RU2831414C1 - Reactor plant emergency protection system - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: control and regulation.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to a system for automated monitoring and control of nuclear power plants. System has a four-channel initiating part, an actuating part, characterized by that automation processor PA-1, located in the collection and processing cabinet of each of the four channels of the initiating part, is configured to transmit signals to equipment located in the emergency command cabinets ECC-1 and ECC- 2 executive part. Automation processor PA-2 arranged in the collection and processing cabinet of each of the four channels of the initiating part is configured to transmit signals to the equipment located in the emergency command cabinets of the ECC-3 and ECC-4 of the actuating part. At that, equipment of each of cabinets of emergency commands ECC-1, ECC-2 is made with possibility of formation of executive commands for actuation of protection and their transmission via wire communication interfaces to equipment located in cabinets of power breakers CPB-1 and CPB-2. Equipment of each emergency command cabinet ECC-3, ECC-4 is configured to generate executive commands for actuation of protection and their transmission via wire communication interfaces to equipment located in cabinets of power breakers CPB-3 and CPB-4.

EFFECT: providing emergency shutdown of the reactor with a single-set four-channel design of the initiating part of the emergency protection and the given organization of interconnections between the initiating and actuating parts of the emergency protection even in case of malfunction of the equipment of diversion or failure of programmable means for a common reason.

6 cl, 6 dwg

Description

The invention relates to automated control and management systems for nuclear power plants (NPP). The proposed invention can be used in control and protection systems for low-power nuclear power plants (LPNPP).

Four-channel control systems for nuclear power plant safety are known under Russian patents No. 2582875, 2598649, 2598599, exclusive rights to which belong to the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “All-Russian Research Institute of Automation named after N.L. Dukhov” (FSUE “VNIIA”).

The nuclear power plant safety system according to the Russian Federation patent No. 2582875 includes input-output stations, priority control stations and a safety automation controller of the SB KA of each safety channel. In this case, two independent software and hardware diversities form a subchannel A and a subchannel B for performing the function of the safety channel and contain a SB KA controller of its subchannel, and each of the input-output buses of each subchannel has a "tree" type structure, the upper root node of which is, respectively, the SB KA controller automation processor module, the lower nodes are the communication modules with the process of the CBB1-n stations MSP and the priority control modules of the SPU1-m stations MPU, and the intermediate nodes are the communication modules.

The control system of the nuclear power plant safety according to the patents of the Russian Federation No. 2598649, 2598599 contains a plurality of identical safety channels, each channel includes stations of input-output of signals of the technological process, stations of priority control of executive mechanisms, the controller of automation of safety means. At the same time, in the system according to the patent No. 2598649, each channel is connected to other safety channels by means of cross-duplex fiber-optic links. The processor module of automation of safety means of each safety channel is connected to the PMA SB of other safety channels by means of cross-links, implemented on the basis of interprocessor interfaces of the MPI type "point-to-point", built on the basis of the Ethernet interface and the communication protocol of the data level.

In the nuclear power plant safety system according to the Russian Federation patent No. 2598599, the process signal input/output station contains process communication modules MSP1-k and a communication module-converter of communication interfaces PIK of the SHVV SB bus. The SPU station contains modules of priority control of actuators MPU1-e and communication modules: a voting communication module MKG and a voting module MG of the SHVV SB bus. Each safety channel additionally contains normal operation automation controllers KA1-s, which are connected to the CBB1-n stations, SPU1-m stations via redundant ENL normal operation buses, built on the basis of a switched Ethernet interface, a radial structure of connection of network switches and a special data level communication protocol, and with the normal operation system via a redundant EN normal operation bus.

The above analogs do not consider the possibility of implementing a single-component structure of the initiating part of the emergency protection (IP AP) taking into account the fulfillment of the requirements for the reliability of the emergency protection (AP) function, and there is no description of the organization of the relationship between the IIP AP and the ISP AP.

The closest analogue to the proposed technical solutions is the four-channel control system for the safety of a nuclear power plant according to patent No. 2743250. It is accepted as a prototype.

