CA2354391A1 - Method of performing a base station challenge in a cellular telecommunications network - Google Patents
Method of performing a base station challenge in a cellular telecommunications network Download PDFInfo
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- CA2354391A1 CA2354391A1 CA002354391A CA2354391A CA2354391A1 CA 2354391 A1 CA2354391 A1 CA 2354391A1 CA 002354391 A CA002354391 A CA 002354391A CA 2354391 A CA2354391 A CA 2354391A CA 2354391 A1 CA2354391 A1 CA 2354391A1
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 34
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 title claims description 31
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 9
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000010367 cloning Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 241001327708 Coriaria sarmentosa Species 0.000 description 1
- 101001121408 Homo sapiens L-amino-acid oxidase Proteins 0.000 description 1
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- 241000120020 Tela Species 0.000 description 1
- CCAZWUJBLXKBAY-ULZPOIKGSA-N Tutin Chemical compound C([C@]12[C@@H]3O[C@@H]3[C@@]3(O)[C@H]4C(=O)O[C@@H]([C@H]([C@]32C)O)[C@H]4C(=C)C)O1 CCAZWUJBLXKBAY-ULZPOIKGSA-N 0.000 description 1
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- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/062—Pre-authentication
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a method for performing base station challenge. The method has steps of sending a base station challenge message (40) from a mobile station (16) to an anchor exchange (12A). The anchor exchange receives the base station challenge message, and performs the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result. Then, the anchor exchange forwards the authentication result (44) to the mobile station through a serving exchange (125).
Description
w0 OQ~352 ! 5 PCTiS f 99IOZ098 METHOD OF PERFORMING A SwSE STATION CHALLENGE IN A
CELLULwR TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
BACKGROT~ND OF THE MENTION
Technical Field oyt~e_~nver~,cion This invention relates to a method of perfornting a base station ch311enge, and more particularly to a mzthod of performing a base station challenge in a c211ular 1 D telecommunications network-DesctiptiQ~a of l~tela~ed Art Ewer since their introduction on the market, mobile stations have changed the way people communicate. Now, it is possible to teach a person almost anywhere, using only one number. The number is no loszgcr linked to a lacatioss, but is rather linked to a mobile staraon ~. S that communicates through a radio interface wish a cellular network. Sa wherever the mobile station is located, i.e. within the cellular network coverage, it cart originate or receive a call by means of the radio interface. For originating a call through the czllular network, the mobile station has to identify itselfby providing its Mobile Identification Number (MII~ and Electronic Serial Number (ESN). The MIN/ESN allows the cellular network to recognize z o which mobile station is calling, so to charge fees incurred for the rah appropriately.
A problem that has emerged with the ever-mcreasirag popularity of mobile stations is the cloning. The cloning ~s pe=formed by "listening" to the radio interface to find a MINIESN, and pmgrarnming a second mobile station with the, same M1N/ESN. By doing so, the fees incurred for calls originated by the second mobile station are charged to the first 25 mobile station_ This method of fraud has caused important financial damages to cellular network providers and to owners of mobile stations.
To solve that problem, the security of cellular networks has been improved with authentication procedures to which the mobile stations must participate. In D-AMPS
networks, different authentication procedures have been developed. Among others, there are 3 0 the Global Challenge, the Unique Challenge, the Shared Secret Data Update, the Base Station ['klal(enge, and the Count Update. These authentication procedures rely on using an w0 QQ/35'_ I
PCT/S!'99i02u9$
CELLULwR TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
BACKGROT~ND OF THE MENTION
Technical Field oyt~e_~nver~,cion This invention relates to a method of perfornting a base station ch311enge, and more particularly to a mzthod of performing a base station challenge in a c211ular 1 D telecommunications network-DesctiptiQ~a of l~tela~ed Art Ewer since their introduction on the market, mobile stations have changed the way people communicate. Now, it is possible to teach a person almost anywhere, using only one number. The number is no loszgcr linked to a lacatioss, but is rather linked to a mobile staraon ~. S that communicates through a radio interface wish a cellular network. Sa wherever the mobile station is located, i.e. within the cellular network coverage, it cart originate or receive a call by means of the radio interface. For originating a call through the czllular network, the mobile station has to identify itselfby providing its Mobile Identification Number (MII~ and Electronic Serial Number (ESN). The MIN/ESN allows the cellular network to recognize z o which mobile station is calling, so to charge fees incurred for the rah appropriately.
A problem that has emerged with the ever-mcreasirag popularity of mobile stations is the cloning. The cloning ~s pe=formed by "listening" to the radio interface to find a MINIESN, and pmgrarnming a second mobile station with the, same M1N/ESN. By doing so, the fees incurred for calls originated by the second mobile station are charged to the first 25 mobile station_ This method of fraud has caused important financial damages to cellular network providers and to owners of mobile stations.
To solve that problem, the security of cellular networks has been improved with authentication procedures to which the mobile stations must participate. In D-AMPS
networks, different authentication procedures have been developed. Among others, there are 3 0 the Global Challenge, the Unique Challenge, the Shared Secret Data Update, the Base Station ['klal(enge, and the Count Update. These authentication procedures rely on using an w0 QQ/35'_ I
PCT/S!'99i02u9$
-2-algorithm c311ed CAVE, and in an exchange of parameters betwren the mobile station and an invoIvcd node (i.e. Authentication Center or Visited j_ocation Register) of the network.
