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EP2868032A2 - Emploi d'une fonction puf pour la vérification d'une authentification, en particulier pour la protection contre un accès non autorisé à une fonction d'un ics ou d'un appareil de commande - Google Patents

Emploi d'une fonction puf pour la vérification d'une authentification, en particulier pour la protection contre un accès non autorisé à une fonction d'un ics ou d'un appareil de commande

Info

Publication number
EP2868032A2
EP2868032A2 EP13753119.0A EP13753119A EP2868032A2 EP 2868032 A2 EP2868032 A2 EP 2868032A2 EP 13753119 A EP13753119 A EP 13753119A EP 2868032 A2 EP2868032 A2 EP 2868032A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
response
challenge
puf
authenticator
authentication
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP13753119.0A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Rainer Falk
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Siemens Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG, Siemens Corp filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP2868032A2 publication Critical patent/EP2868032A2/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/45—Structures or tools for the administration of authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2121—Chip on media, e.g. a disk or tape with a chip embedded in its case

Definitions

  • This invention relates to the technical field of checking authentication by means of a Physical Unclosable Function (PUF).
  • PAF Physical Unclosable Function
  • Authentication is a basic security mechanism.
  • a user or an object can be authenticated.
  • a functionality may e.g. an IC, a controller, software, or a service reachable via a network can be activated or deactivated, e.g. accessing certain memory areas, a configuration and diagnostic function (e.g., JTAG), or activation of a particular functionality (e.g., battery charging with currents above a threshold).
  • a functionality may e.g. an IC, a controller, software, or a service reachable via a network can be activated or deactivated, e.g. accessing certain memory areas, a configuration and diagnostic function (e.g., JTAG), or activation of a particular functionality (e.g., battery charging with currents above a threshold).
  • JTAG configuration and diagnostic function
  • a particular functionality e.g., battery charging with currents above a threshold.
  • Authentication can generally take place by means of a password or a cryptographic key or by means of biometric properties of a user (fingerprint,%) Or of a physical object (physical unclonable function).
  • the authenticated points to know a password, a cryptographic key, or to exhibit a certain property.
  • authentication by possession of an object is also known, e.g. by possession of a door key or a badge.
  • Device authentication eg of a semiconductor IC: A programmable logic device (in particular an FPGA) functions only or only without restriction if a specific hardware device (security IC) is detected as being present. This prevents simple copying of FPGA bitfiles because a copied bitfile is in a different hardware environment in which no or another security IC is available. is not workable there.
  • An example is http: // www. maxim- ic. com / app-notes / index. mvp / id / 3826
  • Semiconductor ICs as well as e.g. Controllers have diagnostic interfaces to access internal functions during development, manufacturing, or repair. Access to such functionality must be protected in regular operation if sensitive information is accessible (e.g., reading stored keys). It is known to disable such interfaces when they are no longer needed (by burning a so-called security fuse). It is also known
  • Physical Unclonable Functions are known to reliably identify objects based on their intrinsic physical properties.
  • a physical property of an object eg a semiconductor IC
  • Authentication of an object is based on the fact that, depending on a challenge value, a corresponding response value is returned by a PUF function defined by physical properties
  • Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) provide a space-saving and thus cost-effective way of authenticating a physical object based on its intrinsic physical properties by adding a corresponding response value to a given challenge value by the PUF, depending on the object-specific physical properties of the object
  • An examiner who selects an object In the case of known ChallengeResponse pairs, a similarity comparison of the present and the response values provided by the authenticated object can identify the object as the original object.
  • PUF chip-internal determination of a cryptographic key by means of a PUF.
  • the determined cryptographic key is used within the chip for calculating a cryptographic operation.
  • the PUF raw data (response) generally still needs to be reworked to compensate for statistical variations in the PUF response to a particular challenge (e.g., by forward error correction or feature extraction, as in conventional fingerprint authentication).
  • http: // www. usenix. org / event / sec07 / tech / full_papers / alkabani / a lkabani.pdf is known to prevent the overbuilding of semiconductor ICs by means of a PUF by modifying the state machine needed to operate the IC to a large number
  • the start state is determined by means of a PUF, ie the IC starts execution in a start state dependent on random, instance-specific properties .Only the designer of the IC, who knows the design specification of the state machine, For example, for a particular IC, it may be practical to determine a path from the random initial state to a start state required for the use of the functionality, and thus to program a fabricated IC.
