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US20050221889A1 - Trusted communications between untrusting parties - Google Patents

Trusted communications between untrusting parties Download PDF

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Publication number
US20050221889A1
US20050221889A1 US11/147,501 US14750105A US2005221889A1 US 20050221889 A1 US20050221889 A1 US 20050221889A1 US 14750105 A US14750105 A US 14750105A US 2005221889 A1 US2005221889 A1 US 2005221889A1
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US
United States
Prior art keywords
party
game
information
activity
user
Prior art date
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Abandoned
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US11/147,501
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English (en)
Inventor
Dennis Dupray
Sheldon Goldberg
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Individual
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Individual
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to US11/147,501 priority Critical patent/US20050221889A1/en
Publication of US20050221889A1 publication Critical patent/US20050221889A1/en
Priority to US11/940,971 priority patent/US8144871B2/en
Priority to US13/429,487 priority patent/US8644508B2/en
Priority to US14/172,232 priority patent/US9363242B2/en
Priority to US14/980,859 priority patent/US9998432B2/en
Priority to US16/005,627 priority patent/US10425389B2/en
Priority to US16/579,790 priority patent/US10708242B2/en
Priority to US16/921,534 priority patent/US11233773B2/en
Priority to US17/583,108 priority patent/US11582209B2/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6272—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database by registering files or documents with a third party
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/08—Auctions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/045—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2107—File encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2109—Game systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

Definitions

  • the present invention is related to assuring that network communications between two parties can not be illicitly tampered with by either of the parties, and more particularly, when the parties are playing a game on a network such as the Internet.
  • the present invention is a novel method and system for assuring that no party involved in the play of a game is able to a inappropriately tamper with or inappropriately disclose pre-game arrangement of tokens and/or events for the game. More generally, the present invention reduces the likelihood that any of the parties involved in a game or contest (e.g., parties such as the sponsor/provider of a game or contest, or any player of the game or contest) is likely to play unfairly by unscrupulously manipulating or disclosing the arrangement of tokens and/or events of the game or contest.
  • the present invention is particularly useful in assuring such parties when game or contest communications between parties occur via transmissions on a communications network such as a local are network, a wide area network, the World Wide Web, the Internet, or some combination of the above.
  • At least one trusted third party is utilized for assuring that both players and game sponsors perceive the game as being played fairly.
  • a trusted third party might be a website to which a representation of card deck(s) for playing the game is transmitted by the sponsor/provider prior to commencement of the game, and wherein, e.g., the copy of the card deck(s) at the trusted third party is available to the game players upon completion of the game for checking against the cards actually played in the game.
  • the game sponsor/provider may provide to each game player, prior to a game commencement, an identification tag for identifying the deck(s) with which the player is playing so that upon termination of the game the player can present (e.g., transmit via the network) the tag to the trusted third party for thereby receiving a copy of the deck(s) representation. That is, once the game is completed and the sponsor/provider has notified the trusted third party that the game is completed, each player would be able to receive a copy of the deck(s) from the third party by providing the identification tag.
  • such a card deck(s) representation may be generated by the trusted third party and subsequently provided to the game sponsor/provider along with an identification tag for identifying the deck(s) so that the sponsor/provider can, in turn, provide the identification tag to game players using the deck(s) when playing a game.
  • each player may request from the trusted third party, a copy of the deck(s) representation used in playing the game.
  • each player may transmit a game log to the trusted third party, wherein the third party performs a comparison between the card representations played and the corresponding card representations in the copy of the deck(s) representation retained by the third party.
  • similar verification techniques may be used with other games or contests for assuring that pre-game or pre-contest data is not inappropriately changed during the game or contest.
  • a trusted third party is unnecessary. Instead, the game sponsor/provider and the players transmit various encryption keys and encodings of the pre-game arrangements of game tokens and/or game events between one another according to a method of the present invention that substantially assures that the pre-game arrangement is neither tampered with during the game, nor known to a game player prior to an appropriate disclosure time during or after the game.
  • this embodiment of the present invention when applied to a communications network version of a card game (such as on the Internet), provides for the date representation of the card deck(s) to be encrypted using a first encryption key provided by a game player, and then encrypted using a second encryption technique provided by the game sponsor/provider.
