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CN120602069A - A verifiable private information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption - Google Patents

A verifiable private information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption

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Publication number
CN120602069A
CN120602069A CN202510719746.6A CN202510719746A CN120602069A CN 120602069 A CN120602069 A CN 120602069A CN 202510719746 A CN202510719746 A CN 202510719746A CN 120602069 A CN120602069 A CN 120602069A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
data
inquiry
response
data owner
information retrieval
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
CN202510719746.6A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
徐旸
胡子潇
张程
李泉霖
唐卓
李肯立
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Hunan University
Original Assignee
Hunan University
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Hunan University filed Critical Hunan University
Priority to CN202510719746.6A priority Critical patent/CN120602069A/en
Publication of CN120602069A publication Critical patent/CN120602069A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Medical Informatics (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Information Retrieval, Db Structures And Fs Structures Therefor (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption. The method comprises the steps of S1, after initialization, generating a zero knowledge proof by a data owner while constructing a private information retrieval inquiry, proving that the inquiry structure is legal, submitting the proof to a Trusted Third Party (TTP), carrying out homomorphic calculation after receiving the inquiry verified by the TTP by a server in response processing and result returning, generating an encryption response and sending the result to the data owner and the TTP, and carrying out synchronous recording of response information by the TTP in response verification and dispute processing, wherein the data owner decrypts and Ha Xibi pairs the returned result, if abnormal is found, can submit a dispute request, and is verified by the TTP in combination with the inquiry and the zero knowledge proof of the response, and the arbitration and responsibility tracing is S4.TTP judges the dispute based on the verification result and confirms the responsible party. The method and the device are suitable for private information retrieval scenes with high requirements on data security and integrity.

Description

Verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of private information retrieval, in particular to a homomorphic encryption verifiable private information retrieval intellectual property protection method.
Background
With the rapid development of information technology and the arrival of big data age, the generation, storage and management modes of data have changed fundamentally. Cloud computing is widely used as an efficient and flexible computing model for data storage, processing, and maintenance work in individuals, businesses, and government agencies. By migrating the data to the cloud computing platform, the user can significantly reduce the cost, promote the usability of the system and simplify the operation and maintenance flow. However, this mode also presents new challenges in terms of how to achieve secure, efficient, and privacy-friendly access to data in a cloud environment.
Private information retrieval (Private Information Retrieval, PIR) technology has received attention in recent years as a cryptographic mechanism that can protect access privacy of data owners. PIR allows a data owner to retrieve data from a cloud server without revealing its query intent. However, despite the significant progress made by existing PIR schemes in protecting query privacy, there are still key challenges in verifiability and accountability. Most of the PIR schemes in the prior art are focused on reducing the complexity and the computational overhead of communication, and neglect the scene that the processing is difficult to return to responsibility when the result is disputed. When the PIR query results are wrong or inconsistent, the prior proposal has difficulty in clearly distinguishing the error sources, whether the data owner generates illegal challenges which do not conform to the protocol specifications or the cloud server fails to correctly maintain the data integrity. This ambiguity significantly weakens the public confidence and applicability of PIR schemes in practical deployments.
Furthermore, both the cloud server and the data owner may constitute a potential threat. The cloud server may cause data corruption due to software failure or hardware errors, and may even intentionally delete data rarely used by the data owner for the purpose of saving storage space, and conceal the fact that the data has been corrupted or deleted. At the same time, the cloud server may also create curiosity with the data content of the data owner. On the other hand, the data owner may construct a query vector that does not conform to the protocol, thereby confusing the source of the error when the query results of the private information retrieval are erroneous or inconsistent.
Although some progress is made in privacy protection, the existing PIR scheme still faces a plurality of problems in practical application. For example, existing PIR schemes often lack an effective verification mechanism to ensure the correctness and integrity of the data returned by the cloud server, and also fail to explicitly account for disputes when they occur. This makes the reliability and security of PIR schemes a serious challenge in the face of malicious cloud servers or data owners.