  • PUFs An advantage of PUFs is that a PUF structure is changed during a physical manipulation and thus tamper protection is achievable.
  • PUFs also applicable if a device does not have memory to permanently store a cryptographic key (this either requires special manufacturing processes, eg for flash memory, or a backup battery for SRAM memory cells).
  • PUF replenishment It is known as PUF replenishment that a PUF authentication server determines challenge-response pairs during operation and stores them for future authentication (check processes) (see http://ip.com/lPCOM/000127000).
  • authenticator also called examiner or authenticator
  • authentication object also called an authenticator, examinee, or supplicant
  • FIG. 1 shows an authentication system 80 according to the prior art.
  • the authentication check function 85 of a tester 83 selects a challenge c in the prior art and transmits it to the test object 82.
  • the test object 82 receives the challenge c and uses a PUF 86 of the test object 82 to determine a response value r.
  • the response value r becomes provided to the examiner 83. It determines here, by means of a list 87 of stored challenge-response pairs (CR pairs), whether the response r provided by the test object 82 is valid. This can be done, for example, by a similarity comparison of the response value r provided by the test object 82 with a reference response value stored for the challenge value c used.
  • CR pairs stored challenge-response pairs
  • a method for checking an authentication of an authentication object by means of an authenticator comprises a physical unclonable function, referred to below as PUF, and an authentication check function.
  • the authenticator is provided with a challenge-response pair.
  • the challenge-response pair comprises a challenge information, also called a challenge below, and a Response information, also called response below.
  • the response is provided to the authenticator by the authentication object.
  • the challenge information is used as input to the PUF.
  • the PUF generates a PUF response to the input of the challenge information.
  • the PUF response and response are used for comparison. Depending on a result of the comparison, a release signal is provided.
  • the invention relates to an authentication device for authenticating an authentication object.
  • the authenticator comprises a PUF, an authentication check function and a detection means for detecting a challenge-response pair.
  • the challenge-response pair comprises a challenge information and a response
  • the detection means is configured and / or adapted to receive the response information from the authentication object.
  • the authenticator is configured and / or adapted to transfer the response to the authentication check function, to use the challenge information sent by the authentication object as input for the PUF, and also to send a PUF response generated by the PUF to the authentication check function to hand over.
  • the authentication check function is configured and / or adapted to use the PUF response and the response for a comparison. The comparison provides an enabling signal depending on the result of the comparison.
  • the invention also relates to an authentication system which comprises the above-described authenticator and an authentication object, wherein the authentication object is configured and / or adapted to make the response available to the authenticator.
  • an authentication system which comprises the above-described authenticator and an authentication object, wherein the authentication object is configured and / or adapted to make the response available to the authenticator.
  • Figure 2 is a system for authenticating an authentication object based on its preferred embodiments of the invention will be explained below.
  • FIG. 2 shows an authentication system 1, which comprises an authentication object 2 and an electronic part 9.
  • the electronic part 9 comprises an authenticator 3, and the authentication object 2 comprises a memory area 7.
  • challenge-response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C are stored.
  • Each of the challenge-response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C comprises a challenge information C, C2, C3, hereinafter also called challenge value C, C2, C3, or simply challenge C, C2, C3, and one to one of the Challenge associated response information R, R2, R3, hereinafter also Ronse value R, R2, R3, or Response R, R2, R3, called.
  • the authenticator 3 comprises an authentication check function 5, a physical unclonable function 6, also referred to below as PUF 6, and a detection means 10 for detecting challenge-response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C.
  • a challenge-response pair 4A is made available to the authenticator.
  • the challenge-response pair 4A is sent to the authenticator 3 by the authentication object 2.
  • the authenticator 3 uses the challenge information C as an input for the PUF 6, which generates a PUF response PR on the input of the challenge information C.
  • the PUF response PR and the response R are used for a comparison, wherein a release signal A is provided depending on the result of the comparison.
  • the authentication object it is not necessary for the authentication object to be 2 stores the challenge-response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C. It can query these from a database, or calculate them by means of a calculation model of the PUF 6. Likewise, it is not necessary for the authentication object to provide the entire challenge / response pair 4A of the PUF. It is sufficient if the response R is provided by the authentication object 2 to the authenticator 3.
