Warning! See "Security" section at the end.

Somewhat an inverse to sudo but with security first.

git clone https://github.com/hilbix/suid.git
cd suid
make
sudo make install

Afterwards you can run something as

suid command args..

suid is inverse to sudo in the sense, that sudo is user->command, where suid is command->user.

Return values:

• 126 for failure or usage (compare: bash -c /dev/null)
• 127 for command not found (compare: bash -c /notfound)

See /etc/suid.conf sample file and /etc/suid.conf.d/ sample directory.

Why not sudo?

• sudo becomes the parent of the called program. This is for additinal safety, because in former times you were able to send signals to suid programs. So the forked suid programs cannot access the PID of the caller (and sudo does not expose the parent to the child either).

• I do not like sudo to allow users to do things on a system level. Also the sudoers file syntax is far from intuitive and the calling convention of sudo is ugly. Instead I think it is far more easy to wrap it like suid does and empower the called command to sort things out (safely).

• suid is very easy to use, as it does not involve passwords (for now).

• suid allows to call (and control) SUID-aware programs without need to set SUID flags in filesystem

Call a script?

• The ability to use a Shebang (#!) was lost in suid v1.1.0 after using fexecve (POSIX.1-2008) in favor of execve (POSIX.1-2001).
• So you need to use flag W now. This has the disadvantage that it leaks the file descriptor of the script to the interpreter.
• As an alternative you can use :sh:/path/to/script:args.. instead of :/path/to/script:args..
• This has the disadvantage, that it re-opens the script in /bin/sh, so it looses the bit better security of fexecve compared to execve (see NOTES section in man fexecve).
• Note: :sh is the short form of :/bin/sh:-c:--:exec "$0" "$@"

Call a suid capable program?

• First: It must not have SUID bits set in filesystem.
• Second: It should be owned by root:root and have mode 755 or even less.
• Third: in /etc/suid.conf configure it as usual.
• Prefix the /path/to/bin with suid:, that's all.
• Bad example: socklinger80::::::suid:/usr/local/bin/socklinger:outeripv4address\:80:./miniweb.sh
  • /usr/local/bin/socklinger has no SUID flag set.
  • socklinger is a suid capable program
  • So it will drop privileges after listening on the privileged port.
  • Each incoming connection then will be served via ./miniweb.sh in the current directory.
  • UID is the UID of the caller
• Security-Notes:
  • If you leave away the suid: then ./miniweb.sh would be served as root.
  • Above is a very bad example, as anybody can call this command as shown within his own context and occupy port 80.
  • This is probably someting you perhaps want on generic dev-machines, but definitively not in production, hence bad.
• Good example: socklinger80::nobody:nogroup::/:root:/usr/local/bin/socklinger:outeripv4address\:80:/srv/miniweb.sh
  • root: is a convenience to call the program as root, but preseed the unprivileged user with the given nobody:nogroup.
  • When socklinger drops privileges, it will become nobody:nogroup
  • Anybody can start the command, but it always will do the same.
  • This also works on dev-machines if the Devs can control what /srv/miniweb.sh does.
  • Hence this is good practice, as this resembles what production will look like as well.
  • For this change nobody:nogroup to whatever you expect in production.

Why is : escaped to \\:\: and arguments should be followed by \\:?

• Escaping is not particular human friendly, but it is easy to script and parse this way.
  • Simple commandlines which do not include a : can be written as-is with separating spaces changed to :
  • If an argument contains no \, it is sufficient to add a \ in front of each literal : in a command
  • If an argument ends on \, you need to append \\: on the argument to allow the next separator.
  • If there are \: sequences in the argument, fully escape : with \\:\: to make it unambiguous.
• If you want a single rule which always works:
  • Escape each occurance of : to \\:\:
  • Join command/argument together with \\::
  • Python: def es(*cmd): return "\\\\::".join([str(a).replace(":", "\\\\:\\:") for a in cmd])
• Parsing this has following properties in a high level language:
  • Split the string on perl-regex /(?<!\\):/
  • In the splitted arguments, replace all occurances of \: with :
  • In the result of the previous, replace all occurances of \: with the empty string.
  • Python: def de(s): return [a.replace("\\:",":").replace("\\:","") for a in re.split(r'(?<!\\):', s)]
• The de-escaper of suid is a bit faster and a bit more clever than this as no regex are needed, also only a single character at-a-time needs to be looked at:
• Low-level parsing forwards means to look left up to 2 characters to remove them:
  • If : is encountered check the previous character for \. If not, it is a separator.
  • We saw \:, so remove the \. Look at the characer before.
  • If it is \, then remove the caracter, too, we are ready (the : is swallowed).
  • Else we saw \:, so just output : (note that we already removed the \).
• Low-level parsing backwards allows a simple state machine:
  • state0: if c is EOF then state=state4 and return, else state=state0 and goto state1
  • state1: If c is : then state=state2 and return, else output c and return
  • state2: If c is \ then state=state3 and return, else output separator and goto state0
  • state3: If c is \ then state=state0 and return, else output : and goto state0
  • state4: final state
  • This assumes EOF is passed in as the "one before the first character" character

Is suid secure?

• Hope so. I did my best to avoid common pitfalls. But no guarantees, though.

