drive electronics (IDE) elements, etc.
- MMU memory management units
- SMP symmetric multiprocessing
- PCI peripheral component interconnect
- IDE integrated drive electronics
- FIG. 4 is a simplified block diagram illustrating one implementation of a system 400 for managing virtual machine configurations in accordance with the present disclosure.
- a VMware Infrastructure Client i.e., VI client
- VI client may be suitably coupled to a control proxy 420 for sending and receiving SOAP messages as previously described herein.
- Control proxy 420 may be operably connected to a VMware ESXi server 430 for sending permitted configuration command messages, received from VI client 410 , to ESXi server 430 .
- a policy database 440 is shown with enumerated operations 442 (i.e., create, clone, delete, start, stop, modify, etc.) and policies 444 (i.e., user, time of day, date, host, etc.).
- operations 442 i.e., create, clone, delete, start, stop, modify, etc.
- policies 444 i.e., user, time of day, date, host, etc.
- VI client 410 may allow an authorized user to select virtual machine configuration commands that correspond to operations for ESXi server 430 , such as, for example, creating, cloning, starting, stopping, deleting, and modifying virtual machines, which includes any associated virtual hardware.
- VI client 410 may create SOAP messages to communicate the selected commands to ESXi server 430 .
- Multiple SOAP messages may be sent for each command selected by the user, with the SOAP messages having a plurality of criteria such as user, host address, date, time of day, etc. embedded therein.
- Control proxy 420 intercepts the SOAP messages and reconstructs the messages to determine which configuration command was intended.
- One of the operations 442 in policy database 440 may then be identified as corresponding to the intended command.
- policies 444 associated with the corresponding operation may be compared to any of the plurality of criteria from the SOAP messages to determine whether the corresponding operation is permitted. Control proxy 420 may then send the SOAP messages to ESXi server 430 if the corresponding operation is permitted. If the corresponding operation is not permitted, however, the control proxy 420 may send an error message back to the VI client 410 .
- FIG. 5 a simplified flowchart 500 is depicted illustrating a process associated with one implementation for managing virtual machine configurations.
- the process involves intercepting messages between client devices and a server, determining what configuration commands have been issued in the messages, and determining whether operations corresponding to the intended commands are permissible based on predefined policies.
- the process may be implemented in control proxy 200 as shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 , which may be implemented in any suitable architecture as described herein.
- control proxy 200 receives configuration command messages from one of the client devices 110 a or 110 b . Because the configuration command options may be provided on client device 110 a or 110 b at a user-understandable level, typically, one user action will result in many messages being sent. Therefore, flow passes to step 520 to reconstruct the plurality of configuration command messages to determine what command the user intended, and to determine an operation in policy database 240 corresponding to the intended command. Once the configuration command messages have been reconstructed and the corresponding operation in policy database 240 has been determined, flow passes to step 530 to determine if the operation corresponding to the intended command is permitted by associated policies in the policy database 240 .
- policies associated with the corresponding operation in policy database 240 may be compared to selected criteria from the configuration command messages. If the associated policies do not permit the corresponding operation to be performed, based on the selected criteria, flow passes to step 540 and an error message may be sent to the particular client device 110 a or 110 b that sent the configuration command messages. However, if the corresponding operation is permitted, then flow passes to step 550 and the configuration command messages are sent to server 300 .
- a policy may be defined in policy database 240 as not allowing particular operations to be performed by any users from any client devices or hosts during a specified time of day, such as normal business hours (e.g., 9 am-5 pm).
- Policy T may then be mapped to operations “delete”, “stop”, and “modify” in policy database 240 for all authorized users and all authorized hosts. If an authorized user initiates a command on client device 110 a or 110 b at 12 pm to modify the memory of virtual machine 310 or 320 in server 300 , configuration command messages would be intercepted by control proxy 200 .
- Control proxy 200 would determine the intended command from the configuration command messages and would then determine that the intended command corresponds to the “modify” operation in the policy database 240 .
- the time of day (i.e., 12 pm) the command messages were issued would be determined from the plurality of criteria embedded in the command messages.
- the time of day (i.e., 12 pm) is compared to Policy T, which is mapped to the “modify” operation in policy database 240 , it would be determined that the modify operation is not permitted and, therefore, the configuration command messages would not be sent to server 300 . Instead, an error message may be sent to the appropriate client device 110 a or 110 b .
- Software for managing virtual machine configurations can be provided at various locations (e.g., within policy module 250 , administration module 260 , protocol message module 230 ). In one example implementation, this software is resident in a computer sought to be protected from a security attack (or protected from unwanted or unauthorized manipulations of a writable memory area). In other embodiments, software could be received or downloaded from a web server (e.g., in the context of purchasing individual end-user licenses for separate devices, separate control proxies, separate virtual machines, hypervisors, servers, etc.) in order to provide this system for managing virtual machine configurations.
- a web server e.g., in the context of purchasing individual end-user licenses for separate devices, separate control proxies, separate virtual machines, hypervisors, servers, etc.
- system and method for managing virtual machine configurations could involve a proprietary element (e.g., as part of an antivirus solution), which could be provided in (or be proximate to) these identified elements, or be provided in any other device, server, network appliance, console, firewall, switch, information technology (IT) device, etc., or be provided as a complementary solution (e.g., in conjunction with a firewall), or provisioned somewhere in the network.
- a proprietary element e.g., as part of an antivirus solution
- IT information technology
- the term ‘computer’ is meant to encompass these possible elements (VMMs, hypervisors, virtual devices, network appliances, routers, switches, gateway, processors, servers, loadbalancers, firewalls, or any other suitable device, component, element, or object) operable to affect or process electronic information in a security environment.
- this computer may include any suitable hardware, software, components, modules, interfaces, or objects that facilitate the operations thereof. This may be inclusive of appropriate algorithms and communication protocols that allow for the effective management of virtual machine configurations.
- the system functions can be consolidated in any suitable manner.
- any of the illustrated modules and components of FIGS. 1-4 may be combined in various possible configurations: all of which are clearly within the broad scope of this Specification.
- the functions of managing virtual machine configurations outlined herein may be implemented by logic encoded in one or more tangible media (e.g., embedded logic provided in an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), digital signal processor (DSP) instructions, software (potentially inclusive of object code and source code) to be executed by a processor, or other similar machine, etc.).
- ASIC application specific integrated circuit
- DSP digital signal processor
- a memory element can store data used for the operations described herein. This includes the memory element being able to store software, logic, code, or processor instructions that are executed to carry out the activities described in this Specification.
- a processor can execute any type of instructions to achieve the operations detailed herein in this Specification.
- the processors could transform an element or an article (e.g., data) from one state or thing to another state or thing.
- the activities outlined herein may be implemented with fixed logic or programmable logic (e.g., software/computer instructions executed by a processor) and the elements identified herein could be some type of a programmable processor, programmable digital logic (e.g., a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM)) or an ASIC that includes digital logic, software, code, electronic instructions, or any suitable combination thereof.
- FPGA field programmable gate array
- EPROM erasable programmable read only memory
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable ROM
- any of these elements can include memory elements for storing information to be used in achieving the management of virtual machine configurations as outlined herein.
- each of these devices may include a processor that can execute software or an algorithm to perform the management of virtual machine configurations activities as discussed in this Specification.
- These devices may further keep information in any suitable memory element (random access memory (RAM), ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, ASIC, etc.), software, hardware, or in any other suitable component, device, element, or object where appropriate and based on particular needs.
- any of the memory items discussed herein should be construed as being encompassed within the broad term ‘memory element.’
- any of the potential processing elements, modules, and machines described in this Specification should be construed as being encompassed within the broad term ‘processor.’
- Each of the computers, network appliances, virtual elements, etc. can also include suitable interfaces for receiving, transmitting, and/or otherwise communicating data or information in a secure environment.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
Abstract
Description
- This application claims the benefit of priority under 35 U.S.C. §119(e) of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/201,699, filed Dec. 11, 2008, by Sharma et al., entitled “VM CHANGE ENFORCEMENT,” which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
- This disclosure relates in general to the field of security and, more particularly, to managing virtual machine configurations in a virtual environment.
- The field of network security has become increasingly important in today's society. In particular, the ability to effectively maintain secure and stable computers and systems presents a significant obstacle for component manufacturers, system designers, and network operators. This obstacle is made even more complicated due to the increased ease with which network systems may be manipulated, particularly in a virtualized environment. Virtualization is a software technology allowing an operating system (OS) to run in an isolated virtual environment (typically referred to as a virtual machine), where a platform's physical characteristics and behaviors are reproduced. More specifically, a virtual machine can represent an isolated, virtual environment running its own operating system and applications and being equipped with virtual hardware (processor, memory, disks, network interfaces, etc.). Commonly, the virtual machine is managed by a virtualization product. A virtual machine monitor (VMM) is the virtualization software layer that manages hardware requests from a guest OS (e.g., simulating answers from real hardware). A hypervisor is computer software/hardware platform virtualization software that may run on bare hardware and allows multiple operating systems to run on a host computer concurrently. ESX and ESXi by VMware, Inc. of Palo Alto, Calif., Xen by Citrix Systems, Inc. of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., and Hyper-V by Microsoft Corp. of Redmond, Wash., represent forms of VMMs and these VMMs can be managed to better protect computers and systems from authorized and unauthorized manipulations that may affect system stability and security.
