FR2681165A1 - Process for transmitting confidential information between two chip cards - Google Patents
Process for transmitting confidential information between two chip cards Download PDFInfo
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- FR2681165A1 FR2681165A1 FR9111009A FR9111009A FR2681165A1 FR 2681165 A1 FR2681165 A1 FR 2681165A1 FR 9111009 A FR9111009 A FR 9111009A FR 9111009 A FR9111009 A FR 9111009A FR 2681165 A1 FR2681165 A1 FR 2681165A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/22—Payment schemes or models
- G06Q20/229—Hierarchy of users of accounts
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L9/16—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms the keys or algorithms being changed during operation
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
PROCEDE DE TRANSMISSION D'INFORMATION CONFIDENTIELLE
ENTRE DEUX CARTES A PUCES
L'invention concerne la sécurité dans les applications des cartes à puces. Plus précisément elle concerne la transmission sécurisée d'informations entre deux cartes à puces.METHOD FOR TRANSMITTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
BETWEEN TWO CHIP CARDS
The invention relates to security in smart card applications. More specifically, it relates to the secure transmission of information between two smart cards.
On décrira 11 invention à propos d'un cas particulier, bien que l'invention ait des applications plus générales. Ce cas particulier est celui de l'élaboration de clés de cryptage secrètes, diversifiées à partir d'une clé de base, qui doivent être placées dans des cartes à puces qu'on veut utiliser dans une application déterminée. The invention will be described in connection with a particular case, although the invention has more general applications. This particular case is that of the development of secret encryption keys, diversified from a basic key, which must be placed in smart cards that we want to use in a specific application.
Pour une application déterminée, application bancaire par exemple, l'émetteur de cartes à puces (la banque par exemple) va distribuer une carte à chaque client. Cette carte devra comporter dans sa mémoire interne une clé de cryptage secrète, non connue et non accessible même par le titulaire de la carte. Cette clé servira à crypter la transmission d'informations entre la carte et l'appareil de transaction qui va utiliser la carte. L'appareil de transaction connaîtra la clé secrète, pour pouvoir décrypter la transmission. For a specific application, such as a banking application, the smart card issuer (the bank for example) will distribute a card to each customer. This card must have in its internal memory a secret encryption key, not known and not accessible even by the card holder. This key will be used to encrypt the transmission of information between the card and the transaction device that will use the card. The transaction device will know the secret key, in order to decrypt the transmission.
La clé secrète sera différente pour chaque carte, et c'est pourquoi elle est appelée clé diversifiée. The secret key will be different for each card, and that is why it is called a diversified key.
Il est donc nécessaire, à un certain stade de l'élaboration des cartes, de placer une même clé secrète à la fois dans la carte d'un titulaire et dans l'appareil de transaction (ou dans le système informatique général qui pilote les appareils de transaction). Il y a donc nécessité de transmettre une information confidentielle d'un organe à un autre. It is therefore necessary, at a certain stage in the development of the cards, to place the same secret key both in the card of a holder and in the transaction device (or in the general computer system which controls the devices transaction). There is therefore a need to transmit confidential information from one body to another.
Cette opération est délicate car il y a un risque qu'une personne chargée de ce travail et pouvant donc avoir de ce fait accès aux clés secrètes, ne s'en serve pour réaliser frauduleusement des cartes ayant toutes les capacités des cartes légitimes. This operation is delicate because there is a risk that a person responsible for this work and who can therefore have access to the secret keys, will not use it to fraudulently produce cards having all the capacities of legitimate cards.
Evidemment on peut crypter à nouveau la transmission de l'information confidentielle. Mais pour cela il faut une clé de cryptage et cette clé doit aussi être transmise. On n'a fait que reporter le problème. Obviously we can encrypt the transmission of confidential information again. But for this you need an encryption key and this key must also be transmitted. We just postponed the problem.
