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EP1061489B1 - Intrusion detector with a device for monitoring against tampering - Google Patents

Intrusion detector with a device for monitoring against tampering Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1061489B1
EP1061489B1 EP99110848A EP99110848A EP1061489B1 EP 1061489 B1 EP1061489 B1 EP 1061489B1 EP 99110848 A EP99110848 A EP 99110848A EP 99110848 A EP99110848 A EP 99110848A EP 1061489 B1 EP1061489 B1 EP 1061489B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
infrared
detector
receiver
radiation
transmitter
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP99110848A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP1061489A1 (en
Inventor
David Siegwart
Peter Stierli
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Building Technologies AG
Original Assignee
Siemens Building Technologies AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Building Technologies AG filed Critical Siemens Building Technologies AG
Priority to EP99110848A priority Critical patent/EP1061489B1/en
Priority to DE59910349T priority patent/DE59910349D1/en
Priority to AT99110848T priority patent/ATE274735T1/en
Priority to IL13586900A priority patent/IL135869A/en
Priority to US09/587,812 priority patent/US6377174B1/en
Publication of EP1061489A1 publication Critical patent/EP1061489A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1061489B1 publication Critical patent/EP1061489B1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
    • G08B29/18—Prevention or correction of operating errors
    • G08B29/183—Single detectors using dual technologies
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/16—Actuation by interference with mechanical vibrations in air or other fluid
    • G08B13/1609—Actuation by interference with mechanical vibrations in air or other fluid using active vibration detection systems
    • G08B13/1645—Actuation by interference with mechanical vibrations in air or other fluid using active vibration detection systems using ultrasonic detection means and other detection means, e.g. microwave or infrared radiation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/18—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength
    • G08B13/181—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using active radiation detection systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/18—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength
    • G08B13/189—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems
    • G08B13/19—Actuation by interference with heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength; Actuation by intruding sources of heat, light, or radiation of shorter wavelength using passive radiation detection systems using infrared-radiation detection systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B29/00—Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
    • G08B29/02—Monitoring continuously signalling or alarm systems
    • G08B29/04—Monitoring of the detection circuits
    • G08B29/046—Monitoring of the detection circuits prevention of tampering with detection circuits

