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EP4236379B1 - Procédé et appareil d'authentification de sécurité appliqués au wi-fi - Google Patents

Procédé et appareil d'authentification de sécurité appliqués au wi-fi

Info

Publication number
EP4236379B1
EP4236379B1 EP20962832.0A EP20962832A EP4236379B1 EP 4236379 B1 EP4236379 B1 EP 4236379B1 EP 20962832 A EP20962832 A EP 20962832A EP 4236379 B1 EP4236379 B1 EP 4236379B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
password
mst
hash
identifier
request
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP20962832.0A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP4236379A1 (fr
EP4236379A4 (fr
Inventor
Kai Liu
Yanjie GU
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co Ltd filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Publication of EP4236379A1 publication Critical patent/EP4236379A1/fr
Publication of EP4236379A4 publication Critical patent/EP4236379A4/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP4236379B1 publication Critical patent/EP4236379B1/fr
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/71—Hardware identity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]

Definitions

  • This application relates to the communication field, and more specifically, to a security authentication method and apparatus applied to wireless fidelity (wireless fidelity, Wi-Fi).
  • wireless fidelity wireless fidelity, Wi-Fi
  • Wi-Fi is a wireless local area network technology based on the IEEE 802.11 standard and is widely used at home and in public places (for example, shopping malls and companies).
  • a security protocol is the basis of Wi-Fi and is used to control who can use a network.
  • the Wi-Fi security protocol enables a supplicant (supplicant) and an access point (access point, AP) to authenticate each other, to generate a session key (session key) and a group transient key (group transient key, GTK), where the session key may be used to protect subsequent unicast communication between the supplicant and the AP, and the group transient key is used to protect broadcast communication of the AP.
  • the supplicant and the AP share a password (pw).
  • the supplicant and the AP each can derive a pairwise master key (pairwise master key, PMK) based on a pw .
  • the supplicant and the AP can perform identity authentication and calculate a pairwise transient key (pairwise transient key, PTK) based on the PMK, and the AP can transmit the group transient key to the supplicant.
  • the PTK includes a transient key TK, namely, the session key.
  • This application provides a security authentication method and apparatus applied to Wi-Fi, so that a first device and an AP can share a second password, and a second device and the AP can share a third password, to help prevent a password from being shared among a plurality of devices and reduce a password leakage risk.
  • the third password shared by the second device and the AP is obtained via the first device. In this way, in this application, the first device can manage access by the second device to the AP.
  • a security authentication method applied to Wi-Fi is provided.
  • the method is applied to an access point AP, i.e., performed by the AP or a component (a chip or a circuit) that is configured in the AP.
  • the access point AP receives a first password input by a first device, where the first password is a password preset before delivery.
  • the AP obtains a second password shared between the AP and the first device, and performs 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second password.
  • the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the AP may receive a first request from the first device, where the first request is used to request a second device to access the AP; and the AP sends a third password to the first device in response to the first request, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the AP and the first device when checking by the AP on the first password that is preset before delivery and that is input by the first device succeeds, the AP and the first device can perform a security authentication protocol based on the second password shared between the AP and the first device. Further, the first device can request the AP to connect the second device to the AP, and the AP sends, in response to the request, the third password shared by the AP and the second device to the first device. Therefore, in embodiments of this application, the first device and the AP can share the second password, and the second device and the AP can share the third password, to help prevent a password from being shared among a plurality of devices and reduce a password leakage risk. In addition, the third password shared by the second device and the AP is obtained via the first device. In this way, in this application, the first device can manage access by the second device to the AP.
  • the first device may serve as a master device to manage another device (for example, the second device, which may be referred to as a common device), for example, authorize access by the common device to a network of the AP, or cancel access by the common device to a network of the AP, which is not limited.
  • the second device which may be referred to as a common device
  • the AP may further store an identifier of the first device and the second password. There is a correspondence between the identifier of the first device and the second password. In this way, the second password can be bound to the identifier of the first device, to help enhance a rainbow table attack resistance capability on an AP side.
  • the AP may require the first device to generate the second password. For example, when checking on the first password ⁇ succeeds, the AP may send an indication message to the first device, to indicate the first device to generate the second password. After receiving the indication message, the first device may generate the second password. Then, the first device may send the second password to the AP. In this way, both the first device and the AP can obtain the second password.
  • the AP may generate the second password, and transmit the second password to the first device. For example, when checking on the first password ⁇ succeeds, the AP may generate the second password for the first device, and send the second password to the first device. In this way, both the first device and the AP can obtain the second password.
  • the performing 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second password may be specifically implemented in the following manner: negotiating a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the first device based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange (twin base password encrypted key exchange, TBPEKE) protocol, and then performing 4-way handshake with the first device based on the first PMK1.
  • a twin base password encrypted key exchange twin base password encrypted key exchange, TBPEKE
  • a PMK with a high entropy value may be generated by performing a TBPEKE process. Therefore, embodiments of this application can help provide an offline dictionary attack resistance capability for the AP and the first device when the AP and the first device perform security authentication. In addition, because a side channel attack can be easily resisted through TBPEKE, in embodiments of this application, the PMK is generated by performing the TBPEKE, so that side channel attack resistance capabilities of the AP and the first device in a Wi-Fi security authentication process can be improved.
  • the AP may further negotiate a first PMK1 with the first device based on the second password and according to a simultaneous authentication of equals (simultaneous authentication of equals, SAE) protocol, and then perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the first PMK1.
  • SAE simultaneous authentication of equals
  • a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device may be further determined based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • an identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst are stored, where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst .
  • the identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst may be stored in an account file (which may be represented as DEV-ACCT) on an AP side.
  • DEV-ACCT DEV-ACCT
  • ⁇ id mst , g mst ⁇ may be an account established by the AP for the first device.
  • the AP may further calculate a hash-to-curve function g mst based on a second password pw mst , and store an identifier id mst of the first device and the hash-to-curve function g mst , so that the first device and the AP can subsequently perform security authentication by using the hash-to-curve function g mst .
  • the hash-to-curve function g mst is obtained based on the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst .
  • the hash-to-curve function g mst can be bound to the identifier id mst of the first device, to enhance the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side.
  • the random number n mst may be used to replace the identifier id mst of the first device to calculate g mst . In this way, the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side can be enhanced.
  • DEV-ACCT DEV-ACCTv ⁇ id mst , n mst , g mst ⁇ .
  • the AP may send the random number n mst to the first device.
  • the first password after the obtaining a second password shared between the AP and the first device, it may be further determined that the first password is invalid.
  • the AP does not determine the another device as a master device.
  • master devices for example, one or two master devices, may exist in a system, to help improve system security.
  • the AP may further delete the identifier of the first device and the second password, and activate the first password.
  • the first device By deleting the identifier of the first device and the second password, the first device can be revoked as the master device.
  • the first password is activated, so that when another device subsequently sends the first password to the AP, checking on the first password succeeds.
  • the AP may further determine the another device as a master device, to change the master device.
  • the identifier of the first device and the second password can be deleted and the first password can be activated by resetting a system of the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP when storing the identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst , the AP may delete the identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst , and activate the first password, to revoke the first device as the master device, and the AP may determine another device as a master device, to change the master device.
  • the AP may further store an identifier of the second device and the third password. There is a correspondence between the identifier of the second device and the third password. In this way, the third password can be bound to the identifier of the second device, to enhance the rainbow table attack resistance on the AP side.
  • the first request includes the identifier of the second device.
  • the AP may generate the identifier of the second device. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP may further perform 4-way handshake with the second device based on the third password, so that the second device and the AP perform security authentication.
  • the performing 4-way handshake with the second device based on the third password may be specifically implemented in the following manner: negotiating a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the second device based on the third password and according to the twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and then performing 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second PMK2.
  • a PMK with a high entropy value may be generated by performing a TBPEKE process. Therefore, embodiments of this application can help provide an offline dictionary attack resistance capability for the AP and the second device when the AP and the second device perform security authentication.
  • the PMK is generated by performing TBPEKE, so that side channel attack resistance capabilities of the AP and the second device in a Wi-Fi security authentication process can be improved.
  • the AP may further negotiate a second PMK2 with the first device based on the second password and according to an SAE protocol, and then perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second PMK2. This is not limited in this application.
  • a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device may be further determined based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on the elliptic curve through the point multiplication operation; and an identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T are stored, where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T .
  • the AP may further calculate the hash-to-curve function g T based on the third password pw T , and store an identifier id T of the second device and the hash-to-curve function g T , so that the second device and the AP can subsequently perform security authentication by using the hash-to-curve function g T .
  • the identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T may be stored in an account file (which may be represented as DEV-ACCT) on an AP side.
  • DEV-ACCT an account file
  • ⁇ id T , g T ⁇ may be an account established by the AP for the second device.
  • the hash-to-curve function g T is obtained based on the identifier id T of the second device and the third password pw T .
  • the hash-to-curve function g T can be bound to the identifier id T of the second device, to enhance the rainbow table attack resistance capability on an AP end.
  • the random number n T may be used to replace the identifier id T of the second device to calculate g T . In this way, the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side can be enhanced.
  • the AP may send the random number n T to the first device, and then the first device sends the random number n T and id T to the second device.
  • the AP may send n T and g T together to the first device, and then the first device sends n T , id T , and g T together to the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device
  • a data frame of the first request includes the MAC address of the second device
  • the identifier of the second device may alternatively be a user name of the second device.
  • the second device may generate the identifier of the second device, or the first device generates the identifier of the second device, or the AP may generate the identifier of the second device. This is not limited in this application.
  • the identifier of the first device is a MAC address of the first device.
  • the method further includes receiving the MAC address of the first device from the first device.
  • the identifier of the first device may alternatively be a user name of the first device.
  • the first device may generate the identifier of the first device, or the AP generates the identifier of the first device. This is not limited in this application.
  • a security authentication method applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi is provided.
  • the method is applied to a first device, i.e., performed by the first device or a component (a chip or a circuit) that is configured in the first device.
  • the first device sends a first password to an access point AP, where the first password is a password preset before delivery; and then when checking on the first password by the AP succeeds, the first device obtains a second password shared between the AP and the first device, and performs 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second password.