The invention provides a verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption. By introducing a third party verification and arbitration mechanism, the mechanism realizes compliance verification of inquiry, correctness verification of response and disputes and can be responsible while protecting query privacy.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is that the prior Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme has a remarkable progress in protecting query privacy, but has key challenges in verifiability and accountability. Most of the existing schemes are focused on reducing the communication complexity and the calculation cost, and neglect the scene that the results are difficult to return to responsibility for processing when disputes occur. When the PIR query results are wrong or inconsistent, the prior proposal has difficulty in clearly distinguishing the error sources, whether the data owner generates illegal challenges which do not conform to the protocol specifications or the cloud server fails to correctly maintain the data integrity. This ambiguity significantly weakens the public confidence and usability of PIR schemes in practical deployments.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a new private information retrieval scheme with third party verifiability and arbitratability. The method is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
a verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption. Characterized by comprising the following steps:
S1, after initialization is completed, a data owner generates privacy inquiry aiming at a target data block, and constructs inquiry validity evidence by using a zero knowledge proof protocol, wherein the inquiry validity evidence is used for proving that an inquiry structure is legal, and the inquiry and the evidence are submitted to a Trusted Third Party (TTP);
s2, the trusted third party verifies the validity of the data owner inquiry, and sends the verified inquiry to the cloud server. The server receives the inquiry verified by the trusted third party, then carries out homomorphic calculation, generates an encryption response, sends the result to the data owner and the trusted third party, and the trusted third party synchronously records response information;
S3, the data owner decrypts the returned result and Ha Xibi pairs, if abnormality is found, the data owner submits an objection request to a trusted third party, and the trusted third party verifies the request by combining the inquiry and zero knowledge proof of response;
And S4, locally verifying the compliance of the arbitration request of the data owner and the correctness of the response of the cloud server by the trusted third party. If both sides prove to pass, the arbitration request is refused, and if verification failure occurs, the error source can be clearly pointed out, so that a judging basis is provided for disputes.
Further, the data owner constructs a private information retrieval inquiry method in step S1 includes running a key generation algorithm, generating a public-private key pair, publishing the public key, storing the private key, generating an inquiry vector according to a target data block, encrypting each bit of the vector by using a Paillier homomorphic encryption method, and ensuring the privacy of the inquiry vector.
Further, the data owner generates a zero knowledge proof method for the cryptographic challenge in step S1, which includes proving that a single ciphertext in the challenge satisfies the binary property, i.e. each bit plaintext of the encryption is 0 or 1. By constructing two proving branches of statement, which correspond to the true value and the false statement respectively, the binary property of the challenge vector is ensured to be proved on the premise of not revealing the plaintext, and the encrypted plaintext after homomorphism addition of all the ciphertext is proved to be equal to 1, namely the plaintext addition of the challenge vector is exactly 1, which indicates that the challenge is an effective choice for the unique data block.
Further, the method for submitting the encryption challenge and the zero knowledge proof thereof by the data owner in the step S1 comprises the steps that the data owner sends the encryption challenge and the zero knowledge proof to a TTP, the TTP verifies the validity of the challenge, and if the verification is passed, the encryption challenge is sent to a server.
Further, the server generating encryption response method in step S2 comprises the steps that after receiving the challenge verified by the TTP, the cloud server calculates a ciphertext response corresponding to the data item requested by the data owner based on the locally stored data block set, and returns a response result to the TTP and the data owner.
Further, the method for decrypting and hashing the result by the data owner in the step S3 comprises the steps that the data owner decrypts the response result of the server by using the homomorphic private key generated in the step S1 to obtain a target plaintext data block, and if the data owner makes a question about the integrity of the data block, the decrypted data block is sent to the TTP.
