US11303461B2 - Security device having physical unclonable function - Google Patents
Security device having physical unclonable function Download PDFInfo
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- US11303461B2 US11303461B2 US16/677,901 US201916677901A US11303461B2 US 11303461 B2 US11303461 B2 US 11303461B2 US 201916677901 A US201916677901 A US 201916677901A US 11303461 B2 US11303461 B2 US 11303461B2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/73—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
Definitions
- the inventive concept relates to a computer security device, and more particularly, to a computer security device having a physical un-clonable function (PUF).
- PEF physical un-clonable function
- a basic method of providing security in the communication system and the smart device is to mount a security device implemented not by a memory, but by hardware logic in the communication system and the smart device. According to such methods, a check is performed to determine whether a malignant code exists or an authentication is performed when a security chip is driven and then, software such as an operating system (OS) is driven. Recently, a security technology having the PUF is receiving attention. When the PUF is used, it is possible to prevent an important key, such as an authentication key stored in the security device, from being copied.
- a security device can include components to provide digital random signals and a validity detector to detect a validity of the digital random signals and to generate validity signals that represent a detection result. Since a conventional validity detector uses a synchronous configuration, a blind zone is generated every cycle. To be specific, in the conventional configuration, since validity of a digital random signal is detected based on a generated synchronous clock, in a period when the synchronous clock is deactivated, although transition of the digital random signal occurs, it is not possible to detect the transition of the digital random signal.
- the inventive concept provides a security device capable of reducing an area of a die required for implementation of a stable PUF by increasing the value of entropy from a predefined number of entropy sources and/or minimizing a blind zone of a validity checking module.
- a security device uses an asynchronous configuration to minimize a blind zone.
- the blind zone is generated only in a period when a reset signal is logic ‘1’. Therefore, it is possible to minimize the blind zone by minimizing a period in which the reset signal is logic ‘1’.
- a security device includes a first entropy source configured to generate a first analog random signal; a second entropy source configured to generate a second analog random signal; a first digitizer configured to digitize the analog random signal to generate a first digital random signal; a second digitizer configured to digitizer the analog random signal to generate a second digital random signal; a first combination unit configured to connect at least one of the first and second entropy sources and at least one of the first and second digitizers; a validity detecting unit configured to detect validity of the first digital random signal to generate a first validity signal and to detect validity of the second digital random signal to generate a second validity signal; and a finalizer configured to determine whether to exclude the first digital random signal and the second digital random signal based on the first validity signal and the second validity signal and to output a final digital random signal in accordance with the determined result.
- At least one of the first entropy source and the second entropy source comprises an inverting unit formed so that an input terminal and an output terminal are connected, and the inverting unit comprises at least one of an inverter, a NAND gate, or a NOR gate, or a combination thereof.
- At least one of the first digitizer and the second digitizer comprises an amplifier configured to amplify an analog random signal, wherein the amplifier comprises at least one of an inverter, an OR gate, an AND gate, or a NAND gate whose input and output terminals are connected, and a NOR gate whose input and output terminals are connected.
- At least one of the first digitizer and the second digitizer comprises a storage unit configured to store the amplified analog random signal as a digital random signal.
- the security device further comprises a storage unit configured to store the first digital random signal or the second digital random signal, and a second combination unit connected between the first digitizer or the second digitizer and the storage unit.
- the first combination unit comprises: a decoder configured to generate first to fourth operation signals in response to a selection signal; a first switching device configured to connect the first entropy source and the first digitizer in response to the first operation signal; a second switching device configured to connect the first entropy source and the second digitizer in response to the second operation signal; a third switching device configured to connect the second entropy source and the first digitizer in response to the third operation signal; and a fourth switching device configured to connect the second entropy source and the second digitizer in response to the fourth operation signal.
- the first combination unit comprises a multiplexer configured to transmit one of the first analog random signal and the second analog random signal to an output port in response to a selection signal.
- the multiplexer comprises: a first passive device configured to be turned on by the selection signal in a first state to transmit the first analog random signal, and a second passive device configured to be turned on by the selection signal in a second state to transmit the second analog random signal.
- the first combination unit comprises a passive crossbar configured to distribute the first and second analog random signals to the first and second digitizers in response to a selection signal of one bit.
- the passive crossbar comprises: a first passive device configured to be turned on by the selection signal in a first state to transmit the first analog random signal to the first digitizer; a second passive device configured to be turned on by the selection signal in a first state to transmit the second analog random signal to the second digitizer; a third passive device configured to be turned on by the selection signal in a second state to transmit the first analog random signal to the second digitizer; and a fourth passive device configured to be turned on by the selection signal in a second state to transmit the second analog random signal to the first digitizer.
- a security device includes: a random signal generating unit configured to generate digital random signals and a validity detecting unit configured to asynchronously detect transition of the digital random signals to detect validity of the digital random signals.
- the validity detecting unit comprises: an asynchronous detector configured to detect transition of the digital random signals, and a validity signal generator configured to generate validity signals in response to output signals of the asynchronous detector.
- the asynchronous detector comprises a first storage unit configured to receive the digital random signal as a clock signal and to output data in response to a clock signal and a second storage unit configured to receive a signal obtained by inverting the digital random signal as a clock signal and to output data in response to a clock signal.
- the validity signal generator comprises an XOR gate or a NOR gate.
- the asynchronous detector comprises: a first input terminal for receiving a digital random signal; a second input terminal for receiving an inverted signal of the digital random signal; and a selection terminal for receiving the digital random signal or the inverted signal of the digital random signal.
- the random signal generating unit comprises at least one of a static random access memory (SRAM) PUF, a ring oscillator PUF, a butterfly PUF, a flip-flop PUF, and an arbiter PUF.
- SRAM static random access memory
- the random signal generating unit comprises an entropy source configured to generate an analog random signal and a digitizer configured to digitize the analog random signal to generate a digital random signal.
- a method of determining a validity of a random signal using a semiconductor security device comprises: digitizing at least one analog random signal to generate a digitized random signal; detecting a transition of the digital random signal by an asynchronous detector, which includes: providing a first clock signal to the asynchronous detector; at a falling edge of the first clock signal, the asynchronous detector setting a reset signal to a first logic level and in response performing a reset operation; at a rising edge of the first clock signal, the asynchronous detector setting the reset signal to a second logic level and in response detecting a validity of the digital random signal and outputting an output signal; and generating a validity signal in response to the output signal from the asynchronous detector by a validity signal generator.
- the reset single first logic level is a “1” and the reset signal second logic level is a “0.”
- the method includes minimizing the time the reset signal is at the first logic level to minimize a blind zone, wherein the blind zone is a time period in which the validity detecting unit VD does not detect a transition or a fluctuation of the digital random signal.
- minimizing the blind zone includes controlling a ratio between the first clock signal and a second clock signal, wherein the ratio is at least 4:1, so that a period of the first clock signal is 1 ⁇ 4 or less than that of the second clock signal.