  • the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the first device may receive a second request from a second device, and send a first request to the AP based on the second request, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP, and the first request is used to request the second device to access the AP. Then, the first device may receive a third password from the AP, and send the third password to the second device, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the performing 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second password may be implemented in the following manner: negotiating a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the AP based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and performing 4-way handshake with the AP based on the first PMK1.
  • a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device may be further determined based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the first request includes an identifier of the second device
  • the second request includes the identifier of the second device
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a security authentication method applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi is provided.
  • the method may be applied to a second device, for example, performed by the second device or a component (for example, a chip or a circuit) that may be configured in the second device.
  • the second device sends a second request to a first device, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP. Then, the second device receives a third password from the first device, where the third password is a shared key that is generated by the AP and that is between the second device and the AP.
  • the second device may perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the third password, so that the second device and the AP perform security authentication.
  • the performing 4-way handshake with the AP based on the third password may be implemented in the following manner: negotiating a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the AP based on the third password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and performing 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second PMK2.
  • a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device may be further determined based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the second request includes an identifier of the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a security authentication apparatus applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi is provided, wherein the security authentication apparatus is an access point AP, or a chip disposed in the AP, or a circuit disposed in the AP and is configured to perform the method according to the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.
  • the apparatus includes a unit or module configured to perform the method in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.
  • the apparatus includes a processing unit and a transceiver unit.
  • the transceiver unit is configured to receive a first password input by a first device, where the first password is a password preset before delivery.
  • the processing unit is configured to obtain, when checking on the first password by the AP succeeds, a second password shared between the AP and the first device, where the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the processing unit is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second password.
  • the transceiver unit is further configured to receive a first request from the first device, where the first request is used to request a second device to access the AP.
  • the processing unit is further configured to control the transceiver unit to send a third password to the first device in response to the first request, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the processing unit is specifically configured to: negotiate a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the first device based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol, and perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the first PMK1.
  • the processing unit is further configured to: determine a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation; and store an identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst , where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst .
  • the processing unit is further configured to determine that the first password is invalid.
  • the processing unit is further configured to delete the identifier of the first device and the second password, and activate the first password.
  • the processing unit is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the second device based on the third password.
  • the processing unit is specifically configured to: negotiate a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the second device based on the third password and according to the twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second PMK2.
  • the processing unit is further configured to determine a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on the elliptic curve through the point multiplication operation: and store an identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T , where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T .
  • the first request includes the identifier of the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a security authentication apparatus applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi is provided, wherein the security authentication apparatus is a first device, or a chip disposed in the first device, or a circuit disposed in the first device and is configured to perform the method according to the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect.
  • the apparatus includes a unit or module configured to perform the method in the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect.
  • the apparatus includes a processing unit and a transceiver unit.
  • the transceiver unit is configured to send a first password to an access point AP, where the first password is a password preset before delivery.
  • the processing unit is configured to obtain, when checking on the first password by the AP succeeds, a second password shared between the AP and the first device, where the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the processing unit is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second password.
  • the transceiver unit is further configured to receive a second request from a second device, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the processing unit is further configured to control the transceiver unit to send a first request to the AP in response to the second request, where the first request is used to request the second device to access the AP.
  • the transceiver unit is further configured to receive a third password from the AP, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the transceiver unit is further configured to send the third password to the second device.
  • the processing unit is specifically configured to: negotiate a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the AP based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and perform, by the first device, 4-way handshake with the AP based on the first PMK1.
  • the processing unit is further configured to determine a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the first request includes an identifier of the second device
  • the second request includes the identifier of the second device
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a security authentication apparatus applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi is provided, and is configured to perform the method according to the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect.
  • the apparatus includes a unit or module configured to perform the method in the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect.
  • the apparatus includes a processing unit and a transceiver unit.
  • the transceiver unit is configured to send a second request to a first device, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the transceiver unit is further configured to receive a third password from the first device, where the third password is a shared key that is generated by the AP and that is between the second device and the AP.
  • the processing unit is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the third password.
  • the processing unit is specifically configured to negotiate a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the AP based on the third password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second PMK2.
  • the processing unit is further configured to determine a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the second request includes an identifier of the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a security authentication apparatus applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi is provided, wherein the security authentication apparatus is an access point AP, or a chip disposed in the AP, or a circuit disposed in the AP, including: a processor and a transceiver, where the processor is coupled to the transceiver.
  • the apparatus may further include a memory.
  • the memory is configured to store instructions
  • the processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the execution enables the processor to perform the method according to the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect.
  • the transceiver is configured to receive a first password input by a first device, where the first password is a password preset before delivery.
  • the processor is configured to obtain, when checking on the first password by the AP succeeds, a second password shared between the AP and the first device, where the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the processor is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second password.
  • the transceiver is further configured to receive a first request from the first device, where the first request is used to request a second device to access the AP.
  • the processor is further configured to control the transceiver to send a third password to the first device in response to the first request, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the processor is specifically configured to: negotiate a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the first device based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the first PMK1.
  • the processor is further configured to: determine a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation; and store an identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst , where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst .
  • the processor is further configured to determine that the first password is invalid.
  • the processor is further configured to delete the identifier of the first device and the second password, and activate the first password.
  • the processor is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the second device based on the third password.
  • the processor is specifically configured to negotiate a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the second device based on the third password and according to the twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second PMK2.
  • the processor is further configured to determine a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on the elliptic curve through the point multiplication operation: and store an identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T , where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T .
  • the first request includes the identifier of the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a security authentication apparatus applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi is provided, the security authentication apparatus is a first device, or a chip disposed in the first device, or a circuit disposed in the first device, including: a processor and a transceiver, where the processor is coupled to the transceiver.
  • the apparatus may further include a memory.
  • the memory is configured to store instructions
  • the processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the execution enables the processor to perform the method according to the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect.
  • the transceiver is configured to send a first password to an access point AP, where the first password is a password preset before delivery.
  • the processor is configured to obtain, when checking on the first password by the AP succeeds, a second password shared between the AP and the first device, where the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the processor is configured to perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second password.
  • the transceiver is configured to receive a second request from a second device, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the transceiver is configured to send a first request to the AP in response to the second request, where the first request is used to request the second device to access the AP.
  • the transceiver is configured to receive a third password from the AP, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the transceiver is configured to send the third password to the second device.
  • the processor is specifically configured to negotiate a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the AP based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the first PMK1.
  • the processor is further configured to determine a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the first request includes an identifier of the second device
  • the second request includes the identifier of the second device
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a security authentication apparatus applied to wireless fidelity Wi-Fi including: a processor and a transceiver, where the processor is coupled to the transceiver.
  • the apparatus may further include a memory.
  • the memory is configured to store instructions
  • the processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the execution enables the processor to perform the method according to the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect.
  • the transceiver is configured to send a second request to a first device, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the transceiver is further configured to receive a third password from the first device, where the third password is a shared key that is generated by the AP and that is between the second device and the AP.
  • the processor is configured to perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the third password.
  • the processor is specifically configured to negotiate a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the AP based on the third password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol; and perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second PMK2.
  • the processor is further configured to determine a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the second request includes an identifier of the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • a chip is provided.
  • the chip includes a processor and a communication interface.
  • the processor is configured to invoke instructions from the communication interface and run the instructions.
  • the processor executes the instructions, the method in any one of the first aspect to the third aspect or any possible implementation of any aspect is implemented.
  • the communication chip may further include a memory.
  • the memory stores instructions.
  • the processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory or other instructions. When the instructions are executed, the processor is configured to implement the method in any one of the first aspect to the third aspect or any possible implementation of any aspect.
  • a computer-readable medium configured to store a computer program, and the computer program includes instructions used to perform the method according to any one of the first aspect to the third aspect or any possible implementation of any aspect.
  • an embodiment of this application further provides a computer program product including instructions.
  • the computer program product runs on a computer, the computer is enabled to perform the method according to any one of the first aspect to the third aspect or any possible implementation of any aspect.
  • a communication system includes an apparatus that has a function of implementing the method and various possible designs according to the first aspect, an apparatus that has a function of implementing the method and various possible designs according to the second aspect, and an apparatus that has a function of implementing the method and various possible designs according to the third aspect.
  • Brute force cracking that is, an offline dictionary attack
  • An offline dictionary for a password means that a length of a password is short and value space is small. Therefore, attackers can guess all possible passwords repeatedly and compare the passwords with stolen communication information to determine a correct password.
  • Rainbow table attack In a system that uses passwords for authentication, a server does not directly store a password of each user, but stores a hash function value of the password of each user. The goal is to prevent the attackers from directly obtaining passwords of all users after they break through the server.
  • the rainbow table attack means that an attacker may create a table (a rainbow table) in advance to store all possible passwords and hash function values corresponding to the passwords. After attacking the server, the attacker may determine a password of a user by comparing the hash function values in the rainbow table with the hash function values stored in the server.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a Wi-Fi-based security authentication method 100.
  • a Wi-Fi security protocol may be a second generation Wi-Fi protected access (Wi-Fi protected access 2, WPA2) version, or a version earlier than WPA2, for example, wired equivalent privacy (wired equivalent privacy, WEP), second generation WEP (WEP2), or WPA. This is not limited.
  • a process shown in FIG. 1 may also be referred to as a security protocol process.
  • the method 100 is performed by a supplicant device (or may be replaced with a supplicant, supplicant) and an AP.
  • the AP may provide a network according to a Wi-Fi protocol
  • the supplicant device is a terminal device that requests to use the network provided by the AP.
  • the AP and the supplicant device share a password pw.
  • the method 100 may include step 101 to step 109.
  • Step 104 to step 109 may be referred to as a 4-way handshake process (4-way handshake).
  • the supplicant device is associated with the AP.
  • the supplicant device and the AP may negotiate a to-be-used security suite through association (association).
  • association may indicate a related encryption algorithm used between the supplicant device and the AP and another related parameter.
  • the supplicant device generates a PMK.
  • the supplicant device may deduce the PMK based on the pw shared by the supplicant device and the AP.
  • the supplicant device may further obtain the PMK based on media access control (media access control, MAC) addresses of the supplicant device and the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP generates the PMK.
  • the AP may deduce the PMK based on the pw shared by the supplicant device and the AP.
