8000 Tags · jitpass/jit · GitHub
[go: up one dir, main page]

Skip to content
  • Tags

    Tags

    v2.4.0

    Toggle v2.4.0's commit message
    jit 2.4.0
    
    

    v2.3.7

    Toggle v2.3.7's commit message
    jit 2.3.7
    
    

    v2.3.6

    Toggle v2.3.6's commit message
    jit 2.3.6
    
    

    v2.3.5

    Toggle v2.3.5's commit message
    jit 2.3.5
    
    

    v2.3.4

    Toggle v2.3.4's commit message
    jit 2.3.4
    
    

    v2.3.3

    Toggle v2.3.3's commit message
    jit 2.3.3
    
    Scan reads `export KEY=value` lines in env files. A .env of exported
    secrets counted "0 plaintext variables" and, since 2.3.2, was not
    reported at all (#186).
    
    `jit review FILE[:LINE]` marks a scan finding checked as not live, a
    real-looking key in a test file or a README; later scans leave it out
    and count it as reviewed. A mark matches what was found, so a changed
    value, or any change to a reviewed env file, is reported again.
    `jit unreview` removes marks (#187).
    
    AI jobs: a secret removed from the vault no longer stops a job, which
    runs without it; editing a profile manifest in the job's folder no
    longer stops it either. A rotated secret still stops the job (#188).
    
    `jit vault list --users` finds every profile that uses a secret, in any
    project folder; `name_looks_secret` says which names are credentials,
    and `jit migrate settings` never moves those out (#189).
    
    `jit decoys expect PROGRAM [--file F]` marks a program's decoy reads as
    expected, such as an editor indexing a folder; `jit audit` tags them.
    Interpreters and shells cannot be marked (#190).

    v2.3.2

    Toggle v2.3.2's commit message
    jit 2.3.2
    
    An env file with no active variable is no longer a Protect finding. An
    empty .env was listed as "0 plaintext variables" with jit migrate as its
    fix, and migrate then refused it ("has no active KEY=value lines to
    migrate"). A file with no variables is now no finding; one whose
    variables are all commented out stays a finding, as a manual one, since
    jit has nothing to move.

    v2.3.1

    Toggle v2.3.1's commit message
    jit 2.3.1
    
    Only secrets go into the vault. Protecting a .env sends to the vault
    what the scan counts as a secret, plus names that look like one; every
    other line (URLs, IDs, file names, flags) stays a plain setting beside
    the vault, and the file keeps working. The live mount serves settings
    to every reader and decoys only for secrets. `jit migrate --secret` and
    `--setting` override a line; `jit migrate preview` shows the split
    first.
    
    `jit vault move-out` and `move-in` move one value either way, each its
    own Touch ID naming the value. `jit vault settings` lists the settings.
    `jit migrate settings` moves the settings out of profiles protected
    before, with one Touch ID. An AI job's settings are part of its
    fingerprint, so a changed setting stops the job. `jit vault export`
    carries settings; an export that holds any is version 3.
    
    Also: an MCP config whose --env-file is already protected is done, not
    a failure, and a project block that could not be parsed is still named.
    Leak Guard checks every push to main, and fails when it cannot list the
    commits.

    v2.3.0

    Toggle v2.3.0's commit message
    jit 2.3.0
    
    AI jobs: an AI tool runs an approved script with your secrets, and gets
    its output back with every secret value hidden. `jit job allow` approves
    a folder and its program; `jit mcp install` connects Claude Desktop and
    Cursor. A job's fingerprint covers its folder and what its program loads
    from outside it (the interpreter's standard library, site-packages, native
    libraries); any change stops the job and names the file.
    
    The vault key can live in this Mac's Secure Enclave: `jit vault rekey
    --wrapper secure-enclave` (or Settings › Protection in JitPass), after a
    recovery file. Only JitPass's signed helper can use it, after Touch ID or
    your password; grants and AI jobs follow with no re-approval. `--wrapper
    keychain` moves it back. Rotating an enclave-held key comes in a later
    version.
    
    Also: `jit mcp install` backups are found by scan and migrate; a jit
    outside JitPass.app no longer takes over the service on an enclave vault;
    status and doctor report an unfinished move, a pending restore and a key
    left in the keychain.

    v2.2.8

    Toggle v2.2.8's commit message
    jit 2.2.8
    
    A seatbelt profile's `(deny network-outbound)` covers unix-domain sockets,
    so every jit command run from a sandboxed shell was refused the connect to
    agent.sock — and a refused dial looked exactly like an absent listener. jit
    reported a service that was running the whole time as "installed but not
    running", sent the reader to `jit service restart`, and told a sandboxed
    agent it had no grants, which is wrong precisely when one is active. The
    kernel does distinguish the two, so jit does now.
    
    The audit trail had the same shape of problem one layer down: a sandboxed
    caller cannot write the config directory either, so the invocations most
    worth recording were the ones being lost. The record is handed to the
    service, which is already authenticated and already writing there, with the
    direct write kept as the fallback.
    
    - agent: a refused socket is a sandboxed caller, not a stopped service (#154)
    - agent: audit_append, so a sandboxed caller's invocations still reach the
      trail (#154)
    
    This is jit 2.2.7 plus #154; everything in 2.2.7 is included.
    0