- the method further comprises generating the at least one analog random signal by at least one entropy source.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIG. 2 is a graph illustrating a ratio between an area occupied by a random number generating unit of a serial connection configuration and an area occupied by a random number generating unit in a security device according to the inventive concept;
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device according to aspect of the inventive concept
- FIGS. 4 to 11 illustrate detailed exemplary embodiments of a single entropy source
- FIG. 12 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- FIGS. 13 to 15 illustrate detailed exemplary embodiments of configurations of an element of a switching device
- FIGS. 16 to 18 are block diagrams schematically illustrating embodiments of security devices according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIG. 19 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an embodiment of a security device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.
- FIG. 20 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- FIG. 21 illustrates an example embodiments of a multiplexer and a de-multiplexer implemented by a passive devices
- FIGS. 22 to 24 illustrate example embodiments in which a first combination unit is implemented by multiplexers and/or de-multiplexers
- FIG. 25 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- FIG. 26 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a configuration of a passive crossbar
- FIG. 27 illustrates an embodiment of a generalized configuration of the first combination unit illustrated in FIG. 25 ;
- FIG. 28 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIGS. 29 and 30 illustrate exemplary embodiments of a validity detecting unit
- FIG. 31 is a timing diagram illustrating embodiments of signals of the security device of FIG. 30 ;
- FIGS. 32 and 33 are a block diagram and a timing diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIGS. 34 and 35 are a block diagram and a timing diagram schematically illustrating embodiments of security devices according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIG. 36 is a timing diagram illustrating an embodiment of processes of generating a reset signal of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIG. 37 is a timing diagram illustrating an embodiment of a reset signal and other signals of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIG. 38 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- FIG. 39 illustrates an embodiment of a detailed exemplary configuration of a finalizer
- FIG. 40 is a plan view schematically illustrating an embodiment of a semiconductor package in which a security device is implemented according to aspects of the inventive concept
- FIG. 41 is a plan view schematically illustrating an embodiment of a smart card in which a security device is implemented according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- FIG. 42 is a circuit diagram illustrating an embodiment of a semiconductor chip of the smart card of FIG. 41 in detail.
- inventive concept will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings.
- inventive concept may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the exemplary embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the inventive concept to one of ordinary skill in the art.
- first, second, etc. may be used herein to describe various elements, components, regions, and/or sections, these elements, components, regions, and/or sections should not be limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish one element, component, region, or section from another element, component, region, or section. Thus, a first element, component, region, or section discussed below could be termed a second element, component, region, or section without departing from the teachings of the inventive concept.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an embodiment of a security device 100 a according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- the security device 100 a may include an entropy source unit ESU, a digitizing unit DGU, a first combination unit CUL a validity detecting unit VD, and a finalizer FN.
- the entropy source unit ESU may include a plurality of entropy sources (refer, for examples, to ES 1 and ES 2 of FIG. 3 ).
- the entropy source may be configured to generate an analog random signal and the analog random signal may be a metastable signal.
- the entropy source may include an inverting unit for inverting an input signal and to output the inverted input signal, where an input terminal and an output terminal of the inverting unit may be connected. That is, the input terminal and the output terminal may be connected in the form of a loop.
- an inverter e.g., refer to FIG. 4
- FIG. 4 an inverter whose input and output terminals are connected, as an example of the inverting unit.
- an output voltage of the inverter converges to a metastable level and remains at that level. Due to thermal noise, the output voltage of the inverter stochastically changes at the metastable level.
- the digitizing unit DGU may include a plurality of digitizers (e.g., refer to DG 1 and DG 2 of FIG. 3 ).
- the digitizers may be configured to digitize analog random signals. As a result, digital random signals may be generated in this manner.
- the digitizers may include at least one serially connected amplifier.
- the analog random signals may be amplified by the amplifier to be amplified to levels that may be sampled by a sampling unit (not shown).
- the amplifier may include an inverting unit.
- the first combination unit CU 1 may be configured to connect at least one entropy source in the entropy source unit ESU with at least one digitizer in the digitizing unit DGU in response to a selection signal. Various combinations between the entropy source and the digitizer may be generated by the first combination unit CU 1 . Due to the various combinations, an area of a die required for implementing a random number generating unit may be reduced.
- the validity detecting unit VD may be configured to detect a validity of the digital random signals and to generate validity signals that represent a detection result.
- the digital random signals may be used as random signals for generating a PIN that may be used as an authentication key.
- the PIN must have a time-invariant characteristic in which a value of the PIN does not vary in accordance with a peripheral environment.
- the validity detecting unit VD may determine the time-invariant characteristics of the digital random signals, may generate the validity signals based on the determination result, and may transmit the generated validity signals to the finalizer FN.
- the finalizer FN may determine whether to exclude the digital random signals based on the validity signals.
- the finalizer FN may receive a plurality of digital random signals RAW OUTPUT from the plurality of digitizers and may receive the validity signals VALIDITY for the plurality of digital random signals from the validity detecting unit VD.
- the finalizer FN may exclude digital random signals that do not have time-invariant characteristics from the plurality of digital random signals based on the validity signals and may output the remaining digital random signals as final digital random signals.
- the entropy sources and the digitizers are serially connected, in order to implement a plurality of unit random number generating units, the entropy sources and the digitizers of the same number as that of unit random number generating units must be provided.
- n entropy and n digitizers are implemented, only n connection combinations may be obtained, that is, only n unit random number generating units may be implemented, which means that the number of connection combinations of the unit random number generating units linearly increases in proportion to the number of entropy sources and digitizers.
- various combinations between the entropy sources and the digitizers may be obtained by the first combination unit.
- n*n connection combinations may be obtained, that is, n*n unit random number generating units may be implemented, which means that the number of connection combinations of the unit random number generating units exponentially increases in accordance with the number of entropy sources and digitizers.
- connection combinations of the unit random number generating units are to be obtained
- the above connection combinations may be obtained only by the n entropy sources and the n digitizers.
- the total implementation area is 2*n*A.
- n*n entropy sources and n*n digitizers in order to obtain n*n combinations of unit random number generating units, n*n entropy sources and n*n digitizers must be provided. Therefore, when it is assumed that an implementation area of an entropy source and that of a digitizer are A, the total implementation area is n*n*A.
- FIG. 2 is a graph illustrating a ratio between an area occupied by a random number generating unit of a serial connection configuration and an area occupied by a random number generating unit in a security device according to the inventive concept.
- an area ratio of the configuration using the combination units to the serial connection configuration may be calculated as 2*n/n ⁇ circumflex over ( ) ⁇ 2. As illustrated in FIG. 2 , it is noted that the area ratio is reduced as the number n of connection combinations increases. As a result, as the number of required connection combinations increases, the area occupied by a random number generating device including combination units is smaller than that occupied by a common random number generating device and area efficiency of the random number generating device including the combination units increases.