Further, the method for verifying the trusted third party combined with the inquiry and the zero knowledge proof of response in the step S3 comprises the steps that the TTP encrypts the data block by using a public key, and consistency judgment is carried out on the data block and a response result record received locally from a cloud server, so that a cloud server with malicious DO (data on the air) stripes as honest is avoided, if the comparison is consistent, the hash value of the data block is calculated and compared with a hash set of the data block stored locally, whether the integrity of the data block is damaged is judged, and a data owner is informed of the comparison result.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that:
1. According to the invention, by introducing a third party verification and arbitration mechanism, the query privacy of the data owner is protected, meanwhile, the bidirectional supervision of the behavior of the cloud server and the data owner is realized, the problem that the existing PIR scheme is difficult to definitely account for disputes is solved, and the public trust and the applicability of the PIR scheme in actual deployment are improved.
2. The invention combines the leading edge cryptographic techniques of verifiable calculation, zero knowledge proof and the like, ensures the compliance of inquiry and the correctness of response, and realizes efficient privacy protection on the premise of not revealing inquiry indexes.
3. The method is suitable for private information retrieval scenes in a single cloud environment, has wide applicability, and can provide theoretical and practical support for secure data access in a multi-party game environment.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a functional diagram of three core entities according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating the data owner DO calculation overhead in an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a diagram illustrating a TTP calculation overhead experiment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is a diagram illustrating CS computation overhead experiments in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below in connection with the drawings and the specific preferred embodiments, but the scope of protection of the invention is not limited thereby.
The system is suitable for cloud computing environment, as shown in figure 2, and mainly comprises three core entities, namely a Data Owner (DO) with access right to cloud storage data, a private information retrieval request is initiated, a target data block is obtained on the premise of not revealing query intention, a Cloud Server (CS) is responsible for storing complete data files, responding to encryption query requests of the data owner, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) is provided with verification capability and does not participate in the data retrieval process, and full-time is responsible for verifying compliance of query and response, handling disputes and arbitrating responsibilities.
In the system initialization phase, the data owner divides the original data file to generate a plurality of equal-length data blocks, which are respectively marked as m 1,m2,…,mn, and calculates a hash value H (m i) for each data block. The data owner submits the hash set to the TTP record. The DO then performs a key generation algorithm comprising the steps of randomly selecting two large prime numbers p, q, calculating the modulus N=pq, and further defining
Define the Paillier homomorphic encryption function E (m) =g mrNmodN2, whereIs a random number. A public-private key pair (pk, sk) is generated, where pk= (N, g), sk = λ. The public key is disclosed for challenge encryption and the private key is kept by the DO for data decryption.
In the challenge generation and compliance verification phase, DO constructs a sparse challenge vector q= (Q 1,q2,…,qn) of length n, with only one bit being 1 and the rest being 0. This vector is Paillier encrypted to yield ciphertext vector C= (C 1,c2,…,cn), where C i＝E(qi. The DO then constructs a zero knowledge proof, which separately performs the following two zero knowledge proof protocols, ensuring challenge compliance.
ZKBit protocol, proving that each bit of challenge ciphertext encrypts only 0 or 1. The data owner performs the following operations on each ciphertext c i, randomly selecting two random numbersFor the case where the plaintext value is0, a true commitment is generated,
For a plaintext value of 1, a true commitment is generated,
Simulate another promise (i.e. a non-real path),
Wherein e sim and z sim are random values
The computational challenge e=h (c||a 0||a1) and split into e 0,e1, satisfying e 0+e1 =e mod q
Computing true path responseOutput attestation
πbit＝(a0,a1,e0,e1,z0,z1) (6)
ZKSum, proving that the result of plaintext after all ciphertext is added is equal to 1, namely only one data block is queried. Homomorphically aggregating challenge ciphertext vector c= (C 1,c2,…,cn) into c= pi C imod N2, and randomly selecting a random number by the data ownerGenerating a commitment
A=g1·sNmodN2 (7)
Calculating challenge, e=h (c||a), calculating response z=ρ·s e mod n using the random number ρ for encryption, outputting proof
πsum=(A,z,e) (8)
Both protocols are based on Fiat-Shamir transformation to non-interacte the interaction process and improve efficiency. DO submits the ciphertext challenge and proof together with the TTP. The TTP verifies the binary property and the summation correctness of the inquiry, and if the verification is passed, the inquiry ciphertext is forwarded to the cloud server CS.
