[go: up one dir, main page]

CN102135621A - Fault recognition method for multi-constellation integrated navigation system - Google Patents

Fault recognition method for multi-constellation integrated navigation system Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN102135621A
CN102135621A CN2010106172501A CN201010617250A CN102135621A CN 102135621 A CN102135621 A CN 102135621A CN 2010106172501 A CN2010106172501 A CN 2010106172501A CN 201010617250 A CN201010617250 A CN 201010617250A CN 102135621 A CN102135621 A CN 102135621A
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
mrow
msubsup
msub
mtd
msup
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CN2010106172501A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN102135621B (en
Inventor
陆伟宁
王千喜
翟羽佳
杨晓昆
胡强
李秋凤
刘岩
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE & INDUSTRY ACADEMY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Original Assignee
CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE & INDUSTRY ACADEMY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE & INDUSTRY ACADEMY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY filed Critical CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE & INDUSTRY ACADEMY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Priority to CN 201010617250 priority Critical patent/CN102135621B/en
Publication of CN102135621A publication Critical patent/CN102135621A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN102135621B publication Critical patent/CN102135621B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Landscapes

  • Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a fault recognition method for a multi-constellation integrated navigation system. The method comprises the following steps of: unifying time and space coordinates of the multi-constellation system; determining fault detection usability; determining a fault; recognizing and removing faulty satellites and the like. Faults of various satellites can be monitored and recognized simultaneously, the success rate of recognizing and removing the faulty satellites is greatly improved due to unification of the time and space coordinates of the multi-constellation system and repeated detection and judgment, and the navigation positioning accuracy, positioning performance and reliability of the multi-constellation integrated navigation system are improved; therefore, the navigation service performance is improved.