- the inventive concept can be applied not only to a configuration in which entropy sources and digitizers are serially connected, but also to another configuration based on a static random access memory (SRAM) PUF, a ring oscillator PUF, a butterfly PUF, a flip-flop PUF, and an arbiter PUF.
- SRAM static random access memory
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device 100 b according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 b according to the embodiment may be a modification of the security device 100 a embodiment of FIG. 1 .
- redundant description of the present embodiment will be omitted.
- an entropy source unit ESU may include a first entropy source ES 1 configured to generate a first analog random signal and a second entropy source ES 2 configured to generate a second analog random signal. At least one of the first entropy source ES 1 and the second entropy source ES 2 may include an inverting unit formed so that an input terminal and an output terminal are connected.
- the inverting unit may include at least one of an inverter INV, a NAND gate, and/or a NOR gate and the input terminal and the output terminal of the inverting unit may be connected in the form of a loop.
- the inverting unit may be an inverter INV whose input and output terminals are connected, depicting various embodiments thereof.
- a switch SW may be connected between the input terminal and the output terminal of the inverter INV. The switch SW may be turned on and off in response to an enable signal EN received from the outside, external to the ESU and/or the security device.
- the switch SW When the switch SW is turned on, the input terminal and the output terminal of the inverter INV are connected. In this case, an output voltage of the inverter INV converges to a metastable level and remains at that level. Due to thermal noise, the output voltage of the inverter INV stochastically changes at the metastable level.
- the inverting unit may be a NAND gate or a NOR gate whose input and output terminals are connected.
- the enable signal EN for example, a logic “1”
- an output voltage of the NAND gate converges to a metastable level.
- the enable signal EN for example, a logic “0”
- an output voltage of the NOR gate converges to a metastable level.
- the inverting unit may further include a multiplexer (MUX) and an output terminal of the inverting unit (INV) and a first input terminal of the multiplexer may be connected together. Therefore, in accordance with a selection signal E applied to the multiplexer, an output voltage of the inverting unit may converge to a metastable level or a signal connected to a second input terminal of the multiplexer may be transmitted to the inverting unit.
- MUX multiplexer
- IMV output terminal of the inverting unit
- the inverter INV is illustrated as the inverting unit.
- the inverting unit of FIG. 8 may be implemented by a NAND gate and/or a NOR gate, rather than the inverter INV.
- input terminals of the NAND gate and the NOR gate may be configured to be connected.
- FIG. 9 illustrates a configuration in which the inverting unit is formed of the inverter INV and a threshold voltage Vth is applied to the input terminal of the inverter INV. Due to the thermal noise of the threshold voltage, the output voltage of the inverter INV may stochastically change.
- the embodiment of FIG. 10 illustrates a configuration in which variable resistances (R 1 and R 2 ) connected to the inverter INV are further implemented in addition to the configuration of FIG. 9 and the threshold voltage characteristic of the inverter INV may be controlled by the variable resistances.
- FIG. 11 illustrates a configuration in which the threshold voltage Vth applied to the inverter INV may be controlled by changing the variable resistances.
- the first entropy source ES 1 may include the NAND gate illustrated in FIG. 6 .
- the second entropy source ES 2 may include the NOR gate illustrated in FIG. 7 . It will be easily understood that the configurations of the first entropy source ES 1 and the second entropy source ES 2 are exemplary and one of the configurations illustrated in FIGS. 4 to 11 may optionally alternatively be used.
- the digitizing unit DGU may include a first digitizer DG 1 configured to digitize an analog random signal to generate a first digital random signal and a second digitizer DG 2 configured to digitize an analog random signal to generate a second digital random signal.
- the first digitizer DG 1 and/or the second digitizer DG 2 may be configured to receive a metastable signal output from the first entropy source ES 1 and/or the second entropy source ES 2 , to amplify the metastable signal, and to output a digital random signal.
- the first digitizer DG 1 and/or the second digitizer DG 2 may include at least one serially connected inverting unit (for example, the inverter or the NAND gate).
- the metastable signal input to the first digitizer DG 1 and/or the second digitizer DG 2 may be amplified to a samplable level while passing through the at least one inverting unit.
- the first digitizer DG 1 and/or the second digitizer DG 2 may include a storage unit (for example, a sampling flip-flop).
- the storage unit may be configured to perform a sampling operation and to store the analog random signal amplified by the at least one inverting unit in the first digitizer DG 1 and/or the second digitizer DG 2 as the digital random signal.
- the first combination unit CU 1 may be configured to connect at least one of the first entropy source ES 1 and the second entropy source ES 2 to at least one of the first digitizer DG 1 and the second digitizer DG 2 based on at least one selection signal S 0 and S 1 .
- Detailed exemplary configurations of the first combination unit CU 1 will be described with reference to the embodiments of FIGS. 12, 16, and 19 to 26 .
- the validity detecting unit VD may be configured to detect a validity of the first digital random signal output by the first digitizer DG 1 to generate a first validity signal and to detect a validity of the second digital random signal to generate a second validity signal.
- Detailed exemplary configurations of the validity detecting unit VD will be described later with reference to the embodiments of FIGS. 28 to 38 .
- the finalizer FN may be configured to determine whether to exclude the first digital random signal and the second digital random signal based on the first validity signal and the second validity signal and to output a final digital random signal in accordance with the determination result.
- a detailed exemplary configuration of the finalizer FN will be described later with reference to the embodiment of FIG. 39 .
- FIG. 12 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device 100 c according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 c according to the embodiment of the inventive concept may be a modification of the security device 100 b embodiment of FIG. 3 . Redundant description of the embodiment will be omitted.
- the first combination unit CU 1 may include a decoder DEC, a first switching device SW 1 , a second switching device SW 2 , a third switching device SW 3 , and a fourth switching device SW 4 .
- the decoder DEC may be configured to generate first to fourth operation signals in response to the selection signals S 0 and S 1 . For example, when logical values of the selection signals are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1), the first to fourth operation signals may be generated. The first to fourth operation signals are applied to the first to fourth switching devices SW 1 , SW 2 , SW 3 , and SW 4 , respectively.
- the first switching device SW 1 may be configured to connect the first entropy source ES 1 and the first digitizer DG 1 in response to the first operation signal.
- the second switching device SW 2 may be configured to connect the first entropy source ES 1 and the second digitizer DG 2 in response to the second operation signal.
- the third switching device SW 3 may be configured to connect the second entropy source ES 2 and the first digitizer DG 1 in response to the third operation signal.
- the fourth switching device SW 4 may be configured to connect the second entropy source ES 2 and the second digitizer DG 2 in response to the fourth operation signal.
- the first to fourth switching devices SW 1 , SW 2 , SW 3 , and SW 4 used in the present embodiment may be implemented by passive devices for directly transmitting the analog random signals generated by the entropy sources to the digitizers.