More particularly, the bast station challenge is used to verify the validity of a Shared Secret Data ($Sh) Update Request. When the mobile station receives a SSD
Update Request, ii sends a base station challenge order with a random number (R.ANDBS) to the base station 1 o to verify the validity of the request_ The base station forwards the base station challenge to the authentication ccntcr, which calculates tht propzr answer (ALlTtiBS) to the challenge.
The authentication center returns the AUTUDS to the Ease Station as the answer io the base station challenge, and the base station forwards it to the mobile station. 'me mobile station accepts the base station challenge and proceeds with the SSD update if the AUTHBS
15 returned corresponds to what it has internally calculated.
However, it has been noticed that when the mobile station is in a serving exchange during the base station challenge, the latter is not completed- The non-completion of the base station challenge either results in allowing a cal l chat may be fraudulent or bamng a call of a legitimate mobile station. Therefore, formabile station users, noncompletion ofbase station 2 o challcttge is not desirable.
In order to overcome the disadvanca.,ge ofexiscing solutions, it would be advantageous to have a method of perforrt~ing a base station challenge that would be supported iss all situations, including when the mobile stations is irs a serving exchange.
~ 5 SUMMARY C1F THE INVENTION
The prcscttt invrnuon pmvidcs a method and a network to pctforrrc a bast station challenge.
In otte aspect, the present invention is a method of perfoiZtting $ base station challertgc. The method scads a base station challenge message from a mobile station to an
More particularly, the bast station challenge is used to verify the validity of a Shared Secret Data ($Sh) Update Request. When the mobile station receives a SSD
Update Request, ii sends a base station challenge order with a random number (R.ANDBS) to the base station 1 o to verify the validity of the request_ The base station forwards the base station challenge to the authentication ccntcr, which calculates tht propzr answer (ALlTtiBS) to the challenge.
The authentication center returns the AUTUDS to the Ease Station as the answer io the base station challenge, and the base station forwards it to the mobile station. 'me mobile station accepts the base station challenge and proceeds with the SSD update if the AUTHBS
15 returned corresponds to what it has internally calculated.
However, it has been noticed that when the mobile station is in a serving exchange during the base station challenge, the latter is not completed- The non-completion of the base station challenge either results in allowing a cal l chat may be fraudulent or bamng a call of a legitimate mobile station. Therefore, formabile station users, noncompletion ofbase station 2 o challcttge is not desirable.
In order to overcome the disadvanca.,ge ofexiscing solutions, it would be advantageous to have a method of perforrt~ing a base station challenge that would be supported iss all situations, including when the mobile stations is irs a serving exchange.
~ 5 SUMMARY C1F THE INVENTION
The prcscttt invrnuon pmvidcs a method and a network to pctforrrc a bast station challenge.
In otte aspect, the present invention is a method of perfoiZtting $ base station challertgc. The method scads a base station challenge message from a mobile station to an
3 0 anchor exchange. The anchor exchatlgc receives the base station challenge message and performs the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result. The, the anchor exchange forwards the authen~icatiop result to the mobile station thmugh a serving exchange.
In another aspect, the present invention is a cellular telecommunications netw4rk to petfarm a base station challenge. The cehular telccommuttications network has at least one CVO OIIi3531S PC'TiSE99iti2098 mobile station, an anchor exchange and a serving exchange. One of the ai least one mobile station transmits a base station challenge message, and per~oTms the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result. The anchor exchange sends the ~thentication result, which is received by the serving exchange. Then, the salving exchange transmits the authcndcation result to the one of the mobile station.
l0 8Ri>F DESCRIPTION OF THE DRwWINGS
The invention will be better understood and ns numerous objects and advantages wit!
become more apparent to those skilled in the art by fcferrnce to the following drawings, itt conjunction with the accompanying specification, in which:
FIGURE i is a schematic diagram of a cellular teleeotttmuitications network;
FIGURE 2 is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge accordance with a f rst embodiment of the present invention;
FIGURE 3 is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge iii accordapce with a second embodiment of the present invention:
FIGURE ~ Is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge in aecordancc with a third embodiment of the present invention; artd FIGURE 5 is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge in accordance with a fourth embodiment of the present invention.
zs DET~LED DESCRIPTION DF EMI~oDIMZ~NTS
The pcescnt invention relates to a method and to a callular telecommunications network for performing a base station challenge when the mobile station is at one point in a setvtng exchange. For doing so, the invention provides new messages for sending forward or backward either the base station challenge message pr the results of the base staziort 30 challeage_ Therefore, the bast station challenge can always be completed for legitimate mobile stations.
Reference is now made to FIGURE 1 wherein there is shown a schematic diagram of a cellular network 10. In the cellular network 10, a plurality of exchanges, also known as Mobile Switching Center (MSC) 12, are used to route e~lis to artd receive calls froth tnobik W o opi35Z t 5 PcTrs E99io=ties °.5 stations 16. The MSC 12 are sometimes co-located with a Visited Location Register (VLR) i 3 such as shown on the FIGURE but may also be non co-located with a VLR 13.