- To provide a more complete understanding of the present disclosure and features and advantages thereof, reference is made to the following description, taken in conjunction with the accompanying figures, wherein like reference numerals represent like parts, in which:
-
FIG. 1 is a pictorial representation of one embodiment of a network environment in which a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented; -
FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of one embodiment of a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations, which may be implemented as a control proxy; -
FIG. 3 is a simplified block diagram illustrating one example implementation of a server in a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations; -
FIG. 4 is a simplified block diagram of one example embodiment of a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations; and -
FIG. 5 is a simplified flowchart illustrating a series of example steps associated with a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations in accordance with one embodiment. - A method in one example implementation includes receiving a plurality of command messages through a control channel. The plurality of command messages may have one or more criteria. The method also includes reconstructing the plurality of command messages to determine an intended command for configuring one or more virtual machines on a server device. The intended command has a corresponding operation in a policy database and the operation may have one or more associated policies. The method further includes determining if the operation is permitted by comparing one or more policies associated with the operation to the one or more criteria. The method also includes sending the plurality of command messages to the server device if the operation is permitted. In more specific embodiments, the operation may include one of creating, cloning, deleting, starting, stopping, and modifying the one or more virtual machines. In other more specific embodiments, the server device is adapted to perform the operation only if a control proxy sends the plurality of command messages to the server device, and the control proxy is adapted to receive only the plurality of command messages through the control channel.
-
FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram of anetwork environment 100 in which a system for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented.Network environment 100 may include aserver 300 accessed by different clients through a communication link provided bynetwork 130. The different clients may include 110 a and 110 b, which represent users having administrative privileges to configureclient devices server 300, and 120 a and 120 b, which represent end users who access applications or services provided byend user devices server 300. In one embodiment,server 300 may be configured to host one or more virtual machines. Acontrol proxy 200 may be operably connected to 110 a and 110 b for receiving configuration commands through a control channel.client devices Control proxy 200 may also be operably connected toserver 300, for sending permitted configuration commands received from 110 a and 110 b toclient devices server 300.Server 300 may send and receive data messages across a data channel for communicating with 120 a and 120 b.end user devices - In example embodiments, a system and method for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented in
network environment 100, providingcontrol proxy 200 for intercepting command messages being sent from a user of 110 a or 110 b to configure virtual machines inclient device server 300.Control proxy 200 interprets the particular protocol command messages to determine which command was intended by the user.Control proxy 200 then checks selected criteria of the command messages against predefined policies to determine whether an operation corresponding to the intended command is permitted. If the operation is permitted, thencontrol proxy 200 sends the command messages to server 300. For purposes of illustrating the techniques of such a system, it is important to understand the activities occurring within a given virtual environment. The following foundational information may be viewed as a basis from which the present disclosure may be properly explained. Such information is offered earnestly for purposes of explanation only and, accordingly, should not be construed in any way to limit the broad scope of the present disclosure and its potential applications. - Protecting a virtual computer environment presents certain complexities that are not associated with a purely physical computer environment. When physical computers are initially configured within a network, physical wires may be connected to the computers, wiring arrangements to appropriate physical components may be configured, memory components may be added, external devices may be added, and the like. Appropriate security may also be included. For example, firewalls may be configured in both hardware and software, proxy servers may be configured between computers, and any other desired security mechanism may be implemented. Modifications to the physical computer may require adding or removing physical components and adding, removing, or rerouting wiring. Thus, such procedures may be labor intensive and consequently, may be performed only as time and manual labor allows. Such changes in a physical environment may necessitate planning and deliberation. For example, in many business environments, implementations and modifications to physical systems are often scheduled during off-hours or work downtime, so as not to interfere with daily business transactions. Even if changes must be made during working hours, end users are typically notified of the impending work and any expected downtime.
- In a virtual environment, however, a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor may control the operation of one or more virtual machines, each having an associated operating system and one or more associated applications. The hypervisor is the basic abstraction layer of software that may sit directly on the hardware of a virtual machine host below operating systems. It is responsible for central processing unit (CPU) scheduling and memory partitioning of the various virtual machines running on a hardware device. The hypervisor not only abstracts the hardware for the virtual machines, but also controls the execution of virtual machines as they share the common processing environment.
- The initial configuration and any subsequent modifications of a virtual machine may occur by simply sending electronic commands to a virtual machine host. Such commands may be issued by anyone with appropriate privileges who can access the virtual machine host. Thus, virtual machines may be configured (e.g., created, cloned, deleted, started, stopped, modified, etc.) simply by an authorized user typing in commands, which are received and performed on the virtual machine host. Such configurations may be accomplished with greater speed and frequency than in a physical environment. In addition, because of the transparency and ease with which such configuration commands may be issued, multiple individuals with appropriate privileges could actually issue conflicting commands, thereby potentially causing frequent and perhaps undesirable changes to the virtual machines. Moreover, these changes could occur anytime, such as during peak working hours, without warning to end users and possibly resulting in undesirable affects on end users and any associated business activities. Virtual machines may also incur substantial damage if a security hacker or other unauthorized user penetrates the virtual environment, at least in part because the hacker may have access to multiple operating systems and applications.
- While the isolation provided by a virtual environment may offer more security from attacks by malicious code and abnormal process ends from an application or operating system, virtual machines may, on the other hand, be more easily manipulated by network administrators and other authorized users than in a purely physical environment. For example, in virtual machine environments such as VMware ESX or VMware ESXi, any individual, such as a network administrator, with appropriate privileges may be allowed to simply type in commands to edit hardware configurations for any of the virtual machines on a host server. A virtual machine may be created, cloned, or deleted, or any virtual machine hardware configurations (e.g., processors, CD/DVD drives, floppy drives, memory, SCSI devices, network adapters, parallel ports, serial ports, etc.) may be added, removed or modified. Moreover, such configuration commands may be issued at any time, from any device so long as the user is authorized (e.g., has a valid password). Thus, without proper controls, the potential for such commands to be issued during a time that disrupts business activities is great. In addition, because configuration commands may be issued from various locations, authorized users could issue conflicting commands that cause problems for the end users and disruptions to associated business activities.
- In one example scenario, many companies or organizations that conduct their businesses using large network systems may outsource their information technology (IT) support to a separate IT organization. Once the IT organization is given access and administrative privileges to the company's network, the company may have limited control over the activities undertaken by the IT organization to configure the virtual machines used by the company. Even well-intentioned configuration changes have the potential to disrupt business activities when performed during working hours without prior approval from and notice to the network owner. Thus, many companies in this scenario would benefit from a way to define policies that control the IT support organization's ability to modify virtual machine configurations within the network.
- Hackers or other unauthorized users may also present problems in the virtual environment. Such individuals may attempt to gain administrative privileges on a virtual machine host server, such as, by acquiring an appropriate password and access to the network. If successful, the hacker or other unauthorized user may cause irreparable damage by issuing configuration commands and thereby adding, removing, or modifying the virtual machines and any associated virtual hardware. Thus, it has become very important to control or manage access to virtual machines based on configuration commands and defined policies associated with such configuration commands.
- A system for managing virtual machine configurations, as outlined in
FIG. 1 , can resolve many of these issues. In accordance with one example implementation, a company or other organization that provides applications or services on network servers configured as virtual machine hosts can define policies that determine, for example, when and by whom particular configuration commands may be sent to the servers. These policies may be defined and evaluated in a control proxy that receives the configuration commands through a control channel from client devices. Also, the servers may be disabled from performing operations in response to configuration commands unless the commands are received from the control proxy. Thus, such a system would give companies or other organizations control over when and how their servers could be configured by network administrators and other users with administrative privileges. - Generally, virtual machine monitors (e.g., VMware ESX, VMware ESXi, Xen, Hyper-V, etc.) are hypervisors that can be employed to manage virtual machines and guest operating system (OS) instances. As used herein in this Specification, the term ‘virtual machine monitor’ is meant to include any such hypervisors, or other devices that can operate to manage one or more virtual machines.