- the switching devices are implemented by active devices that have their own metastability level, it is not suitable for transmitting the analog random signals.
- switching devices according to the inventive concept may be formed in the way not to have their own metastability level. Examples in which the switching devices are implemented by the passive devices are exemplarily illustrated in the embodiments of FIGS. 13 to 15 .
- the switching device may be implemented as a p-type metal oxide semiconductor (PMOS) transistor, an n-type metal oxide semiconductor (NMOS) transistor, or a path-gate, respectively.
- PMOS p-type metal oxide semiconductor
- NMOS n-type metal oxide semiconductor
- path-gate of FIG. 15 when the operation signal generated by the decoder DEC is applied to a gate of the NMOS transistor, the NMOS transistor is turned on so that the entropy source and the digitizer connected to both ends of the NMOS transistor are electrically connected.
- the operation signal is inverted by the inverter and applied to a gate of the PMOS transistor.
- the PMOS transistor is turned on so that the entropy source and the digitizer connected to both ends of the PMOS transistor are electrically connected.
- the entropy source and the digitizer may be electrically connected by a similar principle to that of the path-gate of FIG. 15 .
- FIGS. 16 to 18 are block diagrams schematically illustrating other embodiments of security devices 100 d , 100 e , and 100 f according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- Security devices 100 d , 100 e , and 100 f according to the embodiments of the inventive concept may be modifications of the security device 100 c according to the embodiment of FIG. 3 . Redundant description of the embodiments will be omitted.
- entropy source unit ESU includes four entropy sources and the digitizing unit DGU includes four digitizers is illustrated.
- the decoder DEC may generate operation signals for operating the 16 switching devices in response to selection signals of, for example, four bits.
- the selection signals may be generated by a selection signal generator (not shown). In the present embodiment, it is illustrated that the operation signals of the switching devices are output through the decoder DEC. However, the operation signals may be directly output from the selection signal generator to be applied to the switching devices.
- the security devices 100 e and 100 f may include n entropy sources and m digitizers.
- n*m connection combinations may be obtained.
- the entropy sources and the digitizers may be implemented by inverters as illustrated in the embodiment of FIG. 17 or elements other than the inverters, such as NAND gates and NOR gates as illustrated in the embodiment of FIG. 18 .
- the digitizer may include a storage unit, such as a non-transitory memory storage device or media.
- the storage unit may be configured to store analog random signals amplified by a plurality of inverting units in the digitizer as digital random signals.
- the plurality of digital random signals stored in the storage unit (for example, a D flip-flop) illustrated in FIGS. 17 and 18 may be output in response to a clock signal and the output digital random signals may be filtered through the validity detecting unit and the finalizer. As a result of the filtering, a PUF output signal having a time-invariant characteristic may be generated.
- FIG. 19 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an embodiment of a security device 100 g according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 g may further include a second combination unit CU 2 connected between a plurality of digitizing units and a plurality of storage units.
- a second combination unit CU 2 connected between a plurality of digitizing units and a plurality of storage units.
- FIGS. 17 and 18 configurations in which the digitizers and the storage units are connected in a ratio of one-to-one are illustrated.
- additional combination units may be included between the digitizers and the storage units (that is, a configuration in which the digitizers and the storage units are connected in a ratio of x to y) so that connection combinations between the digitizers and the storage units may be provided. Further, as illustrated in FIG.
- additional combination units may be included between the digitizing units and the storage units (that is, a configuration in which the digitizing units and the storage units are connected in a ratio of x′ to y′) so that connection combinations between the digitizing units and the storage units may be provided.
- the entropy source unit ESU, the first combination unit CU 1 , and the second combination unit CU 2 may form a basic PUF cell and the storage unit may be omitted from the basic PUF cell.
- the digital random signal output from the basic PUF cell may be selectively transmitted to the storage unit by the second combination unit CU 2 .
- an optimal random signal may be generated while minimizing the implementation areas of the combination unit and the storage unit.
- the validity detecting unit (VD) and the finalizer FN in the security device described with reference to FIGS. 1 to 19 may be connected between the PUF cell and the second combination unit CU 2 or between the second combination unit CU 2 and the storage unit.
- FIG. 20 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device 100 h according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 h according to the embodiment may be a modification of the security device 100 c according to the embodiment of FIG. 12 . Redundant description of the embodiment will be omitted.
- a first combination unit CU 1 in a security device 100 h may include a multiplexer MUX configured to transmit a first analog random signal or a second analog random signal to an output port in response to a first selection signal S 0 .
- the first combination unit CU 1 may include a demultiplexer DEMUX configured to receive the signal received to the output port and to transmit the signal to a first digitizer DG 1 or a second digitizer DG 2 in response to a second selection signal S 1 .
- the multiplexer MUX and the demultiplexer DEMUX may be implemented by passive devices. Therefore, an analog random signal generated by an entropy source may be directly transmitted to a digitizer without corruption of its metastability level.
- the multiplexer MUX may include a first path-gate PG 1 configured to be turned on by the first selection signal S 0 in a first state to transmit the first analog random signal and a second path-gate PG 2 configured to be turned on by the first selection signal S 0 in a second state to transmit the second analog random signal.
- the demultiplexer DEMUX may include a third path-gate PG 3 configured to be turned on by the second selection signal S 1 in a first state to transmit an input analog random signal to the first digitizer DG 1 and a fourth path-gate PG 4 configured to be turned on by the second selection signal S 1 in a second state to transmit an input analog random signal to the second digitizer DG 2 .
- a path-gate configuration is illustrated in the embodiment of FIG. 21 as an example of forming the multiplexer MUX and the demultiplexer DEMUX, it will be understood that the multiplexer MUX and the demultiplexer DEMUX may be implemented by other types of passive devices, such as NMOS switches or PMOS switches, instead of the path-gate configuration.
- FIGS. 22 to 24 illustrate various example embodiments in which a first combination unit CU 1 is implemented by multiplexers MUX and/or demultiplexers DEMUX.
- a first combination unit CU 1 may include one multiplexer MUX and one demultiplexer DEMUX. Like in the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 21 , one of a plurality of analog random signals is selected through the multiplexer MUX and the selected analog random signal may be transmitted to one of a plurality of digitizers through the demultiplexer DEMUX.
- the first combination unit CU 1 may include a plurality of multiplexers MUX and one demultiplexer DEMUX. That is, the plurality of multiplexers MUX are arranged through a number of operations so that one analog random signal may be selected through the multiplexers MUX to be transmitted to the demultiplexer DEMUX. The selected analog random signal may be transmitted to one of a plurality of digitizers through the demultiplexer DEMUX.
- FIG. 24 illustrates an example in which a first combination unit is implemented by only a plurality of multiplexers.
- a first combination unit may include a group consisting of a plurality of multiplexers and the group may be provided to correspond to the number of digitizers.