Par exemple, une technique de production d'une clé diversifiée pour une application à utilisateurs multiples est la suivante : on utilise deux cartes à puces semblables, dont l'une est une carte maîtresse chargée d'élaborer et éventuellement de garder en mémoire la clé diversifiée, et l'autre est une carte esclave ou carte à personnaliser, devant recevoir dans sa mémoire la clé secrète diversifiée qu'elle devra utiliser par la suite pour des opérations d'authentification. La carte maftresse pourra servir à transporter, vers les appareils de transaction ou vers le système qui les gère, la liste des clés diversifiées autorisées. For example, a technique for producing a diversified key for a multi-user application is as follows: two similar smart cards are used, one of which is a master card responsible for developing and possibly storing the key diversified, and the other is a slave card or card to be personalized, which must receive in its memory the diversified secret key which it must subsequently use for authentication operations. The maftresse card can be used to transport, to the transaction devices or to the system that manages them, the list of authorized diversified keys.
Dans cette technique, la carte maîtresse contient un microprocesseur avec une mémoire de programmes, et dans cette mémoire un programme d'élaboration de clé diversifiée. Mais comme la clé diversifiée ne doit pas circuler en clair entre les deux cartes (pour éviter les fraudes), la carte comprend aussi un programme de cryptage pour envoyer la clé diversifiée sous une forme indéchiffrable. La clé diversifiée est donc calculée, puis cryptée; le résultat du cryptage est envoyé à la carte à personnaliser. In this technique, the master card contains a microprocessor with a program memory, and in this memory a diversified key generation program. However, since the diversified key must not flow in clear between the two cards (to avoid fraud), the card also includes an encryption program to send the diversified key in an indecipherable form. The diversified key is therefore calculated, then encrypted; the encryption result is sent to the card to be personalized.
La carte à personnaliser contient aussi un microprocesseur et une mémoire de programmes, et dans cette mémoire un programme de décryptage permettant de retrouver la clé diversifiée à partir du signal crypté qu'elle reçoit. The card to be personalized also contains a microprocessor and a program memory, and in this memory a decryption program making it possible to find the diversified key from the encrypted signal which it receives.
Le programme de cryptage utilise une clé secrète de cryptage qui, bien entendu, doit rester confidentielle, faute de quoi une reconstitution de clés diversifiées serait possible, entraînant le risque de production frauduleuse de cartes. The encryption program uses a secret encryption key which, of course, must remain confidential, failing which a reconstitution of diversified keys would be possible, leading to the risk of fraudulent production of cards.
Mais le programme de décryptage doit connaître cette clé, faute de quoi il ne pourrait pas reconstituer la clé diversifiée qu'il attend. Il faut donc que la carte à personnaliser contienne, dans une zone de mémoire inaccessible, cette même clé de cryptage. Et par conséquent il faut qu'à un moment ou un autre du procédé de cryptage on place dans les deux cartes à la fois une même clé de cryptage, qui ne sert que provisoirement pour envoyer de la carte maîtresse vers la carte à personnaliser la clé diversifiée. But the decryption program must know this key, otherwise it could not reconstruct the diversified key it expects. It is therefore necessary that the card to be personalized contains, in an inaccessible memory area, this same encryption key. And therefore it is necessary that at one time or another of the encryption process we place in the two cards at the same time the same encryption key, which is only used temporarily to send from the master card to the card to personalize the key diverse.
Il y a donc un risque qu'une personne mal intentionnée utilise la connaissance qu'elle a de cette clé pour reconstituer à des fins frauduleuses tout le processus de fabrication d'une clé diversifiée. Cette personne pourrait alors réaliser de fausses "vraies cartes". There is therefore a risk that an ill-intentioned person can use their knowledge of this key to reconstruct for fraudulent purposes the whole process of manufacturing a diversified key. This person could then make fake "real cards".
Le but de l'invention est d'éviter ce risque par un moyen relativement simple. The object of the invention is to avoid this risk by a relatively simple means.