The reactor emergency shutdown system according to Russian patent No. 2743250, characterized by a structure with four redundant channels, ensures a high level of NPP safety. The operating principle of the system is real-time monitoring of measuring signals of control points important for NPP safety. The reactor emergency shutdown is immediately triggered for the purpose of priority ensuring reactor safety in the event that the above signals exceed the established permissible limit in operation (or the indirect calculated value exceeds the established permissible limit in operation).

The description of the prototype does not include a description of the organization of the relationships between the InCh AZ and the executive part of the emergency protection (IsCh AZ) with a single-component four-channel structure of the InCh AZ, taking into account the fulfillment of the requirements for the safety and reliability of the AZ function. The proposed invention eliminates the said drawback.

Another significant drawback of this emergency stop system is that the channels of the emergency stop control system have the same structure and are implemented on software and hardware, which can lead to a common cause failure due to hidden faults in the digital equipment and due to hidden errors in the basic and system software. The proposed invention eliminates this drawback.

The proposed emergency protection schemes for a nuclear power plant ensure the performance of protection functions using one set of emergency protection systems, while they meet the requirements for the reliability of the emergency protection function. Reducing the number of emergency protection systems allows for reducing the time required to create an automated process control system for a nuclear power plant, reducing the amount of equipment used, optimizing the equipment layout, reducing the number of personnel required to perform maintenance, and performing installation and commissioning work in shorter periods of time with the required level of safety and reliability.

The technical problem to be solved is to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants.

The technical result of the invention according to the first variant is to ensure emergency shutdown of the reactor with a single-component four-channel design of the IPC AZ and a given organization of the interconnections between the IPC AZ and the IPC AZ even in the event of a malfunction of the equipment of university A or university B, a reduction in the time of system recovery due to a decrease in the number of potential failure nodes, ensuring reliability and safety.

The technical result of the invention according to the second variant is to ensure emergency shutdown of the reactor with a single-set four-channel design of the IPC AZ and a given organization of the interconnections between the IPC AZ and the IS AZ even in the event of failure of the programmable means of the IPC AZ channels due to a common cause (including software failures), a reduction in the system recovery time due to a decrease in the number of potential failure nodes, ensuring reliability and safety by implementing the principle of diversity at the hardware level due to the construction of the first and second channels of the IPC AZ on software and hardware, and the third and fourth channels of the IPC AZ on non-programmable means (on "hard" logic means).

The essence of the invention, which ensures the achievement of the specified technical result according to the first variant, consists in the fact that in the emergency protection system of the reactor plant, including a four-channel initiating part, as well as an executive part, the automation processor PA-1, located in the cabinet for collecting and processing each of the four channels of the initiating part (university A), is designed with the possibility of transmitting signals to the equipment located in the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1 and SHAK-2 of the executive part, the automation processor PA-2, located in the cabinet for collecting and processing each of the four channels of the initiating part (university B), is designed with the possibility of transmitting signals to the equipment located in the emergency command cabinets SHAK-3 and SHAK-4 of the executive part, the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2 is designed with the possibility of generating executive commands for the operation of the protection and transmitting them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1 and SHPP-2, the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-3, SHAK-4 are designed with the possibility of generating executive commands for protection actuation and transmitting them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3 and SHPP-4. In this case, the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3 and SHAK-4 can contain the equipment of the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, SHPP-3 and SHPP-4, respectively. In addition, the emergency command cabinet SHAK-1 can contain the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-2 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, and the emergency command cabinet SHAK-3 can contain the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-4 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3, SHPP-4.