- Turning to the infrastructure of
FIG. 1 , a system for managing virtual machine configurations may be implemented innetwork environment 100, which may include additional servers, client devices, control proxies, and other devices not shown.Network environment 100 may be configured in any form including, but not limited to, local area networks (LANs), intranets, and wide area networks (WANs) such as the Internet. In one embodiment, 110 a and 110 b andclient devices 120 a and 120 b may be operably coupled to network 130 (e.g., the Internet) by an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or through an Internet Server with dedicated bandwidth. In this embodiment, connections to network 130 may include any appropriate medium such as, for example, digital subscriber lines (DSL), telephone lines, T1 lines, T3 lines, wireless, satellite, fiber optics, cable, Ethernet, etc. or any combination thereof. In addition, gateways, routers, and the like may be used to facilitate electronic communication betweenend user devices 110 a and 110 b andclient devices control proxy 200 and between 120 a and 120 b andend user devices server 300. Also, appropriate firewalls may be provided betweennetwork 130 andcontrol proxy 200 andserver 300. In anotherembodiment network 130 may represent a LAN to which 110 a and 110 b are operably connected to communicate withclient devices control proxy 200 and to which 120 a and 120 b are operably connected to communicate withend user devices server 300.Network 130 may, in further embodiments, be implemented as a number of different combinations of networks, including for example,client device 110 a andend user device 120 a connected through a LAN andclient device 110 b andend user device 120 b connected through the Internet. -
Control proxy 200 andserver 300 are operably connected tonetwork 130. Logically,network 130 may be connected to controlproxy 200 through the control channel for sending configuration command messages to controlproxy 200 from 110 a and 110 b.client devices Network 130 may also be logically connected toserver 300 through the data channel for sending data messages between 120 a and 120 b andend user devices server 300. In one embodiment,control proxy 200 does not receive data messages from 110 a and 110 b orclient devices 120 a and 120 b. Rather,end user devices control proxy 200 is configured to only receive messages through the control channel, which include configuration command messages. One example embodiment includesnetwork 130 supporting Simple Object Access Protocol (i.e., SOAP) messaging framework. SOAP is a protocol that may combine remote procedure calls (i.e., RPC) and Hypertext Transport Protocol (i.e., HTTP), allowing HTTP to be used as the transport for RPC messages. Although SOAP messages may be used in this example implementation, it will be apparent that the broad scope of the present disclosure could also be applied using other protocols. - In one example embodiment,
control proxy 200 andserver 300 may be implemented in an IT Headquarters of an organization or a data center, with 110 a and 110 b being computers operated by individual users having network administrator privileges (e.g., authorization to configure and maintain computers, servers, and any other devices within a computer network). In this embodiment,client devices 120 a and 120 b may be computers operated by users without administrative privileges, who remotely or locally access applications or services provided byend user devices server 300.Server 300 may provide applications or services only to end users within the organization that controls server 300 (e.g., employees) or it may provide applications or services to end users outside the organization (e.g., customers, Internet surfers, other businesses). 110 a and 110 b may include computers such as desktops, laptops, or any other computing device or console capable of sending configuration command messages to controlClient devices proxy 200, using, for example the SOAP protocol. 120 a and 120 b may include computers such as desktops, laptops, or mobile or handheld computing devices (e.g., personal digital assistants (PDAs) or mobile phones) or any other computing device capable of receiving and sending data messages toEnd user devices server 300 throughnetwork 130. It should be noted that the network configurations and interconnections shown and described herein are for illustrative purposes only. One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate thatFIG. 1 is intended as an example and should not be construed to imply architectural limitations in the present disclosure. - Turning to
FIG. 2 , a simplified block diagram illustrates one embodiment ofcontrol proxy 200 that may be implemented in accordance with the present disclosure.Control proxy 200 may include hardware elements such as amemory element 210 and aprocessor 220 suitably configured to provide a platform for associated modules ofcontrol proxy 200. In addition, a suitable operating system (not shown) may be configured incontrol proxy 200 to appropriately manage the operation of hardware components therein.Control proxy 200 may include aprotocol message module 230 for receiving configuration command messages.Protocol message module 230 understands the particular protocol (e.g., SOAP, etc.) of the command messages and determines the intended command of a user sending the command messages. Also included incontrol proxy 200 could be apolicy database 240, apolicy module 250 and anadministration module 260.Policy database 240 may include entries corresponding to operations capable of being performed inserver 300 and also may include entries corresponding to predefined policies associated with the operations. Amanagement console 270 may be operably coupled to controlproxy 200 for creating and/or updatingpolicy database 240 withadministration module 260. In one embodiment,management console 270 may be a McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator®. - Turning to
FIG. 3 , a simplified block diagram illustrates aserver 300 that may be implemented in accordance with the present disclosure.Server 300 may be configured with, for example, VMware ESX or ESXi, SAP or other web services. In one example embodiment shown inFIG. 3 ,server 300 may include avirtual machine 310 and avirtual machine 320, which have 314 and 324 runningrespective operating systems 312 and 322.respective applications Server 300 may also include a virtual machine monitor (VMM) 330, which is, in one embodiment, a hypervisor that runs on hardware and which provides the capability of running multiple instances of 314 and 324 and associatedoperating systems 312 and 322, concurrently, by dynamically allocating the hardware resources to theapplications 314 and 324 andoperating systems 312 and 322 as needed. In this arrangement,applications 312 and 322 are logically run on top ofapplications 314 and 324, which are associated with respectiverespective operating systems 310 and 320, and are provided with virtual hardware (e.g., processors, CD/DVD drives, floppy drives, memory, SCSI devices, network adapters, parallel ports, serial ports, etc.).virtual machines Hardware components 340 beneath virtual machine monitor 330 may include amemory element 342 and aprocessor 344.Hardware components 340 may also include additional components such as, for example, network interface cards and disk drives. The entire configuration may be provided in a server (or some other network appliance). This implementation is only representing one possible example to which the present disclosure can apply. Any number of additional hypervisors or virtual elements could similarly benefit from the broad teachings discussed herein. - Typically, in server virtualization an authorized user is provided with an interface to manage a complete setup of virtual machines and the associated applications, operating systems, and virtual hardware. This management includes the hypervisor configuration and virtual machine configuration, including creation, deletion, modification, shutdown, startup, etc. In accordance with one embodiment of the present disclosure,
server 300 is configured in “local access lockdown” such that even authorized users cannot successfully issue configuration commands directly toserver 300. Instead, only configuration commands received fromcontrol proxy 200 will be performed. Thus, even if a user with administrative privileges bypassescontrol proxy 200 and connects directly toserver 300, any configuration commands attempted by the user will not be executed because only configuration commands received in messages fromcontrol proxy 200 will be executed byserver 300. - Not shown in
FIGS. 2 and 3 is additional hardware that may be suitably coupled to controlproxy processor 220 andserver processor 344. Additional hardware may be in the form of memory management units (MMU), additional symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) elements, physical memory, Ethernet, peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus and corresponding bridges, small computer system interface (SCSI)/integrated drive electronics (IDE) elements, etc. - Turning to
FIG. 4 ,FIG. 4 is a simplified block diagram illustrating one implementation of asystem 400 for managing virtual machine configurations in accordance with the present disclosure. In the example implementation, a VMware Infrastructure Client (i.e., VI client) 410 may be suitably coupled to acontrol proxy 420 for sending and receiving SOAP messages as previously described herein.Control proxy 420 may be operably connected to aVMware ESXi server 430 for sending permitted configuration command messages, received fromVI client 410, toESXi server 430. By way of example, apolicy database 440 is shown with enumerated operations 442 (i.e., create, clone, delete, start, stop, modify, etc.) and policies 444 (i.e., user, time of day, date, host, etc.). -
VI client 410 may allow an authorized user to select virtual machine configuration commands that correspond to operations forESXi server 430, such as, for example, creating, cloning, starting, stopping, deleting, and modifying virtual machines, which includes any associated virtual hardware. Once the user has selected a command,VI client 410 may create SOAP messages to communicate the selected commands toESXi server 430. Multiple SOAP messages may be sent for each command selected by the user, with the SOAP messages having a plurality of criteria such as user, host address, date, time of day, etc. embedded therein.Control proxy 420 intercepts the SOAP messages and reconstructs the messages to determine which configuration command was intended. One of theoperations 442 inpolicy database 440 may then be identified as corresponding to the intended command. Once the configuration command and its corresponding operation frompolicy database 440 have been determined,policies 444 associated with the corresponding operation may be compared to any of the plurality of criteria from the SOAP messages to determine whether the corresponding operation is permitted.Control proxy 420 may then send the SOAP messages toESXi server 430 if the corresponding operation is permitted. If the corresponding operation is not permitted, however, thecontrol proxy 420 may send an error message back to theVI client 410. - Turning to
FIG. 5 , asimplified flowchart 500 is depicted illustrating a process associated with one implementation for managing virtual machine configurations. The process involves intercepting messages between client devices and a server, determining what configuration commands have been issued in the messages, and determining whether operations corresponding to the intended commands are permissible based on predefined policies. The process may be implemented incontrol proxy 200 as shown inFIGS. 1 and 2 , which may be implemented in any suitable architecture as described herein. - The process may begin at
step 510, wherecontrol proxy 200 receives configuration command messages from one of the 110 a or 110 b. Because the configuration command options may be provided onclient devices 110 a or 110 b at a user-understandable level, typically, one user action will result in many messages being sent. Therefore, flow passes to step 520 to reconstruct the plurality of configuration command messages to determine what command the user intended, and to determine an operation inclient device policy database 240 corresponding to the intended command. Once the configuration command messages have been reconstructed and the corresponding operation inpolicy database 240 has been determined, flow passes to step 530 to determine if the operation corresponding to the intended command is permitted by associated policies in thepolicy database 240. In this step, policies associated with the corresponding operation inpolicy database 240 may be compared to selected criteria from the configuration command messages. If the associated policies do not permit the corresponding operation to be performed, based on the selected criteria, flow passes to step 540 and an error message may be sent to the 110 a or 110 b that sent the configuration command messages. However, if the corresponding operation is permitted, then flow passes to step 550 and the configuration command messages are sent toparticular client device server 300. - In one example implementation, a policy (“Policy T”) may be defined in
policy database 240 as not allowing particular operations to be performed by any users from any client devices or hosts during a specified time of day, such as normal business hours (e.g., 9 am-5 pm). By way of example, Policy T may then be mapped to operations “delete”, “stop”, and “modify” inpolicy database 240 for all authorized users and all authorized hosts. If an authorized user initiates a command on 110 a or 110 b at 12 pm to modify the memory ofclient device 310 or 320 invirtual machine server 300, configuration command messages would be intercepted bycontrol proxy 200.Control proxy 200 would determine the intended command from the configuration command messages and would then determine that the intended command corresponds to the “modify” operation in thepolicy database 240. The time of day (i.e., 12 pm) the command messages were issued would be determined from the plurality of criteria embedded in the command messages. When the time of day (i.e., 12 pm) is compared to Policy T, which is mapped to the “modify” operation inpolicy database 240, it would be determined that the modify operation is not permitted and, therefore, the configuration command messages would not be sent toserver 300. Instead, an error message may be sent to the 110 a or 110 b. However, if the same authorized user initiated the same command at 6 pm, then, when the time of day (i.e., 6 pm) is compared to Policy T, it would be determined that the modify operation is permitted and therefore, the configuration command messages would be sent toappropriate client device server 300. It will be apparent that this is just one example scenario, and that many other selected criteria, such as, for example, the host, the date, the user, etc., may be evaluated and that the control proxy would determine whether the operation corresponding to the intended command is permitted or not permitted based on the particular policies associated with the operation. - Software for managing virtual machine configurations can be provided at various locations (e.g., within
policy module 250,administration module 260, protocol message module 230). In one example implementation, this software is resident in a computer sought to be protected from a security attack (or protected from unwanted or unauthorized manipulations of a writable memory area). In other embodiments, software could be received or downloaded from a web server (e.g., in the context of purchasing individual end-user licenses for separate devices, separate control proxies, separate virtual machines, hypervisors, servers, etc.) in order to provide this system for managing virtual machine configurations. - In other examples, the system and method for managing virtual machine configurations could involve a proprietary element (e.g., as part of an antivirus solution), which could be provided in (or be proximate to) these identified elements, or be provided in any other device, server, network appliance, console, firewall, switch, information technology (IT) device, etc., or be provided as a complementary solution (e.g., in conjunction with a firewall), or provisioned somewhere in the network. As used herein in this Specification, the term ‘computer’ is meant to encompass these possible elements (VMMs, hypervisors, virtual devices, network appliances, routers, switches, gateway, processors, servers, loadbalancers, firewalls, or any other suitable device, component, element, or object) operable to affect or process electronic information in a security environment. Moreover, this computer may include any suitable hardware, software, components, modules, interfaces, or objects that facilitate the operations thereof. This may be inclusive of appropriate algorithms and communication protocols that allow for the effective management of virtual machine configurations. In addition, the system functions can be consolidated in any suitable manner. Along similar design alternatives, any of the illustrated modules and components of
FIGS. 1-4 may be combined in various possible configurations: all of which are clearly within the broad scope of this Specification. - In certain example implementations, the functions of managing virtual machine configurations outlined herein may be implemented by logic encoded in one or more tangible media (e.g., embedded logic provided in an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), digital signal processor (DSP) instructions, software (potentially inclusive of object code and source code) to be executed by a processor, or other similar machine, etc.). In some of these instances, a memory element (as shown in
FIGS. 2 and 3 ) can store data used for the operations described herein. This includes the memory element being able to store software, logic, code, or processor instructions that are executed to carry out the activities described in this Specification. A processor can execute any type of instructions to achieve the operations detailed herein in this Specification. In one example, the processors (as shown in the FIGURES) could transform an element or an article (e.g., data) from one state or thing to another state or thing. In another example, the activities outlined herein may be implemented with fixed logic or programmable logic (e.g., software/computer instructions executed by a processor) and the elements identified herein could be some type of a programmable processor, programmable digital logic (e.g., a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM)) or an ASIC that includes digital logic, software, code, electronic instructions, or any suitable combination thereof. - Any of these elements (e.g., a computer, a server, a control proxy, a network appliance, a firewall, a virtual machine monitor, any other type of virtual element, etc.) can include memory elements for storing information to be used in achieving the management of virtual machine configurations as outlined herein. Additionally, each of these devices may include a processor that can execute software or an algorithm to perform the management of virtual machine configurations activities as discussed in this Specification. These devices may further keep information in any suitable memory element (random access memory (RAM), ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, ASIC, etc.), software, hardware, or in any other suitable component, device, element, or object where appropriate and based on particular needs. Any of the memory items discussed herein (e.g., policy database, etc.) should be construed as being encompassed within the broad term ‘memory element.’ Similarly, any of the potential processing elements, modules, and machines described in this Specification should be construed as being encompassed within the broad term ‘processor.’ Each of the computers, network appliances, virtual elements, etc. can also include suitable interfaces for receiving, transmitting, and/or otherwise communicating data or information in a secure environment.