  • the AP may further obtain the PMK based on the MAC addresses of the supplicant device and the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP and the first device may perform 4-way handshake based on the PMK.
  • the AP sends Msg1 (r, anonce) to the supplicant device.
  • the supplicant device receives Msg1 (r, anonce).
  • Msg1 represents a message 1 (message 1)
  • anonce represents a one-time random number of the AP
  • r represents a count of a counter.
  • the supplicant device derives (derives) a PTK.
  • the supplicant device may select a one-time random number (which is represented as snonce), and generate the PTK based on the PMK, anonce, and snonce.
  • the supplicant device may further generate the PTK based on the PMK, anonce, snonce, and the MAC addresses of the supplicant device and the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the PTK includes three parts: a key confirmation key (key confirmation key, KCK), a key encryption key (key encryption key, KEK), and a transient key (transient key, TK).
  • KCK key confirmation key
  • KEK key encryption key
  • TK transient key
  • the KCK is used to protect message privacy in the 4-way handshake process
  • the KEK is used to protect message integrity in the 4-way handshake process
  • the TK is a true session key and is used to protect subsequent communication between the supplicant device and the AP.
  • the supplicant device sends Msg2 ( ⁇ r, snonce ⁇ KCK ) to the AP.
  • the AP receives Msg2 ( ⁇ r, snonce ⁇ KCK ).
  • Msg2 represents a message 2 (message 2), and message integrity of Msg2 is protected by using the KCK.
  • the AP derives the PTK.
  • the AP may generate the PTK based on the PMK, anonce, and snonce.
  • the AP may further generate the PTK based on the PMK, anonce, snonce, and the MAC addresses of the supplicant device and the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the PTK generated by the supplicant device is the same as the PTK generated by the AP.
  • the following process is performed.
  • the AP sends Msg3 ( ⁇ r+1, anonce, ⁇ GTK ⁇ KEK ⁇ KCK ) to the supplicant device.
  • the AP receives Msg3 ( ⁇ r+1, anonce, ⁇ GTK ⁇ KEK ⁇ KCK ).
  • Msg3 represents a message 3 (message 3)
  • the GTK is a group transient key. Privacy of the GTK of Msg3 is protected by using the KEK, and message integrity of entire Msg3 is protected by using the KCK.
  • the supplicant device sends Msg4 ( ⁇ r+1 ⁇ KCK ) to the AP.
  • the AP receives Msg4 ( ⁇ r+1 ⁇ KCK ).
  • Msg4 represents a message 4 (message 4). Message integrity of Msg4 is protected by using the KCK.
  • step 101 to step 108 refer to the descriptions in the conventional technology. Details are not described again.
  • the AP and the supplicant device may perform identity authentication in the 4-way handshake process, and generate a session key and a group transient key, to protect subsequent unicast communication between the supplicant device and the AP and broadcast communication of the AP.
  • the PMK is calculated by using the password pw (or the MAC addresses of both parties), and an outstanding feature of the password pw is that the password pw has a small length, that is, has a low entropy value. Consequently, if an attacker intercepts a 4-way handshake message during key generation, the attacker may obtain a password through brute force cracking, which threatens network security.
  • an SAE process is performed to generate a PMK with a high entropy value, to help avoid brute force cracking of the password.
  • the SAE is a password-based password authenticated and key exchange (password authenticated key exchange, PAKE) protocol.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a WPA3-based security authentication method 200.
  • the method 200 may include generation of a PMK by a supplicant device and an AP, association, and a 4-way handshake process.
  • a difference from the method 100 is that in FIG. 2 , a PMK with a high entropy value is generated by performing an SAE process (that is, step 210), where SAE is implemented on an elliptic curve.
  • step 210 includes step 211 to step 220.
  • P is a point on a corresponding elliptic curve, and P may be generated through derivation by using the password pw and the MAC addresses of the supplicant and the AP.
  • a calculation process of generating P by using the password pw may be referred to as a hash-to-curve (hash-to-curve) function.
  • Alice authenticates and commits (auth-commit) ( s A , E A ) to Bob.
  • Bob authenticates and commits (auth-commit) ( s B , E B ) to Alice.
  • Alice and Bob may use the ⁇ value calculated by Alice and Bob as the PMK.
  • the SAE process is performed to generate a PMK with a high entropy value, which can help reduce or even avoid a possibility that brute force cracking is performed on a password.
  • an embodiment of this application provides a communication solution.
  • different supplicant devices perform security authentication with the AP by using different passwords, that is, one device corresponds to one password. In this way, leakage of a password of a supplicant device does not affect passwords of other devices.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a system according to an embodiment of this application.
  • a plurality of supplicant devices may be securely connected to an AP, and use Wi-Fi network resources via the AP.
  • Each supplicant device and the AP perform a security protocol, perform mutual authentication, and negotiate a key for protecting a communication channel between the supplicant device and the AP.
  • different supplicant devices perform the security protocol with the AP by using different passwords.
  • each supplicant device needs to establish, with the AP, a password shared by the supplicant device and the AP.
  • FIG. 3 shows an example of a system applied to an embodiment of this application, but this application is not limited thereto.
  • one, two, four, or more supplicant devices may be connected to the AP.
  • the technical solution of this application may be applied to a wireless communication system, for example, the communication system shown in FIG. 3 .
  • a wireless communication connection relationship among apparatuses in the wireless communication system may be, for example, an AP or a chip configured in the AP.
  • Another apparatus may be, for example, a first device or a chip configured in the first device.
  • Another apparatus may be, for example, a second device or a chip configured in the second device. This is not limited in embodiments of this application.
  • the chip configured in the AP, the chip configured in the first device, and the chip configured in the second device may all perform communication based on a same method. This is not limited in this application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a security authentication method 400 applied to Wi-Fi according to an embodiment of this application. As shown in FIG. 4 , the method 400 includes step 401 to step 409.
  • Wi-Fi security protocols used in the method 400 may include three protocols: a master device determining protocol, a device authorization protocol, and a device authentication protocol.
  • Step 401 to step 403 may correspond to the master device determining protocol, in other words, it may be determined, in step 401 to step 403, that a first device is determined as a master device.
  • Step 404 may correspond to the device authentication protocol, in other words, the first device may perform security authentication with an AP in step 404.
  • Step 405 to step 408 may correspond to the device authorization protocol, in other words, in step 405 to step 408, a second device may establish, via the first device, a password shared with the AP.
  • Step 409 may correspond to the device authentication protocol, in other words, the second device may perform security authentication with the AP in step 409.
  • step 401 to step 409 in detail.
  • the first device sends a first password ⁇ to the AP, where the first password ⁇ is a password preset before delivery.
  • the first password ⁇ may be a factory-delivery password ⁇ that is securely stored by the AP at delivery.
  • the password ⁇ may be transmitted together with the AP to a host owning the AP.
  • the password ⁇ may be written into a secret envelope, or may be set in a QR (quick response) code attached to the AP, or may be sent to the host via a short message. This is not limited in this application.
  • the host can input the password ⁇ into the first device, so that the first device obtains the password ⁇ . Then, the first device may send the first password ⁇ to the AP.
  • the AP receives the first password ⁇ . After receiving the first password ⁇ , the AP may check (check) the first password ⁇ . When checking on the first password ⁇ succeeds, the AP may set the first device as a master device (namely, a master supplicant device, master supplicant).
  • a master device namely, a master supplicant device, master supplicant
  • the AP needs to distinguish between supplicant devices (or user equipments).
  • the supplicant devices or user equipments
  • the master device may be configured to manage the common device.
  • the master device may be responsible for authorization, in other words, the master device may authorize the common device, so that the common device can obtain a password shared with the AP.
  • the master device may be, by default, a device that is first successfully connected to the AP. For example, when a family purchases a new AP and starts to use the AP for the first time, the 1 st device connected to the AP is the master device.
  • the first device may further send an identifier (which may be denoted as id mst ) of the first device to the AP.
  • the AP receives the identifier id mst of the first device.
  • the identifier id mst of the first device is a unique identity of the first device, and may be used to uniquely identify the first device.
  • the first device may generate the identifier id mst of the first device, include the identifier id mst of the first device in a data frame including the first password ⁇ , and send the data frame to the AP.
  • the identifier id mst of the first device may be, for example, a user name of the first device.
  • the identifier of the first device may be a MAC address of the first device.
  • the data frame that includes the first password ⁇ and that is sent by the first device to the AP may include the MAC address of the first device.
  • the first device may separately send the MAC address of the first device to the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the first device obtains a second password pw mst shared between the AP and the first device.
  • the second password pw mst is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the AP obtains the second password pw mst shared between the AP and the first device.
  • the second password pw mst is the shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the AP may require the first device to generate the second password pw mst .
  • the AP may send an indication message to the first device, to indicate the first device to generate the second password pw mst .
  • the first device may generate the second password pw mst .
  • the first device may send the second password pw mst to the AP. In this way, both the first device and the AP obtain the second password pw mst .
  • the AP may generate the second password pw mst , and transmit the second password pw mst to the first device. For example, when checking on the first password ⁇ succeeds, the AP may generate the second password pw mst for the first device, and send the second password pw mst to the first device. In this way, both the first device and the AP can obtain the second password.
  • the AP may store the identifier (which may be denoted as id mst ) of the first device and the second password pw mst , where there is a correspondence between the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst . Therefore, in embodiments of this application, the correspondence between the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst is set, so that the second password pw mst can be bound to the identifier of the first device, to help enhance a rainbow table attack resistance capability on an AP side.
  • the second password pw mst may be obtained, and the device authentication protocol is performed with the first device based on the second password pw mst .
  • the AP may generate the identifier id mst of the first device.
  • the AP may further send the generated identifier id mst of the first device to the first device.
  • the AP may receive the identifier id mst of the first device from the first device.
  • the AP may receive the identifier id mst of the first device from the first device.
  • the first device may serve as the master device to manage another device (which may be referred to as the common device), for example, authorize access by the common device to a network of the AP, or cancel access by the common device to a network of the AP.
  • the common device may serve as the master device to manage another device (which may be referred to as the common device), for example, authorize access by the common device to a network of the AP, or cancel access by the common device to a network of the AP.