  • the present invention allows the representation of the card deck(s) for the game (or instance thereof) to be doubly encrypted prior to commencement of the game, and the doubly encrypted version of the deck(s) is provided to the player of the game prior to game commencement.
  • each player may utilize a decryption key provided at game termination by the game sponsor/provider to decrypt the second encryption of the card deck(s), and subsequently use the player's personal decryption key to decrypt the first encryption of the card deck(s).
  • each game player may receive a substantially distinct doubly encrypted version of the card deck(s) prior to commencement of a game instance, but the game player is unable to determine the cards within the deck(s) other than by playing the game since the encrypted version of the deck(s) provided to the player is encrypted with at least one encryption technique wherein the decryption key is not provided to player until the game instance is completed.
  • the present invention for an activity (such as a game or contest), wherein a predetermined arrangement of tokens and/or events (e.g. a card deck) is pivotal to the success of a user in performing (an instance of) the activity, the present invention also provides both the users (e.g., participants) and the activity sponsor/provider with the assurance that the predetermined arrangement is unlikely to be manipulated or disclosed so that one party has an unanticipated advantage or disadvantage. Thus, the likelihood that a user is at an unanticipated disadvantage is reduced.
  • the predetermined arrangement is doubly encrypted substantially as described above, and the results are provided to each user.
  • the predetermined arrangement is first encoded by the sponsor/provider, via a first encryption technique, using a user supplied public key, and subsequently, the result is encoded so that a secret key, not known by the user, is to be used in decoding the latter encoding.
  • the order of applying the first and second encryption techniques may be reversed in some embodiments.
  • the present invention allows a user to select tokens or events in an order different from the predetermined arrangement.
  • such game tokens e.g., cards
  • game events may be selected by a user indicating the position of a desired game token relative to other tokens or game event representations in the predetermined arrangement. For instance, if the game uses a deck of cards, a user may choose to play only every other card, or more generally, every n th card (n ⁇ 2).
  • other characteristics of such tokens or events substantially unrelated to their game utilization may be used for selection; e.g., a color, size, or shape of such a token and/or event representation may be used.
  • the doubly encoded aspect of the present invention together with the ability of users to select from among a predetermined arrangement of tokens or events according to a user desired selection criteria, is analogous to the technique for assuring fairness in a face-to-face card game wherein one participant of the game shuffles and another participant cuts the card deck.
  • the present invention can be utilized for substantially assuring the integrity of parties' actions during network communications for:
  • Games wherein objects must be located and/or a particular path must be identified and traversed e.g., electronic treasure hunt games where there is a predetermined one or more winning game configurations within a simulated or virtual environment
  • Selection games such as games where a game player selects one or more game tokens and/or game events, and wherein for at least some of the potential game selections, there is a predetermined prize associated therewith.
  • a game player selects one or more game tokens and/or game events, and wherein for at least some of the potential game selections, there is a predetermined prize associated therewith.
  • Internet games wherein a graphic is displayed to a game player and the player is able to select a location on the graphic for determining if the location selected (e.g., a pixel) has a prize associated therewith; and
  • testing services wherein testing is performed via a communications network
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a first embodiment of the present invention for assuring trusted communications regarding a contest provided on a communications network.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a second embodiment of the present invention for assuring trusted network communications among potentially interesting parties involved in an activity such as same or contest.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a first embodiment of the present invention wherein the users of a communications network are able to enter contests (e.g., lotteries, sweepstakes, drawings, etc.) on the network and be assured that a predetermined winning entry to the contest cannot be manipulated during the contest.
  • contests e.g., lotteries, sweepstakes, drawings, etc.
  • the present invention provides greater trust by contestants in the contest sponsor/provider since there is assurance that one or more winning entries have already been selected and that anyone who selects such a winning entry will indeed win the contest.
  • each user e.g., contestant
  • a public/private encryption key pair such as is well known in the encryption arts.
  • RSA can be used to generate the public/private encryption key pair.
  • PGP also known as “Pretty Good Privacy”
  • each user provides his/her public encryption key (generated in step 104 ) to a network site (e.g., an Internet website) that is providing the contest.