- Note that with the examples provided herein, interaction may be described in terms of two, three, four, or more network elements. However, this has been done for purposes of clarity and example only. In certain cases, it may be easier to describe one or more of the functionalities of a given set of flows by only referencing a limited number of components or network elements. It should be appreciated that the networks and systems of
FIGS. 1 and 4 (and their teachings) are readily scalable. The system implemented innetwork environment 100 can accommodate a large number of components, as well as more complicated or sophisticated arrangements and configurations. Accordingly, the examples provided should not limit the scope or inhibit the broad teachings of the system as potentially applied to a myriad of other architectures. In addition, the system has been described herein as operating in conjunction with particular VMware architectures; however, other architectures can readily be accommodated by the present solution. - It is also important to note that the steps described with reference to the preceding FIGURES illustrate only some of the possible scenarios that may be executed by, or within, the system and method for managing virtual machine configurations. Some of these steps may be deleted or removed where appropriate, or these steps may be modified or changed considerably without departing from the scope of the discussed concepts. In addition, a number of these operations have been described as being executed concurrently with, or in parallel to, one or more additional operations. However, the timing of these operations may be altered considerably. The preceding operational flows have been offered for purposes of example and discussion. Substantial flexibility is provided by the present disclosure in that any suitable arrangements, chronologies, configurations, and timing mechanisms may be provided without departing from the teachings of the discussed concepts.
Claims (20)
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US12/636,414 US8544003B1 (en) | 2008-12-11 | 2009-12-11 | System and method for managing virtual machine configurations |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US20169908P | 2008-12-11 | 2008-12-11 | |
| US12/636,414 US8544003B1 (en) | 2008-12-11 | 2009-12-11 | System and method for managing virtual machine configurations |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| US20130247033A1 true US20130247033A1 (en) | 2013-09-19 |
| US8544003B1 US8544003B1 (en) | 2013-09-24 |
Family
ID=49158910
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US12/636,414 Active 2031-08-21 US8544003B1 (en) | 2008-12-11 | 2009-12-11 | System and method for managing virtual machine configurations |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US8544003B1 (en) |
Cited By (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20120297234A1 (en) * | 2011-05-19 | 2012-11-22 | International Business Machines Corporation | Concurrent management console operations |
| US20130159428A1 (en) * | 2011-12-19 | 2013-06-20 | Vmware, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for an e-mail-based management interface for virtualized environments |
| US20140059228A1 (en) * | 2012-08-25 | 2014-02-27 | Vmware, Inc. | Resource allocation diagnosis on distributed computer systems |
| EP3076326A1 (en) * | 2015-03-31 | 2016-10-05 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Configuring a sandbox environment for malware testing |
| US20160315805A1 (en) * | 2015-04-27 | 2016-10-27 | Dell Products L.P. | Systems and methods for one-to-many wireless access to management controllers |
| US10564218B2 (en) | 2017-11-03 | 2020-02-18 | Dell Products L.P. | Systems and methods for debugging access |
| US10628203B1 (en) * | 2016-06-09 | 2020-04-21 | Parallels International Gmbh | Facilitating hibernation mode transitions for virtual machines |
| US10826883B2 (en) | 2017-04-11 | 2020-11-03 | Dell Products L.P. | Systems and methods for host system management of an information handling system via a mobile information handling system |
| US20220053055A1 (en) * | 2019-10-09 | 2022-02-17 | Panasonic Intellectual Property Corporation Of America | Device monitoring method, device monitoring apparatus, and recording medium |
| WO2023202678A1 (en) * | 2022-04-21 | 2023-10-26 | 深圳绿米联创科技有限公司 | Device control method and apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium |
| CN117112071A (en) * | 2023-10-25 | 2023-11-24 | 成都云祺科技有限公司 | Cross-platform configuration information conversion method, system, equipment and storage medium |
Families Citing this family (23)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US7840968B1 (en) | 2003-12-17 | 2010-11-23 | Mcafee, Inc. | Method and system for containment of usage of language interfaces |
| US7856661B1 (en) | 2005-07-14 | 2010-12-21 | Mcafee, Inc. | Classification of software on networked systems |
| US7757269B1 (en) | 2006-02-02 | 2010-07-13 | Mcafee, Inc. | Enforcing alignment of approved changes and deployed changes in the software change life-cycle |
| US7895573B1 (en) | 2006-03-27 | 2011-02-22 | Mcafee, Inc. | Execution environment file inventory |
| US8332929B1 (en) | 2007-01-10 | 2012-12-11 | Mcafee, Inc. | Method and apparatus for process enforced configuration management |
| US9424154B2 (en) | 2007-01-10 | 2016-08-23 | Mcafee, Inc. | Method of and system for computer system state checks |
| US8381284B2 (en) | 2009-08-21 | 2013-02-19 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for enforcing security policies in a virtual environment |
| US8938800B2 (en) | 2010-07-28 | 2015-01-20 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for network level protection against malicious software |
| US8925101B2 (en) | 2010-07-28 | 2014-12-30 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for local protection against malicious software |
| US8549003B1 (en) | 2010-09-12 | 2013-10-01 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for clustering host inventories |
| US9075993B2 (en) | 2011-01-24 | 2015-07-07 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for selectively grouping and managing program files |
| US9112830B2 (en) | 2011-02-23 | 2015-08-18 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for interlocking a host and a gateway |
| US9594881B2 (en) | 2011-09-09 | 2017-03-14 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for passive threat detection using virtual memory inspection |
| US9069586B2 (en) | 2011-10-13 | 2015-06-30 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for kernel rootkit protection in a hypervisor environment |
| US8973144B2 (en) | 2011-10-13 | 2015-03-03 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for kernel rootkit protection in a hypervisor environment |
| US8713668B2 (en) | 2011-10-17 | 2014-04-29 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for redirected firewall discovery in a network environment |
| US8800024B2 (en) | 2011-10-17 | 2014-08-05 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for host-initiated firewall discovery in a network environment |
| US8739272B1 (en) | 2012-04-02 | 2014-05-27 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for interlocking a host and a gateway |
| US8973146B2 (en) | 2012-12-27 | 2015-03-03 | Mcafee, Inc. | Herd based scan avoidance system in a network environment |
| CN105580023B (en) | 2013-10-24 | 2019-08-16 | 迈克菲股份有限公司 | Proxy-Assisted Malicious Application Blocking in Network Environments |
| US9516063B2 (en) * | 2015-03-10 | 2016-12-06 | Raytheon Company | System, method, and computer-readable medium for performing automated security validation on a virtual machine |
| US9742782B2 (en) | 2015-06-11 | 2017-08-22 | International Business Machines Corporation | Configuration management for virtual machine environment |
| US9584378B1 (en) | 2015-12-22 | 2017-02-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | Computer-implemented command control in information technology service environment |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20030200332A1 (en) * | 1999-07-29 | 2003-10-23 | Amit Gupta | Method and apparatus for dynamic proxy insertion in network traffic flow |
| US20100071035A1 (en) * | 2008-09-12 | 2010-03-18 | Renata Budko | Methods and systems for securely managing virtualization platform |
Family Cites Families (213)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US4982430A (en) | 1985-04-24 | 1991-01-01 | General Instrument Corporation | Bootstrap channel security arrangement for communication network |
| US4688169A (en) | 1985-05-30 | 1987-08-18 | Joshi Bhagirath S | Computer software security system |
| US5155847A (en) | 1988-08-03 | 1992-10-13 | Minicom Data Corporation | Method and apparatus for updating software at remote locations |
| US5560008A (en) | 1989-05-15 | 1996-09-24 | International Business Machines Corporation | Remote authentication and authorization in a distributed data processing system |
| CA2010591C (en) | 1989-10-20 | 1999-01-26 | Phillip M. Adams | Kernels, description tables and device drivers |
| US5222134A (en) | 1990-11-07 | 1993-06-22 | Tau Systems Corporation | Secure system for activating personal computer software at remote locations |
| US5390314A (en) | 1992-10-09 | 1995-02-14 | American Airlines, Inc. | Method and apparatus for developing scripts that access mainframe resources that can be executed on various computer systems having different interface languages without modification |
| US5339261A (en) | 1992-10-22 | 1994-08-16 | Base 10 Systems, Inc. | System for operating application software in a safety critical environment |
| US5584009A (en) | 1993-10-18 | 1996-12-10 | Cyrix Corporation | System and method of retiring store data from a write buffer |
| JP3042341B2 (en) | 1994-11-30 | 2000-05-15 | 日本電気株式会社 | Local I/O control method for a cluster-connected multiprocessor system |
| US6282712B1 (en) | 1995-03-10 | 2001-08-28 | Microsoft Corporation | Automatic software installation on heterogeneous networked computer systems |