  • the challenge information C can also be selected by the authenticator 3 or by a third instance.
  • a match measure is determined in the context of the comparison.
  • the match score is compared to a threshold.
  • the enable signal A is provided if the determined measure of conformity reaches or exceeds the threshold value.
  • the Authent Deutschensobj ect 2 is therefore preferably designed and / or adapted to provide the authenticator 3 multiple Responses R, R2, R3 or Challenge-Response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C.
  • the electronic part 9 is designed and / or adapted to be either in an open or in a restricted state. the. In the restricted state, a function of the electronic part is not or only partially usable.
  • the enable signal A does not necessarily serve to limit a function of the electronic part 9, it can also be used to limit external functions, ie to limit the functions of other systems or components.
  • the authentication object 2 also provides PUF correction data that the authenticator 3 uses to verify the provided response R, R2, R3 and the PUF response PR, PR2, PR3, PRi generated by means of the PUF 6.
  • the detection means 10 is also designed and / or adapted to receive the PUF correction data from the authentication object (2).
  • identification information of the authentication object 2 is determined and dependent thereon is a cryptographic key for the encrypted transmission of responses R. , R2, R3, or for the encrypted transmission of challenge-response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C between the authenticator and the Authent Deutschensobj ect or see between an unlockable function and the authentication object 2 determines.
  • the communication could also take place between the unlockable function and the authenticated object (additional variant).
  • the authenticator 3 would determine a cryptographic key and provide the unlockable function.
  • the authenticator 3 depending on the challenge-response pair 4A provided to the authenticator 3 or depending on the challenge-response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C provided to the authenticator 3, the authenticator 3 generates a cryptographic key for the encrypted transmission of responses R, R2, R3, or for the encrypted transmission of challenge-response Pairs 4A, 4B, 4C between the authenticator 3 and the thentleitersobj ect 2 or between an unlockable function and the Authent confusesobj ect 2 determines.
  • the challenge values C, C2, C3 or the challenge-response pairs 4A, 4B, 4C are thus used directly to determine a key.
  • the identification information of the authentication object 2 can thus also be given by the challenge value or values C, C2, C3 or the challenge-response pair 4A, 4B, 4C (in addition to the customary variant that a user Name, a serial number or network address is used).
  • the authenticator 3 comprises a cryptographic means 11.
  • the authenticator 3 comprises a provisioning means 12 which is designed and / or adapted to provide further challenge-response pairs for future authentication after accepting the authentication object 2.
  • the inventive method comprises providing the Authent Deutschensobj ectes 2 and 3 of the authenticator.
  • associated response values can be determined by means of the physical unclonable function PUF for selectable challenge values.
  • PUF physical unclonable function
  • a PUF may be illustratively considered the "fingerprint" of a hardware object Hitherto, according to the prior art, a PUF may be used to identify the object by its "fuzzy" fingerprint. It is also known internally to determine a cryptographic key from PUF responses using error correction methods and stored correction data.
  • a physical unclonable function PUF of an object is now not used as in the prior art for calculating a response provided to an external entity for examination in the context of an object authentication but for checking a received response or a challenge Response pair through the object.
  • a PUF of an object for example of a semiconductor IC such as a memory module, an FPGA or ASIC, or a so-called system on chip SoC
  • the object itself can the PUF of the object to authenticate an outsider and depending on a certain function unlock (eg memory access to a specific memory area, execution / start of a realized by the IC control algorithm or a functionality, test / diagnostic interface of the ICs (eg JTAG interface)
  • Challenge-response pairs of a chip for future authentication processes can be detectable, for example, as long as the chip is in an open mode (eg security fuse not burned), so that they can be read out by an authorized user and stored in a database, for example - chert be, or it may possibly be determined a chip model, m with which the valid responses can be calculated for any challenge.
  • the chip can be "lured", eg by burning a fuse, after which access to protected functionality is only possible after a valid response value has been provided.
  • the PUF can be used in one variant, In other words, according to a preferred embodiment, the PUF 6 is used in a dual fashion, namely by the authenticator 3. The PUF 6 does not realize an authentication function in the role of the device under test here . but an authentication verification in the role of the examiner. This makes it possible to use a simple and inexpensive realizable PUF 6 now for a whole new purpose.
  • the PUF 6 is now used to test a provided Response R.
  • the test object 2 provides a charge-response pair C, R.