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an intrusion detector with and in a housing arranged infrared part, with an infrared sensor, one provided in the housing wall Detector window for the passage of infrared radiation from the outside to the infrared sensor, a means for bundling the infrared radiation incident through the detector window the infrared sensor and with one comprising an infrared transmitter and an infrared receiver Sabotage monitoring device, whereby the infrared seuder and the infrared receiver within the Housing are attached.
  • Such devices for sabotage monitoring also known as anti-mask devices, as for example in EP-A-0 186 226, in EP-A-0 499 177 and in EP-A-0 556 898 are used to identify the two types of cover for the detector, that is the coverage of the detector in a certain, possibly only slight, Distance from the detector window, and the immediate coverage of the detector window by, for example Covering with a film or spraying with an infrared-opaque spray, such as paint spray.
  • the first type of coverage is subsequently referred to as remote coverage and the second is called a spray cover, with remote cover being a cover at a distance of a few millimeters up to a maximum of about 15 cm from the detector window.
  • the known devices for sabotage monitoring are single or two-channel systems built up.
  • two-channel systems such as that described in EP-A-0 186 226 Device, sends a first infrared transmitter, which is arranged inside the detector, Infrared radiation in the monitoring room in front of the detector and a first receiver measures the radiation reflected from the surveillance room.
  • a second one on the outside of the detector arranged infrared transmitter sends radiation through the detector window to a second Receiver that measures the incident radiation from the second transmitter.
  • the first broadcaster and the first receiver form a channel for monitoring attempts at sabotage in the manner of of remote coverage and the second transmitter and the second receiver form a channel for Monitoring of sabotage attempts in the manner of spray coverage.
  • the device for sabotage monitoring contains only one infrared transmitter and only one infrared receiver, the transmitter is arranged on the outside and the receiver inside the detector. The transmitter sends infrared radiation on the one hand into the monitoring room in front of the detector and on the other hand through the detector window onto the receiver.
  • a similar single-channel system is in EP-A-0 556 898.
  • the detector window to line up with the Time discolors and possibly also its transmission properties for infrared radiation changes.
  • the latter can be a technical impairment to the functionality of the detector Be a disadvantage; in any case, the discoloration of the detector window is aesthetic Disadvantage because over time the detector window differs from the detector housing Color assumes.
  • the diffraction-optical grating structure is only for detection suitable from spray cover, but not from remote cover.
  • the invention now aims to provide an intrusion detector with a device for tamper monitoring be specified, which neither the creative freedom for the training of the Detector housing constricts, still impairing functional reliability or the exterior Appearance of a detector equipped with such a device. Furthermore should both types of sabotage, namely the remote cover and the spray cover, can be recognized in so-called real-time mode if possible.
  • Real-time mode is a process in which only sufficiently large and sufficient stable changes trigger a sabotage alarm which, when the signals return to the Normal state is automatically withdrawn.
  • This mode reacts slower than the second known method, the so-called proximity latch mode, has the advantage automatic alarm cancellation.
  • the solution according to the invention is characterized in that that the detector window for the radiation emitted by the infrared transmitter is permeable, and that monitoring sabotage of the detector by measuring the from the inside of the detector window and the the surrounding space to the infrared receiver reflected portion of said radiation he follows.
  • the arrangement of the transmitter and receiver under the detector window is not only aesthetic Viewpoints and avoiding the risk of excessive and difficult to remove Particle deposits on the detector window have the further advantage that not from the outside it can be seen that the detector has a device for monitoring sabotage.
  • dark material means a material that is below one Well absorbed wavelength of about 4 ⁇ m.
  • the reflective layer is in the visible range transparent and allows infrared radiation of short wavelengths, preferably below 4 - 7 ⁇ m through so that it can get into the dark carrier layer, where it is absorbed.
  • the mirror made of dark material ensures that as little interference light as possible on the sensor and falls on the infrared receiver, and is therefore a prerequisite that the detector has both types of sabotage, Remote coverage and spray coverage, can detect in real-time mode.
  • a third preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention is thereby characterized in that the detector consists of an additional transmitter and an additional Receiver existing additional part that an evaluation of the signal of the additional Receiver takes place in two frequency ranges, one of which for movements in the Surveillance room and the other is characteristic of a cover of the detector, and that a common evaluation circuit is provided for the additional part and the infrared part is.
  • the additional part is preferably an ultrasonic part with one ultrasonic transmitter and one Ultrasonic receiver or a microwave part with a microwave transmitter and a microwave receiver.
  • a further preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention is thereby characterized in that evaluation circuit downstream of the infrared sensor PIR channel, an anti-mask channel downstream of the infrared receiver and one second receiver downstream US channel with US antimask channel and one to the outputs of the above-mentioned channels connected logic level for the combined evaluation which has signals from these channels.
  • Fig. 1 shows a longitudinal section through an intrusion detector according to the invention in the direction perpendicular to its rear wall or floor, the floor being removed
  • FIG. 2 shows a partial view from behind, the mirror for bundling the incident Infrared radiation is removed from the detector.
  • the intrusion detector shown is a so-called Dual detector, which consists of the combination of a passive infrared detector and one with there is an ultrasound detector connected via an intelligent link.
  • the infrared part reacts to the body radiation of a person in the infrared spectral range and Ultrasound part on the frequency shift of the caused by the Doppler effect a moving intruder reflected ultrasound.
  • the intrusion detector can sabotage only one of the detectors.
  • a Such sabotage usually takes place on the infrared detector in the form of the introduction to the description mentioned types of coverage remote coverage or spray coverage because of decommissioning of the ultrasound part of the whole detector would have to be covered, which is immediately recognizable would.
  • the device used in the intrusion detector described below Sabotage monitoring also serves to detect sabotage on the infrared detector and can therefore not only be used in conjunction with dual detectors but also with passive infrared detectors may be used, in which case minor adaptations may be required can.
  • the intrusion detector consists of a two-part housing with a base (not shown) and cover 1, a detector window 2 provided in the cover 1 for the Passage of the infrared radiation falling from the room to be monitored onto the detector Detector interior, a circuit board 3 arranged in the interior of the detector, on which, among other things, a Infrared sensor 4, an ultrasound transmitter 5, an ultrasound receiver 6 and an evaluation circuit 7 are arranged, and with a mirror 8 also arranged in the interior of the detector Focusing of the infrared radiation incident through the detector window 2 onto the infrared sensor 4.
  • a pin element 9 of an electrical connector arranged, the socket element is located in the housing base. When closing the Housing pin element 9 is inserted into the socket element, whereby the electrical Contact with the power supply and any data lines is established.
  • the entrance window 2 consists for example of polyethylene or polypropylene and is for Radiation in the wavelength range of approximately 5 to 15 ⁇ m and in the range of approximately 0.9 ⁇ m permeable.
  • the mirror 8 is designed such that it absorbs radiation in the near infrared and Reflected body radiation.
  • a mirror with a day layer is particularly suitable for this made of dark material and a reflective layer applied on it, which for interference radiation below the wavelength range mentioned is transparent and radiation from this wavelength range strongly reflected.
  • EP-A-0 303 913 referenced and with regard to the mirror material to EP-A-0 707 294.
  • the entrance window 2 can be designed as a Fresnel lens and instead of the mirror 8, the infrared radiation on the Focus infrared sensor 4.
  • the ultrasound transmitter 5 emits ultrasound at a frequency of over 20 kHz through an opening 10 in the housing cover 1 in the monitoring room in front of the detector, and the ultrasonic receiver 6 takes the reflected from the surveillance room and through a window 11 in the housing cover 1 on the receiver 6 ultrasound and leads the evaluation circuit 7 a corresponding signal. While stationary objects only use ultrasound reflecting the transmission frequency, a moving object causes a frequency shift after the Doppler effect.
  • the evaluation circuit 7 triggers an alarm signal when this Frequency shift corresponds to the values typical for a moving person and if at the same time the infrared sensor 4 is infrared radiation typical of a human being receives.
  • the intrusion detector shown is with a so-called anti-mask device for detection of processes or optical changes immediately in front of the detector (so-called remote coverage) and changes in the optical properties of the entrance window 2, in particular equipped by its spraying (so-called spray cover).
  • Such masking is used to manipulate the detector so that no infrared radiation can reach the infrared sensor so that unauthorized persons can no longer be detected and can move freely in the monitored room.
  • Masking or sabotage will mostly perpetrated during the disarming of the detector when it is in a stand-by mode is switched on and people in the monitored room do not trigger an alarm.
  • the detector should be able to automatically detect such masking, specifically preferably at the time of masking or at the latest when the detector is armed or the plant.
  • the device for sabotage monitoring is designed so that with a single channel both masking methods can be reliably recognized.
  • an infrared transmitter 12 is arranged on both sides of the infrared sensor 4 and symmetrically to the latter.
  • IRED infrared LED
  • the infrared receiver 13 is preferably formed by a so-called Pn diode.
  • the signal of the infrared receiver 13 with an alarm threshold and preferably also compared to several pre-alarm thresholds or in the case of an evaluation examined with the help of fuzzy logic according to the corresponding fuzzy rules. If below Threshold or reference values are mentioned, so they are always the same Fuzzy rules meant.
  • the evaluation takes place in real-time mode, which is stable over time longer violations of the relevant threshold or reference values respond. A masking alarm is only triggered if the excess is long enough. Furthermore the masking alarm is automatically reset as soon as the detector returns to its normal state returns; intervention by an operator is not for resetting required.
  • the infrared receiver 13 always receives a specific one in the normal operating state of the detector Proportion of the radiation emitted by the infrared transmitters 12, part of which is transmitted through the detector window 2 comes out and another part of the detector window 2 on the infrared receiver 13 is reflected. So you can, as long as the signal of the infrared receiver 13 within of a certain band range, we can safely assume that the detector is not masked.
  • the Pn diode forming the infrared receiver 13 has a non-linear characteristic, and since the detector window 2 because of the arrangement of the device for sabotage monitoring inside the detector has to be transparent to a certain extent, that has to be extraneous light reaching the infrared receiver 13 can be compensated. To this end the incident external light is measured and the signal of the infrared receiver 13 is corresponding corrected.
  • Another correction is due to the temperature dependence of the optical power of the infrared transmitter 12 required. This correction is done by changing the temperature either the electrical current through the infrared transmitter 12 is adjusted via the characteristic curve in this way is that the intensity of the specified infrared radiation remains constant, or it is in the Infrared receiver 13 is the signal component originating from the infrared transmitter 12 with a temperature-dependent one optical power of the infrared transmitter 12 compensating correction factor multiplied.
  • the signal of the infrared receiver 13 falls below a predetermined minimum value, does this mean that the radiation received by the infrared receiver 13 has decreased, and this is an indication of a spray cover of the detector window 2, which is sprayed in the State reflects the radiation of the infrared transmitter 12 less strongly than in the normal state. If the signal from the infrared receiver exceeds a predetermined maximum value, means that either from the outside a larger proportion of that from the infrared transmitters 12 emitted radiation is reflected (remote coverage), or that the detector window more reflective than in normal condition (spray cover with bright color spray).
  • the evaluation circuit 7 contains one connected to the infrared sensor 4 PIR channel 14, an anti-mask channel connected to the infrared receiver 13 15, a US channel 16 connected to the ultrasound receiver 5 with a US antimask channel 17 and a logic stage 18.
  • the outputs of the four channels mentioned are led to the linkage stage 18, in which a combined evaluation of the signals of the individual channels.
  • the result of this combined evaluation forms the basis for the decision for the alarm to be given by the detector, this is an intrusion alarm or a masking alarm.
  • the combined evaluation of the PIR channel 7 and the US channel 16 essentially exists in that the detector emits an intrusion alarm when the signal is in the US channel 16 a predetermined, dependent on the speed of movement of an object, Frequency shift compared to the transmission frequency shows, and at the same time the IR channel 14 receives infrared radiation typical of the presence of a person.
  • the evaluated Doppler frequency range is 25.6 kHz ⁇ 500 Hz, since with not extremely fast movements, what a burglar can assume is a signal in this frequency range is produced.
  • the Antimask channel 15 and the US channel 16 there is only a relatively loose link between the antimask channel 15 and the US channel 16 such that both of these channels have certain types of coverage can recognize, so that the two channels complement each other in a very effective way.
  • the signal of the infrared receiver 13 is observed DC, or in other words, deviations of the signal from its rest value are examined. This is necessary for real-time mode because this is the only way the detector can return to its normal operating condition, i.e. the removal of the cover, can be recognized. Since the If the signal has to be processed digitally, there is an A / D conversion of the signal of the infrared receiver 13 through a high-resolution A / D converter.
  • the great dynamics of the A / D converter is necessary because it covers the rest area of the signal and must recognize very small deviations from this, but the resting value because of the Manufacturing tolerances and the spread of the electro-optical efficiency of the optical Components is subject to strong scattering.
  • the ultrasound part therefore protects itself against covers.
  • he supports the infrared part when detecting remote coverage with materials that are for the infrared part only are difficult to see, such as transparent or black in the infrared range Items.
  • the antimask channel 15 recognizes bright, acoustically soft materials very good and thereby supports the anti-mask function of the ultrasound part. If the Infrared and the ultrasound part would be more closely nested, for example by Arrangement of ultrasound transmitter 6 and ultrasound receiver 5 on different sides of the Detector window 2 (left and right, top and bottom or diagonally opposite), could the signals of channels 15 and 16 are more closely linked.
  • the ultrasound part consisting of the ultrasound transmitter 5 and the ultrasound receiver 6 can also be provided by one consisting of a microwave transmitter and a microwave receiver Microwave part to be replaced, with certain circuitry familiar to those skilled in the art Adjustments are required.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Toxicology (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)

Description

Die vorliegende Erfindung betrifft einen Intrusionsmelder mit einem Gehäuse und einem in diesem angeordneten Infrarotteil, mit einem Infarotsensor, einem in der Gehäusewand vorgesehenen Melderfenster zum Durchtritt von Infrarotstrahlung aus dem Aussenraum zum Infrarotsensor, einem Mittel zur Bündelung der durch das Melderfenster einfallenden Infrarotstrahlung auf den Infrarotsensor und mit einer einen Infrarotsender und einen Infrarotempfänger umfassenden Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung, wobei der Infrarotseuder und der Infrarotempfänger innerhalb des Gehäuses augeordnet sind.The present invention relates to an intrusion detector with and in a housing arranged infrared part, with an infrared sensor, one provided in the housing wall Detector window for the passage of infrared radiation from the outside to the infrared sensor, a means for bundling the infrared radiation incident through the detector window the infrared sensor and with one comprising an infrared transmitter and an infrared receiver Sabotage monitoring device, whereby the infrared seuder and the infrared receiver within the Housing are attached.

