Russia in Global Affairs

BRICS must be based on ‘soft institutionalization,’ seeking not a unified alliance, but a flexible multi-level structure.

The current volatile period gives Russia a chance to decisively move towards its policy of maintaining the closest possible relations with each of the two Koreas, separately.

The name Asia might be a misnomer by Ancient Greeks’ standards, but the homogenous nature of this area is quite visible.

The last thing anyone in Asia would be interested in is self-reflection and ambivalence inherent in the Russian socio-political consciousness, and our discussions of value or civilizational imperatives. People in the Asia-Pacific region respect effectiveness, the ability to achieve goals, consistency and perseverance.

The North Korean issue has become an irritant not only in relations between “continental” and “oceanic” powers, but also within each of the camps and specifically between the United States and South Korea, and Russia and China.

The BRICS can serve as a locomotive for Russia’s geopolitical rise in the 21st century. This development will not necessarily imply a deterioration of relations with the West, which would be almost inevitable if Moscow were to face it alone.

When Goldman Sachs’ economist James O'Neill invented the abbreviation BRIC(S) in 2002, he referred to promising investment markets. BRICS today can’t be treated narrowly as a set of emerging economies, the global economy’s "semi-periphery"?— those views are from the last decade.

It would be counter-productive for Russia to quarrel with its neighbor, let alone to press for its downfall, no matter how much the public might not agree. The bloodshed and misery that the unification of Korea in this way would entail will hardly be excused by North Korea’s far-off future prosperity, or even by Russia’s cooperation with a friendly, neutral and influential country.

Russia has a chance of getting an attractive niche in Northeast Asian affairs now – peacefully, without irritating its partners and avoiding considerable costs. The Russian position in the region may in some measure resemble (although with a much smaller military element) the one that Russia had in post-Versailles Europe, when the absence of conflicts with other major players allowed it to play a balancing role.