The essence of the invention, which ensures the achievement of the specified technical result according to the second variant, is that in the emergency protection system of the reactor plant, including a four-channel initiating part, as well as an executive part, the equipment of the first and second channels of the initiating part of the emergency protection is implemented on software and hardware, and the third and fourth channels - on non-programmable means (on means

"hard" logic); the cabinets for collecting and processing the first and second channels of the initiating part include an interface converter from parallel code to serial and vice versa, which provides the ability to exchange data from the first and second channels of the initiating part with the third and fourth channels via digital non-programmable serial buses based on optics; the cabinets for collecting and processing each of the four channels of the initiating part are designed with the ability to transmit emergency protection signals to the equipment of all four emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3, SHAK-4 of the executive part; the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2 is designed with the possibility of generating executive commands for the protection operation and transmitting them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1 and SHPP-2, the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-3, SHAK-4 is designed with the possibility of generating executive commands for the protection operation and transmitting them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3 and SHPP-4. In this case, the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3 and SHAK-4 may contain the equipment of the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, SHPP-3 and SHPP-4, respectively. In addition, the emergency command cabinet SHAK-1 may contain the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-2 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, and the emergency command cabinet SHAK-3 may contain the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-4 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3, SHPP-4.

The AZ system includes: primary converters of thermal parameters, an initiating part, and an executive part.

The initiating part of the AZ is designed to generate and transmit emergency protection signals of the reactor installation to the executive part of the AZ.

The executive part of the AZ is designed to generate AZ commands based on the processing of protection signals received from the initiating part of the AZ.

At the same time, due to the practically identical functional purpose of sensors for triggering emergency stops and starting security systems according to technological parameters, their initiating parts can be combined into one subsystem.

The initiating part is constructed as a four-channel subsystem, where all four channels are independent and physically and electrically separated from each other.

A channel is understood to be a set of sensors, communication lines, signal processing means and/or parameter presentation intended to ensure control in the volume specified by the project.

The initiating part, at a minimum, includes equipment that ensures: reception and reproduction of signals from sensors; processing of technological process data; reception and transmission of signals from/to other channels of the system and other subsystems; formation of initiating signals according to specified algorithms and their transmission to the executive part.

The reception and reproduction cabinet ensures the reception of signals of technological and neutron parameters, as well as the output of signals to external systems.

The acquisition and processing cabinet provides logical processing of input signals, interchannel exchange with other channels and majority processing.

Each channel of the initiating part of the AZ receives signals from sensors and related systems and equipment.

The equipment of the executive part of the AZ is located in different rooms that are not affected simultaneously by a common cause.

In terms of the reactor emergency protection function, the equipment of the AZ executive part ensures automatic de-energization of the electromagnets of all control body (CB) drives: upon receipt of at least two of the four generalized AZ signals from the AZ initiating part; upon loss of voltage in any set of the AZ executive part or loss of voltage on the power supply buses; upon initiation of the emergency protection response from the manual control bodies at the block control point (BCP) or the backup control point (RCP).

The executive part of the emergency control system includes: emergency command cabinets (ECC), power supply interrupter cabinets (PSIC) with disconnecting switching devices.

Interchannel exchange with cabinets implemented on non-programmable means (on means of "hard" logic) is carried out via digital non-programmable serial buses based on optics (option 2). The equipment implemented on programmable means includes an interface converter from parallel code to the required serial code and back.

Option 1

For a single-set architecture of the AZ, the organization of the relationships between the InCh AZ and the IsCh AZ is implemented in such a way that each of the universities (University A - PA-1, University B - PA-2) is capable of performing the AZ function. Signals from PA-1 of four cabinets of the InCh AZ are sent to cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, and signals from PA-2 of four cabinets of the InCh AZ are sent to SHAK-3, SHAK-4. This makes it possible to perform the AZ function even if all the equipment of one of the universities fails, including for a common reason, using one set of the InCh AZ.

The essence of the invention is explained in Fig. 1-3.

Fig. 1 shows the structural diagram of the AZ system with a single-component InCh, where:

1 - collection and processing cabinets;

2 - automation processors of the University A (PA-1);

3 - automation processors of the University B (PA-2);

4 - wire communication lines for transmitting AZ signals from the University of A InCh AZ to the IsCh AZ;

5 - wire communication lines for transmitting AZ signals from the B InCh AZ diversification university to the IsCh AZ;

6, 7, 8, 9 - emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3, SHAK-4;

10, 11, 12, 13 - power supply circuit breaker cabinets ШПП-1, ШПП-2, ШПП-3, ШПП-4;

14, 15 - wired communication lines SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3, SHAK-4 with SHPP-1, SHPP-2, SHPP-3, SHPP-4;

16, 17 - switching devices KA1, KA2.