- the number of multiplexers in the group may be proportional to the number of entropy sources.
- the number of multiplexer groups may be y and the number of multiplexers in the group may be x ⁇ 1. Therefore, (x ⁇ 1)*y multiplexers are provided.
- the first combination unit may include four (4) multiplexer groups of the same number as that (that is, four) of the digitizer groups.
- the number of multiplexers in the group is 3, which is obtained by subtracting one from the number of entropy sources. Therefore, 12 multiplexers are provided.
- FIG. 25 is a block diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device 100 i according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 i according to the embodiment may be a modification of the security device 100 c according to the embodiment of FIG. 12 . Redundant description of the embodiment will be omitted.
- a first combination unit CU 1 may include a passive crossbar PC configured to transmit a first analog random signal of a first entropy source unit ES 1 and a second analog random signal of a second entropy source unit ES 2 to a first digitizer DG 1 and a second digitizer DG 2 in response to a selection signal (for example, a signal S 0 of one bit), where the transmission from ES 1 and ES 2 to DG 1 and DG 2 or to DG 2 and DG 1 depends on the logical state of S 0 .
- the passive crossbar PC may include a multiplexer MUX for selecting one of analog random signals input to two input terminals in response to the selection signal.
- the multiplexer MUX may be implemented by a passive device as described above.
- the passive crossbar PC may include a first multiplexer MUX 1 and a second multiplexer MUX 2 .
- a first input terminal of the first multiplexer MUX 1 may be connected to the first entropy source ES 1
- a second input terminal of the first multiplexer MUX 1 may be connected to the second entropy source ES 2
- an output terminal of the first multiplexer MUX 1 may be connected to the first digitizer DG 1 .
- a first input terminal of the second multiplexer MUX 2 may be connected to the second entropy source ES 2
- a second input terminal of the second multiplexer MUX 2 may be connected to the first entropy source ES 1
- an output terminal of the second multiplexer MUX 2 may be connected to the second digitizer DG 2 .
- the second multiplexer MUX 2 may select the second analog random signal of the second entropy source ES 2 and may transmit the second analog random signal of the second entropy source ES 2 to the second digitizer DG 2 .
- the first multiplexer MUX 1 may select the second analog random signal of the second entropy source ES 2 and may transmit the second analog random signal of the second entropy source ES 2 to the first digitizer DG 1 .
- the second multiplexer MUX 2 may select the first analog random signal of the first entropy source ES 1 and may transmit the first analog random signal of the first entropy source ES 1 to the second digitizer DG 2 .
- the passive crossbar PC may include a first passive device, a second passive device, a third passive device, and a fourth passive device.
- each MUX (MUX 1 and MUX 2 ) could comprise at least 2 path-gates PG, as in the MUX of FIG. 21 .
- the first and third passive devices may be included in the first multiplexer MUX 1 and the second and fourth passive devices may be included in the second multiplexer MUX 2 .
- FIG. 27 A generalized configuration of the first combination unit CU 1 illustrated in FIG. 25 is illustrated in FIG. 27 .
- the first combination unit CU 1 may be implemented by a plurality of passive crossbars.
- 12 passive crossbars S 00 to S 32
- Such a configuration requires that selection signals of a plurality of bits be provided, however, CU 1 has an advantage in that the entropy sources and the digitizers may be connected by a fastest route. That is, it is possible to minimize the number of multiplexers between the entropy sources of ESU and the digitizers of DGU.
- FIG. 28 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an embodiment of a security device 100 j according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 j may include a random signal generator RSG and a validity detecting unit VD.
- the random signal generator RSG may be configured to generate a digital random signal.
- the random signal generator RSG may include at least one of an SRAM PUF, a ring oscillator PUF, a butterfly PUF, a flip-flop PUF, and an arbiter PUF.
- the random signal generator RSG may include the configurations (for example, the entropy source unit, the first combination unit, and the digitizing unit) illustrated and described in the above-described embodiments. Hereinafter, redundant description of the embodiment will be omitted.
- the validity detecting unit VD may be configured to asynchronously detect transition of a digital random signal to detect validity (for example, a time-invariant characteristic) of the digital random signal.
- the validity detecting unit VD may include an asynchronous detector AD and a validity signal generator VSG.
- the asynchronous detector AD may be configured to detect transition of the digital random signal from a first state (for example, a low state or a logic ‘0’) to a second state (for example, a high state or a logic ‘1’) and transition of the digital random signal from the second state (for example, the high state or the logic ‘1’) to the first state (for example, the low state or the logic ‘0’).
- the validity signal generator VSG may be configured to generate a validity signal in response to an output signal of the asynchronous detector AD.
- the asynchronous detector AD may detect an edge or glitch of the digital random signal to generate the output signal and the validity signal generator VSG may generate the validity signal in response to a change in the output signal, i.e., a change in logic level of the output signal.
- the asynchronous detector AD may include a first storage unit SU 1 and a second storage unit SU 2 and the validity signal generator VSG may include an XOR gate.
- the first storage unit SU 1 may be configured to receive the digital random signal as a first clock signal and to output data in response to the first clock signal.
- the first storage unit SU 1 may output stored data.
- the second storage unit SU 2 may be configured to receive a clock signal obtained by inverting the digital random signal and to output data in response to the clock signal.
- the asynchronous detector AD may further include an inverting unit for inverting the digital random signal.
- the transited signal may be inverted through the inverting unit to be applied to a clock signal input terminal of the second storage unit SU 2 .
- the second storage unit SU 2 may output stored data.
- the validity signal generator VSG may include the XOR gate and the XOR gate may include a first input terminal for receiving an output signal of the first storage unit SU 1 and a second input terminal for receiving an output signal of the second storage unit SU 2 .
- the XOR gate may perform an XOR operation based on the output signals to output the operation result as validity signals.
- the data stored in the first storage unit SU 1 and the second storage unit SU 2 represents whether the transition of the digital random signal occurs and may be the same data (for example, a VDD signal or a logic ‘1’ signal).
- the XOR gate may output a logic ‘0’ signal.
- the XOR gate may output a logic ‘1’ signal.
- a first storage unit SU 1 , a second storage unit SU 2 , and a third storage unit SU 3 may be implemented by D flip-flops.
- a reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’
- outputs of the first storage unit SU 1 and the second storage unit SU 2 are logic ‘0’ so that an output of an XOR gate is also logic ‘0’. Therefore, an output signal FAIL (that is, an output signal of the third storage unit SU 3 ) that represents whether a signal is valid is also maintained to be logic ‘0’.
- the first storage unit SU 1 and the second storage unit SU 2 perform detecting operations. For example, when transition of a digital random signal PUF_DATA from ‘0’ to ‘1’ occurs, the output of the first storage unit SU 1 is logic ‘1’ so that the output of the XOR gate provides a transition signal from the logic ‘0’ to the logic ‘1’ to the third storage unit SU 3 . As a result, the output signal FAIL (that is, the output signal of the D flip-flop) that represents whether a signal is valid is logic ‘1’. The output signal FAIL is maintained until the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’.