| US5699513A (en) | 1995-03-31 | 1997-12-16 | Motorola, Inc. | Method for secure network access via message intercept |
| US5787427A (en) | 1996-01-03 | 1998-07-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | Information handling system, method, and article of manufacture for efficient object security processing by grouping objects sharing common control access policies |
| US5842017A (en) | 1996-01-29 | 1998-11-24 | Digital Equipment Corporation | Method and apparatus for forming a translation unit |
| US5907709A (en) | 1996-02-08 | 1999-05-25 | Inprise Corporation | Development system with methods for detecting invalid use and management of resources and memory at runtime |
| US5787177A (en) | 1996-08-01 | 1998-07-28 | Harris Corporation | Integrated network security access control system |
| US5991881A (en) | 1996-11-08 | 1999-11-23 | Harris Corporation | Network surveillance system |
| US5987611A (en) | 1996-12-31 | 1999-11-16 | Zone Labs, Inc. | System and methodology for managing internet access on a per application basis for client computers connected to the internet |
| US6141698A (en) | 1997-01-29 | 2000-10-31 | Network Commerce Inc. | Method and system for injecting new code into existing application code |
| US6587877B1 (en) | 1997-03-25 | 2003-07-01 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Management of time and expense when communicating between a host and a communication network |
| US6192475B1 (en) | 1997-03-31 | 2001-02-20 | David R. Wallace | System and method for cloaking software |
| US6356957B2 (en) | 1997-04-03 | 2002-03-12 | Hewlett-Packard Company | Method for emulating native object oriented foundation classes on a target object oriented programming system using a template library |
| US6073142A (en) | 1997-06-23 | 2000-06-06 | Park City Group | Automated post office based rule analysis of e-mail messages and other data objects for controlled distribution in network environments |
| US6275938B1 (en) | 1997-08-28 | 2001-08-14 | Microsoft Corporation | Security enhancement for untrusted executable code |
| US6192401B1 (en) | 1997-10-21 | 2001-02-20 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | System and method for determining cluster membership in a heterogeneous distributed system |
| US6393465B2 (en) | 1997-11-25 | 2002-05-21 | Nixmail Corporation | Junk electronic mail detector and eliminator |
| US5987610A (en) | 1998-02-12 | 1999-11-16 | Ameritech Corporation | Computer virus screening methods and systems |
| US6795966B1 (en) | 1998-05-15 | 2004-09-21 | Vmware, Inc. | Mechanism for restoring, porting, replicating and checkpointing computer systems using state extraction |
| US6442686B1 (en) | 1998-07-02 | 2002-08-27 | Networks Associates Technology, Inc. | System and methodology for messaging server-based management and enforcement of crypto policies |
| US6338149B1 (en) | 1998-07-31 | 2002-01-08 | Westinghouse Electric Company Llc | Change monitoring system for a computer system |
| US6546425B1 (en) | 1998-10-09 | 2003-04-08 | Netmotion Wireless, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing mobile and other intermittent connectivity in a computing environment |
| JP3753873B2 (en) | 1998-11-11 | 2006-03-08 | 株式会社島津製作所 | Spectrophotometer |
| US6969352B2 (en) | 1999-06-22 | 2005-11-29 | Teratech Corporation | Ultrasound probe with integrated electronics |
| US6453468B1 (en) | 1999-06-30 | 2002-09-17 | B-Hub, Inc. | Methods for improving reliability while upgrading software programs in a clustered computer system |
| US6256773B1 (en) | 1999-08-31 | 2001-07-03 | Accenture Llp | System, method and article of manufacture for configuration management in a development architecture framework |
| US6990591B1 (en) | 1999-11-18 | 2006-01-24 | Secureworks, Inc. | Method and system for remotely configuring and monitoring a communication device |
| US6321267B1 (en) | 1999-11-23 | 2001-11-20 | Escom Corporation | Method and apparatus for filtering junk email |
| US6662219B1 (en) | 1999-12-15 | 2003-12-09 | Microsoft Corporation | System for determining at subgroup of nodes relative weight to represent cluster by obtaining exclusive possession of quorum resource |
| US6460050B1 (en) | 1999-12-22 | 2002-10-01 | Mark Raymond Pace | Distributed content identification system |
| US6769008B1 (en) | 2000-01-10 | 2004-07-27 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Method and apparatus for dynamically altering configurations of clustered computer systems |
| WO2001069439A1 (en) | 2000-03-17 | 2001-09-20 | Filesx Ltd. | Accelerating responses to requests made by users to an internet |
| US6748534B1 (en) | 2000-03-31 | 2004-06-08 | Networks Associates, Inc. | System and method for partitioned distributed scanning of a large dataset for viruses and other malware |
| CA2305078A1 (en) | 2000-04-12 | 2001-10-12 | Cloakware Corporation | Tamper resistant software - mass data encoding |
| US7325127B2 (en) | 2000-04-25 | 2008-01-29 | Secure Data In Motion, Inc. | Security server system |
| EP1277326A2 (en) | 2000-04-28 | 2003-01-22 | Internet Security Systems, Inc. | Method and system for managing computer security information |
| US6769115B1 (en) | 2000-05-01 | 2004-07-27 | Emc Corporation | Adaptive interface for a software development environment |
| US6847993B1 (en) | 2000-05-31 | 2005-01-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method, system and program products for managing cluster configurations |
| US6934755B1 (en) | 2000-06-02 | 2005-08-23 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | System and method for migrating processes on a network |
| US6611925B1 (en) | 2000-06-13 | 2003-08-26 | Networks Associates Technology, Inc. | Single point of entry/origination item scanning within an enterprise or workgroup |
| US6901519B1 (en) | 2000-06-22 | 2005-05-31 | Infobahn, Inc. | E-mail virus protection system and method |
| US8204999B2 (en) | 2000-07-10 | 2012-06-19 | Oracle International Corporation | Query string processing |
| US7093239B1 (en) | 2000-07-14 | 2006-08-15 | Internet Security Systems, Inc. | Computer immune system and method for detecting unwanted code in a computer system |
| US7350204B2 (en) | 2000-07-24 | 2008-03-25 | Microsoft Corporation | Policies for secure software execution |
| EP1307988B1 (en) | 2000-08-04 | 2004-04-21 | Xtradyne Technologies Aktiengesellschaft | Method and system for session based authorization and access control for networked application objects |
| US7707305B2 (en) | 2000-10-17 | 2010-04-27 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for protecting against overload conditions on nodes of a distributed network |
| US7146305B2 (en) | 2000-10-24 | 2006-12-05 | Vcis, Inc. | Analytical virtual machine |
| US7606898B1 (en) | 2000-10-24 | 2009-10-20 | Microsoft Corporation | System and method for distributed management of shared computers |
| US6930985B1 (en) | 2000-10-26 | 2005-08-16 | Extreme Networks, Inc. | Method and apparatus for management of configuration in a network |
| US6834301B1 (en) | 2000-11-08 | 2004-12-21 | Networks Associates Technology, Inc. | System and method for configuration, management, and monitoring of a computer network using inheritance |
| US6766334B1 (en) | 2000-11-21 | 2004-07-20 | Microsoft Corporation | Project-based configuration management method and apparatus |
| US20020069367A1 (en) | 2000-12-06 | 2002-06-06 | Glen Tindal | Network operating system data directory |
| US6907600B2 (en) | 2000-12-27 | 2005-06-14 | Intel Corporation | Virtual translation lookaside buffer |
| JP2002244898A (en) | 2001-02-19 | 2002-08-30 | Hitachi Ltd | Database management program and database system |
| US6918110B2 (en) | 2001-04-11 | 2005-07-12 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Dynamic instrumentation of an executable program by means of causing a breakpoint at the entry point of a function and providing instrumentation code |
| US6988101B2 (en) | 2001-05-31 | 2006-01-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method, system, and computer program product for providing an extensible file system for accessing a foreign file system from a local data processing system |
| US6715050B2 (en) | 2001-05-31 | 2004-03-30 | Oracle International Corporation | Storage access keys |
| US6988124B2 (en) | 2001-06-06 | 2006-01-17 | Microsoft Corporation | Locating potentially identical objects across multiple computers based on stochastic partitioning of workload |
| US7290266B2 (en) | 2001-06-14 | 2007-10-30 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Access control by a real-time stateful reference monitor with a state collection training mode and a lockdown mode for detecting predetermined patterns of events indicative of requests for operating system resources resulting in a decision to allow or block activity identified in a sequence of events based on a rule set defining a processing policy |
| US7065767B2 (en) | 2001-06-29 | 2006-06-20 | Intel Corporation | Managed hosting server auditing and change tracking |
| US7069330B1 (en) | 2001-07-05 | 2006-06-27 | Mcafee, Inc. | Control of interaction between client computer applications and network resources |
| US20030023736A1 (en) | 2001-07-12 | 2003-01-30 | Kurt Abkemeier | Method and system for filtering messages |
| US20030014667A1 (en) | 2001-07-16 | 2003-01-16 | Andrei Kolichtchak | Buffer overflow attack detection and suppression |
| US6877088B2 (en) | 2001-08-08 | 2005-04-05 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for controlling speculative execution of instructions based on a multiaccess memory condition |
| US7007302B1 (en) | 2001-08-31 | 2006-02-28 | Mcafee, Inc. | Efficient management and blocking of malicious code and hacking attempts in a network environment |
| US7010796B1 (en) | 2001-09-28 | 2006-03-07 | Emc Corporation | Methods and apparatus providing remote operation of an application programming interface |