Description

Fault identification method of multi-constellation combined navigation system
Technical Field
The invention relates to a fault identification method of a navigation system, in particular to a fault identification method of a multi-constellation combined navigation system.
Background
The GPS (global navigation satellite system) has been widely used in the world, and in the GPS, a multi-constellation combined navigation system has high navigation positioning accuracy and good positioning performance and reliability, so that the navigation service provided by the multi-constellation combined navigation system can reach the level that the enhancement system must be used before.
However, when the error of the multi-constellation combined navigation system exceeds the allowable limit due to various reasons such as a failed satellite or a long-time false lock, the multi-constellation combined navigation system cannot be qualified for navigation work. At present, the positioning of the satellite navigation system is failed mainly due to the following reasons:
1) the positioning accuracy of satellite navigation is influenced by the number of satellites and the geometric distribution of the satellites, and the performance of a GPS system is deteriorated in areas with a small number of satellites and poor positioning geometric distribution;
2) the satellite navigation system is large and complex, and the software and hardware faults of the system can also increase the satellite navigation positioning error, so that the flight safety of the airplane is influenced;
3) the owning country of the GPS system adopts some measures for limiting the positioning precision for the safety benefit of the own country, and is difficult to ensure that the owning country does not adopt similar measures for the military benefit under the condition of military conflict and war at present;
4) electromagnetic waves in the external environment, ionosphere changes, natural interference and man-made interference, particularly hostile interference, can also affect the reliability of satellite navigation.
The fault identification and integrity enhancement mainly adopts monitoring technology to provide real-time alarm capability. Methods for achieving system integrity can be divided into two categories, one being internal and the other being external. The internal method uses receiver internal sensor information to achieve integrity monitoring, RAIM.
The invention patent application with the application number of CN 200610165465.8 discloses a GNSS receiver autonomous integrity monitoring method based on multi-satellite fault recognition, which comprises the following steps: a. performing an availability analysis of autonomous integrity; b. and (3) judging single-star and multi-star faults: comparing the detection statistic with a single-star or multi-star detection threshold, if the detection statistic does not exceed any threshold, indicating that no fault exists at present, and continuing to monitor; if the threshold is exceeded, determining to enter a corresponding fault identification step; c. single-star and multi-star fault identification is carried out: carrying out fault identification on single-satellite time by using a characteristic deviation line method, and carrying out fault identification on multi-satellite time by using a hypothesis verification method; d. and (4) carrying out exclusion verification: removing the fault satellite from the selected satellite combination, and repeating the step a and the step b; if no fault is found, indicating that the step c is correct and the fault satellite is eliminated; if a new fault is found, it indicates that step c fails, and the specific conditions need to be analyzed: if the single-satellite fault is failed to be eliminated, the fault is probably a multi-satellite fault; and if the multi-satellite fault removal fails, determining that the measured data at the current moment cannot complete integrity monitoring. The GNSS receiver autonomous integrity monitoring method based on multi-satellite fault identification has the serious defect of low success rate of identifying and removing the fault satellite.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects in the prior art and provide a fault identification method of a multi-constellation combined navigation system, which has reliable performance and high success rate of identifying and eliminating fault satellites.
In order to solve the problems in the prior art, the invention discloses a fault identification method of a multi-constellation combined navigation system, which comprises the following steps:
1) unification of time and space coordinates for multi-constellation systems
1.1) unification in a multi-constellation system: according to a fixed conversion relation between the system time of each constellation and UTC (universal time), roughly resolving the system times of different constellations, and unifying the system times of all the constellation systems; clock difference between system time of each constellation and UTC
Figure BDA0000042229660000021
The following pseudo-range observation equation gives:
<math><mrow><msubsup><mi>&rho;</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>=</mo><mrow><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>X</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>y</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Y</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>z</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Z</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>]</mo></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup><mo>+</mo><mi>c&delta;</mi><msubsup><mi>T</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup></mrow></mrow></math>
<math><mrow><mi>&delta;</mi><msubsup><mi>T</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>=</mo><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>X</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>y</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Y</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>z</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Z</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>]</mo></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>&rho;</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>]</mo><mo>/</mo><mi>c</mi></mrow></math>
wherein, the superscript g represents a system serial number, i is an observation serial number (i is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); (X, y, z) is the coordinates of the receiver in the selected coordinate system, (X)g,Yg,Zg) Converting the observation satellites in each constellation to coordinates under a selected coordinate system by using a coordinate conversion formula;
Figure BDA0000042229660000024
is the clock difference (r ═ 1, 2.. N) between the receiver and each constellation,
Figure BDA0000042229660000025
is a pseudo range observation value of each visible satellite, and c is the speed of light;