- the output of the second storage unit SU 2 is logic ‘1’ so that the output of the XOR gate provides the transition signal from the logic ‘0’ to the logic ‘1’ to the third storage unit SU 3 .
- the output signal FAIL (that is, the output signal of the D flip-flop) that represents whether a signal is valid is logic ‘1’.
- the output signal FAIL is maintained until the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’.
- FIG. 31 is an embodiment of a timing diagram illustrating signals of the security device 100 k ′ of FIG. 30 .
- the security device detects the transition (for example, the transition from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or the transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’) of the digital random signal PUF_DATA to generate the output signal FAIL (for example, logic ‘1’) that represents whether a signal is valid while the reset signal RESET is logic ‘0’.
- the transition for example, the transition from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or the transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’
- FAIL for example, logic ‘1’
- FIGS. 32 and 33 are other embodiments of a block diagram and a timing diagram, respectively, schematically illustrating a security device 100 l according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 l according to the embodiment may be a modification of the security device 100 j according to the embodiment of FIG. 28 .
- redundant description of the embodiment will be omitted.
- the output signal FAIL that represents whether a signal is valid is 0.
- an output signal VALID that represents whether a signal is valid is ‘1’. That is, the output signal FAIL in a normal state is maintained as ‘0’ in FIGS. 30 and 31 and the output signal VALID in a normal state is maintained as 1 in FIGS. 32 and 33 .
- an asynchronous detector AD may include a first storage unit SU 1 and a second storage unit SU 2 .
- the first storage unit SU 1 and the second storage unit SU 2 have similar functions to those of the first storage unit SU 1 and the second storage unit SU 2 of FIG. 30 in that the first storage unit SU 1 and the second storage unit SU 2 receive a digital random signal as a clock signal to detect transition of the digital random signal.
- the asynchronous detector AD may further include a third multiplexer MUX 3 and a fourth multiplexer MUX 4 .
- a first input terminal of the third multiplexer MUX 3 may receive a digital random signal PUF_DATA and a second input terminal of the third multiplexer MUX 3 may receive an enable signal EN (for example, a logic ‘1’ signal).
- EN for example, a logic ‘1’ signal.
- the third multiplexer MUX 3 may receive an output signal Q 1 of the first storage unit SU 1 as a selection signal and an output signal of the third multiplexer MUX 3 may be applied to a clock signal input terminal of the first storage unit SU 1 .
- a first input terminal of the fourth multiplexer MUX 4 may receive a signal obtained by inverting the digital random signal PUF_DATA and a second input terminal of the fourth multiplexer MUX 4 may receive the enable signal EN (or the logic ‘1’ signal).
- the fourth multiplexer MUX 4 may receive an output signal Q 2 of the second storage unit SU 2 as a selection signal and an output signal of the fourth multiplexer MUX 4 may be applied to a clock signal input terminal of the second storage unit SU 2 .
- a validity signal generator VSG may include a NOR gate.
- a first input terminal of the NOR gate may receive the output signal of the first output unit SU 1 and a second input terminal of the NOR gate may receive the output signal of the second storage unit SU 2 . Therefore, when the output signal of the third multiplexer MUX 3 is transited, a logic ‘1’ is applied to the first input terminal and, when the output signal of the fourth multiplexer MUX 4 is transited, a logic ‘1’ is applied to the second input terminal.
- the first storage unit SU 1 and the second storage unit SU 2 perform detecting operations. For example, when transition of the digital random signal PUF_DATA from ‘0’ to ‘1’ occurs, the first storage unit SU 1 is logic ‘1’ so that an output signal VALID (that is, the output signal of the NOR gate) that represents whether a signal is valid is maintained to be logic ‘0’. Since an output signal Q 1 of the first storage unit SU 1 is logic ‘1’, the selection signal Q 1 of the third multiplexer MUX 3 is logic ‘1’ so that the third multiplexer MUX 3 may transmit the signal EN (for example, logic ‘1’) of the second input terminal to the first storage unit SU 1 . Therefore, the first storage unit SU 1 continuously outputs the logic ‘1’ signal so that the output signal VALID is continuously maintained to be logic ‘0’ until the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’.
- the first storage unit SU 1 continuously outputs the logic ‘1’ signal so that the output signal VALID is continuously maintained to be logic ‘
- the second storage unit SU 2 is logic ‘1’ so that the output signal VALID (that is, the output signal of the NOR gate) that represents whether a signal is valid is 0. Since the output signal Q 2 of the second storage unit SU 2 is logic ‘1’, the selection signal Q 2 of the fourth multiplexer MUX 4 is logic ‘1’ so that the fourth multiplexer MUX 4 may transmit the signal EN (for example, logic ‘1’) of the second input terminal to the second storage unit SU 2 . Therefore, the second storage unit SU 2 continuously outputs the logic ‘1’ signal so that the output signal VALID is continuously maintained to be logic ‘0’ until the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’.
- the output signal VALID that is, the output signal of the NOR gate
- FIG. 33 is an embodiment of a timing diagram illustrating signals of the security device 100 l of FIG. 32 .
- the security device 100 l detects the transition (for example, the transition from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or the transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’) of the digital random signal to generate the output signal (for example, logic ‘0’) that represents whether a signal is valid while the reset signal RESET is logic ‘0’.
- the transition for example, the transition from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or the transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’
- the output signal for example, logic ‘0’
- the validity detecting unit of the security device 100 l may be implemented by only two storage units. Therefore, the implementation area of the validity detecting unit of the security device 100 l may be smaller than that of the validity detecting unit of the security device 100 k ′ that requires three storage units according to the embodiment of FIG. 30 .
- FIGS. 34 and 35 are a block diagram and a timing diagram schematically illustrating another embodiment of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a security device 100 m according to the embodiment may be a modification of the security device 100 j according to the embodiment of FIG. 28 . Redundant description of the embodiment will be omitted.
- an asynchronous detector AD may include an OR gate and an AND gate.
- a first input terminal of the OR gate may receive a digital random signal PUF_DATA and a second input terminal of the OR gate may receive an output signal of the OR gate, via a fifth multiplexer MUX 5 and a sixth multiplexer MUX 6 .
- a first input terminal of the AND gate may receive a digital random signal PUF_DATA and a second input terminal of the AND gate may receive an output signal of the AND gate, via a seventh multiplexer MUX 7 and an eighth multiplexer MUX 8 .
- the fifth multiplexer MUX 5 and the sixth multiplexer MUX 6 may be connected together to form a feedback route or path of the OR gate output signal.