The mobile stations lb communicate with nearly proximate base stations l4 through a radio interface 22. As knows in the art, severs! mobile stations 1 C can simultaneously communicatz with one base station 14, and several base stations 14 can c6rrtmunicate with lc~ one MSC 1?. Each base station la communicates with the MSC 12 through a pair of signaling and voice links 34. To allow seamless service to a mobile station 16 chat travels from a base station 14 serviced by a first MSC 12A, called Anchor MSC, to a base station 14 serviced by a second MSC 12S, called a Serving MSC, a pair of voice arid signaling links 2b connect the first snd second MSCs 12.
15 The mabilc stations 16 may travel within tttc cellular network and consecutively communicate with different base stations 14. More particularly, when a mobile station 16 iravcls from an arts that is serviced by a first base station 14 to an arts serviced by another base station, the operation of transferring service from the first base station to the second base station is called a hand-off. When the mobile station 16 hands-off from a base station 14 0 Linked to a first MSC 1 ~A to a base station linked co a second MSC 1?S, it then consists of an inter-system band-off.
In the cellular network 10, a Home Location Reyster (HLR) 18 keeps information on subscribers such as location and services subscribed to. The hiLR 18 may consist of a stand-alone HLR, or of a co-located Service Control point (SCP) as shown osi the FIG1;3RE.
2 5 The HLR 18 commutsicates with the VLRs 13 through a signaling link 28.
While the I<iLR
18 stores inforsrtation far all mobile stations 16 subscribed to the cellular netyvork 10, the VLRs 13 in tutu store certain information on mobi le stations 16 communicating through their cooperating (co-located or not) MSC 12.
The cellular network 10 also has an authentication aer<rer 20. The authentication 3 d center eon'tmunicates with the HLR 18 through a signaling link 30. The authentieauon center keeps information on the mobile stations 16 $uch as Shared Secret Data (SSD).
In D-AMPS networks, different authentication procedures are used. Among others, these are the Shared Secret Data Update and the Base Station Challenge. These auther<tication piocedlues rely on using an algorithm called CAVE, and in an exchange of parameters W O OOf33? 1 ~ PCTiS E99ip=09S
between the mobile station and an involved node (i.e. Authentication Center or Visited Location Register) of the network. The Shared Secret Data Update is generated by the Authentication Centet 20 to modify the value of the Shared Secret Data shared by the Authentication Censer Z0, the VLR 13 and the mobile station 14. Upon completion of the Shared Secret Data Update, the mobile station lb initiates a Base Station Challenge. For doing so, the mobile station 16 generates a Bast Station 10 Challenge message that includes a Random Number(RA.ND$S). Then, the mobile station executes the CAVI=
algorithm using a pending value of SSD, the ESN, the MIN and the RANDBS.
However, if the mobile station 16 is at a point in a serving exchatt~e when it is performing the Base Station Challrngc, the Base is Station Challenge will not be carttp)eted.
7. 5 The npn-completion of the Base Station Challenge either results in allowing a call than stay be fraudulent, or barring a call of a legitimate mobile station. Therefore, for tnabile station users, non- completion of base station eh~llenge is not desirable. The present invention provides a solution to that problem. Referring now to FIGUR.)= 2, there is shown a signal flow diagram ofa base station challenge in accordance wig a first et~tbodiment ofthe prcser<t 2 o invention. In that first embodiment, the ntobilc station perfottns an inter-system hand-off from an Anchor MSC 12A to a Serving MSC 12S prior to generating and sendirts the $ase Station Challenge message 40. The Base Station Challenge message 40 includes the Random Number (RANDBS). The $ase Station Challenge message 40 is sent to the Serving MSC
12S. The Serving MSC I2S forwards the Base Station Challenge, along with the RAND$S
25 to the Anchor MSC 12A in a Base Station Challenge Backward message 52, hereinafter called BSCHA~1_BWD. the BSCHALLB WS 52 ntay also include a Mobile Station Identity (MSID) value apd art later Mobile Switching Center identity trunk (IMSCCID) value. The RANDBS is passed to the Anchor VLR 13A by the Anchor MSC 13A in the BSCHALL
message 42. Upon receipt of the R.ANDBS at the VLR 13A, the CAV): algorithm is 3 Q performed, using the roceived RANDBS, with the SSD-A, MIN and ESN for the mobile station 1G, to obtain the AUTHBS. The AUTHBS is sent to the Anchor MSC 12A by the VLR 13A in the 5 bschall message 44. The bschall message 44 is teceivad by the Anchor MSC 12A. The Anchor MSC 12A forwards the AUTHBS to the 5crvtng MSC 12S in a Base Statiotl Challrnge l3aekward tnessagt 54. hereinafter-called bschallbwd rtressage. Then, the WO 00/3521 ~ PCTiSE99103098 Serving MSC 135 forwards the reeetved AUTHBS to the mobile station 16 ir< a challenge response message S0.
Theteafier, the mobile station l 6 may confirm completion of the SSD update, and the Serving MSC 12S may perform a unique challenge, in a manner known in the act-Referring now to FIGURE 3, there is shown a signal flow diagram of a Base Station 7. o Challenge in accordance with a second embodiment of the present inversion. In that second embodiment, the mobile station 16 generates and sends a Base Station Challenge 3 message 40. The Base Station Challenge message 40 includes a Random Number (RA,IVD$S) which is randomly selected by the mobile station 16. The Basc Station Challenge message 40 is sent to the Anchor exchange (hereinafter called Anchor MSC) 12A. The R~11~1D$S is passed to 15 the Serving VLR 13A by the Anchor MSC 13A tn a BSCHALL message 42. Upon receipt of the R.AND$S at the VLR 13A, the CAV)r algorithm is performed, using the received RANDHS, with the SSD-A, MIN and ESN far the mobile station 16, to obtain an authcatication result hereinafter called AUTHBS_ The AUTH$S i$ sent to the Anchoc MSC
1?A by the VLR 13A in a bschall message ~. The bschall message 44 is ceceived by the o Anchor MSC 12A.