for N constellations, the receiver has N +3 unknowns to be measured, and needs N +3 pseudo-range observation equations to solve to obtain the clock error between the system time and the UTC of each constellation
Figure BDA0000042229660000026
1.2) unifying the spatial coordinates of multiple constellations
The unification of the space coordinates is completed by adopting the following coordinate conversion formula:
<math><mrow><msub><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mrow><mi>sys</mi><mn>1</mn></mrow></msub><mo>=</mo><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mo>+</mo><mrow><mo>(</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>+</mo><mi>m</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>z</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>y</mi></msub></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>z</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>x</mi></msub><mi></mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>y</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>x</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><msub><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mi>sys</mi></msub></mrow></math>
wherein (Δ x, Δ y, Δ z) is the earth center offset, θx,θy,θzRotation angle of coordinate axis, m is scale factor, (x, y, z)sysTo be the coordinates in the coordinate system to be transformed, (x, y, z)sys1Coordinates of a target coordinate system;
2) fault detection availability determination
2.1) judging the number of the visible satellites, if the number of the visible satellites is less than N +3, indicating that fault detection cannot be carried out, carrying out integrity alarm by the system, and otherwise, continuing;
2.2) availability determination:
firstly, a fault detection threshold value sigma is calculatedTThe formula is as follows:
<math><mrow><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mi>T</mi></msub><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn></msub><mo>&times;</mo><mi>T</mi><mo>/</mo><msqrt><mi>n</mi><mo>-</mo><mn>4</mn></msqrt></mrow></math>
wherein σ0Is the variance value of the pseudo-range measurement error; n is the number of visible satellites; the threshold value T is determined by:
<math><mrow><mi>Pr</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>SSE</mi><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>&lt;</mo><msup><mi>T</mi><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mo>=</mo><msubsup><mo>&Integral;</mo><mn>0</mn><msup><mi>T</mi><mn>2</mn></msup></msubsup><msub><mi>f</mi><msubsup><mi>&chi;</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>n</mi><mo>-</mo><mn>4</mn><mo>,</mo><mi>&lambda;</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup></msub><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mi>dx</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>P</mi><mi>FA</mi></msub></mrow></math>
wherein, PFATolerable false alarm probabilities;
Figure BDA0000042229660000033
(x) Is a chi with a degree of freedom of n-42A probability density function of the distribution;
Figure BDA0000042229660000034
statistical summary of residual statistical sum of squares less than threshold TRate;
in the formula:
<math><mrow><mi>SSE</mi><mo>=</mo><msup><mi>v</mi><mi>T</mi></msup><mi>Wv</mi><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow></math>
v=(I-G(GTWG)-1GTW)ε
g is a linearization matrix formed by cosine vectors from each satellite to the receiver, epsilon is a pseudo-range error vector, W is an n multiplied by n dimensional observation pseudo-range weight matrix, and I is a unit matrix;
suppose that the ith satellite has a fault with a bias of biSSE obeys a decentralization of x with a degree of freedom of n-42The distribution, non-center parameter λ, can be obtained by:
<math><mrow><mi>&lambda;</mi><mo>=</mo><mi>E</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><msup><mi>v</mi><mi>T</mi></msup><mi>Wv</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>=</mo><msubsup><mi>RPE</mi><mi>i</mi><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><msubsup><mi>&delta;HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow></math>
wherein,
RPE i = ( A 1 i 2 + A 2 i 2 ) W ii 2 b i
<math><mrow><mi>&delta;</mi><msub><mi>HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi></msub><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi></msub><mo>-</mo><mi>HDOP</mi><mo>=</mo><mfrac><mrow><msubsup><mi>A</mi><mrow><mn>1</mn><mi>i</mi></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>+</mo><msubsup><mi>A</mi><mrow><mn>2</mn><mi>i</mi></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow><msub><mi>Q</mi><msub><mi>v</mi><mi>ii</mi></msub></msub></mfrac></mrow></math>
A=(GTWG)-1GT
Qv=W-1-G(GTWG)-1GT
HDOP denotes the horizontal positioning accuracy factor, HDOP, of all satellites in viewiRepresenting the horizontal positioning accuracy factor after the ith satellite is removed;
calculating delta HDOPmax
Before fault detection, HDOP corresponding to each satellite is calculated in real timeiRemoving and taking the maximum value of delta HDOPmax
Calculating a horizontal positioning error protection limit value HPL, wherein the formula is as follows;
<math><mrow><mi>HPL</mi><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>&delta;HDOP</mi><mi>max</mi></msub><mo>&times;</mo><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn></msub><mo>&times;</mo><msqrt><mi>&lambda;</mi></msqrt></mrow></math>
comparing the HPL with a horizontal error protection limit value HAL, if the HPL is out of limit, the fault detection is unavailable, and the system gives an integrity alarm, otherwise, the system continues to give an alarm;
3) fault determination
By error of actual observed pseudo-rangeVariance (variance)
Figure BDA0000042229660000042
With the fault detection threshold value sigma obtained in step 2)TCompare if, if
Figure BDA0000042229660000043
If the fault is detected, the work is continued, otherwise, the work is finished;
4) identifying and troubleshooting satellites
4.1) judging the number of the visible satellites, if the number of the visible satellites is less than N +4, fault identification cannot be carried out, and the system carries out integrity alarm, otherwise, the system continues to carry out;
4.2) identifying a fault satellite: the identification of the fault satellite adopts a characteristic line deviation method, firstly, an observation coefficient matrix G is subjected to QR decomposition to obtain a matrix QT
Q T = Q X Q P
Wherein Q isXIs QTFirst 4 rows, QPIs QTThe remaining n-4 rows;
the parity residual vector p is p ═ QPy=QP(Gx+ε)=QPε
Calculating the characteristic deviation line K of each satellitecha
K cha = Q p ( 1 , i ) Q p ( 2 , i )
Computing a characteristic deviation slope K for an odd-even space vectorp
Kp=p1/p2
Wherein p is1And p2Is an element of the parity vector p if K of the ith satellitechaAnd KpVery close, the ith satellite is identified as the failed satellite;