- the output signal of the OR gate is applied to a first input terminal of the fifth multiplexer MUX 5 and a logic ‘0’ signal may be applied to a second input terminal of the fifth multiplexer MUX 5 .
- a reset signal RESET may be applied to a selection signal input terminal of the fifth multiplexer MUX 5 .
- a logic ‘0’ signal may be applied to a first input terminal of the sixth multiplexer MUX 6 and a logic ‘1’ signal may be applied to a second input terminal of the sixth multiplexer MUX 6 .
- An output signal of the fifth multiplexer MUX 5 may be applied to a selection signal input terminal of the sixth multiplexer MUX 6 .
- the seventh multiplexer MUX 7 and the eighth multiplexer MUX 8 may be connected together to form a feedback route or path of the AND gate output signal.
- the output signal of the AND gate may be applied to a first input terminal of the seventh multiplexer MUX 7 and a logic ‘1’ signal may be applied to a second input terminal of the seventh multiplexer MUX 7 .
- the reset signal RESET may be applied to a selection signal input terminal of the seventh multiplexer MUX 7 .
- a logic ‘0’ signal may be applied to a first input terminal of the eighth multiplexer MUX 8 and a logic ‘1’ signal may be applied to a second input terminal of the eighth multiplexer MUX 8 .
- An output signal of the seventh multiplexer MUX 7 may be applied to a selection signal input terminal of the eighth multiplexer MUX 8 .
- the asynchronous detector AD may further include a ninth multiplexer MUX 9 and a fourth storage unit SU 4 .
- the output signal of the OR gate may be applied to a first input terminal I 1 of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 and a signal obtained by inverting the output signal of the AND gate may be applied to a second input terminal I 2 of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 .
- the fourth storage unit SU 4 may receive a signal obtained by inverting the reset signal RESET, via INV 2 , as a clock signal and may receive the digital random signal PUF_DATA as data to transmit the digital random signal PUF_DATA to a selection signal input terminal of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 in accordance with the clock signal.
- a validity signal generator VSG may include a NOR gate.
- the reset signal RESET may be applied to a first input terminal of the NOR gate and an output signal of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 may be applied to a second input terminal of the NOR gate.
- the fifth multiplexer MUX 5 When the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’, the fifth multiplexer MUX 5 outputs a logic ‘0’ signal so that the sixth multiplexer MUX 6 outputs a logic ‘0’ signal. Therefore, the OR gate outputs the same logic value as that of the digital random signal. In addition, when the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’, the seventh multiplexer MUX 7 outputs a logic ‘1’ signal and the eighth multiplexer MUX 8 outputs a logic ‘1’ signal. Therefore, the AND gate also outputs the same logic value as that of the digital random input signal PUF_DATA.
- the asynchronous detector AD and the validity signal generator VSG perform detecting operations. Since the fourth storage unit SU 4 operates during the detecting operations, a signal PUF_DATA stored in the fourth storage unit SU 4 is applied to the selection signal input terminal of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 . Therefore, the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 may select one of a signal PUF_DATA input to the first input terminal I 1 and a signal ⁇ PUF_DATA input to the second input terminal I 2 based on the signal PUF_DATA applied to the selection signal input terminal and may output the selected signal.
- the digital random signal PUF_DATA is logic ‘0’
- the signal applied to the first input terminal I 1 is logic ‘0’
- the signal applied to the second input terminal 12 is logic ‘1’.
- the signal applied to the selection signal input terminal of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 is logic ‘0’ so that the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 outputs the signal PUF_DATA input to the first input terminal. Therefore, a logic ‘0’ signal (that is, the signal PUF_DATA input to the first input terminal) is applied to the second input terminal of the NOR gate.
- the signal applied to the first input terminal I 1 is logic ‘1’ and the signal applied to the second input terminal I 2 is logic ‘0’.
- the signal applied to the selection signal input terminal of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 is logic ‘1’ so that the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 outputs the signal ⁇ PUF_DATA input to the second input terminal. Therefore, a logic ‘0’ signal (that is, the signal ⁇ PUF_DATA input to the first input terminal) is applied to the second input terminal of the NOR gate.
- the logic ‘0’ signal is applied to the second input terminal of the NOR gate. Since the reset signal RESET is also logic ‘0’ during the detecting operations, the NOR gate outputs a logic ‘1’ signal and the output signal VALID is continuously maintained to be logic ‘1’ unless transition occurs.
- the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 may output a logic ‘1’ signal to the second input terminal of the NOR gate.
- the logic ‘1’ signal is applied to the second input terminal of the NOR gate.
- the NOR gate outputs a logic ‘0’ signal.
- the output signal VALID is continuously maintained to be logic ‘0’ until the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’.
- the security device 100 m may be generalized to have a configuration in which the digital random signal PUF_DATA is applied to the first input terminal I 1 of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 , the signal obtained by inverting the digital random signal PUF_DATA is applied to the second input terminal I 2 of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 , and the digital random signal is again applied to the selection signal input terminal of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 .
- the inverted form of the digital random signal PUF_DATA may be input to the selection signal input terminal of the ninth multiplexer MUX 9 instead of the digital random signal.
- FIG. 35 is an embodiment of a timing diagram illustrating signals of the security device 100 m of FIG. 34 .
- the security device 100 m detects the transition (for example, the transition from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or the transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’) of the digital random signal PUF_DATA to generate the output signal VALID (for example, logic ‘0’) that represents whether a signal is valid while the reset signal RESET is logic ‘0’.
- the transition for example, the transition from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or the transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’
- VALID for example, logic ‘0’
- the validity detecting unit VD of the security device 100 m may be implemented by only one storage unit. Therefore, the implementation area of the validity detecting unit VD of the security device 100 m may be smaller than that of the validity detecting unit VD of the security device 100 l that requires two storage units, according to the embodiment of FIG. 32 .
- FIG. 36 is an embodiment of a timing diagram illustrating processes of generating a reset signal RESET of a security device according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a first clock signal QCLK quick clock signal
- SCLK slow clock signal
- a period of the QCLK signal may be 1 ⁇ 4 of that of the SCLK signal
- the QCLK signal and the SCLK signal may be synchronized with each other, and the digital random signal may be sampled at a rising edge of the SCLK signal.
- a reset signal RESET may be generated at a falling edge of the QCLK signal to be logic ‘1’ and a reset operation of the security device 100 m is performed while the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’.
- the reset signal RESET may be logic ‘0’ at a rising edge of the QCLK signal and an operation of detecting validity of the digital random signal may be performed after the reset signal RESET is logic ‘0’.
- a validity signal is meaningless.
- the period is referred to as “a blind zone”. Since validity of random numbers generated in the period is not detected, it is preferable that the period in which the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’ be maintained is relatively short.
- a conventional validity detecting unit VD uses a synchronous configuration, the blind zone is generated every cycle.
- validity of a digital random signal is performed based on a generated synchronous clock, in a period when the synchronous clock is deactivated, although transition of the digital random signal occurs, it is not possible to detect the transition of the digital random signal.