  • the AP may further determine that the first password ⁇ is invalid. For example, when checking on the first password ⁇ succeeds and the AP sets the first device as the master device, the AP may determine that the first password ⁇ is invalid. After the AP determines that the first password ⁇ is invalid; and when another device sends the first password ⁇ to the AP, checking on the first password ⁇ does not succeed. Therefore, the AP does not determine the another device as a master device. In this way, only a limited quantity of master devices, for example, one or two master devices, may exist in a system, to help improve system security.
  • the AP may further delete the stored identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst corresponding to the identifier id mst of the first device, to revoke the first device as the master device.
  • the AP may further activate the first password ⁇ .
  • the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst can be deleted and the first password ⁇ can be activated by resetting a system of the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP may further determine the another device as a master device, to change the master device.
  • the first device performs 4-way handshake with the AP.
  • the first device and the AP may obtain a PMK based on the second password pw mst , perform a 4-way handshake protocol to perform security authentication, and generate a session key and a group transient key, to protect subsequent unicast communication between the supplicant device and the AP and broadcast communication of the AP. Then, the first device may be securely connected to the AP, that is, establish a secure communication channel with the AP.
  • the 4-way handshake between the first device and the AP refer to the descriptions in FIG. 1 . Details are not described again.
  • the first device may authorize the common device, so that the common device can obtain a password shared with the AP.
  • the first device, the second device, and the AP may perform the following step 405 to step 408, that is, the device authorization protocol, so that the second device can establish, via the first device, the password shared with the AP.
  • the second device sends a request #1 to the first device.
  • the first device receives the request #1.
  • the second device may serve as the common device and send the request #1 to the first device, where the request #1 is used to request (the first device) to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the second device may request authorization from the first device in step 405.
  • the request #1 may also be referred to as an authorization request. This is not limited in this application.
  • the second device may further send an identifier (which may be denoted as id T ) of the second device to the first device.
  • the identifier id T of the second device is a unique identity of the second device, and may be used to uniquely identify the second device.
  • the second device may generate the identifier (which may be denoted as id T ) of the second device, include the identifier id T of the second device in the request #1, and send the request #1 to the first device.
  • id T may be, for example, a user name of the second device.
  • the identifier id T of the second device may be a MAC address of the second device.
  • a data frame that is sent by the second device to the first device and that includes the requests #1 may include the MAC address of the second device.
  • the second device may separately send the MAC address of the second device to the first device. This is not limited in this application.
  • the first device sends a request #2 to the AP, where the request #2 is used to request the second device to access the AP.
  • the AP receives the request #2.
  • the request #2 may also be referred to as an authorization request. This is not limited in this application.
  • the first device may send the request #2 to the AP when determining to authorize the second device to connect to the AP.
  • the first device when the first device determines not to authorize the second device, that is, does not allow the second device to connect to the AP, the first device may not send, to the AP, the request used to request the second device to access the AP.
  • the first device when determining to authorize the second device to connect to the AP, may further determine an authorization policy (authorization policy).
  • the authorization policy may indicate a validity period of the password shared between the AP and the second device, or whether the password shared between the AP and the second device is bound to the MAC address of the second device, or the like. This is not limited in this application.
  • the request #2 may include the authorization policy.
  • the request #2 may further include the identifier id T of the second device.
  • the identifier id T of the second device may be the user name of the second device or the MAC address of the second device. This is not limited.
  • the request #2 may further include the MAC address of the second device.
  • the first device may generate the identifier id T of the second device, or the first device obtains the identifier id T of the second device from the request #1 in step 405. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP sends a third password to the first device, where the third password is the shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the first device receives the third password.
  • the AP may generate the third password (which may be denoted as pw T ) of the second device, and send the third password pw T to the first device.
  • pw T the third password
  • the AP may generate the third password pw T according to the authorization policy. For example, a validity period of the third password pw T , or whether the third password pw T is bound to the MAC address of the second device may be set. This is not limited.
  • the AP may store the identifier (which may be denoted as id T ) of the second device and the third password pw T , where there is a correspondence between the identifier id T of the second device and the third password pw T . Therefore, in embodiments of this application, the correspondence between the identifier id T of the second device and the third password pw T is set, so that the third password pw T can be bound to the identifier of the second device, to help enhance the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP end.
  • the third password pw T may be obtained, and security authentication may be performed with the second device based on the third password pw T .
  • the AP may generate the identifier id T of the second device.
  • the AP may further send the generated identifier id T of the second device to the first device.
  • the AP may transmit (id T , pw T ) to the first device.
  • the AP may receive the identifier id T of the second device from the first device.
  • the AP may receive the identifier id T of the second device from the first device.
  • the first device sends the third password to the second device.
  • the second device receives the third password.
  • the first device may transmit (id T , pw T ) to the second device.
  • the first device when the first device generates the identifier id T of the second device, and receives the third password pw T from the AP, the first device may transmit (id T , pw T ) to the second device. This is not limited in this application.
  • the first device may request the AP to connect the second device to the AP, and receive and send, to the second device, the third password that is generated by the AP and that is shared between the AP and the second device, so that the first device authorizes the second device, and the second device can obtain the third password shared with the AP. Therefore, in embodiments of this application, through the device authorization protocol, the common device and the AP may share a password corresponding to the common device, to help prevent a password from being shared by a plurality of devices, and to help the master device to manage the common device.
  • the second device performs 4-way handshake with the AP.
  • the second device and the AP may obtain a PMK based on the third password pw T , perform a 4-way handshake protocol to perform security authentication and calculate a PTK, and generate a session key and a group transient key, to protect subsequent unicast communication between the supplicant device and the AP and broadcast communication of the AP. Then, the second device may be securely connected to the AP, that is, establish a secure communication channel with the AP.
  • the 4-way handshake between the second device and the AP refer to the descriptions in FIG. 1 . Details are not described again.
  • the AP and the first device may perform a security authentication protocol based on the second password shared between the AP and the first device. Further, the first device may request the AP to connect the second device to the AP, and the AP sends, in response to the request, the third password shared by the AP and the second device to the first device, so that the second device can obtain, via the first device, the third password shared between the second device and the AP.
  • the first device and the AP may share the second password, and the second device and the AP may share the third password, to help prevent a password from being shared among a plurality of devices and reduce a password leakage risk.
  • the second device may obtain, via the first device, the third password shared by the second device and the AP, so that in this application, the first device may manage access by the second device to the AP.
  • the AP may further negotiate a PMK with the supplicant device based on a password (for example, the second password or the third password) and according to a simultaneous authentication of equals (simultaneous authentication of equals, SAE) protocol.
  • a password for example, the second password or the third password
  • SAE simultaneous authentication of equals
  • the AP may further negotiate a pairwise master key PMK with the supplicant device based on the password (for example, the second password or the third password) and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange (twin base password encrypted key exchange, TBPEKE) protocol, and then perform 4-way handshake with the supplicant device based on the PMK.
  • a twin base password encrypted key exchange twin base password encrypted key exchange, TBPEKE
  • a PMK with a high entropy value may be generated by performing a TBPEKE process. Therefore, embodiments of this application can help provide an offline dictionary attack resistance capability for the AP and the first device when the AP and the first device perform security authentication.
  • the PMK is generated by performing TBPEKE, so that side channel attack resistance capabilities of the AP and the supplicant device in a Wi-Fi security authentication process can be improved.
  • FIG. 5 shows an example of a TBPEKE process.
  • public parameters of two communication parties A and B in the TBPEKE include: a cyclic group G (Gofprimeorder p ) whose order is a prime number p, two independent random generators U and V (which are represented as U and V ⁇ R G in the group, and a hash function H for outputting ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ l (ahashfunctiononto ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ l , which is represented as H: ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ * ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ l ).
  • H: ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ * ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ is a secure hash function, for example, may be SHA256.
  • a and B share a password pw .
  • A may calculate the following based on the public parameters and the password pw :
  • A sends A
  • B may also calculate the following based on the public parameters and the password pw :
  • A may calculate: Z ⁇ Y x .
  • B may calculate: Z ⁇ X y .
  • a and B may respectively calculate a key sk based on A, B, g, X, Y, and Z.
  • the sk may be calculated through the following formula: sk ⁇ H A B g X Y Z .
  • G represents an elliptic curve group
  • a point multiplication operation is performed on the pw.
  • the point multiplication operation can effectively resist a side channel attack. Therefore, in embodiments of this application, the side channel attack can be avoided through the TBPEKE.
  • TBPEKE process shown in FIG. 5 as required.
  • a TBPEKE is used to generate a PMK.
  • FIG. 6 shows a specific example of a process corresponding to a master device determining protocol.
  • the master device determining protocol may be performed by a first device and an AP, and may include step 601 to step 607.
  • steps or operations of the master device determining protocol process are shown in FIG. 6 , the steps or operations are only examples, and other operations or variations of the operations in FIG. 6 may also be performed in this embodiment of this application. Furthermore, the steps in FIG. 6 may be performed in a sequence different from that presented in FIG. 6 , and some operations in FIG. 6 may not need to be performed.
  • the first device sends a first password ⁇ and an identifier id mst of the first device to the AP.
  • the AP receives the first password ⁇ and the identifier id mst of the first device.
  • the first device may not send the identifier id mst of the first device to the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP may determine the first device as a master device. In this case, the following step 603 to step 607 may be performed. Specifically, for the master device, refer to the descriptions in FIG. 4 . Details are not described herein again.
  • the AP when checking on ⁇ does not succeed, the AP does not determine the first device as the master device. Then, the process may end.
  • the first device obtains a second password pw mst (get pw mst ).
  • the AP obtains the second password pw mst (get pw mst ).
  • the AP may store the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst , and the first device and the AP may perform device authentication based on the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst and according to an SAE protocol.
  • SAE protocol For details, refer to the descriptions in FIG. 4 . Details are not described again.
  • the first device and the AP may negotiate a pairwise master key PMK based on the second password pw mst and according to a TBPEKE protocol, and then perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the PMK, to perform the security protocol.
  • the AP may further perform the following step 605 and step 606.
  • U and V are two independent random generators obtained from a cyclic group G whose order is a prime number p, and may be stored as system parameters on an AP end
  • h() is a secure hash function
  • g mst is a hash-to-curve function of the first device, which may be referred to as a first hash-to-curve (hash-to-curve) function g mst , and is used to convert a password pw mst into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the g mst may generate a related parameter when the first device and the AP subsequently perform identity authentication.