Fig. 2 shows a possible implementation of the AZ system with a single-set IFC when placing the equipment of cabinets 10, 11, 12, 13 in cabinets 6, 7, 8, 9, respectively. In this case, the operating principle and the relationship between the IFC AZ and the IFC AZ do not change.

Fig. 3 shows a possible implementation of the automatic control system with a single-set IPC with equipment 7, 10 and 11 placed in cabinet 6, equipment 9, 12 and 13 in cabinet 8. In this case, the automatic control commands from the automation processors 2 of the automatic control system (PA-1) are sent to cabinet 6, and the automatic control commands from the automation processors 3 (PA-2) to cabinet 8. The operating principle of the automatic control system does not change.

The emergency protection system (Fig. 1) functions as follows.

Signals for each parameter in cabinets 1 undergo a "2 out of 4" vote in automation processors 2 (PA-1) and 3 (PA-2), with invalid signals excluded from processing with a corresponding change in the "2 out of 4" voting logic. For each of the parameters participating in the protection algorithm, its own degradation logic from "2 out of 4" to the subsequent logic is used, if necessary (e.g., "2 out of 3", then "1 out of 2", then "1 out of 1").

When one channel of the InCh AZ equipment is taken out of service for maintenance and repair, an emergency signal is automatically generated (the protection algorithms use degradation logic from “2 out of 4” to the subsequent logic).

After the majority processing of signals of technological and neutron-physical parameters in automation processors 2 (PA-1) and 3 (PA-2), algorithmic processing is carried out in accordance with the established protection algorithms.

From cabinets 1, emergency protection signals of the reactor plant are sent to the emergency protection system via wired communication interfaces 4 from equipment 2 of University A and via wired communication interfaces 5 from equipment 3 of University B.

The generated AZ signals from the modules of the AZ initiating part are sent to cabinets 6, 7, 8, 9. In this case, the AZ signals from automation processors 2 (PA-1) are sent to the equipment in cabinets 6, 7, and from automation processors 3 (PA-2) - to the equipment in cabinets 8, 9.

In cabinets 6, 7, 8, 9 of the executive part, processing is carried out according to the logic of “2 out of 4” of generalized signals for each type of protection, received from the initiating part of the AZ, executive commands for the operation of emergency protection are formed and transmitted, which are transmitted via wired communication interfaces 14, 15 to the equipment located in cabinets 10, 11, 12, 13.

Structurally, cabinets 6, 7, 8, 9 include two identical circuits for generating emergency commands for switching off the switching devices, each of which consists of a "two out of four" logic circuit for processing the AZ signals coming from the channels of the initiating part of the set. When the first circuit is triggered in cabinet 6, a command is generated to switch off the switching device 16 in cabinet 10 via wired communication line 14 and to switch off the switching device 16 in cabinet 11 via communication line 15, when the second circuit is triggered - to switch off the switching device 17 in cabinet 10 via communication line 14 and to switch off the switching device 17 in cabinet 11 via communication line 15. In cabinets 7, 8, 9, commands for switching off the switching devices are generated similarly. In the AZ ISC, power interrupters of the OR AZ drives of the reactor from different manufacturers are used for protection against common cause failure.

When two circuits of one cabinet 6, 7, 8, 9 or two (first and second) circuits in different cabinets 6, 7 or 8, 9 are triggered simultaneously, switching devices 16, 17 are disconnected and the drives of all AZ control organs are de-energized, causing them to fall to the extreme lower position. Thus, the triggering of any of the cabinets 6 or 7 (8 or 9) causes the switching devices in the power supply cabinets 10, 11 (12, 13) to be disconnected, which leads to the de-energization of all AZ control organ drives. Thus, the equipment of each of the universities is capable of performing the AZ function regardless of the state of the other university with the required safety and reliability indicators.

