Unit 2 follow-up: R2.2 egress enforcement (relay-layer frame inspection) + R2.4 dynamic port-mapping #553
Closed as not planned
Description
Split from #499 (Unit 2) per the design decision recorded there: the proved spike (docs/spikes/2026-06-21-gvproxy-attachment.md §5) established that gvproxy v0.8.9 has no per-client egress ACL API, and its management API is unix-socket-only / unreachable from a PTask — contradicting the 192.168.127.254:8080 HTTP assumption in the task body and architecture.md. Egress enforcement therefore cannot be "POST the rules to gvproxy"; it must be a relay-layer mechanism. This task owns that design.
Scope
- R2.2 — egress allowlist enforcement via relay-layer frame inspection: parse Ethernet/IP headers in the
net::switchrelay and drop frames whose destination falls outside the session'sallow_subnets/allow_protocols. Owns the security-mechanism design (header-parse surface, drop-vs-reject semantics, performance, fail-closed default). - R2.4 — dynamic port-mapping transport: define the correct control path (the management API is unix-socket-only, not the gateway IP), distinct from the static
POST /services/forwarder/{expose,unexpose}path already landing in feat(minimald,minvmd): egress/ingress policy enforcement, VM-wide egress, and integration tests #499. - Docs: correct
architecture.md§"Unit 2" (the192.168.127.254:8080management-endpoint claim) to match the spike — unix-socket control surface; egress filtering at the relay.
Acceptance
- Egress frames outside
allow_subnets/allow_protocolsare dropped at the relay; fail-closed when a policy is set. - R2.7 rate-limited
tracing::warn!fires on real drops. - Enforcement proofs (spike Proofs 1 & 2) ship as compiling
#[ignore]netns tests underci-netns.yml(privileged netns + pinned gvproxy + root), matching the feat(minimald): gvproxy DM2 child lifecycle, OwnIp switch attachment via SCM_RIGHTS, and integration tests #496/feat(minimald,sandbox2): wire net switch into live OwnIp launch path #547 precedent. architecture.md§Unit 2 no longer references the gateway-IP management endpoint.
References
- Split from feat(minimald,minvmd): egress/ingress policy enforcement, VM-wide egress, and integration tests #499; design rationale in its
needs-humanhand-off - Spike
docs/spikes/2026-06-21-gvproxy-attachment.md§5 (Action item 5: "File this as a design question for the Unit 2 task") - Epic epic: minimald networking — PTask network modes, DNS, egress/ingress, WireGuard mesh #478
This is a security-control design; likely warrants /spec (or a spike) before execution rather than direct dispatch.
Activity
fix(minimald): bind ingress to loopback, align warn window and fields
feat(sessions,minimald): validate egress subnet CIDRs at launch
fix(sessions): reject reversed ingress dynamic_allowed_range
feat(sessions,minvmd): validate dynamic-range floor and vm_egress CIDRs
feat(sessions,minimald,minvmd): static ingress, session policy state,…
fix(docs): address CodeRabbit findings on networking test plan
fix(docs): address CodeRabbit findings on networking test plan