  • the hash-to-curve function g mst is obtained based on the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst .
  • the hash-to-curve function g mst can be bound to the identifier id mst of the first device, to enhance the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side.
  • DEV-ACCT DEV-ACCTv ⁇ id mst , g mst ⁇ .
  • DEV-ACCT represents an account file stored on an AP side, and may include identifiers of one or more accounts and a hash-to-curve function corresponding to each account.
  • the account file in which the identifier id mst of the first device and the corresponding hash-to-curve function g mst are stored may have another name, or the identifier id mst of the first device and the corresponding hash-to-curve function g may be stored in another file, which is not limited.
  • step 607 refers to the descriptions in FIG. 4 . Details are not described herein again.
  • the AP may further change the master device. For example, the AP may delete the stored identifier id mst of the first device and the hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the identifier id mst of the first device, to revoke the first device as the master device. In this case, the AP may further activate the first password ⁇ .
  • the identifier id mst of the first device and the hash-to-curve function g mst can be deleted and the first password ⁇ can be activated by resetting a system of the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the AP may further determine the another device as a master device, to change the master device.
  • the AP may further calculate the hash-to-curve function g mst based on the second password pw mst , and store the identifier id mst of the first device and the hash-to-curve function g mst , so that the first device and the AP can subsequently perform security authentication by using the hash-to-curve function g mst .
  • the AP may send the random number n mst to the first device.
  • the random number n mst may be used to replace the identifier id mst of the first device to calculate g mst . In this way, the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side can be enhanced.
  • FIG. 7 shows a specific example of a process corresponding to a device authentication protocol.
  • the first device may perform security authentication with the AP.
  • the first device obtains a PMK based on the hash-to-curve function g mst , and performs a 4-way handshake protocol to perform security authentication.
  • the device authentication protocol process may be performed after the master device determining protocol process shown in FIG. 6 . That is, after the AP determines the first device as the master device, the first device may perform security authentication with the AP based on the obtained second password.
  • the device authentication protocol shown in FIG. 7 may be a specific example of step 404 in FIG. 4 . This is not limited in this application.
  • the first device may store the second password pw mst
  • steps or operations of the device authentication protocol process are shown in FIG. 7 , the steps or operations are only examples, and other operations or variations of the operations in FIG. 7 may also be performed in this embodiment of this application. Furthermore, the steps in FIG. 7 may be performed in a sequence different from that presented in FIG. 7 , and all operations in FIG. 7 may not need to be performed.
  • the device authentication process may include step 701 to step 707.
  • U and V are two independent random generators obtained from a cyclic group G whose order is a prime number p, and may be stored on a first device side as system parameters.
  • g mst determined by the first device side is the same as g mst stored on the AP side.
  • g mst may be implemented by presetting code in the first device and the AP. This is not limited in this application.
  • the first device sends X and id mst to an AP.
  • the AP receives X and id mst .
  • the first device may send a connection request to the AP, where the connection request includes the parameter X and the identifier id mst of the first device. This is not limited in this application.
  • g mst U ⁇ V h (id mst ,pw mst ) and the random number y.
  • g mst U ⁇ V h (id mst , pw mst ) instead of the password pw mst , so that the AP can be prevented from calculating g mst in real time when performing device authentication, to reduce a calculation amount of the AP end, thereby helping reduce or avoid a denial of service (denial of service, DoS) attack.
  • DoS denial of service
  • the AP end may store the identifier id mst of the first device and the second password pw mst .
  • the AP sends Y to the first device.
  • the first device receives Y.
  • the first device and the AP may separately determine a pairwise master key PMK based on the parameter X , the parameter Y , the identifier id mst of the first device, and an identifier id AP of the AP.
  • Z Y x
  • Z X y
  • id AP represents the identifier of the AP.
  • the identifier of the AP may be a MAC address of the AP.
  • KDF() is a standard key derivation function.
  • the AP may send a broadcast message, where the broadcast message includes the MAC address of the AP.
  • the supplicant device may receive the broadcast message, and obtain the MAC address of the AP via the broadcast message.
  • the broadcast message may be a beacon (beacons) frame, and the beacon frame may be sent before step 701. This is not limited in this application.
  • the first device performs association and 4-way handshake with the AP.
  • the AP and the first device may perform mutual identity authentication and calculate a PTK.
  • the first device After the first device passes the device authentication protocol, the first device may be connected to the AP and establish a secure communication channel.
  • the first device may determine the parameter X based on the hash-to-curve function g mst , and send the parameter X and the identifier id mst of the first device to the AP.
  • the AP may send the parameter Y to the first device.
  • the parameter Y is also determined based on the hash-to-curve function g mst . Therefore, both the first device and the AP can determine the PMK based on the parameter X, the parameter Y, the identifier id mst of the first device, and the identifier id AP of the AP.
  • the first parameter X and the second parameter Y that are transmitted between the AP and the first device are generated based on a hash-to-curve function g and a random number, and do not involve password calculation. Therefore, it is difficult for an attacker to know a password, so that side channel attack resistance capabilities of the AP and the first device in a Wi-Fi security authentication process can be improved, and the AP and the first device can avoid a side channel attack during security authentication.
  • the first device may receive a random number n mst from the AP. In this way, the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side can be enhanced.
  • FIG. 8 shows a specific example of a process corresponding to a device authorization protocol.
  • the first device may authorize the second device, so that the second device can obtain a third password shared with the AP.
  • the device authorization protocol process may be performed after the master device passes the device authentication protocol, for example, after the device authentication protocol process shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the AP end may store the identifier id mst of the first device and the hash-to-curve function g mst , that is, store ⁇ id mst , g mst ⁇ . This is not limited in this application.
  • steps or operations of the device authorization protocol process are shown in FIG. 8 , the steps or operations are only examples, and other operations or variations of the operations in FIG. 8 may also be performed in this embodiment of this application. Furthermore, the steps in FIG. 8 may be performed in a sequence different from that presented in FIG. 8 , and all operations in FIG. 8 may not need to be performed.
  • the device authentication process may include step 801 to step 808.
  • the first device performs device authentication with the AP.
  • step 801 refer to the descriptions in FIG. 7 . Details are not described herein again.
  • the second device sends a request #1 to the first device, where the request #1 is used to request (the first device) to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the first device receives the request #1.
  • step 802 refer to the descriptions in step 405 in FIG. 4 . Details are not described herein again.
  • the first device sends a request #2 to the AP.
  • the request #2 is used to request the second device to access the AP.
  • the request #2 may include an authorization policy P and an identifier id T of the second device.
  • step 803 refer to the descriptions in step 406 in FIG. 4 . Details are not described herein again.
  • the AP generates ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ .
  • the AP generates a third password pw T of the second device.
  • the AP generates ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ based on the identifier id T of the second device and the third password pw T .
  • the AP may obtain the identifier id T of the second device from the request #2.
  • the AP may generate the identifier id T of a second device. This is not limited in this application. For details, refer to the descriptions in step 407 in FIG. 4 . Details are not described again.
  • the AP may generate the third password according to the authorization policy P.
  • the AP may generate the third password according to the authorization policy P.
  • the authorization policy P For example, refer to the descriptions in step 407 in FIG. 4 . Details are not described again.
  • the AP sends ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ to the first device.
  • the first device receives ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ .
  • the first device sends ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ to the second device.
  • the second device receives ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ .
  • the AP may store ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ , and the second device and the AP may perform device authentication based on the identifier id T of the second device and the third password pw T .
  • the AP may store ⁇ id T , pw T ⁇ , and the second device and the AP may perform device authentication based on the identifier id T of the second device and the third password pw T .
  • the AP when the hash-to-curve function used by the second device and the AP to generate the PMK may be used to convert the password pw into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation, for example, when a TBPEKE may be used to generate the PMK, the AP may further perform the following step 807 and step 808.
  • U and V are two independent random generators obtained from a cyclic group G whose order is a prime number p, and may be stored on an AP side as system parameters
  • h() is a secure hash function
  • g T is a hash-to-curve function of the second device, which may be referred to as a second hash-to-curve (hash-to-curve) function g T , and is used to convert the password pw T into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • g T may generate a related parameter when the second device and the AP subsequently perform identity authentication.
  • the hash-to-curve function g T is obtained based on the identifier id T of the second device and the third password pw T .
  • the hash-to-curve function g T can be bound to the identifier id T of the second device, to enhance the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP end.
  • DEV-ACCT DEV-ACCTv ⁇ id mst , g mst , P ⁇ .
  • the AP may store the identifier id T of the second device and the hash-to-curve function g T obtained through calculation in the account file DEV-ACCT.
  • DEV-ACCT DEV-ACCT
  • DEV-ACCT DEV-ACCTv ⁇ id T , g T , P ⁇
  • the account file in which the identifier id T of the second device and the corresponding hash-to-curve function g T are stored may have another name, or the identifier id T of the second device and the corresponding hash-to-curve function g may be stored in another file.
  • the AP may further calculate the hash-to-curve function g T based on the third password pw T , and store the identifier id T of the second device and the hash-to-curve function g T , so that the second device and the AP can subsequently perform security authentication by using the hash-to-curve function g T .
  • step 804 may be: The AP generates ⁇ id T , pw T , n T ⁇ .
  • step 805 and step 806 ⁇ id T , pw T , n T ⁇ is transmitted.
  • the AP may send the random number n T to the first device, and then the first device sends the random number n T and id T to the second device.
  • the AP may send n T and g T together to the first device, and then the first device sends n T , id T , and g T together to the second device.
  • the random number n T may be used to replace the identifier id T of the second device to calculate g T . In this way, the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side can be enhanced.
  • FIG. 9 shows another specific example of a process corresponding to a device authentication protocol.
  • the second device may perform device authentication with the AP.
  • the second device obtains a PMK based on the hash-to-curve function g T , and performs a 4-way handshake protocol to perform security authentication.
  • the device authentication protocol process may be performed after the device authorization protocol process shown in FIG. 8 , that is, after the first device authorizes the second device, so that after the second device obtains the third password shared with the AP, the second device can perform security authentication with the AP based on the obtained third password.