• If you find a bug, please open an Issue at GitHub.

• When sending pull requests, please stick to the "license". (This is, abandon all Copyright from what you wrote.)

• suid does not automagically secure your wrappers in /etc/suid.conf, so do not use insecure directories like /tmp/ (dirs with write access only from root should be ok).

• It is designed with following design principles in mind:

  • Do just one single thing and do this right.
  • Perfection is reached when you cannot leave away anything anymore.
  • Secure by default.
  • If there is an insecure option added, this insecurity will not be switched on by default. Never.

Other conf?

• For security reasons suid configuration is kept in /etc/suid.conf and files /etc/suid.conf.d/*.conf

• It would be very difficult to allow several different suid wrappers with autoconfig. So there is only one supported.

Missing privilege separation directory: /var/run/sshd

• This can happen if you try to run suid sshd when /etc/suid.conf has a line like:

  sshd::::D:/:/usr/sbin/sshd:-D
  

• Solution: Wrap sshd a bit deeper:

  sshd::::D:/:/bin/sh:-c:mkdir -pm700 /var/run/sshd && { flock -nx 1 && exec /usr/sbin/sshd -D </dev/null; } >> /var/run/sshd/lock 2>&1
  

• This way you can start sshd on Windows 10 with a .bat like this:

  echo exec suid sshd; | C:\Windows\System32\bash.exe
  

  This then looks very nice and natural (here with putty localhost):

  $ pstree -p
  init(1)───sshd(2)───sshd(5)───sshd(38)─┬─bash(39)───vim(134)
                                         └─bash(92)───pstree(135)
  

Debianized version?

• I'm working on it, extremely slowly.

• However I probably do not have time to become a Debian maintainer myself.

License?

• See License below.

• Yes, this is not really a license, but it defines the rules.

This Works is placed under the terms of the Copyright Less License, see file COPYRIGHT.CLL. USE AT OWN RISK, ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY.

Read:
This is free as in free beer, free speech and free baby.
Copyright on DNA is contradicting human rights.

suid has a strict "secure by default" policy. This section records the security related changes.

If any major or minor security flaw is fixed:

• the major (or minor respectively) version will be incremented
• and suid will default to the most secure variant,
• even if this breaks existing setups.
• (Such a breaking change usually is a major security flaw.)

Hence, if your setup is broken afterwards, you perhaps lived in danger. (If not does not mean you lived safe!) Now you can check and perhaps enable the option which opens the security hole again. But then you apparently know what you are doing.

• Version 0.1.0 adds ShellShock prevention

  • Environment variables with the ShellShock-Pattern are ignored
  • This is a minor security flaw, as bash ususally is safe against ShellShock nowadays.
  • Use option S to allow the ShellShock pattern

• Version 1.0.0 closes a major security hole

  • Previous versions did not correctly drop privileges.
  • Do not use versions before 1.0.0

• Version 2.0.0 protects against CVE-2016-2779

  • Now setsid() is used to disable TIOCSTI attacks on /dev/tty
  • This might drastically change the behavior of programs!
  • For example it disables Job Control and Ctrl+C as well.
  • Use option T to get rid of setsid() end re-enable TIOCSTI.
  • Evil programs can then inject commands into your TTY.

• Version 2.4.0 changes debug output (flag 'D') and corrects some other infos

  • Remember that flags must be sorted alphabetically
  • It also includes a mitigation for CVE-2021-3156 in suid.conf.d.example/sudo-cve-2021-3156.conf.ex

• Version 3.0.0 closes a MAJOR security flaw for :root: modifier, and repairs :sh: and :bash:

  • If you use any of these 3, please use this version!
  • The MAJOR security flaw only affects you if you happen to run some command with the :root: modifier and this command was writeable by the targeted user as well. This error can still be made easily by executing a shell as command which then runs a script of a foreign user. Hopefully the now working :bash: and :sh: modifiers can help to prevent that common mistake better (as you do not need to run a shell, just use the right modifier to execute the script). Note that suid cannot protect magically against calling the wrong script from the configured command. (Today. In future perhaps namespaces can protect even against that.)
  • So the security flaw was MAJOR from suid's point of view, but probably not MAJOR from your view. However the changes are MAJOR too, affecting all 3 modifiers (but nothing else). When upgrading to this version, please thorougly test all commands which use :root:, :sh: or :bash:.
  • Note that there is no flag to switch back to the previous handling of those modifiers. :bash: and :sh: were ridiculously broken, while the old :root: behavior can be gained by wrapping the command into /bin/bash or similar (as the shell is owned by root, suid cannot detect any permission problem on what the shell does).
  • Note that the use of :sh: and :bash: improve security, because suid is able to test the permissions of both, the script and the shell this way. So instead you wrapping it into the shell, just use the script directly and use the modifier.

• Version 3.2.0 might be affected by CVE-2023-4911 if statically linked

  • Dynamically linked versions (the default) are believed to be not affected anymore after glibc is updated
  • However there is a make static target in Makefile and some people might accidentally be able to use that
  • To mitigate this, only dynamically linked versions or versions above 3.3.0 should be used
  • At the time of writing, 3.2.0 is the latest (stable) version. Urgency at my side is low as only (uncommon) statically compiled versions are affected.