4.3) troubleshooting the satellite: removing the fault satellite identified in the substep 4.2);
5) repeating the steps 1) to 4);
6) and (3) repeating the step 2) and the step 3), if no fault exists, the satellite with the fault is successfully eliminated, the work is finished, otherwise, the measured data cannot be tested for the self-integrity, and the system gives an integrity alarm.
The fault identification method of the multi-constellation combined navigation system can monitor and identify faults of a plurality of satellites at the same time, greatly improves the success rate of identifying and eliminating the fault satellites through unified and multiple detection and judgment of time and space coordinates of the multi-constellation system, and enhances the navigation positioning precision, positioning performance and reliability of the multi-constellation combined navigation system, thereby improving the navigation service performance.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a general flowchart of a fault identification method of a multi-constellation combined navigation system according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
FIG. 1 is a general flowchart of a fault identification method of a multi-constellation combined navigation system according to the present invention
As shown in fig. 1, the method comprises the steps of:
step S1, unifying the time and space coordinates of the multi-constellation system, and unifying the time and space coordinates of the multi-constellation system for the observation data from a plurality of different constellations, so as to ensure the accuracy of the system in resolving the data and ensure the success rate of identifying and removing the fault satellite. The method comprises the following two sub-steps:
and step S1.1, unifying the multi-constellation system, roughly resolving the system time of different constellations according to the fixed conversion relation between the system time of each constellation and the UTC, and unifying the system time of all the constellation systems.
Clock difference between system time of each constellation and UTC
Figure BDA0000042229660000051
The following pseudo-range observation equation gives:
<math><mrow><msubsup><mi>&rho;</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>=</mo><mrow><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>X</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>y</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Y</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>z</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Z</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>]</mo></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup><mo>+</mo><mi>c&delta;</mi><msubsup><mi>T</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup></mrow></mrow></math>
<math><mrow><mi>&delta;</mi><msubsup><mi>T</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>=</mo><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>X</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>y</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Y</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>z</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Z</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>]</mo></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>&rho;</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>]</mo><mo>/</mo><mi>c</mi></mrow></math>
wherein, the superscript g represents a system serial number, i is an observation serial number (i is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); (X, y, z) is the coordinates of the receiver in the selected coordinate system, (X)g,Yg,Zg) Converting the observation satellites in each constellation to coordinates under a selected coordinate system by using a coordinate conversion formula;
Figure BDA0000042229660000054
is the clock difference (r ═ 1, 2.. N) between the receiver and each constellation,is a pseudo range observation value of each visible satellite, and c is the speed of light;
for N constellations, the receiver has N +3 unknowns to be measured, and needs N +3 pseudo-range observation equations to solve to obtain the clock error between the system time and the UTC of each constellation
Figure BDA0000042229660000056
And step S1.2, unifying the space coordinates of multiple constellations, wherein a unified coordinate system is needed for simultaneously processing the observation data of different constellations. Coordinates of all constellations are unified under a coordinate system, and coordinate conversion is needed, in the embodiment, the coordinate conversion adopts a classical burst-Wolf model, and the formula is as follows:
<math><mrow><msub><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mrow><mi>sys</mi><mn>1</mn></mrow></msub><mo>=</mo><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mo>+</mo><mrow><mo>(</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>+</mo><mi>m</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>z</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>y</mi></msub></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>z</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>x</mi></msub><mi></mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>y</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>x</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><msub><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mi>sys</mi></msub></mrow></math>
wherein (Δ x, Δ y, Δ z) is the earth center offset, θx,θy,θzRotation angle of coordinate axis, m is scale factor, (x, y, z)sysTo be the coordinates in the coordinate system to be transformed, (x, y, z)sys1Are the coordinates of the target coordinate system.
Through the step S1, all the observation data can be unified to the same time and space coordinate system, thereby shielding the multiple constellation differences.
Step S2, determining availability for fault detection, wherein the determination of availability for fault detection before fault determination is required after the system completion and the spatial coordinates unification of step S1, and the method includes the following two sub-steps:
step S2.1, firstly, judging the number of the visible satellites, if the number of the visible satellites is less than N +3, indicating that fault detection cannot be carried out, carrying out integrity alarm by the system, and if the number of the visible satellites is more than or equal to N +3, continuously executing step S2.2;
step S2.2, availability determination, failure detection availability determination, first of all, the failure detection threshold value sigma is foundTThe formula is as follows:
<math><mrow><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mi>T</mi></msub><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn></msub><mo>&times;</mo><mi>T</mi><mo>/</mo><msqrt><mi>n</mi><mo>-</mo><mn>4</mn></msqrt></mrow></math>
wherein σ0Is the variance value of the pseudo-range measurement error; n is the number of visible satellites; the threshold value T is determined by:
<math><mrow><mi>Pr</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>SSE</mi><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>&lt;</mo><msup><mi>T</mi><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mo>=</mo><msubsup><mo>&Integral;</mo><mn>0</mn><msup><mi>T</mi><mn>2</mn></msup></msubsup><msub><mi>f</mi><msubsup><mi>&chi;</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>n</mi><mo>-</mo><mn>4</mn><mo>,</mo><mi>&lambda;</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup></msub><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mi>dx</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>P</mi><mi>FA</mi></msub></mrow></math>
wherein, PFATolerable false alarm probabilities;
Figure BDA0000042229660000064
is a chi with a degree of freedom of n-42A probability density function of the distribution;
Figure BDA0000042229660000065
is the statistical probability that the sum of the squared residuals is less than the threshold value T.
In the formula:
<math><mrow><mi>SSE</mi><mo>=</mo><msup><mi>v</mi><mi>T</mi></msup><mi>Wv</mi><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow></math>
v=(I-G(GTWG)-1GTW)ε
wherein G is a linearization matrix formed by cosine vectors of directions from each satellite to the receiver, epsilon is a pseudo-range error vector, W is an n multiplied by n dimensional observation pseudo-range weight matrix, and I is a unit matrix.
Suppose that the ith satellite has a fault with a bias of biSSE obeys a decentralization of x with a degree of freedom of n-42The distribution, non-center parameter λ, can be obtained by:
<math><mrow><mi>&lambda;</mi><mo>=</mo><mi>E</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><msup><mi>v</mi><mi>T</mi></msup><mi>Wv</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>=</mo><msubsup><mi>RPE</mi><mi>i</mi><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><msubsup><mi>&delta;HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow></math>
wherein,
RPE i = ( A 1 i 2 + A 2 i 2 ) W ii 2 b i
<math><mrow><mi>&delta;</mi><msub><mi>HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi></msub><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi></msub><mo>-</mo><mi>HDOP</mi><mo>=</mo><mfrac><mrow><msubsup><mi>A</mi><mrow><mn>1</mn><mi>i</mi></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>+</mo><msubsup><mi>A</mi><mrow><mn>2</mn><mi>i</mi></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow><msub><mi>Q</mi><msub><mi>v</mi><mi>ii</mi></msub></msub></mfrac></mrow></math>
A=(GTWG)-1GT
Qv=W-1-G(GTWG)-1GT
HDOP denotes the horizontal positioning accuracy factor, HDOP, of all satellites in viewiIndicating the horizontal positioning accuracy factor after the ith satellite is removed.
Calculating delta HDOPmax
Before fault detection, HDOP corresponding to each satellite is calculated in real timeiRemoving and taking the maximum value of delta HDOPmax
Calculating a horizontal positioning error protection limit value HPL, wherein the formula is as follows;
<math><mrow><mi>HPL</mi><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>&delta;HDOP</mi><mi>max</mi></msub><mo>&times;</mo><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn></msub><mo>&times;</mo><msqrt><mi>&lambda;</mi></msqrt></mrow></math>
the horizontal positioning error protection limit HPL is compared with the horizontal error protection limit HAL, and if the limit is exceeded, the fault detection is not available and the system gives an integrity alarm, otherwise it continues with step S3.
Step S3, failure determination, variance of error of actual observed pseudo-range
Figure BDA0000042229660000075
σ is performed with the failure detection threshold value obtained in step S2TCompare if, if
Figure BDA0000042229660000076
It indicates that a fault is detected and execution continues at step S4, otherwise the operation ends.
Step S4, identifying and eliminating the failed satellite, when the existence of the failed satellite is detected in step S3, the identification and elimination of the failed satellite are carried out, and the method comprises the following 3 substeps:
and S4.1, firstly, judging the number of the visible satellites, if the number of the visible satellites is less than N +4, failure identification cannot be carried out, carrying out integrity alarm by the system, and if the number of the visible satellites is more than or equal to N +4, continuously executing the step S4.2.
Step S4.2, identifying the fault satellite by using a characteristic line deviation method, and firstly, carrying out QR decomposition on an observation coefficient matrix G to obtain a matrix QT
Q T = Q X Q P
Wherein Q isXIs QTFirst 4 rows, QPIs QTThe remaining n-4 rows;
the parity residual vector p is p ═ QPy=QP(Gx+ε)=QPε
Each time of calculationCharacteristic deviation line K of particle satellitecha
K cha = Q p ( 1 , i ) Q p ( 2 , i )
Computing a characteristic deviation slope K for an odd-even space vectorp
Kp=p1/p2
Wherein p is1And p2Is an element of the parity vector p if K of the ith satellitechaAnd KpVery close, the ith satellite is identified as the failed satellite.
And (4.3) removing the fault satellite: the faulty satellite identified in substep S4.2 is rejected.
In order to ensure the success rate of identifying and eliminating the fault satellite of the fault identification method of the multi-constellation combined navigation system, multiple identifications and judgments are needed for eliminating multiple fault satellites.
And step S5, repeating the steps S1 to S4, and identifying and eliminating the fault satellite still existing. The step S1 is repeated to prevent clock difference between the system time of each constellation and UTC
Figure BDA0000042229660000082
And when new changes exist, unifying the re-read observation data of each constellation to a new same time and space coordinate system, and realizing shielding of the difference of the plurality of constellations again.
Repeating the step S2 and the step S3, if the judgment result shows that no fault exists, the fault star is proved to be successfully eliminated, and the work is finished; if there is still a fault, step S4 is continued to identify and eliminate the faulty satellite.
And S6, repeating the steps S2 and S3, if no fault is judged, proving that the fault satellite is successfully eliminated and the work is finished, otherwise, the fault satellite cannot be eliminated again due to the limitation of the prior art, so that the measured data cannot be subjected to the autonomous integrity test, and the system gives an integrity alarm.
In summary, the embodiments of the present invention disclose preferred embodiments thereof, but are not limited thereto. Those skilled in the art can easily appreciate the spirit of the present invention from the above-mentioned embodiments, and make various extensions and changes, which are within the protection scope of the present invention, without departing from the spirit of the present invention.