Selon l'invention, on utilise le fait que la carte maîtresse et la carte à personaliser ont dans leur mémoire morte des programmes ou des portions de programmes identiques, ne serait-ce que parce qu'elles sont faites par le même fabricant, ou parce qu'elles ont un système d'exploitation identique ou parce qu'elles respectent des critères de normalisation identiques. According to the invention, use is made of the fact that the master card and the card to be personalized have in their read-only memory identical programs or portions of programs, if only because they are made by the same manufacturer, or because whether they have an identical operating system or because they meet identical standardization criteria.
Dans la pratique, la mémoire morte des deux cartes sera même rigoureusement identique.In practice, the ROM of the two cards will even be strictly identical.
L'idée maîtresse de l'invention est d'utiliser comme clé de cryptage commune aux deux cartes une donnée prise parmi un fichier (et de préférence le fichier de mémoire morte du système d'exploitation de la carte) dont le contenu et l'organisation sont identiques dans les deux cartes, la donnée étant désignée à partir d'un index transmis d'une carte à l'autre et susceptible de varier. The main idea of the invention is to use as encryption key common to the two cards a data item taken from a file (and preferably the read-only memory file of the card's operating system) whose content and organization are identical in the two cards, the data being designated from an index transmitted from one card to another and likely to vary.
Par conséquent, au lieu d'avoir à inscrire dans deux cartes différentes une clé de cryptage commune avec le risque que cette inscription double permette ensuite une fraude, on utilise comme clé de cryptage un contenu déjà inscrit mais inconnu a priori et pouvant varier d'une opération à une autre. Si de plus l'adresse à laquelle on va chercher ce contenu varie de manière aléatoire, on aboutit à une très grande sécurité. Consequently, instead of having to register a common encryption key in two different cards with the risk that this double registration would then allow fraud, we use as encryption key content already registered but unknown a priori and which may vary from one operation to another. If in addition the address from which we will seek this content varies randomly, we end up with very high security.
Selon un aspect de l'invention, on propose donc un procédé de transmission cryptée d'une information entre deux cartes à microprocesseur qui ont chacune un fichier de mémoire à plusieurs adresses, ce fichier ayant un contenu identique pour les deux cartes, procédé dans lequel on crypte l'information dans la première carte, on transmet l'information cryptée de la première carte à la deuxième, et on décrypte l'information dans la deuxième carte, ce procédé étant caractérisé en ce que le cryptage et le décryptage sont effectués avec pour clé le contenu d'une partie seulement du fichier de mémoire, identifiée par une donnée d'adressage qui est utilisée par la première carte et transmise à la deuxième carte. According to one aspect of the invention, there is therefore proposed a method of encrypted transmission of information between two microprocessor cards which each have a memory file with several addresses, this file having identical content for the two cards, method in which the information is encrypted in the first card, the encrypted information is transmitted from the first card to the second, and the information is decrypted in the second card, this method being characterized in that the encryption and decryption are carried out with for key the content of only part of the memory file, identified by an address datum which is used by the first card and transmitted to the second card.
La donnée d'adressage peut être une adresse proprement dite, mais de préférence elle sera plutôt un index à partir duquel on peut calculer une adresse. Les deux cartes possèdent alors en mémoire le même programme de calcul d'une adresse à partir d'une valeur d'index. The addressing data can be an address proper, but preferably it will rather be an index from which an address can be calculated. The two cards then have in memory the same program for calculating an address from an index value.
Selon un aspect important de l'invention, c'est la mémoire morte de la carte, celle qui contient le système d'exploitation de la carte qui va être utilisée. Elle constitue en effet un fichier dans lequel on peut puiser un grand nombre de clés (chaque clé correspondant par exemple à un mot ou plusieurs mots consécutifs de mémoire). According to an important aspect of the invention, it is the read only memory of the card, that which contains the operating system of the card which will be used. It constitutes in fact a file from which one can draw a large number of keys (each key corresponding for example to a word or several consecutive words of memory).