  • a network site e.g., an Internet website
  • public encryption keys may be provided with a user's identification (e.g., password) for registering at the network site.
  • the network site determines the one or more winning contest entries. Note that the winning entries may be determined at any time prior to the commencement of allowing users to enter the contest.
  • one or more winning sets of lottery numbers can be determined prior to allowing users to select lottery number combinations, and according to the present invention, such users can be assured that the winning lottery combinations have not been tampered with between their selection and the completion of the lottery.
  • the predetermined winning entries are encrypted with the user's public encryption key obtaining a result denoted herein as “USER_ENCODED_WINNERS(U)”.
  • the contest sponsor/provider thereafter is substantially unable to tamper with such encoded winning entries.
  • users may enter such a contest in other ways besides transmitting network (e.g., Internet) contest entry requests.
  • network e.g., Internet
  • requests may also be provided via e-mail, a voice telephone call, or conventional mail.
  • step 120 the network site subsequently generates one or more private encryption keys K i .
  • keys need not be generated specifically according to the sequence of steps provided in FIG. 1 .
  • private encryption keys K i may be generated by the network site at substantially any time prior to step 124 described hereinbelow.
  • the network site encrypts each USER_ENCODED_WINNERS(U) using one of the network site private keys K i , thereby obtaining a result denoted herein as “DOUBLY_ENCODED_WINNERS(U, K i )”.
  • private (e.g., equivalently, secret) keys K i may be used with various types of encryption procedures such as DES (U.S. government standard specified in FIPS PUB 46 ).
  • DES U.S. government standard specified in FIPS PUB 46
  • other private/secret encryption techniques are also within the scope of the present invention, such as IDEA, Blowfish, RC4, RC2, SAFER, and various hashing techniques, as one skilled in the art will understand.
  • public/private key encryption techniques may also be used here if desired.
  • each user U is provided with a corresponding doubly encoded version of the predetermined winning contest entries, DOUBLY_ENCODED_WINNERS(U, K i ). Accordingly, although each user U has a private key that is able to decode a message encoded with the user's public key, the user is unable to decode the transmission of the contest winners without the corresponding private/secret encryption key K i . Further, note that although many encryption schemes can be broken if there is sufficient time and computational capacity, note that by providing sufficiently long keys K i (e.g., 128 bit keys or longer), such illicit decrypting by a user is reduced.
  • K i e.g., 128 bit keys or longer
  • the identification of the one or more winning entries can be substantially a string of (e.g., ASCII) characters, with possibly additional substantially random or “noise” character codes (more generally, data irrelevant to the identification of the winning entries) interspersed therein for further security, it is believed that such doubly encoded versions of winning contest entries are secure from illicit decrypting.
  • the length of the string to subsequently doubly encrypt (this string denoted herein “noisy winning entry data”) can be substantially longer than the actual winning entry data.
  • a formula for identifying the actual winning entry data within the noisy winning entry data can be provided (after contest termination) to the user.
  • such formulas may be as simple as starting with the j th character of the noisy winning entry data, select every other (alternatively, every n th where n ⁇ 2) character to derive the winning entry data.
  • step 132 the user may enter the contest one or more times (step 132 ), wherein the user retains either electronically or otherwise the identification of each of his/her contest entries.
  • step 136 after all contest entries are received, the network site transmits the appropriate network site private encryption key K i to each user, optionally, together with a user readable version-of the winning entries.
  • each user is able to decrypt his/her doubly encoded version of the predetermined winning contest entries using first the private key K i transmitted by the network site together with, e.g., a standard decryption program provided by, for instance, a commercially available decryption package or by decryption software obtained (e.g., downloaded) from a trusted third party network site (e.g., website).
  • a standard decryption program provided by, for instance, a commercially available decryption package or by decryption software obtained (e.g., downloaded) from a trusted third party network site (e.g., website).
  • the user is then able to decrypt the results from the above decryption process by using his/her private encryption key.
  • a recognizable copy of the winning entries then becomes available to each user.
  • step 144 each user is able to determine whether he/she has a winning entry by comparing his/her contest entry identifications with the winning identifications obtained from step 140 .