  • the device authentication protocol shown in FIG. 9 may be a specific example of step 409 in FIG. 4 . This is not limited in this application.
  • the second device may store the third password pw T , and the AP end stores the identifier id T of the second device and the hash-to-curve function g T , that is, stores ⁇ id T , g T ⁇ . This is not limited in this application.
  • steps or operations of the device authentication protocol process are shown in FIG. 9 , the steps or operations are only examples, and other operations or variations of the operations in FIG. 9 may also be performed in this embodiment of this application. Furthermore, the steps in FIG. 9 may be performed in a sequence different from that presented in FIG. 9 , and all operations in FIG. 9 may not need to be performed.
  • the device authentication process may include step 901 to step 907.
  • X ( U ⁇ V h (id mst , pw mst )
  • the second device sends X and id T to the AP.
  • the AP receives X and id T .
  • the second device may send a connection request to the AP, where the connection request includes the parameter X and the identifier id T of the second device. This is not limited in this application.
  • step 703 in FIG. 7 Some simple adaptations may be performed, and details are not described herein again.
  • the AP sends Y to the second device.
  • the second device receives Y.
  • PMK KDF(Z, id T ⁇ id AP ⁇ X ⁇ Y ).
  • step 705 and step 706 in FIG. 7 Some simple adaptations may be performed, and details are not described herein again.
  • the second device performs association and 4-way handshake with the AP.
  • the AP and the second device can perform mutual identity authentication and calculate a PTK.
  • the second device After the second device passes the device authentication protocol, the second device may be connected to the AP and establish a secure communication channel.
  • the second device may determine the parameter X based on the hash-to-curve function g T , and send the parameter X and the identifier id T of the second device to the AP.
  • the AP may send the parameter Y to the second device.
  • the parameter Y is also determined based on the hash-to-curve function g T . Therefore, both the second device and the AP can determine the PMK based on the parameter X, the parameter Y, the identifier id T of the second device, and the identifier id AP of the AP.
  • the first parameter X and the second parameter Y that are transmitted between the AP and the second device are generated based on the hash-to-curve function g T and the random number, and do not involve password calculation. Therefore, it is difficult for an attacker to know a password, so that side channel attack resistance capabilities of the AP and the second device in a Wi-Fi security authentication process can be improved, and the AP and the second device can avoid a side channel attack during security authentication.
  • the second device may obtain the random number n T sent by the AP. In this way, the rainbow table attack resistance capability on the AP side can be enhanced.
  • the AP side is vulnerable to a DoS attack.
  • a supplicant device for example, the first device or the second device
  • a password pw for example, the second password pw mst corresponding to the first device, or the third password pw T corresponding to the second device
  • Solution 1 The AP may send an anti-DoS credential token to a supplicant device, and check a token sent by the supplicant device again. The AP further processes a connection request of the supplicant device only when checking on the token succeeds.
  • Solution 2 The AP may maintain a list of devices in processing (device in processing, DEVinPROC), and the AP further processes a connection request of the supplicant device only when the supplicant device is not in the list of devices in processing.
  • DEVinPROC device in processing
  • FIG. 10 shows another specific example of a process corresponding to a device authentication protocol.
  • the AP side may use the solution 1 and the solution 2 to reduce or avoid the DoS attack.
  • the supplicant device may be the first device or the second device described above. This is not limited in this application.
  • the supplicant device and the AP share a password pw (for example, pw mst or pw T ).
  • n dev represents a random number.
  • id dev may be id mst
  • n dev may be n mst
  • g dev may be g mst
  • id dev may be id T
  • n dev may be n T
  • g dev may be g T .
  • steps or operations of the device authentication protocol process are shown in FIG. 10 , the steps or operations are only examples, and other operations or variations of the operations in FIG. 10 may also be performed in this embodiment of this application. Furthermore, the steps in FIG. 10 may be performed in a sequence different from that presented in FIG. 10 , and all operations in FIG. 10 may not need to be performed.
  • the device authentication process may include step 1001 to step 1014.
  • whether to enable (enable) an anti-DoS mechanism may be set.
  • a label may be preset.
  • a label value may be set to 1; otherwise, a label value may be set to 0.
  • the token sent by the supplicant device may be checked. This is not limited in this application.
  • the beacon frame may include an identifier (which may be represented as id AP ) of the AP, for example, may be a MAC address (which may be represented as MAC AP ) of the AP.
  • the beacon frame may further include RSNEwithsupp. ciphers (robust security network element with supported ciphers), to notify a capability and the like of the ciphers. This is not limited in this application.
  • the supplicant device may receive the beacon frame, and determine that the supplicant device needs to be connected to a Wi-Fi network provided by the AP.
  • the supplicant device selects a cipher (select cipher), selects a random number x ⁇ Z p * , and determines X - ( U ⁇ V h (id dev , pw ) ) x .
  • the supplicant device selects matched ciphers, that is, selects a cipher suite supported by the supplicant device, to obtain g, or obtain related parameters (for example, U and V) for obtaining g.
  • the AP broadcasts RSNEwithsupp. ciphers and the supplicant device selects the matched ciphers may be an example in which the AP is associated with the supplicant device to negotiate a to-be-used security suite.
  • the supplicant device selects a cipher suite g or U and V may be stored on a first device side as system parameters.
  • the supplicant device sends X and id dev to the AP.
  • the AP receives X and id dev .
  • the supplicant device may send a connection request to the AP, where the connection request includes X and id dev . This is not limited in this application.
  • the list (which may be represented as DEVinPROC) of devices in processing maintained on the AP end may include a MAC address of at least one supplicant device (that is, a device in processing) connected to a network provided by the AP.
  • the MAC address of the supplicant device is in DEVinPROC, that is, (MAC dev ⁇ DEVinPROC)
  • the supplicant device uses a false MAC address to perform a malicious attack on the AP, and the supplicant device may be an attacker.
  • the AP may not process the connection request of the supplicant device, that is, does not calculate the token for the supplicant device, to reduce or avoid the DoS attack on the AP.
  • the AP sends the token to the supplicant device. That is, after generating the token bound to the address of id dev , the AP returns the token to the supplicant device. Correspondingly, the supplicant device receives the token.
  • the supplicant device sends the token, X, and id dev to the AP.
  • the supplicant device commits a connection request and a token to the AP again.
  • the token may be carried in the connection request. This is not limited in this application.
  • the token may alternatively be encapsulated together with the connection request in a message and sent to the AP.
  • the AP receives the token, X, and id dev .
  • the AP may further check whether the token is equal to the token calculated by the AP in step 1004.
  • the AP may further process the connection request of the supplicant device.
  • the AP may not process the connection request of the supplicant device.
  • the AP can generate, based on the identifier id dev of the supplicant device and the key k stored on the AP end, an anti-DoS token bound to the identifier of the supplicant device, and return the token to the supplicant device.
  • the supplicant device needs to send the identifier id dev of the supplicant device and the token to the AP again, so that the AP can check the identifier id dev of the supplicant device and the corresponding token, and process the connection request of the supplicant device only when checking on the token succeeds. Therefore, this can help prevent the AP from processing all connection requests, and help reduce or avoid the DoS attack on the AP.
  • the AP may not check the token, that is, may not process the connection request of the supplicant device.
  • DEVinPROC DEVinPROCv ⁇ id dev ⁇ .
  • the AP may not process the connection request, thereby helping reduce or avoid the DoS attack on the AP.
  • the AP sends Y to the supplicant device.
  • the supplicant device performs association and 4-way handshake with the AP.
  • step 1009 to step 1013 refer to the descriptions of step 703 to step 707 in FIG. 7 , or refer to the descriptions of step 903 to step 907 in FIG. 9 . Details are not described herein again.
  • DEVinPROC DEVinPROC- ⁇ id dev ⁇ .
  • the identifier of the supplicant device may be deleted from the current DEVinPROC list. In this way, the supplicant device can still send a connection request to the AP subsequently. In addition, because the identifier of the supplicant device is not in DEVinPROC, the AP can perform corresponding processing on the connection request of the supplicant device.
  • the AP further processes the connection request of the supplicant device only when determining that the MAC address of the supplicant device is not in the DEVinPROC list of the AP. This can help prevent the AP from processing all connection requests, help reduce a calculation amount of the AP end, and help reduce or avoid the DoS attack on the AP.
  • the method implemented by the AP may also be implemented by a component (for example, a chip or a circuit) that may be used in the AP
  • the method implemented by the first device may also be implemented by a component (for example, a chip or a circuit) that may be used in the first device
  • the method implemented by the second device may also be implemented by a component (for example, a chip or a circuit) that may be used in the second device.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of a security authentication apparatus 1100 applied to Wi-Fi according to an embodiment of this application.
  • the apparatus 1100 is an AP, or a chip or a circuit that is disposed in the AP.
  • the apparatus 1100 is a first device, or a chip or a circuit that is disposed in the first device.
  • the apparatus 1100 may be a second device, or may be a chip or a circuit, for example, a chip or a circuit that may be disposed in the second device.
  • the apparatus 1100 may include a processing unit 1110 (namely, an example of a processor) and a transceiver unit 1130.
  • a processing unit 1110 namely, an example of a processor
  • a transceiver unit 1130 namely, an example of a transceiver
  • the transceiver unit 1130 may be implemented by using a transceiver, a transceiver-related circuit, or an interface circuit.
  • the apparatus may further include a storage unit 1120.
  • the storage unit 1120 is configured to store instructions.
  • the storage unit may also be configured to store data or information.
  • the storage unit 1120 may be implemented via a memory.
  • the processing unit 1110 may be configured to execute the instructions stored in the storage unit 1120, to enable the apparatus 1100 to implement the steps performed by the AP in the foregoing method.
  • the processing unit 1110, the storage unit 1120, and the transceiver unit 1130 may communicate with each other through an internal connection path, to transmit a control signal and/or a data signal.
  • the storage unit 1120 is configured to store a computer program
  • the processing unit 1110 may be configured to invoke the computer program from the storage unit 1120 and run the computer program, to control the transceiver unit 1130 to receive a signal and/or send a signal, to complete the steps of the AP in the foregoing method.
