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feat(bep): T132 — Name each software key in min auth status - #3466
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HeldKey gains store(), so the published identity can say which proxy keys are software keys in Secret Service (BEP-090).
An identity file an older bep wrote reads with no store (BEP-090).
After the sign-in line, min auth status prints one line for each proxy key that Secret Service holds, read from the published identity (BEP-090).
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Round 1 of 10 on a failed check suite: the coder changed nothing. Revise round 1: the directive lists a failed |
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Marked ready: the owner accepted the three edits outside T132's layers at |
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Approved: no findings at Nothing to do. Verdict APPROVE, posted as a comment: the App cannot review its own pull request; the check and the label carry it. Clobber: none seen. |
…software-key-in-min-auth-status
Only a missing identity file means no proxy published its keys. Any other read failure now prints its reason, so silence never stands for safe custody.
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Round 2 of 10 on the runtime's review findings, pushed as
Verify Outside the task's
Converted to a draft: something above needs a person before review. Review threads the coder judged:
On a Linux desktop with no TPM, Notes from the agent: Revise round 2: only the auth.rs thread was addressed. A missing identity file still prints nothing. Any other read error prints the PublishError message (group-writable or foreign owner, open directory, malformed JSON, I/O). The test now also pins the malformed-file line. The bep test lines were not re-run this round, because no bep file changed. |
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arch-review: PASS · the full ruling
The change conforms to §6.10 line 837, and the ruling on the earlier head stands. The new commit prints the read error when the identity file exists but does not read. Before, min auth status was silent in that case. That silence looked the same as hardware custody. Now only a missing file is silent. No conditions.
Ruled at 8e5dfe2 against gominimal/arch@327e1b57d16b by claude-opus-5-5.
after_replacement compared whole PublishedKey entries, store included. An identity file from an older bep has no store, so a sealing or signing key replacement after an upgrade dropped a valid root certificate. Compare the public key and kid only.
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Round 3 of 10 on the runtime's review findings, pushed as
Verify Outside the task's
Converted to a draft: something above needs a person before review. Review threads the coder judged:
On a Linux desktop with no TPM, Notes from the agent: Revise round 3: the review finding was valid. |
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Every failing check on
Re-run the failed jobs. If the same checks go red again on this head, the next failed suite starts a round; if this red is not the flake, |
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/review |
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Babysitter review of 310d7581 against T132's plan block and test lines. Approve.
- keys:
HeldKey::storedefaults toNone.KeychainKeyreturnskeychain,TpmKeyreturnstpm,SecretServiceKeyreturnssecret-service, andLinuxKeyforwards its inherentstore().each_held_key_names_its_storepins the mixed Linux case (TPM, Secret Service, TPM) and a memory key naming none. - publish:
PublishedKey.storeis#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")], so a file an olderbepwrote reads with no store (pinned).PublishedKey::ofreads the store throughHeldKey::store. Round 3'ssame_keykeeps the root certificate across a store difference.with_root_validityalready compares bykid, so the derivedPartialEqon the new field touches no other decision. - status:
write_statusprints the exact BEP-090 line for each key in Secret Service, after the sign-in line, and nothing for TPM, keychain or no store. A missing file prints nothing. Since round 2, any other read error prints its message. - Out of layers:
store: None,in three test literals, accepted by the owner.
Observation, not blocking: a Secret Service key named by a file from an older bep prints nothing until bep next starts and republishes. Each start publishes the identity, so the window is one upgrade.
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Marked ready again: the owner re-accepted the three one-line |
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arch-review: PASS · the full ruling
The new commit keeps the root certificate when only the published store differs and the root key is the same. That matches the intent in Identity::after_replacement: a certificate stays valid while its root key stays. A different root key still drops the certificate, so the check fails closed. The rest of the change keeps the earlier PASS against Gatehouse §6.10 line 837. No conditions.
Ruled at 310d758 against gominimal/arch@327e1b57d16b by claude-opus-5-5.
T132 — Name each software key in
min auth statusslice: S18
kind: task
covers: BEP-090
size: M
est: 170 code, 200 tests
executor: agent
difficulty: routine
model: standard
diagnostics:
min auth statusprints, after the sign-in line, one line for each proxy key in Secret Service: "The proxy's key is a software key in Secret Service. A program running as your user can copy it.", pinned by auth_status_reports_software_key_custody; it prints nothing for a key in the TPM or the keychainobservability: none:
min auth statusreads a published file and logs nothing, andbeplogs the store of each key at start (T131)layers:
- keys:
- crates/bep/src/keys.rs:
HeldKeygainsstore(&self) -> Option<&'static str>, the name of the store that holds the key, with a default that returnsNone, and the macOSKeychainKeyreturnskeychain- crates/bep/src/tpm.rs:
TpmKeyreturnstpmfromHeldKey::store- crates/bep/src/secret_service.rs:
SecretServiceKeyreturnssecret-servicefromHeldKey::store- crates/bep/src/linux_store.rs:
LinuxKeyreturns the store of the key it holds fromHeldKey::store, as its inherentstore()names ittest: cargo nextest run -p bep each_held_key_names_its_store
- publish:
- crates/bep/src/publish.rs:
PublishedKeycarries the store that holds the key (keychain,tpmorsecret-service), read throughHeldKey::store, and an identity file an olderbepwrote reads with no storetest: cargo nextest run -p bep the_published_identity_names_each_key_store
- status:
- crates/minimal/src/cmd/auth.rs:
write_statusreads the published identity at~/.minimal/bep/identity.jsonand prints the line above for each key in Secret Servicetest: cargo nextest run -p minimal auth_status_reports_software_key_custody
produces: none
consumes:
- crates/bep/src/linux_store.rs
proof: On a Linux desktop with no TPM,
min auth statusnames each proxy key held in Secret Service as a software key that a program running as the user can copy.depends on:
- blocked by #3327
Proof
On a Linux host with no TPM,
min auth statusprints the sign-in line and then one line for each proxy key in Secret Service, for example "The proxy's sealing key is a software key in Secret Service. A program running as your user can copy it." A key in the TPM or the keychain prints no line. The proxy writes the store of each key to ~/.minimal/bep/identity.json, andmin auth statusreads it from there.Notes from the agent: Outside the layers: crates/minimal/src/mint.rs, crates/minimal/src/tests.rs and crates/minimal/src/cmd/boxes/create.rs each get
store: Nonein a test-onlyPublishedKeystruct literal. Without it, the new field stops the minimal test build from compiling.write_statusnow takes the identity path as an argument. The existing tests passNone. The key lines also print after the "Not signed in" line, because the proxy keys do not depend on the sign-in. A missing or unreadable identity file prints no key line. An identity file that an olderbepwrote has nostore, so it prints no key line untilbeppublishes again. The TpmKey store is a constant. No test builds a real TpmKey, so linux_store tests cover thetpmname through LinuxKey. The macOS KeychainKeystorewas not compiled on this Linux box. The printed line is the exact text from the task's diagnostics line. It passes the printed-text rule.cargo clippy -p bep -p minimal --all-targetsis clean.Tests
cargo nextest run -p bep each_held_key_names_its_storecargo nextest run -p bep the_published_identity_names_each_key_storecargo nextest run -p minimal auth_status_reports_software_key_custodyVerify
min task run agent-verifyexited 100, so this PR is a draft.Out of scope
These files are outside the task's
layers:, so this PR is a draft:crates/minimal/src/cmd/boxes/create.rscrates/minimal/src/mint.rscrates/minimal/src/tests.rsCloses #3328