Claims (1)

1. A fault identification method of a multi-constellation combined navigation system is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) unification of time and space coordinates for multi-constellation systems
1.1) unification in a multi-constellation system: according to the fixed conversion relation between the system time of each constellation and the UTC, roughly resolving the system times of different constellations, and unifying the system times of all the constellation systems;
clock difference between system time of each constellation and UTC
Figure FDA0000042229650000011
The following pseudo-range observation equation gives:
<math><mrow><msubsup><mi>&rho;</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>=</mo><mrow><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>X</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>y</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Y</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>z</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Z</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>]</mo></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup><mo>+</mo><mi>c&delta;</mi><msubsup><mi>T</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup></mrow></mrow></math>
<math><mrow><mi>&delta;</mi><msubsup><mi>T</mi><mi>r</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>=</mo><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>[</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>X</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>y</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Y</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>+</mo><msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>z</mi><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>Z</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>]</mo></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mn>2</mn></mrow></msup><mo>-</mo><msubsup><mi>&rho;</mi><mi>i</mi><mi>g</mi></msubsup><mo>]</mo><mo>/</mo><mi>c</mi></mrow></math>
wherein, the superscript g represents a system serial number, i is an observation serial number (i is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); (X, y, z) is the coordinates of the receiver in the selected coordinate system, (X)g,Yg,Zg) For transforming the observation satellites in each constellation to the selected coordinate system by using a coordinate transformation formulaCoordinates;
Figure FDA0000042229650000014
is the clock difference (r ═ 1, 2.. N) between the receiver and each constellation,
Figure FDA0000042229650000015
is a pseudo range observation value of each visible satellite, and c is the speed of light;
for N constellations, the receiver has N +3 unknowns to be measured, and needs N +3 pseudo-range observation equations to solve to obtain the clock error between the system time and the UTC of each constellation
Figure FDA0000042229650000016
1.2) unifying the spatial coordinates of multiple constellations
The unification of the space coordinates is completed by adopting the following coordinate conversion formula:
<math><mrow><msub><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mrow><mi>sys</mi><mn>1</mn></mrow></msub><mo>=</mo><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>&Delta;z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mo>+</mo><mrow><mo>(</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>+</mo><mi>m</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>z</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>y</mi></msub></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>z</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>x</mi></msub><mi></mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>y</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><msub><mi>&theta;</mi><mi>x</mi></msub></mtd><mtd><mn>1</mn></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><msub><mfenced open='[' close=']'><mtable><mtr><mtd><mi>x</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>y</mi></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd><mi>z</mi></mtd></mtr></mtable></mfenced><mi>sys</mi></msub></mrow></math>
wherein (Δ x, Δ y, Δ z) is the earth center offset, θx,θy,θzRotation angle of coordinate axis, m is scale factor, (x, y, z)sysTo be the coordinates in the coordinate system to be transformed, (x, y, z)sys1Coordinates of a target coordinate system;
2) fault detection availability determination
2.1) judging the number of the visible satellites, if the number of the visible satellites is less than N +3, indicating that fault detection cannot be carried out, carrying out integrity alarm by the system, and otherwise, continuing;
2.2) availability determination:
firstly, a fault detection threshold value sigma is calculatedTThe formula is as follows:
<math><mrow><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mi>T</mi></msub><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn></msub><mo>&times;</mo><mi>T</mi><mo>/</mo><msqrt><mi>n</mi><mo>-</mo><mn>4</mn></msqrt></mrow></math>
wherein σ0Is the variance value of the pseudo-range measurement error; n is the number of visible satellites; the threshold value T is determined by:
<math><mrow><mi>Pr</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>SSE</mi><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>&lt;</mo><msup><mi>T</mi><mn>2</mn></msup><mo>)</mo></mrow><mo>=</mo><msubsup><mo>&Integral;</mo><mn>0</mn><msup><mi>T</mi><mn>2</mn></msup></msubsup><msub><mi>f</mi><msubsup><mi>&chi;</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>n</mi><mo>-</mo><mn>4</mn><mo>,</mo><mi>&lambda;</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup></msub><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>x</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mi>dx</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>-</mo><msub><mi>P</mi><mi>FA</mi></msub></mrow></math>
wherein, PFATolerable false alarm probabilities;
Figure FDA0000042229650000022
is a chi with a degree of freedom of n-42A probability density function of the distribution;
Figure FDA0000042229650000023
the statistical probability that the sum of the squares of the residual errors is smaller than a threshold value T is obtained;
in the formula:
<math><mrow><mi>SSE</mi><mo>=</mo><msup><mi>v</mi><mi>T</mi></msup><mi>Wv</mi><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow></math>
v=(I-G(GTWG)-1GTW)ε
g is a linearization matrix formed by cosine vectors from each satellite to the receiver, epsilon is a pseudo-range error vector, W is an n multiplied by n dimensional observation pseudo-range weight matrix, and I is a unit matrix;
suppose that the ith satellite has a fault with a bias of biSSE obeys a decentralization of x with a degree of freedom of n-42The distribution, non-center parameter λ, can be obtained by:
<math><mrow><mi>&lambda;</mi><mo>=</mo><mi>E</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><msup><mi>v</mi><mi>T</mi></msup><mi>Wv</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>=</mo><msubsup><mi>RPE</mi><mi>i</mi><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>/</mo><msubsup><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn><mn>2</mn></msubsup><msubsup><mi>&delta;HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow></math>
wherein,
RPE i = ( A 1 i 2 + A 2 i 2 ) W ii 2 b i
<math><mrow><mi>&delta;</mi><msub><mi>HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi></msub><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>HDOP</mi><mi>i</mi></msub><mo>-</mo><mi>HDOP</mi><mo>=</mo><mfrac><mrow><msubsup><mi>A</mi><mrow><mn>1</mn><mi>i</mi></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup><mo>+</mo><msubsup><mi>A</mi><mrow><mn>2</mn><mi>i</mi></mrow><mn>2</mn></msubsup></mrow><msub><mi>Q</mi><msub><mi>v</mi><mi>ii</mi></msub></msub></mfrac></mrow></math>
A=(GTWG)-1GT
Qv=W-1-G(GTWG)-1GT
HDOP denotes the horizontal positioning accuracy factor, HDOP, of all satellites in viewiRepresenting the horizontal positioning accuracy factor after the ith satellite is removed;
calculating delta HDOPmax
Before fault detection, HDOP corresponding to each satellite is calculated in real timeiRemoving and taking the maximum value of delta HDOPmax
Calculating a horizontal positioning error protection limit value HPL, wherein the formula is as follows;
<math><mrow><mi>HPL</mi><mo>=</mo><msub><mi>&delta;HDOP</mi><mi>max</mi></msub><mo>&times;</mo><msub><mi>&sigma;</mi><mn>0</mn></msub><mo>&times;</mo><msqrt><mi>&lambda;</mi></msqrt></mrow></math>
comparing the HPL with a horizontal error protection limit value HAL, if the HPL is out of limit, the fault detection is unavailable, and the system gives an integrity alarm, otherwise, the system continues to give an alarm;
3) fault determination
Variance of error of actual observed pseudo range
Figure FDA0000042229650000031
With the fault detection threshold value sigma obtained in step 2)TCompare if, if
Figure FDA0000042229650000032
If the fault is detected, the work is continued, otherwise, the work is finished;
4) identifying and troubleshooting satellites
4.1) judging the number of the visible satellites, if the number of the visible satellites is less than N +4, fault identification cannot be carried out, and the system carries out integrity alarm, otherwise, the system continues to carry out;
4.2) identifying a fault satellite: the identification of the fault satellite adopts a characteristic line deviation method, firstly, an observation coefficient matrix G is subjected to QR decomposition to obtain a matrix QT
Q T = Q X Q P
Wherein Q isXIs QTFirst 4 rows, QPIs QTThe remaining n-4 rows;
the parity residual vector p is p ═ QPy=QP(Gx+ε)=QPε
Calculating the characteristic deviation line K of each satellitecha
K cha = Q p ( 1 , i ) Q p ( 2 , i )
Computing a characteristic deviation slope K for an odd-even space vectorp
Kp=p1/p2
Wherein p is1And p2Is an element of the parity vector p if K of the ith satellitechaAnd KpVery close, the ith satellite is identified as the failed satellite;
4.3) troubleshooting the satellite: removing the fault satellite identified in the substep 4.2);
5) repeating the steps 1) to 4);
6) and (3) repeating the step 2) and the step 3), if no fault exists, the satellite with the fault is successfully eliminated, the work is finished, otherwise, the measured data cannot be tested for the self-integrity, and the system gives an integrity alarm.
CN 201010617250 2010-12-31 2010-12-31 Fault recognition method for multi-constellation integrated navigation system Active CN102135621B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN 201010617250 CN102135621B (en) 2010-12-31 2010-12-31 Fault recognition method for multi-constellation integrated navigation system