L'invention est applicable notamment mais non exclusivement au cas évoqué dans le préambule, à savoir le cas ou l'information à transmettre de manière cryptée entre les deux cartes est elle-même une clé de cryptage; et notamment lorsque cette information est une clé diversifiée qui doit être calculée par la première carte et stockée de manière confidentielle dans la deuxième. The invention is applicable in particular but not exclusively to the case mentioned in the preamble, namely the case where the information to be transmitted in an encrypted manner between the two cards is itself an encryption key; and in particular when this information is a diversified key which must be calculated by the first card and stored confidentially in the second.
Une manière de mettre en oeuvre l'invention consiste à utiliser, pour chaque opération de transmission cryptée entre les deux cartes, un générateur de donnée aléatoire interne à l'une des cartes (de préférence la première); ce générateur fournira une donnée non prévisible pouvant servir d'index pour le calcul d'une adresse de mémoire de chaque carte. Cet index aléatoire permettra de définir une clé de cryptage; il sera utilisé par la première carte pour crypter la transmission, et il sera envoyé à la deuxième carte en même temps que l'information cryptée pour permettre le décryptage. Lors d'une nouvelle opération, le générateur aléatoire fournira une autre adresse de mémoire. One way of implementing the invention consists in using, for each encrypted transmission operation between the two cards, a generator of random data internal to one of the cards (preferably the first); this generator will provide unpredictable data that can serve as an index for calculating a memory address for each card. This random index will make it possible to define an encryption key; it will be used by the first card to encrypt the transmission, and it will be sent to the second card at the same time as the encrypted information to allow decryption. During a new operation, the random generator will provide another memory address.
D'autres caractéristiques et avantages de l'invention apparaîtront à la lecture de la description détaillée qui suit et qui est faite en référence aux dessins annexés dans lesquels
- la figure 1 représente un système de diversification de clé dans lequel la présente invention peut être mise en oeuvre;
- la figure 2 représente schématiquement les deux cartes du système;
- la figure 3 représente les étapes principales du procédé de transmission sécurisée de l'invention.Other characteristics and advantages of the invention will appear on reading the detailed description which follows and which is given with reference to the appended drawings in which
- Figure 1 shows a key diversification system in which the present invention can be implemented;
- Figure 2 shows schematically the two cards of the system;
- Figure 3 shows the main steps of the secure transmission method of the invention.
L'invention est applicable de manière générale à la transmission d'information cryptée entre deux cartes ayant chacune au moins une mémoire figée dont le contenu est commun aux deux cartes; la description qui suit sera donnée en référence à l'exemple particulier de la transmission d'une clé diversifiée entre une carte maîtresse et une carte à personaliser avec une clé diversifiée. The invention is generally applicable to the transmission of encrypted information between two cards each having at least one frozen memory whose content is common to the two cards; the following description will be given with reference to the particular example of the transmission of a diversified key between a master card and a card to be personalized with a diversified key.
A la figure 1 on a donc représenté un système capable de recevoir deux cartes et de permettre un dialogue entre les deux caftes. Le système peut être un microordinateur à usage général PC avec un clavier CL, un écran SC et deux lecteurs de cartes LC1 et LC2, ou bien ce peut être un système spécialement conçu pour l'opération de diversification. Il doit pouvoir réaliser la transmission d'informations entre deux cartes à puces. In Figure 1 there is therefore shown a system capable of receiving two cards and allowing a dialogue between the two cafes. The system can be a general purpose microcomputer PC with a keyboard CL, a screen SC and two card readers LC1 and LC2, or it can be a system specially designed for the diversification operation. It must be able to carry out the transmission of information between two smart cards.
L'une des cartes est la carte maîtresse CM; l'autre est la carte à personaliser CP. One of the cards is the CM master card; the other is the personalized CP card.