  • the sponsor/provider publicizes the winning entries after the contest is terminated, and, for example, users are able to communicate with other users (e.g., via a bulletin board or network chat room) and/or users are able to view a sufficiently large plurality of different instances of noisy winning entry data that were actually provided to other users during the contest, then it is believed that users will be assured that no alternative set of one or more winning entries could have been substituted by the sponsor/provider changing formulas during the contest.
  • the step of providing the noisy winning entry data can be accomplished in various ways, such as positioning characters of the winning entries according to: (a) at offsets from prime number positions in a resulting noisy winning entry data instance, or (b) a geometric progression wherein the number of noise characters between consecutive characters identifying the winning entries grows geometrically (e.g., 2 noise characters, then 4 noise characters, then 8 noise characters, etc.). It is, however, in at least one embodiment, preferable that each contest user be able to easily determine the winning entry data from noise characters without relying upon any computational module provided by the sponsor/provider, and more preferably, each user should be able to determine the winning entry data without any computational assistance whatsoever (i.e., entirely manually).
  • contest sponsor/provider need not communicate with users entirely via network communications from a network site as described hereinabove.
  • contest communications may be also performed by traditional mailings.
  • contest processing need not necessarily be performed at the network site as indicated in some steps of the flowchart of FIG. 1 .
  • the network site may merely provide a network portal to various contests wherein the contest processing is performed remotely from the network site and transmitted therethrough to the contest users.
  • phrase “each user” in the steps of FIG. 1 may be replaced with phrases such as “some one or more users”.
  • the steps provided in FIG. 1 may be asynchronously performed for each user such that for different users, the different users and/or the network site may be substantially simultaneously performing different steps of the flowchart of FIG. 1 .
  • a first user may be generating his/her public/private encryption key pair (e.g., step 104 ), while a second user may be substantially simultaneously in the process of providing a contest entry (e.g., step 132 ).
  • the predetermining of winning entries should occur prior to the receipt of user contest entries (e.g., step 132 ) for at least a sufficient number of users so that substantially all users trust that the predetermined contest winning entries were not illicitly modified after users were allowed to enter the contest.
  • the flowchart of FIG. 2 illustrates another embodiment of the present invention for providing trusted communications between parties, wherein at least one of the parties may be inclined to distrust communications provided by the other party.
  • the flowchart of FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of the present invention for use in providing trusted network communications in activities such as various kinds of games and contests.
  • the flowchart of FIG. 2 describes steps to be performed related to communications between two parties wherein a first of the parties provides an activity that can be performed by a second party, and further, the first party selectively provides the second party with data related to the activity, as appropriate, while the second party is performing the activity and/or after the second party has completed the activity.
  • steps to be performed related to communications between two parties wherein a first of the parties provides an activity that can be performed by a second party, and further, the first party selectively provides the second party with data related to the activity, as appropriate, while the second party is performing the activity and/or after the second party has completed the activity.
  • activities may be:
  • card games e.g., hearts, poker, blackjack
  • contests e.g., lotteries, sweepstakes, drawings, or other games wherein users, such as players or participants, select or receive contest entries);
  • (c) activities wherein prizes are distributed throughout a simulated or virtual environment and wherein a user encounters the prizes by a combination of skill and/or fortitudious selection e.g., a simulated graphical maze-type video game such as dungeons and dragons, a game wherein a user attempts to select a “winning” simulated graphical door, selection of a “winning” pixel of a displayed graphic, various combat games wherein users encounter prizes on different levels of the game, and treasure hunt-type games wherein a user searches through a simulated environment for prizes encountered therein).
  • a combination of skill and/or fortitudious selection e.g., a simulated graphical maze-type video game such as dungeons and dragons, a game wherein a user attempts to select a “winning” simulated graphical door, selection of a “winning” pixel of a displayed graphic, various combat games wherein users encounter prizes on different levels of the game, and treasure hunt-type games wherein a
  • a sponsor/provider of the activity may determine (as such activity related data) a card ordering for one or more card deck representations to be used in playing the game.
  • the card representations in the card deck representations should not be reordered or inappropriately manipulated during the game, and that game users (e.g., players) should only be able to view the faces of card representations as is appropriate to the rules of the game.