  • the response value R is stored here. If authentication is successful, the authentication check function 5 provides an Accept signal A. This may enable a function of the tester 3 (e.g., diagnostic interface, configuration mode, feature enable). In a variant (not shown) the test specimen 2 can be provided by the examiner 3 with a message about the success or failure.
  • a comparator 7 of the authenticator 3 checks the response R provided by the authenticated 2 and the (expected) response PR determined by the PUF 6 of the authenticator 3 for consistency (sufficient similarity).
  • the internal PUF 6 of the authenticator 3 may be polled multiple times for the same challenge information C to obtain multiple PUF responses PRi for a particular challenge information C.
  • the challenge value C can be selected by the authenticating object 2 (test object), by the authenticator 3 (examiner) or by a third party. It is possible to use an identical challenge information C, but preferably a plurality of changing challenge information C, C2, C3.
  • the test object 2 provides PUF correction data (helper data / fuzzy extractor parameters, eg parameters forward error correction) which the checker 3 uses to verify the provided response R and the response value PR determined by means of the physical PUF 6.
  • PUF correction data helper data / fuzzy extractor parameters, eg parameters forward error correction
  • the examiner 3 sets aside CR-
  • the correction data has a selectable parameter (e.g., a PIN or a password). This has the advantage that an authentication by means of a password,
  • the auditor 3 therefore does not have to store any check information, but instead can check a provided password by means of a PUF and provided data.
  • the tester 3 additionally provides correction data in addition to the CR pair or the response value R assigned to a specific challenge value C, wherein the response value R or the correction data is selected by a selectable parameter (PIN , Password) provided to the verifier 3.
  • the examinee 2 then stores only a CR pair or correction data, but not the password or the PIN.
  • the password or PIN first has to be provided to the device under test 2, eg by a user via an input option, so that the authentication data required for successful authentication can be available to the device under test 2 and thus made available to the tester 3.
  • the test object 2 can store CR pairs 4A, 4B, 4C of the authenticator 3, query from a database, or calculate the PUF 6 by means of a calculation model.
  • the (physical) PUF 6 is measured in an initialization phase in order to determine the model parameters. In both cases (CR pairs, model parameters), this data has been collected and stored at an earlier point in time, eg during the manufacture of the authenticator.
  • this query via a communication connection, eg via an IP / http connection.
  • a communication connection eg via an IP / http connection.
  • IPsec IP Security
  • SSL / TLS Secure Sockets Layer
  • the examinee 2 authenticates itself, for example, by means of a password or a cryptographic key with respect to the database server. Only if the device under test 2 is authorized to release a functionality on an examiner component, a CR pair is provided to it for activating the functionality of the database server.
  • a diagnostic interface JTAG, RS232, USB
  • certain functionality e.g., access to a memory area, use of a stored key
  • this functionality is unlocked. It can remain unlocked until a lock command is received, power is interrupted, or rebooted.
  • the described authentication can also be performed with further authentication methods, e.g. a conventional password check or a cryptographic challenge response
  • Authentication can be combined. Depending on the authentication variant used, a different functionality can be enabled. In another variant, several authentication must be passed successfully in order to enable a functionality of the auditor 3.
  • the CR pair 4A or the response value R which is transmitted to the verifier 3, is cryptographically encrypted.
  • the verifier 3 uses a stored cryptographic key to decrypt the received C-R pair 4A and the received response R, respectively.
  • the decrypted value is provided to the PUF 6 internally for review.
  • a given examinee 2 is thereby provided with C-R pairs 4A, 4B, 4C for later authentications tied to its identity. Another candidate with a different identity can not use these C-R pairs. This prevents easy copying of C-R pairs 4A, 4B, 4C and use by another device under test.
  • a later authentication of the test specimen by the examiner first his identity is detected and dependent on the key reconstructed in order to decrypt thus received by him C-R pairs or Responses.
  • the determination of the specimen-specific key may e.g. using a cryptographic Key Derivation Function (KDF), a cryptographic hash function.
  • KDF cryptographic Key Derivation Function
  • a DUT-specific key is derived from an unbound key (i.e., calculated by a one-way function).
  • the original key used can be fixed, configurable, or it can be determined from a PUF (identical or different to the authentication verification PUU).
  • an alternative to a password check is provided.
  • a password check the password or a password of the
  • Password dependent test parameters are stored. No memory is required, making it suitable for ICs that do not have the ability to store data permanently. Otherwise a memory would have to be provided (for example production-technically problematic) or
  • flammable fuses which also represent a memory
  • an SRAM backup battery can be provided (battery problematic), or an external EEPROM memory can be used (cost, interface vulnerable to EEPROM).