  • the processing unit 1110 is a processor and the transceiver unit 1130 is a transceiver
  • the processor may be coupled to the transceiver, for example, send instructions to the transceiver, to instruct (or control) the transceiver unit to receive a signal and/or send a signal, to complete the steps of the AP in the foregoing method.
  • the processing unit 1110 may be configured to execute the instructions stored in the storage unit 1120, to enable the apparatus 1100 to implement the steps performed by the first device in the foregoing method.
  • the processing unit 1110, the storage unit 1120, and the transceiver unit 1130 may communicate with each other through an internal connection path, to transmit a control signal and/or a data signal.
  • the storage unit 1120 is configured to store a computer program
  • the processing unit 1110 may be configured to invoke the computer program from the storage unit 1120 and run the computer program, to control the transceiver unit 1130 to receive a signal and/or send a signal, to complete the steps of the first device in the foregoing method.
  • the processor unit 1110 when the processor unit 1110 is a processor and the transceiver unit 1130 is a transceiver, the processor may be coupled to the transceiver, for example, send instructions to the transceiver, to instruct (or control) the transceiver unit to receive a signal and/or send a signal, to complete the steps of the first device in the foregoing method.
  • the processing unit 1110 may be configured to execute the instructions stored in the storage unit 1120, to enable the apparatus 1100 to implement the steps performed by the second device in the foregoing method.
  • the processing unit 1110, the storage unit 1120, and the transceiver unit 1130 may communicate with each other through an internal connection path, to transmit a control signal and/or a data signal.
  • the storage unit 1120 is configured to store a computer program
  • the processing unit 1110 may be configured to invoke the computer program from the storage unit 1120 and run the computer program, to control the transceiver unit 1130 to receive a signal and/or send a signal, to complete the steps of the second device in the foregoing method.
  • the processor unit 1110 when the processor unit 1110 is a processor and the transceiver unit 1130 is a transceiver, the processor may be coupled to the transceiver, for example, send instructions to the transceiver, to instruct (or control) the transceiver unit to receive a signal and/or send a signal, to complete the steps of the second device in the foregoing method.
  • the storage unit 1120 may be integrated into the processing unit 1110, or may be disposed separately from the processing unit 1110.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 may include a receiver and a transmitter.
  • the receiver and the transmitter may be a same physical entity or different physical entities.
  • the receiver and the transmitter may be collectively referred to as a transceiver.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 includes an input interface and an output interface.
  • transceiver unit 1130 a function of the transceiver unit 1130 is implemented via a transceiver circuit or a dedicated transceiver chip. It may be considered that the processing unit 1110 is implemented via a dedicated processing chip, a processing circuit, a processing unit, or a general-purpose chip.
  • a communication device for example, the AP, the first device, or the second device
  • a general-purpose computer that is, program code for implementing functions of the processing unit 1110 and the transceiver unit 1130 is stored in the storage unit 1120, and a general-purpose processing unit implements the functions of the processing unit 1110 and the transceiver unit 1130 by executing the code in the storage unit 1120.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is configured to receive a first password input by a first device, where the first password is a password preset before delivery.
  • the processing unit 1110 is configured to obtain, when checking on the first password by the AP succeeds, a second password shared between the AP and the first device, where the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second password.
  • the processing unit 1110 may perform 4-way handshake with the first device via the transceiver unit 1130.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is further configured to receive a first request from the first device, where the first request is used to request a second device to access the AP.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to control the transceiver unit 1130 to send a third password to the first device in response to the first request, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the processing unit 1110 is specifically configured to negotiate a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the first device based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol, and perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the first PNM1.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to determine a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation; and store an identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst , where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the first device and the first hash-to-curve function g mst .
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to determine that the first password is invalid.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to delete the identifier of the first device and the second password, and activate the first password.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the second device based on the third password.
  • the processing unit 1110 may perform 4-way handshake with the second device via the transceiver unit 1130.
  • the processing unit 1110 is specifically configured to negotiate a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the second device based on the third password and according to the twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol, and perform 4-way handshake with the first device based on the second PMK2.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to determine a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on the elliptic curve through the point multiplication operation; and store an identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T , where there is a correspondence between the identifier of the second device and the second hash-to-curve function g T .
  • the first request includes the identifier of the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is configured to send a first password to an access point AP, where the first password is a password preset before delivery.
  • the processing unit 1110 is configured to obtain, when checking on the first password by the AP succeeds, a second password shared between the AP and the first device, where the second password is a shared key between the first device and the AP.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second password.
  • the processing unit 1110 may perform 4-way handshake with the AP via the transceiver unit 1130.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is further configured to receive a second request from a second device, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to control the transceiver unit to send a first request to the AP in response to the second request, where the first request is used to request the second device to access the AP.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is further configured to receive a third password from the AP, where the third password is a shared key between the second device and the AP.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is further configured to send the third password to the second device.
  • the processing unit 1110 is specifically configured to negotiate a first pairwise master key PMK1 with the AP based on the second password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol, and perform, by the first device, 4-way handshake with the AP based on the first PMK1.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to determine a first hash-to-curve function g mst corresponding to the first device based on the second password, where the first hash-to-curve function g mst is used to convert the second password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the first request includes an identifier of the second device
  • the second request includes the identifier of the second device
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is configured to send a second request to a first device, where the second request is used to request to allow the second device to access the AP.
  • the transceiver unit 1130 is further configured to receive a third password from the first device, where the third password is a shared key that is generated by the AP and that is between the second device and the AP.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the third password.
  • the processing unit 1110 may perform 4-way handshake with the AP via the transceiver unit 1130.
  • the processing unit 1110 is specifically configured to negotiate a second pairwise master key PMK2 with the AP based on the third password and according to a twin base password encrypted key exchange TBPEKE protocol, and perform 4-way handshake with the AP based on the second PMK2.
  • the processing unit 1110 is further configured to determine a second hash-to-curve function g T corresponding to the second device based on the third password, where the second hash-to-curve function g T is used to convert the third password into a point on an elliptic curve through a point multiplication operation.
  • the second request includes an identifier of the second device.
  • the identifier of the second device is a MAC address of the second device.
  • the units in the foregoing embodiment may also be referred to as modules, circuits, or components.
  • the modules or units in the apparatus 1100 may be configured to perform the actions or processing processes performed by the AP in the foregoing method embodiments.
  • the modules or the units in the apparatus 1100 may be configured to perform the actions or processing processes performed by the first device in the foregoing method embodiments.
  • the modules or the units in the apparatus 1100 may be configured to perform the actions or processing processes performed by the second device in the foregoing method embodiments.
  • an embodiment of this application further provides a communication system, including the AP, the first device, and the second device.
  • the processor in embodiments of this application may be a central processing unit (central processing unit, CPU), or the processor may be another general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (digital signal processor, DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (application-specific integrated circuit, ASIC), a field programmable gate array (field programmable gate array, FPGA) or another programmable logic device, a discrete gate or a transistor logic device, a discrete hardware component, or the like.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like.
  • the memory in embodiments of this application may be a volatile memory or a nonvolatile memory, or may include a volatile memory and a nonvolatile memory.
  • the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (read-only memory, ROM), a programmable read-only memory (programmable ROM, PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (erasable PROM, EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (electrically EPROM, EEPROM), or a flash memory.
  • the volatile memory may be a random access memory (random access memory, RAM), used as an external cache.
  • random access memory random access memory
  • static random access memory static random access memory
  • DRAM dynamic random access memory
  • SDRAM synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • double data rate SDRAM double data rate SDRAM
  • DDR SDRAM double data rate SDRAM
  • ESDRAM enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • SCRAM synchronous link dynamic random access memory
  • direct rambus RAM direct rambus RAM, DR RAM
  • All or some of the foregoing embodiments may be implemented via software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination thereof.
  • all or some of the foregoing embodiments may be implemented in a form of a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or the computer programs are loaded or executed on a computer, the procedure or functions according to embodiments of this application are all or partially generated.
  • the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a dedicated computer, a computer network, or other programmable apparatuses.
  • the computer instructions may be stored on a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center in a wired (for example, infrared, radio, or microwave) manner.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any usable medium accessible to a computer, or a data storage device, such as a server or a data center, integrating one or more usable media.
  • the usable medium may be a magnetic medium (for example, a floppy disk, a hard disk, or a magnetic tape), an optical medium (for example, DVD), a semiconductor medium, or the like.
  • the semiconductor medium may be a solid-state drive.
  • An embodiment of this application further provides a computer-readable medium that stores a computer program.
  • steps performed by the AP, steps performed by the first device, or steps performed by the second device in any one of the foregoing embodiments are implemented.
  • An embodiment of this application further provides a computer program product.
  • steps performed by the AP, steps performed by the first device, or steps performed by the second device in any one of the foregoing embodiments are implemented.
  • An embodiment of this application further provides a system chip.
  • the system chip includes: a communication unit and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit may be, for example, a processor.
  • the communication unit may be, for example, an input/output interface, a pin, or a circuit.
  • the processing unit may execute computer instructions, so that a chip in the communication apparatus performs steps performed by the AP, steps performed by the first device, or steps performed by the second device provided in the foregoing embodiments of this application.
  • the computer instructions are stored in a storage unit.
  • aspects or features of this application may be implemented as a method, an apparatus, or a product that uses standard programming and/or engineering technologies.
  • product used in this application covers a computer program that can be accessed from any computer-readable component, carrier, or medium.
  • a computer-readable medium may include but is not limited to: a magnetic storage component (for example, a hard disk, a floppy disk, or a magnetic tape), an optical disc (for example, a compact disc (compact disc, CD) or a digital versatile disc (digital versatile disc, DVD)), a smart card, and a flash memory component (for example, an erasable programmable read-only memory (erasable programmable read-only memory, EPROM), a card, a stick, or a key drive).
  • various storage media described in this specification may indicate one or more devices and/or other machine-readable media that are configured to store information.
  • the term "machine-readable media” may include but is not limited to a radio channel, and various other media that can store, include and/or carry instructions and/or data.
  • Embodiments in this application may be used independently, or may be used jointly. For example, any one or more steps in different embodiments may be combined to form an embodiment separately. This is not limited herein.
  • sequence numbers of the foregoing processes do not indicate an execution sequence in embodiments of this application.