Les deux cartes sont des cartes à microprocesseur, comportant un microprocesseur, une mémoire vive de travail (RAM), une mémoire morte de programmes (ROM) contenant au moins le système d'exploitation de la carte, et une mémoire non volatile électriquement inscriptible (EPROM ou EEPROM ou Flash EPROM). Cette dernière mémoire contient en principe des programmes d'application, mais elle peut contenir aussi d'autres données, et notamment des numéros d'identification, et la clé secrète diversifiée qu'on va chercher à y mettre. The two cards are microprocessor cards, comprising a microprocessor, a working random access memory (RAM), a program read-only memory (ROM) containing at least the operating system of the card, and an electrically writable non-volatile memory ( EPROM or EEPROM or Flash EPROM). This last memory in principle contains application programs, but it can also contain other data, and in particular identification numbers, and the diversified secret key that we are going to try to put in it.
Classiquement, certaines zones de la mémoire non volatile inscriptible électriquement sont non accessibles en lecture et en écriture, sauf par le microprocesseur dans certains programmes du système d'exploitation. Conventionally, certain zones of the electrically writable non-volatile memory are not accessible in read and write, except by the microprocessor in certain programs of the operating system.
Le contenu de la mémoire morte de programmes n'est d'ailleurs pas accessible sur les bornes extérieures de la carte. Seul le microprocesseur peut aller le chercher, uniquement lors de certains programmes du système d'exploitation. The contents of the program read-only memory are moreover not accessible on the external terminals of the card. Only the microprocessor can fetch it, only during certain operating system programs.
Sur la figure 2 on a représenté les deux cartes sous forme schématique, avec leur microprocesseurs (MP1 pour la carte maîtresse, MP2 pour la carte à personaliser), leur mémoire vive (110, 210) leur mémoire morte (120, 220) leur mémoire non volatile (130, 230), et un interface de communication avec l'extérieur (140, 240). In FIG. 2, the two cards are represented in schematic form, with their microprocessors (MP1 for the master card, MP2 for the card to be personalized), their random access memory (110, 210) their read-only memory (120, 220) their memory non-volatile (130, 230), and an external communication interface (140, 240).
L'élaboration de la clé diversifiée, à placer à la fois dans la mémoire non volatile de la carte à personaliser et dans la mémoire non volatile de la carte maîtresse, se fait comme suit
Une donnée NS est envoyée par la carte à personaliser CP à la carte maîtresse CM. Cette donnée peut être le numéro de série de la carte, inscrit dans sa mémoire non volatile 230.The development of the diversified key, to be placed both in the non-volatile memory of the card to be personalized and in the non-volatile memory of the master card, is done as follows
Data NS is sent by the card to personalize CP to the master card CM. This data can be the serial number of the card, written in its non-volatile memory 230.
Cette donnée sert à l'élaboration de la clé diversifiée Kd qu'on veut élaborer. This data is used to develop the diversified key Kd that we want to develop.
Par exemple, la valeur Kd est élaborée à partir de
NS par une fonction de cryptage à clé secrète C(NS,KF) ou KF est une clé secrète contenue dans la carte maîtresse. Le programme de calcul de cette fonction est contenu dans la mémoire de la carte MP et est exécuté par le microprocesseur de cette carte. La fonction C() est de préférence l'algorithme standard DES ("Data
Encryption Standard") publié par le National Bureau of
Standards des USA, dans Federal Register vol 40, N052 du 17 Mars 1975 et NO 149 du ler Août 1975.For example, the Kd value is developed from
NS by a secret key encryption function C (NS, KF) or KF is a secret key contained in the master card. The program for calculating this function is contained in the memory of the MP card and is executed by the microprocessor of this card. The C () function is preferably the standard DES ("Data
Encryption Standard ") published by the National Bureau of
US standards, in Federal Register vol 40, N052 of March 17, 1975 and NO 149 of August 1, 1975.