In the cloud server response generation stage, the CS executes the following homomorphic operation on the locally stored data block { m i } according to the received challenge ciphertext C:
The response ciphertext R is actually the result of the encryption of the target data block. The CS sends it to the DO and TTP, which records this response.
And in the decryption and dispute processing stage, after receiving the ciphertext response, the DO decrypts the ciphertext by using the private key to obtain the plaintext data block m j. If DO is doubtful of the correctness of the result, an arbitration request can be initiated to the TTP. After receiving the arbitration request, the TTP executes the following verification process, firstly encrypts the plaintext m j by using the public key of DO to obtain R ', verifies whether the R' is consistent with the local record response ciphertext R, compares the hash value of m j with the hash set originally submitted by DO, and confirms the data integrity. If either step is inconsistent, the TTP can determine that the error originated from a DO forgery challenge or a CS dishonest calculation, making a fair decision.
In the embodiment, the technical scheme is verified through a simulation experiment, a prototype system of the method is realized based on a Python language, an exhaustive experimental test is carried out in a typical single cloud environment, a Windows 11 operating system is adopted as an experimental platform, and a AMD Ryzen 7 5800H@3.20GHz processor, a Samsung DDR4 32000 MHz 16GB memory and a WDC SN730 SSD memory are configured as hardware. And the Python 3.9 version is used as a development and test language platform, so that the universality and reproducibility of the method implementation are ensured.
And (3) verifying the computing overhead, and respectively evaluating the operation phases of three types of entities, namely a Data Owner (DO), a Cloud Server (CS) and a third party verifier (TTP), in terms of computing performance.
The main calculation cost of the data owner is concentrated on three links of challenge vector generation, zero knowledge proof (ZKBit, ZKSum) generation and response decryption. Experimental results show that challenge generation time increases linearly with increasing number of data blocks, where challenge encryption is the most dominant bottleneck (taking more than 10 seconds at 200 data blocks), while ZKBit and ZKSum generation times remain small or constant levels, respectively. The third party verifier TTP verification task includes ZKBit and ZKSum proof verification and result consistency detection. Experimental data indicate that ZKBit validation time increases linearly with the number of data blocks, ZKSum validation is nearly constant (about 0.002 seconds). This difference in verification efficiency is due to the polymeric structure in ZKSum designs, suitable for deployment in a computationally constrained environment. And the cloud end mainly executes the response calculation task. Experiments prove that the response calculation time increases linearly with the number of data blocks, from 20 blocks to 200 blocks, and the time increases from 1.5 seconds to 12 seconds, thus showing the controllability of the calculation complexity. The experiment verifies that the protocol realizes relatively balanced calculation task allocation among three parties, and shows good engineering deployment performance.
The communication process of the protocol of the invention is divided into three sections, namely DO submits inquiry and certification to TTP, TTP forwards inquiry vector to CS, and CS returns response result to DO. Through measurement and calculation, the communication overhead of the data owner linearly expands along with the query dimension and is mainly concentrated on sending the Paillier ciphertext vector and the corresponding ZK evidence, the TTP communication traffic also linearly depends on the query dimension, but is relatively light, the CS communication load is minimum, and only the target ciphertext block needs to be returned. Therefore, the invention ensures the safety and simultaneously, communication pressure on the cloud server side is remarkably reduced, and the cloud server is suitable for low-bandwidth or edge environments.
Error detection capability verification, in order to test the detection capability of the invention on illegal query vectors, the applicant designs three types of attack samples comprising non-Boolean ciphertext, non-unique selection vectors and fake ZK certification, and performs 100 rounds of simulation experiments in a 64-dimensional query vector space. Experimental results show that TTP successfully identifies and refuses illegal requests in all test rounds, the error identification rate reaches 100%, the average verification time is not more than 0.16 seconds, and the proposed protocol has strong robustness and arbitratability on the premise of not affecting the efficiency
The foregoing is merely a preferred example of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention in any way. Although the invention has been described in terms of preferred embodiments, it is not intended to be limited thereto. Therefore, any simple modification, equivalent variation and modification of the above embodiments according to the technical substance of the present invention shall fall within the protection scope of the technical solution of the present invention.