  • the execution sequence of the processes should be determined according to functions and internal logic of the processes, and should not be construed as any limitation on the implementation processes of embodiments of this application.
  • a and/or B may represent the following three cases: Only A exists, both A and B exist, and only B exists.
  • a character "/" generally indicates an "or” relationship between the associated objects.
  • at least one means one or more.
  • at least one of A and B similar to the term "A and/or B" describes an association relationship between the associated objects and represents that three relationships may exist. For example, at least one of A and B may represent the following three cases: Only A exists, both A and B exist, and only B exists.
  • the disclosed system, apparatus, and method may be implemented in other manners.
  • the described apparatus embodiments are only examples.
  • division of the units is only logical function division, and may be other division during actual implementation.
  • a plurality of units or components may be combined or may be integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not performed.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual couplings or direct couplings or communication connections may be implemented through some interfaces.
  • the indirect couplings or communication connections between the apparatuses or units may be implemented in electronic, mechanical, or other forms.
  • the units described as separate parts may or may not be physically separate, and parts displayed as units may or may not be physical units, and may be located in one position, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units may be selected depending on actual requirements to achieve the objectives of the solutions in embodiments.
  • the functions When the functions are implemented in a form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, the functions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on such an understanding, the technical solutions of this application essentially, or the part contributing to the conventional technology, or some of the technical solutions may be implemented in a form of a software product.
  • the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, and includes several instructions for instructing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device) to perform all or some of the steps of the methods described in embodiments of this application.
  • the foregoing storage medium includes any medium that can store program code, such as a USB flash drive, a removable hard disk, a read-only memory (read-only memory, ROM), a random access memory (random access memory, RAM). a magnetic disk, or an optical disc.
  • program code such as a USB flash drive, a removable hard disk, a read-only memory (read-only memory, ROM), a random access memory (random access memory, RAM). a magnetic disk, or an optical disc.

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Claims (15)

  1. Procédé d'authentification de sécurité appliqué à la fidélité sans fil Wi-Fi, dans lequel le procédé comprend :
    la réception (401), par un point d'accès AP, d'un premier mot de passe entré par un premier dispositif, dans lequel le premier mot de passe est un mot de passe prédéfini avant la distribution ;
    l'obtention (403), par l'AP lorsque la vérification du premier mot de passe par l'AP réussit, d'un deuxième mot de passe partagé entre l'AP et le premier dispositif, dans lequel le deuxième mot de passe est une clé partagée entre le premier dispositif et l'AP ;
    le fait d'effectuer (404), par l'AP, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec le premier dispositif sur la base du deuxième mot de passe ; caractérisé par
    la réception (406), par l'AP, d'une première demande à partir du premier dispositif, dans lequel la première demande est utilisée pour demander à un second dispositif d'accéder à l'AP ; et
    l'envoi (407), par l'AP, d'un troisième mot de passe au premier dispositif en réponse à la première demande, dans lequel le troisième mot de passe est une clé partagée entre le second dispositif et l'AP.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel le fait d'effectuer (404), par l'AP, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec le premier dispositif sur la base du deuxième mot de passe comprend :
    la négociation, par l'AP, d'une première clé maîtresse par paire PMK1 avec le premier dispositif sur la base du deuxième mot de passe et conformément à un protocole d'échange de clés chiffrées à mot de passe à deux bases, TBPEKE ; et
    le fait d'effectuer, par l'AP, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec le premier dispositif sur la base de la première PMK1.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, dans lequel avant la négociation, par l'AP, d'une première clé maîtresse par paire PMK1 avec le premier dispositif sur la base du deuxième mot de passe et conformément à un protocole d'échange de clés chiffrées à mot de passe à deux bases, TBPEKE, le procédé comprend en outre :
    la détermination, par l'AP sur la base du deuxième mot de passe, d'une première fonction de hachage-sur-courbe g mst correspondant au premier dispositif, dans lequel la première fonction de hachage-sur-courbe g mst est utilisée pour convertir le deuxième mot de passe en un point sur une courbe elliptique par le biais d'une opération de multiplication de points ; et
    le stockage, par l'AP, d'un identificateur du premier dispositif et de la première fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gmst , dans lequel il existe une correspondance entre l'identificateur du premier dispositif et la première fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gmst.
  4. Procédé selon la revendication 3, dans lequel la première fonction de hachage-sur-courbe g mst est représentée comme suit : g mst = U ⋅ V h id mst pw mst , dans lequel
    U et V sont respectivement deux générateurs aléatoires indépendants obtenus à partir d'un groupe cyclique G dont l'ordre est un nombre premier p, h() est une fonction de hachage sécurisée, idmst représente l'identificateur du premier dispositif, et pwmst représente le deuxième mot de passe.
  5. Procédé selon la revendication 3, dans lequel la première fonction de hachage-sur-courbe g mst est représentée comme suit : g mst = U ⋅ V h n mst pw mst , , dans lequel
    U et V sont respectivement deux générateurs aléatoires indépendants obtenus à partir d'un groupe cyclique G dont l'ordre est un nombre premier p, h() est une fonction de hachage sécurisée, nmst est un nombre aléatoire, et pwmst représente le deuxième mot de passe.
  6. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 5, dans lequel après l'obtention (403), par l'AP, d'un deuxième mot de passe partagé entre l'AP et le premier dispositif, le procédé comprend en outre :
    la détermination, par l'AP, que le premier mot de passe est invalide.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 6, comprenant en outre :
    la suppression, par l'AP, de l'identificateur du premier dispositif et du deuxième mot de passe ; et
    l'activation, par l'AP, du premier mot de passe.
  8. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 7, comprenant en outre :
    le fait d'effectuer (409), par l'AP, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec le second dispositif sur la base du troisième mot de passe.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 8, dans lequel le fait d'effectuer, par l'AP, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec le second dispositif sur la base du troisième mot de passe comprend :
    la négociation, par l'AP, d'une seconde clé maîtresse par paire PMK2 avec le second dispositif sur la base du troisième mot de passe et conformément au protocole d'échange de clés chiffrées à mot de passe à deux bases, TBPEKE ; et
    le fait d'effectuer, par l'AP, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec le second dispositif sur la base de la seconde PMK2.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 9, dans lequel avant la négociation, par l'AP, d'une seconde clé maîtresse par paire PMK2 avec le second dispositif sur la base du troisième mot de passe et conformément au protocole d'échange de clés chiffrées à mot de passe à deux bases, TBPEKE, le procédé comprend en outre :
    la détermination, par l'AP sur la base du troisième mot de passe, d'une seconde fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gT correspondant au second dispositif, dans lequel la seconde fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gT est utilisée pour convertir le troisième mot de passe en un point sur la courbe elliptique par le biais de l'opération de multiplication de points ; et
    le stockage, par l'AP, d'un identificateur du second dispositif et de la seconde fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gT , dans lequel il existe une correspondance entre l'identificateur du second dispositif et la seconde fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gT .
  11. Procédé selon la revendication 10, dans lequel la seconde fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gT est représentée comme suit : g T = U ⋅ V h id T pw T , dans lequel
    U et V sont respectivement deux générateurs aléatoires indépendants obtenus à partir d'un groupe cyclique G dont l'ordre est un nombre premier p, h() est une fonction de hachage sécurisée, idT représente l'identificateur du second dispositif, et pwT représente le troisième mot de passe.
  12. Procédé selon la revendication 10, dans lequel la seconde fonction de hachage-sur-courbe gT est représentée comme suit : g T = U ⋅ V h n T pw T , dans lequel
    U et V sont respectivement deux générateurs aléatoires indépendants obtenus à partir d'un groupe cyclique G dont l'ordre est un nombre premier p, h() est une fonction de hachage sécurisée, nT est un nombre aléatoire, et pwT représente le troisième mot de passe.
  13. Procédé d'authentification de sécurité appliqué à la fidélité sans fil Wi-Fi, dans lequel le procédé comprend :
    l'envoi (401), par un premier dispositif, d'un premier mot de passe à un point d'accès AP, dans lequel le premier mot de passe est un mot de passe prédéfini avant la distribution ;
    l'obtention (402), par le premier dispositif lorsque la vérification du premier mot de passe par l'AP réussit, d'un deuxième mot de passe partagé entre l'AP et le premier dispositif, dans lequel le deuxième mot de passe est une clé partagée entre le premier dispositif et l'AP ;
    le fait d'effectuer (404), par le premier dispositif, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec l'AP sur la base du deuxième mot de passe ; caractérisé par
    la réception (405), par le premier dispositif, d'une seconde demande à partir d'un second dispositif, dans lequel la seconde demande est utilisée pour demander d'autoriser le second dispositif à accéder à l'AP ;
    l'envoi (406), par le premier dispositif, d'une première demande à l'AP en réponse à la seconde demande, dans lequel la première demande est utilisée pour demander au second dispositif d'accéder à l'AP ;
    la réception (407), par le premier dispositif, d'un troisième mot de passe de l'AP, dans lequel le troisième mot de passe est une clé partagée entre le second dispositif et l'AP ; et
    l'envoi (408), par le premier dispositif, du troisième mot de passe au second dispositif.
  14. Procédé selon la revendication 13, dans lequel le fait d'effectuer (404), par le premier dispositif, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec l'AP sur la base du second mot de passe comprend :
    la négociation, par le premier dispositif, d'une première clé maîtresse par paire PMK1 avec l'AP sur la base du deuxième mot de passe et conformément à un protocole d'échange de clés chiffrées à mot de passe à deux bases, TBPEKE ; et
    le fait d'effectuer, par le premier dispositif, une poignée de main à quatre voies avec l'AP sur la base de la première PMK1.
  15. Appareil d'authentification de sécurité (1100) appliqué à la fidélité sans fil Wi-Fi, dans lequel l'appareil d'authentification de sécurité est un point d'accès AP, configuré pour effectuer le procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 12, ou l'appareil d'authentification de sécurité est un premier dispositif, configuré pour effectuer le procédé selon la revendication 13 ou 14.
EP20962832.0A 2020-11-26 2020-11-26 Procédé et appareil d'authentification de sécurité appliqués au wi-fi Active EP4236379B1 (fr)

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CN116458173B (zh) 2025-10-03
CN116458173A (zh) 2023-07-18
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