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nstun: reject unspecified SOCKS5 UDP relay endpoints - #396
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Summary
Reject successful IPv4 SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE replies whose advertised relay address is unspecified (
0.0.0.0) or whose relay port is zero. Validate the reply before allocating the UDP socket or draining queued guest datagrams, and use the existing association teardown on rejection.Concrete relay endpoints remain supported, including explicit loopback, a relay IP distinct from the TCP proxy IP, and IPv4 relay transport for IPv6 guest destinations.
Reason for the guard
At baseline commit
d1d9af34c61daf834b843d58100a108c7cc2c574, the negotiated IPv4 relay address and port were copied unchanged into latersendto()destinations. In a separate Linux 6.18.57 loopback-only namespace experiment,sendto()to0.0.0.0reached an owned listener bound to127.0.0.1;IP_PKTINFOreported127.0.0.1as destination. That experiment motivates validating a successful server reply rather than relying on platform routing behavior.Scope: This is endpoint/input hardening. The experiment did not establish unauthorized host-service access, guest control of the configured SOCKS proxy, a jail-boundary violation, or a sandbox escape.
Regression evidence
Not verified: Five namespace-dependent checks were blocked identically on baseline and patched builds: four failed with
EPERMwriting child UID maps and one failed withEPERMmounting tmpfs. They are environmental blocks, not passing tests. Public-network checks in the broadermake testtarget were not run. PR-level hosted CI is pending.Compatibility and upstream overlap
0.0.0.0as shorthand for its UDP relay must instead return a concrete reachable address; a zero reply port is also rejected.127.0.0.1, a separate loopback relay, and a relay IP different from the TCP proxy IP remain valid.Proposed against upstream master as a narrowly scoped guard with an accompanying relay regression harness. Author and committer: David Boyd. Commit:
af73faf905f1dad34c63531e4f3afb92249a1f2b.