Claims (8)

1. A verifiable private information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption, comprising:
S1, after initialization is completed, a data owner generates privacy inquiry aiming at a target data block, and constructs inquiry validity evidence by using a zero knowledge proof protocol, wherein the inquiry validity evidence is used for proving that an inquiry structure is legal, and the inquiry and the evidence are submitted to a Trusted Third Party (TTP);
S2, the trusted third party verifies the validity of the data owner inquiry, the verified inquiry is sent to the cloud server, the server receives the inquiry verified by the trusted third party and then carries out homomorphic calculation, an encryption response is generated, the result is sent to the data owner and the trusted third party, and the trusted third party synchronously records response information;
S3, the data owner decrypts the returned result and Ha Xibi pairs, if abnormality is found, the data owner submits an objection request to a trusted third party, and the trusted third party verifies the request by combining the inquiry and zero knowledge proof of response;
And S4, locally verifying the compliance of the arbitration request of the data owner and the response correctness of the cloud server by the trusted third party, if both sides prove to pass, rejecting the arbitration request, and if verification failure occurs, clearly indicating the error source and providing a judging basis for disputes.
2. The homomorphic encryption-based verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism of claim 1, wherein the initialization method in step S1 comprises the steps that the data owner firstly divides the data file into a plurality of data blocks with equal size, calculates the hash value of each block, generates a hash set of the whole data blocks, and submits the hash set to a third party for recording in order to support the subsequent possible arbitration process.
3. The homomorphic encryption-based verifiable private information retrieval mechanism of claim 1, wherein the generating a private query method in step S1 comprises the data owner running a key generation algorithm to generate a public-private key, disclosing a public key, encrypting each bit of the challenge vector according to the Paillier homomorphic encryption method using the public key, and forming an encrypted challenge vector.
4. The homomorphic encryption-based verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism of claim 1, wherein the constructing the challenge validity proof using the zero knowledge proof protocol in step S1 comprises proving that a single ciphertext in the challenge vector satisfies a certain value of binary sum of ciphertext, i.e., each bit plaintext of encryption is 0 or 1, and the plaintext encrypted after homomorphically summing all the ciphers in the challenge vector is equal to 1.
5. The verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption of claim 1, wherein the server performing homomorphic calculation method of step S2 comprises the server performing homomorphic summation calculation on the challenge vector by using a public key disclosed by a data owner based on the property of Paillier homomorphic encryption, and generating the encrypted response.
6. The homomorphic encryption-based verifiable private information retrieval mechanism of claim 1, wherein the data owner decrypting the returned result in step S3 comprises decrypting the encrypted response from the server according to the Paillier homomorphic encryption method using the homomorphic private key to obtain the original data block.
7. The homomorphic encryption-based verifiable privacy information retrieval mechanism of claim 1, wherein the method for verifying the compliance of the arbitration request of the data owner and the correctness of the response of the cloud server in step S4 comprises the steps that after the trusted third party receives the decrypted data block of the data owner, the public key of the data owner is used for encrypting the data block and comparing the encrypted data block with the response result of the server of the local record, if the encrypted data block is inconsistent, the arbitration request is rejected, otherwise, a hash function is used for generating a hash digest, and comparing the hash digest with the hash record recorded at the time of initialization to judge whether the integrity of the data block is damaged.
8. The homomorphic encryption-based verifiable private information retrieval mechanism according to claim 1, wherein the generating of the private query mechanism of step S1 is applicable to any binary query vector in a private information retrieval scenario where data security and integrity requirements are high.
CN202510719746.6A 2025-05-30 2025-05-30 A verifiable private information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption Pending CN120602069A (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202510719746.6A CN120602069A (en) 2025-05-30 2025-05-30 A verifiable private information retrieval mechanism based on homomorphic encryption

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
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