- the security device uses an asynchronous configuration, it is possible to minimize the blind zone.
- the blind zone is generated only in the period where the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’. Therefore, it is possible to minimize the blind zone by minimizing the period in which the reset signal RESET is logic ‘1’.
- the blind zone may be minimized by controlling a period ratio (that is, a frequency ratio) between the QCLK signal and the SCLK signal.
- the frequency ratio between the QCLK signal and the SCLK signal illustrated in FIG. 36 is 4:1, for this embodiment.
- the blind zone that is, a time period in which the validity detecting unit VD may not detect transition or fluctuation of the digital random signal
- the blind zone may be reduced to 1 ⁇ 2.
- FIG. 37 is an embodiment of a timing diagram illustrating a reset signal RESET and other signals of a security device according to an embodiment of the inventive concept.
- the reset signal RESET may be generated using the SCLK signal and the QCLK signal and the period (that is, a time period in which the reset signal RESET remains logic ‘1’ before being changed into logic ‘0’) in which the reset signal RESET is generated corresponds to the blind zone Tb.
- the reset signal RESET is generated using two signals (the SCLK signal and the QCLK signal).
- the inventive concept is not limited thereto and the reset signal may be generated using only one signal, that is, the SCLK signal and a signal obtained by delaying the SCLK signal. That is, after generating a delay signal based on the SCLK signal, the reset signal may be generated at a rising edge of the delay signal.
- a signal ENH means an enable signal EN for the validity detecting unit VD and a signal SEL ⁇ n:0> may correspond to the selection signal applied to the first combination unit (or applied to the decoder connected to the first combination unit) according to the above-described embodiments.
- FIG. 38 is a block diagram schematically illustrating an embodiment of a security device 100 n according to another aspect of the inventive concept.
- a first digital random signal generated by a random signal generator RSG may be ‘0’
- a second digital random signal may be ‘0’
- a third digital random signal may be ‘1’
- a fourth digital random signal may be ‘1’.
- a validity detecting unit VD may detect validity (that is, fluctuation) of the first to fourth digital random signals.
- the validity detecting unit VD may transmit a logic ‘1’ signal representing that the first and third digital random signals are valid to a finalizer FN.
- transition of the second and fourth digital random signals occurs in a detecting period so that the second and fourth digital random signals may be determined as non-valid signals.
- the validity detecting unit VD may transmit a logic ‘0’ signal to the finalizer FN indicating that the second to fourth digital random signals are not valid.
- the finalizer FN may receive validity signals from the validity detecting unit VD to output the first digital random signal (logic ‘0’) and the third digital random signal (logic ‘1’), having time-invariant characteristics among the first to fourth digital random signals, as final digital random signals.
- the finalizer FN may receive a plurality of digital random signals and validity signals for the digital random signals and may output digital random signals corresponding to the validity signals as final digital random signals only when the validity signals are logic ‘1’.
- FIG. 40 is a plan view schematically illustrating an embodiment of a semiconductor package in which a security device is implemented according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a semiconductor package according to the embodiment may include a security device according to the above-described embodiments.
- a security device 100 may be implemented on a semiconductor chip 500 and the semiconductor chip 500 may be mounted on a printed circuit board (PCB) 600 .
- a chip pad 550 of the semiconductor chip 500 may be electrically connected to an external terminal 650 of the PCB 600 through a bond wire 570 , for example. Therefore, a first power supply VCC, a second power supply VSS, and a clock signal CLK applied from the external terminal 650 may be applied to the semiconductor chip 500 through the bond wire 570 and a random signal RN generated by the security device 100 may be output to the external terminal 650 through the chip pad 550 and the bond wire 570 .
- the packaging method and configuration illustrated in FIG. 40 is only an example and the semiconductor package may be implemented using other various packaging methods and configurations.
- FIG. 41 is a plan view schematically illustrating an embodiment of a smart card 700 in which a security device 100 is implemented according to aspects of the inventive concept.
- a smart card 700 according to the embodiment may include the security device 100 according to the above-described embodiments.
- authentication of a card user is basically performed by the smart card 700 , authentication between a card reader (not shown) and the smart card 700 is required.
- the authentication may be performed by, for example, the card reader receiving authentication information stored in the smart card 700 to check authority.
- it since it is necessary to maintain security for the authentication information, it is necessary to implement an appropriate algorithm for encoding the authentication information and a security device used for the algorithm.
- the semiconductor chip 500 may include the security device according to the embodiments of the inventive concept in order to perform the above-described authentication.
- An antenna 800 may receive a power supply from the card reader to transmit the received power supply to the semiconductor chip 500 that includes the security device 100 or may transmit the encoded authentication information generated by the semiconductor chip 500 .
- FIG. 42 is an embodiment of a circuit diagram illustrating a semiconductor chip of the smart card of FIG. 41 in detail.
- the semiconductor chip 500 may include a power supply circuit, a clock generating circuit, a logic circuit, and a data communication circuit.
- the power supply circuit may generate a direct current (DC) power supply based on an alternating current (AC) signal received from the antenna 800 .
- the power supply circuit may include a power on reset circuit for resetting previously stored data as the power supply is applied.
- the clock generating circuit may convert the AC signal received from the antenna 800 into a clock signal CLK to apply the clock signal CLK to the logic circuit.
- the logic circuit may include a controller CONTROLLER, a memory MEMORY, and a security device RANDOM NUMBER GENERATING DEVICE.
- the security device generates a final digital random signal RN. Since the configuration of the security device is illustrated in the above-described embodiment, description thereof will be omitted.
- the controller may be configured to encode the authentication information based on the final digital random signal RN generated by the security device.
- the memory stores the authentication information, the final digital random signal RN, and the encoded authentication information.
- the data communication circuit processes the information received from the card reader and the antenna 800 to transmit the processed information to the logic circuit or processes the encoded authentication information generated by the logic circuit to transmit the processed authentication information to the antenna 800 and the card reader.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (19)
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US16/677,901 US11303461B2 (en) | 2013-09-02 | 2019-11-08 | Security device having physical unclonable function |
Applications Claiming Priority (6)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US201361872781P | 2013-09-02 | 2013-09-02 | |
| KR1020140013822A KR102122457B1 (en) | 2013-09-02 | 2014-02-06 | Security device having physical unclonable function |
| KR10-2014-0013822 | 2014-02-06 | ||
| US14/460,982 US10044513B2 (en) | 2013-09-02 | 2014-08-15 | Security device having physical unclonable function |
| US16/021,494 US10498544B2 (en) | 2013-09-02 | 2018-06-28 | Security device having physical unclonable function |
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| US12047518B2 (en) * | 2021-03-18 | 2024-07-23 | Analog Devices, Inc. | Delay based PUF implementation with integrated determination of optimum configuration |
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