However, since the Base Station Challenge was initiated by the mobile station 16, and the moment at which the Anchor MSC I2A receives the AUTHHS, the mobile station performed an inter-system hatred-o ff and is now being serviced by the Serving MSC 1 ?S. The Anchor MSC 1?A forwards the AUTHBS to the Serving MSC 12S in a Base Station 25 Challectge Confirmation Forward mcsst;ge a6, hereirtafteccalled HSCHALLCONFFWD
message. The Anchor MSC 12A also forwards in the BSCHALLCOhIFF~p message 4b information to pet~orm a Unique Challenge, i.e. RANDU and AU'THt1 values. The Serving MSC 12S confirms receipt of the AUTHBS by sending to the A,nchoc MSC 12A a bschallconffwd message 48. Then, the Serving MSC 125 forwards the received AUTHBS
3 0 to the mobile station 16 in a base stxation challenge response message 50.
Thereafter, the mobile station 16 may confirm cornpletiott of the SSD update, and the Servipg MSC 125 may Perform a unique challenge, using the received RANDU and AUTHU
values, as known in the an-WO oor35215 PCTiSE99~o2u~r Refertin$ now to FIGURE 4, there is shown a signal flow dmgram of a base station challenge in accorda,rtce with a third embodiment of the present invention. In that third embodiment, the mobile station performs an inter-system band-off from an Anchor MSC
12A to a Serving MSC 12S prior to generating and sending the Base Station Challenge message 40, and performs another inter-system handoff from the Serving MSC.12S
to another Serving MSC 12S' after the Base Station Chal lenge message 40 has been generated and sern to the Serving MSC12S. The Sermng ~~ISC 12S forwards the Base Station Challenge, along with the RANpBS to the Anch4t MSC l 2A in the Base Station Challenge Backward message 52_ The RANDBS is passed to the Anchor VLR I3A by the AnchorMSC
13A in the ESCHALL message 4?. Upott receipt of the RANDBS at the VLR 13A, the CAVE algorithm is performed, using the received RANpBS, with the SSD-A, MIN
and ESN
forthe mobile station 16, to obtain the AUTHBS. The AUTHHS is serif to the Anchor I~SC
12A by the VLR 13A in she bschall mes$age 44. The bscha(1 message 44 is received by the Anchor MSC 12A. The Anchor MSC 13A forwards the AUTI3HS to the other Serving MSC
13S' where the mobile station 16 has handed-off in the Base Station Challenge Confirmation z 0 Forward message 46 message_ The other Serving MSC 12S' confirms receipt of the AUTHBS by sending the bschallconffwd message 41; to the Anchor MSC 12A. Then, the other Serving MSC 12S forwards the received AUTHBS to the mobile station 16 in the cha(lettge response message S0.
ThereaBer. the mobile station 16 may confirm completion of the SSh update, and the other Serving MSC 12S' may perform a unique challenge, in a manner known in the ar<-Referring now to Figure S, there is shown a signal flow diagram of a Base Station Challenge in accordance with a fourth embodiment of the present invention. In that fourth embodiment. ~C mobile station performs an inter-system hand-off from an Anchor MSC
1?A to a Serving MSC 12S prior to generating and sending the ease Station Challenge 3 0 message 40, and performs another inter-system hand-off from the Serving MSC 13S back to the Anchor MSC 1?A aRer the Base Station Challenge message 40 has been generated and sent to the Serving MSC 12S_ The Serving MSC 12S forwards the Base Station Challenge, along with the RANDBS
to the Anchor MSC 12A in the Base Station Challenge Backward message 52. The R.ANpBS
W O 00/3521 S PCTiS E99~02098 _$_ is passed to the Anchor VT.R 13A by the Anchor MSC I2A in the BSChiALL message 42.
Upon receipt of the RANDBS at the VLR 13A, the CAVE algorithm is performed, using the received R,p~BS, with the SSD-A, MIN and ESN far the mobile stalion 16, to obtain the AUTHBS. The ATJTHBS is sent to the Anchor MSC 12A by the Anchor VLR 13A in the bschall message 44. The bschall message 4~ is received by the Anchor MSC 12A.
The :l0 Anchor MSC 12A fot~ards the received AUTHBS to the mobile statiAn 16 in the challenge response message S0.
Thereafter, the mobile station 16 may conf rm completion of the SSD update, and the Anchor MSC 12A may perform a unique challenge in a manner known in the art.
Referring now to Figures ?. 3, 4 attd S it is to be understood that all the rnessagcs :L5 described could be sent directly between the nodes descr;bed, or could be sept through one or several tandem exchanges, as known in the art. In a preferred manner, the BSCHAlLBWD message, the bschallbwd message, the BSCHALLCONFFWp message and the bschallconffwd message are ANSI-41 messages, which are incorporated by reference herein.
e! 0 It is thus believed that the Qperatio~ and construction of the prGSCnt invention will be apparent from the foregoing description. While the method and system shown and described have been characterized as being preferred, it will be readily apparent that various changes and modifications could be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the following claims.