Derartige auch als Antimaskeinrichtungen bezeichnete Einrichtungen zur Sabotageüberwachung, wie sie beispielsweise in der EP-A-0 186 226, in der EP-A-0 499 177 und in der EP-A-0 556 898 beschrieben sind, dienen zur Erkennung der beiden Abdeckungsarten des Melders, das sind die Abdeckung des Melders in einer bestimmten, unter Umständen nur geringen, Distanz vom Melderfenster, und die unmittelbare Abdeckung des Melderfensters durch beispielsweise Abdecken mit einer Folie oder Besprühen mit einem infrarotundurchlässigen Spray, wie beispielsweise Farbspray. Die erste Abdeckungsart wird nachfolgend als Fernabdeckung und die zweite wird als Sprayabdeckung bezeichnet, wobei mit Fernabdeckung eine Abdeckung im Abstand von wenigen Millimtem bis zu maximal etwa 15 cm vom Melderfenster gemeint ist.Such devices for sabotage monitoring, also known as anti-mask devices, as for example in EP-A-0 186 226, in EP-A-0 499 177 and in EP-A-0 556 898 are used to identify the two types of cover for the detector, that is the coverage of the detector in a certain, possibly only slight, Distance from the detector window, and the immediate coverage of the detector window by, for example Covering with a film or spraying with an infrared-opaque spray, such as paint spray. The first type of coverage is subsequently referred to as remote coverage and the second is called a spray cover, with remote cover being a cover at a distance of a few millimeters up to a maximum of about 15 cm from the detector window.

Vorgänge oder optische Änderungen unmittelbar vor dem Melder, wie die Fernabdeckung, bewirken in den meisten Fällen eine Reflexion der vom Infrarotsender der Antimaskeinrichtung ausgesandten Strahlung auf den Infrarotempfänger, was sich durch eine Änderung der vom Infrarotempfänger empfangenen Strahlung äussert. Zur Erkennung von Änderungen der optischen Eigenschaften des Melderfensters, wird dieses mit Infrarotstrahlung beaufschlagt und es wird die das Melderfenster durchsetzende oder die von diesem reflektierte Strahlung gemessen. Zur Auswertung der Signale der Antimaskeinrichtung werden die Signale des Infrarotempfängers mit Schwell- oder Referenz- oder allgemein Spannungswerten verglichen, die über- oder unterschritten und über einen gewissen Zeitraum gehalten werden müssen.Operations or optical changes immediately in front of the detector, such as the remote cover in most cases a reflection of that from the infrared transmitter of the anti-mask device emitted radiation on the infrared receiver, which is due to a change in that from the infrared receiver received radiation expresses. To detect changes in the optical Properties of the detector window, this is exposed to infrared radiation and it the radiation passing through the detector window or reflected by it is measured. The signals from the infrared receiver are used to evaluate the signals of the anti-mask device compared with threshold or reference or general voltage values that over or below and must be kept for a certain period of time.

Die bekannten Einrichtungen zur Sabotageüberwachung sind als Ein- oder Zweikanalsysteme aufgebaut. Bei Zweikanalsystemen, wie beispielsweise bei der in der EP-A-0 186 226 beschriebenen Einrichtung, sendet ein erster Infrarotsender, welcher im Melderinneren angeordnet ist, Infrarotstrahlung in den Überwachungsraum vor dem Melder und ein erster Empfänger misst die aus dem Überwachungsraum reflektierte Strahlung. Ein zweiter, an der Aussenseite des Melders angeordneter Infrarotsender sendet Strahlung durch das Melderfenster auf einen zweiten Empfänger, der die auftreffende Strahlung des zweiten Senders misst. Der erste Sender und der erste Empfänger bilden einen Kanal zur Überwachung von Sabotageversuchen in der Art von Fernabdeckung und der zweite Sender und der zweite Empfänger bilden einen Kanal zur Überwachung von Sabotageversuchen in der Art von Sprayabdeckung.The known devices for sabotage monitoring are single or two-channel systems built up. In two-channel systems, such as that described in EP-A-0 186 226 Device, sends a first infrared transmitter, which is arranged inside the detector, Infrared radiation in the monitoring room in front of the detector and a first receiver measures the radiation reflected from the surveillance room. A second one, on the outside of the detector arranged infrared transmitter sends radiation through the detector window to a second Receiver that measures the incident radiation from the second transmitter. The first broadcaster and the first receiver form a channel for monitoring attempts at sabotage in the manner of of remote coverage and the second transmitter and the second receiver form a channel for Monitoring of sabotage attempts in the manner of spray coverage.

Bei dem in der EP-A-0 499 177 beschriebenen Einkanalsystem enthält die Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung nur einen Infrarotsender und nur einen Infrarotempfänger, wobei der Sender an der Aussenseite und der Empfänger im Inneren des Melders angeordnet ist. Der Sender sendet Infrarotstrahlung einerseits in den Überwachungsraum vor dem Melder und andererseits durch das Melderfenster auf den Empfänger. Ein ähnliches Einkanalsystem ist in der EP-A-0 556 898 beschrieben.In the single-channel system described in EP-A-0 499 177, the device for sabotage monitoring contains only one infrared transmitter and only one infrared receiver, the transmitter is arranged on the outside and the receiver inside the detector. The transmitter sends infrared radiation on the one hand into the monitoring room in front of the detector and on the other hand through the detector window onto the receiver. A similar single-channel system is in EP-A-0 556 898.

Allen bekannten Einrichtungen zur Sabotageüberwachung, gleichgültig, ob sie als Ein- oder als Zweikanalsystem ausgebildet sind, ist gemeinsam, dass der Infrarotsender an der Aussenseite des Melders angeordnet ist. Diese Anordnung beeinflusst in einem bestimmten Umfang die Ausbildung des Meldergehäuses, weil an diesem eine gegenüber dem Melderfenster vorspringende Partie zur Aufnahme des Infrarotsenders vorhanden sein muss, und sie beeinflusst wesentlich das äussere Erscheinungsbild des Melders, das auf diese Weise stark durch technische Erfordernisse bestimmt ist, welche dem gestalterischen Einfluss nur wenig Spielraum lassen.All known devices for sabotage monitoring, regardless of whether they are as one or as Two channel system are common, that the infrared transmitter is on the outside the detector is arranged. This arrangement influences the training to a certain extent of the detector housing, because one protrudes from the detector window Batch for receiving the infrared transmitter must be present, and it has a significant influence the external appearance of the detector, which in this way is strongly influenced by technical It defines requirements that leave little room for creative influence.

Bei einer in der EP-A-0 772 171 beschriebenen Antimaskeinrichtung ist auf der Aussenseite des Melderfensters eine beugungsoptische Gitterstruktur angebracht, die das vom Infrarotsender ausgesandte Licht auf den optischen Empfänger fokussiert. Im Fall von Sabotage durch Besprühen des Melderfensters wird die Fokussierwirkung der beugungsoptischen Gitterstruktur zerstört, so dass sich die auf den Infrarotdetektor fallende Lichtintensität verringert. Bei dieser Einrichtung ist zwar der Infrarotsender im Innenraum des Melders angeordnet, es befindet sich aber die beugungsoptische Gitterstruktur aussen am Melderfenster. Dies führt dazu, dass sich in der Luft des überwachten Raumes befindliche Partikel, beispielsweise Rauch- oder Russoder auch Fettpartikel auf dieser Gitterstruktur ablagern, wodurch sich das Melderfenster mit der Zeit verfärbt und unter Umständen auch seine Transmissionseigenschaften für Infrarotstrahlung ändert. Letzteres kann ein die Funktionsfähigkeit des Melders beeinträchtigender technischer Nachteil sein; in jedem Fall ist aber die Verfärbung des Melderfensters ein ästhetischer Nachteil, weil dadurch das Melderfenster mit der Zeit eine vom Meldergehäuse abweichende Farbgebung annimmt. Ausserdem ist die beugungsoptische Gitterstruktur nur zur Erkennung von Sprayabdeckung, nicht aber von Fernabdeckung geeignet. In an anti-mask device described in EP-A-0 772 171, on the outside of the Detector window attached a diffraction-optical grating structure that the infrared transmitter emitted light focused on the optical receiver. In the case of sabotage by spraying of the detector window, the focusing effect of the diffraction-optical grating structure is destroyed, so that the light intensity falling on the infrared detector is reduced. At this facility If the infrared transmitter is located in the interior of the detector, it is located but the diffraction-optical grating structure on the outside of the detector window. This leads to that Particles in the air of the monitored room, for example smoke or soot also deposit fat particles on this lattice structure, causing the detector window to line up with the Time discolors and possibly also its transmission properties for infrared radiation changes. The latter can be a technical impairment to the functionality of the detector Be a disadvantage; in any case, the discoloration of the detector window is aesthetic Disadvantage because over time the detector window differs from the detector housing Color assumes. In addition, the diffraction-optical grating structure is only for detection suitable from spray cover, but not from remote cover.