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN 201010617250 CN102135621B (en) 2010-12-31 2010-12-31 Fault recognition method for multi-constellation integrated navigation system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN102135621A true CN102135621A (en) 2011-07-27
CN102135621B CN102135621B (en) 2013-01-23

Family

ID=44295459

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN 201010617250 Active CN102135621B (en) 2010-12-31 2010-12-31 Fault recognition method for multi-constellation integrated navigation system

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN102135621B (en)

Cited By (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102654407A (en) * 2012-04-17 2012-09-05 南京航空航天大学 Multiple-fault detecting device and detecting method for tightly-integrated inertial satellite navigation system
CN104199051A (en) * 2014-09-26 2014-12-10 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 Method for detecting and identifying satellite navigation RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) multi-satellite faults
CN104267410A (en) * 2014-10-10 2015-01-07 北京航空航天大学 Method and device for excluding multiple faults in airborne integrity monitoring
CN104483678A (en) * 2014-12-04 2015-04-01 北京航空航天大学 Air-ground coordinated multi-constellation satellite navigation integrity multi-stage monitoring method
CN104048675B (en) * 2014-06-26 2017-01-11 东南大学 Integrated navigation system fault diagnosis method based on Gaussian process regression
CN110749790A (en) * 2019-10-21 2020-02-04 中国科学院微小卫星创新研究院 Comprehensive test fault positioning method
CN112953619A (en) * 2018-12-25 2021-06-11 长沙天仪空间科技研究院有限公司 Satellite communication system and method
CN113341438A (en) * 2021-06-02 2021-09-03 成都天奥信息科技有限公司 Multi-satellite fault identification method and system based on gross error inverse solution
CN112946692B (en) * 2021-02-03 2023-09-26 中国人民解放军61540部队 Method and system for monitoring space reference deviation of satellite navigation system
CN118244302A (en) * 2024-05-28 2024-06-25 辽宁天衡智通防务科技有限公司 Navigation enhancement method based on double-star fault detection

Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6847893B1 (en) * 2003-01-22 2005-01-25 Trimble Navigation, Ltd Horizontal/vertical exclusion level determination scheme for RAIM fault detection and exclusion implementation
CN101281248A (en) * 2008-05-20 2008-10-08 北京航空航天大学 A Multiple Fault Identification Method Applied to Integrated Satellite Navigation System
US20100033370A1 (en) * 2003-12-02 2010-02-11 Gmv Aerospace And Defence, S.A. Gnss navigation solution integrity in non-controlled environments
CN101776762A (en) * 2009-12-30 2010-07-14 北京航空航天大学 Completeness monitoring method, device and system based on multi-foundation enhancement system
CN101806903A (en) * 2010-04-01 2010-08-18 北京航空航天大学 Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) method used for satellite navigation system
CN101833101A (en) * 2010-05-05 2010-09-15 北京航空航天大学 Completeness or adequateness monitoring method and device based on local area augmentation system (LAAS)

Patent Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6847893B1 (en) * 2003-01-22 2005-01-25 Trimble Navigation, Ltd Horizontal/vertical exclusion level determination scheme for RAIM fault detection and exclusion implementation
US20100033370A1 (en) * 2003-12-02 2010-02-11 Gmv Aerospace And Defence, S.A. Gnss navigation solution integrity in non-controlled environments
CN101281248A (en) * 2008-05-20 2008-10-08 北京航空航天大学 A Multiple Fault Identification Method Applied to Integrated Satellite Navigation System
CN101776762A (en) * 2009-12-30 2010-07-14 北京航空航天大学 Completeness monitoring method, device and system based on multi-foundation enhancement system
CN101806903A (en) * 2010-04-01 2010-08-18 北京航空航天大学 Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) method used for satellite navigation system
CN101833101A (en) * 2010-05-05 2010-09-15 北京航空航天大学 Completeness or adequateness monitoring method and device based on local area augmentation system (LAAS)