| US7177267B2 (en) | 2001-11-09 | 2007-02-13 | Adc Dsl Systems, Inc. | Hardware monitoring and configuration management |
| US7346781B2 (en) | 2001-12-06 | 2008-03-18 | Mcafee, Inc. | Initiating execution of a computer program from an encrypted version of a computer program |
| US7159036B2 (en) | 2001-12-10 | 2007-01-02 | Mcafee, Inc. | Updating data from a source computer to groups of destination computers |
| US7039949B2 (en) | 2001-12-10 | 2006-05-02 | Brian Ross Cartmell | Method and system for blocking unwanted communications |
| US10033700B2 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2018-07-24 | Intellectual Ventures I Llc | Dynamic evaluation of access rights |
| WO2003050662A1 (en) | 2001-12-13 | 2003-06-19 | Japan Science And Technology Agency | Software safety execution system |
| US7398389B2 (en) | 2001-12-20 | 2008-07-08 | Coretrace Corporation | Kernel-based network security infrastructure |
| JP3906356B2 (en) | 2001-12-27 | 2007-04-18 | 独立行政法人情報通信研究機構 | Syntax analysis method and apparatus |
| US7743415B2 (en) | 2002-01-31 | 2010-06-22 | Riverbed Technology, Inc. | Denial of service attacks characterization |
| US20030167399A1 (en) | 2002-03-01 | 2003-09-04 | Yves Audebert | Method and system for performing post issuance configuration and data changes to a personal security device using a communications pipe |
| US7600021B2 (en) | 2002-04-03 | 2009-10-06 | Microsoft Corporation | Delta replication of source files and packages across networked resources |
| US20070253430A1 (en) | 2002-04-23 | 2007-11-01 | Minami John S | Gigabit Ethernet Adapter |
| US7370360B2 (en) | 2002-05-13 | 2008-05-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Computer immune system and method for detecting unwanted code in a P-code or partially compiled native-code program executing within a virtual machine |
| US7823148B2 (en) | 2002-05-22 | 2010-10-26 | Oracle America, Inc. | System and method for performing patch installation via a graphical user interface |
| US20030221190A1 (en) | 2002-05-22 | 2003-11-27 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | System and method for performing patch installation on multiple devices |
| US7024404B1 (en) | 2002-05-28 | 2006-04-04 | The State University Rutgers | Retrieval and display of data objects using a cross-group ranking metric |
| US7512977B2 (en) | 2003-06-11 | 2009-03-31 | Symantec Corporation | Intrustion protection system utilizing layers |
| US7823203B2 (en) | 2002-06-17 | 2010-10-26 | At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P. | Method and device for detecting computer network intrusions |
| US7139916B2 (en) | 2002-06-28 | 2006-11-21 | Ebay, Inc. | Method and system for monitoring user interaction with a computer |
| US8924484B2 (en) | 2002-07-16 | 2014-12-30 | Sonicwall, Inc. | Active e-mail filter with challenge-response |
| US7522906B2 (en) | 2002-08-09 | 2009-04-21 | Wavelink Corporation | Mobile unit configuration management for WLANs |
| US7624347B2 (en) | 2002-09-17 | 2009-11-24 | At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. | System and method for forwarding full header information in email messages |
| US7546333B2 (en) | 2002-10-23 | 2009-06-09 | Netapp, Inc. | Methods and systems for predictive change management for access paths in networks |
| US7353501B2 (en) | 2002-11-18 | 2008-04-01 | Microsoft Corporation | Generic wrapper scheme |
| US20040143749A1 (en) | 2003-01-16 | 2004-07-22 | Platformlogic, Inc. | Behavior-based host-based intrusion prevention system |
| US20040167906A1 (en) | 2003-02-25 | 2004-08-26 | Smith Randolph C. | System consolidation tool and method for patching multiple servers |
| US7024548B1 (en) | 2003-03-10 | 2006-04-04 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for auditing and tracking changes to an existing configuration of a computerized device |
| US7529754B2 (en) | 2003-03-14 | 2009-05-05 | Websense, Inc. | System and method of monitoring and controlling application files |
| CN1723446A (en) | 2003-03-28 | 2006-01-18 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | Recording medium, recording device, and reproduction device using the recording medium and device |
| US7607010B2 (en) | 2003-04-12 | 2009-10-20 | Deep Nines, Inc. | System and method for network edge data protection |
| US20050108516A1 (en) | 2003-04-17 | 2005-05-19 | Robert Balzer | By-pass and tampering protection for application wrappers |
| US20040230963A1 (en) | 2003-05-12 | 2004-11-18 | Rothman Michael A. | Method for updating firmware in an operating system agnostic manner |
| DE10324189A1 (en) | 2003-05-28 | 2004-12-16 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Method for controlling access to a resource of an application in a data processing device |
| US7657599B2 (en) | 2003-05-29 | 2010-02-02 | Mindshare Design, Inc. | Systems and methods for automatically updating electronic mail access lists |
| US20050108562A1 (en) | 2003-06-18 | 2005-05-19 | Khazan Roger I. | Technique for detecting executable malicious code using a combination of static and dynamic analyses |
| US7283517B2 (en) | 2003-07-22 | 2007-10-16 | Innomedia Pte | Stand alone multi-media terminal adapter with network address translation and port partitioning |
| US7886093B1 (en) | 2003-07-31 | 2011-02-08 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Electronic device network supporting compression and decompression in electronic devices |
| US7464408B1 (en) | 2003-08-29 | 2008-12-09 | Solidcore Systems, Inc. | Damage containment by translation |
| US20050060412A1 (en) | 2003-09-16 | 2005-03-17 | Chebolu Anil Kumar | Synchronizing automatic updating of client |
| US20050114672A1 (en) | 2003-11-20 | 2005-05-26 | Encryptx Corporation | Data rights management of digital information in a portable software permission wrapper |
| US7600219B2 (en) | 2003-12-10 | 2009-10-06 | Sap Ag | Method and system to monitor software interface updates and assess backward compatibility |
| US7546594B2 (en) | 2003-12-15 | 2009-06-09 | Microsoft Corporation | System and method for updating installation components using an installation component delta patch in a networked environment |
| US7840968B1 (en) | 2003-12-17 | 2010-11-23 | Mcafee, Inc. | Method and system for containment of usage of language interfaces |
| US7272654B1 (en) | 2004-03-04 | 2007-09-18 | Sandbox Networks, Inc. | Virtualizing network-attached-storage (NAS) with a compact table that stores lossy hashes of file names and parent handles rather than full names |
| US7783735B1 (en) | 2004-03-22 | 2010-08-24 | Mcafee, Inc. | Containment of network communication |
| WO2005099342A2 (en) | 2004-04-19 | 2005-10-27 | Securewave S.A. | A generic framework for runtime interception and execution control of interpreted languages |
| US20060004875A1 (en) | 2004-05-11 | 2006-01-05 | Microsoft Corporation | CMDB schema |
| US7890946B2 (en) | 2004-05-11 | 2011-02-15 | Microsoft Corporation | Efficient patching |
| US7818377B2 (en) | 2004-05-24 | 2010-10-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Extended message rule architecture |
| US7469139B2 (en) | 2004-05-24 | 2008-12-23 | Computer Associates Think, Inc. | Wireless manager and method for configuring and securing wireless access to a network |
| US7506170B2 (en) | 2004-05-28 | 2009-03-17 | Microsoft Corporation | Method for secure access to multiple secure networks |
| US20050273858A1 (en) | 2004-06-07 | 2005-12-08 | Erez Zadok | Stackable file systems and methods thereof |
| JP4341517B2 (en) | 2004-06-21 | 2009-10-07 | 日本電気株式会社 | Security policy management system, security policy management method and program |
| US20050289538A1 (en) | 2004-06-23 | 2005-12-29 | International Business Machines Corporation | Deploying an application software on a virtual deployment target |
| US7203864B2 (en) | 2004-06-25 | 2007-04-10 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Method and system for clustering computers into peer groups and comparing individual computers to their peers |
| US7908653B2 (en) | 2004-06-29 | 2011-03-15 | Intel Corporation | Method of improving computer security through sandboxing |
| US20060015501A1 (en) | 2004-07-19 | 2006-01-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | System, method and program product to determine a time interval at which to check conditions to permit access to a file |
| US7937455B2 (en) | 2004-07-28 | 2011-05-03 | Oracle International Corporation | Methods and systems for modifying nodes in a cluster environment |
| US7703090B2 (en) | 2004-08-31 | 2010-04-20 | Microsoft Corporation | Patch un-installation |
| US7873955B1 (en) | 2004-09-07 | 2011-01-18 | Mcafee, Inc. | Solidifying the executable software set of a computer |
| US20060080656A1 (en) | 2004-10-12 | 2006-04-13 | Microsoft Corporation | Methods and instructions for patch management |
| US9329905B2 (en) | 2004-10-15 | 2016-05-03 | Emc Corporation | Method and apparatus for configuring, monitoring and/or managing resource groups including a virtual machine |
| US7765538B2 (en) | 2004-10-29 | 2010-07-27 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Method and apparatus for determining which program patches to recommend for installation |
| US20060101277A1 (en) | 2004-11-10 | 2006-05-11 | Meenan Patrick A | Detecting and remedying unauthorized computer programs |
| WO2006101549A2 (en) | 2004-12-03 | 2006-09-28 | Whitecell Software, Inc. | Secure system for allowing the execution of authorized computer program code |
| US8479193B2 (en) | 2004-12-17 | 2013-07-02 | Intel Corporation | Method, apparatus and system for enhancing the usability of virtual machines |
| US7765544B2 (en) | 2004-12-17 | 2010-07-27 | Intel Corporation | Method, apparatus and system for improving security in a virtual machine host |
| US7607170B2 (en) | 2004-12-22 | 2009-10-20 | Radware Ltd. | Stateful attack protection |
| US7302558B2 (en) | 2005-01-25 | 2007-11-27 | Goldman Sachs & Co. | Systems and methods to facilitate the creation and configuration management of computing systems |