Durch die Erfindung soll nun ein Intrusionsmelder mit einer Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung angegeben werden, welche weder den gestalterischen Freiraum für die Ausbildung des Meldergehäuses einengt, noch zu Beeinträchtigungen der Funktionssicherheit oder des äusseren Erscheinungsbildes eines mit einer solchen Einrichtung ausgerüsteten Melders führt. Ausserdem sollen beide Sabotagearten, nämlich die Fernabdeckung und die Sprayabdeckung, möglichst im sogenannten Real-time-Modus erkannt werden können.The invention now aims to provide an intrusion detector with a device for tamper monitoring be specified, which neither the creative freedom for the training of the Detector housing constricts, still impairing functional reliability or the exterior Appearance of a detector equipped with such a device. Furthermore should both types of sabotage, namely the remote cover and the spray cover, can be recognized in so-called real-time mode if possible.

Unter Real-time-Modus versteht man ein Verfahren, bei dem nur genügend grosse und genügend stabile Änderungen einen Sabotagealarm auslösen, der bei Rückkehr der Signale in den Normalzustand automatisch zurückgenommen wird. Dieser Modus reagiert zwar langsamer als das zweite bekannte Verfahren, der sogenannte Proximity Latch-Modus, hat aber den Vorteil der automatischen Alarmrücknahme.Real-time mode is a process in which only sufficiently large and sufficient stable changes trigger a sabotage alarm which, when the signals return to the Normal state is automatically withdrawn. This mode reacts slower than the second known method, the so-called proximity latch mode, has the advantage automatic alarm cancellation.

Die erfindungsgemässe Lösung ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das Melderfenster für die vom Infrarotsender ausgesandte Strahlung durchlässig ist, und dass die Überwachung von Sabotage des Melders durch Messung des von der Innenseite des Melderfensters und des aus dem Umgebungsraum zum Infrarotempfänger reflektierten Anteils der genannten Strahlung erfolgt.The solution according to the invention is characterized in that that the detector window for the radiation emitted by the infrared transmitter is permeable, and that monitoring sabotage of the detector by measuring the from the inside of the detector window and the the surrounding space to the infrared receiver reflected portion of said radiation he follows.

Die Anordnung von Sender und Empfänger unter dem Melderfenster weist neben ästhetischen Gesichtspunkten und der Vermeidung der Gefahr von übermässigen und nur schwer entfembaren Partikelablagerungen am Melderfenster den weiteren Vorteil auf, dass von aussen nicht erkennbar ist, dass der Melder eine Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung aufweist.The arrangement of the transmitter and receiver under the detector window is not only aesthetic Viewpoints and avoiding the risk of excessive and difficult to remove Particle deposits on the detector window have the further advantage that not from the outside it can be seen that the detector has a device for monitoring sabotage.

Eine erste bevorzugte Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemässen Intrusionsmelders ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass dem Infrarotsender und/oder dem Infrarotempfänger Mittel zur Kompensation des durch das Melderfenster einfallenden Fremdlichts zugeordnet sind.This is a first preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention characterized in that the infrared transmitter and / or the infrared receiver means for Compensation of the external light entering through the detector window are assigned.

Eine zweite bevorzugte Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemässen Intrusionsmelders ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das Mittel zur Bündelung der durch das Melderfenster einfallenden Infrarotstrahlung durch einen eine Trägerschicht aus dunklem Material und eine auf diese applizierte Reflexionsschicht aufweisenden Spiegel gebildet ist, wobei die Reflexionsschicht einerseits für Störstrahlung unterhalb des typischen Wellenlängenbereichs von menschlicher Wärmestrahlung transparent ist und andererseits Strahlung aus dem genannten Wellenlängenbereich stark reflektiert.This is a second preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention characterized that the means for bundling the incident through the detector window Infrared radiation through a carrier layer made of dark material and one applied to it Mirror having a reflective layer is formed, the reflective layer on the one hand for interference radiation below the typical wavelength range of human heat radiation is transparent and on the other hand radiation from the wavelength range mentioned strongly reflected.

Mit "dunklem Material" ist in diesem Zusammenhang ein Material gemeint, das unterhalb einer Wellenlänge von etwa 4 µm gut absorbiert. Die Reflexionsschicht ist im sichtbaren Bereich transparent und lässt Infrarotstrahlung kurzer Wellenlängen, vorzugsweise unterhalb von 4 - 7 µm durch, so dass diese in die dunkle Trägerschicht gelangen kann, wo sie absorbiert wird.In this context, "dark material" means a material that is below one Well absorbed wavelength of about 4 µm. The reflective layer is in the visible range transparent and allows infrared radiation of short wavelengths, preferably below 4 - 7 µm through so that it can get into the dark carrier layer, where it is absorbed.

Der Spiegel aus dunklem Material bewirkt, dass möglichst wenig Störlicht auf den Sensor und auf den Infrarotempfänger fällt, und ist damit eine Voraussetzung, dass der Melder beide Sabotagearten, Fernabdeckung und Sprayabdeckung, im Real-time-Modus erkennen kann.The mirror made of dark material ensures that as little interference light as possible on the sensor and falls on the infrared receiver, and is therefore a prerequisite that the detector has both types of sabotage, Remote coverage and spray coverage, can detect in real-time mode.

Eine dritte bevorzugte Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemässen Intrusionsmelders ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Melder einen aus einem zusätzlichen Sender und einem zusätzlichen Empfänger bestehenden Zusatzteil aufweist, dass eine Auswertung des Signals des zusätzlichen Empfängers in zwei Frequenzbereichen erfolgt, von denen der eine für Bewegungen im Überwachungraum und der andere für eine Abdeckung des Melders charakteristisch ist, und dass für den Zusatzteil und den Infrarotteil eine gemeinsame Auswerteschaltung vorgesehen ist. Der Zusatzteil ist vorzugsweise ein Ultraschallteil mit einem Ultraschallsender und einem Ultraschallempfänger oder ein Mikrowellenteil mit einem Mikrowellensender und einem Mikrowellenempfänger.A third preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention is thereby characterized in that the detector consists of an additional transmitter and an additional Receiver existing additional part that an evaluation of the signal of the additional Receiver takes place in two frequency ranges, one of which for movements in the Surveillance room and the other is characteristic of a cover of the detector, and that a common evaluation circuit is provided for the additional part and the infrared part is. The additional part is preferably an ultrasonic part with one ultrasonic transmitter and one Ultrasonic receiver or a microwave part with a microwave transmitter and a microwave receiver.

Eine weitere bevorzugte Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemässen Intrusionsmelders ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass Auswerteschaltung einem dem Infarotsensor nachgeschalteten PIR-Kanal, einen dem Infrarotempfänger nachgeschalteten Antimask-Kanal und einen dem zweiten Empfänger nachgeschalteten US-Kanal mit US-Antimask-Kanal sowie eine an die Ausgänge der genannten Kanäle angeschlossene Verknüpfungsstufe für die kombinierte Auswertung der Signale dieser Kanäle aufweist.A further preferred embodiment of the intrusion detector according to the invention is thereby characterized in that evaluation circuit downstream of the infrared sensor PIR channel, an anti-mask channel downstream of the infrared receiver and one second receiver downstream US channel with US antimask channel and one to the outputs of the above-mentioned channels connected logic level for the combined evaluation which has signals from these channels.