Non-Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
《测绘通报》 20070831 李飞等 GNSS接收机自主完好性监测算法研究 全文 1 , 第08期 *
《电子测量技术》 20071031 廉保旺等 GPS自主完整性监测算法研究 全文 1 第30卷, 第10期 *
廉保旺等: "GPS自主完整性监测算法研究", 《电子测量技术》, vol. 30, no. 10, 31 October 2007 (2007-10-31) *
李飞等: "GNSS接收机自主完好性监测算法研究", 《测绘通报》, no. 08, 31 August 2007 (2007-08-31) *

Cited By (15)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102654407B (en) * 2012-04-17 2014-07-02 南京航空航天大学 Multiple-fault detecting device and detecting method for tightly-integrated inertial satellite navigation system
CN102654407A (en) * 2012-04-17 2012-09-05 南京航空航天大学 Multiple-fault detecting device and detecting method for tightly-integrated inertial satellite navigation system
CN104048675B (en) * 2014-06-26 2017-01-11 东南大学 Integrated navigation system fault diagnosis method based on Gaussian process regression
CN104199051A (en) * 2014-09-26 2014-12-10 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 Method for detecting and identifying satellite navigation RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) multi-satellite faults
CN104199051B (en) * 2014-09-26 2017-01-11 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 Method for detecting and identifying satellite navigation RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) multi-satellite faults
CN104267410A (en) * 2014-10-10 2015-01-07 北京航空航天大学 Method and device for excluding multiple faults in airborne integrity monitoring
CN104483678A (en) * 2014-12-04 2015-04-01 北京航空航天大学 Air-ground coordinated multi-constellation satellite navigation integrity multi-stage monitoring method
CN104483678B (en) * 2014-12-04 2017-03-01 北京航空航天大学 A kind of many constellations satellite navigation integrity multistage monitoring method of air-ground coordination
CN112953619A (en) * 2018-12-25 2021-06-11 长沙天仪空间科技研究院有限公司 Satellite communication system and method
CN112953619B (en) * 2018-12-25 2022-07-29 长沙天仪空间科技研究院有限公司 Satellite communication system and method
CN110749790A (en) * 2019-10-21 2020-02-04 中国科学院微小卫星创新研究院 Comprehensive test fault positioning method
CN112946692B (en) * 2021-02-03 2023-09-26 中国人民解放军61540部队 Method and system for monitoring space reference deviation of satellite navigation system
CN113341438A (en) * 2021-06-02 2021-09-03 成都天奥信息科技有限公司 Multi-satellite fault identification method and system based on gross error inverse solution
CN118244302A (en) * 2024-05-28 2024-06-25 辽宁天衡智通防务科技有限公司 Navigation enhancement method based on double-star fault detection
CN118244302B (en) * 2024-05-28 2024-07-19 辽宁天衡智通防务科技有限公司 Navigation enhancement method based on double-star fault detection

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN102135621B (en) 2013-01-23

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN102135621B (en) Fault recognition method for multi-constellation integrated navigation system
CN110007317B (en) Star-selection optimized advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring method
CN114545454B (en) Integrity monitoring method of fusion navigation system for automatic driving
CN101833101B (en) Completeness or adequateness monitoring method and device based on local area augmentation system (LAAS)
CN102654407B (en) Multiple-fault detecting device and detecting method for tightly-integrated inertial satellite navigation system
CN103592656B (en) A kind of Autonomous Integrity Monitoring method being applicable to satellite-based navigation receiver
EP2598912B1 (en) Method for determining a protection space in the event of two simultaneous satellite failures
EP3690734A1 (en) High-integrity optical pose estimation using coded features
CN105487088B (en) RAIM algorithms based on Kalman filtering in a kind of satellite navigation system
WO2013003662A2 (en) System and method for wireless collaborative verification of global navigation satellite system measurements
CN114325767B (en) A method and device for detecting spoofing signals based on pseudo-range rate of Beidou satellite navigation system
CN112230247B (en) A GNSS Integrity Monitoring Method for Urban Complex Environment
US20090182495A1 (en) Navigation system with apparatus for detecting accuracy failures
CN101950026B (en) Measured value quality monitoring method applied to local area augmentation system
CN115236700A (en) Factor graph navigation fault detection method based on satellite pseudo-range
CN106443577A (en) Multi-path error detection and elimination method in allusion to inter-satellite radio frequency relative measurement
CN115420284A (en) A fault detection and identification method for an integrated navigation system
CN120153289A (en) System and method for delimiting satellite positioning solution integrity
CN115327590B (en) Protection level correction method, calculation device and storage medium for positioning terminal
CN118566956A (en) Robust positioning method considering correlation between satellites
CN112083463B (en) Method and device for detecting whether ambiguity is fixed correctly and positioning terminal
CN112835079B (en) GNSS self-adaptive weighted positioning method based on edge sampling consistency
CN116736339B (en) Beidou autonomous monitoring and early warning method for control of forbidden navigation areas
CN104965209A (en) Method, device and system for calculating actual navigation performance
CN112526549B (en) Integrity fault identification method and system for ground enhancement system

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
C06 Publication
PB01 Publication
C10 Entry into substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
C14 Grant of patent or utility model
GR01 Patent grant