La clé diversifiée Kd à mettre dans la carte à personaliser est donc Kd = C(NS,KF). Elles est destinée à être transmise à la carte à personaliser, mais par ailleurs elle peut être enregistrée dans la carte maîtresse, ou être envoyée par tout moyen à l'application dans laquelle la carte sera utilisée. La carte maîtresse peut elle-même servir de vecteur de transmission vers un ordinateur central de cette application. The diversified key Kd to put in the card to be personalized is therefore Kd = C (NS, KF). They are intended to be transmitted to the card to be personalized, but moreover it can be saved in the master card, or be sent by any means to the application in which the card will be used. The master card can itself serve as a vector for transmission to a central computer of this application.
Dans certains cas, il n'est même pas nécessaire de conserver la clé Kd autrement que dans la carte à personaliser. C'est le cas lorsque l'application ne cherche pas à vérifier précisément chaque clé diversifiée mais cherche tout simplement à vérifier si la clé présente dans la carte est bien une clé diversifiée à partir d'une clé de base KF déterminée. In some cases, it is not even necessary to keep the Kd key other than in the card to be personalized. This is the case when the application does not seek to verify precisely each diversified key but quite simply seeks to verify whether the key present in the card is indeed a diversified key from a determined basic KF key.
Pour ne pas transmettre en clair la clé Kd à la carte à personaliser on procède de la manière indiquée ci-apres. In order not to clearly transmit the Kd key to the card to be personalized, we proceed as indicated below.
Un index I de valeur aléatoire, non répétitive d'une étape de diversification de clé à une autre est élaboré. An index I of random, non-repetitive value from one key diversification step to another is developed.
Sommairement, on peut créer cet index à partir d'un générateur pseudo-aléatoire physique, ou avec un programme contenu dans la mémoire de la carte maîtresse; ce programme peut utiliser le contenu d'un registre non volatile incrémenté à chaque nouvelle opération et une fonction de cryptage telle que l'algorithme DES, éventuellement avec la même clé secrète KF déjà utilisée précédemment ou avec n'importe quelle autre clé. Le nombre ainsi généré peut être considéré comme aléatoire et non répétitif pour les besoins pratiques. Briefly, this index can be created from a physical pseudo-random generator, or with a program contained in the memory of the master card; this program can use the content of a non-volatile register incremented with each new operation and an encryption function such as the DES algorithm, possibly with the same secret key KF already used previously or with any other key. The number thus generated can be considered random and not repetitive for practical purposes.
L'index de valeur aléatoire I va servir à calculer une adresse de mémoire morte. Pour augmenter la sécurité, on préfère ne pas utiliser directement l'index comme adresse ou comme saut d'adresse. Mais on effectue un calcul, par exemple une fonction polynomiale, pour générer une adresse AD = P(I). On s'arrange pour que cette adresse reste contenue dans des limites telles que n'importe quelle adresse ainsi générée désigne un mot de mémoire d'un fichier identique dans les deux cartes. The random value index I will be used to calculate a read-only memory address. To increase security, it is preferable not to use the index directly as an address or as an address jump. But one performs a calculation, for example a polynomial function, to generate an address AD = P (I). We arrange for this address to remain contained within limits such that any address thus generated designates a memory word from an identical file in the two cards.
Le programme de calcul de l'adresse AD à partir de
I est contenu dans une.mémoire de la carte maîtresse, mais aussi dans une mémoire de la carte à personaliser.The AD address calculation program from
It is contained in a memory of the master card, but also in a memory of the card to be personalized.
L'index I sera transmis en clair à la carte à personaliser. The index I will be transmitted in clear to the card to be personalized.
L'adresse AD est utilisée par le microprocesseur qui va lire dans la mémoire de la carte, à l'adresse AD, un contenu qui sera considéré comme une clé de cryptage
Kc pour une fonction de cryptage D(Kd,Kc) de la clé de diversification Kd.The address AD is used by the microprocessor which will read in the memory of the card, at the address AD, content which will be considered as an encryption key
Kc for an encryption function D (Kd, Kc) of the diversification key Kd.