Im folgenden wird die Erfindung anhand eines in den Zeichnungen dargestellten Ausführungsbeispiels näher erläutert; es zeigt:

Fig. 1
einen Längsschnitt durch einen erfindungsgemässen Intrusionsmelder,
Fig. 2
eine ausschnittsweise Ansicht in Richtung des Pfeiles II von Fig. 1; und
Fig. 3
ein Blockschaltbild des Melders von Fig. 1
The invention is explained in more detail below on the basis of an exemplary embodiment illustrated in the drawings; it shows:
Fig. 1
2 shows a longitudinal section through an intrusion detector according to the invention,
Fig. 2
a partial view in the direction of arrow II of Fig. 1; and
Fig. 3
a block diagram of the detector of Fig. 1st

Fig. 1 zeigt einen Längsschnitt durch einen erfindungsgemässen Intrusionsmelder in der Richtung senkrecht zu dessen Rückwand oder Boden, wobei der Boden abgenommen ist, und Fig. 2 zeigt eine ausschnittsweise Ansicht von hinten, wobei der Spiegel zur Bündelung der einfallenden Infrarotstrahlung aus dem Melder entfernt ist. Der dargestellte Intrusionsmelder ist ein sogenannte Dual-Melder, der aus der Kombination eines passiven Infrarotdetektors und eines mit diesem über eine intelligente Verknüpfung verbundenen Ultraschalldetektors besteht. Der Infrarotteil reagiert auf die Körperstrahlung eines Menschen im infraroten Spektralbereich und der Ultraschallteil auf die durch den Doppler-Effekt verursachte Frequenzverschiebung des von einem sich bewegenden Eindringling reflektierten Ultraschalls. Durch Kombination der beiden Prinzipien lässt sich das unerwünschte Eindringen einer Person in den geschützten Bereich mit grösserer Sicherheit und Selektivität erkennen als bei Verwendung nur eines der beiden Detektionsverfahren. Auf diese Weise kann eine fehlerhafte Alarmsignalabgabe mit grösserer Sicherheit vermieden werden.Fig. 1 shows a longitudinal section through an intrusion detector according to the invention in the direction perpendicular to its rear wall or floor, the floor being removed, and FIG. 2 shows a partial view from behind, the mirror for bundling the incident Infrared radiation is removed from the detector. The intrusion detector shown is a so-called Dual detector, which consists of the combination of a passive infrared detector and one with there is an ultrasound detector connected via an intelligent link. The infrared part reacts to the body radiation of a person in the infrared spectral range and Ultrasound part on the frequency shift of the caused by the Doppler effect a moving intruder reflected ultrasound. By combining the two Principles allow a person's unwanted intrusion into the protected area Detect greater security and selectivity than when using only one of the two detection methods. In this way, faulty alarm signaling can be carried out with greater certainty be avoided.

Da die beiden Detektoren durch eine Schaltung miteinander verbunden sind, kann der Intrusionsmelder durch Sabotage nur eines der Detektoren funktionsunfähig gemacht werden. Eine solche Sabotage erfolgt in der Regel am Infrarotdetektor in Form der in der Beschreibungseinleitung erwähnten Abdeckungsarten Fernabdeckung oder Sprayabdeckung, weil zur Ausserbetriebsetzung des Ultraschallteils der ganze Melder abgedeckt werden müsste, was sofort erkennbar wäre. Die beim nachfolgend beschriebenen Intrusionsmelder verwendete Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung dient ebenfalls zur Erkennung von Sabotage am Infrarotdetektor und kann daher nicht nur in Verbindung mit Dual-Meldern sondern auch an Passiv-Infrarotmelder verwendet werden, wobei in diesem Fall eventuell geringfügige Adaptionen erforderlich sein können.Since the two detectors are interconnected by a circuit, the intrusion detector can sabotage only one of the detectors. A Such sabotage usually takes place on the infrared detector in the form of the introduction to the description mentioned types of coverage remote coverage or spray coverage because of decommissioning of the ultrasound part of the whole detector would have to be covered, which is immediately recognizable would. The device used in the intrusion detector described below Sabotage monitoring also serves to detect sabotage on the infrared detector and can therefore not only be used in conjunction with dual detectors but also with passive infrared detectors may be used, in which case minor adaptations may be required can.

Der erfindungsgemässe Intrusionsmelder besteht aus einem zweiteiligen Gehäuse mit Boden (nicht dargestellt) und Deckel 1, einem im Deckel 1 vorgesehenen Melderfenster 2 für den Durchtritt der aus dem zu überwachenden Raum auf den Melder fallenden Infrarotstrahlung ins Melderinnere, einer im Melderinneren angeordneten Platine 3, auf welcher unter anderem ein Infrarotsensor 4, ein Ultraschallsender 5, ein Ultraschallempfänger 6 und eine Auswerteschaltung 7 angeordnet sind, und mit einem ebenfalls im Melderinneren angeordneten Spiegel 8 zur Fokussierung der durch das Melderfenster 2 einfallenden Infrarotstrahlung auf den Infrarotsensor 4. Am oberen Ende der Platine 3 ist ein Stiftelement 9 eines elektrischen Steckverbinders angeordnet, dessen Buchsenelement sich im Gehäuseboden befindet. Beim Schliessen des Gehäuses wird das Stiftelement 9 in das Buchsenelement gesteckt, wodurch der elektrische Kontakt mit der Stromversorgung und eventuellen Datenleitungen hergestellt ist.The intrusion detector according to the invention consists of a two-part housing with a base (not shown) and cover 1, a detector window 2 provided in the cover 1 for the Passage of the infrared radiation falling from the room to be monitored onto the detector Detector interior, a circuit board 3 arranged in the interior of the detector, on which, among other things, a Infrared sensor 4, an ultrasound transmitter 5, an ultrasound receiver 6 and an evaluation circuit 7 are arranged, and with a mirror 8 also arranged in the interior of the detector Focusing of the infrared radiation incident through the detector window 2 onto the infrared sensor 4. At the upper end of the board 3 is a pin element 9 of an electrical connector arranged, the socket element is located in the housing base. When closing the Housing pin element 9 is inserted into the socket element, whereby the electrical Contact with the power supply and any data lines is established.

Das Eintrittsfenster 2 besteht beispielsweise aus Polyethylen oder Polypropylen und ist für Strahlung im Wellenlängenbereich von etwa 5 bis 15 µm sowie im Bereich um etwa 0,9 µm durchlässig. Der Spiegel 8 ist so ausgebildet, dass er Strahlung im nahen Infrarot absorbiert und Körperstrahlung reflektiert. Dazu eignet sich besonders gut ein Spiegel mit einer Tägerschicht aus dunklem Material und einer darauf applizierten Reflexionsschicht, welche für Störstrahlung unterhalb des genannten Wellenlängenbereichs transparent ist und Strahlung aus diesem Wellenlängenbereich stark reflektiert. Bezüglich der Form des Spiegels wird auf die EP-A-0 303 913 verwiesen und bezüglich des Spiegelmaterials auf die EP-A-0 707 294. Das Eintrittsfenster 2 kann als Fresnellinse ausgebildet sein und anstelle des Spiegels 8 die Infrarotstrahlung auf den Infrarotsensor 4 fokussieren. The entrance window 2 consists for example of polyethylene or polypropylene and is for Radiation in the wavelength range of approximately 5 to 15 µm and in the range of approximately 0.9 µm permeable. The mirror 8 is designed such that it absorbs radiation in the near infrared and Reflected body radiation. A mirror with a day layer is particularly suitable for this made of dark material and a reflective layer applied on it, which for interference radiation below the wavelength range mentioned is transparent and radiation from this wavelength range strongly reflected. With regard to the shape of the mirror, reference is made to EP-A-0 303 913 referenced and with regard to the mirror material to EP-A-0 707 294. The entrance window 2 can be designed as a Fresnel lens and instead of the mirror 8, the infrared radiation on the Focus infrared sensor 4.