Option 2

For a single-set architecture of the AZ, the organization of the relationships between the AZ InCh and the AZ IsCh is implemented with the ability to perform the AZ function in full on non-programmable means (channels 3,4 of the AZ InCh on the means of "hard" logic), regardless of the operability of the programmable means (channels 1,2 of the AZ InCh). Signals from the cabinets for collecting and processing each channel of the AZ InCh are sent to each cabinet of the IsCh AZ (SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3, SHAK-4). This allows the AZ function to be performed even if all equipment on programmable means fails, including for a common reason, including software failures, using one set of the AZ InCh.

The essence of the invention is explained in Fig. 4-6.

Fig. 4 shows the structural diagram of the AZ system with a single-component InCh, where:

1 - data collection and processing cabinets implemented using programmable means;

2 - collection and processing cabinets implemented using non-programmable means;

3 - interprocessor optical data transmission interface;

4 - non-programmable serial interface based on optical data;

5 - wire communication lines for issuing AZ signals from the AZ InCh equipment on programmable means in the AZ ISC;

6 - wire communication lines for issuing AZ signals from the AZ InCh equipment on non-programmable means in the AZ ISC;

7, 8, 9, 10 - emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3, SHAK-4;

11, 12, 13, 14 - power circuit breaker cabinets ШПП-1, ШПП-2, ШПП-3, ШПП-4;

15, 16 - wired communication lines SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3, SHAK-4 with SHPP-1, SHPP-2, SHPP-3, SHPP-4;

17, 18 - switching devices KA1, KA2.

Fig. 5 shows a possible implementation of the AZ system with a single-set IFC when placing the equipment of cabinets 11, 12, 13, 14 in cabinets 7, 8, 9, 10, respectively. In this case, the operating principle and the relationship between the IFC AZ and the IFC AZ do not change.

Fig. 6 shows a structural diagram of the automatic control system with a single-set IFC when equipment 8, 11 and 12 are placed in cabinet 7, and equipment 10, 13 and 14 in cabinet 9. In this case, automatic control commands from the automatic control system equipment are sent to cabinets 7 and 9. The operating principle of the automatic control system does not change.

The emergency protection system (Fig. 4) functions as follows.

In the cabinets of collection and processing 1, 2, logical processing of signals for each parameter, interchannel exchange with other cabinets and majority processing take place. Interchannel exchange with cabinets 2, implemented on non-programmable means (on the means of "hard" logic), is carried out via digital non-programmable serial buses based on optics 4. Data exchange between cabinets 1 is carried out via interprocessor optical data transfer interface 3.

In collection and processing cabinets 1, 2, voting is performed "2 out of 4", with invalid signals excluded from processing with a corresponding change in the voting logic "2 out of 4". For each of the parameters participating in the protection algorithm, its own degradation logic from "2 out of 4" to the subsequent logic is used, if necessary (for example, "2 out of 3", then "1 out of 2", then "1 out of 1").

When one channel of the InCh AZ equipment is taken out of service for maintenance and repair, an emergency signal is automatically generated (the protection algorithms use degradation logic from “2 out of 4” to the subsequent logic).

After the majority processing of signals of technological and neutron-physical parameters in collection and processing cabinets 1, 2, algorithmic processing is carried out in accordance with the established protection algorithms.

From cabinets 1, 2, emergency protection signals of the reactor plant are sent to the emergency protection control system via wired communication interfaces 5 from equipment on programmable means and via wired communication interfaces 6 from equipment on non-programmable means (on “hard” logic means).

The generated AZ signals from the modules of the AZ initiating part are sent to cabinets 7, 8, 9, 10 of the AZ ISC. The AZ signals are sent from each cabinet 1, 2 to each cabinet 7, 8, 9, 10.

In cabinets 7, 8, 9, 10 of the executive part, processing is carried out according to the logic of “2 out of 4” of generalized signals for each type of protection, received from the initiating part of the AZ, executive commands for the operation of emergency protection are formed and transmitted, which are transmitted via wired communication interfaces 15, 16 to the equipment located in cabinets 11, 12, 13, 14.