  • game users e.g., players
  • the advertisement consists of a virtual world having embedded therein advertising information related to at least one of a product and a service as well as prizes, bonuses, and/or discounts related to the products and/or services being advertised.
  • such a virtual world may allow a user to navigate through this world and accumulate various prizes according to the area of the world explored, and optionally, also according to the user's expertise in playing a game provided in the virtual world, or the user's knowledge regarding some area of knowledge possibly related to the products or services being advertised.
  • a virtual world might include past, current and future cars from a particular automaker wherein users are allowed to assemble, disassemble, redesign, drive and/or crash these cars, and wherein prizes such as discounts for buying a car currently being manufactured by the automaker are distributed throughout the virtual world).
  • prizes such as discounts for buying a car currently being manufactured by the automaker are distributed throughout the virtual world.
  • the present invention may be used in interactive advertising such as is presented to Internet users. For instance, when such users are viewing and/or interacting with an Internet presentation (e.g., a search engine, an online personal finance system, or an online shopping system), advertisements may offer prizes (or other compensation) for interacting with their advertisements, wherein the user has a chance of winning a prize by entering a contest or playing a game such as attempting to select a winning pixel, or other graphical area. Accordingly, the present invention can be used to assure the user that the prize winning area has already been determined.
  • an Internet presentation e.g., a search engine, an online personal finance system, or an online shopping system
  • advertisements may offer prizes (or other compensation) for interacting with their advertisements, wherein the user has a chance of winning a prize by entering a contest or playing a game such as attempting to select a winning pixel, or other graphical area.
  • the present invention can be used to assure the user that the prize winning area has already been determined.
  • a prize offering entity e.g., an Internet website, or a casino having a gaming local area network
  • a prize offering entity e.g., an Internet website, or a casino having a gaming local area network
  • the prize offering entity generates data related to (an instance of) the activity being offered, wherein for convenience, this data is denoted ACTIVITY_DATA.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA is dependent upon the type of activity provided by the prize offering entity.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA may be a representation of a card deck or card shoe.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA may be a predetermined association between:
  • ACTIVITY_DATA may be a predetermined sequence of dice rolls (e.g., a predetermined sequence of numbers between 2 and 12) for activities such as games where the dice values determine the position of a user's token (e.g., Monopoly-type games), or other games such as craps or other wagering games dependent upon dice rolls.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA may be related to activities such as games or simulations having predetermined stochastically generated controlling data and/or having probabilities regarding the encountering of prizes. For example, games such as network-based (e.g., Internet) slot machine simulations whereby an advertised percentage of funds are received from the playing of such slot machines is returned as winnings.
  • network-based e.g., Internet
  • ACTIVITY_DATA may include the slot machine results for, e.g., the next 500 plays.
  • the user would then be allowed to decrypt an encrypted version of ACTIVITY_DATA to determine, e.g., what slot machine plays would have occurred if the user had continued, so that, e.g., the user may determine how close to the advertised percent of returned funds compares with the 500 results he/she could have played.
  • the present invention may offer further enticements to users in that a user can see what would have happened if he/she had continued playing (or more generally, performing the activity).
  • ACTIVITY_DATA may be transmitted through a communications network
  • at least some of the software and/or data for the activity may be provided on a storage media such as a compact disk, or a DVD.
  • the software and/or hardware for enabling embodiments of the present invention may be provided from a plurality of different sources.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA is influential in determining one or more of: an outcome for the activity, prizes and/or winnings that can be distributed to users performing the activity to which the ACTIVITY_DATA is related.
  • step 212 the prize offering entity waits for a user U to request to participate in the activity (or instance thereof). Subsequently, in step 216 , if the user has not previously provided to the prize offering entity, the public key of a public/private key encryption pair specific to the user (and likely generated by the user), then the user provides such a public key to the prize offering entity in this step. Note that in one embodiment of the present flowchart, the user transmits his/her public key to the prize offering entity via the Internet. In step 220 , the prize offering entity encrypts, with the user's public key, the ACTIVITY_DATA for the (instance of the) activity in which the user has requested to participate.
  • ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA the results of this encryption is denoted herein as ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA is encrypted into ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA, the prize offering entity is restricted from manipulating this activity related data for purposely changing this data in a predictable way that, e.g., provides the user with either a greater disadvantage or advantage than would otherwise be the case if there were no tampering with such data.
  • step 224 the prize offering entity encrypts the ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA with a second encryption procedure using a corresponding secret key, K U , not available to the user U (and likely not available to any user or participant in the activity).
  • K U may be different for each time the user participates in the activity.
  • K u may be different for each time the user participates in the activity.
  • the second encryption is dependent on K u , each such second encryption will be different.
  • the prize offering entity provides DOUBLY_ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA to the user U.
  • DOUBLY_ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA may be transmitted to the user U via the Internet.
  • DOUBLY_ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA cannot be changed in a predictable way by either the prize offering entity or the user U. Further, as discussed with reference to the winning entries data of FIG.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA is interleaved with random alphanumeric “noise” data in a simple predictable fashion (e.g., prior to encoding ACTIVITY_DATA with the user's public key, ACTIVITY_DATA is interleaved with meaningless “noise” data according to, e.g., a formula dependent upon a small number of parameters (e.g., ⁇ 3), such that users can manually or with a conventional calculator distinguish the data of ACTIVITY_DATA from the noise data once values for the parameters are provided).
  • the data encrypted by the user's public key (step 220 ) can be substantially larger than ACTIVITY_DATA.
  • a majority of the data encrypted with the user's public key may be noise or random data, it is believed that this further inhibits illicit access to ACTIVITY_DATA by the user.
  • step 232 the two steps 232 and 236 are performed substantially asynchronously, wherein step 232 is performed by the user and step 236 is performed by the prize offering entity substantially independent from step 232 .
  • the user U performs the (instance of the) activity
  • step 236 a determination is made by the prize offering entity as to whether other users are allowed to participate in the (instance of the) activity. Accordingly, if other users are allowed to participate, then steps 212 through 236 are again performed until no further users are allowed to participate the (instance of the) activity.
  • step 240 is encountered wherein each user participating in the activity and/or the prize offering entity waits for all users to complete the (instance of the) activity.
  • step 240 may be interpreted to mean that no further steps for the present flowchart are available to be performed until all users have performed the (instance of the) activity, and the prize offering entity has determined that there are no further users eligible to participate in the (instance of the) activity.
  • step 240 should not be given a narrow interpretation wherein users and/or the prize offering entity substantially ceases to perform other tasks than the steps of the present flowchart.
  • the prize offering entity is a website that is providing a tournament for a particular game, wherein each user must complete a predetermined number of game instances, then one or more users and/or the prize offering entity may be required to wait (at step 240 ) for a plurality of days until all users have completed the predetermined number of games, or a tournament time limit has expired.
  • this does not mean that the website ceases performing tasks substantially unrelated to the final step ( 244 ) of FIG. 2 .
  • step 244 is performed, wherein the prize offering entity provides to at least one or more of the users U, a corresponding one of the secret keys K U so that each of these users can decrypt DOUBLY_ENCODED_ACTIVITY_DATA, first with K U , and subsequently with the user's private key.
  • the user is able to obtain a copy of ACTIVITY_DATA for determining whether this data is consistent with the version of this data used when the user was performing (the instance of) the activity.
  • ACTIVITY_DATA is interleaved with noise data
  • the prize offering entity provides these users with any additional information to select ACTIVITY_DATA from the interleaved noise data.
  • every user u may be preferable for every user u to receive a corresponding secret key(s) K U so that every user can obtain a copy of ACTIVITY_DATA.
  • users i.e., players
  • a sequence of card representations are not sequence in a manner that results in an unexpected or unfair disadvantage for the user.
  • each user may be allowed to select the next one or more card representations to be played from the initial card sequence provided by the prize winning entity.
  • each user may be allowed to specify cards to be played by: (a) selecting a subsequence of the card representations such as every second card (more generally, every nth card), or (b) randomly select the next one or more card representations by inputting positional information indicating the position(s) of the next card(s) to be played, such as positional information being, e.g., numerical input or graphical pointer (mouse) input.
  • positional information e.g., numerical input or graphical pointer (mouse) input.