In another aspect, the present invention is a cellular telecommunications netw4rk to petfarm a base station challenge. The cehular telccommuttications network has at least one CVO OIIi3531S PC'TiSE99iti2098 mobile station, an anchor exchange and a serving exchange. One of the ai least one mobile station transmits a base station challenge message, and per~oTms the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result. The anchor exchange sends the ~thentication result, which is received by the serving exchange. Then, the salving exchange transmits the authcndcation result to the one of the mobile station.
l0 8Ri>F DESCRIPTION OF THE DRwWINGS
The invention will be better understood and ns numerous objects and advantages wit!
become more apparent to those skilled in the art by fcferrnce to the following drawings, itt conjunction with the accompanying specification, in which:
FIGURE i is a schematic diagram of a cellular teleeotttmuitications network;
FIGURE 2 is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge accordance with a f rst embodiment of the present invention;
FIGURE 3 is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge iii accordapce with a second embodiment of the present invention:
FIGURE ~ Is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge in aecordancc with a third embodiment of the present invention; artd FIGURE 5 is a signal flow diagram of a base station challenge in accordance with a fourth embodiment of the present invention.
zs DET~LED DESCRIPTION DF EMI~oDIMZ~NTS
The pcescnt invention relates to a method and to a callular telecommunications network for performing a base station challenge when the mobile station is at one point in a setvtng exchange. For doing so, the invention provides new messages for sending forward or backward either the base station challenge message pr the results of the base staziort 30 challeage_ Therefore, the bast station challenge can always be completed for legitimate mobile stations.
Reference is now made to FIGURE 1 wherein there is shown a schematic diagram of a cellular network 10. In the cellular network 10, a plurality of exchanges, also known as Mobile Switching Center (MSC) 12, are used to route e~lis to artd receive calls froth tnobik W o opi35Z t 5 PcTrs E99io=ties °.5 stations 16. The MSC 12 are sometimes co-located with a Visited Location Register (VLR) i 3 such as shown on the FIGURE but may also be non co-located with a VLR 13.
The mobile stations lb communicate with nearly proximate base stations l4 through a radio interface 22. As knows in the art, severs! mobile stations 1 C can simultaneously communicatz with one base station 14, and several base stations 14 can c6rrtmunicate with lc~ one MSC 1?. Each base station la communicates with the MSC 12 through a pair of signaling and voice links 34. To allow seamless service to a mobile station 16 chat travels from a base station 14 serviced by a first MSC 12A, called Anchor MSC, to a base station 14 serviced by a second MSC 12S, called a Serving MSC, a pair of voice arid signaling links 2b connect the first snd second MSCs 12.
15 The mabilc stations 16 may travel within tttc cellular network and consecutively communicate with different base stations 14. More particularly, when a mobile station 16 iravcls from an arts that is serviced by a first base station 14 to an arts serviced by another base station, the operation of transferring service from the first base station to the second base station is called a hand-off. When the mobile station 16 hands-off from a base station 14 0 Linked to a first MSC 1 ~A to a base station linked co a second MSC 1?S, it then consists of an inter-system band-off.
In the cellular network 10, a Home Location Reyster (HLR) 18 keeps information on subscribers such as location and services subscribed to. The hiLR 18 may consist of a stand-alone HLR, or of a co-located Service Control point (SCP) as shown osi the FIG1;3RE.
2 5 The HLR 18 commutsicates with the VLRs 13 through a signaling link 28.
While the I<iLR
18 stores inforsrtation far all mobile stations 16 subscribed to the cellular netyvork 10, the VLRs 13 in tutu store certain information on mobi le stations 16 communicating through their cooperating (co-located or not) MSC 12.
The cellular network 10 also has an authentication aer<rer 20. The authentication 3 d center eon'tmunicates with the HLR 18 through a signaling link 30. The authentieauon center keeps information on the mobile stations 16 $uch as Shared Secret Data (SSD).
In D-AMPS networks, different authentication procedures are used. Among others, these are the Shared Secret Data Update and the Base Station Challenge. These auther<tication piocedlues rely on using an algorithm called CAVE, and in an exchange of parameters W O OOf33? 1 ~ PCTiS E99ip=09S
between the mobile station and an involved node (i.e. Authentication Center or Visited Location Register) of the network. The Shared Secret Data Update is generated by the Authentication Centet 20 to modify the value of the Shared Secret Data shared by the Authentication Censer Z0, the VLR 13 and the mobile station 14. Upon completion of the Shared Secret Data Update, the mobile station lb initiates a Base Station Challenge. For doing so, the mobile station 16 generates a Bast Station 10 Challenge message that includes a Random Number(RA.ND$S). Then, the mobile station executes the CAVI=
algorithm using a pending value of SSD, the ESN, the MIN and the RANDBS.
However, if the mobile station 16 is at a point in a serving exchatt~e when it is performing the Base Station Challrngc, the Base is Station Challenge will not be carttp)eted.