Structurally, cabinets 7, 8, 9, 10 include two identical circuits for generating emergency commands for switching off the switching devices, each of which consists of a "two out of four" logic circuit for processing the AZ signals coming from the channels of the initiating part of the set. When the first circuit is triggered in cabinet 7, a command is generated to switch off the switching device 17 in cabinet 11 via wire communication line 15 and to switch off the switching device 17 in cabinet 12 via communication line 16, when the second circuit is triggered - to switch off the switching device 18 in cabinet 11 via communication line 15 and to switch off the switching device 18 in cabinet 12 via communication line 16. In cabinets 8, 9, 10, commands for switching off the switching devices are generated similarly. In the AZ ISC, power interrupters of the OR AZ drives of the reactor from different manufacturers are used for protection against common cause failure.

When two circuits of one cabinet 7, 8, 9, 10 or two (first and second) circuits in different cabinets 7, 8 or 9, 10 are triggered simultaneously, switching devices 17, 18 are disconnected and the drives of all AZ control organs are de-energized, causing them to fall to the extreme lower position. Thus, the triggering of any of the cabinets 7 or 8 (9 or 10) causes the switching devices in the power supply cabinets 11, 12 (13, 14) to be disconnected, which leads to the de-energization of all AZ control organ drives. This makes it possible to perform the AZ function even if all equipment on programmable means fails, including due to a common cause, including software failures, using one AZ InCh set with the required safety and reliability indicators.

Claims (6)

1. An emergency protection system for a reactor installation, including a four-channel initiating part, an executive part, characterized in that the automation processor PA-1, located in the collection and processing cabinet of each of the four channels of the initiating part, is designed with the possibility of transmitting signals to equipment located in the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1 and SHAK-2 of the executive part, the automation processor PA-2, located in the collection and processing cabinet of each of the four channels of the initiating part, is designed with the possibility of transmitting signals to equipment located in the emergency command cabinets SHAK-3 and SHAK-4 of the executive part; the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2 is designed with the ability to generate executive commands for the protection to operate and transmit them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1 and SHPP-2, the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-3, SHAK-4 is designed with the ability to generate executive commands for the protection to operate and transmit them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3 and SHPP-4. 2. The emergency protection system of the reactor plant according to paragraph 1, characterized in that the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3 and SHAK-4 contain the equipment of the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, SHPP-3 and SHPP-4, respectively. 3. The emergency protection system of the reactor plant according to paragraph 1, characterized in that the emergency command cabinet SHAK-1 contains the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-2 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, and the emergency command cabinet SHAK-3 contains the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-4 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3, SHPP-4. 4. An emergency protection system for a reactor plant, comprising a four-channel initiating part, an executive part, characterized in that the equipment of the first and second channels of the initiating part of the emergency protection is implemented using software and hardware, and the third and fourth channels - using non-programmable means (using "hard" logic); the collection and processing cabinets of the first and second channels of the initiating part include an interface converter from parallel code to serial and vice versa, providing the ability to exchange data from the first and second channels of the initiating part with the third and fourth channels via digital non-programmable serial buses based on optics; the collection and processing cabinets of each of the four channels of the initiating part are designed with the ability to transmit emergency protection signals to the equipment of all emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3, SHAK-4 of the executive part; the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2 is designed with the ability to generate executive commands for the protection to operate and transmit them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1 and SHPP-2, the equipment of each of the emergency command cabinets SHAK-3, SHAK-4 is designed with the ability to generate executive commands for the protection to operate and transmit them via wired communication interfaces to the equipment located in the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3 and SHPP-4. 5. The emergency protection system of the reactor plant according to paragraph 4, characterized in that the emergency command cabinets SHAK-1, SHAK-2, SHAK-3 and SHAK-4 contain the equipment of the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, SHPP-3 and SHPP-4, respectively. 6. The emergency protection system of the reactor plant according to paragraph 4, characterized in that the emergency command cabinet SHAK-1 contains the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-2 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-1, SHPP-2, and the emergency command cabinet SHAK-3 contains the equipment of the emergency command cabinet SHAK-4 and the power interrupter cabinets SHPP-3, SHPP-4.