| US8056138B2 (en) | 2005-02-26 | 2011-11-08 | International Business Machines Corporation | System, method, and service for detecting improper manipulation of an application |
| US7836504B2 (en) | 2005-03-01 | 2010-11-16 | Microsoft Corporation | On-access scan of memory for malware |
| US7685635B2 (en) | 2005-03-11 | 2010-03-23 | Microsoft Corporation | Systems and methods for multi-level intercept processing in a virtual machine environment |
| TW200707417A (en) | 2005-03-18 | 2007-02-16 | Sony Corp | Reproducing apparatus, reproducing method, program, program storage medium, data delivery system, data structure, and manufacturing method of recording medium |
| US7552479B1 (en) | 2005-03-22 | 2009-06-23 | Symantec Corporation | Detecting shellcode that modifies IAT entries |
| US7770151B2 (en) | 2005-04-07 | 2010-08-03 | International Business Machines Corporation | Automatic generation of solution deployment descriptors |
| US8590044B2 (en) | 2005-04-14 | 2013-11-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | Selective virus scanning system and method |
| US7349931B2 (en) | 2005-04-14 | 2008-03-25 | Webroot Software, Inc. | System and method for scanning obfuscated files for pestware |
| US7363463B2 (en) | 2005-05-13 | 2008-04-22 | Microsoft Corporation | Method and system for caching address translations from multiple address spaces in virtual machines |
| WO2006137057A2 (en) | 2005-06-21 | 2006-12-28 | Onigma Ltd. | A method and a system for providing comprehensive protection against leakage of sensitive information assets using host based agents, content- meta-data and rules-based policies |
| US8839450B2 (en) | 2007-08-02 | 2014-09-16 | Intel Corporation | Secure vault service for software components within an execution environment |
| US7739721B2 (en) | 2005-07-11 | 2010-06-15 | Microsoft Corporation | Per-user and system granular audit policy implementation |
| US7856661B1 (en) | 2005-07-14 | 2010-12-21 | Mcafee, Inc. | Classification of software on networked systems |
| US7895651B2 (en) | 2005-07-29 | 2011-02-22 | Bit 9, Inc. | Content tracking in a network security system |
| US7962616B2 (en) | 2005-08-11 | 2011-06-14 | Micro Focus (Us), Inc. | Real-time activity monitoring and reporting |
| US7340574B2 (en) | 2005-08-30 | 2008-03-04 | Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for synchronizing an industrial controller with a redundant controller |
| US8327353B2 (en) | 2005-08-30 | 2012-12-04 | Microsoft Corporation | Hierarchical virtualization with a multi-level virtualization mechanism |
| US20070074199A1 (en) | 2005-09-27 | 2007-03-29 | Sebastian Schoenberg | Method and apparatus for delivering microcode updates through virtual machine operations |
| US8131825B2 (en) | 2005-10-07 | 2012-03-06 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Method and a system for responding locally to requests for file metadata associated with files stored remotely |
| US7725737B2 (en) | 2005-10-14 | 2010-05-25 | Check Point Software Technologies, Inc. | System and methodology providing secure workspace environment |
| US20070169079A1 (en) | 2005-11-08 | 2007-07-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Software update management |
| US7836303B2 (en) | 2005-12-09 | 2010-11-16 | University Of Washington | Web browser operating system |
| US7856538B2 (en) | 2005-12-12 | 2010-12-21 | Systex, Inc. | Methods, systems and computer readable medium for detecting memory overflow conditions |
| US20070143851A1 (en) | 2005-12-21 | 2007-06-21 | Fiberlink | Method and systems for controlling access to computing resources based on known security vulnerabilities |
| US20070174429A1 (en) | 2006-01-24 | 2007-07-26 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Methods and servers for establishing a connection between a client system and a virtual machine hosting a requested computing environment |
| US7757269B1 (en) | 2006-02-02 | 2010-07-13 | Mcafee, Inc. | Enforcing alignment of approved changes and deployed changes in the software change life-cycle |
| WO2007099273A1 (en) | 2006-03-03 | 2007-09-07 | Arm Limited | Monitoring values of signals within an integrated circuit |
| US8621433B2 (en) | 2006-03-20 | 2013-12-31 | Microsoft Corporation | Managing version information for software components |
| US7895573B1 (en) | 2006-03-27 | 2011-02-22 | Mcafee, Inc. | Execution environment file inventory |
| US7752233B2 (en) | 2006-03-29 | 2010-07-06 | Massachusetts Institute Of Technology | Techniques for clustering a set of objects |
| US7870387B1 (en) | 2006-04-07 | 2011-01-11 | Mcafee, Inc. | Program-based authorization |
| US8015563B2 (en) | 2006-04-14 | 2011-09-06 | Microsoft Corporation | Managing virtual machines with system-wide policies |
| US7966659B1 (en) | 2006-04-18 | 2011-06-21 | Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. | Distributed learn mode for configuring a firewall, security authority, intrusion detection/prevention devices, and the like |
| US8458673B2 (en) | 2006-04-26 | 2013-06-04 | Flexera Software Llc | Computer-implemented method and system for binding digital rights management executable code to a software application |
| US7849502B1 (en) | 2006-04-29 | 2010-12-07 | Ironport Systems, Inc. | Apparatus for monitoring network traffic |
| US8291409B2 (en) | 2006-05-22 | 2012-10-16 | Microsoft Corporation | Updating virtual machine with patch on host that does not have network access |
| US7761912B2 (en) | 2006-06-06 | 2010-07-20 | Microsoft Corporation | Reputation driven firewall |
| US7809704B2 (en) | 2006-06-15 | 2010-10-05 | Microsoft Corporation | Combining spectral and probabilistic clustering |
| US20070300215A1 (en) | 2006-06-26 | 2007-12-27 | Bardsley Jeffrey S | Methods, systems, and computer program products for obtaining and utilizing a score indicative of an overall performance effect of a software update on a software host |
| US8468526B2 (en) | 2006-06-30 | 2013-06-18 | Intel Corporation | Concurrent thread execution using user-level asynchronous signaling |
| US8365294B2 (en) | 2006-06-30 | 2013-01-29 | Intel Corporation | Hardware platform authentication and multi-platform validation |
| US8572721B2 (en) | 2006-08-03 | 2013-10-29 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Methods and systems for routing packets in a VPN-client-to-VPN-client connection via an SSL/VPN network appliance |
| US8015388B1 (en) | 2006-08-04 | 2011-09-06 | Vmware, Inc. | Bypassing guest page table walk for shadow page table entries not present in guest page table |
| US8161475B2 (en) | 2006-09-29 | 2012-04-17 | Microsoft Corporation | Automatic load and balancing for virtual machines to meet resource requirements |
| US9697019B1 (en) | 2006-10-17 | 2017-07-04 | Manageiq, Inc. | Adapt a virtual machine to comply with system enforced policies and derive an optimized variant of the adapted virtual machine |
| US7689817B2 (en) | 2006-11-16 | 2010-03-30 | Intel Corporation | Methods and apparatus for defeating malware |
| US8336046B2 (en) | 2006-12-29 | 2012-12-18 | Intel Corporation | Dynamic VM cloning on request from application based on mapping of virtual hardware configuration to the identified physical hardware resources |
| US7996836B1 (en) | 2006-12-29 | 2011-08-09 | Symantec Corporation | Using a hypervisor to provide computer security |
| US8381209B2 (en) | 2007-01-03 | 2013-02-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | Moveable access control list (ACL) mechanisms for hypervisors and virtual machines and virtual port firewalls |
| US8254568B2 (en) | 2007-01-07 | 2012-08-28 | Apple Inc. | Secure booting a computing device |
| US8380987B2 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2013-02-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Protection agents and privilege modes |
| US8276201B2 (en) | 2007-03-22 | 2012-09-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Integrity protection in data processing systems |
| US7930327B2 (en) | 2007-05-21 | 2011-04-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and apparatus for obtaining the absolute path name of an open file system object from its file descriptor |
| US20080301770A1 (en) | 2007-05-31 | 2008-12-04 | Kinder Nathan G | Identity based virtual machine selector |
| US20090007100A1 (en) | 2007-06-28 | 2009-01-01 | Microsoft Corporation | Suspending a Running Operating System to Enable Security Scanning |
| US8763115B2 (en) | 2007-08-08 | 2014-06-24 | Vmware, Inc. | Impeding progress of malicious guest software |
| US8315999B2 (en) | 2007-08-29 | 2012-11-20 | Nirvanix, Inc. | Policy-based file management for a storage delivery network |
| US8250641B2 (en) | 2007-09-17 | 2012-08-21 | Intel Corporation | Method and apparatus for dynamic switching and real time security control on virtualized systems |
| US8819676B2 (en) | 2007-10-30 | 2014-08-26 | Vmware, Inc. | Transparent memory-mapped emulation of I/O calls |
| JP5238235B2 (en) | 2007-12-07 | 2013-07-17 | 株式会社日立製作所 | Management apparatus and management method |
| US8336094B2 (en) | 2008-03-27 | 2012-12-18 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Hierarchical firewalls |
| US8321931B2 (en) | 2008-03-31 | 2012-11-27 | Intel Corporation | Method and apparatus for sequential hypervisor invocation |
| WO2010016904A2 (en) | 2008-08-07 | 2010-02-11 | Serge Nabutovsky | Link exchange system and method |
| US9141381B2 (en) | 2008-10-27 | 2015-09-22 | Vmware, Inc. | Version control environment for virtual machines |
| US8060722B2 (en) | 2009-03-27 | 2011-11-15 | Vmware, Inc. | Hardware assistance for shadow page table coherence with guest page mappings |
| US8359422B2 (en) | 2009-06-26 | 2013-01-22 | Vmware, Inc. | System and method to reduce trace faults in software MMU virtualization |
| US8341627B2 (en) | 2009-08-21 | 2012-12-25 | Mcafee, Inc. | Method and system for providing user space address protection from writable memory area in a virtual environment |
| US8925101B2 (en) | 2010-07-28 | 2014-12-30 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for local protection against malicious software |