Le fichier choisi pour servir ainsi de réserve de clés de cryptage est le fichier de mémoire morte, celui qui contient le système d'exploitation de la mémoire, car d'une part il est identique pour les deux cartes, et d'autre part il contient suffisamment de mots pour constituer une réserve de nombreuses clés de cryptage possibles. The file chosen to serve as a reserve of encryption keys is the read-only memory file, the one which contains the operating system of the memory, because on the one hand it is identical for the two cards, and on the other hand it contains enough words to build up a pool of many possible encryption keys.
Le programme de cryptage D() qui va utiliser la clé trouvée à l'adresse AD est contenu dans la mémoire de la carte maîtresse; il est exécuté et le résultat D(Kd,Kc) est transmis à la carte à personaliser en même temps que l'index I. The encryption program D () which will use the key found at the address AD is contained in the memory of the master card; it is executed and the result D (Kd, Kc) is transmitted to the card to be personalized at the same time as the index I.
La carte à personaliser reçoit l'index I, exécute la même fonction polynomiale, qu'elle a en mémoire (morte ou non volatile), détermine l'adresse AD, va chercher son contenu qui est le même contenu Kc que dans l'autre carte du fait que la zone de mémoire désignée est identique dans les deux cartes. The card to be personalized receives the index I, performs the same polynomial function, which it has in memory (dead or non-volatile), determines the address AD, goes to seek its content which is the same content Kc as in the other card because the designated memory area is the same in both cards.
La carte à personaliser comporte par ailleurs un programme de décryptage D-1() qui est l'inverse du programme de cryptage D() et qui permet donc de retrouver Kd en utilisant la même clé Kc qui a servi à crypter Kd. The card to be personalized furthermore includes a decryption program D-1 () which is the reverse of the encryption program D () and which therefore makes it possible to find Kd using the same key Kc which was used to encrypt Kd.
Autrement dit, si U = D(Kd,Kc), alors
Kd = D-1(U,Kc). In other words, if U = D (Kd, Kc), then
Kd = D-1 (U, Kc).
La clé diversifiée Kd est donc retrouvée, et stockée dans la mémoire non volatile de la carte à personaliser (zone inaccessible, c'est-à-dire ne pouvant pas être utilisée autrement que par le microprocesseur pour les besoins des fonctions de cryptage). The diversified key Kd is therefore found, and stored in the non-volatile memory of the card to be personalized (inaccessible area, that is to say that cannot be used other than by the microprocessor for the purposes of the encryption functions).
La clé diversifiée Kd peut également être stockée dans la mémoire de la carte maîtresse CM. The diversified key Kd can also be stored in the memory of the master card CM.
Seul a transité en clair entre les deux cartes l'index I. Celui-ci représente non pas un cryptage réel mais une dissimulation de l'adresse AD. Only the index I has passed in clear between the two cards. This represents not real encryption but concealment of the address AD.
Mais même si un fraudeur arrivait à connaître l'adresse AD qui a servi au moment du cryptage, il faut comprendre que
- d'une part, le fraudeur ne connaît pas le contenu du fichier (inaccessible) qui est utilisé comme réserve de clés;
- d'autre part, l'index et donc l'adresse AD sont renouvelés à chaque fois d'une manière aléatoire et par conséquent l'observation d'une transmission ne permet pas de déduire des enseignements pour une prochaine fois. But even if a fraudster came to know the AD address which was used at the time of encryption, it should be understood that
- on the one hand, the fraudster does not know the content of the file (inaccessible) which is used as a key store;
- on the other hand, the index and therefore the AD address are renewed each time in a random manner and therefore the observation of a transmission does not allow to deduce lessons for a next time.