7. 5 The npn-completion of the Base Station Challenge either results in allowing a call than stay be fraudulent, or barring a call of a legitimate mobile station. Therefore, for tnabile station users, non- completion of base station eh~llenge is not desirable. The present invention provides a solution to that problem. Referring now to FIGUR.)= 2, there is shown a signal flow diagram ofa base station challenge in accordance wig a first et~tbodiment ofthe prcser<t 2 o invention. In that first embodiment, the ntobilc station perfottns an inter-system hand-off from an Anchor MSC 12A to a Serving MSC 12S prior to generating and sendirts the $ase Station Challenge message 40. The Base Station Challenge message 40 includes the Random Number (RANDBS). The $ase Station Challenge message 40 is sent to the Serving MSC
12S. The Serving MSC I2S forwards the Base Station Challenge, along with the RAND$S
25 to the Anchor MSC 12A in a Base Station Challenge Backward message 52, hereinafter called BSCHA~1_BWD. the BSCHALLB WS 52 ntay also include a Mobile Station Identity (MSID) value apd art later Mobile Switching Center identity trunk (IMSCCID) value. The RANDBS is passed to the Anchor VLR 13A by the Anchor MSC 13A in the BSCHALL
message 42. Upon receipt of the R.ANDBS at the VLR 13A, the CAV): algorithm is 3 Q performed, using the roceived RANDBS, with the SSD-A, MIN and ESN for the mobile station 1G, to obtain the AUTHBS. The AUTHBS is sent to the Anchor MSC 12A by the VLR 13A in the 5 bschall message 44. The bschall message 44 is teceivad by the Anchor MSC 12A. The Anchor MSC 12A forwards the AUTHBS to the 5crvtng MSC 12S in a Base Statiotl Challrnge l3aekward tnessagt 54. hereinafter-called bschallbwd rtressage. Then, the WO 00/3521 ~ PCTiSE99103098 Serving MSC 135 forwards the reeetved AUTHBS to the mobile station 16 ir< a challenge response message S0.
Theteafier, the mobile station l 6 may confirm completion of the SSD update, and the Serving MSC 12S may perform a unique challenge, in a manner known in the act-Referring now to FIGURE 3, there is shown a signal flow diagram of a Base Station 7. o Challenge in accordance with a second embodiment of the present inversion. In that second embodiment, the mobile station 16 generates and sends a Base Station Challenge 3 message 40. The Base Station Challenge message 40 includes a Random Number (RA,IVD$S) which is randomly selected by the mobile station 16. The Basc Station Challenge message 40 is sent to the Anchor exchange (hereinafter called Anchor MSC) 12A. The R~11~1D$S is passed to 15 the Serving VLR 13A by the Anchor MSC 13A tn a BSCHALL message 42. Upon receipt of the R.AND$S at the VLR 13A, the CAV)r algorithm is performed, using the received RANDHS, with the SSD-A, MIN and ESN far the mobile station 16, to obtain an authcatication result hereinafter called AUTHBS_ The AUTH$S i$ sent to the Anchoc MSC
1?A by the VLR 13A in a bschall message ~. The bschall message 44 is ceceived by the o Anchor MSC 12A.
However, since the Base Station Challenge was initiated by the mobile station 16, and the moment at which the Anchor MSC I2A receives the AUTHHS, the mobile station performed an inter-system hatred-o ff and is now being serviced by the Serving MSC 1 ?S. The Anchor MSC 1?A forwards the AUTHBS to the Serving MSC 12S in a Base Station 25 Challectge Confirmation Forward mcsst;ge a6, hereirtafteccalled HSCHALLCONFFWD
message. The Anchor MSC 12A also forwards in the BSCHALLCOhIFF~p message 4b information to pet~orm a Unique Challenge, i.e. RANDU and AU'THt1 values. The Serving MSC 12S confirms receipt of the AUTHBS by sending to the A,nchoc MSC 12A a bschallconffwd message 48. Then, the Serving MSC 125 forwards the received AUTHBS
3 0 to the mobile station 16 in a base stxation challenge response message 50.
Thereafter, the mobile station 16 may confirm cornpletiott of the SSD update, and the Servipg MSC 125 may Perform a unique challenge, using the received RANDU and AUTHU
values, as known in the an-WO oor35215 PCTiSE99~o2u~r Refertin$ now to FIGURE 4, there is shown a signal flow dmgram of a base station challenge in accorda,rtce with a third embodiment of the present invention. In that third embodiment, the mobile station performs an inter-system band-off from an Anchor MSC
12A to a Serving MSC 12S prior to generating and sending the Base Station Challenge message 40, and performs another inter-system handoff from the Serving MSC.12S
to another Serving MSC 12S' after the Base Station Chal lenge message 40 has been generated and sern to the Serving MSC12S. The Sermng ~~ISC 12S forwards the Base Station Challenge, along with the RANpBS to the Anch4t MSC l 2A in the Base Station Challenge Backward message 52_ The RANDBS is passed to the Anchor VLR I3A by the AnchorMSC
13A in the ESCHALL message 4?. Upott receipt of the RANDBS at the VLR 13A, the CAVE algorithm is performed, using the received RANpBS, with the SSD-A, MIN
and ESN
forthe mobile station 16, to obtain the AUTHBS. The AUTHHS is serif to the Anchor I~SC
12A by the VLR 13A in she bschall mes$age 44. The bscha(1 message 44 is received by the Anchor MSC 12A. The Anchor MSC 13A forwards the AUTI3HS to the other Serving MSC
13S' where the mobile station 16 has handed-off in the Base Station Challenge Confirmation z 0 Forward message 46 message_ The other Serving MSC 12S' confirms receipt of the AUTHBS by sending the bschallconffwd message 41; to the Anchor MSC 12A. Then, the other Serving MSC 12S forwards the received AUTHBS to the mobile station 16 in the cha(lettge response message S0.