| US8938800B2 (en) | 2010-07-28 | 2015-01-20 | Mcafee, Inc. | System and method for network level protection against malicious software |
-
2009
- 2009-12-11 US US12/636,414 patent/US8544003B1/en active Active
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20030200332A1 (en) * | 1999-07-29 | 2003-10-23 | Amit Gupta | Method and apparatus for dynamic proxy insertion in network traffic flow |
| US20100071035A1 (en) * | 2008-09-12 | 2010-03-18 | Renata Budko | Methods and systems for securely managing virtualization platform |
Cited By (22)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US9298501B2 (en) * | 2011-05-19 | 2016-03-29 | Globalfoundries Inc. | Concurrent management console operations |
| US20120297234A1 (en) * | 2011-05-19 | 2012-11-22 | International Business Machines Corporation | Concurrent management console operations |
| US20130159428A1 (en) * | 2011-12-19 | 2013-06-20 | Vmware, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for an e-mail-based management interface for virtualized environments |
| US9049257B2 (en) * | 2011-12-19 | 2015-06-02 | Vmware, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for an E-mail-based management interface for virtualized environments |
| US9871856B2 (en) | 2012-08-25 | 2018-01-16 | Vmware, Inc. | Resource allocation diagnosis on distributed computer systems |
| US20140059228A1 (en) * | 2012-08-25 | 2014-02-27 | Vmware, Inc. | Resource allocation diagnosis on distributed computer systems |
| US9323579B2 (en) * | 2012-08-25 | 2016-04-26 | Vmware, Inc. | Resource allocation diagnosis on distributed computer systems |
| EP3540625A1 (en) * | 2015-03-31 | 2019-09-18 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Configuring a sandbox environment for malware testing |
| CN111488571A (en) * | 2015-03-31 | 2020-08-04 | 瞻博网络公司 | Configure a sandbox environment for malware testing |
| US9740853B2 (en) | 2015-03-31 | 2017-08-22 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Configuring a sandbox environment for malware testing |
| US9477837B1 (en) | 2015-03-31 | 2016-10-25 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Configuring a sandbox environment for malware testing |
| US10380337B2 (en) | 2015-03-31 | 2019-08-13 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Configuring a sandbox environment for malware testing |
| EP3076326A1 (en) * | 2015-03-31 | 2016-10-05 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Configuring a sandbox environment for malware testing |
| US10225095B2 (en) * | 2015-04-27 | 2019-03-05 | Dell Products L.P. | Systems and methods for one-to-many wireless access to management controllers |
| US20160315805A1 (en) * | 2015-04-27 | 2016-10-27 | Dell Products L.P. | Systems and methods for one-to-many wireless access to management controllers |
| US10628203B1 (en) * | 2016-06-09 | 2020-04-21 | Parallels International Gmbh | Facilitating hibernation mode transitions for virtual machines |
| US10826883B2 (en) | 2017-04-11 | 2020-11-03 | Dell Products L.P. | Systems and methods for host system management of an information handling system via a mobile information handling system |
| US10564218B2 (en) | 2017-11-03 | 2020-02-18 | Dell Products L.P. | Systems and methods for debugging access |
| US20220053055A1 (en) * | 2019-10-09 | 2022-02-17 | Panasonic Intellectual Property Corporation Of America | Device monitoring method, device monitoring apparatus, and recording medium |
| US11962653B2 (en) * | 2019-10-09 | 2024-04-16 | Panasonic Intellectual Property Corporation Of America | Device monitoring method, device monitoring apparatus, and recording medium for transmitting messages containing device control commands based on predetermined conditions |
| WO2023202678A1 (en) * | 2022-04-21 | 2023-10-26 | 深圳绿米联创科技有限公司 | Device control method and apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium |
| CN117112071A (en) * | 2023-10-25 | 2023-11-24 | 成都云祺科技有限公司 | Cross-platform configuration information conversion method, system, equipment and storage medium |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US8544003B1 (en) | 2013-09-24 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US8544003B1 (en) | System and method for managing virtual machine configurations | |
| EP2499598B1 (en) | System and method for preventing data loss using virtual machine wrapped applications | |
| KR102539777B1 (en) | Binding of secure guests' security keys to a hardware security module | |
| Dawoud et al. | Infrastructure as a service security: Challenges and solutions | |
| Sabahi | Virtualization-level security in cloud computing | |
| Aiash et al. | Secure live virtual machines migration: issues and solutions | |
| US20150229674A1 (en) | Payment card industry (pci) compliant architecture and associated methodology of managing a service infrastructure | |
| US20090307705A1 (en) | Secure multi-purpose computing client | |
| US11080408B2 (en) | Secure information storage | |
| Alshareef | Current development, challenges, and future trends in cloud computing: A survey | |
| US11062041B2 (en) | Scrubbing log files using scrubbing engines | |
| Sabahi | Cloud computing reliability, availability and serviceability (RAS): issues and challenges | |
| Djenna et al. | Security problems in cloud infrastructure | |
| US10382456B2 (en) | Remote computing system providing malicious file detection and mitigation features for virtual machines | |
| CN104598842B (en) | A kind of monitor of virtual machine trusts domain splitting method | |
| Micro | DEEP SECURITY™ SOFTWARE | |
| WO2017142970A1 (en) | Enforcing label-based rules on a per-user basis in a distributed network management system | |
| Bose et al. | A secure hypervisor-based technology create a secure cloud environment | |
| US11748505B2 (en) | Secure data processing in a third-party cloud environment | |
| AlMutair et al. | A new virtualization-based security architecture in a cloud computing environment | |
| Sokolov et al. | Providing security for virtual infrastructures based on an integrated mechanism | |
| Lawal et al. | Security management of infrastructure as a service in cloud computing | |
| Bandela et al. | Survey on cloud computing technologies and security threats | |
| CN113557509B (en) | Binding a secure key of a secure client to a hardware security module | |
| Jena | Bottle-necks of cloud security-A survey |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MCAFEE INC., CALIFORNIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:SAWHNEY, HARVINDER SINGH;SARAF, SUMAN;SHARMA, ROSEN;SIGNING DATES FROM 20091208 TO 20091211;REEL/FRAME:023643/0834 |
|
| FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: PAYOR NUMBER ASSIGNED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: ASPN); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Free format text: PAYER NUMBER DE-ASSIGNED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: RMPN); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
| STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
| FPAY | Fee payment |
Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MCAFEE, LLC, CALIFORNIA Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME AND ENTITY CONVERSION;ASSIGNOR:MCAFEE, INC.;REEL/FRAME:043665/0918 Effective date: 20161220 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MORGAN STANLEY SENIOR FUNDING, INC., MARYLAND Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:MCAFEE, LLC;REEL/FRAME:045056/0676 Effective date: 20170929 Owner name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., NEW YORK Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:MCAFEE, LLC;REEL/FRAME:045055/0786 Effective date: 20170929 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MORGAN STANLEY SENIOR FUNDING, INC., MARYLAND Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVE PATENT 6336186 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 045056 FRAME 0676. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:MCAFEE, LLC;REEL/FRAME:054206/0593 Effective date: 20170929 Owner name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., NEW YORK Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVE PATENT 6336186 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 045055 FRAME 786. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:MCAFEE, LLC;REEL/FRAME:055854/0047 Effective date: 20170929 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MCAFEE, LLC, CALIFORNIA Free format text: RELEASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COLLATERAL - REEL/FRAME 045055/0786;ASSIGNOR:JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT;REEL/FRAME:054238/0001 Effective date: 20201026 |
|
| MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 8TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1552); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Year of fee payment: 8 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MCAFEE, LLC, CALIFORNIA Free format text: RELEASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COLLATERAL - REEL/FRAME 045056/0676;ASSIGNOR:MORGAN STANLEY SENIOR FUNDING, INC., AS COLLATERAL AGENT;REEL/FRAME:059354/0213 Effective date: 20220301 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT AND COLLATERAL AGENT, NEW YORK Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:MCAFEE, LLC;REEL/FRAME:059354/0335 Effective date: 20220301 |
|
| AS | Assignment |
Owner name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, NEW YORK Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE THE PATENT TITLES AND REMOVE DUPLICATES IN THE SCHEDULE PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL: 059354 FRAME: 0335. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNOR:MCAFEE, LLC;REEL/FRAME:060792/0307 Effective date: 20220301 |
|
| MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 12TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1553); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Year of fee payment: 12 |