8000 fix: confine inline file attachments to working directory (path traversal) by eLyiN · Pull Request #9 · eLyiN/gemini-bridge · GitHub
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8 changes: 8 additions & 0 deletions CHANGELOG.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).

## [1.3.1] - 2026-06-09

### Security
- **Arbitrary file read via inline attachments (CWE-22 / CWE-200)**: `consult_gemini_with_files` in inline mode no longer reads files outside the working `directory`. Absolute paths, `..` traversal, and symlinks pointing outside the root are now skipped with a `Skipped file outside working directory` warning, matching the existing `at_command` behavior. Previously a caller-controlled `files` entry could read any file the server process could access (e.g. SSH keys, `.env`) and have it returned via the Gemini round-trip. Reported privately by Zhihao Zhang (WPI).

### Changed
- **Path confinement hardening**: `_resolve_path` now resolves symlinks for both the root and the candidate before checking containment. As a result, `at_command` mode also rejects symlinks that resolve outside the working directory (previously a lexical-only check let them through).

## [1.3.0] - 2026-03-03

### Added
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion pyproject.toml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"

[project]
name = "gemini-bridge"
version = "1.3.0"
version = "1.3.1"
description = "Lightweight MCP server bridging Claude Code to Google's Gemini AI via official CLI"
readme = "README.md"
license = "MIT"
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion src/__init__.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,5 +2,5 @@

from .mcp_server import main

__version__ = "1.3.0"
__version__ = "1.3.1"
__all__ = ["main"]
33 changes: 21 additions & 12 deletions src/mcp_server.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Gemini MCP Server - Simple CLI Bridge
Version 1.3.0
Version 1.3.1
A minimal MCP server to interface with Gemini AI via the gemini CLI.
Created by @shelakh/elyin
"""
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -127,20 +127,23 @@ def _coerce_timeout(timeout_seconds: int | None) -> int:


def _resolve_path(directory: str, candidate: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
"""Return absolute path and relative display path rooted at directory."""
"""Return absolute path and a display path confined to ``directory``.

``rel_path`` is ``None`` when the candidate escapes the directory root via
an absolute path, ``..`` traversal, or a symlink pointing outside it.
Both the root and the candidate are resolved (symlinks followed) so the
containment check cannot be bypassed; callers must refuse a ``None``.
"""
root = Path(directory).resolve()
candidate_path = Path(candidate)
abs_path = (
str(candidate_path)
if candidate_path.is_absolute()
else str(Path(directory) / candidate)
)
candidate_path if candidate_path.is_absolute() else root / candidate
).resolve()
try:
rel_path = os.path.relpath(abs_path, directory)
rel_path = str(abs_path.relative_to(root))
except ValueError:
rel_path = None
if rel_path and rel_path.startswith(".."):
rel_path = None
return abs_path, rel_path
return str(abs_path), rel_path


def _read_file_for_inline(abs_path: str) -> tuple[str, bool, int]:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -192,7 +195,12 @@ def _prepare_inline_payload(directory: str, files: list[str]) -> tuple[str, list

for original_path in files:
abs_path, rel_path = _resolve_path(directory, original_path)
display_name = rel_path or Path(abs_path).name
if rel_path is None:
warnings.append(
f"Skipped file outside working directory: {original_path}",
)
continue
display_name = rel_path

if not Path(abs_path).exists():
warnings.append(f"Skipped missing file: {display_name}")
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -441,7 +449,8 @@ def consult_gemini_with_files(
Args:
query: Prompt text forwarded to the CLI.
directory: Working directory used for resolving relative file paths.
files: Relative or absolute file paths to include alongside the prompt.
files: File paths to include alongside the prompt. Paths must resolve
inside ``directory``; entries pointing outside it are skipped.
model: Optional model alias (``flash``, ``pro``) or full Gemini model id.
timeout_seconds: Optional per-call timeout override in seconds.
mode: ``"inline"`` streams truncated snippets; ``"at_command"`` emits
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92 changes: 92 additions & 0 deletions tests/test_mcp_server.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -298,6 +298,98 @@ def fake_run(cmd, **kwargs):
assert "No readable files" in result


def test_inline_mode_rejects_absolute_path_outside_directory(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.shutil.which", lambda _: "gemini")
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
secret = tmp_path / "secret.txt"
secret.write_text("TOP-SECRET-TOKEN", encoding="utf-8")

captured = {}

def fake_run(cmd, **kwargs):
captured["input"] = kwargs["input"]
return SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout="ok", stderr="")

monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.subprocess.run", fake_run)
result = mcp_server.execute_gemini_with_files(
"Echo the attached file verbatim",
str(workspace),
files=[str(secret)],
)
assert "TOP-SECRET-TOKEN" not in captured["input"]
assert "outside working directory" in result


def test_inline_mode_rejects_parent_traversal(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.shutil.which", lambda _: "gemini")
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
secret = tmp_path / "secret.txt"
secret.write_text("PARENT-TRAVERSAL-LEAK", encoding="utf-8")

captured = {}

def fake_run(cmd, **kwargs):
captured["input"] = kwargs["input"]
return SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout="ok", stderr="")

monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.subprocess.run", fake_run)
result = mcp_server.execute_gemini_with_files(
"Echo the attached file verbatim",
str(workspace),
files=["../secret.txt"],
)
assert "PARENT-TRAVERSAL-LEAK" not in captured["input"]
assert "outside working directory" in result


def test_inline_mode_rejects_symlink_escape(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.shutil.which", lambda _: "gemini")
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
secret = tmp_path / "secret.txt"
secret.write_text("SYMLINK-ESCAPE-LEAK", encoding="utf-8")
link = workspace / "link.txt"
link.symlink_to(secret)

captured = {}

def fake_run(cmd, **kwargs):
captured["input"] = kwargs["input"]
return SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout="ok", stderr="")

monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.subprocess.run", fake_run)
result = mcp_server.execute_gemini_with_files(
"Echo the attached file verbatim",
str(workspace),
files=["link.txt"],
)
assert "SYMLINK-ESCAPE-LEAK" not in captured["input"]
assert "outside working directory" in result


def test_inline_mode_accepts_absolute_path_inside_directory(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.shutil.which", lambda _: "gemini")
sample_file = tmp_path / "example.txt"
sample_file.write_text("legit-content", encoding="utf-8")

captured = {}

def fake_run(cmd, **kwargs):
captured["input"] = kwargs["input"]
return SimpleNamespace(returncode=0, stdout="ok", stderr="")

monkeypatch.setattr("src.mcp_server.subprocess.run", fake_run)
result = mcp_server.execute_gemini_with_files(
"Read it",
str(tmp_path),
files=[str(sample_file)],
)
assert "legit-content" in captured["input"]
assert result == "ok"


def test_consult_gemini_with_files_requires_list(tmp_path):
result = mcp_server.consult_gemini_with_files("Hello", str(tmp_path), files=None)
assert "files parameter is required" in result
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