Der Ultraschallsender 5 strahlt Ultraschall mit einer Frequenz von über 20 kHz durch eine Öffnung 10 im Gehäusedeckel 1 in den Überwachungsraum vor dem Melder ab, und der Ultraschallempfänger 6 nimmt den aus dem Überwachungsraum reflektierten und durch ein Fenster 11 im Gehäusedeckel 1 auf den Empfänger 6 gelangenden Ultraschall auf und führt der Auswerteschaltung 7 ein entsprechendes Signal zu. Während ortsfeste Objekte nur Ultraschall mit der Sendefrequenz reflektieren, verursacht ein sich bewegendes Objekt eine Frequenzverschiebung nach dem Doppler-Effekt. Die Auswerteschaltung 7 löst ein Alarmsignal aus, wenn diese Frequenzverschiebung den für einen sich bewegenden Menschen typischen Werten entspricht und wenn gleichzeitig der Infrarotsensor 4 eine für einen Menschen typische Infrarotstrahlung empfängt.The ultrasound transmitter 5 emits ultrasound at a frequency of over 20 kHz through an opening 10 in the housing cover 1 in the monitoring room in front of the detector, and the ultrasonic receiver 6 takes the reflected from the surveillance room and through a window 11 in the housing cover 1 on the receiver 6 ultrasound and leads the evaluation circuit 7 a corresponding signal. While stationary objects only use ultrasound reflecting the transmission frequency, a moving object causes a frequency shift after the Doppler effect. The evaluation circuit 7 triggers an alarm signal when this Frequency shift corresponds to the values typical for a moving person and if at the same time the infrared sensor 4 is infrared radiation typical of a human being receives.

Der dargestellte Intrusionsmelder ist mit einer sogenannten Antimaskeinrichtung zur Erfassung von Vorgängen oder optischen Änderungen unmittelbar vor dem Melder (sogenannte Fernabdeckung) und von Änderungen der optischen Eigenschaften des Eintrittsfensters 2, insbesondere von dessen Besprayen (sogenannte Sprayabdeckung) ausgerüstet.The intrusion detector shown is with a so-called anti-mask device for detection of processes or optical changes immediately in front of the detector (so-called remote coverage) and changes in the optical properties of the entrance window 2, in particular equipped by its spraying (so-called spray cover).

Eine solche Maskierung dient dazu, den Melder so zu manipulieren, dass keine Infrarotstrahlung auf den Infrarotsensor gelangen kann, so dass unbefugte Personen nicht mehr detektiert werden und sich im überwachten Raum frei bewegen können. Maskierung oder Sabotage wird zumeist während der Unscharfstellung des Melders verübt, wenn dieser auf einen Stand-by-Modus geschaltet ist und im überwachten Raum befindliche Personen keinen Alarm auslösen.Such masking is used to manipulate the detector so that no infrared radiation can reach the infrared sensor so that unauthorized persons can no longer be detected and can move freely in the monitored room. Masking or sabotage will mostly perpetrated during the disarming of the detector when it is in a stand-by mode is switched on and people in the monitored room do not trigger an alarm.

Der Melder soll in der Lage sein, eine solche Maskierung automatisch zu detektieren, und zwar vorzugsweise zum Zeitpunkt der Maskierung oder spätestens beim Scharfschalten des Melders oder der Anlage. Es gibt diesbezüglich verschiedene Strategien, aber zumindest bei an eine Zentrale angeschlossenen Meldern verhält es sich heute in der Regel so, dass die Melder immer eingeschaltet sind und auch während der Unscharfstellung im Stand-by-Modus Alarmsignale an die Zentrale liefern, die aber diese Signale im Stand-by-Modus unterdrückt. Wenn der Melder immer eingeschaltet ist, dann kann er Sabotageversuche ohne Zeitverzögerung erkennen und an die Zentrale melden.The detector should be able to automatically detect such masking, specifically preferably at the time of masking or at the latest when the detector is armed or the plant. There are various strategies in this regard, but at least for one Central connected detectors are today usually so that the detectors are always alarm signals are switched on and also during disarming in stand-by mode to the control center, which suppresses these signals in stand-by mode. If the detector is always switched on, then he can detect attempts at sabotage without delay and report to the head office.

Die Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung ist so ausgebildet, dass mit einem einzigen Kanal beide Maskiermethoden sicher erkannt werden. Wie insbesondere aus Fig. 2 ersichtlich ist, ist am unteren Ende der Platine 3, das ist im Bereich des oberen Randes des Melderfensters 2, zu beiden Seiten des Infrarotsensors 4 und symmetrisch zu diesem je ein Infrarotsender 12 angeordnet. Die Infrarotsender 12, die je durch eine Infrarot-LED (sogenannte IRED) gebildet sind, welche Strahlung im Bereich des nahen Infrarot von etwa 0.9 µm aussendet, sind so auf der Platine 3 befestigt, dass sie auf die Mitte des Melderfensters 2 ausgerichtet sind. In der Mitte zwischen den beiden Infrarotsendern 12 und unterhalb des Infrarotsensors 4 ist auf der Platine 3 ein Infrarotempfänger 13 vorgesehen. Dieser ist unter einem bestimmten Winkel geneigt zur Platine 3 angeordnet, wobei der Neigungswinkel so gewählt ist, dass die von den Infrarotsendem 12 ausgesandte Strahlung zu einem gewissen, von den optischen Eigenschaften des Melderfensters abhängigen Teil, auf den Infrarotempfänger 13 reflektiert wird. Der Infrarotempfänger 13 ist vorzugsweise durch eine sogenannte Pn-Diode gebildet.The device for sabotage monitoring is designed so that with a single channel both masking methods can be reliably recognized. As can be seen in particular from FIG at the lower end of the board 3, that is in the area of the upper edge of the detector window 2 an infrared transmitter 12 is arranged on both sides of the infrared sensor 4 and symmetrically to the latter. The infrared transmitters 12, which are each formed by an infrared LED (so-called IRED), Which radiation emits in the near infrared range of about 0.9 µm is so on the Board 3 attached so that they are aligned with the center of the detector window 2. In the middle between the two infrared transmitters 12 and below the infrared sensor 4 is on the board 3 an infrared receiver 13 is provided. This is inclined at a certain angle Board 3 arranged, the angle of inclination is selected so that that of the infrared transmitters 12 emitted radiation to a certain extent, from the optical properties of the Detector window dependent part, is reflected on the infrared receiver 13. The infrared receiver 13 is preferably formed by a so-called Pn diode.

In der Auswerteschaltung 7 wird das Signal des Infrarotempfängers 13 mit einer Alarmschwelle und vorzugsweise auch mehreren Voralarmschwellen verglichen oder im Fall einer Auswertung mit Hilfe von Fuzzy-Logic nach den entsprechenden Fuzzy-Regeln untersucht. Wenn nachfolgend von Schwellen- oder Referenzwerten die Rede ist, so sind damit sinngemäss auch immer Fuzzy-Regeln gemeint. Die Auswertung erfolgt im Real-time-Modus, der auf zeitlich stabile, also länger andauernde Überschreitungen der betreffenden Schwellen- oder Referenzwerte reagiert. Ein Maskieralarm wird nur dann ausgelöst, wenn die Überschreitung lang genug ist. Ausserdem wird der Maskieralarm automatisch wieder zurückgesetzt, sobald der Melder in seinen Normalzustand zurückkehrt; eine Intervention einer Bedienungsperson ist für das Zurücksetzen nicht erforderlich.In the evaluation circuit 7, the signal of the infrared receiver 13 with an alarm threshold and preferably also compared to several pre-alarm thresholds or in the case of an evaluation examined with the help of fuzzy logic according to the corresponding fuzzy rules. If below Threshold or reference values are mentioned, so they are always the same Fuzzy rules meant. The evaluation takes place in real-time mode, which is stable over time longer violations of the relevant threshold or reference values respond. A masking alarm is only triggered if the excess is long enough. Furthermore the masking alarm is automatically reset as soon as the detector returns to its normal state returns; intervention by an operator is not for resetting required.

Der Infrarotempfänger 13 empfängt im normalen Betriebszustand des Melders immer einen bestimmten Anteil der von den Infrarotsendern 12 ausgestrahlten Strahlung, von der ein Teil durch das Melderfenster 2 nach aussen tritt und ein anderer Teil vom Melderfenster 2 auf den Infrarotempfänger 13 reflektiert wird. Man kann also, solange das Signal des Infrarotempfängers 13 innerhalb eines gewissen Bandbereichs liegt, mit Sicherheit davon ausgehen, dass der Melder nicht maskiert ist.The infrared receiver 13 always receives a specific one in the normal operating state of the detector Proportion of the radiation emitted by the infrared transmitters 12, part of which is transmitted through the detector window 2 comes out and another part of the detector window 2 on the infrared receiver 13 is reflected. So you can, as long as the signal of the infrared receiver 13 within of a certain band range, we can safely assume that the detector is not masked.