  • the sequence of card representations is not predetermined by the prize offering entity, but the initial sequence of card representations is predetermined and verifiable by users.
  • the present invention may be used as a trustworthy system and method for performing a procedure similar to “drawing straws,” wherein the users (e.g., straw drawers) utilize a communication network (e.g., the Internet) to draw the “straws,” and wherein the users do not necessarily trust one another.
  • the present invention allows the users in a group of users to select one or more of their group randomly (or some particular random option) without an intervening trusted third party.
  • a designated user of the group generates a list of N distinct numbers (N ⁇ 2), wherein N is the number of users in the group. Subsequently, each member (other than the designated user) supplies the designated user with a public key of a public/private encryption key pair. For each user supplied public key, the designated user encrypts the list with the public key and then encrypts the result with a secret key known only to the designated user. The designated user then transmits the doubly encoded list to the user that supplied the public key.
  • each user other than the designated user selects a distinct number from the list by, e.g., requesting the number in a particular position in the list such as the number in the fifth position. Accordingly, the designated user by default is provided with the single remaining number after all other users of the group have selected a number from the list. Then, the designated user supplies each of the other users with the designated user's secret key so that each of the other users can decrypt their doubly encrypted version of the list, first with the designated user's secret key, and then with their corresponding private key of their public/private encryption key pair.
  • each user can verify that the list was not manipulated during the number selection process, and accordingly, all users can be assured that the users selected and/or unselected according to a predetermined criteria related to the value of the numbers (e.g., the small number) was performed fairly.
  • a predetermined criteria related to the value of the numbers e.g., the small number

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US11/147,501 US20050221889A1 (en) 1999-07-16 2005-06-06 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US11/940,971 US8144871B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2007-11-15 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US13/429,487 US8644508B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2012-03-26 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US14/172,232 US9363242B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2014-02-04 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US14/980,859 US9998432B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2015-12-28 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US16/005,627 US10425389B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2018-06-11 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US16/579,790 US10708242B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2019-09-23 Assuring transaction integrity on a network
US16/921,534 US11233773B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2020-07-06 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US17/583,108 US11582209B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2022-01-24 Trusted communications between untrusting parties

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US13/429,487 Expired - Fee Related US8644508B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2012-03-26 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US14/172,232 Expired - Fee Related US9363242B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2014-02-04 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US14/980,859 Expired - Fee Related US9998432B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2015-12-28 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US16/005,627 Expired - Fee Related US10425389B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2018-06-11 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US16/579,790 Expired - Fee Related US10708242B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2019-09-23 Assuring transaction integrity on a network
US16/921,534 Expired - Lifetime US11233773B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2020-07-06 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
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US14/172,232 Expired - Fee Related US9363242B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2014-02-04 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US14/980,859 Expired - Fee Related US9998432B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2015-12-28 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US16/005,627 Expired - Fee Related US10425389B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2018-06-11 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US16/579,790 Expired - Fee Related US10708242B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2019-09-23 Assuring transaction integrity on a network
US16/921,534 Expired - Lifetime US11233773B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2020-07-06 Trusted communications between untrusting parties
US17/583,108 Expired - Lifetime US11582209B2 (en) 1999-07-16 2022-01-24 Trusted communications between untrusting parties

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US11582209B2 (en) 2023-02-14
AU6230500A (en) 2001-02-05
US20080091937A1 (en) 2008-04-17
US20180295106A1 (en) 2018-10-11
US20160112383A1 (en) 2016-04-21
US9363242B2 (en) 2016-06-07
US20200021565A1 (en) 2020-01-16
US10708242B2 (en) 2020-07-07
US8644508B2 (en) 2014-02-04
WO2001006691A3 (fr) 2009-09-24
US20140153718A1 (en) 2014-06-05
US8144871B2 (en) 2012-03-27
US10425389B2 (en) 2019-09-24
US20220150225A1 (en) 2022-05-12
US9998432B2 (en) 2018-06-12
US11233773B2 (en) 2022-01-25
US20200336473A1 (en) 2020-10-22
US20120183138A1 (en) 2012-07-19
WO2001006691A2 (fr) 2001-01-25

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