La figure 3 rappelle les principales étapes de ces opérations. Figure 3 recalls the main stages of these operations.
On pourrait envisager d'utiliser comme mémoire commune aux deux cartes non pas la mémoire morte de programme de système de la carte mais une mémoire électriquement programmable (non accessible en écriture effacement ou lecture) pourvu qu'elle ait un contenu identique pour les deux cartes. One could consider using as memory common to the two cards not the read only memory of system program of the card but an electrically programmable memory (not accessible in writing erasing or reading) provided that it has identical contents for the two cards .
La clé de cryptage Kc trouvée à l'adresse AD peut être constituée par un mot à cette adresse, ou plusieurs mots consécutifs débutant à l'adresse AD, ou encore une fraction du mot à l'adresse AD. On peut aussi envisager des solutions plus complexes de choix de la clé à partir de l'adresse AD : par exemple, la clé peut être constituée par le premier bit de x mots successifs à partir de l'adresse AD. The encryption key Kc found at the address AD can consist of a word at this address, or several consecutive words starting at the address AD, or even a fraction of the word at the address AD. One can also envisage more complex solutions for choosing the key from the address AD: for example, the key can be constituted by the first bit of x successive words from the address AD.
Claims (7)
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR9111009A FR2681165B1 (en) | 1991-09-05 | 1991-09-05 | METHOD FOR TRANSMITTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION BETWEEN TWO CHIP CARDS. |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR9111009A FR2681165B1 (en) | 1991-09-05 | 1991-09-05 | METHOD FOR TRANSMITTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION BETWEEN TWO CHIP CARDS. |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
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| FR2681165A1 true FR2681165A1 (en) | 1993-03-12 |
| FR2681165B1 FR2681165B1 (en) | 1998-09-18 |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| FR9111009A Expired - Fee Related FR2681165B1 (en) | 1991-09-05 | 1991-09-05 | METHOD FOR TRANSMITTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION BETWEEN TWO CHIP CARDS. |
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| US8316221B2 (en) | 2004-07-26 | 2012-11-20 | Proton World International N.V. | Recording of a key in an integrated circuit |
| EP1717767A1 (en) * | 2005-04-14 | 2006-11-02 | Radio Tactics Limited | A forensic toolkit and methods for accessing data stored on electronic smart cards |
| US7886347B2 (en) | 2005-04-14 | 2011-02-08 | Radio Tactics Limited | Forensic toolkit and method for accessing data stored on electronic smart cards |
| US8161537B2 (en) | 2005-04-14 | 2012-04-17 | Radio Tactics Limited | Forensic toolkit and method for accessing data stored on electronic smart cards |
| EP1873962A1 (en) * | 2006-06-29 | 2008-01-02 | Incard SA | Method for key diversification on an IC Card |
| US7894601B2 (en) | 2006-06-29 | 2011-02-22 | Incard S.A. | Method for key diversification on an IC card |
| CN101110141B (en) * | 2006-06-29 | 2012-09-05 | 英卡股份有限公司 | Method for key diversification on an ic card |
| US8191790B2 (en) | 2008-03-28 | 2012-06-05 | Incard S.A. | Apparatus and method for initializing an IC card |
| EP2105892A1 (en) | 2008-03-28 | 2009-09-30 | Incard SA | Apparatus and method for initializing an IC card |
| WO2010069631A1 (en) * | 2008-12-19 | 2010-06-24 | Gemalto Sa | Method of managing sensitive data in an electronic token |
| EP2200253A1 (en) * | 2008-12-19 | 2010-06-23 | Gemalto SA | Method of managing sensitive data in an electronic token |
| US9148783B2 (en) | 2008-12-19 | 2015-09-29 | Gemalto Sa | Method of managing sensitive data in an electronic token |
| US9946855B2 (en) | 2010-11-19 | 2018-04-17 | Nagravision S.A. | Method to detect cloned software |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| FR2681165B1 (en) | 1998-09-18 |
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