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne la vérification d'une authentification au moyen d'une fonction PUF (fonction physique non clonable) (6). Un dispositif d'authentification (3) comprend une fonction PUF (6) et une fonction de vérification d'authentification (5). Une paire défi-réponse (4A) comportant une information de défi (C) et une information de réponse (R) est préparée pour le dispositif d'authentification (3). L'information de défi (C) sert d'entrée pour la fonction PUF (6) qui génère, suite à l'entrée de l'information de défi (C), une réponse PUF (PR). La réponse PUF (PR) et la réponse (R) sont employées pour une comparaison en fonction d'un résultat de laquelle un signal de validation (A) est préparé.
EP13753119.0A 2012-10-19 2013-08-13 Emploi d'une fonction puf pour la vérification d'une authentification, en particulier pour la protection contre un accès non autorisé à une fonction d'un ics ou d'un appareil de commande Withdrawn EP2868032A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102012219112.7A DE102012219112A1 (de) 2012-10-19 2012-10-19 Verwenden einer PUF zur Prüfung einer Authentisierung, insbesondere zum Schutz vor unberechtigtem Zugriff auf eine Funktion eines ICs oder Steuergerätes
PCT/EP2013/066875 WO2014060134A2 (fr) 2012-10-19 2013-08-13 Emploi d'une fonction puf pour la vérification d'une authentification, en particulier pour la protection contre un accès non autorisé à une fonction d'un ics ou d'un appareil de commande

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2868032A2 true EP2868032A2 (fr) 2015-05-06

Family

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP13753119.0A Withdrawn EP2868032A2 (fr) 2012-10-19 2013-08-13 Emploi d'une fonction puf pour la vérification d'une authentification, en particulier pour la protection contre un accès non autorisé à une fonction d'un ics ou d'un appareil de commande

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US20150269378A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP2868032A2 (fr)
CN (1) CN104782076A (fr)
DE (1) DE102012219112A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2014060134A2 (fr)

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CN104782076A (zh) 2015-07-15

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