ThereaBer. the mobile station 16 may confirm completion of the SSh update, and the other Serving MSC 12S' may perform a unique challenge, in a manner known in the ar<-Referring now to Figure S, there is shown a signal flow diagram of a Base Station Challenge in accordance with a fourth embodiment of the present invention. In that fourth embodiment. ~C mobile station performs an inter-system hand-off from an Anchor MSC
1?A to a Serving MSC 12S prior to generating and sending the ease Station Challenge 3 0 message 40, and performs another inter-system hand-off from the Serving MSC 13S back to the Anchor MSC 1?A aRer the Base Station Challenge message 40 has been generated and sent to the Serving MSC 12S_ The Serving MSC 12S forwards the Base Station Challenge, along with the RANDBS
to the Anchor MSC 12A in the Base Station Challenge Backward message 52. The R.ANpBS
W O 00/3521 S PCTiS E99~02098 _$_ is passed to the Anchor VT.R 13A by the Anchor MSC I2A in the BSChiALL message 42.
Upon receipt of the RANDBS at the VLR 13A, the CAVE algorithm is performed, using the received R,p~BS, with the SSD-A, MIN and ESN far the mobile stalion 16, to obtain the AUTHBS. The ATJTHBS is sent to the Anchor MSC 12A by the Anchor VLR 13A in the bschall message 44. The bschall message 4~ is received by the Anchor MSC 12A.
The :l0 Anchor MSC 12A fot~ards the received AUTHBS to the mobile statiAn 16 in the challenge response message S0.
Thereafter, the mobile station 16 may conf rm completion of the SSD update, and the Anchor MSC 12A may perform a unique challenge in a manner known in the art.
Referring now to Figures ?. 3, 4 attd S it is to be understood that all the rnessagcs :L5 described could be sent directly between the nodes descr;bed, or could be sept through one or several tandem exchanges, as known in the art. In a preferred manner, the BSCHAlLBWD message, the bschallbwd message, the BSCHALLCONFFWp message and the bschallconffwd message are ANSI-41 messages, which are incorporated by reference herein.
e! 0 It is thus believed that the Qperatio~ and construction of the prGSCnt invention will be apparent from the foregoing description. While the method and system shown and described have been characterized as being preferred, it will be readily apparent that various changes and modifications could be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the following claims.
Claims (33)
1. A method of performing a base station challenge, the method comprising steps of:
sending a base station challenge message from a mobile station to an anchor exchange;
receiving the base station challenge message at the anchor exchange and performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result; and forwarding the authentication result from the anchor exchange to the mobile station through a serving exchange.
sending a base station challenge message from a mobile station to an anchor exchange;
receiving the base station challenge message at the anchor exchange and performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result; and forwarding the authentication result from the anchor exchange to the mobile station through a serving exchange.
2. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 1, wherein the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the serving exchange.
3. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 2, wherein:
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the serving exchange and at least one tandem exchange; and the authetatication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station through the serving exchange and the at least one tandem exchange.
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the serving exchange and at least one tandem exchange; and the authetatication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station through the serving exchange and the at least one tandem exchange.
4. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 2, wherein the base station challenge message includes a Mobile Station Identity (MSID) value, an Inter Mobile Switching Center Identity trunk (IMSCCID) value, and a Random Number (RANDBS) value.
5. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 2, wherein the authentication result includes an Authentication Result (AUTHBS) value.
6. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 2, wherein the base station challenge message is an ANST-41 BaseStationChallengeBackward message.
7. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 1, wherein the authentication result is an ANSI-41 BaseStationChallengeConfirmationForward message.
8. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 4, wherein the performing of the base station challenge includes executing a CAVE algorithm using the RANDBS value.
9. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 2, wherein the anchor exchange is a Mobile Switching Center and a Visited Location Register.
10. A method of performing a base station challenge, the method comprising steps of: sending a base station challenge message from a mobile station to an anchor exchange through a serving exchange;
receiving the base station challenge message at the anchor message and performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result; and forwarding the authentication result from the anchor exchange to the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
receiving the base station challenge message at the anchor message and performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result; and forwarding the authentication result from the anchor exchange to the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
11. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 10, wherein:
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the serving exchange and at least one tandem exchange and the authentication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the serving exchange and at least one tandem exchange and the authentication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
12. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 10, wherein the base station challenge message includes a Mobile Station Identity (MSID) value, an Inter Mobile Switching Center Identity trunk (IMSCCID) value, and a Random Number (RANDBS) value.
13. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 10, wherein the authentication result includes an Authentication Result (AUTHBS) value.
14. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 10, wherein the base station challenge message is an ANSI-41 BaseStationChallengeBackward message.
15. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 12, wherein the performing of the base station challenge includes executing a CAVE algorithm using the RANDBS value.
16. The method of performing a base station challenge of claim 10, wherein the anchor exchange is a Mobile Switching Center and a Visited Location Register.
17. A cellular telecommunications network comprising: at least one mobile station, one of the at least one mobile station transmitting a base station challenge message;
an anchor exchange for receiving the base station challenge message, the anchor exchange performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result and sending the authentication result; and a serving exchange for receiving the authentication result and transmitting the authentication result to the one of the mobile station.
an anchor exchange for receiving the base station challenge message, the anchor exchange performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result and sending the authentication result; and a serving exchange for receiving the authentication result and transmitting the authentication result to the one of the mobile station.
18. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 17, wherein the base station challenge message is transmitted from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through another serving exchange.
19. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 17, wherein:
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the another serving exchange and an at least one tandem exchange; and the authentication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station through the serving exchange and the at least one tandem exchange.
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the another serving exchange and an at least one tandem exchange; and the authentication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station through the serving exchange and the at least one tandem exchange.
20. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 18, wherein the base station challenge message includes a Mobile Station Identity (MSID) value, an Inter Mobile Switching Center Identity trunk (IMSCCID) value, and a Random Number (RANDBS) value.
21. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 18, wherein the authentication result includes an Authentication Result (AUTBBS) value.
22. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 18, wherein the base station challenge message is an ANSI-4 BaseStationChallengeBackward message.
23. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 18, wherein the authentication result is an ANSI-41 BaseStationChallengeConfirationForward message.
24. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 20, wherein the performing of the base station challenge includes executing a CAVE algorithm using the RANDBS
value.
value.
25. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 18, wherein the anchor exchange is a Mobile Switching Center with a co-located Visited Location Register.
26. A cellular telecommunications network comprising:
at least one mobile station, one of the at least one mobile station transmitting a base station challenge message;
a serving exchange; and an anchor exchange for receiving the base station challenge message through the serving exchange, the anchor exchange performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result, and sending the authentication result to the one of the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
at least one mobile station, one of the at least one mobile station transmitting a base station challenge message;
a serving exchange; and an anchor exchange for receiving the base station challenge message through the serving exchange, the anchor exchange performing the base station challenge to obtain an authentication result, and sending the authentication result to the one of the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
27. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 26, wherein the authentication result is transmuted from the anchor exchange to the mobile station through another serving exchange.
28. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 27, wherein:
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the serving exchange and an at least one tandem exchange and the authentication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
the base station challenge message is sent from the mobile station to the anchor exchange through the serving exchange and an at least one tandem exchange and the authentication result is sent from the anchor exchange to the mobile station without going through the serving exchange.
29. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 27, wherein the base station challenge message includes a Mobile Station Identity (MSID) value, an Inter Mobile Switching Center Identity trunk (IMSCCID) value, and a Random Number (RANDBS) value.
34. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 27, wherein the authentication result includes an Authentication Result (AUTHBS) value.
31. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 27, wherein the base station challenge message is an ANSI-41 Base Station Challenge Backward message.
32. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 29, wherein the performing of the base station challenge includes executing a CAVE algorithm using the RANDBS
value.
value.
33. The cellular telecommunications network of claim 26, wherein the anchor exchange is a Mobile Switching Center with a co-located Visited Location Register.
Applications Claiming Priority (5)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US11164798P | 1998-12-09 | 1998-12-09 | |
| US60/111,647 | 1998-12-09 | ||
| US24053999A | 1999-01-29 | 1999-01-29 | |
| US09/240,539 | 1999-01-29 | ||
| PCT/SE1999/002098 WO2000035215A2 (en) | 1998-12-09 | 1999-11-16 | Method of performing a base station challenge in a cellular telecommunications network |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA2354391A1 true CA2354391A1 (en) | 2000-06-15 |
Family
ID=26809103
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002354391A Abandoned CA2354391A1 (en) | 1998-12-09 | 1999-11-16 | Method of performing a base station challenge in a cellular telecommunications network |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| AU (1) | AU2008600A (en) |
| BR (1) | BR9916077A (en) |
| CA (1) | CA2354391A1 (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2000035215A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP4105824B2 (en) * | 1999-06-10 | 2008-06-25 | 松下電器産業株式会社 | Base station apparatus and network identifier assignment method |
| AU7326400A (en) * | 1999-09-10 | 2001-04-17 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | System and method of passing encryption keys after inter-exchange handoff |
| CN1980466B (en) | 2005-12-07 | 2010-11-10 | 华为技术有限公司 | A paging group network and terminal location update method |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO1998031162A2 (en) * | 1997-01-11 | 1998-07-16 | Tandem Computers, Incorporated | Method and apparatus for limiting authentication directive initiation in a mobile telephone system |
| WO1998031164A2 (en) * | 1997-01-11 | 1998-07-16 | Tandem Computers, Incorporated | Method and apparatus for configuration of authentication center operations allowed by system access type in a mobile telephone system |
| US6097962A (en) * | 1997-10-07 | 2000-08-01 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Method of handling short message service acknowledgement messages between cooperating mobile switching centers in a radio telecommunications network |
| US6594492B2 (en) * | 1998-06-16 | 2003-07-15 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Anchor MSC information retrieval from a serving MSC following a completed inter-exchange handoff |
-
1999
- 1999-11-16 CA CA002354391A patent/CA2354391A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 1999-11-16 BR BR9916077-3A patent/BR9916077A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1999-11-16 AU AU20086/00A patent/AU2008600A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1999-11-16 WO PCT/SE1999/002098 patent/WO2000035215A2/en not_active Ceased
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| AU2008600A (en) | 2000-06-26 |
| BR9916077A (en) | 2001-11-20 |
| WO2000035215A3 (en) | 2000-10-26 |
| WO2000035215A2 (en) | 2000-06-15 |
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