Da die den Infrarotempfänger 13 bildende Pn-Diode eine nicht-lineare Kennlinie aufweist, und da ausserdem das Melderfenster 2 wegen der Anordnung der Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung im Inneren des Melders zu einem gewissen Grad durchsichtig sein muss, muss das auf den Infrarotempfänger 13 gelangende Fremdlicht kompensiert werden. Zu diesem Zweck wird das einfallende Fremdlicht gemessen und das Signal des Infrarotempfängers 13 entsprechend korrigiert.Since the Pn diode forming the infrared receiver 13 has a non-linear characteristic, and since the detector window 2 because of the arrangement of the device for sabotage monitoring inside the detector has to be transparent to a certain extent, that has to be extraneous light reaching the infrared receiver 13 can be compensated. To this end the incident external light is measured and the signal of the infrared receiver 13 is corresponding corrected.

Eine weitere Korrektur ist durch die Temperaturabhängigkeit der optischen Leistung des Infrarotsenders 12 erforderlich. Diese Korrektur erfolgt dadurch, dass bei Temperaturänderungen entweder der elektrische Strom durch den Infrarotsender 12 über die Kennlinie so angepasst wird, dass die Intensität der angegebenen Infrarotstrahlung konstant bleibt, oder es wird im Infrarotempfänger 13 der vom Infrarotsender 12 stammende Signalanteil mit einem die temperaturabhängige optische Leistung des Infrarotsenders 12 kompensierenden Korrekturfaktor multipliziert. Another correction is due to the temperature dependence of the optical power of the infrared transmitter 12 required. This correction is done by changing the temperature either the electrical current through the infrared transmitter 12 is adjusted via the characteristic curve in this way is that the intensity of the specified infrared radiation remains constant, or it is in the Infrared receiver 13 is the signal component originating from the infrared transmitter 12 with a temperature-dependent one optical power of the infrared transmitter 12 compensating correction factor multiplied.

Wenn das Signal des Infrarotempfängers 13 einen vorgegebenen Minimalwert unterschreitet, bedeutet das, dass die vom Infrarotempfänger 13 empfangene Strahlung zurückgegangen ist, und das ist ein Hinweis auf eine Sprayabdeckung des Melderfensters 2, welches im besprayten Zustand die Strahlung der Infrarotsender 12 weniger stark reflektiert als im Normalzustand. Wenn das Signal des Infrarotempfängers einen vorgegebenen Maximalwert überschreitet, bedeutet das, dass entweder aus dem Aussenraum ein grösserer Anteil der von den Infrarotsendem 12 ausgesandten Strahlung reflektiert wird (Fernabdeckung), oder dass das Melderfenster stärker reflektiert als im Normalzustand (Sprayabdeckung mit hellem Farbspray). Mit der beschriebenen Einrichtung zur Sabotageüberwachung, die vollständig hinter dem Melderfenster 2 im Melderinneren angeordnet ist, ist es also möglich mit einem einzigen Kanal mit den beiden Infrarotsendern 12 und dem Infrarotempfänger 13 beide Maskierungsmethoden zu erkennen, ohne dass zusätzliche Hilfsmittel, wie z.B. reflektierende Flügel oder zusätzliche reflektierende Flächen oder aussen am Meldergehäuse angeordnete Infrarotdioden erforderlich sind.If the signal of the infrared receiver 13 falls below a predetermined minimum value, does this mean that the radiation received by the infrared receiver 13 has decreased, and this is an indication of a spray cover of the detector window 2, which is sprayed in the State reflects the radiation of the infrared transmitter 12 less strongly than in the normal state. If the signal from the infrared receiver exceeds a predetermined maximum value, means that either from the outside a larger proportion of that from the infrared transmitters 12 emitted radiation is reflected (remote coverage), or that the detector window more reflective than in normal condition (spray cover with bright color spray). With the described Sabotage monitoring device completely behind the detector window 2 is located inside the detector, it is therefore possible with a single channel with the two Infrared transmitters 12 and the infrared receiver 13 to recognize both masking methods, without additional aids, e.g. reflective wings or additional reflective Surfaces or infrared diodes arranged on the outside of the detector housing are required.

Gemäss Fig. 3 enthält die Auswerteschaltung 7 (Fig. 1 ) einen an den Infrarotsensor 4 angeschlossenen PIR-Kanal 14, einen an den Infrarotempfänger 13 angeschlossenen Antimask-Kanal 15, einen an den Ultraschallempfänger 5 angeschlossenen US-Kanal 16 mit einem US-Antimask-Kanal 17 und eine Verknüpfungsstufe 18. Die Ausgänge der vier genannten Kanäle sind an die Verknüpfungsstufe 18 geführt, in welcher eine kombinierte Auswertung der Signale der einzelnen Kanäle erfolgt. Das Ergebnis dieser kombinierten Auswertung bildet die Entscheidungsgrundlage für die Abgabe eines Alarms durch den Melder, sei dies ein Intrusionsalarm oder ein Maskieralarm.According to FIG. 3, the evaluation circuit 7 (FIG. 1) contains one connected to the infrared sensor 4 PIR channel 14, an anti-mask channel connected to the infrared receiver 13 15, a US channel 16 connected to the ultrasound receiver 5 with a US antimask channel 17 and a logic stage 18. The outputs of the four channels mentioned are led to the linkage stage 18, in which a combined evaluation of the signals of the individual channels. The result of this combined evaluation forms the basis for the decision for the alarm to be given by the detector, this is an intrusion alarm or a masking alarm.

Die kombinierte Auswertung des PIR-Kanals 7 und des US-Kanals 16 besteht im wesentlichen darin, dass vom Melder ein Intrusionsalarm dann abgegeben wird, wenn das Signal im US-Kanal 16 eine vorbestimmte, von der Bewegungsgeschwindigkeit eines Objekts abhängige, Frequenzverschiebung gegenüber der Sendefrequenz zeigt, und gleichzeitig der IR-Kanal 14 eine für die Anwesenheit eines Menschen typische Infrarotstrahlung empfängt. Der ausgewertete Doppler-Frequenzbereich liegt bei 25.6 kHz ±500 Hz, da bei nicht extrem schnellen Bewegungen, wovon bei einem Einbrecher ausgegangen werden kann, ein Signal in diesem Frequenzbereich erzeugt wird.The combined evaluation of the PIR channel 7 and the US channel 16 essentially exists in that the detector emits an intrusion alarm when the signal is in the US channel 16 a predetermined, dependent on the speed of movement of an object, Frequency shift compared to the transmission frequency shows, and at the same time the IR channel 14 receives infrared radiation typical of the presence of a person. The evaluated Doppler frequency range is 25.6 kHz ± 500 Hz, since with not extremely fast movements, what a burglar can assume is a signal in this frequency range is produced.

Zwischen dem Antimask-Kanal 15 und dem US-Kanal 16 besteht nur eine relativ lose Verknüpfung derart, dass sowohl der eine als auch der andere dieser Kanäle gewisse Abdeckungsarten erkennen kann, so dass die beiden Kanäle einander auf eine sehr wirksamen Art ergänzen. Im Antimask-Kanal wird das Signal des Infrarotempfängers 13 gleichstrommässig beobachtet, oder mit anderen Worten, es werden Abweichungen des Signals von seinem Ruhewert untersucht. Das ist für den Real-time-Modus erforderlich, weil nur so die Rückkehr des Melders in seinen normalen Betriebzustand, also die Entfernung der Abdeckung, erkannt werden kann. Da die Verarbeitung des Signals digital erfolgen muss, erfolgt eine A/D-Wandlung des Signals des Infrarotempfängers 13 durch einen hochauflösenden A/D-Wandler. Die grosse Dynamik des A/D-Wandlers ist deswegen erforderlich, weil dieser den Ruhebereich des Signals abdecken und sehr kleine Abweichungen von diesem erkennen muss, wobei aber der Ruhewert wegen der Fertigungstoleranzen und der Streuung der elektrooptischen Wirkungsgrade der optischen Komponenten starken Streuungen unterworfen ist.There is only a relatively loose link between the antimask channel 15 and the US channel 16 such that both of these channels have certain types of coverage can recognize, so that the two channels complement each other in a very effective way. in the Antimask channel, the signal of the infrared receiver 13 is observed DC, or in other words, deviations of the signal from its rest value are examined. This is necessary for real-time mode because this is the only way the detector can return to its normal operating condition, i.e. the removal of the cover, can be recognized. Since the If the signal has to be processed digitally, there is an A / D conversion of the signal of the infrared receiver 13 through a high-resolution A / D converter. The great dynamics of the A / D converter is necessary because it covers the rest area of the signal and must recognize very small deviations from this, but the resting value because of the Manufacturing tolerances and the spread of the electro-optical efficiency of the optical Components is subject to strong scattering.

Im US-Antimask-Kanal 17 erfolgt eine Sabotageüberwachung für den Ultraschallteil. Zu diesem Zweck sendet der Ultraschallsender 6 durch kurzes Ein-/Ausschalten oder Aus-/Einschalten einen kurzen Ultraschallpuls aus, wodurch ein breites Frequenzspektrum unter anderem auch zwischen 24 und 25 kHz entsteht. Das Signal in diesem Frequenzbereich wird bezüglich Amplitude und zeitlichem Verlauf ausgewertet. Dabei werden die genannten Parameter auf für Veränderungen im Raum vor dem Melder typische Abweichungen von Mittelwerten oder früheren Messergebnissen untersucht, insbesondere auf solche Abweichungen, die für die Anbringung einer Abschirmung oder Abdeckung vor dem Melder charakteristisch sind. Da hier keine Auswertung des Doppler-Frequenzbereichs erfolgt, können Bewegungen und Luftturbulenzen diese Antimaskfunktion nicht stören.Sabotage monitoring for the ultrasound part takes place in the US antimask channel 17. To this Purpose is sent by the ultrasonic transmitter 6 by briefly switching on / off or off / on a short ultrasound pulse, which, among other things, also means a wide frequency spectrum between 24 and 25 kHz. The signal in this frequency range is amplitude related and time history evaluated. The parameters mentioned are used for changes Typical deviations from mean values or earlier in the area in front of the detector Measurement results examined, in particular for such deviations that are necessary for the attachment a shield or cover in front of the detector are characteristic. Since no evaluation here movements and air turbulence can occur in the Doppler frequency range Do not interfere with the anti-mask function.

Der Ultraschallteil schützt sich also selbst gegen Abdeckungen. Zusätzlich unterstützt er aber den Infrarotteil beim Erkennen von Fernabdeckung mit Materialien, die für den Infrarotteil nur schwer erkennbar sind, wie beispielsweise im Infrarotbereich durchsichtige oder schwarze Gegenstände. Andererseits erkennt aber der Antimask-Kanal 15 helle, akustisch weiche Materialien sehr gut und unterstützt dadurch die Antimaskfunktion des Ultraschallteils. Wenn der Infrarot- und der Ultraschallteil stärker ineinander verschachtelt wären, beispielsweise durch Anordnung von Ultraschallsender 6 und Ultraschallempfänger 5 zu verschiedenen Seiten des Melderfensters 2 (links und rechts, oben und unten oder diagonal gegenüberliegend), könnte eine stärkere Verknüpfung der Signale der Kanäle 15 und 16 erfolgen.The ultrasound part therefore protects itself against covers. In addition, he supports the infrared part when detecting remote coverage with materials that are for the infrared part only are difficult to see, such as transparent or black in the infrared range Items. On the other hand, the antimask channel 15 recognizes bright, acoustically soft materials very good and thereby supports the anti-mask function of the ultrasound part. If the Infrared and the ultrasound part would be more closely nested, for example by Arrangement of ultrasound transmitter 6 and ultrasound receiver 5 on different sides of the Detector window 2 (left and right, top and bottom or diagonally opposite), could the signals of channels 15 and 16 are more closely linked.

Der aus dem Ultraschallsender 5 und dem Ultraschallempfänger 6 bestehende Ultraschallteil kann auch durch einen aus einem Mikrowellensender und einem Mikrowellenempfänger bestehenden Mikrowellenteil ersetzt sein, wobei gewisse, dem Fachmann geläufige, schaltungstechnische Anpassungen erforderlich sind.The ultrasound part consisting of the ultrasound transmitter 5 and the ultrasound receiver 6 can also be provided by one consisting of a microwave transmitter and a microwave receiver Microwave part to be replaced, with certain circuitry familiar to those skilled in the art Adjustments are required.

Claims (11)

  1. Intrusion detector having a housing (1) and an infrared section disposed in the latter, having an infrared sensor (4), a detector window (2), provided in the housing wall, for the passage of infrared radiation from the external space to the infrared sensor (4), a means for focusing the infrared radiation incident through the detector window (2) on the infrared sensor (4) and having a sabotage surveillance device comprising an infrared transmitter (12) and an infrared receiver (13), wherein the infrared transmitter (12) and the infrared receiver (13) are disposed inside the housing (1), characterized in that the detector window (2) is transparent to radiation emitted by the infrared transmitter (12), and in that sabotage of the detector is kept under surveillance by measuring the proportion of the said radiation reflected to the infrared receiver (13) from the inside of the detector window (2) and that reflected from the surrounding space.
  2. Intrusion detector according to Claim 1, characterized in that the infrared transmitter (12) and/or the infrared receiver (13) is/are assigned means for compensating for the extraneous light incident through the detector window (2).
  3. Intrusion detector according to Claim 1, characterized in that means are provided for compensating for the temperature dependence of the optical output of the infrared transmitter (12).
  4. Intrusion detector according to Claim 1, characterized in that the means for focusing the infrared radiation incident through the detector window (2) is formed by a base layer of dark material and a mirror (8) having a reflection layer applied to the latter, wherein the reflection layer is, on the one hand, transparent to interfering radiation below the wavelength range of human thermal radiation and, on the other hand, strongly reflects radiation from the said wavelength range.
  5. Intrusion detector according to any one of Claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the sabotage surveillance device has two infrared transmitters (12) directed at an angle with respect to the inside of the detector window (2), and in that the infrared receiver (13) is disposed between the two infrared transmitters (12).
  6. Intrusion detector according to any one of Claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the detector has an ancillary section comprising an additional transmitter (5) and an additional receiver (6), in that the signal of the additional receiver (6) is evaluated in two frequency ranges, one of which is typical of movements in the space under surveillance and the other is typical of masking of the detector, and in that a common evaluation circuit (7) is provided for the ancillary section and the infrared section.
  7. Intrusion detector according to Claim 6, characterized in that the additional transmitter (5) and the additional receiver (6) are disposed in the vicinity of the periphery of the detector window (2).
  8. Intrusion detector according to Claim 6 or 7, characterized in that the evaluation circuit (7) has a PIR channel (14) connected downstream of the infrared sensor (4), an anti-mask channel (15) connected downstream of the infrared receiver (13) and a US channel (16) that is connected downstream of the additional receiver (6) and that has a US anti-mask channel (17), and the evaluation circuit (7) also has a combining stage (18) connected to the outputs of the said channels for the combined evaluation of the signals of said channels.
  9. Intrusion detector according to Claim 8, characterized in that, in the case of the said combined evaluation, the ancillary section supports the sabotage surveillance device in the detection of materials that are detectable with difficulty for infrared radiation and the sabotage surveillance device supports the ancillary section in the detection of materials that are detectable only with difficulty for said section.
  10. Intrusion detector according to one of Claims 6 to 9, characterized in that the ancillary section is formed by an ultrasonic section comprising an ultrasonic transmitter (5) and an ultrasonic receiver (6) or by a microwave section comprising a microwave transmitter and a microwave receiver.
  11. Intrusion detector according to Claim 10, characterized in that the anti-mask channel (15) contains a high-resolution A/D converter for the digitization of the signal of the infrared receiver (13).
EP99110848A 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Intrusion detector with a device for monitoring against tampering Expired - Lifetime EP1061489B1 (en)

Priority Applications (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP99110848A EP1061489B1 (en) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Intrusion detector with a device for monitoring against tampering
DE59910349T DE59910349D1 (en) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Intrusion detector with a device for sabotage monitoring
AT99110848T ATE274735T1 (en) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 INTRUSION DETECTOR WITH A DEVICE FOR SABOTAGE MONITORING
IL13586900A IL135869A (en) 1999-06-07 2000-04-28 Intrusion detector having a sabotage surveillance device
US09/587,812 US6377174B1 (en) 1999-06-07 2000-06-06 Intrusion detector having a sabotage surveillance device

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP99110848A EP1061489B1 (en) 1999-06-07 1999-06-07 Intrusion detector with a device for monitoring against tampering
US09/587,812 US6377174B1 (en) 1999-06-07 2000-06-06 Intrusion detector having a sabotage surveillance device

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EP1061489A1 EP1061489A1 (en) 2000-12-20
EP1061489B1 true EP1061489B1 (en) 2004-08-25

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